PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862--EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--
EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS--THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE
PROSPECTS--WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED--THE
BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED--THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY HEAVEN--
RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS--THE CONFEDERATE
GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862--PRESIDENT DAVIS
URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR--HIS WISE OPPOSITION TO SHORT
ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS--PREMONITIONS OF MISFORTUNES IN THE WEST--THE
CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY--GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON--HIS
CAREER BEFORE THE WAR--CHARACTER--APPEARANCE--THE FRIEND OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS--MUTUAL ESTEEM--SIDNEY JOHNSTON IN KENTUCKY--HIS PLANS--HIS
DIFFICULTIES--THE FORCES OF GRANT AND BUELL--CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL
SIDNEY JOHNSTON--A REVERSE--GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON--
LOSS OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE--FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST--BURNSIDE
CAPTURES ROANOKE ISLAND--SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES--POPULAR
DISAPPOINTMENT--ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE
ADMINISTRATION--CHARACTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION--AN EFFORT TO
REVOLUTIONIZE PRESIDENT DAVIS' CABINET--ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES
BENJAMIN AND MALLORY--CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE
REVERSES--CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJAMIN--SECRETARY MALLORY--
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND--THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT--SECOND
INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS--SEVERITY OF THE SEASON--THE CEREMONIES--
APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS--ITS EFFECT--
POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE--MESSAGE TO CONGRESS--COMMENTS OF RICHMOND PRESS.
When President Davis held his first New-Year's reception, as the chief
magistrate of the infant Confederacy, there were not wanting signs of the
approaching shadows, which were to throw in temporary eclipse the
brilliant foreground of the first year of the war. Richmond was then in
its exultant spirit, its gayety, festivity, and show, the type of that
fatal confidence in Southern invincibility, which, in a few weeks of
disaster, was brought to grief and humiliation.
In that numerous and brilliant assemblage, representing the various
branches of the new government, civil, naval, and military, members of
Congress and of State Legislatures, and admiring citizens, eager to make
formal tender of their esteem to the first President of the South, there
were few who discerned the omens of the coming storm, which was to shake
its foundation, the power of which that occasion was an imposing symbol.
Perhaps there were as few who could penetrate his assuring exterior of
grace, gentleness, and dignity, and share the anxiety with which, even in
the midst of popular adulation, he contemplated the approach of that stern
trial for which the country was so deficient in preparation.
With singular accord of opinion, writers, who had an _inside_ view of the
Southern conduct of the war, have commented upon the disasters consequent
upon the period of fancied security and relaxed exertions which followed
the battle of Manassas. We can not share, however, the shallow and
unphilosophical conclusion which pronounces the glorious triumph of
Manassas a calamity to the South. The temporary salvation of the
Confederacy, guaranteed by that victory, was not its only fruit. Manassas
gave a stamp of _prestige_ to Southern valor and soldiership, which not
even a deluge of subsequent disasters could efface. It gave an
imperishable record and an undying incentive to resolution.
Yet it is not to be questioned that the public apathy, engendered by an
exaggerated estimate of the value of the numerous and consecutive
triumphs of the preceding summer and autumn, was measurably productive of
evil consequences. Encouraged by the press, in many instances, the
Southern people saw, in the comparatively easy triumphs of their superior
valor over undisciplined Northern mobs--for which Manassas, Belmont,
Leesburg, and similar engagements constituted the mere apprenticeship of
war--the auguries significant of a speedy attainment of their
independence. Inflated orators and boastful editorials proclaimed the
absolute certainty of early interference of foreign powers, in behalf of
the South, as the source of the indispensable staples of cotton and
tobacco. In the face of the enormous preparations of the enemy, his
monster armies, numbering, in December, 1861, more than six hundred
thousand men; his numerous fleets for sea-board operations, and iron-clad
floating batteries for the interior streams, comparatively insignificant
successes were pointed to as sufficient proofs of the inability of the
enemy to make any serious impression upon Southern territory.
The Richmond _Examiner_, which had early evinced a disposition hostile to
President Davis and his administration, the ablest and most influential
journal of the South, destined to furnish both the brains and inspiration
in support of future opposition, was conspicuous in its contempt for the
fighting qualities of the North, and vehement in its prophesies of good
fortune for the Confederacy. Late in December, the _Examiner_, commenting
upon recent intelligence from the North, said: "All other topics become
trifles beside the tidings of England which occupies this journal, and all
commentary that diverts public attention from that single point is
impertinence. The effect of the outrage of the Trent on the public
sentiment of Great Britain more than fulfills the prophesy that we made
when the arrest of the Confederate ministers was a fresh event. All legal
quibbling and selfish calculation has been consumed like straw in the
burning sense of incredible insult. The Palmerston cabinet has been forced
to immediate and decisive measures; and a peremptory order to Lord Lyons
comes with the steamer that brings the news to the American shore. He is
directed to demand the unconditional surrender of Messrs. Mason and
Slidell, to place them in the position they were found beneath the British
flag, and a complete disavowal of their seizure as an authorized act.
_Now, the Northern Government has placed itself in such a position that it
can do none of these things. The Abolitionist element of the Northern
States would go straight to revolution at the least movement toward a
surrender of the captives_; the arrest was made by the deliberately
written orders of the Government, already avowed and published beyond the
hope of apology or possibility of retraction.
"The United States can do absolutely nothing but refuse the demands of
Great Britain, and abide the consequences of that refusal. What they will
be can be clearly foretold: _first, there will be the diplomatic rupture;
Lord Lyons will demand his passports, and Mr. Adams will be sent away from
London; then will follow an immediate recognition of the Southern
Confederacy, with encouragement and aid in fitting out its vessels, and
supplying their wants in the British ports and islands. Lastly, a war will
be evolved from these two events._"
Continuing its comments upon what it terms the "raving madness" of the
North, the _Examiner_ says: "Then came the proclamation of Lincoln.
Nothing but insanity could have dictated it; and without it the secession
of Virginia was impossible. _Then their crazy attempt to subdue a country
not less difficult to conquer than Russia itself, with an armed mob of
loafers._"
In the contemplation of the pleasing sketch which its imagination had
executed, the _Examiner_ asks: "_Spectators of these events, who can doubt
that the Almighty fiat has gone forth against the American Union, or that
the Southern Confederacy is decreed by the Divine Wisdom?_" It declares
that the "dullest worldling, the coolest Atheist, the most hardened cynic,
might be struck with awe by the startling and continued interposition of a
power beyond the control or cognizance of men in these affairs;" and
triumphantly asks: "Who thought, when the Trent was announced to sail,
that on its deck, and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of
the blockade would be lost?"
The natural and inevitable result of the assurances tendered to the
people, was to lull the patriotic ardor which marked the first great
uprising for defense, when two hundred thousand men sprung to arms. There
can be no justice in holding the Confederate Government responsible for
the popular apathy, which it had no agency in producing, or for the
weakness of the armies, which, next to the naval weakness of the South,
was the immediate cause of the disasters of the early months of 1862.
Since the commencement of hostilities, the Government had been
indefatigable in its efforts to promote enlistments of _volunteers for the
war_, instead of the twelve-months' system, which could be adequate for
the demands of a temporary exigency only, and not for such a terrific
struggle as must result from the temper and resources of the two
contestants. Volunteering was as yet the only method of raising troops
sanctioned by law, or likely to meet popular approval. The country was not
yet prepared for an enforced levy of troops; and it is only necessary to
remember the opposition, in certain quarters, to the execution of the
subsequent conscription law, adopted under the pressure of disasters which
made its necessity plain and inevitable, to conjecture the temper in which
such a measure would have been met, in the over-confident and foolishly
exultant tone of the press and public in the winter of 1861.
Mr. Davis especially sought to disabuse the public mind of its fallacious
hope of a short contest, by his efforts to place the military resources of
the South upon a footing capable of indefinite resistance to an attempt at
conquest, which was to end only with the success or exhaustion of the
North. Conscious of the perpetual disorganization and decimation of the
armies which must result from the system of short enlistments, he had,
early in the war, attracted unfriendly criticism by his refusal of any
more six or twelve-months' volunteers than were necessary to meet the
shock of the enemy's first advance. It was clear to his mind that, under
the wretched system of short enlistments, which he characterized as a
"frightful cause of disaster," the country must, at some period of the
war, be virtually without an army. Such was the case in January and
February, 1862, when the enemy eagerly pressed his immense advantage while
the process of furloughs and reënlistments was in progress, and the army
almost completely disorganized.
Such a crisis was inevitable, and had it not occurred then, it would
merely have been deferred, to be encountered at a period when the capacity
of the Confederacy was even less adequate for its perils. The lesson was
not without its value, since it drove the country and the press to a
recognition of the fact that independence was not to be won by shifts and
dalliance, by temporary expedients, and by spasmodic popular uprisings for
temporary exigencies.
The efforts of the Government were unceasing to prepare for the tremendous
onset of the enemy in almost every quarter of the Confederacy, which it
must have been blind, indeed, not to anticipate. The responses to the
calls of the Government were neither in numbers nor enthusiasm
encouraging. The people were blind in their confidence, and deaf to
appeals admonishing them of perils which, in their fancied security, they
believed impossible of realization. But this soothing sense of security
was soon to have a terrible awakening. The Confederate Government had
recognized the peculiar perils menacing the western section of its
territory. There for weeks rested the anxious gaze of President Davis, and
thence were to come the first notes of alarm--the immediate premonitions
of disaster.
Immediately, upon the occupation of Kentucky by the Confederate forces,
had begun the development of a plan of defense by the Southern generals.
The command of General Polk, constituting the Confederate left, was at
Columbus. On the upper waters of the Cumberland River, in South-eastern
Kentucky, was a small force constituting the Confederate right, commanded
first by General Zollicoffer, and afterward by General Crittenden. At
Bowling Green, with Green River in front, and communicating by railway
with Nashville and the South, was the main Confederate force in Kentucky,
commanded by General Buckner until the arrival of General Albert Sidney
Johnston, whom President Davis had commissioned a full general in the
Confederate service, and assigned to the command of the Western
Department.
Apart from the historical interest which belongs to the name of Albert
Sidney Johnston, and from the dramatic incident of his death at the very
climax of a splendid victory, which immediately paled into disaster upon
his fall, as the long and valued friend of Jefferson Davis, he is
entitled to special mention in the biography of the latter.
Albert Sidney Johnston was born in Mason County, Kentucky, in 1803. He
graduated at West Point in 1826; was commissioned as Lieutenant of
infantry; served in the Black Hawk war with distinction; resigned and
settled in Texas in 1836. He volunteered as a private in her armies soon
after the battle of San Jacinto. His merit soon raised him from the ranks,
and he was appointed senior Brigadier-General, and succeeded General
Houston in the command of the Texan army. In 1838 he was appointed Texan
Secretary of War, and in 1839 organized an expedition against the hostile
Cherokees, in which he routed them completely in a battle on the river
Neches. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States,
and after this union was effected, he took part in the Mexican war. His
services at the siege of Monterey drew upon him the public favor and the
thanks of General Butler. He continued in the army, and in 1857, was sent
by President Buchanan as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army to
subdue the Mormons. His successful advance in the Great Salt Lake City,
and the skill and address with which he conducted a difficult enterprise,
largely increased his fame. When the war commenced between the North and
South, he was in California, but when he learned the progress of the
revolution, he resigned his commission and set out from San Francisco, to
penetrate by land to Richmond, a distance of two thousand three hundred
miles.
The safe arrival of General Albert Sidney Johnston, within the lines of
the Confederacy, was greeted with a degree of public acclamation hardly
less enthusiastic than would have signalized the intelligence of a great
victory. It was known that the Federal authorities, anxious to prevent so
distinguished and valuable an accession to the generalship of the South,
were intent upon his capture. For weeks popular expectation had been
strained, in eager gaze, for tidings of the distinguished commander, who,
beset by innumerable perils and obstacles, was making his way across the
continent, not less eager to join his countrymen, than were they to feel
the weight of his noble blade in the unequal combat.
Few of the eminent soldiers, who had sought service under the banners of
the Confederacy, had a more brilliant record of actual service; and to the
advantages of reputation, General Johnston added those graces and
distinctions of person with which the imagination invests the ideal
commander. He was considerably past middle age; his height exceeded six
feet, his frame was large and sinewy; his every movement and posture
indicated vigorous and athletic manhood. The general expression of his
striking face was grave and composed, but inviting rather than austere.
The arrival of General Johnston in Richmond, early in September, was a
source of peculiar congratulation to President Davis. Between these
illustrious men had existed, for many years, an endearment, born of close
association, common trials and triumphs, and mutual confidence, which
rendered most auspicious their coöperation in the cause of Southern
independence.
"Albert Sidney Johnston," says Professor Bledsoe, in a recent publication,
"who, take him all in all, was the simplest, bravest, grandest man we have
ever known, once said to the present writer: 'There is no measuring such a
man as Davis;' and this high tribute had a fitting counterpart in that
which Davis paid Johnston, when discussing, in the Federal Senate, the
Utah expedition. Said he ... 'I hold that the country is indebted to the
administration for having selected the man who is at the head of the
expedition; who, as a soldier, has not a superior in the army or out of
it; and whose judgment, whose art, whose knowledge is equal to this or any
other emergency; a man of such decision, such resolution that his
country's honor can never be tarnished in his hands; a man of such
calmness, such kindness, that a deluded people can never suffer by
harshness from him.'"
President Davis immediately tendered to General Johnston the command of
one of the two grand military divisions of the Confederacy, and he as
promptly repaired to the scene of his duties.
The general features of General Johnston's policy contemplated a line of
defense running from the Mississippi through the region immediately
covering Nashville to Cumberland Gap--the key to the defense of East
Tennessee and South-western Virginia, and thus to the most vital line of
communication in the South. It is easy to conceive the large force
requisite for so important and difficult a task, against the immense
armies of Grant and Buell, numbering, in the aggregate, more than one
hundred thousand men. Despite the earnest appeals of General Johnston, and
notwithstanding that upon the successful maintenance of his position
depended the successful defense of the entire southern and south-western
sections of the Confederacy, his force, at the last of January, 1862, did
not exceed twenty-six thousand men. Informed of his perilous situation,
the Confederate Government could do no more than second the appeals and
remonstrances of General Johnston. Slight accessions were made to his
force from the States which were menaced, but, as results speedily
demonstrated, he was unable to meet the enemy with an adequate force at
any one of the vital points of his defensive line.
In the immediate front of General Johnston's position was the army of
Buell, estimated at forty thousand men, which, during the entire winter,
was in training for its meditated advance along the line of the railroad
in the direction of Nashville. Under Grant, at Cairo, was an army of more
than fifty thousand men, which, in coöperation with a formidable naval
force, was designed to operate against Nashville, and, by securing
possession of the line of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, to hold
Kentucky and West Tennessee. General Johnston's position was indeed a
cruel dilemma, and was sufficiently explained in a letter to President
Davis, representing the inadequacy of his force, for either front of
attack, upon a line whose every point demanded ample defense. Only a
self-denying patriotism could have induced General Johnston to occupy his
false position before the public, which accredited to him an army ample
even for aggressive warfare. With an almost certain prospect of disaster,
he nevertheless resolved to make the supreme effort which alone could
avert it.
His plan was to meet Grant's attack upon Nashville with sixteen thousand
men, hoping, in the meanwhile, by boldly confronting Buell with the
residue of his forces, to hold in check the enemy in his immediate front.
During the winter, by a skillful disposition of his forces and adroit
maneuvers, he deceived the enemy as to his real strength, and thus
deferred the threatened advance until the month of February.
The month of January, 1862, was to witness the first check to the arms of
the Confederacy, after seven months of uninterrupted victory. The scene of
the disaster was near Somerset, Kentucky. The forces engaged were
inconsiderable as compared with the conflicts of a few weeks later, but
the result was disheartening to the impatient temper of the South, not yet
chastened by the severe trials of adversity. General Crittenden was badly
defeated, though, as is probable, through no erroneous calculation or
defective generalship on his part. A melancholy feature of the disaster
was the death of General Zollicoffer. With the repulse and retreat of the
Confederate forces after the battle of Fishing Creek, as the action was
called, followed the virtual possession of South-eastern Kentucky by the
Federal army. The Confederate line of defense in Kentucky was thus broken,
and the value of other positions materially impaired.
Early in February the infantry columns of Grant and the gunboats of
Commodore Foote commenced the ascent of the Tennessee River. The immediate
object of assault was Fort Henry, an imperfectly constructed
fortification, on the east bank of the river, near the dividing line of
Kentucky and Tennessee. After a signal display of gallantry by its
commander, General Tilghman, the fort was surrendered, the main body of
the forces defending it having been previously sent to Fort Donelson, the
principal defense of the Cumberland River. The capture of Fort Henry
opened the Tennessee River, penetrating the States of Tennessee and
Alabama, and navigable for steamers for more than two hundred miles, to
the unchecked advance of the enemy.
General Grant promptly advanced to attack Fort Donelson. After a series of
bloody engagements and a siege of several days, Fort Donelson was
surrendered, with the garrison of more than nine thousand men. This result
was indeed a heavy blow to the Confederacy, and produced a most alarming
crisis in the military affairs of the Western Department. General
Johnston was near Nashville, with the force which had lately held Bowling
Green, the latter place having been evacuated during the progress of the
fight at Fort Donelson. Nashville was immediately evacuated, and the
remnant of General Johnston's army retreated southward, first to
Murfreesboro', Tennessee, and afterwards crossed the Tennessee, at
Decatur, Alabama.
In January, General Beauregard had been transferred from Virginia to
Kentucky, and, at the time of the surrender of Nashville, was in command
of the forces in the neighborhood of Columbus, Kentucky, which protected
the passage of the Mississippi. The entire Confederate line of defense in
Kentucky and Tennessee having been lost with the surrender of Forts Henry
and Donelson, its various posts became untenable. In a subsequent portion
of this narrative, we shall trace the results of the Confederate endeavor
to establish a new line of defense in the West by a judicious and masterly
combination of forces.
Meanwhile, the preparations of the enemy in the East were even more
formidable and threatening than in the West. It was in Virginia that the
"elastic spirit" of the North, as the Richmond _Examiner_ termed the
alacrity of the consecutive popular uprisings in favor of the war at the
North, was chiefly ambitious and hopeful of decisive results in favor of
the Union. Here was to be sought retrieval of the national honor lost at
Manassas; here was the capital of the Confederacy, which, once taken, the
"rebellion would collapse." The energy and administrative ability of
General McClellan had accomplished great results in the creation of a fine
army and the security of the capital. But, with the opening of the season
favorable to military operations, he was expected to accomplish far more
decisive results--nothing less than the capture of Richmond, the expulsion
of the Confederate authority from Virginia, and the destruction of the
Confederate army at Manassas.
Until the opening of spring, military operations in Virginia were attended
by no events of importance. But the East was not to be without its
contribution to the unvarying tide of Confederate disaster. In the month
of February, Roanoke Island, upon the sea-line of North Carolina, defended
by General Wise, with a single brigade, was assaulted by a powerful
combined naval and military expedition, under General Burnside, and
surrendered, with its garrison. This success opened to the enemy the
sounds and inlets of that region, with their tributary streams, and gave
him easy access to a productive country and important communications.
It was not difficult to estimate correctly the serious nature of these
successive reverses covering nearly every field of important operations.
They were of a character alarming, indeed, in immediate consequences, and,
necessarily, largely affecting the destiny of the war in its future
stages. Retreat, evacuation, and surrender seemed the irremediable
tendency of affairs every-where. Thousands of prisoners were in the hands
of the enemy, the capital of the most important State in the West
occupied, the Confederate centre was broken, the great water-avenues of
the south-west open to the enemy, the campaign transferred from the heart
of Kentucky to the northern borders of the Gulf States, and hardly an
available line was left for the recovery of the lost territory.
Within a few weeks the extravagant hopes of the South were brought to the
verge of extreme apprehension. The public mind was not to be soothed by
the affected indifference of the press to calamities, the magnitude of
which was too palpable, in the presence of actual invasion of nearly one
half the Southern territory, and of imminent perils threatening the speedy
culmination of adverse fortune to the Confederacy. Richmond, which, during
the war, was at all times the reflex of the hopes and aspirations of the
South, was the scene of gloom and despondency, in painful contrast with
the ardent and gratulatory tone so lately prevalent.
Popular disappointment rarely fails in its search for scapegoats upon
which to visit responsibility for misfortunes. A noticeable result of the
Confederate reverses in the beginning of 1862 was the speedy evolution of
an organized hostility to the administration of President Davis. The
season was eminently propitious for outward demonstrations of feeling,
heretofore suppressed, in consequence of the brilliant success, until
recently, attending the movement for Southern independence. The universal
and characteristic disposition of the masses to receive, with favor,
censure of their rulers, and to charge public calamities to official
failure and maladministration, was an inviting inducement, in this period
of public gloom, to the indulgence of partisan aspirations and personal
spleen.
To one familiar with the political history of the South during the decade
previous to secession, there could be no difficulty in penetrating the
various motives, instigating to union, for a common purpose, the
heterogeneous elements of this opposition. Prominent among its leaders
were men, the life-long opponents of the President, notorious for their
want of adhesion to any principle or object for its own sake, and
especially lukewarm, at all times, upon issues vitally affecting the
safety of the South. These men could not forget, even when their
allegiance had been avowed to the sacred cause of country and liberty, the
rancor engendered in the old contests of party. Some, in addition to
disappointed political ambition, arising from the failure of the President
to tender them the foremost places in the Government, had personal
resentments to gratify. Much the larger portion of the opposition, which
continued, until the last moments of the Confederacy, to assail the
Government, had its origin in these influences, and they speedily
attracted all restless and impracticable characters--born Jacobins,
malcontents by the decree of nature, and others of the class who are
"never at home save in the attitude of contradiction."
At first feeble in influence, this faction, by pertinacious and
unscrupulous efforts, eventually became a source of embarrassment, and
promoted the wide-spread division and distrust which, in the latter days
of the Confederacy, were so ominous of the approaching catastrophe. Its
earliest shafts were ostensibly not aimed at the President, since there
was no evidence that the popular affection for Mr. Davis would brook
assaults upon him, but assumed the shape of accusations against his
constitutional advisers. A deliberate movement, cloaked in the disguise of
respectful remonstrance and petition, sustained by demagogical
speeches--which, though artfully designed, in many instances revealed the
secret venom--was arranged, upon the assembling of the First Congress
under the permanent Government, to revolutionize the cabinet of President
Davis.
Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the
Navy, were the objects of especial and most envenomed assault. They were
assailed in Congress, and by a portion of the Richmond press, as directly
chargeable with the late reverses. Yet it should have been plain that the
most serious of these disasters were attributable chiefly to the
overwhelming naval preponderance of the enemy--an advantage not to have
been obviated entirely by any degree of foresight on the part of the
Confederate naval secretary--and by a deficiency of soldiers, for which
the country itself, and not Mr. Benjamin, was to be censured.
The indisputable facts in the case were ample in the vindication of Mr.
Mallory, as to the insufficient defenses of the Western rivers, now in
Federal possession. The obvious dangers of the Cumberland and Tennessee
Rivers, as an avenue of access to the heart of the South, were not
overlooked by the Government. The channels of these rivers are navigable
during a large portion of the year, and the two streams gradually approach
each other, as they pass from Tennessee into Kentucky, on their course to
the Ohio, coming at one point within less than three miles of each other,
and emptying their waters only ten miles apart. The facilities afforded by
their proximity for combined military and naval operations, were
necessarily apparent. The Government contemplated the defense of these
streams by floating defenses the only means by which they could be
debarred to the enemy. The Provisional Congress, however, by a most
singular and fatal oversight of the recommendation of the Government, made
no appropriation for floating defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland,
until the opportunity to prepare them had passed.
It authorized the President to cause to be constructed thirteen steam
gunboats _for sea-coast defense_, and such floating defenses for the
Mississippi River as he might deem best adapted to the purpose; but no
provision was made for armed steamers on the large Western interior rivers
until the month of January, 1862, when an act was approved appropriating
one million of dollars, to be expended for this purpose, at the discretion
of the President, by the Secretary of War, or of the Navy, as he might
direct. This was less than _four weeks_ before the actual advance of the
Federal gunboats, and was, of course, too late for the needed armaments.
The appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars, for equipment and
repairs of vessels of the Confederate navy, hardly sufficed to enable the
Secretary of that department to maintain a few frail steamers on the
Tennessee, hastily prepared from commercial or passenger boats, and very
imperfectly armed.
A congressional investigating committee censured Mr. Benjamin and General
Huger as responsible for the capture of Roanoke Island and its garrison.
The latter affair was indeed a disaster not to be lightly palliated, and
was one of those inexplicable mishaps, which, upon retrospection, we see
should have been avoided, though it is at least doubtful who is justly
censurable. It is, however, only just to state that no view of the Roanoke
Island disaster has ever been presented to the writer, which did not
acquit General Wise of all blame. His exculpation was complete before
every tribunal of opinion.
Whatever may have been the real merit of these issues made against
Secretaries Mallory and Benjamin, it is very certain that those two
gentlemen continued to be the objects of marked disfavor from those
members of Congress, and that portion of the Richmond press known to be
hostile to the administration of Mr. Davis. Popular prejudice is
proverbially unreasoning, and it was indeed singular to note how promptly
the public echoed the assaults of the hostile press against these
officials, upon subsequent occasions, when they were held accountable for
disasters with which they had no possible connection.[43]
This period of Confederate misfortunes gave the first verification of a
fact which afterward had frequent illustration, that the resolution of the
South, so indomitable in actual contest, staggered under the weight of
reverses. The history of the war was a record of the variations of the
Southern mind between extreme elation and immoderate depression.
Extravagant exultation over success, and immoderate despondency over
disaster, usually followed each other in prompt succession.
Overestimating, in many instances, the importance of its own victories,
the South quite as frequently exaggerated the value of those won by the
enemy. There was thus a constant departure from the middle ground of
dispassionate judgment, which would have accurately measured the real
situation; making available its opportunities, by a vigorous prosecution
of advantage, and overcoming difficulties by energetic preparation.
But this despondency happily gave place to renewed determination, as the
success of the enemy brought him nearer the homes of the South, and made
more imminent the evils of subjugation. A grand and noble popular
reanimation was the response to the renewed vigor and resolution of the
Government.
When the Confederate Government was organized at Montgomery, the operation
of the provisional constitution was limited to the period of one year, to
be superseded by the permanent government. No material alteration of the
political organism was found necessary, nor was there any change in the
_personnel_ of the administration--Mr. Davis having been unanimously
chosen President at the election in November, and retaining his
administration as it existed at the close of the functions of the
provisional constitution. Though the change was thus merely nominal, the
occasion was replete with historic interest to the people whose liberties
were involved in the fate of the government, now declared "permanent." It
was, indeed, an assumption of a new character--a declaration, with renewed
emphasis, of the high and peerless enterprise of independent national
existence; an introduction to a future, promising a speedy fulfillment of
inestimable blessings or "woes unnumbered."
On the 18th of February, 1862, the first Congress, under the permanent
constitution of the Confederate States, assembled in the capitol at
Richmond. On the 22d occurred the ceremony of the inauguration of
President Davis.
To the citizens of Richmond and others who were spectators, the scene in
Capitol Square, on that memorable morning, was marked by gloomy
surroundings, the recollection of which recalls, with sad interest,
suggestive omens, which then seemed to betoken the adverse fate of the
Confederacy. The season was one of unusual rigor, and the preceding month
of public calamity and distress had been fitly commemorated by a
protracted series of dark and cheerless days. Never, within the
recollection of the writer, had there been a day in Richmond so severe,
uncomfortable, and gloomy, as the day appointed for the ceremony of
inauguration. For days previous heavy clouds had foreshadowed the rain,
which fell continuously during the preceding night, and which seemed to
increase in volume on the morning of the ceremony. The occasion was in
singular contrast with that which, a year previous, had witnessed the
installment of the provisional government--upon a day whose genial
sunshine seemed prophetic of a bright future for the infant power then
launched upon its voyage.
But however wanting in composure may have been the public mind, and
whatever the perils of the situation, the voice of their twice-chosen
chief quickly infused into the heart of the people, that unabated zeal and
unconquerable resolution, with which he proclaimed himself devoted anew to
the deliverance of his country. The inaugural address was a noble and
inspiring appeal to the patriotism of the land. Its eloquent, candid, and
patriotic tone won all hearts; and even the unfriendly press and
politicians accorded commendation to the dignity and candor with which the
President avowed his official responsibility; the manly frankness with
which he defended departments of the government unjustly assailed; and the
assuring, defiant courage, with which he invited all classes of his
countrymen to join him in the supreme sacrifice, should it become
necessary.
The inaugural ceremonies were as simple and appropriate as those witnessed
at Montgomery a year previous. The members of the Confederate Senate and
House of Representatives, with the members of the Virginia Legislature,
awaited in the hall of the House of Delegates the arrival of the
President. In consequence of the limited capacity of the hall,
comparatively few spectators--a majority of them ladies--witnessed the
proceedings there. Immediately fronting the chair of the speaker were the
ladies of Mr. Davis' household, attended by relatives and friends. In
close proximity were members of the cabinet.
A contemporary account thus mentions this scene: "It was a grave and great
assemblage. Time-honored men were there, who had witnessed ceremony after
ceremony of inauguration in the palmiest days of the old confederation;
those who had been at the inauguration of the iron-willed Jackson; men
who, in their fiery Southern ardor, had thrown down the gauntlet of
defiance in the halls of Federal legislation, and in the face of the enemy
avowed their determination to be free; and finally witnessed the
enthroning of a republican despot in their country's chair of state. All
were there; and silent tears were seen coursing down the cheeks of
gray-haired men, while the determined will stood out in every feature."
The appearance of the President was singularly imposing, though there were
visible traces of his profound emotion, and a pallor, painful to look
upon, reminded the spectator of his recent severe indisposition. His dress
was a plain citizen's suit of black. Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, temporary
President of the Confederate Senate, occupied the right of the platform;
Mr. Bocock, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the left. When
President Davis, accompanied by Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, Chairman of
the Committee of Arrangements, on the part of the Senate, reached the hall
and passed to the chair of the Speaker, subdued applause, becoming the
place and the occasion, greeted him. A short time sufficed to carry into
effect the previously arranged programme, and the distinguished procession
moved to the Washington monument, where a stand was prepared for the
occasion.
Hon. James Lyons, of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee of
Arrangements, called the assemblage to order, and an eloquent and
appropriate prayer was offered by Bishop Johns, of the Diocese of
Virginia. The President, having received a most enthusiastic welcome from
the assemblage, with a clear and measured accent, delivered his inaugural
address:
FELLOW-CITIZENS: On this, the birthday of the man most identified with
the establishment of American independence, and beneath the monument
erected to commemorate his heroic virtues and those of his
compatriots, we have assembled, to usher into existence the permanent
government of the Confederate States. Through this instrumentality,
under the favor of Divine Providence, we hope to perpetuate the
principles of our revolutionary fathers. The day, the memory, and the
purpose seem fitly associated.
It is with mingled feelings of humility and pride that I appear to
take, in the presence of the people, and before high Heaven, the oath
prescribed as a qualification for the exalted station to which the
unanimous voice of the people has called me. Deeply sensible of all
that is implied by this manifestation of the people's confidence, I am
yet more profoundly impressed by the vast responsibility of the
office, and humbly feel my own unworthiness.
In return for their kindness, I can only offer assurances of the
gratitude with which it is received, and can but pledge a zealous
devotion of every faculty to the service of those who have chosen me
as their Chief Magistrate.
When a long course of class legislation, directed not to the general
welfare, but to the aggrandizement of the Northern section of the
Union, culminated in a warfare on the domestic institutions of the
Southern States; when the dogmas of a sectional party, substituted for
the provisions of the constitutional compact, threatened to destroy
the sovereign rights of the States, six of those States, withdrawing
from the Union, confederated together to exercise the right and
perform the duty of instituting a government which would better
secure the liberties for the preservation of which that Union was
established.
Whatever of hope some may have entertained that a returning sense of
justice would remove the danger with which our rights were threatened,
and render it possible to preserve the Union of the Constitution, must
have been dispelled by the malignity and barbarity of the Northern
States in the prosecution of the existing war. The confidence of the
most hopeful among us must have been destroyed by the disregard they
have recently exhibited for all the time-honored bulwarks of civil and
religious liberty. Bastiles filled with prisoners, arrested without
civil process, or indictment duly found; the writ of _habeas corpus_
suspended by executive mandate; a State Legislature controlled by the
imprisonment of members whose avowed principles suggested to the
Federal executive that there might be another added to the list of
seceded States; elections held under threats of a military power;
civil officers, peaceful citizens, and gentle women incarcerated for
opinion's sake, proclaimed the incapacity of our late associates to
administer a government as free, liberal, and humane as that
established for our common use.
For proof of the sincerity of our purpose to maintain our ancient
institutions, we may point to the Constitution of the Confederacy and
the laws enacted under it, as well as to the fact that, through all
the necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been no act, on our
part, to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, of thought,
or of the press. The courts have been open, the judicial functions
fully executed, and every right of the peaceful citizen maintained as
securely as if a war of invasion had not disturbed the land.
The people of the States now confederated became convinced that the
Government of the United States had fallen into the hands of a
sectional majority, who would pervert the most sacred of all trusts to
the destruction of the rights which it was pledged to protect. They
believed that to remain longer in the Union would subject them to a
continuance of a disparaging discrimination, submission to which would
be inconsistent to their welfare and intolerable to a proud people.
They, therefore, determined to sever its bonds, and establish a new
confederacy for themselves.
The experiment, instituted by our revolutionary fathers, of a
voluntary union of sovereign States, for purposes specified in a
solemn compact, had been prevented by those who, feeling power and
forgetting right, were determined to respect no law but their own
will. The Government had ceased to answer the ends for which it had
been ordained and established. To save ourselves from a revolution
which, in its silent but rapid progress, was about to place us under
the despotism of numbers, and to preserve, in spirit as well as in
form, a system of government we believed to be peculiarly fitted to
our condition and full of promise for mankind, we determined to make a
new association, composed of States homogeneous in interest, in
policy, and in feeling.
True to our traditions of peace and love of justice, we sent
commissioners to the United States to propose a fair and amicable
settlement of all questions of public debt or property which might be
in dispute. But the Government at Washington, denying our right to
self-government, refused even to listen to any proposals for a
peaceful separation. Nothing was then left to us but to prepare for
war.
The first year in our history has been the most eventful in the annals
of this continent. A new government has been established, and its
machinery put in operation, over an area exceeding seven hundred
thousand square miles. The great principles upon which we have been
willing to hazard every thing that is dear to man have made conquests
for us which could never have been achieved by the sword. Our
Confederacy has grown from six to thirteen States; and Maryland,
already united to us by hallowed memories and material interests,
will, I believe, when able to speak with unstifled voice, connect her
destiny with the South. Our people have rallied, with unexampled
unanimity, to the support of the great principles of constitutional
government, with firm resolve to perpetuate by arms the rights which
they could not peacefully secure. A million of men, it is estimated,
are now standing in hostile array, and waging war along a frontier of
thousands of miles; battles have been fought, sieges have been
conducted, and, although the contest is not ended, and the tide for
the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not
doubtful.
The period is near at hand when our foes must sink under the immense
load of debt which they have incurred--a debt which, in their efforts
to subjugate us, has already attained such fearful dimensions as will
subject them to burdens which must continue to oppress them for
generations to come.
We, too, have had our trials and difficulties. That we are to escape
them in the future is not to be hoped. It was to be expected, when we
entered upon this war, that it would expose our people to sacrifices,
and cost them much both of money and blood. But we knew the value of
the object for which we struggled, and understood the nature of the
war in which we were engaged. Nothing could be so bad as failure, and
any sacrifice would be cheap as the price of success in such a
contest.
But the picture has its lights as well as its shadows. This great
strife has awakened in the people the highest emotions and qualities
of the human soul. It is cultivating feelings of patriotism, virtue,
and courage. Instances of self-sacrifice and of generous devotion to
the noble cause for which we are contending are rife throughout the
land. Never has a people evinced a more determined spirit than that
now animating men, women, and children in every part of our country.
Upon the first call, the men fly to arms; and wives and mothers send
their husbands and sons to battle without a murmur of regret.
It was, perhaps, in the ordination of Providence that we were to be
taught the value of our liberties by the price which we pay for them.
The recollections of this great contest, with all its common
traditions of glory, of sacrifices, and of blood, will be the bond of
harmony and enduring affection amongst the people, producing unity in
policy, fraternity in sentiment, and joint effort in war.
Nor have the material sacrifices of the past year been made without
some corresponding benefits. If the acquiescence of foreign nations in
a pretended blockade has deprived us of our commerce with them, it is
fast making us a self-supporting and an independent people. The
blockade, if effectual and permanent, could only serve to divert our
industry from the production of articles for export, and employ it in
supplying commodities for domestic use.
It is a satisfaction that we have maintained the war by our unaided
exertions. We have neither asked nor received assistance from any
quarter. Yet the interest involved is not wholly our own. The world at
large is concerned in opening our markets to its commerce. When the
independence of the Confederate States is recognized by the nations of
the earth, and we are free to follow our interests and inclinations by
cultivating foreign trade, the Southern States will offer to
manufacturing nations the most favorable markets which ever invited
their commerce. Cotton, sugar, rice, tobacco, provisions, timber, and
naval stores will furnish attractive exchanges. Nor would the
constancy of these supplies be likely to be disturbed by war. Our
confederate strength will be too great to attempt aggression; and
never was there a people whose interests and principles committed them
so fully to a peaceful policy as those of the Confederate States. By
the character of their productions, they are too deeply interested in
foreign commerce wantonly to disturb it. War of conquest they can not
wage, because the Constitution of their Confederacy admits of no
coerced association. Civil war there can not be between States held
together by their volition only. This rule of voluntary association,
which can not fail to be conservative, by securing just and impartial
government at home, does not diminish the security of the obligations
by which the Confederate States may be bound to foreign nations. In
proof of this, it is to be remembered that, at the first moment of
asserting their right of secession, these States proposed a settlement
on the basis of a common liability for the obligations of the General
Government.
Fellow-citizens, after the struggles of ages had consecrated the right
of the Englishman to constitutional representative government, our
colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birthright by an
appeal to arms. Success crowned their efforts, and they provided for
their posterity a peaceful remedy against future aggression.
The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and least
responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and the
remedy. Therefore we are in arms to renew such sacrifices as our
fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty. At the
darkest hour of our struggle, the provisional gives place to the
permanent government. After a series of successes and victories, which
covered our arms with glory, we have recently met with serious
disasters. But, in the heart of a people resolved to be free, these
disasters tend but to stimulate to increased resistance.
To show ourselves worthy of the inheritance bequeathed to us by the
patriots of the Revolution, we must emulate that heroic devotion which
made reverse to them but the crucible in which their patriotism was
refined.
With confidence in the wisdom and virtue of those who will share with
me the responsibility, and aid me in the conduct of public affairs;
securely relying on the patriotism and courage of the people, of which
the present war has furnished so many examples, I deeply feel the
weight of the responsibilities I now, with unaffected diffidence, am
about to assume; and, fully realizing the inadequacy of human power to
guide and to sustain, my hope is reverently fixed on Him, whose favor
is ever vouchsafed to the cause which is just. With humble gratitude
and adoration, acknowledging the Providence which has so visibly
protected the Confederacy during its brief but eventful career, to
Thee, O God! I trustingly commit myself, and prayerfully invoke Thy
blessing on my country and its cause.
The effect of this address upon the public was electrical. The anxious and
dispirited assemblage, which, for more than an hour previous to the
arrival of the President, had braved the inclement sky and traversed the
almost impassable avenues of Capitol Square, in eager longing for
re-assuring words from him upon whose courage and will so much depended,
was not disappointed. A consciousness of a burden removed, of doubts
dispelled, of the re-assured feeling, which comes with strengthened
conviction that confidence has not been misplaced, animated and thrilled
the crowd as it caught the impressive tones and gestures of the speaker.
In the memory of every beholder must forever dwell the imposing presence
of Mr. Davis, as, with uplifted hands, he pronounced the beautiful and
appropriate petition to Providence, which forms the peroration.
* * * * *
The message sent by President Davis to Congress, a few days after the
inauguration, is hardly inferior in importance, as a historical document,
to the inaugural address. In view of its explanations of the earlier
policy of the Confederate Government, of the causes of recent disasters,
and indications of important changes in the future conduct of the war, we
present entire this first message of Mr. Davis to the First Congress
assembled under the permanent Constitution:
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate
States_--
In obedience to the constitutional provision, requiring the President,
from time to time, to give to the Congress information of the state of
the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient, I have to communicate that,
since my message at the last session of the Provisional Congress,
events have demonstrated that the Government had attempted more than
it had power successfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect,
by our arms, the whole of the territory of the Confederate States,
sea-board and inland, we have been so exposed as recently to encounter
serious disasters. When the Confederacy was formed, the States
composing it were, by the peculiar character of their pursuits, and a
misplaced confidence in their former associates, to a great extent,
destitute of the means for the prosecution of the war on so gigantic a
scale as that which it has attained. The workshops and artisans were
mainly to be found in the Northern States, and one of the first duties
which devolved upon this Government was to establish the necessary
manufactories, and in the meantime to obtain, by purchase from abroad,
as far as practicable, whatever was required for the public defense.
No effort has been spared to effect both these ends, and though the
results have not equaled our hopes, it is believed that an impartial
judgment will, upon full investigation, award to the various
departments of the Government credit for having done all which human
power and foresight enabled them to accomplish.
The valor and devotion of the people have not only sustained the
efforts of the Government, but have gone far to supply its
deficiencies.
The active state of military preparations among the nations of Europe,
in April last, the date when our agents first went abroad, interposed
unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the want of a navy
has greatly impeded our efforts to import military supplies of all
sorts.
I have hoped for several days to receive official reports in relation
to our discomfiture at Roanoke Island, and the fall of Fort Donelson.
They have not yet reached me, and I am, therefore, unable to
communicate to you such information of those events, and the
consequences resulting from them, as would enable me to make
recommendations founded upon the changed condition which they have
produced. Enough is known of the surrender of Roanoke Island to make
us feel that it was deeply humiliating, however imperfect may have
been the preparations for defense. The hope is still entertained that
our reported losses at Fort Donelson have been greatly exaggerated,
inasmuch as I am not only unwilling, but unable to believe that a
large army of our people have surrendered without a desperate effort
to cut their way through investing forces, whatever may have been
their number, and to endeavor to make a junction with other divisions
of the army. But in the absence of that exact information which can
only be afforded by official reports, it would be premature to pass
judgment, and my own is reserved, as I trust yours will be, until that
information is received. In the meantime, strenuous efforts have been
made to throw forward reinforcements to the armies at the positions
threatened, and I can not doubt that the bitter disappointments we
have borne, by nerving the people to still greater exertions, will
speedily secure results more accordant with our just expectation, and
as favorable to our cause as those which marked the earlier periods of
the war.
The reports of the Secretaries of War and the Navy will exhibit the
mass of resources for the conduct of the war which we have been
enabled to accumulate, notwithstanding the very serious difficulties
against which we have contended.
They afford the cheering hope that our resources, limited as they were
at the beginning of the contest, will, during its progress, become
developed to such an extent as fully to meet our future wants.
The policy of enlistment for short terms, against which I have
steadily contended from the commencement of the war, has, in my
judgment, contributed, in no immaterial degree, to the recent reverses
which we have suffered, and even now renders it difficult to furnish
you an accurate statement of the army. When the war first broke out,
many of our people could with difficulty be persuaded that it would be
long or serious. It was not deemed possible that any thing so insane
as a persistent attempt to subjugate these States could be made--still
less that the delusion would so far prevail as to give to the war the
vast proportions which it has assumed. The people, incredulous of a
long war, were naturally averse to long enlistment, and the early
legislation of Congress rendered it impracticable to obtain volunteers
for a greater period than twelve months. Now, that it has become
probable that the war will be continued through a series of years, our
high-spirited and gallant soldiers, while generally reënlisting, are,
from the fact of having entered the service for a short term,
compelled, in many instances, to go home to make the necessary
arrangements for their families during their prolonged absence.
The quotas of new regiments for the war, called for from the different
States, are in rapid progress of organization. The whole body of our
new levies and reënlisted men will probably be ready in the ranks
within the next thirty days. But, in the meantime, it is exceedingly
difficult to give an accurate statement of the number of our forces in
the field. They may, in general terms, be stated at four hundred
regiments of infantry, with a proportionate force of cavalry and
artillery, the details of which will be shown by the report of the
Secretary of War. I deem it proper to advert to the fact that the
process of furloughs and reënlistment in progress for the last month
had so far disorganized and weakened our forces as to impair our
ability for successful defense; but I heartily congratulate you that
this evil, which I had foreseen and was powerless to prevent, may now
be said to be substantially at an end, and that we shall not again,
during the war, be exposed to seeing our strength diminished by this
fruitful cause of disaster--short enlistments.
The people of the Confederate States, being principally engaged in
agricultural pursuits, were unprovided at the commencement of
hostilities with ships, ship-yards, materials for ship-building, or
skilled mechanics and seamen, in sufficient numbers to make the prompt
creation of the navy a practicable task, even if the required
appropriations had been made for the purpose. Notwithstanding our very
limited resources, however, the report of the Secretary will exhibit
to you a satisfactory progress in preparation, and a certainty of
early completion of vessels of a number and class on which we may
confidently rely for contesting the vaunted control of the enemy over
our waters.
The financial system, devised by the wisdom of your predecessors, has
proved adequate to supplying all the wants of the Government,
notwithstanding the unexpected and very large increase of expenditures
resulting from the great augmentation in the necessary means of
defense. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury will exhibit the
gratifying fact that we have no floating debt; that the credit of the
Government is unimpaired, and that the total expenditure of the
Government for the year has been, in round numbers, one hundred and
seventy millions of dollars--less than one-third the sum wasted by the
enemy in his vain effort to conquer us--less than the value of a
single article of export--the cotton crop of the year.
The report of the Postmaster-General will show the condition of that
department to be steadily improving--its revenue increasing, and
already affording the assurance that it will be self-sustaining at the
date required by the Constitution, while affording ample mail
facilities for the people.
In the Department of Justice, which includes the Patent Office and
Public Printing, some legislative provision will be required, which
will be specifically stated in the report of the head of that
department.
I invite the attention of Congress to the duty of organizing a Supreme
Court of the Confederate States, in accordance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
I refer you to my message communicated to the Provisional Congress in
November last, for such further information touching the condition of
public affairs, as it might be useful to lay before you; the short
interval which has since elapsed not having produced any material
changes in that condition, other than those to which reference has
already been made.
In conclusion, I cordially welcome representatives who, recently
chosen by the people, are fully imbued with their views and feelings,
and can so ably advise me as to the needful provisions for the public
service. I assure you of my hearty coöperation in all your efforts for
the common welfare of the country.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
The message, not less than the inaugural address, was received with many
evidences of public reanimation. The following extracts indicate the state
of feeling in Richmond at this period:
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.
(From the Richmond Whig, Feb. 20, 1862.)
The President makes a candid and frank confession of our recent
reverses. Very justly, he does not regard them as vital to our cause;
but they will entail a long war upon us. That long war ensures our
independence, and the ultimate confusion and ruin of the Yankees....
The _Examiner_, of the same date, in the opening paragraph of its leader,
said:
The President's Message is a manly and dignified document, but, like
the inaugural, it contains not a solitary word indicating the plan or
policy of the Government. Far from objecting to this characteristic,
we think it eminently proper that the executive should keep its
counsels from the public eye, and that the Congress should withdraw
its deliberations from the public ear. What is wanted from the one is
distinct and peremptory _orders_; and from the other, decisive and
adequate provisions for the public safety. The duty of the country is
unhesitating obedience; of the soldiers, the courage that prefers
death in glory, like Jennings Wise....