to protect freedom of speech. It’s a good issue and we’ve had some fine
response. I think we ought to soon rally some support for the Smith Act
victims. I hope we can get some contributions too.”
“Fine,” the organizer added, “but always remember that we must stress
our united-front campaign. We’ve got to show the workers in these
right-wing [that is, anticommunist] unions that the Party stands for
peace, higher wages, and better working conditions.
“What if most of the workers don’t agree with communism?” the organizer
continued. “That doesn’t keep them from working with us. We’ve got
to convince them that we must all work together, that we have common
aims. Besides, it will help us organize the rank and file against the
reactionary [anticommunist] leadership.”
The caucuses give guidance. This is how to agitate on Party issues: Issue
petitions and resolutions, set up a “peace” stand outside the shop gate,
start a front. Ideas are exchanged, weaknesses analyzed, tactical shifts
worked out, all under supervision of Party headquarters.
Sometimes the caucuses manipulate special “deals” to enhance Party
influence. The following case, which occurred in Cleveland, Ohio, is
revealing:
“Howard,” the organizer said, addressing one of the older members,
“you’ve got to give up your job as editor of the union’s newspaper.”
“Give up ...,” the member said, surprised.
“Your time’s running out. You’re just about pegged as a communist. If you
try to stay on another year, you’ll be thrown out. That’ll cause a rumpus
and we’ll lose ground. Step out now.”
“OK,” the member replied, accepting the instruction. “I think I can get
Elmer elected in my place. Dick may want it, but we’ve got to stop him.”
“Right you are,” the organizer said. “Dick is a vicious Red baiter. He’s
a faker and reactionary. I’d rather have the paper discontinued than have
him as editor.”
“Elmer isn’t known as a communist,” the member added. “Of course, if I
support him it’ll tag him somewhat, but....”
“That’s our best approach, Howard,” the organizer said. “Submit your
resignation tomorrow. You’ll catch Dick and his cronies off guard. Then
push all you can for Elmer.”
What follows now is a case history which reveals the whole sinister
process of infiltration. It concerns an organization that we shall call
The 123 Group, typical of many trade-union, fraternal, civic, community,
and nationality groups. It covers a six-year struggle for control between
the Communist Party—working through a group of open and concealed
members, sympathizers, and dupes—and a noncommunist opposition, at first
unorganized, hitting wildly, but later to become all-powerful.
The 123 Group was an influential and respected noncommunist organization.
Even partly to control its actions would be of great value to the Party.
The problem for communist headquarters was how best to attack. The
obvious target, as in most organizations, was the officers. To control
one officer, such as a president, secretary, or treasurer, is often
worth ten, twenty, or fifty rank-and-file members. Everything must be
done to prepare for the next elections in an effort to oust as many
anticommunists as possible and replace them with pro-Party people or at
least neutrals.
All officers of The 123 Group were bitterly anticommunist except one, the
secretary. He would have loudly protested if called a Party member, and
he wasn’t; but for many years he had maintained cordial contacts with
Party officials. He was, in every respect, a sympathizer. He was popular
and had a large personal following among the rank and file. For this
reason the anticommunists had not been able to defeat him. Here was the
obvious weak point.
“We’ve got to draw up an entire slate of candidates,” the Party organizer
emphasized. “Let’s call it the ‘Reform Ticket.’ We must include a few
reactionaries. That’ll hide our interest.” Then the frank admission: “We
must not show our hand. We’ll run on a program acceptable to the right
wing as much as possible. After we get in we’ll take control.”
The communist Trojan horse was jockeying for position. Maneuver often
compensates for lack of numbers and organizational position. Deals,
stratagems, and hypocrisy must be given free play.
The secretary-sympathizer agreed to run on the Reform Ticket. His name
would lend prestige and give the ticket a capable career officer. Here
was the first breakthrough. More deals, however, were necessary.
The chief problem now was the presidency. Whom to run? A known
procommunist could not win. To support another anticommunist was
unthinkable. The answer: an opportunist.
The right man was at hand, a noncommunist, personally ambitious, who
disliked the current president. Lacking a dynamic personality, a “little
backward,” as one Party official called him, he could be “guided.” He was
just the man to head the ticket.
He was contacted. Run for president and you’ll receive “our” support.
The communists, of course, didn’t openly identify themselves. The
opportunist, however, probably suspected, but he didn’t care. That is
the mark of an opportunist: his personal ambition is so great that it
overrides every other consideration.
Now the other noncommunist candidates on the Reform Ticket must be chosen.
To communists there are different degrees of “foes.” A “60 per cent” foe
is better “working material” than a “100 per cent” foe. Another may be
appraised as a 40 or even 10 percenter. In drawing up the slate, find as
many “low percenters” as possible. Also there is the practical factor,
always to be remembered, of selecting candidates who can “pull” votes to
the ticket.
These deals were made.
Then there was the task, after selection of the slate (which contained
concealed communists along with noncommunists), of getting it elected.
This meant more strategy, manipulation, and deals. The communists could
count on only a small minority of the vote—their own members and a
few sympathizers. Their tactic lay in exploiting existing jealousies,
conflicts, and dissatisfactions among the majority noncommunists. To
catch the secret of communist infiltration tactics, we must understand
how the Party, with great skill, is able to exploit, guide, and
capitalize on the splits and lack of interest in noncommunist ranks.
That’s how the Party is able to wield an influence far out of proportion
to its numbers.
There was, of course, the usual share of communist deals. One technique,
often used, is a deal with a noncommunist member of the group who is
running for office in another organization in which the communists also
have members. “Support our candidates here,” the deal goes, “and we’ll
help you next week.” Then there is the communist who is a union official
or company foreman who says to a noncommunist member of the group, “Maybe
we can consider a promotion for you at the plant if....”
Another technique is to urge “benevolent neutrality” upon those
noncommunists who are wavering and might vote for the current officers;
that’s a good day for them to stay home or go fishing!
Result: The Reform Ticket won a complete victory. Now one-third of the
officers, five Party members, were controlled by Party headquarters. The
rest were virtual prisoners.
To infiltrate an organization is only a first step. It must be made to
serve Party interests. There are many ways:
1. A proposal, promoted by the communists, was made that Henry G., both
a member of The 123 Group and a secret communist, be sent as an official
delegate to the National Convention of a communist-front organization.
This group was painted in glowing terms as a fighter for human rights.
No mention was made of communist control. Opponents objected, labeled
it as a communist “outfit.” The vote was taken: motion passed, and the
communist member went, expenses paid.
2. A concealed communist was running for public office. Motion was made
that his candidacy be endorsed. Again another outcry from the opponents,
but the motion passed.
3. “John Doe is a victim of injustice. We should pass a resolution to
be sent to the governor demanding his freedom....” An anticommunist
protested, “It’s not our business to be passing resolutions about such
matters.” “A reactionary,” replies the spokesman for the communist line.
“Aren’t you interested in justice?” Label your opponents as “Fascists,”
“reactionaries,” “hardhearted.” The vote was taken: motion passed.
4. The communists had established a Party “front school.” Money was
needed for expansion. One source: The 123 Group. Motion was made that a
contribution be sent to the “school.” Passed. A tactic the communists
like to use: Make noncommunists “share” the Party’s expenses.
5. Other ways: seize, if possible, the group’s bulletin or newspaper.
Make it a Party mouthpiece, or at least attempt to silence or weaken its
criticism. The instructions flow steadily from Party headquarters: start
a letter-writing campaign, pass this foreign-policy resolution, contact a
public official. The 123 Group becomes a masquerade for communist attack.
In one instance an official of The 123 Group (who was also a secret
communist) was invited to testify before a congressional investigating
committee about a certain economic development. What did he do? He
went to the Party and asked for copies of the _Daily Worker_ and other
communist background material. Now he had the Party line!
Such victories are not always easily won. One requirement is a
well-planned floor strategy for all club meetings. That’s the secret of
many Party successes. First, as one Party leader expressed it, “we want
our mob present.” No absences are allowed. Every Party vote is needed. If
a motion is to be made, who will present it? When? Early in the evening
while the crowd is large? Or much later when many of the delegates, but
not the communists, have gone home? How should objections be handled? If
concessions must be made, which ones?
Every move is planned.
If a communist is chairman, the task is easier. He can use many
parliamentary devices such as not recognizing an opposition speaker,
rushing votes, ruling opponents out of order. The communists, one member
remarked, always had the meetings “so well in hand” in his organization
that an “outsider” had no chance of even voicing opposition.
Numerous tricks can be used; for example the diamond formation, seating
members in a diamond pattern. This gives the impression, during debate,
that Party supporters are more numerous than they actually are. Another
is the false opposition. Selected members make foolish, silly, and stupid
objections to communist proposals. The purpose: to make the communists
look even better.
Communist infighting is vicious and utterly devoid of moral principle.
For several years the Party controlled The 123 Group. Time after time,
the organization consisting of hundreds of members was subverted for
Party purposes.
Then troubles began to appear. Some sympathizers and opportunists grew
restive. Noncommunist opposition increased.
Party counterattacks were launched.
The first problem was to hold the opportunist-president in line. Vanity
is a weapon in the early stages. Do everything you can to “blow up” his
ego. Raise his salary (the organization pays for it, not the Party).
Give him a testimonial dinner. Send him as a delegate to a convention,
preferably as far away as possible. The communist vice-president will run
affairs until he returns.
Frequently, as time passes, opportunists and sympathizers become
“big-headed.” They don’t do what they are told. “Jack J. is feeling the
effects of power,” one Party leader complained. “He’s forgetting his
old factional allies.” Now stronger measures must be applied. Remind
him forcefully that it is communist support which keeps him in office.
“Encircle the guy,” as one Party member recommended, meaning to make
him even more dependent on the Party. Perhaps cut his salary. A little
“smear” campaign might be effective.
If new alignments can be made, he might be dropped. If not, he’ll be
subjected to even stronger pressure. Blackmail and threats are often part
of communist tactics at this stage.
Finally, six years later, The 123 Group eliminated the communist
infiltration after a long, tiring battle. Here were some of the basic
points the noncommunist opposition had to keep everlastingly in mind:
1. _Rally the majority noncommunist strength._ The communists, usually
a minority, capitalize on the lack of interest of noncommunists. One
communist member was elected to office with only 3 per cent of the total
eligible vote.
2. _Remember that communism is always an evil, never a temporary good._
Often communists give the impression of working for the best interests of
the group. “What do you care whether we are communists?” one Party leader
asked. “We’re trying to help you.” Another quipped: “Politics don’t
matter. It’s the issues that count.” That’s wrong. Any conciliation,
friendship, or trust placed in communism will sooner or later be
exploited against democratic society.
3. _Don’t underestimate communist ability._ Many communists are extremely
intelligent. One Party leader was described by an opponent as very
capable, well versed in parliamentary procedure, and possessing an
excellent command of English. To think of communists as mere rabble
rousers and nuisances is to risk defeat.
4. _Understand communist tactics._ Learn how they, though numerically
few, are able to exert a maximum influence. Deceit is one of their
strongest weapons.
5. _Stand up and be counted._ Many noncommunists hesitate to speak up in
meetings. They fear to be attacked by an acid-tongued Party spokesman.
They may remember Mr. So-and-So. He opposed a communist proposal several
weeks ago. Now look at him. He hasn’t slept a full night for weeks.
Somebody is constantly calling him on the telephone. His relatives are
pestered. It’s best, they think, just to stay away from meetings or, if
there, remain silent. Others, irritated, bored, or simply “fed up” with
communist tactics, walk out. Just what the communists want. They have
a clear field. Speak your mind. Stand your ground. Don’t be afraid to
defend American liberty.
6. _Wage the fight in a democratic manner._ Emotion should never replace
reason as a weapon. To pursue extralegal methods is simply to injure your
cause. Fight hard, but fight according to the rules.
When communists speak of their desire to advance the cause of labor, the
question should always be asked: What is their objective? In August,
1957, streetcar and bus workers went on strike in Lodz, Poland. The
workers were using this means to protest against the unfulfilled promises
of the leaders of the Polish Communist government. The strike was soon
brought to a halt through the use of some 3000 troops with fixed bayonets
and police who fired tear gas into the milling mob.
While the communists were demonstrating their brutality and terroristic
tactics against labor in Poland, American communists were giving another
demonstration of how they habitually ignore the truth. William Z. Foster,
as the elder statesman of the Communist Party in the United States, was
saying:
One of the most striking phenomena of the capitalist world in
recent years has been the enormous extension of the workers’
fight for democracy—among other phases, to defend their right
to organize and strike.... World Socialism has enormously
stimulated this struggle.
The answer is a simple one. The communists, once in control, crush every
opponent, while, in coming to power, they promise everything to soften
the opposition. This opposition will be “softened,” however, only if we
allow infiltration to take place before our very eyes without knowing it
for what it is.
17.
_The Communist Front_
The auditorium was packed. More than 1000 delegates and observers waved
their arms enthusiastically, along with some 200 others who did not fill
out registration forms to avoid leaving a record of their attendance.
(The _Daily Worker_ said they were in “... fear of intimidation.”)
This was the founding convention of the National Negro Labor Council,
a new organization dedicated to “equality,” “social progress,” and the
upholding of “civil rights.” Speeches, resolutions, election of officers,
everything ran smoothly. Two days later came adjournment. A new communist
front had been born.
Delegates had come from all over the United States. They would now
return to their home cities, start local chapters, enroll members, issue
literature.
A master organizing hand was at work. One thousand individuals just
didn’t arrive by accident.
The convention call was communist-inspired. For weeks in advance, local
Party members had been arranging housing, running errands, securing
finances.
The Council claimed that its purpose was to aid the Negro; however, the
House Committee on Un-American Activities concluded that, “rather than
helping the Negro worker, it has been a deterrent to him.”
The founding of the National Negro Labor Council was typical of many
Party fronts created over the past generation.
Fronts probably represent the Party’s most successful tactic in
capturing noncommunist support. Like mass agitation and infiltration,
fronts espouse the deceptive Party line (hence the term “front”) while
actually advancing the real Party line. In this way the Party is able to
influence thousands of noncommunists, collect large sums of money, and
reach the minds, pens, and tongues of many high-ranking and distinguished
individuals. Moreover, fronts are excellent fields for Party recruitment.
A front is an organization which the communists openly or secretly
control. The communists realize that they are not welcome in American
society. Party influence, therefore, is transmitted, time after time,
by a belt of concealed members, sympathizers, and dupes. Fronts become
transmission belts between the Party and the noncommunist world. Earl
Browder, when head of the Party, gave this definition: “Transmission
belts mean having Communists work among the masses in the various
organizations.”
Some may be newly created, or, as often happens, they may be old-line
organizations captured by infiltration, like The 123 Group mentioned
in the preceding chapter. They may operate nationally, regionally, or
locally. Some are permanent organizations; others exist for only a day, a
week, or a month.
The Party has operated hundreds of major fronts in practically every
field of Party agitation: “peace,” civil rights, protection of the
foreign-born, support for Smith Act “victims,” abolition of H-bomb tests,
exploitation of nationality and minority groups. Some are based on
specific appeal, to teachers, writers, lawyers, labor, women, youth. Many
have national officers, local chapters, and substantial assets.
In addition, literally hundreds of minor fronts of all shapes, sizes,
and types appear each year in everyday Party life. They serve a specific
short-time purpose, then disappear. A few handbills, a rally, or a picket
line, and a front has gone to work.
We must not think of fronts in terms of legitimate organizations. A few
fronts collect dues, issue a newspaper, or sponsor organized activities,
such as a sports program or cultural affairs. Most, however, exist only
on paper. Their assets usually consist of a few office supplies, a
secondhand Mimeograph machine, and a mailing list. The danger of a Party
front rests not on its physical appearance or size but on its ability to
deceive.
A few fronts may maintain separate headquarters, usually in a small room
in an old building. Some operate from Party headquarters, a basement, or
somebody’s home. Often they are found in clusters, one office serving
as the headquarters for two, three, or a half-dozen fronts. The only
difference is the wording of their names.
“Front schools,” where Marxist and related subjects were available
for noncommunist students, have been most important to the communists
over the years. In one such school it is estimated that over 100,000
individuals received instruction; in another, 75,000.
Every front, in its own way, is fighting the Party’s battles:
—sponsoring agitation campaigns;
—collecting money (fronts are one of the Party’s chief sources
of income);
—supplying speakers for noncommunist organizations (it’s
surprising the number of requests received by front groups,
especially those sponsoring “peace” and “civil rights,” for
speakers. A sympathizer or dupe who has prominence in the
community, such as a lawyer or professor, will often be sent);
—issuing literature;
—sponsoring mass rallies;
—lobbying for or against legislative bills;
—influencing key individuals whom the Party could not otherwise
reach;
—teaching Marxist doctrines.
During the recent period when most Party headquarters were closed because
of a tactical shift to underground operations, fronts performed many
functions for the Party. In Chapter 20, we shall see this aspect of
fronts.
A single front can generate terrific communist pressure. Take this case,
for example:
Time: shortly after lunch. Agnes G, executive secretary of the DEF
Committee to Fight the High Cost of Living, is reading a letter.
Dan H enters the office. “It’s happened. The legislature just passed the
Anticommunist Bill.”
This bill must be stopped.
As a first step Agnes dictates a letter to Professor Frank Y, a “good
friend” at the university. “Issue a statement right away. This bill
threatens freedom of speech. It must be vetoed.”
Then more letters are sent to teachers, clergymen, several lawyers.
Contact is made with key Party members and sympathizers.
“The Anticommunist Bill has passed. Send telegrams to the governor,
urging a veto. Start a petition circulating.”
Next, a bold step: Agnes places a telephone call to the governor.
“Mr. Governor, I’m speaking for the DEF Committee to Fight the High
Cost of Living. We are disturbed about the passage of the Anticommunist
Bill. We feel you should veto it. Would it be possible to have our
representatives meet with you?”
The governor agrees. He wants to hear all points of view. The DEF
Committee sounds like one of many groups interested in this legislation.
An appointment is made.
Pressure was being built up. The front could enter where the Party never
dreamed of going. Three ministers, an attorney, and a newspaperman were
contacted. Would they see the governor as part of the delegation?
“I want Larry R to go along,” Agnes says. “He’s not too bright a guy, but
he’s easy and willing. I can tell him what to say. Besides, he’s from a
very respectable organization.”
Nothing was said about the fact that this delegation was serving a
communist purpose.
Every point had to be planned. “Be sure the right people do the talking.”
About one fellow the Party organizer had commented, “Better have him stay
quiet.” You never know, maybe a dupe will say something out of place.
How to talk to the governor? The delegation could act like “nice, little
people,” but that wouldn’t be very impressive. Or it could be vaguely
threatening. The latter suggestion was ruled out as too dangerous.
Not everything went according to plan. One minister refused to go. Agnes
became angry. “It takes this kind of work,” she fumed, “to see what
ministers are made of—dishwater.”
A wonderful guy, if you cooperate; if not, you’re a “bum.”
The delegation was dispatched, a delegation made up chiefly of
noncommunists, yet fighting for communist aims, a delegation organized
exclusively by a communist front. The DEF Committee was not interested in
opposing the high cost of living. _It was fighting for communism._
Fronts exist not in isolation but as part of a vast, interlaced front
system. Communist pressure can be greatly increased by manipulating these
organizations.