PARTIES AND PARTY ISSUES, 1877-1896
It was a long time before the conditions created by the great economic
revolution were squarely reflected in political literature and party
programs. Indeed, they were but vaguely comprehended by the generation
of statesmen who had been brought up in the days of the stagecoach and
the water mill. It is true that the inevitable drift of capitalism in
the United States might have been foreseen by turning to Europe,
particularly to England, where a similar economic revolution had
produced clearly ascertainable results; but American politicians
believed, or at least contended, that the United States lived under a
special economic dispensation and that the grave social problems which
had menaced Europe for more than a generation when the Civil War broke
out could never arise on American soil.
From 1861 to 1913, the Republican party held the presidential office,
except for eight years. That party had emerged from the Civil War
fortified by an intense patriotism and by the support of the
manufacturing interests which had flourished under the high tariffs and
of capitalists anxious to swing forward with the development of railways
and new enterprises. Its origin had been marked by a wave of moral
enthusiasm such as has seldom appeared in the history of politics. It
came to the presidency as a minority party, but by the fortunes of war
it became possessed of instruments of power beyond all calculation. Its
leading opponents from the South deserted in a mass giving it in a short
time possession of the field--all the Federal branches of government. It
had the management of the gigantic war finances, through which it
attached to itself the interests and fortunes of the great capitalists
and bankers throughout the North. It raised revenues by a high tariff
which placed thousands of manufacturers under debt to it and linked
their fortunes also with its fate. It possessed the Federal offices,
and, therefore, railway financiers and promoters of all kinds had to
turn to it for privileges and protection. Finally, millions of farmers
of the West owed their homes to its generous policy of giving away
public lands. Never had a party had its foundations on interests
ramifying throughout such a large portion of society.
And over all it spread the mantle of patriotism. It had saved the Union,
and it had struck the shackles from four million bondmen. In a baptism
of fire it had redeemed a nation. Europe's finger of scorn could no
longer be pointed to the "slave republic paying its devotions to liberty
and equality within the sound of the bondman's wail." The promises of
the Declaration of Independence had been fulfilled and the heroic deeds
of the Revolution rivaled by Republican leaders. As it declared in its
platform of 1876, the Republican party had come into power "when in the
economy of Providence this land was to be purged of human slavery and
when the strength of the government of the people, by the people, and
for the people was to be demonstrated." Incited by the memories of its
glorious deeds "to high aims for the good of our country and mankind,"
it looked forward "with unfaltering courage, hope, and purpose."
Against such a combination of patriotism and economic interest, the
Democratic party had difficulty in making headway, for its former
economic mainstay, the slave power, was broken and gone; it was charged
with treason, and it enjoyed none of the spoils of national office. But
in spite of all obstacles it showed remarkable vitality. Though divided
on the slave question in 1860, those who boasted the name of "Democrat"
were in an overwhelming majority, and even during the Civil War, with
the southern wing cut off completely, the party was able to make a
respectable showing in the campaign which resulted in Lincoln's second
election. When the South returned to the fold, and white dominion drove
the negro from the polls, the Democratic party began to renew its youth.
In the elections of 1874, it captured the House of Representatives; it
narrowly missed the presidency in 1876; and it retained its control of
the lower house of Congress in the elections of 1876 and 1878.
* * * * *
The administration of President Hayes did little to strengthen the
position of the Republicans. His policy of pacification in the South
alienated many partisans who believed that those who had saved the Union
should continue to rule it; but it is difficult to say how much
disaffection should be attributed to this cause. It seems to have been
quietly understood within official circles that support would be
withdrawn from the Republican administrations in Louisiana and South
Carolina. Senator Hoar is authority for the statement "that General
Grant, before he left office, had determined to do in regard to these
state governments exactly what Hayes afterward did, and that Hayes acted
with his full approval. Second, I have the authority of President
Garfield for saying that Mr. Blaine had come to the same conclusion."
Charges based on sectional feeling were also brought forward in
criticism of some of Hayes' cabinet appointments. He terrified the
advocates of "no concession to rebels" by appointing David M. Key, an
ex-Confederate soldier of Tennessee, to the office of Postmaster-General;
and his selection of Carl Schurz, a leader of the Liberal Republican
Movement of 1872 and an uncertain quantity in politics, as Secretary of
the Interior, was scarcely more palatable in some quarters. He created
further trouble in Republican ranks by his refusal to accede to the
demands of powerful Senators, like Cameron of Pennsylvania and Conkling
of New York, for control over patronage in their respective states. No
other President for more than a generation had so many nominations
rejected by the Senate.
On the side of legislation, Hayes' administration was nearly barren.
During his entire term the House of Representatives was Democratic, and
during the last two years the Senate was Democratic also by a good
margin. Had he desired to carry out a large legislative policy, he could
not have done so; but he was not a man of great capacity as an initiator
of public policies. He maintained his dignity and self-possession in
the midst of the most trying party squabbles; but in a democracy other
qualities than these are necessary for effective leadership.
* * * * *
In their desperation, the conservative leaders of the Republican party
resolved to have no more "weak and goody-goody" Presidents, incapable of
fascinating the populace and keeping it in good humor, and they made a
determined effort to secure the renomination of Grant for a third term,
in spite of the tradition against it. Conkling captured the New York
delegation to the national convention in 1880 for Grant; Cameron swung
Pennsylvania into line; and Logan carried off Illinois. Grant's consent
to be a candidate was obtained, and Conkling placed his name in
nomination in a speech which Senator Hoar describes as one of "very
great power."
Strong opposition to Grant developed, however, partly on account of the
feeling against the third term, and particularly on account of the
antagonism to the Conkling faction which was backing him. Friends of
Blaine, then Senator from Maine, and supporters of John Sherman of Ohio,
thought that Grant had had enough honors at the hands of the party, and
that their turn had come. As a result of a combination of circumstances,
Grant never received more than 313 of the 378 votes necessary to
nomination at the Republican convention. After prolonged balloting, the
deadlock was broken by the nomination of James A. Garfield, of Ohio, as
a "dark horse." The Grant contingent from New York received a sop in
the shape of the nomination of Chester A. Arthur, a politician of the
Conkling school, to the office of Vice President.
In spite of the promising signs, the Democrats were unable to defeat the
Republicans in 1880. The latter found it possible to heal, at least for
campaign purposes, the breaches created by Hayes' administration. It is
true that Senator Conkling and the "Stalwart" faction identified with
corporation interests were sorely disappointed in their failure to
secure the nomination of Grant for a third term, and that Garfield as a
"dark horse" did not have a personal following like that of his chief
opponents, the Hero of Appomattox, Blaine of Maine, and Sherman of Ohio.
But he had the advantage of escaping the bitter factional feeling within
the party against each of these leaders. He had risen from humble
circumstances, and his managers were able to make great capital out of
his youthful labors as a "canal-boat boy." He had served several terms
in Congress acceptably; he had been intrusted with a delicate place as a
member of the electoral commission that had settled the Hayes-Tilden
dispute; and he was at the time of his nomination Senator-elect from
Ohio. Though without the high qualities of leadership that distinguished
Blaine, Garfield was a decidedly "available" candidate and his
candidature was strengthened by the nomination of Arthur, who was
acceptable to the Conkling group and the spoilsmen generally.
The Republican fortunes in 1880 were further enhanced by the divisions
among the Democrats and their inability to play the game of practical
politics. Two sets of delegates appeared at the convention from New
York, and the Tammany group headed by "Boss" Kelly was excluded, thus
offending a powerful section of the party in that pivotal state. The
candidate nominated, General Hancock, was by no means a skilful leader.
In fact, he had had no public experience outside of the Army, where he
had made a brilliant record, and he showed no ability at all as a
campaigner. Finally, the party made its fight principally on the "great
fraud of 1876," asking vindication at the hands of the people on the
futile theory that the voters would take an interest in punishing a
four-year-old crime. In its platform, reported by Mr. Watterson, of
Kentucky, it declared that the Democrats had submitted to that outrage
because they were convinced that the people would punish the crime in
1880. "This issue precedes and dwarfs every other; it imposes a more
sacred duty upon the people of the Union than ever addressed to the
conscience of a nation of freemen." Notwithstanding this narrow issue,
Hancock fell behind Garfield only about ten thousand votes, although his
electoral vote was only 155 to 214 for his opponent.
Whether Garfield would have been able to consolidate his somewhat
shattered party by effective leadership is a matter of speculation, for,
on July 2, 1881, about four months after his inauguration, he was shot
by Charles J. Guiteau, a disappointed and half-crazed office seeker, and
he died on September 19. His successor, Vice President Arthur, though a
man of considerable ability, who managed his office with more acumen and
common honesty than his opponents attributed to him, was unable to clear
away the accumulating dissatisfaction within his party or convince the
country that the party would do its own reforming.
In fact, Arthur, notwithstanding the taint of "spoils" associated with
his career, proved to be by no means the easy-going politician that had
been expected. He took a firm stand against extravagant appropriations
as a means of getting rid of the Treasury surplus, and in 1882 he vetoed
a river and harbor appropriation bill which was specially designed to
distribute funds among localities on the basis of favoritism. In the
same year, he vetoed a Chinese exclusion act as violating the treaty
with China, and made recommendations as to changes which were accepted
by Congress. Arthur also advocated legislation against the spoils
system, and on January 16, 1883, signed the Civil Service law.[24] He
recommended a revision of the tariff, including some striking reductions
in schedules, but the tariff act of 1883 was even less satisfactory to
the public than such measures usually are. Judging by past standards,
however, Arthur had a claim upon his party for the nomination in 1884.
* * * * *
But Arthur was not a magnetic leader, and the election of Grover
Cleveland as governor of New York in 1882 and Democratic victories
elsewhere warned the Republicans that their tenure of power was not
indefinite. Circumspection, however, was difficult. A "reform" faction
had grown up within the party, protesting against the gross practices of
old leaders like Conkling and urging at least more outward signs of
propriety. In this faction were Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, George
William Curtis, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt--the last of
whom had just begun his political career with his election to the New
York legislature in 1881. Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, was the leader of
this group, and his nomination was warmly urged in the Republican
convention at Chicago in 1884.
The hopes of the Republican reformers were completely dashed, however,
by the nomination of Blaine. This "gentleman from Maine" was a man of
brilliant parts and the idol of large sections of the country,
particularly the Middle West; but some suspicions concerning his
personal integrity were widely entertained, and not without reason, by a
group of influential leaders in his party. In 1876, he was charged with
having shared in the corruption funds of the Union Pacific Railroad
Company, and as Professor Dunning cautiously puts it, "the facts
developed put Mr. Blaine under grave suspicion of just that sort of
wealth-getting, if nothing worse, which had ruined his colleagues in the
Credit Mobilier." Moreover, Mr. Blaine's associations had been with that
wing of his party which had been involved or implicated in one scandal
after another. Partly on this account, he had been defeated for
nomination in 1876, when he was decidedly the leading aspirant and again
in 1880 when he received 285 votes in the convention. But in 1884,
leaders like Senator Platt, of New York, declared "it is now Blaine's
turn," and he was nominated in spite of a threatened bolt.
The Democrats were fortunate in their selection of Grover Cleveland as
their standard bearer. He had been mayor of Buffalo and governor of New
York, but he had taken no part in national politics and had the virtue
of having few enemies in that field. He was not a man of any large
comprehension of the economic problems of his age, but he was in every
way acceptable to financiers in New York, for he had showed his
indifference to popular demands by vetoing a five-cent fare bill for the
New York City elevated roads which were then being watered and
manipulated by astute speculators, like Jay Gould. Moreover, Mr.
Cleveland possessed certain qualities of straightforwardness and homely
honesty which commended him to a nation wearied of scandalous
revelations and the malodorous spoils system.
These qualities drew to Cleveland the support of a group of eminent
Republicans, like Carl Schurz who had been Secretary of the Interior
under Hayes, George William Curtis, the civil service reformer, Henry
Ward Beecher, and William Everett, who were nicknamed "Mugwumps" from an
Indian word meaning "chief." Although the "reformers" talked a great
deal about "purity" in politics, the campaign of 1884 was principally
over personalities; and, as a contemporary newspaper put it, it took on
the tone of "a pothouse quarrel." There was no real division over
issues, as will be seen by a comparison of platforms, and scandalous
rumors respecting the morals of the two candidates were freely employed
as campaign arguments. Indeed, the spirit of the fray is reflected in
the words of the Democratic platform: "The Republican party, so far as
principle is concerned, is a reminiscence. In practice, it is an
organization for enriching those who control its machinery. The frauds
and jobbery which have been brought to light in every department of the
government are sufficient to have called for reform within the
Republican party; yet those in authority, made reckless by the long
possession of power, have succumbed to its corrupting influence and have
placed in nomination a ticket against which the independent portion of
the party are in open revolt. Therefore a change is demanded." Having
enjoyed no opportunities for corruption worthy of mention, except in New
York City where they had reaped a good harvest during the sunshine, the
Democrats could honestly pose as the party of "purity in politics."
Their demand for a change was approved by the voters, for Cleveland
received 219 electoral votes as against 182 cast for Blaine. A closer
analysis of the vote, however, shows no landslide to the Democrats, for
had New York been shifted to the Republican column, the result would
have been 218 for Blaine and 183 for Cleveland. And the Democratic
victory in New York was so close that a second count was necessary, upon
which it was discovered that the successful candidate had only about
eleven hundred votes more than the vanquished Blaine. Taking the country
as a whole, the Democrats had a plurality of a little more than twenty
thousand votes.
Cleveland's administration was beset by troubles from the beginning. The
civil service reformers were early disappointed with his performances,
as they might have expected. It is true that the Democratic party had
posed in general as the party of "reform," because forsooth having no
patronage to dispense nor favors to grant it could readily make a
virtue of necessity; but it is fair to say that the party had in fact
been somewhat noncommittal on civil service reform, and Cleveland,
though friendly, was hardly to be classed as ardent. The test came soon
after his inauguration. More than one hundred thousand Federal offices
were in the hands of Republicans; the Senate which had to pass upon the
President's chief nominations was Republican and the clash between the
two authorities was spectacular. The pressure of Democrats for office
was naturally strong, and although the civil service reformers got a few
crumbs of comfort, the bald fact stood forth that within two years only
about one third of the former officeholders remained. "Of the chief
officers," says Professor Dewey, "including the fourth class
post-masters, collectors, land officers, numbering about 58,000, over
45,000 were changed. All of the 85 internal revenue collectors were
displaced; and of the 111 collectors of customs, 100 were removed or not
reappointed."
Cleveland's executive policy was negative rather than positive. He
vigorously applied the veto to private pension bills. From the
foundation of the government until 1897, it appears that 265 such bills
were denied executive approval; and of these five were vetoed by Grant
and 260 by Cleveland--nearly all of the latter's negatives being in his
first administration. Cleveland also vetoed a general dependent pension
bill in 1887 on the ground that it was badly drawn and ill considered.
Although his enemies attempted to show that he was hostile to the old
soldiers, his vetoes were in fact based rather upon a careful
examination of the merits of the several acts which showed extraordinary
carelessness, collusion, and fraud. At all events, the Grand Army
Encampment in 1887 refused to pass a resolution of censure. Cleveland
also killed the river and harbor bill of 1887 by a pocket veto, and he
put his negative on a measure, passed the following year, returning to
the treasuries of the northern states nearly all of the direct taxes
which they had paid during the Civil War in support of the Federal
government.
On the constructive side, Cleveland's first administration was marked by
a vigorous land policy under which upwards of 80,000,000 acres of land
were recovered from private corporations and persons who had secured
their holdings illegally. He was also the first President to treat the
labor problem in a special message (1886); and he thus gave official
recognition to a new force in politics, although the sole outcome of his
recommendations was the futile law of 1888 providing for the voluntary
arbitration of disputes between railways and their employees. The really
noteworthy measure of his first administration was the interstate
commerce law of 1887, but that could hardly be called a partisan
achievement.[25]
* * * * *
Holding his place by no overwhelming mandate and having none of those
qualities of brilliant leadership which arouse the multitude, Cleveland
was unable to intrench his party, and he was forced to surrender his
office at the end of four years' tenure, although his party showed its
confidence by renominating him in 1888. He had a Democratic House during
his administration, but he was embarrassed by party divisions there and
by a Republican Senate. Under such circumstances, he was able to do
little that was striking, and in his message of December, 1887, he
determined to set an issue by a vigorous attack on the tariff--a subject
which had been treated in a gingerly fashion by both parties since the
War. While he disclaimed adherence to the academic theory of free trade
as a principle, his language was readily turned by his enemies into an
attack on the principle of the protective tariff. Although the
performance of the Democrats in the passage of the Mills tariff bill by
the House in 1888 showed in fact no strong leanings toward free trade,
the Republicans were able to force a campaign on the "American doctrine
of protection for labor against the pauper millions of Europe."
On this issue they carried the election of 1888. Passing by Blaine once
more, the Republicans selected Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, a United
States Senator, a shrewd lawyer, and a reticent politician. Mr.
Wanamaker, a rich Philadelphia merchant, was chosen to raise campaign
funds, and he successfully discharged the functions of his office. As he
said himself, he addressed the business men of the country in the
following language: "How much would you pay for insurance upon your
business? If you were confronted by from one to three years of general
depression by a change in our revenue and protective measures affecting
our manufactures, wages, and good times, what would you pay to be
insured for a better year?" The appeal was effective and with a full
campaign chest and the astute Matthew S. Quay as director of the
national committee, the Republicans outwitted the Democrats, winning 233
electors' votes against 168 for Cleveland, although the popular vote for
Harrison was slightly under that for his opponent.
Harrison's administration opened auspiciously in many ways. The
appointment of Blaine as Secretary of State was a diplomatic move, for
undoubtedly Blaine was far more popular with the rank and file of his
party than was Harrison. The civil service reformers were placated by
the appointment of Theodore Roosevelt as president of the Civil Service
Commission, for he was a vigorous champion of reform, who brought the
whole question forcibly before the country by his speeches and articles,
although it must be said that no very startling gains were made against
the spoils system under his administration of the civil service law. It
required time to educate the country to the point of supporting the
administrative heads in resisting the clamor of the politicians for
office.
Harrison's leadership in legislation was not noteworthy. The Republicans
were in power in the lower house in 1889 for the first time since 1881,
but their majority was so small that it required all of the
parliamentary ingenuity which Speaker Reed could command to keep the
legislative machine in operation. Nevertheless, several important
measures were enacted into law. The McKinley tariff act based upon the
doctrine of high protection was passed in 1890. In response to the
popular outcry against the trusts, the Sherman anti-trust law was
enacted the same year; and the silver party was thrown a sop in the form
of the Sherman silver purchase act. The veterans of the Civil War
received new recognition in the law of 1890 granting pensions for all
disabled soldiers whether their disabilities were incurred in service or
not. Negro voters were taken into account by an attempt to get a new
"force bill" through Congress, which would insure a "free ballot and a
fair count everywhere."
* * * * *
There had been nothing decisive, however, about the Republican victory
in 1888, for a few thousand votes in New York changed the day as four
years before. Harrison had not proved to be a very popular candidate,
and there was nothing particularly brilliant or striking about his
administration to enhance his reputation. He was able to secure a
renomination in 1892, largely because he controlled so many
officeholding delegates to the Republican convention, and there was no
other weighty candidate in the field, Blaine being unwilling to make an
open fight at the primaries.
In the second contest with Cleveland, Harrison was badly worsted,
receiving only 145 electoral votes against 277 cast for the Democratic
candidate and 22 for the Populist, Weaver. The campaign was marked by no
special incidents, for both Cleveland and Harrison had been found safe
and conservative and there was no very sharp division over issues. The
tariff, it is true, was vigorously discussed, but Cleveland made it
clear that no general assault would be made on any protected interests.
The million votes cast for the Populist candidate, however, was a solemn
warning that the old game of party see-saw over personalities could not
go on indefinitely. The issues springing from the great economic
revolution were emerging, not clearly and sharply, but rather in a vague
unrest and discontent with the old parties and their methods.
President Cleveland went into power for the second time on what appeared
to be a wave of business prosperity, but those who looked beneath the
surface knew that serious financial and industrial difficulties were
pending. Federal revenues were declining and a deficit was staring the
government in the face at a time when there was, for several reasons, a
stringency in the gold market. The Treasury gold reserve was already
rapidly diminishing, and Harrison was on the point of selling bonds when
the inauguration of Cleveland saved the day for him. Congress was
deadlocked on the money question, though called in a special session to
grant relief; and Cleveland at length resorted to the sale of bonds
under an act of 1875 to procure gold for the Treasury. The first sale
was made in January, 1894, and the financiers, to pay for the bonds,
drew nearly half of the amount of gold out of the Treasury itself.
The "endless chain" system of selling bonds to get gold for the
Treasury, only to have it drawn out immediately, aroused a great hue and
cry against the financial interests. In November, 1894, a second sale
was made with similar results, and in February, 1895, Cleveland in sheer
desperation called in Mr. J. P. Morgan and arranged for the purchase of
gold at a fixed price by the issue of bonds, with an understanding that
the bankers would do their best to protect the Treasury. To the silver
advocates and the Populists this was the climax of "Cleveland's
iniquitous career of subserviency to Wall Street," for it seemed to show
that the government was powerless before the demands of the financiers.
This criticism forced the administration to throw open the issue of
January 6, 1896, to the public, and the result was decidedly
advantageous to the government--apparently an indictment of Cleveland's
policy. Congress in the meantime did nothing to relieve the
administration.
While the government was wrestling with the financial problem, the
country was in the midst of an industrial crisis. The number of
bankruptcies rose with startling rapidity, hundreds of factories were
closed, and idle men thronged the streets hunting for work. According to
a high authority, Professor D. R. Dewey, "never before had the evil of
unemployment been so widespread in the United States." It was so
pressing that Jacob Coxey, a business man from Ohio, planned a march of
idle men on Washington in 1894 to demand relief at the hands of the
government. His "army," as it was called, ended in a fiasco, but it
directed the attention of the country to a grave condition of affairs.
Reductions in wages produced severe strikes, one of which--the Pullman
strike of Chicago--led to the paralysis of the railways entering
Chicago, because the Pullman employees were supported by the American
Railway Union. The disorders connected with the strike--which are now
known to have been partially fomented by the companies themselves for
the purpose of inducing Federal interference--led President Cleveland to
dispatch troops to Chicago, against the ardent protest of Governor
Altgeld, who declared that the state of Illinois was able to manage her
own affairs without intermeddling from Washington. The president of the
union, Mr. E. V. Debs, was thrown into prison for violating a "blanket
injunction"[26] issued by the local Federal court, and thus the strike
was broken, leaving behind it a legacy of bitterness which has not yet
disappeared.
The most important piece of legislation during Cleveland's second
administration was the Wilson tariff bill--a measure which was so
objectionable to the President that he could not sign it, and it
therefore became law without his approval. The only popular feature in
it was the income tax provision, which was annulled the following year
by the Supreme Court. Having broken with his party on the money
question, and having failed to secure a revision of the tariff to suit
his ideas, Cleveland retired in 1897, and one of his party members
declared that he was "the most cordially hated Democrat in the country."
_Party Issues_
The tariff was one of the issues bequeathed to the parties from
ante-bellum days, but there was no very sharply defined battle over it
until the campaign of 1888. The Republicans, in their platform of 1860,
had declared that "sound policy requires such an adjustment of these
imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interests of
the whole country"; and although from time to time they advocated tariff
reductions, they remained consistently a protectionist party. The high
war-tariffs, however, were revenue measures, although the protection
feature was by no means lost sight of. In the campaign of 1864, both
parties were silent on the question; four years later it again emerged
in the Democratic platform, but it was not hotly debated in the ensuing
contest. The Democrats demanded "a tariff for revenue upon foreign
imports and such equal taxation under the internal revenue laws as will
afford incidental protection to domestic manufactures."
From that campaign forward the Democrats appeared to favor a "revenue
tariff" in their platforms. It is true they accepted the Liberal
Republican platform in 1872, which frankly begged the question by
acknowledging the wide differences of opinion on the subject and
remitted the discussion of the matter "to the people in their
congressional districts and the decision of Congress thereon." But in
1876, the Democrats came back to the old doctrine and demanded "that all
custom-house taxation shall be only for revenue." In their victorious
campaign of 1884, however, they were vague. They pledged themselves "to
revise the tariff in a spirit of fairness to all interests"; but they
promised, in making reductions, not "to injure any domestic industries,
but rather to promote their healthy growth," and to be mindful of
capital and labor at every step. Subject to these "limitations" they
favored confining taxation to public purposes only. It was small wonder
that Democratic orators during the campaign could promise "no
disturbance of business in case of victory."
Cleveland, in the beginning of his administration, faithfully followed
his platform, for in his first message he "placed the need of tax
reduction solely on the ground of excess revenue and declared that there
was no occasion for a discussion of the wisdom or expediency of the
protective system." But within two years he had seen a new light, and he
devoted his message of December, 1887, exclusively to a discussion of
the tariff issue, in vague and uncertain language it is true, but still
characterized by such a ringing denunciation of the "vicious, illegal,
and inequitable" system of taxation then in vogue, that the Republicans
were able to call it, with some show of justification, a "free trade
document." The New York _Tribune_ announced with evident glee that
Cleveland had made "the issue boldly and distinctly and that the
theories and aims of the ultra-opponents of protection have a new and
zealous advocate." Of course, Cleveland hotly denied that he was trying
to commit his party to a simple doctrine of free trade or even the old
principle of the platform, "tariff for revenue only." Moreover, the
Democrats, in their platform of the following year, while indorsing
Cleveland's messages, renewed the tariff pledges of their last platform
and promised to take "labor" into a careful consideration in any
revision.
In spite of the equivocal position taken by the Democrats, the
Republicans made great political capital out of the affair, apparently
on the warranted assumption that the voters would not read Cleveland's
message or the platform of his party. In their declaration of principles
in 1888, the Republicans made the tariff the leading issue: "We are
uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection. We
protest against its destruction, as proposed by the President and his
party. They serve the interests of Europe; we will support the interest
of America. We accept the issue and confidently appeal to the people for
their judgment. The protective system must be maintained.... We favor
the entire repeal of internal taxes rather than the surrender of any
part of our protective system, at the joint behest of the whisky trusts
and the agents of foreign manufacturers." Again, in 1892, the
Republicans attempted to make the tariff the issue: "We reaffirm the
American doctrine of protection. We call attention to its growth abroad.
We maintain that the prosperous condition of our country is largely due
to the wise revenue legislation of the Republican Congress," _i.e._ the
McKinley bill.
The effect of this Republican hammering on the subject was to bring out
a solemn declaration on the part of the Democrats. "We denounce," they
say in 1892, "the Republican protection as a fraud, a robbery of the
great majority of the American people for the benefit of the few. We
declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic party that
the Federal government has no constitutional power to impose and collect
tariff duties, except for the purposes of revenue only, and we demand
that the collection of such taxes shall be limited to the necessities of
the government when honestly and economically administered." Although
elected on this platform, the Democrats did not regard their mandate as
warranting a serious attack on the protective system, for the Wilson
tariff act of 1894 was so disappointing to moderate tariff reformers
that Cleveland refused to sign it.
A close analysis of the platforms and performances of the parties from
1876 to 1896 shows no clear alignment at all on the tariff. Both parties
promise reductions, but neither is specific as to details. The
Republicans, while making much of the protective system, could not
ignore the demand for tariff reform; and the Democrats, while repeating
the well-worn phrases about tariff for revenue, were unable to overlook
the fact that a drastic assault upon the protective interests would mean
their undoing. In Congress, the Republicans made no serious efforts to
lower the duties, and the attempts of the Democrats produced meager
results.
* * * * *
Among the new issues raised by the economic revolution was the control
of giant combinations of capital. Although some of the minor parties had
declaimed against trusts as early as 1876, and the Democratic party, in
1884, had denounced "land monopolies," industrial combinations did not
figure as distinct issues in the platforms of the old parties until
1888. In that year, the Democrats vaguely referred to unnecessary
taxation as a source of trusts and combinations, which, "while unduly
enriching the few that combine, rob the body of our citizens by
depriving them of the benefits of natural competition." Here appears the
favorite party slogan that "the tariff is the mother of the trusts," and
the intimation that the remedy is the restoration of "natural
competition" by a reduction of the tariff. The Republicans in 1888 also
recognized the existence of the trust problem by declaring against all
combinations designed to control trade arbitrarily, and recommended to
Congress and the states legislation within their jurisdictions to
"prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the people by undue
charges on their supplies or by unjust rates for the transportation of
their products to market."
Both old parties returned to the trust question again in 1892. The
Democrats recognized "in the trusts and combinations which are designed
to enable capital to secure more than its just share of the joint
product of capital and labor, a natural consequence of the prohibitive
taxes which prevent the free competition which is the life of honest
trade, but we believe the worst evils can be abated by law." Thereupon
follows a demand for additional legislation restraining and controlling
trusts. The Republicans simply reaffirmed their declaration of 1888,
indorsed the Sherman anti-trust law already enacted by Congress in 1890,
and favored new legislation remedying defects and rendering the
enforcement of the law more complete.
The railway issue emerged in 1880 when the Republicans, boasting that
under their administration railways had increased "from thirty-two
thousand miles in 1860 to eighty-two thousand miles in 1879," pronounced
against any further grants of public domain to railway corporations. The
Democrats went on record against discriminations in favor of
transportation lines, but left the subject with that pronouncement. Four
years later the subject had taken on more precision. The Republicans
favored the public regulation of railway corporations and indorsed
legislation preventing unjust discriminations and excessive charges for
transportation, but in the campaign of 1888 the overshadowing tariff
issue enabled them to omit references to railway regulation. The
Democrats likewise ignored the subject in 1884 and 1888. In 1892 the
question was overlooked by the platforms of both parties, although the
minor parties were loudly demanding action on the part of the Federal
Government. The old parties agreed, however, on the necessity of
legislation protecting the life and limb of employees engaged in
interstate transportation.
* * * * *
Even before the Civil War, the labor vote had become a factor that could
not be ignored, and both old parties consistently conciliated it by many
references. The Republicans in 1860 commended that "policy of national
exchanges which secures to the workingmen liberal wages." The defense of
the protective system was gradually shifted by the Republicans, until,
judging from the platforms, its continuation was justifiable principally
on account of their anxiety to safeguard the American workingman against
"the pauper labor of Europe." The Democrats could not overlook the
force of this appeal, and in their repeated demands for the reduction of
the tariff they announced that no devotion to free trade principles
would allow them to pass legislation which might put American labor "in
competition with the underpaid millions of the Old World." In 1880, the
Democratic party openly professed itself the friend of labor and the
laboring man and pledged itself to "protect him against the cormorant
and the commune." In their platform of 1888, the Democrats promised to
make "due allowance for the difference between the wages of American and
foreign labor" in their tariff revisions; and in 1892 they deplored the
fact that under the McKinley tariff there had been ten reductions in the
wages of the workingmen to one increase. In the latter year, the
Republicans urged that on articles competing with American products the
duties should "equal the difference between wages abroad and at home."
Among the more concrete offerings to labor were the promises of
homesteads in the West by the Republicans--promises which the Democrats
reiterated; protection against Chinese and coolie labor, particularly in
the West, safety-appliance laws applicable to interstate carriers, the
establishment of a labor bureau at Washington, the prohibition of the
importation of alien laborers under contract, and the abolition of
prison contract labor. On these matters there was no marked division
between the two old parties; each advocated measures of its own in
general terms and denounced the propositions of the other in equally
general terms.
The money question bulked large in the platforms, but until 1896 there
was nothing like a clean-cut division.[27] Both parties hedged and
remained consistently vague. The Republicans in 1888 declared in favor
of "the use of both gold and silver as money," and condemned "the policy
of the Democratic administration in its efforts to demonetize silver."
Again, in 1892, the Republicans declared: "The American people, from
tradition and interest, favor bimetallism, and the Republican party
demands the use of both gold and silver as standard money, with such
restriction and under such provisions, to be determined by legislation,
as will secure the maintenance of the parity of values of the two
metals, so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar,
whether of silver, gold, or paper, shall be at all times equal." The
Democrats likewise hedged their profession of faith about with
limitations and provisions. They declared in favor of both metals and no
discrimination for mintage; but the unit of coinage of both metals "must
be of equal intrinsic or exchangeable value, or be adjusted through
international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as shall
insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals." Thus both of
the platforms of 1892 are paragons of ambiguity.
FOOTNOTES:
[24] See below, p. 130.
[25] Below, p. 133. The tenure of office law was repealed in
1887. The presidential succession act was passed in 1886.
[26] A judicial order to all and sundry forbidding them to
interfere with the movement of the trains.
[27] See below, p. 119.