CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

Long before the Civil War, steam and machinery had begun to invade

American industries and statesmen of the new commercial and industrial

order had appeared in Washington. The census of 1860 reported nearly a

million and a half wage earners in the United States, and more than a

billion dollars invested in manufacturing. By that year over thirty

thousand miles of railway had been constructed, including such important

lines as the New York Central, the Erie, the Baltimore and Ohio, and the

Pennsylvania. Politicians of the type of Stephen A. Douglas, who

discussed slavery in public and devoted their less obvious activities to

securing grants of public lands and mineral resources to railway and

manufacturing corporations, had begun to elbow the more cultivated and

respectable leaders like Calhoun, Webster, and Alexander Stephens, who

belonged to the old order.

But the spectacular conflict over slavery prevented the political

results of the economic transformation from coming to the surface. Those

who had occasion to watch the proceedings of Congress during the two

decades just before the War discovered the manipulations of railway

corporations seeking land grants and privileges from the Federal

Government and the operations of the "protected" interests in behalf of

increased tariffs. Those were also harvest days for corporations and

companies in the state legislatures where special charters and

privileges were being bartered away by the wholesale. There was emerging

in a number of the larger industrial centers a small, though by no means

negligible, labor movement. But the slavery issue overshadowed

everything. The annexation of Texas, slavery in the territories, the

Compromise of 1850, the Nebraska bill, and Bleeding Kansas kept the mind

of the North from the consideration of the more fundamental economic

problems connected with the new order. The politicians, to be sure, did

not live by the slavery agitation alone, but it afforded the leading

topics for public discussion and prevented the critical from inquiring

too narrowly into the real staples of politics.

The Civil War sharply shifted the old scenery of politics. It gave a

tremendous impetus to industry and railway construction. The tariff

measures during the War gave to manufacturers an unwonted protection

against foreign competition; the demand for war supplies, iron, and

steel, railway materials, textiles, and food supplies, quickened every

enterprise in the North; the great fortunes made out of speculations in

finances, contracts for government supplies, and land-grants placed an

enormous capital in private hands to carry forward business after the

War was over.

Within little more than a quarter of a century the advance of industry

and commerce had made the United States of Lincoln's day seem small and

petty. The census of 1905 showed over twelve billion dollars invested in

factories and nearly five and one half million wage earners employed. In

that year, the total value of manufactured products was over fourteen

billion dollars--fifteen times the amount turned out in 1860. As late as

1882 the United States imported several hundred thousand tons of steel

rails annually, but within ten years the import had fallen to 134 tons

and no less than 15,000 tons were exported. At the close of the Civil

War about 3000 tons of Bessemer steel were produced annually, but within

twenty years over two million tons were put out every twelve months.

The building of railways more than kept pace with the growth of the

population and the increase in manufacturing. There were 30,000 miles of

lines in 1860; 52,000 in 1870; 166,000 in 1890; and 242,000 in 1910.

Beginning at first with the construction of lines between strategic

centers like Boston and Albany, and Philadelphia and Reading, the

leaders in this new enterprise grew more bold. They pushed rapidly into

the West where there were no cities of magnitude and no prospect of

developing a profitable business within the immediate future. Capital

flowed into the railways like water; European investors caught the

fever; farmers and merchants along prospective lines bought stocks and

bonds, expecting to reap a harvest from increased land values and

business, only to find their paper valueless on account of preferred

claims for construction; and the whole West was aflame with dreams of a

new Eldorado to be created by transportation systems.

The era of feverish construction was shortly followed by the combination

of lines and the formation of grand trunk railways and particular

"systems." In 1869, Cornelius Vanderbilt united the Hudson River and New

York Central lines, linking the metropolis and Buffalo, and four years

later he opened the way to Chicago by leasing the Lake Shore Michigan

and Southern. About the same time two other eastern companies, the

Pennsylvania and Baltimore and Ohio secured western connections which

let them into Chicago.

It must not be thought that this rapid railway expansion was due solely

to private enterprise, for, as has been the standing custom in American

politics, the cost of doubtful or profitless undertakings was thrown as

far as possible upon the public treasury. Up to 1872, the Federal

Government had granted in aid of railways 155,000,000 acres of land, an

area estimated as "almost equal to the New England states, New York, and

Pennsylvania combined; nineteen different states had voted sums

aggregating two hundred million dollars for the same purpose; and

municipalities and individuals had subscribed several hundred million

dollars to help railway construction." To the Union Pacific concern

alone the Federal Government had granted a free right of way through

public lands, twenty sections of land with each mile of railway, and a

loan up to fifty million dollars secured by a second mortgage on the

company's property. The Northern Pacific obtained lands which a railway

official estimated to be worth enough "to build the entire railroad to

Puget Sound, to fit out a fleet of sailing vessels and steamers for the

China and India trade and leave a surplus that would roll up into the

millions." Cities, townships, counties, and states voted bonds to help

build railways within their limits or granted rights of way and lands,

in addition, with a lavish hand.

The chronicle of all the frauds connected with the manipulation of land

grants to railways and the shameless sale of legal privileges cannot be

written, because in most instances no tangible records have been left.

Perhaps the most notorious of all was the Credit Mobilier scandal

connected with the Union Pacific. The leading stockholders in that

company determined to secure for themselves a large portion of the

profits of construction, which were enormous on account of the prodigal

waste; and they organized a sham concern known as the Credit Mobilier in

which they had full control and to which the construction profits went.

Inasmuch as the Federal Government through its grants and loans was an

interested party that might interfere at any time, the concern, through

its agent in Congress, Oakes Ames, a representative from Massachusetts,

distributed generous blocks of stock to "approachable" Senators and

Representatives. News of the transaction leaked out, and a congressional

investigation in 1872 showed that a number of men of the highest

standing, including Mr. Colfax, the Vice President, were deeply

implicated. Nothing was done, however; the leading conspirator, Ames,

was merely censured by the House, and the booty, for the most part,

remained in the hands of those connected with the scandal. When the

road was complete, "it was saddled with interest payments on $27,000,000

first mortgage bonds, $27,000,000 government bonds, $10,000,000 income

bonds, $10,000,000 land grant bonds, and if anything were left, dividend

payments on $36,000,000 of stock."

* * * * *

It would be easy to multiply figures showing astounding gains in

industry, business, foreign trade, and railways; or to multiply stories

of scandalous and unfair practices on the part of financiers, but we are

not primarily concerned here with the technique of inventions or the

history of promotion.[7] The student of social and political evolution

is concerned rather with the effect of such material changes upon the

structure of society, that is, with the rearrangements of classes and

the development of new groups of interests, which are brought about by

altered methods of gaining a livelihood and accumulating fortunes. It is

this social transformation that changes the relation of the individual

to the state and brings new forces to play in the struggle for political

power. The social transformation which followed the Civil War embraced

the following elements.

In the first place, capital, as contrasted with agriculture, increased

enormously in amount and in political influence. Great pecuniary

accumulations were thenceforward made largely in business

enterprise--including the work of the entrepreneur, financier,

speculator, and manipulator under that general term. Inevitably, the

most energetic and the keenest minds were attracted by the dominant mode

of money-making. Agricultural regions were drained of large numbers of

strenuous and efficient men, who would otherwise have been their natural

leaders in politics. To these were added the energetic immigrants from

the Old World. That forceful, pushing, dominating section of society

historically known as the "natural aristocracy" became the agents of

capitalism. The scepter of power now passed definitively from the

masters of slaves to the masters of "free laborers." The literary and

professional dependents of the ruling groups naturally came to the

defense of the new order.[8] The old contest between agrarianism and

capitalism now took on a new vigor.[9]

On the side of the masses involved in the transition this economic

revolution meant an increasing proportion of wage workers as contrasted

with agriculturalists, owning and operating their farms, and with

handicraftsmen. This increase is shown by the following table, giving

the number of wage earners in _manufacturing_ alone:

POPULATION WAGE EARNERS

1850 23,191,876 957,059

1860 31,443,321 1,311,246

1870 38,558,371 2,053,996

1880 50,155,783 2,732,595

1890 62,947,714 4,251,535

1900 75,994,575 5,306,143

1910 91,972,266 6,615,046

In terms of social life, this increase in wage workers meant, in the

first place, a rapid growth of city populations. In 1860, the vast

majority of the people were agriculturists; in 1890, 36.1 per cent of

the population lived in towns of over 2500; in 1900, 40.5 per cent; in

1910, 46.3 per cent. In the forty years between the beginning of the

Civil War and the close of the century, Chicago had grown from 109,260

to 1,698,575; Greater New York from 1,174,779 to 3,437,202; San

Francisco from 56,802 to 342,782.

In the next place, the demand for labor stimulated immigration from

Europe. It is true there was a decline during the Civil War, and the

panic of 1873 checked the tide when it began to flow, but by 1880 it had

nearly touched the half-a-million mark, and by 1883 it reached the

astounding figure of 788,992. Almost all of this immigration was from

Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, and Scandinavian countries, less than

one in twenty of the total number coming from Austria-Hungary, Italy,

and Poland in 1880. On the Pacific coast, railway building and

industrial enterprise, in the great dearth of labor, resorted to the

Orient for large supplies of Chinese coolies.

This industrial development meant the transformation of vast masses of

the people into a proletariat, with all the term implies: an immense

population housed in tenements and rented dwellings, the organization of

the class into trades-unions, labor parties, and other groups; poverty

and degradation on a large scale; strikes, lockouts, and social warfare;

the employment of large numbers of women and children in factories; the

demand for all kinds of legislation mitigating the evils of the

capitalist process; and finally attacks upon the very basis of the

industrial system itself.

This inevitable concomitant of the mechanical revolution, the industrial

proletariat, began to make itself felt as a decided political and

economic factor in the decade that followed the War. Between 1860 and

1870, the railway engineers, firemen, conductors, bricklayers, and cigar

makers had formed unions. In the campaign of 1872 a party of Labor

Reformers appeared; and a few years later the Knights of Labor, a grand

consolidated union of all trades and grades of workers, came into

existence as an active force, conducting an agitation for labor bureaus,

an eight hour day, abolition of contract labor systems, and other

reforms, and at the same time engineering strikes.

In 1877 occurred the first of the great labor struggles in that long

series of campaigns which have marked the relations of capitalists and

workingmen during the past four decades. In that year, trouble began

between the management of the Baltimore and Ohio railway and its

employees over a threatened reduction in wages--the fourth within a

period of seven years. From this starting point the contest spread

throughout the East and Middle West, reaching as far as Texas. Inasmuch

as there was already considerable unemployment, the strikers saw that

only by violence and intimidation could they hope to prevent the

companies from moving their trains. Troops were called out by the

governors of several states and Federal assistance was invoked.

Pittsburgh fell almost completely into the hands of the strikers;

railway buildings were burned and property to the value of more than ten

million dollars destroyed. Everywhere the raw militia of the states was

found to be inefficient for such a serious purpose, and the superior

power of the Federal Government's regular troops was demonstrated. Where

railways were in the hands of receivers, Federal courts intervened by

the use of injunctions and the first blood in the contest between the

judiciary and labor was drawn.

The last, but perhaps most significant, result of the industrial

revolution above described has been the rise of enormous combinations

and corporations in industry as well as in transportation. An increasing

proportion of the business of the country has passed steadily into

corporate, as contrasted with individual, ownership;[10] and this

implies a momentous change in the rights, responsibilities, and economic

theories of the owners of capital. Moreover, it involves the creation of

a new class of men, not entrepreneurs in the old sense, but organizers

of already established concerns into larger units.

The industrial revolution had not advanced very far before an intense

competition began to force business men to combine to protect themselves

against their own weapons. As early as 1879 certain oil interests of

Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other centers had begun to

control competition by making agreements through their officers. Three

years later, they devised an excellent scheme for a closer organization

in the formation of a "trust." They placed all their stocks in the hands

of nine trustees, including John D. Rockefeller, who issued in return

certificates representing the proportionate share of each holder in the

concern, and managed the entire business in the interests of the

holders.

The trust proved to be an attractive proposition to large business

concerns. Within five years combinations had been formed in cotton oil,

linseed oil, lead, sugar, whisky, and cordage, and it was not long

before a system of interlocking interests began to consolidate the

control of all staple manufactures in the hands of a few financiers. Six

years after its formation the Standard Oil Company was paying to a small

group of holders about $20,000,000 annually in dividends on a capital of

$90,000,000, and the recipients of these large dividends began to invest

in other concerns. In 1879, one of them, H. M. Flagler, became a

director of the Valley Railroad; in 1882, William Rockefeller appeared

as one of the directors of the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul; in

1887, John D. Rockefeller was connected with a syndicate which absorbed

the Minnesota Iron Company, and about the same time representatives of

the Oil Trust began to figure in the Northern Pacific, the Missouri,

Kansas, and Texas, and the Ohio River railways. Thus a perfect network

of financial connections throughout the country was built up.

But on the whole the decades following the Civil War were characterized

by economic anarchy, _laissez faire_ with a vengeance. There were

prolonged industrial crises accompanied by widespread unemployment and

misery among the working classes. In the matter of railway management

the chaos was unparalleled.

Shortly after 1870 a period of ruinous competition set in and was

followed by severe financial crises among the railways. Passenger and

freight rate "wars" for the "through" traffic brought many roads to the

verge of bankruptcy, in spite of their valiant efforts to save

themselves by exorbitant charges on subsidiary branches where they had

no competition. Crooked financiering, such as the watering of stocks,

misappropriation of construction funds by directors, and the purchase of

bankrupt lines by directors of larger companies and their resale at

great advances, placed a staggering burden of interest charges against

practically all of the lines. In 1873 nearly half of the mileage in the

country was in the hands of court receivers, and between 1876 and 1879

an average of more than one hundred roads a year were sold under the

foreclosure of mortgages. In all this distress the investors at large

were the losers while the "inside" operators such as Jay Gould,

Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Russell Sage doubled their already

over-topping fortunes.

A very good example of this "new finance" is afforded by the history of

the Erie Railway. In 1868, Vanderbilt determined to secure possession of

this line which ran across New York State in competition with the New

York Central and Hudson River lines. Jay Gould and a group of operators,

who had control of the Erie, proceeded to water the stock and "unload"

upon Vanderbilt, whose agents bought it in the hope of obtaining the

coveted control. After a steeple chase for a while the two promoters

came to terms at the expense of the stockholders and the public. Between

July 1 and October 24, 1868, the stock of the Erie was increased from

$34,000,000 to $57,000,000, and the price went downward like a burnt

rocket. During the short period of Gould's administration of the Erie

"the capital stock of the road had been increased $61,425,700 and the

construction account had risen from $49,247,700 in 1867 to $108,807,687

in 1872. Stock to the amount of $40,700,000 had been marketed by the

firm of Smith, Gould, and Martin, and, incredible as it may seem, its

sale had netted the company only $12,803,059."[11]

The anarchy in railway financing, which characterized the two decades

after the War, was also accompanied by anarchy in management. A Senate

investigating committee in 1885 enumerated the following charges against

the railroads: that local rates were unreasonably high as compared with

through rates; that all rates were based apparently not on cost of

service but "what the traffic would bear"; that discriminations between

individuals for the same services were constant; that "the effect of the

prevailing policy of railroad management is, by an elaborate system of

secret special rates, rebates, drawbacks, and concessions, to foster

monopoly, to enrich favorite shippers, to prevent free competition in

many lines of trade in which the item of transportation is an important

factor;" that secret rate cutting was constantly demoralizing business;

that free passes were so extensively issued as to create a privileged

class, thus increasing the cost to the passenger who paid; that the

capitalization and bonded indebtedness of companies largely exceeded the

actual cost of construction; and that railway corporations were engaged

in other lines of business and discriminating against competitors by

unfair rate manipulations. In a word, the theories about competition

written down in the books on political economy were hopelessly at

variance with the facts of business management; the country was at the

mercy of the sharp practices of transportation promoters.

* * * * *

However, emphasis upon this great industrial revolution should not be

allowed to obscure the no less remarkable development in agriculture.

The acreage in improved farm lands rose from 113,032,614 in 1850 to

478,451,750 in 1910. In the same period the number of farms increased

from 1,449,073 to 6,361,502. Notwithstanding the significant fact that

"whereas the total population increased 21 per cent between 1900 and

1910, the urban population increased 34.8 per cent and the rural

population 11.2 per cent," the broad basis of the population during the

half a century here under consideration has remained agricultural, and

in 1913 it was estimated that at the present rate of transformation "it

will take a generation before the relative number of industrial wage

workers will have reached half of all bread winners."

_The Development of the West_

When Hayes was inaugurated, a broad wedge of territory separated the

organized states of the East from their sister commonwealths in the far

West--Oregon, California, and Nevada. Washington, Idaho, Montana,

Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Dakota, and Indian Territory still

remained territories. Their combined population in 1870 was under half a

million, less than that of the little state of Connecticut. New Mexico

with 91,000 and Utah with 86,000 might, with some show of justification,

have claimed a place among the states because Oregon was inhabited by

only 90,000 people. The commonwealth of Nevada, with 42,000, was an

anomaly; it had been admitted to the Union in 1864 to secure the

ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery.

This vast and sparsely settled region was then in the second stage of

its economic evolution. The trapper, hunter, and explorer had gathered

most of their harvest, and the ranchmen and cowboys with their herds of

cattle were roaming the great grazing areas, waging war on thieves, land

syndicates, and finally going down to defeat in the contest with the

small farmer who fenced off the fertile fields and planted his homestead

there. So bitter were the contests among the cattle kings, and so

extensive was the lawlessness in these regions during the seventies and

early eighties that Presidents were more than once compelled to warn the

warlike parties and threaten them with the Federal troops.

Of course, the opening of the railways made possible a rapidity in the

settlement of the remaining territories which outrivaled that of the

older regions. The first Pacific railroad had been completed in 1869;

the Southern Pacific connecting New Orleans with the coast was opened in

1881; and two years later the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe was

finished, and the last stroke was put on the Northern Pacific,

connecting Chicago and Portland, Oregon. Thus four lines of

communication were established with the coast, traversing the best

agricultural regions of the territories and opening up the

mineral-bearing regions of the mountains as well. Lawless promoters fell

upon the land and mineral resources with that rapacity which Burke

attributed to Hastings.

* * * * *

Utah presented, in the eighties, the elements of an ordered and

well-advanced civilization and could with some show of reason ask for

admission as a state. The territory had been developed by the Mormons

who settled there, after suffering "persecution" for their religious

opinions and their plural marriages, in Illinois and Missouri.

Notwithstanding an act of Congress passed in 1862 prohibiting polygamy,

it continued to flourish. The territorial officers were nearly all

Mormons and the remoteness of the Federal authority prevented an

enforcement of the law. Consequently, it remained a dead letter until

1882, when Congress enacted the Edmunds law prescribing heavy penalties,

including the loss of citizenship, for polygamous practices. Hundreds of

prosecutions and convictions followed, but plural marriages were openly

celebrated in defiance of the law. At length, in 1887, Congress passed

the Edmunds-Tucker act authorizing the Federal Government to seize the

property of the Mormon church.

Meanwhile the gentile population increased in the territory; and at

length the Mormons, seeing that the country was determined to suppress

polygamy and that, while the institution was maintained, statehood could

not be secured, decided upon at least an outward acquiescence in the

law. After much discussion in Congress, and notwithstanding the repeated

contention that the Mormons were not sincere in their promises, Utah was

admitted as a state in 1895 under a constitution which, in accordance

with the provisions of the enabling act of Congress, forbade polygamous

and plural marriages forever. Thus the inhabitants of the new state were

bound by a solemn contract with the Union never to restore the marriage

practices which had caused them so much trouble and "persecution," as

they called it.

* * * * *

Although the Mormons were the original pioneers and homestead makers in

that great region, theirs was in fact the last of the middle tier of

territories to receive statehood. They had left the advancing frontier

line far behind. To the northward that advance was checked by the

enormous Sioux reservation in Dakota, but the discovery of gold in the

Black Hills marked the doom of the Indian rights. Miners and

capitalists demanded that the way should be made clear for their

enterprise and the land hungry were clamoring for more farms. Indeed,

before Congress could act, pioneers were swarming over the regions

around the Indian lands. Farmers from the other northern states,

Norwegians, Germans, and Canadians were planting their homesteads amid

the fertile Dakota fields; the population of the territory jumped from

14,181 in 1870 to 135,177 in 1880, and before the close of the next

decade numbered more than half a million. It was evident that the region

was destined to be principally agricultural in character, inhabited by

thrifty farmers like those of Iowa and Nebraska. Pretensions to

statehood therefore rose with the rising tide of population.

Far over on the western coast, the claims of Washington to statehood

were being urged. The population there had increased until it rivaled

Oregon and passed the neighboring commonwealth in 1890. In addition to

rich agricultural areas, it possessed enormous timber resources which

were to afford the chief industry for a long time; and keen-sighted men

foresaw a swift development of seaward trade. Between the Dakotas and

Washington lay the narrow point of Idaho and the mountainous regions of

Montana, now rapidly filling up with miners and capitalists exploiting

the gold, silver, coal, copper, and other mineral resources, and

rivaling the sheep and cattle kings in their contest for economic

supremacy.

After the fashion of enterprising westerners, the citizens of these

territories began to boast early of their "enormous" populations and

their "abounding" wealth, and to clamor for admission as states. Finding

their pleas falling upon unheeding ears, the people of the southern

Dakota took matters into their own hands in 1885, called a convention,

framed a constitution, and failing to secure the quick and favorable

action of Congress threatened to come into the Union unasked. Sober

counsels prevailed, however, and the impatient Dakotans were induced to

wait awhile. Meantime the territory was divided into two parts in 1887,

after a popular vote had been taken on the matter.

As had been the case almost from the beginning of the Republic, the

admission of these new states was a subject of political controversy and

intrigue at the national capital. During Cleveland's first

administration the House was Democratic and the Senate Republican.

Believing that Dakota was firmly Republican, the Senate passed the

measure admitting the southern region in 1886, but the Democratic House

was unable to see eye to eye with the Senate on this matter. In the

elections of 1888, the Republicans carried the House, and it was evident

that the new Congress would take some action with regard to the

clamoring territories. Montana was probably Democratic, and Washington

was uncertain. At all events the Democrats thought it wise to come to

terms, and accordingly on February 22, 1889, the two Dakotas,

Washington, and Montana were admitted simultaneously.

With less claim to statehood than any commonwealths admitted up to that

time, except Nevada, the two territories of Idaho and Wyoming were soon

enabled, by the assistance of the politicians, to secure admission to

the Union. Republican politics and the "silver interests" were

responsible for this step. Although neither territory had over 40,000

inhabitants in 1880, extravagant claims were made by the advocates of

admission--claims speedily belied by the census of 1890, which gave

Idaho 88,000 and Wyoming 62,000. At last in July, 1890, they were

admitted to the Union, and the territorial question was settled for a

time, although Arizona and New Mexico felt that their claims were

unjustly treated. It was not until seventeen years later that another

new state, Oklahoma, modeled out of the old Indian Territory, was added

to the Union. Finally, in 1912, the last of the continental territories,

Arizona and New Mexico, were endowed with statehood.[12]

_The Economic Advance of the South_

Notwithstanding the prominence given to the negro question during and

after Reconstruction, the South had other problems no less grave in

character to meet. Industry and agriculture were paralyzed by the

devastations of the War. A vast amount of material capital--railways,

wharves, bridges, and factories--had been destroyed during the conflict;

and fluid capital seeking investment had been almost destroyed as well.

The rich with ready money at their command had risked nearly all their

store in confederate securities or had lost their money loaned in other

ways through the wreck of the currency. Plantations had depreciated in

value, partly because of the destruction of equipment, but especially on

account of the difficulties of working the system without slave labor.

The South had, therefore, to rehabilitate the material equipment of

industry and transportation and to put agriculture on another basis than

that of slave labor. Surely this was a gigantic task.

The difficulties of carrying forward the plantation system with free

negro labor compelled the holders of large estates (many of which were

heavily mortgaged) to adopt one of two systems: the leasing or renting

of small plots to negroes or poor whites, or the outright sale in small

quantities which could be worked by one or two hands. This

disintegration of estates went forward with great rapidity. In 1860 the

average holding of land in the southern states was 335.4 acres; in 1880

it had fallen to 153.4; and in 1900 it had reached 138.2. The great

handicap was the difficulty of securing the capital to develop the small

farm, and no satisfactory system for dealing with this problem has yet

been adopted.

The very necessities of the South served to bind that section to the

North in a new fashion. Fluid capital had to be secured, in part at

least, from the North, and northern enterprise found a new outlet in the

reconstruction of the old, and the development of the new, industries in

the region of the former confederacy. The number of cotton spindles in

the South increased from about 300,000 in 1860 to more than 4,000,000 at

the close of the century; the number of employees rose from 10,000 to

nearly 100,000; and the value of the output leaped from $8,460,337

annually to $95,002,059. This rapid growth was, in part, due to the

abundance of water power in the hill regions, the cheap labor of women

and children, the low cost of living, and the absence of labor laws

interfering with the hours and conditions of work in the factories.

Even in the iron and steel industry, West Virginia and Alabama began to

press upon the markets of the North within less than twenty years after

the close of the War. In 1880, the latter state stood tenth among the

pig-iron producing states; in 1890 it stood third. The southern states

alone now produce more coal, iron ore, and pig iron than all of the

states combined did in 1870. The census of 1909 reports 5685

manufacturing establishments in Virginia, 4931 in North Carolina, 4792

in Georgia, and 3398 in Alabama.

The social effects which accompany capitalist development inevitably

began to appear in the South. The industrial magnate began to contest

with the old aristocracy of the soil for supremacy; many former slave

owners and their descendants drifted into manufacturing and many poor

whites made their way upward into wealth and influence. The census of

1909 reports more than thirty thousand proprietors and firm members in

the South Atlantic states, an increase over the preceding report almost

equal to that in the New England states. The same census reports in the

southern states more than a million wage earners--equal to almost two

thirds the entire number in the whole country at the opening of the

Civil War. The percentage of increase in the wage earners of the South

Atlantic states between 1904 and 1909 was greater than in New England or

the Middle Atlantic states.

With this swift economic development, northern capital streamed into the

South; northern money was invested in southern public and industrial

securities in enormous amounts; and energetic northern business men were

to be found in southern market places vying with their no less

enterprising southern brethren. The men concerned in creating this new

nexus of interest between the two regions naturally deprecated the

perpetual agitation of sectional issues by the politicians, and

particularly northern interference in the negro question. Business

interest began to pour cold water on the hottest embers which the Civil

War had left behind.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] The following brief chronology of inventions illustrates the

rapidity in the technical changes in the new industrial development:

1875--Bell's telephone in operation between Boston and

Salem.

1879--Brush arc street lighting system installed in San

Francisco.

1882--Edison's plant for incandescent lighting opened in New

York City.

1882--Edison's electric street car operated at Menlo Park,

New Jersey.

1885--Electric street railways in operation at Richmond,

Virginia, and Baltimore.

[8] For the keenest analysis of this social transformation,

see Veblen, _Theory of the Leisure Class_ and _Theory of

Business Enterprise_.

[9] See below, Chaps. VI and VII.

[10] See below, p. 234.

[11] Youngman, _The Economic Causes of Great Fortunes_, p.

75.

[12] By an act passed in August, 1912, Congress provided a

territorial legislature for Alaska, which had been governed

up to that time by a governor appointed by the President and

Senate, under acts of Congress.

Contemporary American History, 1877-1913 · 第 2 / 13 章