IMPERIALISM
The Republicans triumphed in 1896, but the large vote for Mr. Bryan and
his platform and the passions aroused by the campaign made it clear to
the far-sighted that, whatever might be the fate of free silver, new
social elements had entered American politics. It was fortunate for the
conservative interests that the quarrel with Spain came shortly after
Mr. McKinley's election, and they were able to employ that ancient
political device, "a vigorous foreign policy," to divert the public mind
from domestic difficulties. This was particularly acceptable to the
populace at the time, for there had been no war for more than thirty
years, and, contrary to their assertions on formal occasions, the
American people enjoy wars beyond measure, if the plain facts of history
are allowed to speak.[43]
Since 1876 there had been no very spectacular foreign affair to fix the
attention of the public mind, except the furor worked up over the
application of the Monroe Doctrine to Venezuela during President
Cleveland's second administration. For a long time that country and
Great Britain had been waging a contest over the western boundary of
British Guiana; and the United States, on the appeal of Venezuela, had
taken a slight interest in the dispute, generally assuming that the
merits of the case were on the side of the South American republic. In
1895, it became apparent that Great Britain did not intend to yield any
points in the case, and Venezuela began to clamor again for protection,
this time with effect. In July of that year, the Secretary of State,
Richard Olney, demanded that Great Britain answer whether she was
willing to arbitrate the question, and announced that the United States
was master in this hemisphere by saying: "The United States is
practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the
subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because
of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by
reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom
and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the
United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds, its
infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master
of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other
powers."
This extraordinary document, to put it mildly, failed to arouse the
warlike sentiment in England which its language invited, and Lord
Salisbury replied for the British government that this startling
extension of the Monroe Doctrine was not acceptable in the present
controversy and that the arbitration of the question could not be
admitted by his country. This moderate reply brought from President
Cleveland a message to Congress on December 17, 1895, which created in
the United States at least all the outward and visible signs of the
preliminaries to a war over the matter. He asked Congress to create a
commission to ascertain the true boundary between Venezuela and British
Guiana, and then added that it would be the duty of the United States
"to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its
rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or
the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which,
after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."
He declared that he was conscious of the responsibilities which he thus
incurred, but intimated that war between Great Britain and the United
States, much as it was to be deplored, was not comparable to "a supine
submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national
self-respect and honor." In other words, we were to decide the dispute
ourselves and go to war on Great Britain if we found her in possession
of lands which in our opinion did not belong to her.
This defiant attitude on the part of President Cleveland, while it
aroused a wave of enthusiasm among those sections of the population
moved by bold talk about the unimpeachable integrity of the United
States and its daring defense of right everywhere, called forth no
little criticism in high places. Contrary to expectation, it was not met
by bluster on the part of Great Britain, but it was rather deplored
there as threatening a breach between the two countries over an
insignificant matter. Moreover, when the commission created by Congress
set to work on the boundary dispute, the British government courteously
replied favorably to a request for assistance in the search for
evidence. Finally, Great Britain yielded and agreed to the earlier
proposition on the part of the United States that the issue be
submitted to arbitration; and this happy outcome of the matter
contributed not a little to Mr. Cleveland's reputation as "a sterling
representative of the true American spirit." This was not diminished by
the later discovery that Great Britain was wholly right in her claims in
South America.
* * * * *
The Venezuelan controversy was an echo of the time-honored Monroe
Doctrine and was without any deeper economic significance. There were
not wanting, however, signs that the United States was prepared
economically to accept that type of imperialism that had long been
dominant in British politics and had sprung into prominence in Germany,
France, and Italy during the generation following the Franco-Prussian
War. This newer imperialism does not rest primarily upon a desire for
more territory, but rather upon the necessity for markets in which to
sell manufactured goods and for opportunities to invest surplus
accumulations of capital. It begins in a search for trade, advances to
intervention on behalf of the interests involved, thence to
protectorates, and finally to annexation. By the inexorable necessity of
the present economic system, markets and safe investment opportunities
must be found for surplus products and accumulated capital. All the
older countries being overstocked and also forced into this new form of
international rivalry, the drift is inevitably in the direction of the
economically backward countries: Africa, Asia, Mexico, and South
America. Economic necessity thus overrides American isolation and
drives the United States into world politics.
Although the United States had not neglected the protection of its
interests from the days when it thrashed the Barbary pirates, sent Caleb
Cushing to demand an open door in China, and dispatched Commodore Perry
to batter down Japanese exclusiveness, the relative importance of its
world operations was slight until manufacturing and commerce gained
their ascendancy over agriculture.
The pressure of the newer interests on American foreign policy had
already been felt when the demand for the war with Spain came. In 1889,
the United States joined with Great Britain and Germany in a
protectorate over the Samoan Islands, thus departing, according to
Secretary Gresham, from our "traditional and well-established policy of
avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relation to objects
remote from this hemisphere."[44] Preparations had been made under
Harrison's administration for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands,
after a revolution, largely fomented by American interests there, had
overthrown the established government; but this movement was blocked for
the time being by President Cleveland, who learned through a special
commissioner, sent to investigate the affair, that the upheaval had been
due principally to American disgust for the weak and vacillating
government of the Queen. It was not until the middle of the Spanish War
that Congress, recognizing the importance of the Hawaiian Islands in
view of the probable developments resulting from Admiral Dewey's victory
in the Philippines, annexed them to the United States by joint
resolution on July 6, 1898.[45]
_The Spanish War_
It required, however, the Spanish War and the acquisition of the insular
dependencies to bring imperialism directly into politics as an
overshadowing issue and to secure the frank acknowledgment of the new
emphasis on world policy which economic interests demanded. It is true
that Cuba had long been an object of solicitude on the part of the
United States. Before the Civil War, the slave power was anxious to
secure its annexation as a state to help offset the growing predominance
of the North; and during the ten years' insurrection from 1868 to 1878,
when a cruel guerilla warfare made all life and property in Cuba unsafe,
intervention was again suggested. But it was not until the renewal of
the insurrection in 1895 that American economic interests in Cuba were
strong enough to induce interference. Slavery was gone, but capital,
still more dominant, had taken its place.
In 1895, Americans had more than fifty million dollars invested in Cuban
business, and our commerce with the Island had risen to one hundred
millions annually. The effect of the Cuban revolt against Spain was not
only to diminish trade, but also to destroy American property. The
contest between the rebels and Spanish troops was characterized by
extreme cruelty and a total disregard for life and property. Gomez, the
leader of the revolt, resorted to the policy made famous by Sherman on
his march to the sea. He laid waste the land to starve the Spaniards and
compel American interference if possible. By a proclamation of November
6, 1895, he ordered that plantation buildings and railway connections
should be destroyed and sugar factories closed everywhere; what he left
undone was finished by the Spanish general, Weyler, who concentrated the
inhabitants of the rural districts in the centers occupied by the
troops. Under such a policy, business was simply paralyzed; and within
less than two years Americans had filed against Spain claims amounting
to sixteen million dollars for property destroyed in the revolution.
The atrocities connected with the insurrection attracted the sympathy of
the American people at once. Sermons were preached against Spanish
barbarism; orators demanded that the Cuban people be "succored in their
heroic struggle for the rights of men and of citizens"; Mr. Hearst's
newspapers appealed daily to the people to compel governmental action at
once, and denounced the tedious methods of negotiation, in view of an
inevitable war. Cuban juntas formed in American cities raised money and
supplied arms for the insurrectionists. All the enormous American
property interests at stake in the Island, with their widespread and
influential ramifications in the United States, demanded action. The
war fever, always quick to be kindled, rose all over the country.
Even amid the exciting campaign of 1896, the Democrats found time to
express sympathy with the Cubans, and the Republicans significantly
remarked that inasmuch as Spain was "unable to protect the property or
lives of resident American citizens," the good offices of the United
States should be tendered with a view to pacification and independence.
Perhaps, not unaware of the impending crisis, the Republicans also
favored a continued enlargement of the navy to help maintain the
"rightful influence" of the United States among the nations of the
earth.
President Cleveland, repudiated by his own party and having no desire to
"play the game of politics," assumed an attitude of neutrality in the
conflict and denied to the Cubans the rights of belligerents. He offered
to Spain the good offices of the United States in mediation with the
insurgents--a tender which was rejected by Spain with the suggestion
that the United States might more vigorously suppress the unlawful
assistance which some of its citizens were lending to the
revolutionists. Mr. Cleveland's second administration closed without any
positive action on the Cuban question.
Within four months after his inauguration, President McKinley protested
strongly to Spain against her policy in Cuba, and during the summer and
autumn and winter he conducted a running fire of negotiations with
Spain. Congress was impatient for armed intervention and fretted at the
tedious methods of diplomacy. Spain shrewdly made counter thrusts to
every demand advanced by the United States, but made no outward sign of
improvement in the affairs of Cuba, even after the recall of General
Weyler. In February, 1898, a private letter, written by De Lome, the
Spanish minister at Washington, showing contempt for Mr. McKinley and
some shifty ideas of diplomacy, was acquired by the _New York Journal_
and published. This stirred the country and led to the recall of the
minister by his home government. Meanwhile the battleship _Maine_ was
sent to Havana, officially to resume friendly relations at Cuban ports,
but not without an ulterior regard for the necessity of protecting the
lives and property of Americans in jeopardy. The incident of the Spanish
minister's letter had hardly been closed before the _Maine_ was blown up
and sunk on the evening of February 15, 1898. The death of two officers
and two hundred and fifty-eight of the crew was a tragedy which moved
the nation beyond measure, and with the cry "Remember the _Maine_"
public opinion was worked up to a point of frenzy.
A commission was appointed at once to inquire into the cause of the
disaster, and on March 21 it reported that the _Maine_ had been
destroyed by an explosion of a submarine mine which set off some of the
ship's magazines. Within a week, negotiations with Spain were resumed,
and that country made generous promises to restore peace in the Island
and permit a Cuban parliament to be established in the interests of
local autonomy. None of Spain's promises were regarded as satisfactory
by the administration, and on April 4, General Woodford, the American
representative in that country, was instructed to warn the ministry that
no effective armistice had been offered the Cubans and that President
McKinley would shortly lay the matter before Congress--which meant war.
After some delay, during which representatives of the European powers
and the Pope were at work in the interests of peace, Spain promised to
suspend hostilities, call a Cuban parliament, and restore a reasonable
autonomy.
On the day after the receipt of this promise, President McKinley sent
his war message to Congress without explaining fully the latest
concessions made by Spain. It was claimed by the Spanish government that
it had yielded absolutely everything short of independence and that all
of the demands of the United States had been met. Some eminent editors
and publicists in the United States have since accepted this view of the
affair and sharply criticized the President for not making public the
full text of Spain's last concession on the day that he sent his war
message to Congress. Those who take this view hold that President
McKinley believed war to be inevitable and desirable all along, but
merely wished to bring public opinion to the breaking point before
shifting the responsibility to Congress. The President's defenders,
however, claim that no credence could be placed in the good faith of
Spain and that the intolerable conditions in Cuba would never have been
removed under Spanish administration, no matter what promises might have
been made.
In his war message of April 11, 1898, Mr. McKinley brought under review
the conditions in Cuba and the history of the controversy, coming to
the conclusion that the dictates of humanity, the necessity of
protecting American lives and property in Cuba, and the chronic
disorders in the Island warranted armed intervention. Congress responded
by an overwhelming vote on April 19, in favor of a resolution declaring
that Cuba should be free, that Spain's withdrawal should be demanded,
and the President be authorized to use the military and naval forces of
the country to carry the decree into effect. In the enthusiasm of the
hour, Congress also specifically disclaimed any intention of exercising
"sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the
pacification thereof." Thus war was declared on the anniversary of the
battle of Lexington.
In the armed conflict which followed, the most striking and effective
operations were on the sea. In anticipation of the war, Commodore Dewey,
in command of the Asiatic station, had been instructed as early as
February to keep his squadron at Hongkong, coaled, and ready, in event
of a declaration of hostilities, to begin offensive operations in the
Philippine Islands. The battleship _Oregon_, then off the coast of
Washington, was ordered to make the long voyage around the Horn, which
has now become famous in the annals of the sea. At the outbreak of the
war, Rear Admiral Sampson, in charge of the main squadron at Key West,
was instructed to blockade important stretches of the coast of Cuba and
to keep watch for the arrival of the Spanish fleet, under Admiral
Cervera, which was then on the high seas, presumably bound for Cuba.
The first naval blow was struck by Admiral Dewey, who had left Chinese
waters on receiving news of the declaration of war and had reached
Manila Bay on the evening of April 30. Early the following morning he
opened fire on the inferior Spanish fleet under the guns of Cavite and
Manila, and within a few hours he had destroyed the enemy's ships,
killed nearly four hundred men, and silenced the shore batteries without
sustaining the loss of a single man or suffering any injuries to his own
ships worthy of mention. News of this extraordinary exploit reached the
United States by way of Hongkong on May 6, and the hero of the day was,
by popular acclaim, placed among the immortals of our naval history.
While celebrating the victory off Manila, the government was anxiously
awaiting the arrival of the Spanish fleet in American waters which were
being carefully patrolled. In spite of the precautions of Admiral
Sampson, Cervera was able to slip into the harbor of Santiago on May 19,
where he was immediately blockaded by the American naval forces. An
attempt was made to stop up the mouth of the harbor by sending
Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson to sink a collier at the narrow entrance,
but this spectacular move, carried out under a galling fire, failed to
accomplish the purpose of the projectors, and Hobson and his men fell
into the hands of the Spaniards.
The time had now come for bringing the land forces into cooperation with
the navy for a combined attack on Santiago, and on June 14 a large body
of troops, principally regulars, embarked from Tampa, where men and
supplies had been concentrating for weeks. The management of the army
was in every respect inferior to the administration of the navy.
Secretary Alger, of the War Department, was a politician of the old
school, who could not allow efficiency to interfere with the "proper"
distribution of patronage; and as a result of his dilatory methods (to
put it mildly) and the general unpreparedness of the army, the camp at
Tampa was grossly mismanaged. Sanitary conveniences were indescribably
bad, supply contractors sold decayed meat and wretched food to the
government, heavy winter clothing was furnished to men about to fight in
the summer time in a tropical climate, and, to cap the climax of
blundering, inadequate provisions were made for landing the troops when
they reached Cuba on June 22.
The forces dispatched to Cuba were placed under the command of General
Shafter, but owing to his illness the fighting was principally carried
on under Generals Lawton and Wheeler. The most serious conflicts in the
land campaign occurred at El Caney and San Juan Hill, both strategic
points near Santiago. At the second of these places the famous "Rough
Riders" under Colonel Roosevelt distinguished themselves by a charge up
the hill under heavy fire and by being the first to reach the enemy's
intrenchments. In spite of several engagements, in which the fortunes of
the day were generally on the side of the Americans, sickness among the
soldiers and lack of supplies caused General Shafter to cable, on July
3, that without additional support he could not undertake a successful
storming of Santiago.
At this critical juncture, the naval forces once more distinguished
themselves, and made further bloody fighting on land unnecessary, by
destroying Cervera's fleet which attempted to make its escape from the
Santiago harbor on the morning of July 3. The American ships were then
in charge of Commodore Schley, for Admiral Sampson had left watch early
that morning for a conference with General Shafter; and the sailors
acquitted themselves with the same skill that marked Dewey's victory at
Manila. Within less than four hours' fighting all the Spanish ships were
destroyed or captured with a loss of about six hundred killed and
wounded, while the Americans sustained a loss of only one man killed and
one wounded. This victory, of course, marked the doom of Santiago,
although it did not surrender formally until July 17, after two days'
bombardment by the American ships.
The fall of Santiago ended military operations in Cuba, and General
Miles, who had come to the front in time to assist General Shafter in
arranging the terms of the surrender of Santiago, proceeded at once to
Porto Rico. He was rapidly gaining possession of that Island in an
almost bloodless campaign when news came of the signing of the peace
protocol on August 12. Unfortunately it required longer to convey the
information to the Philippines that the war was at an end, and on the
day after the signature of the protocol, that is, August 13, General
Merritt and Admiral Dewey carried Manila by storm.
As early as July 26, 1898, the Spanish government approached President
McKinley through M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, and
asked for a preliminary statement of the terms on which the war could
be brought to a close. After some skirmishing, in which Spain
reluctantly yielded to the American ultimatum, a peace protocol was
signed on August 12, to the effect that Cuba should be independent,
Porto Rico ceded to the United States, and Manila occupied pending the
final negotiations, which were opened at Paris by special commissioners
on October 1.
When the commissioners met according to arrangements, the government of
the United States apparently had not come to a conclusion as to the
final disposition of the Philippines. The administration was anxious not
to go too far in advance of public opinion, at least so far as official
pronunciamento was concerned, although powerful commercial interests
were busy impressing the public mind with the advantages to be derived
from the retention of the distant Pacific Islands. In his instructions
to the peace commissioners, on the eve of their departure, Mr. McKinley,
while denying that there had originally been any intention of conquest
in the Pacific, declared that the march of events had imposed new duties
upon us, and added: "Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the
commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be
indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the
enlargement of American trade." While stating that the possession of
territory was less important than an "open door" for trade purposes, he
concluded by instructing the commissioners that the United States could
not "accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the
Island of Luzon."
The peace commissioners were divided among themselves as to the policy
to be pursued with regard to the Philippines; but in the latter part of
October they received definite instructions from the Secretary of State,
Mr. John Hay, that the cession of Luzon alone could not be justified "on
political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds," and that the entire
archipelago must be surrendered by Spain. The Spanish commissioners
protested vigorously against this demand, on the theory that it was
outside of the terms of the peace protocol, but they were forced to
yield, receiving as a sort of consolation prize the payment of twenty
million dollars in compensation for the loss.
The final treaty, as signed on December 10, 1898, embodied the following
terms: the independence of Cuba, the cession of Porto Rico, Guam, and
the Philippines to the United States, the cancellation of the claims of
the citizens of the two countries against each other, the United States
undertaking to settle the claims of its citizens against Spain, the
payment of twenty million dollars for the Philippines by the United
States, and the determination of the civil and political status of the
inhabitants of the ceded territories by Congress.
When the treaty of peace was published, the contest over the retention
of the Philippines took on new bitterness--at least in public speeches
and editorials. The contentions on both sides were so vehement that it
was almost impossible to secure any frank discussion of the main issue:
"Does the United States want a foothold in the Pacific in order to
secure the trade of the Philippines and afford American capital an
opportunity to develop the dormant natural resources, and in order also
to have a station from which to give American trade and capital a better
chance in the awakening Orient?" Democrats demanded self-government for
the Philippines, "in recognition of the principles of the immortal
Declaration of Independence." Republicans talked in lofty strains about
"the mysterious hand of Providence which laid this burden upon the
Anglo-Saxon race."
The proposal to retain the Philippines, in fact, gave the southern
statesmen just the opportunity they had long wanted to taunt the
Republicans with insincerity on the race question. "Republican leaders,"
said Senator Tillman, "do not longer dare to call into question the
justice or necessity of limiting negro suffrage in the South." And on
another occasion he exclaimed in querulous accents: "I want to call your
attention to the remarkable change that has come over the spirit of the
dream of the Republicans. Your slogans of the past--brotherhood of man
and fatherhood of God--have gone glimmering down through the ages. The
brotherhood of man exists no longer." To such assertions, Republicans of
the old school, like Senator Hoar, opposed to imperialism, replied
sadly, "The statements of Mr. Tillman have never been challenged and
never can be." But Republicans of the new school, unvexed by charges of
inconsistency, replied that high talk about the rights of man and of
self-government came with poor grace from southern Democrats who had
disfranchised millions of negroes that were just as capable of
self-government as the bulk of the natives in the Philippines.
Senator Vest, on December 6, introduced in the Senate a resolution to
the effect "that under the Constitution of the United States, no power
is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and
governed permanently as colonies." He was ably supported by Senator
Hoar, from Massachusetts, who took his stand upon the proposition that
"governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."
On the other side, Senator O. H. Platt, of Connecticut, expounded the
gospel of manifest destiny: "Every expansion of our territory has been
in accordance with the irresistible law of growth. We could no more
resist the successive expansions by which we have grown to be the
strongest nation on earth than a tree can resist its growth. The history
of territorial expansion is the history of our nation's progress and
glory. It is a matter to be proud of, not to lament. We should rejoice
that Providence has given us the opportunity to extend our influence,
our institutions, and our civilization into regions hitherto closed to
us, rather than contrive how we can thwart its designs."
At length on February 6, 1899, the treaty was ratified by the Senate,
but it must not be assumed that all of the Senators who voted for the
ratification of the treaty favored embarking upon a policy of
"imperialism." Indeed, at the time of the approval of the treaty, a
resolution was passed by the Senate to the effect that the policy to be
adopted in the Philippines was still an open question; but the outbreak
of an insurrection there led to an immediate employment of military rule
in the Islands and criticism was silenced by the cry that our national
honor was at stake.
The revolt against American dominion might have been foreseen, for the
conduct of Generals Anderson and Merritt at Manila had invited trouble.
For a long time before the War, native Filipinos had openly resisted
Spanish rule, and particularly the dominance of the monks and priests,
who held an enormous amount of land and managed civil as well as
ecclesiastical affairs. Just before the outbreak of the Spanish War,
there had been a revolt under the leadership of Aguinaldo which had been
brought to an end by the promise to pay a large sum to the revolutionary
leaders and to introduce extensive administrative reforms. The promises,
however, had not been carried out, and Admiral Dewey had invited the
cooperation of Aguinaldo and his insurgents in the attack on Manila.
When the land assault was made on the city, in August, Aguinaldo joined
with a large insurgent army under the banner of the Filipino republic
which had been proclaimed in July, but he was compelled to take a
subordinate position, and received scant respect from the American
commanders, who gave him to understand that he had no status in the war
or the settlement of the terms of capitulation.
As may be imagined, Aguinaldo was in no happy frame of mind when the
news came in January, 1899, that the United States had assumed
sovereignty over the islands; but it is not clear that some satisfactory
adjustment might not have been made then, if the United States had been
willing to accept a sort of protectorate and allow the revolutionaries
to establish a local government of their own. However, little or nothing
was done to reach a peaceful adjustment, and on February 4, some
Filipino soldiers were shot by American troops for refusing to obey an
order to halt, on approaching the American lines. This untoward incident
precipitated the conflict which began with some serious regular fighting
and dwindled into a vexatious guerilla warfare, lasting three years and
costing the United States heavily in men and money. Inhuman atrocities
were committed on both sides, resembling in brutality the cruel deeds
which had marked frontier warfare with the Indians. Reports of these
gruesome barbarities reached the United States and aroused the most
severe criticism of the administration, not only from the opponents of
imperialism, but also from those supporters of the policy, who imagined
that it could be carried out with rose water.
* * * * *
The acquisition of the insular dependencies raised again the old problem
as to the power of Congress over territories, which had been so
extensively debated during the slavery conflict. The question now took
the form: "Does the Constitution restrict Congress in the government of
the Islands as if they were physically and politically a part of the
United States, and particularly, do the limitations in behalf of private
rights, freedom of press, trial by jury, and the like, embodied in the
first ten Amendments, control the power of Congress?" Strict
constitutionalists answered this question in the affirmative without
hesitation, citing the long line of constitutional decisions which had
repeatedly affirmed the doctrine that Congress is limited everywhere,
even in the territories by the Amendments providing for the protection
of personal and property rights; but practical politicians, supporting
the McKinley administration, frankly asserted that the Constitution and
laws of the United States did not of their own force apply in the
territories and could not apply until Congress had expressly extended
them to the insular possessions.
The abstract question was given concrete form in several decisions by
the Supreme Court, known as "the Insular Cases." The question was
speedily raised whether importers of commodities from Porto Rico should
be compelled to pay the duties prescribed by the Dingley act, and the
Court answered in the case of De Lima _v._ Bidwell in 1901 that the
Island was "domestic" within the meaning of the tariff act and that the
duties could not be collected. In the course of his remarks, the
Justice, who wrote the opinion, said that territory was either domestic
or foreign, and that the Constitution did not recognize any halfway
position. Four Justices dissented, however; and American interests,
fearing this new competition, had dissented in advance,--so vigorously,
in fact, that Congress during the previous year had passed the Foraker
act imposing a tariff on goods coming into the United States from Porto
Rico and _vice versa_.
This concession to the protected interests placed the Supreme Court in a
dilemma. If Porto Rico was domestic territory,--a part of the United
States,--was not the Foraker act a violation of the constitutional
provision that duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States? This question was judicially answered by the Court
in the case of Downes _v._ Bidwell, decided on May 27, 1901, which
upheld the Foraker act on grounds so various that the only real point
made by the Court was that the law was constitutional. None of the four
justices who concurred with Justice Brown in the opinion agreed with his
reasoning, and the four judges, who dissented entirely from the decision
and the opinion, vigorously denied that there could be any territory
under the flag of the United States which was not subject to the
limitations of the Constitution.
In other cases involving freedom of the press in the Philippines and
trial by jury in the Hawaiian Islands, the Supreme Court upheld the
doctrine that Congress, in legislating for the new dependencies, was not
bound by all those constitutional limitations which had been hitherto
applied in the continental territories of the United States. The upshot
of all these insular decisions is that the Constitution may be divided
into two parts, "fundamental" and "formal"; that only the fundamental
parts control the Federal authorities in the government of the
dependencies; and that the Supreme Court will decide, from time to time
as specific cases arise, what parts of the Federal Constitution are
"fundamental" and what parts are merely "formal." In two cases, the
Court has gone so far as to hold that indictment by grand jury and trial
by petit jury with unanimous verdict are not "fundamental" parts of the
Constitution, "but merely concern a method of procedure." In other
words, the practical necessities of governing subject races of different
origins and legal traditions forced that eminent tribunal to resort to
painful reasoning in an effort not to hamper unduly the power of
Congress by constitutional limitations.
* * * * *
In the settlement which followed the Spanish War, three general problems
were presented. In the first place, our relations to Cuba required
definition. It is true that in the declaration of war on Spain Congress
had disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to
leave the government and control of the Island to its people"; but
American economic interests in the Island were too great to admit of the
actual fulfillment of this promise. Consequently, Cuba was forced to
accept, as a part of her constitution, several provisions, known as the
Platt amendment, adopted by the Congress of the United States on March
2, 1901, restricting her relations with foreign countries, limiting her
debt-creating power, securing the right of the United States to
intervene whenever necessary to protect life and property, and reserving
to the United States the right to acquire coaling stations at certain
points on the Island to be agreed upon.
Under the constitution, to which the Platt reservations on behalf of the
United States were attached, the Cubans held a general election in
December, 1901, choosing a president and legislature; and in the spring
of the following year American troops were withdrawn, leaving the
administration in the hands of the natives. It was not long, however,
before domestic difficulties began to disturb the peace of the Island,
and in the summer of 1906 it was reported that the government of
President Palma was about to be overthrown by an insurrection. Under the
circumstances, Palma resigned, and the Cuban congress was unable to
secure a quorum for the transaction of business. After due warning,
President Roosevelt intervened, under the provisions of the Platt
amendment, and instituted a temporary government supported by American
troops. American occupation of the Island continued for a few months,
but finally the soldiers were withdrawn and native government was once
more put on trial.
The second problem was presented by Porto Rico, where military rule was
put into force after the occupation in 1898. At length, on May 1, 1900,
an "organic act," instituting civil government in that Island, was
approved by the President. This law did not confer citizenship on the
Porto Ricans, but assured them of the protection of the United States.
It set up a government embracing a governor, appointed by the President
and Senate of the United States, six executive secretaries appointed in
the same manner as the governor, and a legislature of two houses--one
composed of the six secretaries and five other persons selected by the
President and Senate, acting as the upper house, and a lower house
elected by popular vote. Under this act, the practice of appointing
Americans to the chief executive offices took the final control of
legislative matters out of the hands of the natives, leaving them only
an initiatory power. This produced a friction between the appointive
and elective branches of the government, which became so troublesome
that the dispute had to be carried to Washington in 1909, and Congress
enacted a measure providing that, in case the lower house of the Porto
Rican legislature refused to pass the budget, the financial arrangements
of the previous year should continue.
The problem of governing the Philippines was infinitely more complicated
than that of governing Porto Rico, because the archipelago embraced more
than three thousand islands and about thirty different tribes and
dialects. The evolution of American control there falls into three
stages. At first, they were governed by the President of the United
States under his military authority. In 1901, a civil commission, with
Mr. W. H. Taft at the head, took over the civil administration of all
the pacified provinces. In 1902, Congress passed an "organic act" for
the Islands, providing that, after their pacification, a legislative
assembly should be erected. At length, in 1907, this assembly was duly
instituted, and the government now consists of the governor, a
commission appointed by the President and Senate, and a legislature
composed of the commission and a lower house of representatives elected
by popular vote.
* * * * *
Important as are the problems of governing dependencies, they are not
the sole or even the most significant aspects of imperialism. The
possession of territories gives a larger control over the development of
their trade and resources; but capital and enterprise seeking an outlet
flow to those countries where the advantages offered are the greatest,
no matter whoever may exercise political dominion there. The acquisition
of the Philippines was simply an episode in the development of American
commercial interests in the Orient.
It was those interests which led the United States to send Caleb Cushing
to China in 1844 to negotiate a treaty with that country securing for
Americans rights of trade in the ports which had recently been blown
open by British guns in the famous "Opium War." It was those interests
which induced the United States government to send Commodore Perry to
Japan in 1853 and led to the opening of that nation--long closed to the
outside world--to American trade and enterprise. After 1844 in China,
and 1854 in Japan, American trade steadily increased, and American
capital seeking investments soon began to flow into Chinese business and
railway undertakings. Although the United States did not attempt to
follow the example of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany in
seizing Chinese territory, it did obtain a sufficient economic interest
in that Empire to warrant the employment of American soldiers in
cooperation with Russian, English, French, Japanese, and other
contingents at the time of the Boxer insurrection at Peking in the
summer of 1900.
The policy of the United States at the time won no little praise from
the Chinese government. Having no territorial ambitions in the Empire,
the administration at Washington, through Mr. John Hay, Secretary of
State, was able to announce that the United States favored an "open
door" for trade and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of
China. "The policy of the Government of the United States," said Mr. Hay
to the Powers, in the summer of 1900, "is to seek a solution which may
bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese
territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to
friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the
world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the
Chinese empire." This friendly word, which was much appreciated by
China, was later supplemented by the generous action of the United
States government in returning to that country a large sum of money
which had been collected as an indemnity for the injury to American
rights in the Boxer uprising, and was discovered to be an overcharge due
to excessive American claims.
While thus developing American interests in the Orient, the United
States government was much embarrassed by the legislation of some of the
western states against Orientals. Chinese and Japanese laborers were
excluded from the country by law or agreements, but in spite of this
fact there were large numbers of Orientals on the coast. This was
resented by many whites, particularly trade unionists with whom the
cheap labor came into competition, and from time to time laws were
enacted by state legislatures that were alleged to violate the rights
which the United States had guaranteed to the Chinese or Japanese by
treaties with their respective countries.
Such a dispute occurred a few years ago over an attempt to exclude
Japanese children from the regular public schools in San Francisco, and
again in 1912 in connection with a law of California relative to the
acquisition of lands by aliens--the naturalization of Orientals being
forbidden by Federal law. These legal disputes arose from the fact that
the Federal government has the power to make treaties with foreign
countries relative to matters which are entirely within the control of
state legislatures. The discriminations against the Orientals, coupled
with the pressure of American interests in the Far East and the presence
of American dominion in the Philippines, caused no little friction
between certain sections of the United States and of Japan; and there
were some who began, shortly after the Spanish War, to speak of the
"impending conflict" in the Orient.
_The Campaign of 1900_
It was inevitable that the new issues, raised by the Spanish War, the
acquisition of the insular possessions, and the insurrection against
American rule in the Philippines, should find their way almost
immediately into national politics. By the logic of their situation, the
Republicans were compelled to defend their imperialist policy, although
it was distasteful to many of the old leaders; and at their national
convention, at Philadelphia in June, 1900, they renominated President
McKinley by acclamation, justified their methods in the dependencies,
approved the new commercial advances in the Orient, advocated government
aid to the merchant marine, and commended the acquisition of the
Hawaiian Islands. The trust plank, couched in vague and uncertain terms,
was, interestingly enough, drafted by Mr. Hanna, who appropriately
levied the campaign collections for his party in Wall Street.[46] Mr.
Roosevelt, then governor of New York, was nominated for Vice President,
although he had refused to agree to accept the office. The desire of
Senator Platt, the Republican "boss" in New York, to put him out of the
state threw the "machine" in his favor, and this, combined with
enthusiasm for him in the West, gave him every vote in the convention
save his own. Under the circumstances he was forced to accept the
nomination.
The Democrats took up the challenge on "imperialism"; but Mr. Bryan was
determined not to allow the silver question to sink into an early grave,
and he accordingly forced the adoption of a free silver plank, as the
price of his accepting the nomination. The platform was strong in its
denunciation of Republican "imperialist" policy, in general and in
detail. It favored promising the Filipinos stable government,
independence, and, finally, protection from outside interference. It was
also more positive on the trust question, and it advocated an increase
in the powers of the interstate commerce commission, enabling it "to
protect individuals and communities from discriminations and the people
from unjust and unfair transportation rates." An effort was made to
placate the conservative section of the party by offering the nomination
to the Vice Presidency to David B. Hill, of New York, and on his
refusal of the honor it was given to Adlai Stevenson, who had held that
office during Cleveland's second administration.
Although many Republicans supported Mr. Bryan on account of their
dislike of imperialism and its works, the result of the campaign was a
second victory for Mr. McKinley, even greater than that of 1896. He
received a larger popular vote and Mr. Bryan a smaller vote than in that
year. Of the 447 electors, Mr. McKinley received 292. This happy outcome
he naturally regarded as a vindication of his policies, and he was
evidently turning toward the future with renewed confidence (as his
Buffalo speech on reciprocity indicated) when on September 6, 1901, he
was shot by an anarchist at the Buffalo exposition and died eight days
later.
Mr. Roosevelt immediately took the oath of office, and promised to
continue "absolutely unbroken" the policy of his predecessor.
FOOTNOTES:
[43] J. B. Moore, _Four Phases of American Development_, p.
195.
[44] In 1899, the tripartite arrangement was dissolved and
the United States obtained outright possession of Tutuila.
[45] The Hawaiian Islands are ruled by a governor appointed
by the President and Senate and by a legislature of two
houses elected by popular vote.
[46] Croly, _Life of Marcus Hanna_, p. 307.