CHAPTER VI

THE GROWTH OF DISSENT

Important as was the legislation described in the preceding chapter,

there were sources of discontent which it could not, in the nature of

things, dry up. With the exception of the income tax, there had been no

decisive effort to placate the poorer sections of the population by

distinct class legislation. It is true, the alien contract labor law and

the Chinese exclusion act were directed particularly to the working

class, but their effects were not widely felt.

The accumulation of vast fortunes, many of which were gained either by

fraudulent manipulations, or shady transactions within the limits of the

law but condemned by elementary morals, and the massing of millions of

the proletariat in the great industrial cities were bound in the long

run to bring forth political cleavages as deep as the corresponding

social cleavage. The domination of the Federal government by the

captains of machinery and capital was destined to draw out a counter

movement on the part of the small farmers, the middle class, and the

laborers. Mutterings of this protest were heard in the seventies; it

broke forth in the Populist and Socialist movement in the nineties; it

was voiced in the Democratic campaign of 1896; silenced awhile by a

wave of imperialism, it began to work a transformation in all parties at

the opening of the new century.

* * * * *

This protest found its political expression in the organization of

"third" or minor parties. The oldest and most persistent of all these

groups is the Prohibitionist party, which held its first national

convention at Columbus, Ohio, in 1872, and nominated Mr. Black, of

Pennsylvania, as its candidate. In its platform, it declared the

suppression of the liquor traffic to be the leading issue, but it also

proposed certain currency reforms and the regulation of transportation

companies and monopolies.

Although their popular vote in 1872 was less than six thousand, the

Prohibitionists returned to their issue at each succeeding campaign with

Spartan firmness, but their gains were painfully slow. They reached 9522

in 1876, and 10,305 in 1880. In the campaign of 1884, when many

Republicans were dissatisfied with the nomination of Blaine, and

unwilling to follow Curtis and Schurz into the Democratic camp, the

Prohibition vote rose to 150,369. A further gain of nearly one hundred

thousand votes in the next election, to which a slight addition was made

in 1892, encouraged the Prohibitionists to hope that the longed-for

"split" had come, and they frightened the Republican politicians into

considering concessions, especially in the states where the temperance

party held the balance of power. In fact, in their platform of 1892 the

Republicans announced in a noncommittal fashion that they sympathized

with "all wise and legitimate efforts to lessen and prevent the evils of

intemperance and promote morality." The scare was unwarranted, however,

for the Prohibition party had about reached its high-water mark. Being

founded principally on one moral issue and making no appeal to any

fundamental economic divisions, it could not make headway against the

more significant social issues, and its strength was further reduced by

the growth of state and local prohibition.

* * * * *

Almost immediately after the Civil War, labor entered politics in a

small way on its own account. In 1872, a party known as the "Labor

Reformers" held a national convention at Columbus which was attended by

delegates from seventeen states. It declared in favor of restricting the

sale of public lands to homesteaders, Chinese exclusion, an eight-hour

day in government employments, civil service reform, one term for each

President, regulation of railway and telegraph rates, and the subjection

of the military to the civil authorities. The party nominated Justice

Davis, who had been appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States

by Lincoln and had shown Populist leanings immediately after the War;

but Mr. Davis declined to serve, and O'Connor of New York, to whom the

place was then tendered, only polled about 29,000 votes.

This early labor party was simply a party of mild protest. It originated

in Massachusetts, where there had been a number of serious labor

disputes and a certain shoe manufacturer had imported a carload of

Chinese to operate his machinery. Although Wendell Phillips, who had

declared the emancipation of labor to be the next great issue after the

emancipation of slaves, was prominently identified with it and stood

next to Justice Davis on the first poll in the convention, the party as

a whole manifested no tendency to open a distinct class struggle, and

the leading planks of its program were shortly accepted by both of the

old parties.

Standing upon such a temporary platform, and unsupported by any general

philosophy of politics, the labor reform party inevitably went to

pieces. Its dissolution was facilitated by the rise of an agrarian

party, the Greenbackers, who, in their platform of 1880, were more

specific and even more extensive in their declaration of labor's rights

than the "Reformers" themselves had been. It was not until 1888 that

another "labor" group appeared, but since that date there has been one

or more parties making a distinct appeal to the working class. In that

year, there were two "labor" factions, the Union Labor party and the

United Labor party. Both groups came out for the public ownership of the

means of transportation and communication and a code of enlightened

labor legislation. The former advocated the limitation of land ownership

and the latter the application of the single tax. Both agreed in

denouncing the "Democratic and Republican parties as hopelessly and

shamelessly corrupt, and, by reason of their affiliation with

monopolies, equally unworthy of the suffrages of those who do not live

upon public plunder." The vote of both groups in the ensuing election

was slightly over 150,000.

The labor groups which had broken with the old parties took a more

definite step toward socialism in 1892, when they frankly assumed the

name of the Socialist Labor party[34] and put forward a declaration in

favor of the public ownership of utilities and a general system of

protective labor legislation. Although the socialism of Karl Marx had by

this time won a wide influence among the working classes of Europe,

there are few if any traces of it in the Socialist Labor platform of

1892. That platform says nothing about the inevitable contest between

labor and capitalism, or about the complete public ownership of all the

means of transportation and production. On the contrary, it confines its

statements to concrete propositions, including the political reforms of

the initiative, referendum, and recall, all of which have since been

advocated by leaders in the old parties. The small vote received in 1892

by the socialistic candidate, 21,532, is no evidence of the strength of

the labor protest, for the Populist party in that year included in its

program substantially the same principles and made a distinct appeal to

the working class, as well as to the farmers.

* * * * *

Indeed, the discontent of the two decades from 1876 to 1896 was confined

principally to the small farmers, who waged, in fact, a class war upon

capitalists and financiers, although they nowhere formulated it into a

philosophy. They chose to rely upon the inflation of the currency as

their chief weapon of offense. A precursor to the agrarian movement in

politics is to be found in the "Granger Movement," which began with the

formation of an association known as the "Patrons of Husbandry" in

1867. This society, which organized local lodges on a secret basis and

admitted both men and women, was originally designed to promote

agricultural interests in a general and social way, and its political

implications were not at first apparent. It naturally appealed, however,

to the most active and socially minded farmers, and its leaders soon

became involved in politics.

The sources of agrarian discontent were obvious. During the War, prices

had been high and thousands of farm "hands" and mechanics had become

land owners, thanks to the homestead laws enacted by the Republican

party; but they had little capital to start with, and their property was

heavily mortgaged. When the inflated War prices collapsed, they found

themselves compelled to pay interest at the old rate, and they figured

it out that capitalists and bondholders were the chief beneficiaries of

the Federal financial legislation. In spite of all that had been paid on

the national and private debts, the amount still due, they reckoned,

measured in the products of toil, wheat and corn, was greater than ever.

They, therefore, hit on the conclusion that the chief source of trouble

was in the contraction of the currency which reduced the money value of

their products. The remedy obviously was inflation in some form.[35]

While the currency thus became the chief agrarian issue, the farmers

attributed a part of their troubles to the railway companies whose

heavily "watered" capital made high freight rates necessary, and whose

discriminations in charges fell as heavy burdens on shippers outside of

the zones of competition. The agrarians, therefore, resorted to railway

legislation in their respective states--the regulation of rates and

charges for transportation and the conditions under which grain should

be warehoused and handled. In Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and other

states, the law makers yielded to the pressure of the farmers for this

kind of legislative relief, and based their legal contentions on the

ground that the railways "partook of the nature of public highways." The

Grangers were strengthened in their convictions by the violence of the

opposition offered on the part of the railways to the establishment of

rates and charges by public authority, and by their constant appeals to

the courts for relief.[36]

Of course, the fixing of flat rates without any inquiry into the cost of

specific services was open to grave objections; but the opposition of

the companies was generally based on the contention that they had a

right to run their business in their own way. The spirit of this

opposition is reflected in an editorial published in the _Nation_, of

New York, in January, 1875: "We maintain that the principle of such

legislation is either confiscation, or, if another phrase be more

agreeable, the change of railroads from pieces of private property,

owned and managed for the benefit of those who have invested their money

in them, into eleemosynary or charitable corporations, managed for the

benefit of a particular class of applicants for outdoor relief--the

farmers. If, in the era of progress to which the farmers' movement

proposes to introduce us, we are going back to a condition of society in

which the only sort of property which we can call our own is that which

we can make our own by physical possession, it is certainly important to

every one to know it, and the only body which can really tell us is the

Supreme Court at Washington."

Not content with their achievements in the state legislatures, the

agrarians entered national politics in 1876 in the form of the

Independent National or Greenback party, designed to "stop the present

suicidal and destructive policy of contraction." They declared their

belief that "a United States note, issued directly by the government and

convertible on demand into United States obligations, bearing a rate of

interest not exceeding one cent a day on each one hundred dollars and

exchangeable for United States notes at par, will afford the best

circulating medium ever devised." In spite of the small vote polled by

their standard bearer, Peter Cooper, of New York, they put forward a

candidate in the next campaign[37] and made a third attempt in 1884,

growing more and more radical in tone. In their last year, they

declared: "Never in our history have the banks, the land-grant

railroads, and other monopolies been more insolent in their demands for

further privileges--still more class legislation. In this emergency the

dominant parties are arrayed against the people and are the abject tools

of the corporate monopolies." The Greenbackers demanded, in addition to

currency reform, the regulation of interstate commerce, a graduated

income tax, labor legislation, prohibition of importation of contract

laborers, and the reduction of the terms of United States Senators.

Although their candidate, B. F. Butler, polled 175,000 votes in 1884,

the Greenbackers gave up the contest, and in 1888 yielded their place to

the Union Labor party.

The agrarian interest was, however, still the chief source of conscious

discontent, and the disappearance of the Greenbackers was shortly

followed by the establishment of two societies, the National Farmers'

Alliance and Industrial Union and the National Farmers' Alliance, the

former strong in the South and West, and the latter in the North. In

1890, these orders claimed over three million members, and in several of

the southern states they had dominated or split the Democratic party.

The Northern Alliance was likewise busy with politics, and in Kansas and

Nebraska, by independence or fusion, carried a large number of

legislative districts.

Although professing to be non-political in the beginning, the leaders of

these alliances called a national convention at Omaha in 1892 and put

forth the most radical platform that had yet appeared in American

politics. It declared that the newspapers were subsidized, corruption

dominated the ballot box, homes were covered with mortgages, labor was

impoverished and tyrannized over by a hireling standing army, and the

nation stood on the verge of ruin. "The fruits of the toils of

millions," runs the platform, "are boldly stolen to build up colossal

fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the

possessors of these in turn despise the republic and endanger liberty.

From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed two

classes of tramps and millionaires." Their demands included the free

coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, postal-savings banks,

government ownership of railways, telegraph and telephones; they

declared their sympathy with organized labor in its warfare for better

conditions and its struggle against "Pinkerton hirelings"; and they

commended the initiative, referendum, and popular election of United

States Senators. On this program, the Populists polled over a million

votes and captured twenty-two presidential electors. Evidently the

indifference of the old parties to such issues could not remain

undisturbed much longer.

* * * * *

Fuel was added to the discontent in the spring of 1895, when the Supreme

Court declared null and void the income tax law of the previous

year.[38] The opponents of the tax, having lost in the Congress, made

their last stand in the highest Federal tribunal, and marshaled on their

side an array of legal talent seldom seen in an action at law, including

Senator Edmunds, Mr. Joseph H. Choate, and other attorneys prominently

identified with railway and corporation litigation. No effort was spared

in bringing pressure to bear on the Court, and no arguments, legal,

political, and social, were neglected in the attempt to impress upon the

Court the importance of stopping Populism by a judicial pronunciamento.

Conservative New York papers, like the _Herald_, boldly prophesied in

the summer of 1894 that "the income tax will be blotted from the statute

books before the people are cursed with its inquisitorial enforcement."

No easy victory lay before the opponents of the income tax, for the law

seemed to be against them. In 1870, the Supreme Court had upheld the

Civil War income tax without a dissenting voice, and had distinctly

said: "Our conclusions are that direct taxes, within the meaning of the

Constitution, are only capitation taxes as expressed in that instrument

and taxes on real estate, and that the tax of which the plaintiff in

error complains [the income tax] is within the category of an excise or

duty." Of course, the terms of the new law were not identical with those

of the Civil War measure, and the Supreme Court had been known to

reverse itself.

The attorneys against the tax left no stone unturned. As Professor

Seligman remarks, "Some of the important financial interests now engaged

a notable array of eminent counsel to essay the arduous task of

persuading the Supreme Court that it might declare the income tax a

direct tax without reversing its previous decisions. The effort was made

with the most astonishing degree of ability and ingenuity, and the

briefs and arguments of the opposing counsel fill several large

volumes.... The counsel's arguments abound in historical errors and

economic inaccuracies.... Errors and misstatements which might be

multiplied pale into insignificance compared with the misinterpretation

put upon the origin and purpose of the direct-tax clause--a

misinterpretation which like most of the preceding mistakes was bodily

adopted by the majority of the Court, who evidently found no time for an

independent investigation of the subject." Having exhausted their

ingenuity in the matter of technicalities and imposing historical and

economic and legal arguments, the counsel appealed to every class fear

and prejudice that might be entertained by the Court.

The introduction of the passions of a social conflict into what

purported to be a legal contest was intrusted to Mr. Choate. He

threatened the Court with the declaration that if it approved the law,

and "the communistic march" went on, a still higher exemption of $20,000

might be made and a rate of 20 per cent imposed--a highly important

statement, but one that had no connection with the question whether an

income tax was a direct tax. "There is protection now or never," he

exclaimed. The very keystone of civilization, he continued, was the

preservation of the rights of private property, and this fundamental

principle was scattered to the winds by the champions of the tax. Mr.

Choate concluded by warning the Court not to pay any attention to the

popular passions enlisted on the side of the law, and urged it not to

hesitate in declaring the law unconstitutional, "no matter what the

threatened consequences of popular or populistic wrath may be."

The Court was evidently moved by the declamation of Mr. Choate, for

Justice Field, in his opinion, replied in kind. "The present assault

upon capital," he said, "is but the beginning. It will be but the

stepping stone to others larger and more sweeping till our political

conditions will become a war of the poor against the rich; a war

growing in intensity and bitterness." If such a law were upheld, he

gravely announced, boards of walking delegates would be fixing tax rates

in the near future. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion,

however, replied in behalf of the populace by saying: "The practical

effect of the decision to-day is to give certain kinds of property a

position of favoritism and advantage inconsistent with the fundamental

principles of our social organization, and to invest them with power and

influence that may be perilous to that portion of the American people

upon whom rests the larger part of the burdens of government and who

ought not to be subjected to the dominion of aggregated wealth any more

than the property of the country should be at the mercy of the lawless."

At the best, the nullification of the income tax law was not an easy

task. There were eight justices on the bench when the decision of the

Court was handed down on April 8, 1895. All of them agreed that the law

was unconstitutional in so far as it laid a tax on revenues derived from

state and municipal bonds; five of them agreed that a tax on rent or

income from land was a direct tax and hence unconstitutional unless

apportioned among the states on the basis of population--which was

obviously impolitic; and the Court stood four to four on the important

point as to the constitutionality of taxes on incomes derived from

mortgages, interest, and personal property generally. The decision of

the Court was thus inconclusive on the only point that interested

capitalists particularly, and it was so regarded by the Eastern press.

On April 9, the day following the decision of the Court, the New York

_Sun_ declared: "Twice in great national crises the Supreme Court of the

United States has failed to meet the expectations of the people or to

justify its existence as the ultimate tribunal of right and law. In both

instances the potent consideration has been neither right nor law, but

the supposed demands of political expediency.... Yesterday the failure

of the Supreme Court to decide the main question of constitutionality

submitted to it was brought about by political considerations. It was

not Democracy against Republicanism as before, but Populism and

Clevelandism against Democracy, and the vote was four to four." The

_Tribune_, on April 10, declared that "the Court reached a finding which

is as near an abdication of its power to interpret the Constitution and

a confession of its unfitness for that duty as anything well can be."

In view of the unsatisfactory condition created by its decision, the

Court consented to a rehearing, and, on May 20, 1895, added its opinion

that the tax on incomes from personal property was also a direct tax,

thus bringing the whole law to the ground by a vote of five to four.

Justice Jackson, who was ill when the first decision was made, had in

the meantime returned to the bench, and he was strongly in favor of

declaring the law constitutional. Had the Court stood as before, the

personal property income tax would have been upheld, but one Justice,

who had sustained this particular provision in the first case, was

induced to change his views and vote against it on the final count. Thus

by a narrow vote of five to four, brought about by a Justice who

changed his mind within the period of a few days, all of the essential

parts of the income tax law were declared null and void.

The temper of the country over the affair was well manifested in the

press comments on the last decision. The New York _Sun_, which had

roundly denounced the Court in the first instance, now joined in a

chorus of praise: "In a hundred years the Supreme Court of the United

States has not rendered a decision more important in its immediate

effect or reaching further in its consequences than that which the _Sun_

records this morning. There is life left in the institutions which the

founders of this republic devised and constructed. There is a safe

future for the national system under which we were all born and have

lived and prospered according to individual capacity. The wave of

socialistic revolution has gone far, but it breaks at the foot of the

ultimate bulwark set up for protection of our liberties. Five to four,

the court stands like a rock."

The _Tribune_, on May 24, added: "The more the people study the

influences behind this attempt to bring about a communistic revolution

in modes of taxation, the more clearly they will realize that it was an

essential part of the distinctly un-American and unpatriotic attempt to

destroy the American policy of defense for home industries, in the

interest of foreigners.... Thanks to the Court, our government is not to

be dragged into communistic warfare against rights of property and the

rewards of industry while the Constitution of its founders remains a

bulwark of the rights of states and of individual citizens."

The New York _World_, on the other hand, which had so stoutly championed

the tax in behalf of "the masses," represented the decision of the Court

as "the triumph of selfishness over patriotism. It is another victory of

greed over need. Great and rich corporations, by hiring the ablest

lawyers in the land and fighting against a petty tax upon superfluity as

other men have fought for their liberties and their lives, have secured

the exemption of wealth from paying its just share towards the support

of the government that protects it.... The people at large will bow to

this decision as they habitually do to all the decrees of their highest

courts. But they will not accept law as justice. No dictum or decision

of any wrong can make wrong right, and it is not right that the entire

cost of the Federal government shall rest upon consumption.... Equity

demands that citizens shall contribute to the support of the government

with some regard to benefits received and ability to pay."

* * * * *

Although the conservative elements saw in the annulment of the income

tax nothing but a wise and timely exercise of judicial authority in

defense of the Constitution and sound policy, the radical elements

regarded it as an evidence "that the judicial branch of the government

was under the control of the same interests that had mutilated the

Wilson tariff bill in the Senate." The local Federal courts augmented

this popular feeling by frequently issuing injunctions ordering

workingmen in time of strikes not to interfere with their employers'

business, thus crippling them in the coercion of employers, by

imprisoning without jury trial those who disobeyed judicial orders.

Although the injunction was an ancient legal device, it was not until

after the Civil War that it was developed into a powerful instrument in

industrial disputes; and it became particularly effective in the hands

of Federal judges. They were not popularly elected, but were appointed

by the President and the Senate (where corporate influences were ably

represented). Under the provisions of the law giving Federal courts

jurisdiction in cases involving citizens of different states, they were

called upon to intervene with increasing frequency in industrial

disputes, for railway and other corporations usually did business in

several states, and they could generally invoke Federal protection by

showing that they were "non-residents" of the particular states in which

strikes were being waged. Moreover, strikers who interfered with

interstate commerce were likely to collide with Federal authorities

whose aid was invited by the employers affected. Whenever a corporation

was in bankruptcy, control over its business fell into the hands of the

Federal courts.

The effectiveness of Federal judicial intervention in labor troubles

became apparent in the first great strikes of the seventies, when the

state authorities proved unable to restrain rioting and disorder by the

use of the local militia. During the railway war of 1877 a Federal judge

in southern Illinois ordered the workingmen not to interfere with a

railway for which he had appointed a receiver, and he then employed

Federal troops under the United States marshal to execute his mandate.

About the same time other Federal judges intervened effectively in

industrial disputes by the liberal use of the injunction, and the

president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company pointed out in an article

published in the _North American Review_ for September, 1877, how much

more potent Federal authority was in such trying crises to give railway

corporations efficient protection.

From that time forward the injunction was steadily employed by Federal

and state courts, but it was not until the great railway strike of 1894

in Chicago that it was brought prominently before the country as a

distinct political issue. In that strike, the Democratic governor, Mr.

Altgeld, believing that the employers had fomented disorder for the

purpose of invoking Federal intervention (as was afterward pretty

conclusively shown), refused to employ the state militia speedily and

effectively, contending that the presence of troops would only make

matters worse. The postal authorities, influenced by a variety of

motives, of which, it was alleged, a desire to break the strike was one,

secured prompt Federal intervention on the part of President Cleveland

and the use of Federal troops. Thus the labor unions were quickly

checkmated.

This action on the part of President Cleveland was supplemented in July,

1894, by a general blanket injunction issued from the Federal district

court in Chicago to all persons concerned, ordering them not to

interfere with the transmission of the mails or with interstate commerce

in any form. Mr. Debs, president of the American Railway Union, who was

directing the strike which was tying up interstate commerce, was

arrested, fined, and imprisoned for refusing to obey this injunction.

Mr. Debs, thereupon, through his counsel, claimed the right to jury

trial, asserting that the court could not impose a penalty which was not

provided by statute, but which depended solely upon the will of the

judge. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the

lower court and declared that imprisonment for contempt of court did not

violate the principle of jury trial.

It was not merely labor leaders who were stirred to wrath by this

development in judicial authority. Many eminent lawyers saw in it an

attack upon the ancient safeguards of the law which provided for regular

proceedings, indictment, the hearing of witnesses, jury trial, and the

imposition of only such punishments as could be clearly ascertained in

advance. On the other hand others held it to be nothing new at all, but

simply the application of the old principle that injunctions could issue

in cases where irreparable injury might otherwise ensue. They pointed

out that its effectiveness depended upon speedy application, and that

the delays usually incident to regular judicial procedure would destroy

its usefulness altogether. To workingmen it appeared to be chiefly an

instrument for imprisoning their leaders and breaking strikes by the

prevention of coercion, peaceful or otherwise. At all events, the

decision of the Supreme Court upholding the practice and its doctrines

added to the bitterness engendered by the income tax decision--a

bitterness manifested at the Democratic convention at Chicago the

following year.

The crowning cause of immediate discontent was the financial policy

pursued by President Cleveland,[39] which stirred the wrath of the

agrarians already agitated over inflation, and gave definiteness to an

issue on which both parties had been judiciously ambiguous in their

platforms in 1892. The farmers pointed out that, notwithstanding the

increased output of corn, the total amount of money received in return

was millions less than it had been in the early eighties. They

emphasized the fact that more than half of the taxable acreage of Kansas

and Nebraska was mortgaged, and that many other western states were

nearly as badly off. The falling prices and their inability to meet

their indebtedness they attributed to the demonetization of silver and

the steady enhancement of gold.

For the disease, as they diagnosed it, they had a remedy. The

government, they said, had been generous to Wall Street and financial

interests at large by selling bonds at rates which made great fortunes

for the narrow group of purchasers, and by distributing its deposits

among the banks in need of assistance. The power of the government could

also be used for the benefit of another class--namely, themselves. Gold

should be brought down and the currency extended by the free coinage of

silver on a basis of sixteen to one. The value of crops, when measured

in money, would thus mount upwards, and it would be easier to pay the

interest on mortgages and discharge their indebtedness. Furthermore,

while the government was in the business of accommodating the public it

might loan money to the farmers at a low rate of interest.[40] But the

inflation of the currency and the increase of prices of farm products by

the free coinage of silver were the leading demands of the discontented

agrarians--an old remedy for an old disease.

FOOTNOTES:

[34] See below, p. 296.

[35] See above, p. 121.

[36] See above, pp. 67 ff.

[37] They polled about a million votes in the congressional

elections of 1878.

[38] See above, p. 137.

[39] See above, p. 106.

[40] It is interesting to note that agricultural credit--a

subject in which European countries are far advanced--is just

now beginning to receive some attention in quarters where the

demands of the farmers for better terms on borrowed money

were once denounced as mere vagaries.

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