MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIS' ARREST--AN AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE
BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE--THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS
CAPTURE--THE INFAMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM--WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED
WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY--THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED HIM--
HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION--HIS RELEASE FROM
FORTRESS MONROE--BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND--JOY OF THE
COMMUNITY--IN CANADA--RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL COURT--HIS
TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED--CONCLUSION.
All doubt has long since been dispelled as to the motive of the pursuit
and arrest of Mr. Davis. His arrest and imprisonment were the
after-thought of the saturnine Secretary of War, and his associate
inquisitors of the Bureau of Military Justice, at Washington. The details
given by Mr. Mallory, of the circumstances of Mr. Davis' progress through
North Carolina, South Carolina, and a part of Georgia, added to facts
which are yet fresh in the public memory, fully justify the conclusion
that the Federal authorities connived at his supposed purpose to escape
the country. The reputation of Mr. Lincoln among his countrymen, for
humanity as well as good sense, renders it extremely probable that such
would have been his method of avoiding the perplexity which must arise
from the capture of Mr. Davis.
Well understanding that the inflamed public sentiment of the North,
regarding Mr. Davis as a political offender of the worst possible
character, would not tolerate his immediate release, the Federal
Government would have served the ends of humanity and sound policy by
encouraging his escape. On the other hand the laws of the United States
tolerate prolonged imprisonment only after trial and sentence. Hence the
arrest of Mr. Davis must open an endless perspective of embarrassments. He
could not be tried simply as an individual, nor could his punishment for
any alleged crime of his own, be the sole object to be sought. His
arraignment before a judicial tribunal, would be the arraignment of the
principle of State Sovereignty, of the States which had sought to put that
principle in practice, of the five millions of American citizens who had
supported it, and who had cheerfully risked their lives and earthly
possessions for its maintenance.
Nay, more, the trial of Jefferson Davis, upon a charge of treason, meant
the trial of the North also. Should all efforts to convict the South in
the person of Mr. Davis, of treason, fail, the recoil might well be
dreaded by those who instigated the war upon the rights and existence of
the States. It was not to be safely assumed that the legal decision of a
constitutional question, which divided the framers of the Federal
Constitution, would necessarily affirm the party and sectional dogmas upon
which the North waged the war. Should secession be legally justified, what
justification could the North claim, that is rightfully denied to Russia
in her conduct towards Poland? What plea should England need for her
outrages upon Ireland? With Jefferson Davis acquitted of treason, what
could the conduct of the North for four years have been, but a revelry in
blood--the wanton perpetration of a monstrous crime?
In this dilemma the industry of the Bureau of Military Justice, which
afterwards achieved an immortality of infamy, by its record of judicial
murders, aided by the ingenuity of Stanton, devised a scheme for the
arrest of Mr. Davis, upon charges designed to cover him and the cause
which he represented, with everlasting obloquy. Not content with having
triumphed by superior numbers, in a war of political opinions, which in
the beginning was declared not to be waged for social or political
subversion; not content with having settled a grave constitutional
question, by brute force, in a government founded upon the idea of popular
consent, the Federal authorities were now made a party to infamous
falsehoods, the circumstances and results of which have fixed a stigma
upon the American name.
Contemporary with the announcement of events, which proclaimed the
irretrievable downfall of the Confederacy, were the calumnies of the
Northern press, under the alleged inspiration of Stanton, representing
that Mr. Davis was escaping with wagons filled with plunder, and with the
gold of the Richmond banks; and that he had endeavored to escape in the
concealment of female apparel. No one knew better than those who
promulgated this paltry defamation, its utter falsity, and we would not
insult Mr. Davis and the Southern people by bestowing consideration upon
such palpable calumnies. It was not calculated that such a portraiture of
one, whose personal honor, courage, and manhood had triumphantly endured
every test, would be accepted by the intelligence even of the North. But
it nevertheless had an obvious purpose, which was well answered. It
imposed upon the weak and credulous. The besotted and cowardly mobs of the
Northern cities, who filled the air with clamor for the "blood of
traitors," while the men who had conquered the South, were touched with
sympathy for the misfortunes of foes whom they respected, of course
eagerly accepted any caricature of Mr. Davis agreeable to their own vulgar
imaginations. In this manner was consummated the first step in the object
of delaying the feeling of personal respect, and of sympathy for
misfortunes, which eventually assert themselves in the masses, for a
fallen foe, whom it was already resolved to persecute with oppression and
cruelty previously unknown under the American political system.
Next came the atrocious proclamation charging Mr. Davis with complicity in
the assassination of President Lincoln. It is safe to say that incidents
hitherto prominent by their infamy, will be forgotten by history, in
comparison with the dastardly criminal intent which instigated that
document. Circumstances warrant the belief that not one of the
conspirators against the life and honor of Mr. Davis, believed either then
or now, that the charge had one atom of truth. Had the charge been
honestly made, it would have been disavowed, when its falsity became
apparent. But this would not have subserved the end of the conspirators,
and the poison was permitted to circulate and rankle, long after the
calumny had been exploded during the investigations of the military
commission, in the cases of Mrs. Surratt and Captain Wirz. At length
justice was vindicated by the publication of the confidential
correspondence between Holt and Conover, which disclosed the unparalleled
subornation and perjury upon which the conspirators relied. Well has it
been said that the world will yet wonder "how it was that a people,
passing for civilized and Christian, should have consigned Jefferson Davis
to a cell, while they tolerated Edwin M. Stanton as a Cabinet Minister."
We have no desire to dwell upon the details of Mr. Davis' long and cruel
imprisonment. The story is one over which the South has wept tears of
agony, at whose recital the civilized world revolted, and which, in years
to come, will mantle with shame the cheek of every American citizen who
values the good name of his country. In a time of profound peace, when the
last vestige of resistance to Federal authority had disappeared in the
South, Mr. Davis, wrecked in fortune and in health, in violation of every
fundamental principle of American liberty, of justice and humanity, was
detained for two years, without trial, in close confinement, and, during a
large portion of this period, treated with all the rigor of a sentenced
convict.
But if indeed Mr. Davis was thus to be prejudged as the "traitor" and
"conspirator" which the Stantons, and Holts, and Forneys declared him to
be, why should he be selected from the millions of his advisers and
followers, voluntary participants in his assumed "treason," as the single
victim of cruelty, outrage, and indignity? What is there in his
antecedents inconsistent with the character of a patriotic statesman
devoted to the promotion of union, fraternity, harmony, and faithful
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of his country? We have endeavored
faithfully to trace his distinguished career as a statesman and soldier,
and at no stage of his life is there to be found, either in his conduct or
declared opinions, the evidence of infidelity to the Union as its
character and objects were revealed to his understanding. Nor is there to
be found in his personal character any support of that moral turpitude
which a thousand oracles of falsehood have declared to have peculiarly
characterized his commission of "treason."
No tongue and pen were more eloquent than his in describing the grandeur,
glory, and blessings of the Union, and in invoking for its perpetuation
the aspirations and prayers of his fellow-citizens. In the midst of
passion and tumult, in 1861, he was conspicuous by his zeal for
compromise, and for a pacific solution of difficulties. No Southern
Senator abandoned his seat with so pathetic and regretful an announcement
of the necessity which compelled the step. The sorrowful tone of his
valedictory moistened the eye of every listener, and convinced even
political adversaries of the sincerity and purity of his motives. His
elevation to the Presidency of the Confederacy was not dictated by the
recognition of any supposed title to leadership in the secession movement.
His election was indeed a triumph over the extreme sentiment of the South,
and was declared by those who opposed it to involve a compromise of the
exclusive sectionalism which was the basis of the new government. His
administration of the Confederate Government exhibited the same unswerving
loyalty to duty, to justice and humanity, which his previous life so nobly
exemplified. The people of the South alone know how steadfastly he opposed
the indulgence of vengeance; how he strove, until the last moments of the
struggle, to restrain the rancor and bitterness so naturally engendered
under the circumstances. Yet, when Jefferson Davis lay a helpless prisoner
in the strongest fortress of the Union, with "broad patches of skin
abraded" by the irons upon his limbs, men were practically pardoned who
had devoted years of labor to the purpose of disunion, and had reproached
him for not unfurling the "black flag." Is not the inference, then,
justified that all of these tortures and indignities were aimed at the
people and the cause which his dignity, purity, and genius had so exalted
in the eyes of mankind?
But how impotent are falsehood and malignity to obstruct the illumination
of truth! As subornation and perjury proved unavailing to convict him of
atrocious guilt, so equally has persecution failed to accomplish its
purpose. To all that shameful picture of barbarous violence and gratuitous
insult; of insolent _espionage_ and vulgar curiosity; of the illustrious
leader of a brave people, whose whole life does not exhibit one act of
meanness or shame, or one word of untruth, crushed by disaster, and
prostrate with disease, fettered as if he were a desperate felon;
restricted in his diet, and not even permitted a change of linen, except
by the authority of a military jailer; an object of unrelaxed scrutiny,
often driven to his cell by the peering curiosity of vulgar men and
unsexed women--to all this there was but one relief--the patient and
constant heroism of the sufferer, giving heart to his despairing
countrymen, and ennobling his own captivity. History furnishes no similar
instance of patient and dignified endurance of adversity and persecution.
The incidents of Mr. Davis' history since his release from Fortress
Monroe, do not require detailed narration. For the most part they are
confined to that domain of privacy which decency holds to be inviolable.
When two years--wanting a few days--from the date of his incarceration had
elapsed, Mr. Davis was transferred by the military authorities to the
custody of the Federal civil authorities at Richmond. Here, amid the
congratulations of friends, and the rejoicings of the community, which
loves him as it loves but one other--his constant friend and compeer in
fame--he was released from custody under circumstances which are well
known. The interval between his release in May, 1867, and his
re-appearance before the Federal court, at Richmond, in the ensuing
November, was passed by Mr. Davis in Canada. There he was the recipient of
the respect and sympathy which his character and his sufferings might have
been expected to elicit from a humane people. At the November term of the
Federal court, Mr. Davis was again present, with his eminent counsel,
awaiting trial, and was again released upon recognizance to appear on the
25th March, 1868.
In the face of the close proximity of the event, it would be unprofitable
to speculate as to the sequel of this third appearance of Jefferson Davis
before a judicial tribunal, to answer the charge of treason. Nor do we
propose to add to the brief consideration, which has already been given in
this volume, of the legal and historical question involved in the case of
Mr. Davis. The subject has been exhausted. The masterly expositions by Mr.
Davis of the theory of the Federal Government (some of which we have
given), are at once the complete vindications of himself and his
countrymen, and the sufficient monuments of his fame.
But are the issues of the war to be subjected to candid and impartial
legal adjudication? Will the North approve this raising of a doubt as to
its own justification, merely in the hope of vengeance upon one who is
powerless for injury? But if there is to be admitted another jurisdiction
than that of War; if the arbitrament of battle is to be carried to the
higher tribunal of Law and Public Opinion; if there is to be a trial and
not a judicial farce, with a foregone conclusion and a prejudged sentence,
the South and its late leader will not shrink from the verdict. Of this,
the world requires no more emphatic iteration than that furnished by past
events.
But the decision of this question, whatever it may be, can not recover the
wager which the South gallantly staked and irretrievably lost. Time will
show, however, the amount of truth in the prophecy of Jefferson Davis,
made in reply to the remark that the cause of the Confederacy was lost:
"_It appears so. But the principle for which we contended is bound to
re-assert itself, though it may be at another time and in another form._"
FOOTNOTES:
[1] A pertinent remark of Macaulay is, "It is the nature of parties to
retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original
principles. During many years, a generation of Whigs, whom Sydney would
have spurned as slaves, continued to wage war with a generation of Tories
whom Jeffries would have hanged."
[2] Mr. Gladstone.
[3] Mr. Davis has, since his withdrawal from the army until the breaking
out of the war, resided on his plantation in Warren County, a few miles
from Vicksburg.
[4] Dr. Craven relates the following incident, which is an impressive
illustration of the depth and intensity of Mr. Davis' veneration for the
character of Mr. Calhoun:
"General Miles observed, interrogatively, that it was reported that John
C. Calhoun had made much money by speculations, or favoring the
speculations of his friends, connected with this work (the Rip-Raps, near
Fortress Monroe).
"In a moment Mr. Davis started to his feet, betraying much indignation by
his excited manner and flushed cheek. It was a transfiguration of friendly
emotion. The feeble and wasted invalid and prisoner, suddenly forgetting
his bonds--forgetting his debility, and ablaze with eloquent anger against
this injustice to the memory of one he loved and reverenced. Mr. Calhoun,
he said, lived a whole atmosphere above any sordid or dishonest
thought--was of a nature to which even a mean act was impossible. It was
said in every Northern paper that he (Mr. Davis) had carried with him five
millions in gold when quitting Richmond--money pilfered from the treasury
of the Confederate States; and that there was just as much truth in that
as in these imputations against Calhoun.... Calhoun was a statesman, a
philosopher, in the true sense of that grossly-abused term--an enthusiast
of perfect liberty in representative and governmental action."--_Prison
Life of Jefferson Davis. Library edition, pages 206, 207._
[5] Massachusetts even refused military honors to the remains of a gallant
son of her own soil, (Captain Lincoln,) and a descendant of one of her
most eminent families, who was killed at Buena Vista. Her fanatical
intolerance would not forget that he had fallen in a war which she did not
approve.
[6] "Our Living Representative Men," by Mr. John Savage.
[7] Lieutenant-Colonel A. K. McClung.
[8] For this spirited account of the operations of the Mississippi
regiment at Monterey, the author is indebted to a sketch of Mr. Davis in
Mr. John Savage's "Living Representative Men," which was published a year
or two prior to the war. Though having several other accounts, possibly
more complete, I have selected this as the most graphic. The author
readily acknowledges the assistance which he has derived from the work of
Mr. Savage.
[9] This Constitutional question was again raised by Mr. Davis, while
President of the Confederacy, and his action with reference to similar
legislation by the Confederate Congress, was in entire accordance with the
reason assigned for declining Mr. Polk's appointment.
[10] Henry Clay, Jr., a graduate of West Point, and at the time of his
death, Lieutenant-Colonel of volunteers. He fell at Buena Vista.
[11] The repeal of the Missouri Compromise has been commonly alluded to as
the special and leading measure of the Pierce administration. It was, in
reality, not an administration measure. The well-known cordiality of Mr.
Davis' relations with President Pierce induced a number of Senators to
call upon Mr. Davis, on the Sunday morning previous to the introduction of
the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and ask his aid in securing them the pledge of
the President's approval. They represented the measure as contemplating
merely the assertion of the rights of property, slavery included, in the
Territories. Mr. Davis objected, at first, to an interruption of the
President, on the Sabbath, for such a purpose, but finally yielded. The
President promptly signified his approbation of a measure contemplating
such a purpose. It is not necessary to say that the legislation of
Congress embraced a far greater scope than that indicated. The
administration indorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in full, because the
principle was correct, though its assertion then was wholly unnecessary,
unprofitable, and likely to lead to mischievous results. This was the real
connection of the Pierce administration with a measure for whose
consequences the ambition of Judge Douglas was almost solely responsible.
[12] Governor Wise, of Virginia, characterized "squatter sovereignty" as a
"short cut to all the ends of Black Republicanism."
[13] To be found at the conclusion of this chapter.
[14] William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an able lawyer and constitutional
expounder. Mr. Buchanan, in his history of his own administration, thus
mentions him: "The right of secession found advocates afterwards in men of
distinguished abilities and unquestioned patriotism. In 1825, it was
maintained by Mr. William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an eminent and
universally-respected lawyer.... His biographer says that, 'in 1791, he
was appointed District Attorney of the United States,' and 'the situation
of Attorney General was more than once tendered to him by Washington, but
as often declined,' for domestic reasons."
[15] Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama.
[16] It is not to be understood that Mr. Davis approved Mr. Buchanan's
policy in the winter of 1861. The message of the President disappointed
the South, and was offensive to many of his most attached supporters, in
consequence of its denial of the right of secession. Denying the right of
secession, Mr. Buchanan yet denied, also, the power of coercing the
States, but subsequently lent himself to the latter policy. Mr. Davis
freely testified his disappointment at certain positions taken in the
Message, and criticised them with emphasis, but great courtesy. Mr.
Buchanan indicates the special message of January, 1861, as the occasion
of the termination of all friendly relations between himself and those
whom he terms the "secession Senators."
[17] It is a notable fact that, years ago, the strong and avowed
attachment of Mr. Davis for the Union, was habitually sneered at by some
Southern men, who are now seeking to gratify their lust for place by
"crooking the pregnant hinges of the knee," to those who persecute him and
his countrymen.
[18] Mr. Crittenden, whose supreme devotion to the Union, can not be
called in question, since he continued to cling to the shadow long after
the substance had departed, and in the midst of actual war continued to
hope for a final pacific settlement, was greatly incensed at the
unpatriotic course of the Republican Senators. His gray hairs, his
eloquence, his unquestioned Unionism, were all unavailing. He was
frequently hotly denunciatory, of what, equally with Mr. Davis, he
regarded a purpose to prevent any adjustment which could have a pacifying
effect upon the country.
[19] Statement of Hon. S. S. Cox.
[20] Acts of secession were adopted by the various States as follows:
South Carolina, December 20, 1860.
Florida, January 7, 1861.
Mississippi, January 9, 1861.
Alabama, January 11, 1861.
Georgia, January 20, 1861.
Louisiana, January 26, 1861.
Texas, February 1, 1861.
[21] Extract from President Davis' address before the Mississippi
Legislature, December, 1862.
[22] By the steamer "Star of the West," which was driven back by the South
Carolina batteries.
[23] It was not until the 8th of April that the commissioners obtained a
reply to their official communication of March 12th. From this reply, it
appeared that "during the whole interval while the commissioners were
receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their
mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had
already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever; to refuse
even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the
delay created by their own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the
means for effective hostile operations."--_President Davis' Message, April
29th, 1861._
[24] Message to Confederate Congress.
[25] This expedition, ostensibly "for the relief of a starving garrison,"
consisted of eleven vessels, with two hundred and eighty-five guns and
twenty-four hundred men.
[26] Before instructing General Beauregard to fire upon the fort,
President Davis made another effort to prevent hostilities, which he thus
explains: "Even then" (after Beauregard had applied for instructions),
"under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen
to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the
United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and
directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had
avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from
directing our fire at Fort Sumter, if he would promise not to open fire on
our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The
conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the
besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet
and fort. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was
executed by General Beauregard with skill and success."--_Message, 29th
April, 1861._
[27] Mr. Lincoln's proclamation was dated April 15, 1861.
[28] On the day of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Mr. Lincoln protested to
the Virginia commissioners the pacific purposes of his government. When
giving these assurances to Virginia he had heard of the surrender of the
fort, and knew that for two days Beauregard had been firing upon the
"sacred flag."
[29] April 24, 1861. Virginia joined the Confederacy as a member May 6,
1861.
[30] "East Tennessee" was a perpetual "fire in the rear" to the
Confederacy.
[31] President Davis appreciated the immense value to the South of
privateering. The Federal Government employed all the naval force at their
command to blockade the South, recalled the squadrons stationed in foreign
waters, and made extensive purchases of vessels for purposes of war. The
South, of course, had no navy, since there had been no time to prepare or
purchase one within the brief space between the organization of the
Confederate Government and the beginning of hostilities. Under these
circumstances there remained only the resort to private armed ships, under
letters of marque, to assault the floating commerce of the enemy, and, to
some extent, neutralize the blockade. Doubting the constitutional power of
the executive in the premises, he, with characteristic regard for law,
determined not to commission privateers until duly authorized by the
legislation of Congress. The authority to issue commissions, and letters
of marque and general reprisal, to privateers, was given by act of
Congress, passed 6th of May.
[32] A recent work (_Richmond During the War_) thus mentions the arrival
of Mr. Davis in Richmond:
"He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of handsome
apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until
arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and
suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows of
the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined for
his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor of his
arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the 'Stars and
Bars.'
"An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It was
situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a
landscape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly
furnished, and there Mr. and Mrs. Davis dispensed the elegant
hospitalities for which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a
tall, commanding figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and
strongly-marked expression, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With
firmly-set yet flexible lips, there is indicated much energy of purpose
and will, but beautifully softened by the usually sad expression of her
dark, earnest eyes. Her manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and
her receptions were characterized by the dignity and suavity which should
very properly distinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief
Magistrate of a Republic."
[33] We intentionally waive the discussion of this question as to the
extent of the preparation made by the States, severally, for actual war.
It is not incumbent upon us here to examine the action of the individual
States. We do not desire to be understood, however, as assenting to the
proposition that all the States were inadequately prepared. It is a
singular commentary upon the wisdom and sagacity of the leaders of
secession in its earlier stages (by the various States), that Virginia and
North Carolina were each better able to arm their troops than were some of
the Cotton States. The latter may have made as much preparation as was
possible under the circumstances. When Mr. Davis reached Mississippi,
after his withdrawal from the Senate, the Legislature had appropriated
$150,000 for military purposes. As Major-General commanding the forces of
the State, he was consulted as to additional appropriations. He
immediately recommended an appropriation of _three millions of dollars_.
It is needless to say that such a recommendation, at that period, was
deemed little less than extravagant folly.
[34] It should be observed that Mr. Lincoln did not call upon the Federal
Congress to assemble until July 4th, two months after the meeting of the
Confederate Congress.
[35] In this connection, we quote from a remarkably faithful and careful
chronicle of events during a portion of the war: "On the morning of the
29th of May, President Davis arrived in Richmond.... He found the military
preparations in a state requiring instant energy, and, within a few hours
after his arrival, he telegraphed and wrote messages to every State in the
South, urging that troops should be sent forward with increased
speed."--_Howison's History of the War._
[36] General Von Molkte, who planned the Prussian campaign in Bohemia.
[37] General Jubal A. Early.
[38] The speech made by Mr. Davis at the depot of the Virginia Central
Railroad was not reported in the newspapers. The writer, in company with
two friends, was in the crowd which greeted the return of Mr. Davis to the
capital, and such was the effect of the scene and the glowing words of the
speaker, that neither can ever be forgotten. A few hours subsequently to
the scene at the depot, the words, as given below, were repeated, in the
presence of several persons who heard Mr. Davis, and were pronounced by
them the identical language used by him. They were preserved in writing,
and are now published for the first time. Apart from its historical
interest, the speech is a remarkable specimen of spontaneous, sententious
eloquence, eminently appropriate to the occasion:
"_Fellow-citizens of the Confederate States_:
"I rejoice with you, this evening, in those better and happier
feelings which we all experience, as compared with the anxiety of
three days ago. Your little army--derided for its want of
numbers--derided for its want of arms--derided for its lack of all the
essential material of war--has met the grand army of the enemy, routed
it at every point, and it now flies, in inglorious retreat, before our
victorious columns. We have taught them a lesson in their invasion of
the sacred soil of Virginia; we have taught them that the grand old
mother of Washington still nurtures a band of heroes; and a yet
bloodier and far more fatal lesson awaits them, unless they speedily
acknowledge that freedom to which you were born."
[39] The _Harper's Magazine_ article of General Jordan.
[40] The Federal official reports are overwhelmingly in confirmation of
these views of General Jackson. General McClellan stated that "in no
quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer resistance to a
respectable body of the enemy."
[41] The writer heard this speech of Mr. Davis, and his recollection is
positive of the encouragement extended by the President to the hope of an
immediate forward movement. The recollection of the author of "The Diary
of a Rebel War Clerk" seems to be substantially the same.
[42] One evidence of this "persecution" would appear to consist in the
fact that the President, having reluctantly commissioned Generals Lovell
and G. W. Smith, upon the recommendations of Generals Beauregard and
Johnston, chose also to commission, at the same time, with a similar rank,
General Van Dorn, giving the latter a senior commission. Smith and Lovell
had but recently come to the South, both being residents of New York,
before the war, while Van Dorn had promptly sought service in the
Confederate army before hostilities commenced, had done excellent service,
and been constantly in front of the enemy. Another proof of "persecution"
is that the President refused to permit such an organization of the army
as he believed to be in conflict with the laws of Congress.
The commonly assigned origin of the difference between President Davis and
General Beauregard, which gave rise to so much scandal and falsehood
during the war, was the suppression of the preliminary portion of General
B.'s report of the battle of Manassas. The correct version of that matter
is now well known. President Davis did not suppress any portion of
Beauregard's report. He did object to certain preliminary statements of
the report, and requested that they should be altered or omitted. When
this was declined, the President sent the report to Congress, accompanied
by an indorsement of his own, correcting what he conceived to be errors.
General Beauregard's friends in Congress, unwilling that these comments of
the President should be published, suppressed both the objectionable
passages and the executive indorsement. So that they, and not the
President, occasioned that "suppression," from which arose much gossip and
mystery. A sufficient answer to these charges of personal antagonism by
the President to these two officers, should be the fact that he retained
them in command of the two largest armies of the Confederacy, until
relinquished by them, in the one case, because of sickness, and in the
other, in consequence of a wound which caused disability.
[43] The friends of Mr. Mallory, in illustration of this unreasoning
prejudice, were accustomed to declare that, "were a Confederate vessel to
sink in a storm, in the middle of the ocean, the Richmond _Examiner_ and
Mr. Foote would advocate the censure of the Secretary of the Navy, as
responsible for her loss."
[44] The careful reader will hardly have overlooked the passage, in the
Message to Congress, in the preceding chapter, in which Mr. Davis thus
alludes to this subject: "The active state of military preparation among
the nations of Europe, in April last, the date when our agents first went
abroad, interposed unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the
want of a navy has greatly impeded our efforts to obtain military supplies
of all sorts."
A few months later, he said, speaking with characteristic candor: "I was
among those who, from the beginning, predicted war as the consequences of
secession, although I must admit that the contest has assumed proportions
more gigantic than I had anticipated. I predicted war, not because our
right to secede and to form a government of our own was not indisputable
and clearly defined in the spirit of that declaration, which rests the
right to govern on the consent of the governed, but saw that the
wickedness of the North would precipitate a war upon us."--_Address before
Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862._
Mr. Davis here candidly admits that the "gigantic proportions" of the war
exceeded his expectations, as they did also the expectations of the whole
country and of the world. He did foresee a _great war_, and prepared for
it; but he was not guilty of the foolish pretension that the war simply
realized his expectations, when every statesman of Europe and America was
deceived, both as to its duration and magnitude. Who believes that
Napoleon the First, equally the unrivaled master of war and diplomacy,
would pretend that he foresaw the extent and duration, or the results, of
the wars of the empire? that he realized the inextinguishable nature of
English hostility, or anticipated the numerous perfidies of Austria? Mr.
Seward, who is likely to be remembered, with some distinction, in
connection with the diplomacy and statesmanship of the late war,
constantly predicted its termination in "ninety days." _No opinion can be
truthfully ascribed to Mr. Davis indicating a light estimate of the
struggle either before or during the war._ Yet there is a retrospective
statesmanship in the South which now claims that he should have been
lifted to its own preternatural powers, and from the first have seen every
phase and incident. How absurd must this pretension appear to the sober
judgment of fifty years hence.
Mr. Davis was even accredited in Richmond, by an extravagant and unfounded
popular report, with the prophecy that "children then (1862) unborn would
be soldiers in the war between the North and South." People in those days
saw nothing in the action of the Government indicating its faith in a
short war. Their only consolation was found in the editorials of Richmond
newspapers predicting foreign intervention should McClellan be defeated.
[45] Inaugural Address, February 22, 1862.
[46] The order was in these terms:
"WAR DEPARTMENT,
"ADJUTANT AND HIS INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"March 13. 1862.
"General Orders, No. 14.
"General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of Government;
and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct
of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy.
"By command of the Secretary of War.
"S. COOPER,
"_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."
[47] The fact is not generally known that the President was, upon two
occasions, assailed with urgent petitions for the removal of Stonewall
Jackson, which he peremptorily rejected on both occasions; first, after
the campaign about Romney, in December, 1861, and again, after the battle
of Kernstown. March, 1862.
[48] I am mainly indebted for these facts to a recent publication by
Professor Bledsoe, late Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederate
States.
[49] In this engagement General Benjamin McCulloch, of Texan fame, a brave
and efficient soldier, was killed.
[50] When General Beauregard had eluded Halleck at Corinth, and brought
his army to Tupelo, he turned over the command to General Bragg, and
sought repose and recuperation at Bladon Springs, Alabama. Those who
assume to be the friends and admirers of General Beauregard, but who are
far more anxious to establish a mean malignity in the character of Mr.
Davis, than to exalt their favorite, have laid great stress upon the fact,
that the President then placed Bragg in command of the army for the
ensuing campaign, thus placing Beauregard in retirement. There can be
little difficulty in comprehending the commendable motives which prompted
Mr. Davis to this course. The period of General Beauregard's absence from
his command (three weeks, it is understood) would protract the period of
inactivity until midsummer. Time was precious. The Western army had done
nothing but lose ground all the current year, and, meanwhile, Lee was
preparing his part of the operations, by which the Government hoped to
throw the enemy back upon the frontier. Was, then, the Western army to lie
idle, awaiting the disposition and convenience of one man? With the
approval of the army and the country, the President appointed to the
vacated command, an able and devoted soldier, whose reputation and service
justified the trust. The writer has seen nothing from General Beauregard
approving the assaults of his pretended admirers upon Mr. Davis, and it is
not unreasonable to suppose that he does not indorse them.
It is also urged that Mr. Davis, when pressed to remove Bragg and replace
Beauregard, declared that he would not, though the whole world should
unite in the petition. Very likely, and altogether proper that he should
not remove an officer while in the actual execution of his plans of
campaign. But there can be no better explanation than that given by Mr.
Davis: "The President remarked, that so far as giving Beauregard command
of Bragg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. _Bragg had
arranged all his plans_, and had co-intelligence with the Department, with
Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall; and _to put a new commander at the
head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would
not do it if the whole world united in the petition_."
But President Davis never designed that General Beauregard should be
without a command. With that just appreciation of the real merits of his
generals, apart from the cheap applause or unmerited censure of the crowd,
which distinguished most of his selections, he placed General Beauregard
in charge of the coast defenses, where his reputation was certainly much
enhanced. In this oft-repeated and unfounded charge of "injustice" and
"persecution," in the case of General Joseph E. Johnston, as in that of
General Beauregard, there is no specification, more awkwardly sustained,
than that which denies the abundant opportunity enjoyed by each of those
officers, for the display of the superior genius asserted for them by
their admirers. The slightest acquaintance with the history of the war
will verify this statement.
[51] Much crimination and recrimination followed the fall of New Orleans.
It is, at least, safe to say, that public opinion in the South was much
divided, as to where the burden of censure for this dire and unexpected
calamity should properly rest. The intelligence of the capture of the city
was an appalling surprise, not only to the public in Richmond, but to the
Government. President Davis declared that the event was totally unexpected
by him. The fall of New Orleans was one of those instances, in which the
Confederates had decided for them, in a most unsatisfactory manner, the
long disputed question as to the efficiency of shore batteries against
vessels of war. Precedents established, when sailing vessels were used in
warfare, were overthrown by the experience of steam vessels, especially
when iron-plated. Commodore Farragut, with perfect success and comparative
ease, passed the forts below New Orleans, after the chief of the naval
force had despaired of their reduction.
[52] These revelations of the designs of McClellan are derived from the
admirable work of Mr. Swinton--the "History of the Army of the
Potomac"--perhaps the ablest and most impartial contribution yet made to
the history of the late war.
It is noteworthy that General Grant attempted nearly the same approach to
Richmond and was signally foiled--a fact which he promptly recognized, by
his change of plan, after his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864.
[53] This dispatch was in substance: "Halt the army where it is."
[54] The incidents of this trying period, when Richmond was doubly
threatened by the hosts of McClellan, and the gunboats in the river, are
"mementoes of heroism," proudly illustrating the unconquerable spirit of
that devoted city and its rulers. We give the resolution passed by the
Legislature on the occasion referred to--May 14, 1862:
"_Resolved by the General Assembly_, That this General Assembly expresses
its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last
extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the
President of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured,
that whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or
individuals shall hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to."
Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Governor
Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the surrender
of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, if necessary.
In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo:
"I say now--and I will abide by it--when the citizens of Richmond demand
of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confederacy, to the
enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the
mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up
the city, I hope I may have physical courage and strength enough left to
shoulder a musket and go into the ranks."
[55] It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations,
similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not
therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston's
ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely
and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to
his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, _results_ were not in
his favor.
[56] Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this
circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing
the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted,
was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the
battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The
President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a
farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open.
General Lee, apprised of the President's whereabouts, sent a courier to
warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury,
just as the Federal battery opened fire.
[57] A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his
plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his
adversary's movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three
thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate
army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a
subject of much gossip in the Confederacy.
[58] A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended
neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary.
Said he: "The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty's
Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more
powerful of the two contending parties."
[59] General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own
as _ten to three_. Mr. Swinton states Hooker's force at one hundred and
twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns.
Lee's effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand.
The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his
operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely
indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to
meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An
impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet's
detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually
ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond.
[60] "Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness,
and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and
pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive
officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all
duties.... He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding
the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the
character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any
other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual
sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson
never lacked.... 'For glory he lived long enough,' continued Mr. Davis,
with much emotion; 'and if this result had to come, it was the Divine
mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the
shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy
lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons
could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it
joyfully.'"--_Craven's Prison Life of Jefferson Davis_, pp. 180, 181.
[61] Chiefly conscripts.
[62] It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave errors
at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme caution
with which such a judgment should be pronounced: "_It had not been
intended to fight a general battle at such distance from our base unless
attacked by the enemy_; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by
the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the
mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was
unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's
main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying
the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus
became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of
the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from
the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew
the attack."
Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, makes a
statement which throws much light upon the theory with which this campaign
was undertaken: "Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, General Lee
expressly promised his corps commanders that _he would not assume a
tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him_."--_Campaigns
of the Army of the Potomac._
[63] Major John Esten Cooke justly says: "Gettysburg was the
Waterloo--Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war.... Not without good
reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the North
with addresses and rejoicings--with crowds, and brass bands, and
congratulations. The American Waterloo is worth making that noise over;
and the monument proposed there is a natural conception."
[64] General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not
necessary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration
faction. His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in
the disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its
zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The
motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to offset
the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President.
[65] The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the
facts of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the
most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to
_invite all attainable testimony against him_.
[66] It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr.
Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was
the case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error.
For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism in
his appointment of General "Dick" Taylor, who was a brother of Mr. Davis'
first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon by Stonewall Jackson,
in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The President made Taylor a
Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and afterward a
Major-General, because Jackson _knew_ him to be worthy of it. Did Taylor's
subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics?
The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which
Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors,
and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless
to multiply examples.
[67] One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execution
of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Confederate
Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of their
actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The record of
their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the Federal
Government furnished a copy of the charges and specifications against
them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, _but none of
the evidence_.
From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that they
had been accused or tried as spies--that the sole charge against these
unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the
Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and
represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and
Representatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a
scintilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext
for their execution was the technical one that these officers were
recruiting in one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United
States, a principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina,
and which would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and
private we had in our service.
[68] General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling
toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his
magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the
alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces
his remarks with the declaration, that he "has never been among the
personal friends of Mr. Davis;" that he was "at no time an admirer of his
executive abilities;" and further declares himself to have been the
recipient of an "unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong," at the
hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier:
"It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and no
evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness of
the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in regard
to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character of its
articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffection
among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Unionism by the
battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all newborn
proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: 'This
man is not more disloyal than ----' (naming a well-known editor, whose
assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) 'I don't see how
one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.' To this a
gentleman replied: 'You are unjust. Mr. ----, though an enemy of the
President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no love for
them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of his own
people.' Mr. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: 'You have exactly
described the difference between the two men.'... But it _is not_ true
that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pursued them with
rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison with his supposed
friends, they were in his estimation both intellectually weak and morally
perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and appreciative of their
merits. I saw him several times during the session of a Confederate
Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once he alluded
incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment in language
or manner. I think that there was no instance of the suppression of a
newspaper, though several editors were notoriously disloyal to the
Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the
Confederate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held 'error to be the
portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that
public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.'"
[69] At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of
coin, and had a paper circulation of about the same amount.
[70] My limited space has prevented the extended account of the
Confederate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The
history of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the
Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Colonel
Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with
incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The
amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, may
be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Richmond,
that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely than he.
Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South willingly testify
to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Northrop. Equally
false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely his personal
partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had given no
previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the regular
Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, where he was
detailed, after having been disabled. His services were amply testified to
by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar qualifications for
the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis had _personal
knowledge_, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the head of the
Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than twenty years.
Again, when commissioned by Mr. Davis, Colonel Northrop was the
Commissary-General of South Carolina--a position to which he would hardly
have been invited, without at least some conviction, by the authorities of
that State, of his fitness. It is well known, too, that a committee of the
Confederate Congress investigated the affairs of the Commissary
Department, and made a report which amply and honorably vindicated Colonel
Northrop. Indeed, a member of that committee, one of the ablest men in
Virginia, and not friendly to Mr. Davis, declared it to be the best
managed department of the Confederate Government.
Editors perpetually clamored against Colonel Northrop for issuing _half
rations_ to the army, who daily issued _half sheets_ to their
subscribers--refusing to understand that in each case the cause was the
same, viz., an exhaustion of supply, resulting from the depletion of the
resources of the country.
[71] We present two resolutions of a series adopted by Federal prisoners
of war:
"_Resolved_, That whilst allowing the Confederate authorities all due
praise for the attention paid to our prisoners, numbers of our men are
daily consigned to early graves in the prime of manhood, far from home
and kindred, and this is not caused intentionally by the Confederate
Government, but by the force of circumstances; the prisoner is obliged
to go without shelter, and, in a great portion of cases, without
medicine.
* * * * *
"_Resolved_, That whereas, in the fortune of war, it was our lot to
become prisoners, we have suffered patiently, and are still willing to
suffer, if by so doing we can benefit the country, _but we would most
respectfully beg to say that we are not willing to suffer to further
the ends of any party or clique_, to the detriment of our own honor,
our families, and our country; and we would beg this affair be
explained to us, that we may continue to hold the Government in the
respect which is necessary to make a good citizen and a soldier.
"BRADLEY,
"_Chairman of Committee, on behalf of Prisoners_."
These resolutions were adopted at a meeting of prisoners in Savannah,
September 28, 1864, and sent to President Lincoln.
[72] Upon the person of Dahlgren was found the address, from which
extracts relative to the purpose of the expedition are given. The portions
which we omit are mainly exhortations to the courage of the men in a
desperate enterprise:
"_Officers and men_--
"You have been selected from brigades and regiments, as a picked
command, to attempt a desperate undertaking--an undertaking, which, if
successful, will write your names on the hearts of your countrymen in
letters that can never be erased, and which will cause the prayers of
your fellow-soldiers, now confined in loathsome prisons, to follow you
wherever you may go.
"We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, and, having
seen them fairly started, we will cross the James River into Richmond,
destroying the bridges after us, and exhorting the released prisoners
to destroy and burn the hateful city; and do not allow the rebel
leader, Davis, and his traitorous crew to escape," etc. The conclusion
of this remarkable order is, "Ask the blessing of the Almighty, and do
not fear the enemy."
We have not space for the indisputable testimony which has established the
authenticity of the "Dahlgren Papers"--a subject upon which there is no
longer room for doubt. The writer, at the time of this raid, had full
descriptions of them from persons who saw the originals. They were found
upon Dahlgren's body by a school-boy thirteen years old, who could not
write, and were immediately placed in the hands of his teacher. The soiled
folds of the paper were plainly visible. The words referring to the murder
of President Davis were a part of the regular text of the manuscript.
Additional proof of the authenticity of the papers was furnished by the
note-book, also found upon the person of Dahlgren, containing a rough
draft of the address to the troops, and various memoranda. The address was
written in pencil in the note-book, and differs very slightly from the
copy, containing, however, the injunction that the Confederate authorities
be "_killed on the spot_." The statement of Mr. Halbach, who is still
living, supported by the testimony of a number of persons, must be deemed
conclusive of the genuineness of the documents published in the Richmond
journals.
Hon. Stephen R. Mallory, late Confederate Secretary of the Navy, has
recently made the following statement of Mr. Davis' course concerning this
matter:
"An expedition directed avowedly against the lives of the heads of the
Government, and aiming at firing an entire city, was deemed so
violative of the rules of war as to demand a retribution of death upon
all concerned in it.
"The subject was one of universal discussion in Richmond; excitement
increased with what it fed upon; Congress participated in it; and a
pressure was brought to bear upon Mr. Davis to order the execution of
some of the captured.
"He entertained no doubt that justice, humanity, and policy equally
forbade this cruel measure, and refused to sanction it; and at the
same time referred the subject to General Lee, then near Petersburg,
for immediate attention. The General's answer promptly came,
asserting, without having been apprized of them, the views already
presented by Mr. Davis; and the chief of which was, that the men,
having surrendered with arms in their hands, and been accepted and
treated as prisoners of war, could not, in retaliation for the
unexecuted designs of their leader, be treated otherwise. This
disposed of the case, and satisfied the people, who were ever ready to
recognize the wisdom and policy of General Lee's judgment."
[73] The "Fort Pillow massacre" was a fruitful theme for new chapters of
"rebel barbarities." Forrest was charged with indiscriminate slaughter of
a captive garrison, when, in fact, he only continued to fight a garrison
which had not surrendered. After the Confederates had forced their way
into the fort, the flag was not taken down, nor did the garrison offer to
surrender. The explanation obviously was that the enemy relied upon their
gunboats in the river to destroy Forrest's forces after they had entered
the fort.
[74] In the last two years of the war, there were few more promising
officers than General Hoke. Mr. Davis thought very highly of his capacity,
and, upon one occasion, alluded to him as "that gallant North Carolinian,
who always did his duty, and did it thoroughly."
[75] At Hanover Junction, on the 23d of May, General Lee was joined by
Breckinridge's division, numbering less than three thousand muskets, and
by Pickett's division of perhaps three thousand five hundred muskets.
General Lee was compelled, very shortly afterwards, to send Breckinridge's
division back to the Valley.
[76] This estimate includes Grant's losses in his assaults upon the
fortifications of Petersburg, immediately after his passage of the James
River. I have seen his total losses from the Rapidan, until the siege of
Petersburg was regularly begun, estimated by Northern writers, at over
ninety thousand.
[77] President Davis regarded the security of Atlanta as an object of the
utmost consequence, for which, if necessary, even great hazards must be
run. His frequent declaration was that the Confederacy "_had no vital
points_." This theory was correct, as there was certainly no one point,
the loss of which necessarily involved the loss of the cause. Yet it was
obvious in the beginning that certain sections, either for strategic
reasons, or as sources of supply, were of vast importance for the
prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The value of
Richmond and Virginia was obvious. Equally important was a secure foothold
in the Mississippi Valley, and the possession of the great mountainous
range from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the "backbone region" of the South.
Mr. Davis regarded each one of these three objects as justifying almost
any hazard or sacrifice. Under no circumstances could he approve a
military policy which contemplated the surrender of either of these
objects, without a desperate struggle. He had wanted Vicksburg defended to
the last extremity, and now desired equal tenacity as to Atlanta. This
city was a great manufacturing centre; the centre of the system of
railroads diverging in all directions through the Gulf States, and it was
the last remaining outpost in the defense of the central section of the
Confederacy.
[78] Yet the argument that General Hood's errors establish the wisdom of
General Johnston's policy, can hardly be deemed fair by an intelligent and
impartial judgment. A more competent commander than Hood might have more
ably executed an offensive campaign, even after the fall of Atlanta; or,
again, other tactics than those of Johnston, from Dalton to Atlanta, might
have had better results.
After Johnston's removal, the President received numerous letters from
prominent individuals in the Cotton States, heartily applauding that step.
The condemnation of the President, for the removal of Johnston, came only
after Hood's disasters; and it must be remembered that Hood's later
operations were not in accordance with Mr. Davis' views.
The writer remembers a pithy summary of the Georgia campaign, made by a
Confederate officer, shortly before the end of the war. Said he: "While
Johnston was in command there were _no results at all_; when Hood took
command, _results came very rapidly_."
[79] It has been contended that the odds against the South in numbers and
resources were compensated by the advantages of her defensive position,
and by the strong incentives of a war for her homes and liberties. An
ingenious argument in demonstration of the assumed defective
administration of the Confederacy has been deduced from various historical
examples of successful resistance against overwhelming odds. The most
plausible citation has been the success of Frederick the Great, in his
defense of Prussia against the coalition of Russia, Austria, and France.
This illustration has no value, as it does not at all meet the case.
Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the
South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance.
Frederick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South
fought three, four, sometimes five to one--but never equal numbers. Again,
Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches--not penetrated, like
the South, in every direction by navigable rivers, and nearly surrounded
by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had the lives and
property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on the other hand,
never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being
constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be
coerced by the press hostile to the administration, or influenced by the
slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole
means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet
invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses
providing exemptions and immunities of every description. President Davis
was too sincere a republican, and had too much regard for the restraints
of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted powers.
It is to be remembered, too, that the South received no foreign aid, while
Frederick was at last saved by the accession of Peter to the Russian
throne, which event dissolved the coalition against Prussia.
[80] General Hood's magnanimous acknowledgment is sufficient for the
acquittal of Mr. Davis from any responsibility for this ill-starred
movement. On taking leave of his army, in January, 1865, Hood said,
speaking of the late campaign: "_I am alone responsible for its
conception, and strove hard to do my duty in its execution_."
But in addition to this, there was a correspondence, between Mr. Davis and
a Confederate officer of high rank, which _completely exculpated Mr.
Davis_. In accordance with Mr. Davis' accustomed magnanimity and regard
for the public welfare, this correspondence was never published. The facts
in this matter conspicuously illustrate the persistent and reckless
misrepresentation, which has not ceased with the termination of the war.
With a class of writers, the _facts_ regarding Mr. Davis are things least
to be desired. In many instances, their attacks upon his fame are puerile,
but in others, where facts are either distorted or wantonly disregarded,
the object seems to be merely to gratify a wicked spirit of detraction.
[81] In the autumn of 1864, General Price advanced into Missouri,
proclaiming his purpose to be a permanent occupation. The expedition ended
in disaster. Defeated in an engagement on the Big Blue, Price retreated
into Kansas, and finally into Southern Arkansas. The campaign did not
affect the current of the war elsewhere, and was a failure.
[82] The author has seen an absurd statement, made without any inquiry
into the facts, that Mr. Davis was seen to turn "ghastly white" at the
moment of receiving the intelligence of the disaster at Petersburg. It is
simply one of a thousand other reckless calumnies, with as little
foundation as the rest.
We do not feel called upon here to relate the details of the evacuation of
Richmond and the occupation of the city by the Federal army. They are,
doubtless, known to every intelligent reader, and we are here specially
concerned only in the movements of Mr. Davis.
End of Project Gutenberg's The Life of Jefferson Davis, by Frank H. Alfriend