THE EVACUATION OF ELBA.--NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISH
FRIGATES.--BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.--NELSON PROMOTED TO
REAR-ADMIRAL.--SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ.
DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797. AGE, 38.
"When we quitted Toulon," wrote Nelson to his old captain, Locker,
while on the passage to Gibraltar, "I remember we endeavoured to
reconcile ourselves to Corsica; now we are content with Elba--such
things are." Even this small foothold was next to be resigned. Upon
reaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders from the Admiralty to
evacuate the island.
This was the duty upon which Nelson was so soon despatched again to
the Mediterranean. Though "most important," wrote he to his wife, "it
is not a fighting mission, therefore be not uneasy." The assurance was
doubtless honestly given, but scarcely to be implicitly accepted in
view of his past career. Leaving the admiral on the evening of
December 14, with the frigates "Blanche" and "Minerve," his
commodore's pendant flying in the latter, the two vessels, about 11
p.m. of the 19th, encountered two Spanish frigates close to Cartagena.
The enemies pairing off, a double action ensued, which, in the case of
the "Minerve," ended in the surrender of her opponent, "La Sabina," at
half-past one in the morning. Throwing a prize-crew on board, the
British ship took her late antagonist in tow and stood away to the
southeast. At half-past three another Spanish frigate came up, and, in
order to meet this fresh enemy on fairly equal terms, the "Minerve"
had to drop her prize. The second fight began at 4.30, and lasted
half an hour, when the Spaniard hauled off. With daylight appeared
also two hostile ships-of-the-line, which had been chasing towards the
sound of the guns. These had already been seen by the "Blanche," which
was by them prevented from taking possession of her antagonist, after
the latter struck. The pursuit lasted through the day, the "Minerve"
being hard pressed in consequence of the injuries received by all her
masts during the engagement; but both British frigates succeeded in
shaking off their pursuers. "La Sabina" was recaptured; she had
already lost one mast, and the remaining two were seen to go over the
side as she was bringing-to, when the enemy overtook her. It is
interesting to note that her captain, Don Jacobo Stuart, was descended
from the British royal house of Stuart. He, with many of his crew, had
been transferred to the "Minerve," and remained prisoners.
Nelson reached Porto Ferrajo a week later, on the 26th of December.
"On my arrival here," wrote he to his brother, "it was a ball night,
and being attended by the captains, I was received in due form by the
General, and one particular tune was played:[41] the second was 'Rule
Britannia.' From Italy I am loaded with compliments." Having regard to
comparative strength, the action was in all respects most creditable,
but it received additional lustre from being fought close to the
enemy's coast, and in full view of a force so superior as that from
which escape had been handsomely made, under conditions requiring both
steadiness and skill. Though on a small scale, no such fair stand-up
fight had been won in the Mediterranean during the war, and the
resultant exultation was heightened by its contrast with the general
depression then weighing upon the British cause. Especially keen and
warmly expressed was the satisfaction of the veteran
commander-in-chief at Lisbon, who first learned the success of his
valued subordinate through Spanish sources. "I cannot express to you,
and Captain Cockburn, the feelings I underwent on the receipt of the
enclosed bulletin, the truth of which I cannot doubt, as far as
relates to your glorious achievement in the capture of the Sabina, and
dignified retreat from the line-of-battle ship, which deprived you of
your well-earned trophy; your laurels were not then within their
grasp, and can never fade."
General De Burgh, who commanded the troops in Elba, had received no
instructions to quit the island, and felt uncertain about his course,
in view of the navy's approaching departure. Nelson's orders were
perfectly clear, but applied only to the naval establishment. He
recognized the general's difficulty, though he seems to have thought
that, under all the circumstances, he might very well have acted upon
his own expressed opinion, that "the signing of a Neapolitan peace
with France ought to be our signal for departure." "The army," wrote
Nelson to the First Lord of the Admiralty, "are not so often called
upon to exercise their judgment in political measures as we are;
therefore the general feels a certain diffidence." He told De Burgh
that, the King of Naples having made peace, Jervis considered his
business with the courts of Italy as terminated; that the Admiralty's
orders were to concentrate the effort of the fleet upon preventing the
allied fleets from quitting the Mediterranean, and upon the defence of
Portugal, invaluable to the British as a base of naval operations. For
these reasons, even if he had to leave the land forces in Elba, he
should have no hesitation in following his instructions, which were to
withdraw all naval belongings. "I have sent to collect my squadron,
and as soon as they arrive, I shall offer myself for embarking the
troops, stores, &c.; and should you decline quitting this post, I
shall proceed down the Mediterranean with such ships of war as are not
absolutely wanted for keeping open the communication of Elba with the
Continent."
The necessary preparations went on apace. Vessels were sent out to
summon the scattered cruisers to the port. A frigate was despatched to
Naples to bring back Sir Gilbert Elliot, the late Viceroy of Corsica,
who, since the abandonment of the latter island, had been on a
diplomatic visit to Rome and Naples. It is to this incident that we
owe the fullest account transmitted of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent;
the narrator, Colonel Drinkwater, being then a member of the Viceroy's
suite, and attending him upon his return with Nelson's squadron. The
Spanish prisoners were sent to Cartagena in a cartel, Nelson restoring
to the captain of the "Sabina" the sword which he had surrendered. "I
felt this consonant to the dignity of my Country, and I always act as
I feel right, without regard to custom." By the 16th of January all
the naval establishment was embarked, ready for departure, though some
of the ships of war had not yet returned, nor had the Viceroy arrived.
The delay allowed the "Minerve" to be completely refitted, two of her
masts and most of her rigging having to be renewed.
When Elliot came, it was decided in a consultation between him,
Nelson, and De Burgh, that the troops should remain. The transports
had been completely victualled, and so prepared that every soldier
could be embarked in three days. With them were left two frigates and
a few smaller ships of war. On the 29th of January, Nelson sailed with
the rest of his force and the convoy, divided into three sections,
which proceeded for the Straits by different routes, to diminish the
chances of total loss by capture. Nelson himself, with another
frigate, the "Romulus," in company, intended to make a round of the
enemy's ports, in order to bring the admiral the latest information of
the number of ships in each, and their state of preparation. "I hope
to arrive safe in Lisbon with my charge," he wrote to his wife on the
eve of sailing, "but in war much is left to Providence: however, as I
have hitherto been most successful, confidence tells me I shall not
fail: and as nothing will be left undone by me, should I not always
succeed, my mind will not suffer; nor will the world, I trust, be
willing to attach blame, where my heart tells me none would be due."
The habit of taking risks had wrought its beneficial influence upon
mind and temper, when he thus calmly and simply reasoned from the
experience of the past to the prospective fortnight, to be passed in
sight of a hostile coast, and in waters where he could meet no
friendly sail. "It has ever pleased Almighty God to give his blessing
to my endeavours," was his New Year greeting to his father at this
time.
During this month in Elba a slight political reference shows how his
views and purpose were changing with the rapidly shifting political
scene. In this hour of deepening adversity he no longer looks for
peace, nor seeks the reason for the current war, which a few months
before he had failed to find. "As to peace, I do not expect it; Lord
Malmesbury will come back as he went. But the people of England will,
I trust, be more vigorous for the prosecution of the war, which can
alone insure an honourable peace."
The "Minerve" and the "Romulus" looked first into the old British
anchorage in San Fiorenzo Bay, which was found deserted. Standing
thence to Toulon, they remained forty-eight hours off that port, in
which were to be seen no ships in condition for sailing. From there
they passed off Barcelona, showing French colors, but without
succeeding in drawing out any vessel there lying. The wind not being
fair for Minorca, where Nelson had purposed to reconnoitre Port Mahon,
the frigates next went to Cartagena, and ascertained that the great
Spanish fleet was certainly not there. As Toulon also had been found
empty, it seemed clear that it had gone to the westward, the more so
as the most probable information indicated that the naval enterprises
of the French and their allies at that time were to be outside of the
Mediterranean. Nelson therefore pushed ahead, and on the 9th of
February the "Minerve" and "Romulus" anchored in Gibraltar. All three
divisions from Elba passed the Straits within the same forty-eight
hours.
The Spanish grand fleet had been seen from the Rock, four days before,
standing to the westward into the Atlantic. Two ships-of-the-line and
a frigate had been detached from it, with supplies for the Spanish
lines before Gibraltar, and had anchored at the head of the bay, where
they still were when Nelson arrived. On board them had also been sent
the two British lieutenants and the seamen, who became prisoners when
the "Sabina" was recaptured. Their exchange was effected, for which
alone Nelson was willing to wait. The fact that the Spanish fleet had
gone towards Jervis's rendezvous, and the continuance of easterly
winds, which would tend to drive them still farther in the same
direction, gave him uneasy premonitions of that coming battle which it
would "break his heart" to miss. It was, besides, part of his
ingrained military philosophy, never absent from his careful mind,
that a fair wind may fall or shift. "The object of a sea-officer is to
embrace the happy moment which now and then offers,--it may be to-day,
it may be never." Regretting at this moment the loss even of a tide,
entailed by the engagements of the Viceroy, whom he had to carry to
Jervis, and therefore could not leave, he wrote, "I fear a _westerly_
wind." The Providence in which he so often expresses his reliance, now
as on many other occasions, did not forsake the favored son, who never
by sluggishness or presumption lost his opportunities. The wind held
fair until the 13th of February, when Nelson rejoined the
commander-in-chief. That night it shifted to the westward, and the
following day was fought the Battle of Cape St. Vincent.
Taken in its entirety, the episode of this nearly forgotten mission to
Elba is singularly characteristic, not only of Nelson's own qualities,
but also of those concurrences which, whatever the origin attributed
to them by this or that person, impress upon a man's career the stamp
of "fortunate." An errand purely of evasion, not in itself of prime
importance, but for an object essentially secondary, it results in a
night combat of unusual brilliancy, which would probably not have been
fought at all could the British have seen the overwhelming force ready
to descend upon conqueror and conquered alike. With every spar
wounded, and a hostile fleet in sight, the "Minerve" nevertheless
makes good her retreat. Solitary, in an enemy's sea, she roams it with
premeditated deliberateness, escaping molestation, and, except in the
first instance, even detection. She carries the fortunes of a Caesar
yet unknown, who is ready to stake them at any moment for adequate
cause; but everything works together, not merely for his preservation,
but to bring him up just in time for the exceptional action, which
showed there was more to him than even his untiring energy and
fearlessness had so far demonstrated. As when, in later years, burning
anxiety pressed him to hasten after Villeneuve, yet failed so to
discompose him as to cause the neglect of any preparation essential to
due provision for the abandoned Mediterranean; so now, with every
power at highest tension to rejoin the admiral, eager not to waste a
moment, he mars his diligence by no precipitancy, he grudges no hour
necessary to the rounded completion of the present task,--to see, and
know, and do, all that can be seen and done. He might almost have used
again, literally, the expression before quoted: "I have not a thought
on any subject separated from the immediate object of my command."
Leaving the "Romulus" in Gibraltar, the "Minerve" sailed again on the
11th. The Spanish ships-of-the-line followed her at once. The east
wind blows in wild and irregular puffs upon the anchorages immediately
under the lofty Rock, where the frigate lay. Farther up, where the
Spaniards were, it crosses the low neck joining the peninsula to the
mainland, and is there more equable and more constant. The "Minerve"
was consequently at a disadvantage until she got fairly from under its
lee, and the chase through the Straits became close enough to draw the
idlers of the town and garrison in crowds to the hillsides. It soon
became evident that the leading ship-of-the-line was gaining upon the
frigate, and the latter cleared for action. Nelson had but a poor
opinion of the Spanish navy of his day, and doubtless chose, before
surrendering, to take his chance of one of those risks which in war
often give strange results. He said to Drinkwater that he thought an
engagement probable, but added, "Before the Dons get hold of that bit
of bunting I will have a struggle with them, and sooner than give up
the frigate, I'll run her ashore."
About this time the officers' dinner was announced. Drinkwater went
below, and was just congratulating Lieutenant Hardy, who had been
captured in the "Sabina," upon his exchange, when the cry "Man
overboard!" was heard. The party dispersed hurriedly, in sympathy with
the impulse which invariably causes a rush under such circumstances;
and Drinkwater, running to the stern windows, saw a boat already
lowering with Hardy in it, to recover the man, who, however, could not
be found. The boat therefore, making signal to that effect, soon
turned to pull to the ship. The situation was extremely embarrassing,
not to say critical; on the one hand, the natural reluctance to
abandon any one or anything to the enemy, on the other, the imminent
risk of sacrificing the ship and all concerned by any delay,--for the
leading Spaniard, by himself far superior in force, was nearly within
gunshot. Temperament and habit decide, in questions where reason has
little time and less certainty upon which to act; by nature and
experience Nelson was inclined to take risks. It was evident the boat
could not overtake the frigate unless the latter's way was lessened,
and each moment that passed made this step more perilous, as the
pursuer was already overhauling the "Minerve." "By God, I'll not lose
Hardy!" he exclaimed; "back the mizzen-topsail." The ship's speed
being thus checked, the boat came alongside, and the party scrambled
on board. Singularly enough, the enemy, disconcerted by Nelson's
action, stopped also, to allow his consort to come up,--a measure
wholly inexcusable, and only to be accounted for by that singular
moral effect produced in many men by a sudden and unexpected
occurrence. The daring deed had therefore the happiest results of a
stratagem, and the frigate was troubled no further.
Steering that night to the southward, to throw off her pursuers, the
"Minerve" found herself unexpectedly in the midst of a fleet, which,
from the signals made, was evidently not that of Jervis, and therefore
must be hostile. The hazy atmosphere veiled the British frigate from
close observation, and, by conforming her movements to those of the
strangers, she escaped suspicion. Nelson was uncertain whether it was
the Spanish grand fleet, or, possibly, a detached body proceeding to
the West Indies. He had heard a rumor of such an expedition, and the
impression was probably confirmed by these ships being met when
steering southerly from the Straits; Cadiz, the known destination of
the grand fleet, being north. As the British commercial interests in
the Caribbean were of the first importance, and would be much
endangered, he told Drinkwater, who lay awake in his cot, that, if he
became convinced the ships in sight were bound there, he should give
up the attempt to join the commander-in-chief, and should start at
once for the Islands, to forewarn them of the approaching danger. The
colonel was naturally startled at the prospect of an involuntary trip
across the Atlantic, and represented the equally urgent necessity--as
he thought--of Jervis and the British Cabinet getting the information,
which Elliot was bringing, of the views and intentions of the Italian
governments. This Nelson admitted, but replied that he thought the
other consideration greater, and that--the condition arising--he must
do as he had said. The incident illustrates the activity of his mind,
in comprehending instantly the singular opportunity thrust
unexpectedly upon him, as well as the readiness to accept
responsibility and to follow his own judgment, which he showed on so
many other occasions, both before and after this.
Later in the night the hostile ships went about, evidencing thereby a
desire to keep to windward, which pointed much more toward Cadiz than
to any western destination. The "Minerve" imitated them, but altered
her course so as to edge away gradually from her dangerous neighbors.
Nelson, some time after, again entered the cabin, and told Drinkwater
and Elliot, the latter having also waked, that he had got clear of the
enemy, but that at daylight the course would be altered so as to sight
them once more, if they were really going west. Should it prove to be
so, they must make up their minds to visit the West Indies. Nothing,
however, being seen during the 12th, the commodore, satisfied at last
that he had been in the midst of the grand fleet, hastened on, and
towards noon of the 13th joined the admiral. Before doing so, some of
the Spaniards were again sighted. They had been seen also by the
regular British lookouts, one at least of which had kept touch with
them through the preceding days of hazy weather. Nelson, after an
interview with Jervis, went on board the "Captain," where his broad
pendant was again hoisted at 6 P.M.
At daybreak, the position of the two fleets was twenty-five miles west
of Cape St. Vincent, a headland on the Portuguese coast, a hundred and
fifty miles northwest of Cadiz. During the night the wind had shifted
from the eastward to west by south, and, being now fair, the Spaniards
were running for their port, heading about east-southeast; but they
were in disorder, and were divided into two principal fragments, of
which the headmost, and therefore leewardmost, numbered six ships. It
was separated from the other division of twenty-one by a space of six
or eight miles. In the whole force, of twenty-seven ships, there were
seven of three decks, the least of which carried one hundred and
twelve guns; the remainder were principally seventy-fours, there
being, however, one of eighty-four guns. Jervis's fleet consisted of
fifteen ships-of-the-line,--two of one hundred guns, four of
ninety-eight or ninety, eight seventy-fours, and one sixty-four. From
the intelligence received the previous day of the enemy's proximity,
the admiral kept the command throughout the night in two columns, in
close order, a formation suited by its compactness to a hazy night,
and at the same time manageable in case of encountering an enemy
suddenly. The course was south by west, almost perpendicular to that
of the Spaniards. The two fleets were thus running, one from the
westward, and the other from the northward, to a common crossing.[42]
At daylight the enemy's fleet was partly visible to the leading ships
of the British columns. As the morning advanced, and the situation
developed, it was seen that the Spanish line was long and straggling,
and the gap began to show. As the British were heading directly
towards it, Jervis ordered a half-dozen of his ships, which were all
still under moderate canvas, to press on and interpose between the
enemy's divisions. An hour or so later he made the signal to form the
single column, which was the usual fighting order of those days. The
fleet being already properly disposed for manoeuvres, this change of
order was effected, to use his own words, "with the utmost celerity."
Nelson's ship was thirteenth in the new order, therefore nearly the
last. Next after him came the sixty-four, the "Diadem," while
Collingwood, in the "Excellent," brought up the rear. Immediately
ahead of Nelson was the "Barfleur," carrying the flag of one of the
junior admirals, to whom naturally fell the command in that part of
the line.
Three of the larger Spanish body succeeded in crossing ahead of the
British column and joining the lee group, thus raised to nine ships.
No others were able to effect this, the headmost British ships
anticipating them in the gap. Jervis's plan was to pass between their
two divisions with his one column, protracting this separation, then
to go about in succession and attack the eighteen to windward, because
their comrades to leeward could not help them in any short time. This
was done. The lee ships did attempt to join those to windward by
breaking through the British order, but were so roughly handled that
they gave it up and continued to the south-southwest, hoping to gain a
better opportunity. The weather ships, on the other hand, finding they
could not pass, steered to the northward,--nearly parallel, but
opposite, to the course which both the British and their own lee group
were then following.
A heavy cannonade now ensued, each British ship engaging as its
batteries came to bear, through the advance of the column to the
south-southwest. After an hour of this, the admiral made the signal to
tack in succession. This was instantly obeyed by the leader, the
"Culloden," which was expecting it, and each following ship tacked
also as it reached the same point. But as the Spaniards were
continually receding from this point, which the British rear was
approaching, it was evident that in time the latter would leave
uncovered the ground that had so far separated the two hostile
divisions. This the Spanish admiral expected to be his opportunity; it
proved to be Nelson's.
At 1 P.M.,[43] by Nelson's journal, the "Captain," standing south by
west, had come abreast the rearmost of the eighteen weather ships,
having passed the others. He then noticed that the leaders of that
body were bearing up before the wind, to the eastward, to cross behind
the British column. If this were carried out unmolested, they could
join the lee ships, which heretofore had been separated from them by
the centre and rear of the British line, and at this moment were not
very far distant, being still engaged with the British centre; or
else, so Nelson thought, they might fly before the wind, making
ineffective all that had been done so far. "To prevent either of their
schemes from taking effect, I ordered the ship to be wore, and passing
between the Diadem and Excellent, at a quarter past one o'clock, was
engaged with the headmost, and of course leewardmost of the Spanish
division. The ships which I know were, the Santissima Trinidad, 126;
San Josef, 112;[1] Salvador del Mundo, 112;[1] San Nicolas, 80;[44]
another first-rate, and seventy-four, names not known. I was
immediately joined and most nobly supported by the Culloden, Captain
Troubridge. The Spanish fleet,[45] from not wishing (I suppose) to
have a decisive battle, hauled to the wind [again] on the larboard
tack, which brought the ships afore-mentioned to be the leewardmost
and sternmost ships in their fleet."
By this spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority, by
signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick perceptions,
Nelson entirely defeated the Spanish movement. Devoting his own ship
to a most unequal contest, he gained time for the approaching British
van to come up, and carry on the work they had already begun when
first passing these ships--before the moment of tacking. The British
column being then in a V shape,--part on one tack, part on the other,
the point of the V being that of tacking,--he hastened across, by a
short cut, from the rear of one arm of the V to a position on the
other side, toward which the van was advancing, but which it, being
more distant, could not reach as soon as he, and therefore not to as
good effect. To quote Jervis's words concerning this incident,
"Commodore Nelson, who was in the rear on the starboard tack, _took
the lead_ on the larboard, and contributed very much to the fortune of
the day." On the intellectual side, the side of skill, this is what he
did; on the side of valor, it is to be said that he did it for the
moment single-handed. The "Culloden," the actual leader, came up
shortly, followed afterwards by the "Blenheim;" and the "Excellent"
was ordered by Jervis to imitate Nelson's movement, and strengthen the
operation which he had initiated. It was the concentration of these
ships at the point which Nelson seized, and for a moment held alone,
that decided the day; and it was there that the fruits of victory were
chiefly reaped.
It must not be understood, of course, that all the honors of the day
are to be claimed for Nelson, even conjointly with those present with
him at the crucial moment. Much was done, both before and after, which
contributed materially to the aggregate results, some of which were
missed by the very reluctance of men of solid military qualities to
desist from seeking enemies still valid, in order to enjoy what Nelson
called the "parade of taking possession of beaten enemies." It seems
probable that more Spanish ships might have been secured, had it not
been for the eagerness of some British vessels to push on to new
combats. But, while fully allowing the merits of many others, from the
commander-in-chief down, it is true of St. Vincent, as of most
battles, that there was a particular moment on which success or
failure hinged, and that upon the action then taken depended the chief
outcome,--a decisive moment, in short. That moment was when the enemy
attempted, with good prospect, to effect the junction which Nelson
foiled. As Collingwood afterwards summed up the matter: "The highest
rewards are due to you and Culloden; you formed the plan of
attack,--we were only accessories to the Dons' ruin; for had they got
on the other tack, they would have been sooner joined, and the
business would have been less complete."
When Collingwood came up with the "Excellent," the "Captain" was
practically disabled for further movement, had lost heavily in men,
and was without immediate support. The "Culloden" had dropped astern,
crippled, as had two of the Spanish vessels; the "Blenheim," after
passing the "Culloden" and the "Captain," between them and the enemy,
had drawn ahead. The "Excellent," steering between the two Spanish
ships that had fallen behind, fired into both of them, and Nelson
thought both then struck; but Collingwood did not stop to secure them.
"Captain Collingwood," says Nelson, in his account, "disdaining the
parade of taking possession of beaten enemies, most gallantly pushed
up, with every sail set, to save his old friend and messmate, who was
to appearance in a critical state. The Excellent ranged up within ten
feet of the San Nicolas, giving a most tremendous fire. The San
Nicolas luffing up, the San Josef fell on board her, and the Excellent
passing on for the Santissima Trinidad, the Captain resumed[46] her
situation abreast of them, and close alongside. At this time the
Captain having lost her fore-topmast, not a sail, shroud,[47] or rope
left, her wheel shot away, and incapable of further service in the
line, or in chase, I directed Captain Miller to put the helm
a-starboard, and calling for the boarders, ordered them to board."[48]
The "Captain" fetched alongside of the "San Nicolas," her bow touching
the lee (starboard) quarter of the Spanish vessel, her spritsail yard
hooking in the other's mizzen shrouds. Commander Berry, a very young
man, who had lately been first lieutenant of the "Captain," leaped
actively into the mizzen chains, the first on board the enemy; he was
quickly supported by others, who passed over by the spritsail yard.
The captain of the ship was in the act of following, at the head of
his men, when Nelson stopped him. "No, Miller," he said, "_I_ must
have that honour;" and he directed him to remain. One of the soldiers
of the Sixty-ninth Regiment, who were serving on board as marines,
broke open the upper quarter-gallery window of the "San Nicolas," and
through this Nelson entered, with a crowd of followers, to find
himself in the cabin of the enemy's ship. The doors being fastened,
they were held there a few moments, while Spanish officers from the
quarter-deck discharged their pistols at them; but the doors were soon
broken down, and the party, after firing a volley, sallied on the spar
deck, which the enemy yielded to them,--a Spanish commodore falling by
the wheel as he retreated. Berry had by this time reached the poop,
where he hauled down the colors, while Nelson passed to the forward
part of the ship, meeting on his way several Spanish officers, who,
being by this time in the hands of British seamen, gave up to him
their swords. The Spanish guns on the lower decks still continued
firing for some moments, apparently at the "Prince George," which had
passed to leeward of the "Captain," and now kept her batteries playing
upon the hull of the "San Nicolas" forward of the part where the
"Captain" touched her.
At this moment a small-arm fire was opened from the stern galleries of
the "San Josef" upon the British party in the "San Nicolas." Nelson
caused the soldiers to reply to it, and ordered reinforcements sent to
him from the "Captain." Parties were stationed at the hatchways of the
"San Nicolas" to control the enemy and keep them below decks, and then
the boarders charged again for the Spanish three-decker. Nelson was
helped by Berry into her main chains; but he had got no farther before
a Spanish officer put his head over the rail and said they
surrendered. "From this most welcome information," continues Nelson,
in his narrative, "it was not long before I was on the quarter-deck,
when the Spanish captain, with a bow, presented me his sword, and said
the admiral was dying of his wounds below. I asked him, on his honour,
if the ship were surrendered? he declared she was; on which I gave him
my hand, and desired him to call to his officers and ship's company,
and tell them of it--which he did; and on the quarter-deck of a
Spanish First-rate, extravagant as the story may seem, did I receive
the swords of vanquished Spaniards; which, as I received, I gave to
William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who put them with the greatest
sangfroid under his arm. I was surrounded by Captain Berry, Lieutenant
Pierson, 69th Regiment, John Sykes, John Thomson, Francis Cook, all
old Agamemnons, and several other brave men, seamen and soldiers: thus
fell these ships." The firing from the lower deck of the "San Nicolas"
was by this time stopped, and the "Prince George" was hailed that both
the enemy's vessels were in possession of the British. The "Victory,"
Jervis's flagship, passed a few moments later and cheered, as did
every ship in the fleet.
The dramatic and picturesque surroundings which colored the seizure of
these two Spanish ships have doubtless given an exaggerated idea of
the danger and difficulty attending the exploit. The impression made
upon a sympathetic and enthusiastic eye-witness, Sir Gilbert Elliot,
who saw the affair from the decks of the frigate "Lively," has been
transmitted to posterity with little diminution. "Nothing in the world
was ever more noble than the transaction of the Captain from beginning
to end, and the glorious group of your ship and her two prizes, fast
in your gripe, was never surpassed, and I dare say never will." Yet it
may better be looked upon as another of those "fortunate" occurrences
which attend--and in Nelson's career repeatedly attended--the happy
meeting of opportunity and readiness. Doubtless they were beaten
ships, but other beaten ships have escaped in general actions--did at
St. Vincent. "I pretend not to say," wrote Nelson a week later, "that
these ships might not have fell, had I not boarded them; but truly it
was far from impossible but they might have forged into the Spanish
fleet as the other two ships did." He was there, he could do nothing
else, he saw with his rapid glance that he might do this, and he did
it. And, after all, it was a big thing,--this boarding a first-rate
ship over the decks of another hostile ship, not inaptly characterized
in the fleet as "Nelson's patent bridge." We must mark, too, or we
shall miss significant indications of character, that the same
qualities which led him to the quarter-deck of the "San Josef" had led
him but an hour before from the rear of the fleet to the van to save
the fight,--the same quickness to see opportunity, the same promptness
to seize it, the same audacity to control it. The brilliant crowning
of the day may be but an ornament, but it sits well and fitly upon the
knightly deed that rolled back the tide of battle in the hour of need.
Those Spanish ships of the weather division which were first
encountered by Nelson, after he wore out of the line, bore the brunt
of the fighting. As the whole division continued to stand on close to
the wind, these ships, becoming crippled, dropped astern of their
consorts, and so first received the broadsides of the British van as
that arrived. Being also the leaders in the movement frustrated by
Nelson, they became the most leewardly; and, as the British van on
coming up passed to leeward, this contributed farther to concentrate
fire upon the same vessels. Among them was the "Santisima Trinidad,"
of four decks and one hundred and thirty guns, then the largest ship
of war in the world. When Collingwood passed ahead of Nelson, he
engaged her, but not as near as he wished, and could have done, had
not the "Excellent's" rigging been so cut as to prevent her hauling
close to the wind. She was also brought to action by Sir James
Saumarez, in the "Orion," and towards the close of her contest with
the latter ship showed a British Union Jack,--a token of submission
possibly unauthorized, as it was almost immediately hauled in again.
Besides those boarded by Nelson, two other enemy's ships had already
struck.
It was now after four o'clock, and the other Spanish division, of
eight ships, was heading for the scene and near at hand. Although
effectually blocked in their first attempt to pierce the British line,
these had not received such injury as to detract seriously from their
efficiency. Continuing to stand south-southwest, after the British
began tacking, they at last gained ground sufficiently to come up to
windward, the side on which their other division was. In view of the
now inevitable junction of a great number of comparatively fresh
ships, and of the casualties in his own vessels, Jervis decided to
discontinue the action. He ordered his fleet to form on the starboard
tack, covering the four prizes and the "Captain;" and with this done
the firing soon ceased. The Spanish divisions united, and carried off
their other disabled ships.
Nelson's account of the proceedings of the "Captain" on the 14th of
February, having been published not long afterwards, apparently by his
authority, was challenged as incorrect by Vice-Admiral William Parker,
commanding the van, whose flag was on board the third British ship,
the "Prince George." Parker claimed that the latter, with the
"Blenheim" and "Orion," had been much closer to the "Captain" and
"Culloden" than was implied in Nelson's narrative by the words, "For
near an hour, I believe, (but do not pretend to be correct as to
time,) did the Culloden and Captain support this apparently, but not
really, unequal contest; when the Blenheim, passing between us and the
enemy, gave us a respite." Parker labored under the misfortune of a
singularly involved and obscure style, while in two separate papers he
contradicted himself more than once on points of detail; but the tone
of his letter to Nelson was temperate and dignified, and he asserted
that, "so different to your statement, very soon after you commenced
your fire, you had four ships pressing on [Culloden, Blenheim, Prince
George, and Orion], almost on board of each other, close in your rear;
but"--and the admission following must be noted as well as the
charge--"ships thus pressing upon each other, and the _two latter not
far enough ahead to fire with proper effect_,[49] besides having none
of the enemy's ships left in the rear for our succeeding ships, at
forty-three[50] minutes past one I made the signal to fill and stand
on." Parker had also stated, in his log of the action, that the brunt
fell upon the "Captain," the "Culloden," and the "Blenheim," but more
particularly the two former, "from their being more in the van."
It appears to the writer probable that Nelson over-estimated the
period that he and Troubridge remained unsupported; time would seem
long to the bravest man, when opposed to such heavy odds. Parker seems
to have reckoned it to be about fifteen minutes, and he admits that it
was impossible for him to open fire with proper effect for some time,
although close on the heels of the "Captain" and the "Culloden,"
because he could not get abreast of the enemy. All the ships--Spanish
and British--were moving ahead, probably at not very different rates
of speed. The "Prince George" certainly became in the end actively and
closely engaged, much of the time with the "San Josef," a ship of
force superior to her own.
Nelson's account is a simple, if somewhat exultant, narrative of the
facts as they passed under his observation; and, except in the
statement to which Parker objected, they do not even inferentially
carry an imputation upon any one else. There was a reflection, though
scarcely intended, upon the van ships, which should have been, and
Parker says were, close behind the "Culloden;" but the attack was upon
the extreme rear of the enemy, and Nelson probably forgot that readers
might not understand, as he did, that the ships behind him must need
some time to get up, and that his own position, abreast the enemy's
rear, was in itself an obstacle to their reaching a place whence their
batteries could bear, with the limited train of broadside guns in
those days.
Another and interesting illustration of the injustice a man may thus
unintentionally do, through inadvertence, is afforded by Nelson's
accounts of St. Vincent. There were two drawn up on board the
"Captain,"--one by himself in his own hand; the second simply signed
by him, Miller, and Berry. It is quite evident that the latter is
based upon the former, much of the phraseology being identical; but
the whole is toned down in many points. The instance of unintentional
injustice is this. In his autograph account, Nelson, thinking only of
himself,[51] speaks of his going with the boarders, and makes no
mention of the captain of the ship, Miller, whose proper business it
would be rather than his. In the revision, Miller would naturally feel
that his failure to board should be accounted for, and it contains
accordingly the statement, "Captain Miller was in the very act of
going also, but I directed him to remain." Berry's hand also appears;
for whereas Nelson's own account of boarding the "San Josef" simply
says, "I got into her main-chains," the published copy reads, "Captain
Berry assisting me into the main-chains."
So too with reference to Parker's controversy. In the first draft
there occurs the unqualified statement: "For an hour the Culloden and
Captain supported this apparently unequal contest." The revision
reads: "For near an hour, I believe, (_but do not pretend to be
correct as to time_,)[52] did Culloden and Captain," etc. Parker
quotes from the revision, which was therefore the one published, but
does not quote the words italicized. Probably, if the "Blenheim" and
the "St. George" had had a hand in this revision, there would have
been more modification; but Nelson did not realize where he was
hurting them, any more than he did in Miller's case.
The love of glory, the ardent desire for honorable distinction by
honorable deeds, is among the most potent and elevating of military
motives, which in no breast has burned with a purer flame than in that
of Nelson; but it is better that officers leave the public telling of
their own exploits to others, and it is evident that Nelson, when
taken to task, realized uncomfortably that he had not exercised due
thoughtfulness. Parker refrained from addressing him till he had
received the printed account. This was not till July, and his
remonstrance reached Nelson shortly after the loss of his arm at
Teneriffe, when on his way home for what proved to be a tedious and
painful recovery. He was then suffering, not only from pain and
weakness, but also from discouragement about his professional future,
which he thought threatened by disability, and for these conditions
allowance must be made; but for all this his reply did not compare
favorably with Parker's letter, which had been explicit in its
complaint as well as moderate in expression. He wrote curtly: "I must
acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of July; and, after
declaring that I know nothing of the Prince George till she was hailed
from the forecastle of the San Nicolas,[53] it is impossible I can
enter into the subject of your letter."
This course was the more ungenerous, because no explanation, or even
admission of involuntary wrong done, could have detracted in the
least from the abounding credit due and accorded to Nelson for his
conduct at St. Vincent, which indeed did not depend upon the length of
time he remained unsupported, but upon the rapidity and fearlessness
with which he had acted aright at a very critical juncture. This had
been done so openly, under the eyes of all men, that it could by no
means be hid. Collingwood had borne witness to it, in words which have
been quoted. Drinkwater and Elliot had watched the whole from the deck
of their frigate. The latter had written to him: "To have had any
share in yesterday's glory is honour enough for one man's life, but to
have been foremost on such a day could fall to your share alone." The
commander-in-chief had come out to greet him upon the quarter-deck of
the flagship,--a compliment naval officers can appreciate,--had there
embraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank him, and "used
every kind expression which could not fail to make me happy." Jervis
had also insisted upon his keeping the sword of the Spanish
rear-admiral who fell on board the "San Josef."
Before dropping this subject, which has the unpleasantness that
attends all contentions between individuals about their personal
deserts, it is right to say that Nelson had held from the first that
Collingwood, Troubridge, and himself were the only ones "who made
great exertions on that glorious day: the others did their duty, and
some not exactly to my satisfaction." "Sir John Jervis," he continued,
"is not quite contented, but says nothing publicly." He then quotes an
anecdote which, if he had it from Jervis, confirms his own opinion
about the support given. "Calder [the Chief of Staff] said, 'Sir, the
Captain and Culloden are separated from the fleet, and unsupported:
shall we recall them?' 'I will not have them recalled. I put my faith
in those ships: it is a disgrace that they are not supported and [are]
separated.'"
In his public letter Jervis refrained alike from praise and from
blame. He mentions but one name, that of Calder, as bearer of
despatches, and only incidentally says that he has been useful to him
at all times. In a private letter to the First Lord he was more
explicit, yet scarcely adequately so. Whatever momentary expression of
impatience escaped him, when anxious about the "Culloden" and
"Captain," he knew that his own flagship could not get to them in time
for efficient support, and he gives as the reason for reticence in his
public letter that all had behaved well, and that he was "confident
that had those who were least in action been in the situation of the
fortunate few, their conduct would not have been less meritorious." He
then mentions by name Troubridge,--who led the fleet,--Nelson, and
Collingwood, and five ships (without the names of the captains),
"Blenheim," "Prince George," "Orion," "Irresistible," and "Colossus,"
which "gallantly supported" Troubridge, though just where or when is
not specified. "The ships' returns of killed and wounded," he says
explicitly, "although not always the criterion of their being more or
less in action, is, in this instance, correctly so." This would
include the "Blenheim," whose casualties were in excess of any except
the "Captain," and Parker's ship, the "Prince George," which lost not
many less than Collingwood. The "Captain's" loss in killed,
twenty-four, was double that of any other ship, and in killed and
wounded nearly one-third that of the whole fleet.
An interesting anecdote of Jervis shows the importance conceded by him
to Nelson's action. It rests on good authority, and is eminently
characteristic of one who valued beyond most traits in an officer the
power to assume responsibility. "The test of a man's courage," he used
to say, "is responsibility." In the evening, while talking over the
events of the day, Calder spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the line as
an unauthorized departure from the method of attack prescribed by the
admiral. "It certainly was so," replied Jervis, "and if ever you
commit such a breach of your orders, I will forgive you also."
Success covers many faults, yet it is difficult to believe that had
Nelson been overwhelmed, the soundness of his judgment and his
resolution would not equally have had the applause of a man, who had
just fought twenty-seven ships with fifteen, because "a victory was
essential to England at that moment." The justification of departure
from orders lies not in success, but in the conditions of the case;
and Jervis was not one to overlook these, nor hereafter to forget that
only one man in his fleet had both seen the thing to do and dared the
responsibility of doing it.
A victory so signal entailed, as a matter of course, a number of those
rewards and titles with which Great Britain judiciously fostered the
spirit of emulation in her Navy. These were to a considerable extent
affairs of routine and precedent, and Nelson, knowing that junior
flag-officers had on several previous occasions been made baronets,
wished to avoid this hereditary dignity because inconsistent with his
means. His love of distinction also prompted him to desire one of
those Orders which carry with them the outward token of merit. Meeting
Drinkwater the day after the battle, he expressed his reluctance to
the baronetage, and upon the other's asking him whether he would
prefer to be a Knight of the Bath, he replied, "Yes; if my services
have been of any value, let them be noticed in a way that the public
may know them." To Elliot, who was about to return at once to England,
he wrote, asking him to make known his wishes to the Admiralty. "If
you can be instrumental in keeping back what I expect will happen, it
will be an additional obligation. I conceive to take hereditary
honours without a fortune to support the dignity, is to lower that
honour it would be my pride to support in proper splendour. There are
other honours which die with the possessor, and I should be proud to
accept, if my efforts are thought worthy of the favour of my King."
Elliot started for England a few days afterwards, and reached London
at a time when the whole country was ringing with the news of the
victory. Arriving at such a propitious moment, there could have been
for Nelson no better advocate than this man, placed high in political
councils, and having to give to the Ministry a long account of his
career in the Mediterranean, throughout the whole of which the two had
been in intimate contact and constant correspondence. Himself an
eye-witness, and filled with enthusiasm for Nelson's latest exploit,
Elliot knew better than any one that it was no sporadic outburst, but
only a signal manifestation of the intuitive sagacity, the flashing
promptness, and the sustained energy, whose steady fires he had known
to burn, without slackening of force or change of motive, through two
years of close personal association in public action to a common end.
The government thus learned more of him than can easily transpire
under ordinary service conditions, or be shown even by an incident
like that at St. Vincent; and Elliot's admiration, free from all bias
of professional partiality or professional jealousy, doubtless was
more useful to Nelson than any narrative of his own could have been.
Even the royal favor was conciliated, despite the obstinate temper
which yielded prejudices with difficulty. "I must rejoice," wrote
Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, who had mentioned to him the King's
approval, "in having gained the good opinion of my Sovereign, which I
once was given to understand I had no likelihood of enjoying."[54] It
was to the honor of the monarch that he was thus as pliant to admit
merit in an officer as yet only rising to distinction, as he was firm
at a later day to stamp with the marks of his displeasure the flagrant
moral aberration of the then world-renowned admiral.
The coveted Knighthood of the Bath was accorded on the 17th of March,
"in order," wrote the First Lord, "to mark the Royal approbation of
your successful and gallant exertions on several occasions during the
course of the present war in the Mediterranean, and more particularly
of your very distinguished conduct in the glorious and brilliant
victory obtained over the fleet of Spain by His Majesty's fleet, on
the 14th of February last." Nelson's delight was great and
characteristic. Material rewards were not in his eyes the most real or
the richest. "Chains and Medals," he wrote to his brother, "are what
no fortune or connexion in England can obtain; and I shall feel
prouder of those than all the titles in the King's power to bestow."
To his wife he said: "Though we can afford no more than a
cottage--yet, with a contented mind, my chains, medals, and ribbons
are all sufficient." To receive honor was second to no possession,
except that of knowing he had deserved it.
On the evening of the Battle of St. Vincent, soon after the firing
ceased, Nelson shifted his commodore's pendant to the "Irresistible,"
of seventy-four guns, the "Captain" being unmanageable from the damage
done to her spars and rigging. Her hull also had been so battered,
that he wrote a few days later she would never be able to receive him
again, which proved to be true; for although, after she had been
patched up, he returned to her temporarily, a newly fitted ship, the
"Theseus," seventy-four, was assigned to his flag, as soon as a
reinforcement arrived from England.
After a vain effort to reach the Tagus against contrary winds, with
disabled ships, Jervis decided to take his fleet into Lagos Bay, an
open roadstead on the southern coast of Portugal, and there to refit
sufficiently to make the passage to Lisbon. While lying at Lagos
Nelson became a Rear-Admiral of the Blue, by a flag-promotion dated on
the 20th of February, although his flag was not hoisted until the
first of April, when the official notification of his advancement was
received by him. He was then thirty-eight and a half years of age. In
this rank he remained until after the Battle of the Nile was fought,
but it mattered comparatively little where he stood on the list of
flag-officers, while Jervis commanded; that he was an admiral at all
made it possible to commit to him undertakings for which he was
pre-eminently qualified, but which could scarcely have been intrusted
to a simple captain by any stretching of service methods, always--and
not improperly--conservative.
On the 23d of February the fleet sailed again, and on the 28th
anchored in the Tagus. The same day Nelson wrote to his wife that he
was to go to sea on the 2d of March, with three ships-of-the-line, to
look out for the Viceroy of Mexico, who was reported to be on his way
to Cadiz, also with three ships-of-the-line, laden with treasure. "Two
are first-rates," said he, "but the larger the ships the better the
mark, and who will not fight for dollars?" Foul winds prevented his
getting away until the 5th. From that date until the 12th of April he
remained cruising between Cape St. Vincent and the coast of Africa,
covering the approaches to Cadiz; frigates and smaller vessels being
spread out to the westward, to gain timely notice of the approach of
the specie ships, upon whose safe arrival Spain depended both for her
commercial affairs and her naval preparations.
But while thus actively employed, and not insensible to the charm of
dollars, the immediate business on board was not in itself so
engrossing, nor to him so attractive, as to obtain that exclusiveness
of attention which he prided himself upon giving to matters more
military in character, and more critical in importance. "The Spaniards
threaten us they will come out, and take their revenge," he writes to
an occasional correspondent. "The sooner the better; but I will not
believe it till I see it; and if they do, what will the mines of
Mexico and Peru signify, compared with the honour I doubt not we shall
gain by fighting an angry Don? They will have thirty sail of the
line, we twenty or twenty-two; but fear we shall have a peace before
they are ready to come out. What a sad thing that will be!" His mind
reverts to the troops in Elba, which had been left in a most exposed
position, and were now about to withdraw under the protection of some
frigates, passing through a thousand miles of hostile sea open to the
line-of-battle ships at Toulon. He is more concerned about them than
about his possible prize-money in the rich ships from Vera Cruz and
Havana, whose danger from his own squadron was agitating all Spain.
"Respecting myself," he writes to Jervis, "I wish to stay at sea, and
I beg, if line-of-battle ships are left out,[55] either on this side
the Gut, or to the eastward of Gibraltar, that I may be the man. This
brings forward a subject which I own is uppermost in my mind,--that of
the safety of our troops, should they embark from Elba. The French
have a number of ships at Toulon. They may get two, three, or four
ready, with a number of frigates, and make a push for our convoy. I am
ready, you know, to go eastward to cover them, even to Porto Ferrajo,
or off Toulon, or Minorca, as you may judge proper."
This exposed detachment continued to occupy his thoughts. A month
later, on the 11th of April, he again writes: "I own, Sir, my feelings
are alive for the safety of our army from Elba. If the French get out
two sail of the line, which I am confident they may do, our troops are
lost, and what a triumph that would be to them! I know you have many
difficulties to contend with, but I am anxious that nothing should
miscarry under your orders. If you think a detachment can be spared, I
am ready to go and do my best for their protection." In both letters
he apologizes for this freedom of urgency with his superior: "I have
said much, but you have spoiled me by allowing me to speak and write
freely. I trust you will not imagine that my taking the great liberty
of thus mentioning my thoughts, arises from any other motive than
affection towards you."
Jervis had already joined him on the 1st of April, before the second
letter was written. His hesitation about sending the detachment
suggested by Nelson had arisen, not from doubt as to the danger of the
troops, but from the imminent expectation of the Spanish fleet coming
out. The British force was already too inferior, numerically, to risk
any diminution, in view of such a contingency. Confronted with
divergent objects, Jervis would not be drawn into the snare of
dividing his force; but after reconnoitring the port, he was satisfied
that the Spaniards could not sail before Nelson had time to fulfil the
proposed mission, and on the 12th of April he gave him the necessary
orders. The latter transferred his own squadron to the command of Sir
James Saumarez, and started at once. He had now returned to the
"Captain," which had doubtless come down with Jervis. "She is little
better than a wreck," he wrote to a friend; but the cripples had to be
kept to the front, pending the arrival of fresh ships. Besides her, he
had the "Colossus," seventy-four, and "Leander," fifty, with a
suitable number of smaller cruisers. Passing within gunshot of Port
Mahon in Minorca, he heard from several passing vessels that a French
squadron of four ships-of-the-line was at sea, as he had anticipated;
and these, he afterwards learned, were seen off Minorca only
twenty-two hours before he passed. Fortunately a fresh northwest gale
had carried them to the southward, and on the 21st of April, sixty
miles west of Corsica, he joined the convoy, which carried over three
thousand soldiers. He reached Gibraltar with it in safety in the early
days of May, without adventures of any kind. "I observed a man-of-war
brig evidently looking at us; but my charge was too important to
separate one ship in chase of her, especially as three frigates had
parted company; for until this garrison is safe down, I do not think
our business is well finished." Its arrival completed the evacuation
of the Mediterranean.
At Gibraltar several days were spent, evidently crowded with
administrative details concerning the coming and going of convoys, for
there is here an almost total cessation of Nelson's usually copious
letter-writing. An interesting and instructive incident is, however,
made known to us by one of the three letters dated during these ten
days. The Consul of the United States of America had to apply to him
for the protection of twelve American merchant ships, then at Malaga,
against the probable depredations of French privateers lying in that
port, which, under the edicts of the government of the French
Republic, with whom the United States was at peace, were expected to
overhaul and capture them when they sailed. Nelson at once complied,
ordering a British frigate to go to Malaga and escort the vessels to
the Barbary coast, and even out of the Straits, if necessary. In doing
this, he wrote courteously to the Consul: "I am sure of fulfilling the
wishes of my Sovereign, and I hope of strengthening the harmony which
at present so happily subsists between the two nations."
On the 24th of May Nelson rejoined the admiral off Cadiz, and on the
27th shifted his own flag into the "Theseus." The day before he left
the fleet, April 11th, Jervis had decided to institute a strict
commercial blockade of Cadiz, with the object of distressing Spanish
trade, preventing the entrance of supplies, upon which depended the
operations of Spain against Portugal, as well as her naval
preparations, and so forcing the Spanish fleet out to fight, in order
to rid itself of such embarrassment. Nelson, as commander of the
inshore squadron, had then issued the necessary notices to neutrals in
the port, and to this charge he now returned. Under Jervis's
intelligent partiality, he, the junior flag-officer, was thus
intrusted with a command, which in the conduct of details, great and
small, and in emergencies, was practically independent. Jervis,
knowing his man, was content to have it so, reserving of course to
himself the decision of the broad outlines of military exertion. The
inshore squadron was gradually increased till it numbered ten
sail-of-the-line. The boats of the fleet, which had been rowing guard
off the harbor's mouth under the general supervision of the two senior
flag-officers, were ordered, shortly after Nelson's arrival, to report
to him; and upon him, indeed, devolved pretty nearly all the active
enterprises of the fleet. It was his practice to visit the line of
boats every night in his barge, to see by personal inspection of these
outposts that his instructions were fully observed. "Our inferiority,"
he wrote about this time, "is greater than before. I am barely out of
shot of a Spanish rear-admiral. The Dons hope for peace, but must soon
fight us, if the war goes on."
Another motive, perhaps even more imperative than the wish to force
the Dons out, now compelled Jervis to seek by all means to increase
the activity of his fleet, and to intrust the management of such
activities to his most zealous and capable subordinate. These were the
months of the great mutinies of the British Navy, in which the seamen
of the Channel fleet, and of the North Sea fleet, at the Nore, had
taken the ships out of the hands of their officers. The details of
Jervis's management, which was distinguished as much by keen judgment
and foresight as by iron-handed severity, that knew neither fear nor
ruth when it struck, belong to his biography, not to Nelson's; but it
is necessary to note the attitude of the latter, a man more
sympathetic, and in common life gentler, than his stern superior.
Always solicitous for everything that increased the well-being and
happiness of his crew,--as indeed was eminently the case with Jervis
also,--he did not withhold his candid sympathy from the grievances
alleged by the Channel fleet; grievances which, when temperately
presented to the authorities, had been ignored. "I am entirely with
the seamen in their first complaint. We are a neglected set, and, when
peace comes, are shamefully treated; but for the Nore scoundrels,"
passing on to those who had rebelled after substantial redress had
been given, and had made unreasonable demands when the nation was in
deadly peril, "I should be happy to command a ship against them."
Jervis's measures received full support from him, clear-headed as ever
to see the essentials of a situation. The senior vice-admiral, for
instance, went so far as to criticise the commander-in-chief for
hanging a convicted mutineer on Sunday. "Had it been Christmas Day
instead of Sunday," wrote Nelson, "I would have executed them. We know
not what might have been hatched by a Sunday's grog: _now_ your
discipline is safe." His glorious reputation and his known kindly
character, supported by that of his captain, made mutiny impossible
under his flag. It had not been up a month on board the "Theseus,"
which was lately from the Channel and infected with the prevalent
insubordination, when a paper was dropped on the quarter-deck,
expressing the devotion of the ship's company to their commander, and
pledging that the name of the "Theseus" should yet be as renowned as
that of the "Captain."
The stringent blockade, and the fears for the specie ships, weighed
heavily on the Spaniards, who were not as a nation hearty in support
of a war into which they had been coerced by France. Their authorities
were petitioned to compel the fleet to go out. Whatever the event, the
British would at least have to retire for repairs; while if the Lima
and Havana ships--to look for which the Cadiz people every morning
flocked to the walls, fearing they might be already in the enemy's
hands--should be captured, the merchants of Spain would be ruined.
Better lose ten ships-of-the-line, if need be, than this convoy. With
rumors of this sort daily reaching him, Nelson's faculties were in a
constant state of pleasing tension. He was in his very element of
joyous excitement and expectation. "We are in the advance day and
night, prepared for battle; bulkheads down, ready to weigh, cut, or
slip,[56] as the occasion may require. I have given out a line of
battle--myself to lead; and you may rest assured that I will make a
vigorous attack upon them, the moment their noses are outside the
Diamond. Pray do not send me another ship," he implores; "if you send
any more, they may believe we are prepared, and know of their
intention." "If they come out," he writes later to a naval friend,
when he had ten sail under him, "there will be no fighting beyond my
squadron."
To increase yet further the pressure upon the Spanish fleet to come
out, a bombardment was planned against the town and the shipping, the
superintendence of which also was intrusted to the commander of the
inshore squadron. Only one bomb-vessel was provided, so that very
extensive results could scarcely have been anticipated; but Nelson
saw, with evident glee, that the enemy's gunboats had taken advanced
positions, and intended to have a hand in the night's work. "So much
the better," wrote he to Jervis; "I wish to make it a warm night in
Cadiz. If they venture from their walls, I shall give Johnny[57] his
full scope for fighting. It will serve to talk of better than
mischief." "It is good," he writes to another, "at these times to keep
the devil out of their heads. I had rather see fifty shot by the
enemy, than one hanged by us."
The bombardment, which was continued upon two successive nights, did
little direct harm; but it led to a sharp hand-to-hand contest between
the British and Spanish boats, in which Nelson personally bore a part,
and upon which he seems afterwards to have dwelt with even greater
pride and self-satisfaction than upon the magnificent victories with
which his name is associated. "It was during this period that perhaps
my personal courage was more conspicuous than at any other part of my
life." On the first night the Spaniards sent out a great number of
mortar gunboats and armed launches. Upon these he directed a vigorous
attack to be made, which resulted in their being driven back under the
walls of Cadiz; the British, who pursued them, capturing two boats and
a launch. In the affray, he says, "I was boarded in my barge with its
common crew of ten men, coxswain, Captain Freemantle, and myself, by
the commander of the gunboats; the Spanish barge rowed twenty-six
oars, besides officers,--thirty men in the whole. This was a service
hand-to-hand with swords, in which my coxswain, John Sykes, now no
more, twice saved my life. Eighteen of the Spaniards being killed and
several wounded, we succeeded in taking their commander." In his
report he complimented this Spanish officer, Don Miguel Tyrason, upon
his gallantry. Near a hundred Spaniards were made prisoners in this
sharp skirmish.
Not even the insult of bombardment was sufficient to attain the
designed end of forcing the enemy's fleet out to fight. The Spaniards
confined themselves to a passive defence by their shore batteries,
which proved indeed sufficient to protect the town and shipping, for
on the second night they got the range of the bomb-vessel so
accurately that the British were forced to withdraw her; but this did
not relieve the vital pressure of the blockade, which could only be
removed by the mobile naval force coming out and fighting. So far from
doing this, the Spanish ships of war shifted their berth inside to get
out of the range of bombs. Nelson cast longing eyes upon the smaller
vessels which lay near the harbor's mouth, forming a barricade against
boat attack, and threatening the offensive measures to which they
rarely resorted. "At present the brigs lie too close to each other to
hope for a dash at them, but soon I expect to find one off her guard,
and then--" For the rest, his sanguine resolve to persist in annoyance
until it becomes unbearable, and insures the desired object, finds
vent in the words: "if Mazaredo will not come out, down comes Cadiz;
and not only Cadiz, but their fleet."
This close succession of varied and exciting active service, unbroken
between the day of his leaving Lisbon, March 5th, and the date of the
last bombardment, July 5th, had its usual effect upon his spirits. His
correspondence is all animation, full of vitality and energy,
betraying throughout the happiness of an existence absorbed in
congenial work, at peace with itself, conscious of power adequate to
the highest demands upon it, and rejoicing in the strong admiration
and confidence felt and expressed towards him on all sides, especially
by those whose esteem he most valued. He complains of his health,
indeed, from time to time; he cannot last another winter; he is
suffering for the want of a few months' rest, which he must ask for in
the coming October, and trusts that, "after four years and nine
months' service, without one moment's repose for body or mind, credit
will be given me that I do not sham."
Bodily suffering was his constant attendant, to which he always
remained subject, but at this time it was powerless to depress the
moral energies which, under less stimulating conditions, at times lost
something of their elastic force. They never, indeed, failed to rise
equal to imminent emergency, however obscured in hours of gloom, or
perplexity, or mental conflict; but now, supported by the concurrence
of every favoring influence, they carried him along in the full flow
of prosperity and exhilaration. Thanking Earl Spencer, the First Lord
of the Admiralty, for a complimentary letter, he says: "The unbounded
praises Sir John Jervis has ever heaped, and continues to heap on me,
are a noble reward for any services which an officer under his command
could perform. Nor is your Lordship less profuse in them." To his
wife he writes: "I assure you I never was better, and rich in the
praises of every man, from the highest to the lowest in the fleet."
"The imperious call of honour to serve my country, is the only thing
that keeps me a moment from you, and a hope, that by staying a little
longer, it may enable you to enjoy those little luxuries which you so
highly merit." "My late affair here[58] will not, I believe, lower me
in the opinion of the world. I have had flattery enough to make me
vain, and success enough to make me confident."
FOOTNOTES:
[41] It is evident that this must have involved a compliment personal to
Nelson.
[42] See Plate, Figure 1.
[43] See Plate, Figure 2.
[44] Captured.
[45] That is, the weather division,--the eighteen ships.
[46] That is, was left in.
[47] Shrouds are large ropes which support the masts.
[48] See Plate, Figure 3.
[49] The italics are the author's.
[50] In his letter to Nelson this is thirteen, but evidently a slip. His
log of the action says forty-three.
[51] Both papers are headed: "A few remarks relative to myself in the
Captain," etc. It is unfortunate that Nicolas, in giving these two papers,
puts first the one which, from internal indications, is (in the author's
judgment) the later in date.
[52] Author's italics.
[53] Hailed to stop firing because the "San Nicolas" had surrendered.
[54] See _ante_, page 89.
[55] That is, at sea, the main fleet being still in the Tagus.
[56] Cut, or let go, the cables,--leaving the anchor in haste, instead of
raising it from the bottom.
[57] The British seamen.
[58] The night conflict with the Spanish launches.