what character he befits?_ Whence, said Epictetus, doth the bull alone,
when the lion approacheth, discover his own capacity, and advance to
defend the whole herd? It is clear that with the capacity is ever joined
the perception of the same, and thus, whoever of us may possess a like
capacity will not be ignorant of it. But a bull is not made in a moment,
nor is a man of generous spirit; but we must have preparation and
winter-training,[1] and not lightly rush upon things that do not concern
us.
CHAPTER VIII.
THAT WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL OF THE SOUL AS OF THE BODY.
In going about, you are careful not to step upon a nail or to twist your
foot. Care thus also lest you injure your ruling faculty. And if we
observe this in each thing we do, we shall the more safely undertake it.
CHAPTER IX.
THE MEASURE OF GAIN.
The measure of gain for each man is the body, as the foot is for the
shoe. Take your stand on this, and you shall preserve the measure. But
if you transgress it, you must thenceforth be borne, as it were, down a
steep. And so it is with the shoe, for if you will go beyond the measure
of the foot, the shoe will be first gilded, then dyed purple, then
embroidered. For that which hath once transgressed its measure hath no
longer any limit.
CHAPTER X.
THE WORTH OF WOMEN.
From the age of fourteen years women are flattered and worshiped by
men. Seeing thus that there is nothing else for them but to serve the
pleasure of men, they begin to beautify themselves, and to place all
their hopes in this. It were well, then, that they should perceive
themselves to be prized for nothing else than modesty and decorum.
CHAPTER XI.
A DULL NATURE.
It betokens a dull nature to be greatly occupied in matters that concern
the body, as to be much concerned about exercising one's self, or
eating, or drinking, or other bodily acts. But these things should be
done by the way, and all attention be given to the mind.
CHAPTER XII.
OF ADORNMENT OF THE PERSON.
1. A certain young man, a rhetorician, having come to Epictetus with his
hair dressed in an unusually elaborate way, and his other attire much
adorned, Tell me, said Epictetus, think you not that some dogs are
beautiful, and some horses, and so of the other animals?
----"I do think it," said he.
And men too--are not some beautiful and some ill-favored?
----"How otherwise?"
Whether, then, do we call each of these beautiful for the same reasons
and in the same kind, or each for something proper to itself? And you
shall see the matter thus: Inasmuch as we observe a dog to be formed by
nature for one end, and a horse for another, and, let us say, a
nightingale for another, we may in general say, not unreasonably, that
each of them is then beautiful when it is excellent according to its own
nature; but since the nature of each is different, different also, it
seems to me, is the manner of being beautiful in each. Is it not so?
He acknowledged that it was.
Therefore, that which maketh a dog beautiful maketh a horse ill-favored;
and that which maketh a horse beautiful, a dog ill-favored; if, indeed,
their natures are different?
----"So it seems."
And that which maketh a beautiful Pancratiast,[1] the same maketh a
wrestler not good, and a runner utterly laughable? And he who is
beautiful for the Pentathlon is very bad for wrestling?
----"It is so," he said.
What is it, then, that makes a man beautiful? Is it not that which, in
its kind, makes also a dog or a horse beautiful?
----"It is that," he answered.
What, then, makes a dog beautiful? The presence of the virtue of a dog.
And a horse? The presence of the virtue of a horse. And what, then, a
man? Is it not also the presence of the virtue of a man? And, O youth,
if thou wouldst be beautiful, do thou labor to perfect this, the virtue
of a human being. But what is it? Look whom you praise when you praise
any without affection--is it the righteous or the unrighteous?
----"The righteous."
Is it the temperate or the profligate?
----"The temperate."
Is it the continent or the incontinent?
----"The continent."
Then making yourself such a one as you praise, you will know that you
are making yourself beautiful; but so long as you neglect these things,
though you sought out every device to appear beautiful, you must of
necessity be ugly.
2. For thou art not flesh and hair, but a Will: if thou keep this
beautiful, then wilt thou be beautiful. But so far I dare not tell thee
that thou art ugly, for I think thou wilt more easily bear to hear
anything else than this. But see what Socrates saith to Alcibiades, the
most beautiful and blooming of men: _Endeavor, then, to be beautiful_;
and what saith he? _Curl thy locks, and pluck out the hairs of thy
legs?_ God forbid. But _Set thy Will in order, cast out evil doctrines_.
----"And how then shall we deal with the body?"
As nature made it. Another hath cared for this; commit it to Him.
----"But what? Shall the body then be uncleansed?"
God forbid. But that which thou art and wast made by Nature, cleanse
this; let a man be clean as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a
child.
3. For we ought not even by the aspect of the body to scare away the
multitude from philosophy; but by his body, as in all other things, a
philosopher should show himself cheerful, and free from troubles.
_Behold, friends, how I have nothing and need nothing; behold how I am
homeless and landless, and an exile_, if so it chance, _and hearthless,
and yet I live more free from troubles than all the lordly and the rich.
But look on my body, too; ye see that it is not the worse for my hard
life._ But if one saith this to me, having the countenance and garb of a
condemned criminal, what God shall persuade me to approach to philosophy
which makes such men as this? God forbid! I would not, were it even to
become a sage.
4. I, indeed, by the Gods, had rather a young man in his first movement
towards philosophy came to me with his hair curled than disheveled and
foul. For a certain impression of the beautiful is to be seen in him,
and an aim at what is becoming; and to the thing wherein it seemeth to
him to lie, there he applies his art. Thenceforth it only needs to show
him its true place, and to say, _Young man, thou seekest the beautiful,
and thou dost well. Know, then, that it flourishes there where thy
Reason is; there seek it where are thy likes and dislikes, thy pursuits
and avoidances, for this is what thou hast in thyself of choice and
precious, but the body is by nature mud. Why dost thou spend thy labor
upon it in vain? for that the body is naught, Time shall certainly teach
thee, though it teach thee nothing else._ But if one come to me foul and
filthy, and a mustache down to the knees, what have I to say to him?
with what image or likeness can I draw him on? For with what that is
like unto Beauty hath he ever busied himself, so as I may set him on
another course, and say, _Not here is Beauty, but there_? Will you have
me tell him, _Beauty consists not in being befouled, but in the Reason_?
For doth he even seek Beauty? hath he any impression of it in his mind?
Go, and reason with a hog, that he shall not roll himself in the mud.
5. Behold a youth worthy of love--behold an old man worthy to love, and
to be loved in return; to whom one may commit his sons, his daughters,
to be taught; to whom young men may come, if it please you--that he may
deliver lectures to them on a dunghill! God forbid. Every extravagance
arises from something in human nature, but this is near to being one
that is not human.
CHAPTER XIII.
WHY WE SHOULD BEAR WITH WRONG.
When some one may do you an injury, or speak ill of you, remember that
he either does it or speaks it believing that it is right and meet for
him to do so. It is not possible, then, that he can follow the thing
that appears to you, but the thing that appears to him. Wherefore, if it
appear evil to him, it is he that is injured, being deceived. For also
if any one should take a true consequence to be false, it is not the
consequence that is injured, but he which is deceived. Setting out,
then, from these opinions, you will bear a gentle mind towards any man
who may revile you. For, say on each occasion, _So it appeared to him_.
CHAPTER XIV.
THAT EVERYTHING HATH TWO HANDLES.
Every matter hath two handles--by the one it may be carried; by the
other, not. If thy brother do thee wrong, take not this thing by the
handle, _He wrongs me_; for that is the handle whereby it may not be
carried. But take it rather by the handle, _He is my brother, nourished
with me_; and thou wilt take it by a handle whereby it may be carried.
CHAPTER XV.
ON CERTAIN FALSE CONCLUSIONS.
There is no true conclusion in these reasonings: _I am richer than thou,
therefore I am better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore I am
better_. But the conclusions are rather these: _I am richer than thou,
therefore my wealth is better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore
my speech is better_. But thou art not wealth, and thou art not speech.
CHAPTER XVI.
PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT.
1. Doth a man bathe himself quickly? Then, say not, _Wrongly_, but
_Quickly_. Doth he drink much wine? Then say not, _Wrongly_, but _Much_.
For whence do you know if it were ill done till you have understood his
opinion?
2. Thus it shall not befall you to assent to any other things than
those whereof you are truly and directly sensible.[1]
3. What is the cause of assenting to anything? The appearance that it is
so. But if it appear to be not so, it is impossible to assent to it.
Wherefore? For that this is the nature of the mind, to receive the true
with favor, the false with disfavor, and the uncertain with
indifference. The proof of this? Be sure, if you can, at this moment,
that it is night. You cannot. Cease to be sure that it is day. You
cannot. Be sure that the stars are odd in number, or that they are even.
You cannot. When, therefore, any man shall assent to what is false, know
that he had no will to consent to falsehood; for, as saith Plato, no
soul is willingly deprived of the truth, but the false appeared to it to
be true. Come, then, what have we in actions corresponding to this true
and false? The seemly and the unseemly, the profitable and the
unprofitable, that which concerns me and that which doth not concern me,
and such like. Can any man think that a certain thing is for his profit,
and not elect to do it? He cannot. How, then, is it with her who saith--
"And will I know the evils I shall do,
But wrath is lord of all my purposes?"
_Medea_, 1079.
For, did she hold this very thing, to gratify her wrath and avenge
herself on her husband more profitable than to spare her children? Even
so: but she was deceived. Show her clearly that she was deceived, and
she will not do it; but so long as you show it not, what else hath she
to follow than the thing as it appears to her? Nothing. Wherefore, then,
have you indignation with her, that the unhappy wretch has gone astray
concerning the greatest things, and has become a viper instead of a
human being? If anything, will you not rather pity, as we pity the blind
and the lame, those that are blinded and lamed in the chiefest of their
faculties?
4. ----"So that all these great and dreadful deeds have this same origin
in the appearance of the thing?"
The same, and no other. The _Iliad_ is nought but appearance, and the
use of appearances. The thing that appeared to Paris was the carrying
off of the wife of Menelaus; the thing that appeared to Helen was to
accompany him. Had it, then, appeared to Menelaus to be sensible that it
was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not
only had there been no _Iliad_, but no _Odyssey_ neither.
----"On such a little thing do such great ones hang?"
But what talk is this of great things? Wars and seditions and
destructions of many men, and overthrow of cities? And what is there of
great in these? Nothing. For what is there of greatness in the deaths
of many oxen and sheep, and the burning or overthrow of many nests of
swallows or storks?
----"But are these things like unto those?"
They are most like. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of
oxen and of sheep. The dwellings of men are burned, and the nests of
storks. What is there great, what is there awful in this? Or show me
wherein differeth the dwelling of a man, as a dwelling, from the nest of
a stork, save that the one buildeth his little houses of planks and
tiles and bricks, and the other of sticks and mud?
----"Are a stork and a man, then, alike?"
What say you? In body they are most like.
----"Doth a man, then, differ in no respect from a stork?"
God forbid; but in these matters there is no difference.
----"Wherein, then, doth he differ?"
Seek, and you shall find that in another thing there is a difference.
Look if it be not in the observing and studying of what he doth; look if
it be not in his social instinct, in his faith, his reverence, his
steadfastness, his understanding. Where, then, is the great Good or Evil
for man? There, where the difference is. If this be saved, and abide, as
it were, in a fortress, and reverence be not depraved, nor faith, nor
understanding, then is the man also saved. But if one of these things
perish, or be taken by storm, then doth the man also perish. And in this
it is that great actions are done. It was a mighty downfall, they say,
for Paris, when the Greeks came, and when they sacked Troy, and when his
brothers perished. Not so: for through another's act can no man
fall--that was the sacking of the storks' nests. But the downfall was
then when he lost reverence and faith, when he betrayed hospitality and
violated decorum. When was the fall of Achilles? When Patroclus died?
God forbid; but when he was wrathful, when he bewept the loss of his
girl, when he forgot that he was there not to win mistresses but to make
war. These, for men, are downfall and storming and overthrow, when right
opinions are demolished or depraved.
CHAPTER XVII.
THAT THE PHILOSOPHER SHALL EXHIBIT TO THE VULGAR DEEDS, NOT WORDS.
1. Thou shalt never proclaim thyself a philosopher, nor speak much
among the vulgar of the philosophic maxims; but do the things that
follow from the maxims. For example, do not discourse at a feast upon
how one ought to eat, but eat as one ought. For remember that even so
Socrates everywhere banished ostentation, so that men used to come to
him desiring that he would recommend them to teachers of philosophy, and
he brought them away and did so, so well did he bear to be overlooked.
2. And if among the vulgar discourse should arise concerning some maxim
of thy philosophy, do thou, for the most part, keep silence, for there
is great risk that thou straightway vomit up what thou hast not
digested. And when some one shall say to thee, _Thou knowest naught_,
and it bites thee not, then know that thou hast begun the work.
3. And as sheep do not bring their food to the shepherds to show how
much they have eaten, but digesting inwardly their provender, bear
outwardly wool and milk, even so do not thou, for the most part, display
the maxims before the vulgar, but rather the works which follow from
them when they are digested.
CHAPTER XVIII.
ASCESIS.
When you have adapted the body to a frugal way of living, do not
flatter yourself on that, nor if you drink only water, say, on every
opportunity, _I drink only water_. And if you desire at any time to
inure yourself to labor and endurance, do it to yourself and not unto
the world. And do not embrace the statues; but some time when you are
exceedingly thirsty take a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out, and
say nothing about it.
CHAPTER XIX.
TOKENS.
1. The position and token of the vulgar: he looks never to himself for
benefit or hurt, but always to outward things. The position and
character of the philosopher: he looks for benefit or hurt only to
himself.
2. The tokens of one that is making advance: he blames none, he praises
none, he accuses none, he complains of none; he speaks never of himself,
as being somewhat, or as knowing aught. When he is thwarted or hindered
in aught, he accuseth himself. If one should praise him, he laughs at
him in his sleeve; if one should blame him, he makes no defense. He goes
about like the sick and feeble, fearing to move the parts that are
settling together before they have taken hold. He hath taken out of
himself all pursuit, and hath turned all avoidance to things in our
power which are contrary to nature. Toward all things he will keep his
inclination slack. If he is thought foolish or unlearned, he regardeth
it not. In a word, he watches himself as he would a treacherous enemy.
CHAPTER XX.
THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY.
1. Since Reason is that by which all other things are organized and
perfected,[1] it is meet that itself should not remain unorganized. But
by what shall it be organized? For it is clear that this must be either
by itself or by some other thing. But this must be Reason; or something
else which is greater than Reason, which is impossible.
2. "Yea," one may say, "but it is more pressing to cure our vices, and
the like."
You desire, then, to hear something of these things? Hear then; but if
you shall say to me, _I know not if you are reasoning truly or falsely?_
or if I utter something ambiguous, and you shall bid me distinguish,
shall I lose patience with you and tell you, _It is more pressing to
cure our vices than chop logic_?
3. For this reason I think the logical are set at the beginning of our
study, even as before the measuring of corn we set the examination of
the measure. For unless we shall first establish what is a modius[2] and
what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?
4. In this case, then, if you have not understood and accurately
investigated the criterion of all other things, and that through which
they are understood, shall we be able to investigate and understand
anything else? and how could we? _Yea, but a modius is a wooden thing,
and barren._ But it measures corn. _And logic is also barren._ As
regards this, indeed, we shall see. But even if one should grant this,
it sufficeth that logic is that which distinguishes and investigates
other things, and, as one may say, measures and weighs them. Who saith
these things? is it Chrysippus alone and Zeno and Cleanthes? but doth
not Antisthenes[3] say it? And who wrote that the investigation of terms
is the beginning of education?--was it not Socrates? and of whom doth
Xenophon write that he began with the investigation of terms, what each
of them signified?
CHAPTER XXI.
GRAMMARIAN OR SAGE.
When some one may exalt himself in that he is able to understand and
expound the works of Chrysippus, say then to thyself: If Chrysippus had
not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing whereon to exalt
himself. But I, what do I desire? Is it not to learn to understand
Nature and to follow her? I inquire, then, who can expound Nature to me,
and hearing that Chrysippus can, I betake myself to him. But I do not
understand his writings, therefore I seek an expounder for them. And so
far there is nothing exalted. But when I have found the expounder, it
remaineth for me to put in practice what he declares to me, and in this
alone is there anything exalted. But if I shall admire the bare
exposition, what else have I made of myself than a grammarian instead of
a philosopher, save, indeed, that the exposition is of Chrysippus and
not of Homer? When, therefore, one may ask me to lecture on the
philosophy of Chrysippus, I shall rather blush when I am not able to
show forth works of a like nature and in harmony with the words.
CHAPTER XXII.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
1. The clearer be the characters in which a book is writ, the more
pleasantly and conveniently shall any man read it. Thus also a man shall
listen more conveniently to any discourse if it be conveyed in
well-ordered and graceful words. Be it not said, then, that there is no
faculty of expression, for this is the thought of a man both impious and
cowardly[1]--impious, for he holds in disesteem the gracious gifts of
God, as if he would take away the serviceable faculty of seeing, or of
hearing, or indeed this of speaking. Did God give the eyes for nothing?
And was it for nothing that He mingled in them a spirit of such might
and cunning as to reach a long way off and receive the impression of
visible forms--a messenger so swift and faithful? Was it for nothing
that He gave the intervening air such efficacy, and made it elastic, so
that being, in a manner, strained,[2] our vision should traverse it? Was
it for nothing that He made Light, without which there were no benefit
of any other thing?
2. Man, be not unthankful for these things, nor yet unmindful of better
things. For seeing and hearing, and, by Zeus, for life itself, and the
things that work together to maintain it, for dried fruits, for wine,
for oil, do thou give thanks to God. But remember that He hath given
thee another thing which is better than all these--that, namely, which
uses them, which approves them, which taketh account of the worth of
each. For what is that which declareth concerning all these faculties
how much each of them is worth? Is it the faculty itself? Heard you
ever the faculty of vision tell aught concerning itself? or that of
hearing? or wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? Nay, but as
ministers and slaves are they appointed, to serve the faculty which
makes use of appearances. And if you would learn how much any of them is
worth, of whom will you inquire? who shall give answer? How then shall
any other faculty be greater than this, which both useth the others as
its servants, and the same approveth each of them and declareth
concerning them? For which of them knoweth what itself is, and what it
is worth? Which of them knoweth when it behooves to make use of it, and
when not? What is that which openeth and closeth the eyes, turning them
away from things which they should not behold, and guiding them towards
other things? Is it the faculty of vision? Nay, but the faculty of the
Will. What is that which closeth and openeth the ears?--that in
obedience to which they become busy and curious, or again, unmoved by
what they hear? Is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than that
of the Will.
3. Being then so great a faculty, and set over all the rest, let it come
to us and tell us that the best of existing things is the flesh! Not
even if the flesh itself affirmed that it was the best, would any man
have patience with it. Now what is it, Epicurus, which declares this
doctrine, that the flesh is best, which wrote concerning the _End of
Being_, and on _Laws of Nature_, and on the _Canon of Truth_?--which let
thy beard grow? which wrote, when dying, that it was spending its last
day and a happy one?[3] Is it the flesh or the Will? Wilt thou affirm,
then, that thou hast aught better than the Will? Nay, but art thou not
mad--so blind, in truth, and deaf as thou art?
4. What then? Shall any man contemn the other faculties? God forbid!
Doth any man say that there is no use or eminence in the faculty of
eloquence? God forbid--that were senseless, impious, thankless towards
God. But to each thing its true worth. For there is a certain use in an
ass, but not so much as in an ox; and in a dog, but not so much as in a
slave; and in a slave, but not so much as in a citizen; and in citizens,
but not so much as in governors. Yet not because other things are better
is the use which anything affords to be contemned. There is a certain
worth in the faculty of eloquence, but not so much as in the Will. When,
then, I speak thus, let no man deem that I would have you neglect the
power of eloquence, for I would not have you neglect your eyes, or ears,
or hands, or feet, or raiment, or shoes. But if one ask me which is,
then, the best of existing things, what shall I say? The faculty of
eloquence I cannot say, but that of the Will, when it is made right. For
this is that which useth the other, and all the other faculties, both
small and great. When this is set right, a man that was not good becomes
good; when it is not right, the man becomes evil. This is that whereby
we fail or prosper--whereby we blame others, or approve them; the
neglect of which is the misery, and the care of it the happiness, of
mankind.
5. But to take away the faculty of eloquence, and to say that there is
in truth no such faculty, is not only the part of a thankless man toward
Him who hath given it, but also of a cowardly. For such a one seemeth to
me to fear lest if there be any faculty of this kind we shall not be
able to despise it. Such are they also which say that there is no
difference between beauty and ugliness. Then were a man to be affected
in like manner on seeing Thersites and Achilles, or on seeing Helen and
any common woman?[4] Truly, a thought of fools and boors, and of men who
know not the nature of each thing, but fear lest, if one perceive the
difference, he shall be straightway swept away and overpowered by it.
But the great thing is this--to leave to each the faculty that it hath,
and so leaving it to scan the worth of the faculty, and to learn what is
the greatest of existing things; and everywhere to pursue this, and be
zealous about this, making all other things accessory to this, albeit,
according to our powers, not neglecting even these. For of the eyes also
must we take care, yet not as of the best thing; yet of these, too, by
the very exercise of the best thing; since that shall in no other wise
subsist according to Nature save by wise dealing in these matters, and
preferring certain things to others.
6. But what is done in the world? As if a man journeying to his own
country should pass by an excellent inn, and the inn being agreeable to
him, should stay, and abide in it. Man, thou hast forgotten thy purpose;
thy journeying was not to this, but through this. _But this is
pleasant._ And how many other inns are pleasant, and how many meadows?
yet merely for passing through. But thy business is this, to arrive in
thy native country, to remove the fears of thy kinsfolk, to do, thyself,
the duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the
customary offices. For thou art not come into this world to choose out
its pleasanter places, but to dwell in those where thou wast born, and
whereof thou wast appointed to be a citizen. And so in some wise it is
with this matter. Since, by the aid of speech and such like deliverance,
we must come to our aim, and purify the Will, and order aright the
faculty which makes use of appearances; and it is necessary that this
deliverance of the doctrines come to pass by a certain use of speech,
and with a certain art and trenchancy of expression, there are some
which are taken captive by these things themselves, and abide in
them--one in the gift of speech, one in syllogisms, one in sophisms, one
in some such another of these inns, and there they linger and molder
away, as though they were fallen among the Sirens.
7. Man, thy business was to make thyself fit to use the appearances that
encounter thee according to Nature, not missing what thou pursuest, nor
falling into what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of good fortune, nor
overtaken of ill fortune, free, unhindered, uncompelled, agreeing with
the governance of Zeus, obedient unto the same, and well-pleased
therein; blaming none, charging none, able of thy whole soul to utter
these lines:--
"Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny!"
Then, having this for thy business, if some little matter of eloquence
please thee, or certain speculations, wilt thou stay and abide in them,
and elect to settle in them, forgetting all that is at home? and wilt
thou say, _These things are admirable_? Who saith they are not
admirable? but for passing through, like inns. What should hinder one
that spoke like Demosthenes to be unfortunate? or one that could resolve
syllogisms like Chrysippus to be miserable, to grieve, to envy; in a
word, to be troubled and unhappy? Nothing. Thou seest now that all these
things are but inns, and of no worth; but our business was another
thing. When I say these things to certain persons, they think I am
rejecting all care about language or speculation. But I do not reject
this; I reject the endless occupation with them, the putting our hopes
in them. If a man by this teaching injureth those who hear him, reckon
me also among those who do this injury. For I cannot, in order to please
you, see that one thing is best and chief of all, and say that another
is.[5]
CHAPTER XXIII.
CONSTANCY.
Abide in the precepts as in laws which it were impious to transgress.
And whatsoever any man may say of thee, regard it not; for neither is
this anything of thine own.
CHAPTER XXIV.
HOW LONG?
1. How long wilt thou delay to hold thyself worthy of the best things,
and to transgress in nothing the decrees of Reason? Thou hast received
the maxims by which it behooves thee to live; and dost thou live by
them? What teacher dost thou still look for to whom to hand over the
task of thy correction? Thou art no longer a boy, but already a man full
grown. If, then, thou art neglectful and sluggish, and ever making
resolve after resolve, and fixing one day after another on which thou
wilt begin to attend to thyself, thou wilt forget that thou art making
no advance, but wilt go on as one of the vulgar sort, both living and
dying.
2. Now, at last, therefore hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full
age and one who is pressing forward, and let everything that appeareth
the best be to thee as an inviolable law. And if any toil or pleasure or
reputation or the loss of it be laid upon thee, remember that now is the
contest, here already are the Olympian games, and there is no deferring
them any longer, and that in a single day and in a single trial ground
is to be lost or gained.
3. It was thus that Socrates made himself what he was, in all things
that befell him having regard to no other thing than Reason. But thou,
albeit thou be yet no Socrates, yet as one that would be Socrates, so it
behooveth thee to live.
CHAPTER XXV.
PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY.
1. The first and most necessary point in philosophy is the use of the
precepts, for example, not to lie. The second is the proof of these, as,
Whence it comes that it is wrong to lie? The third is that which giveth
confirmation and coherence to the others, such as, Whence it comes that
this is proof? for what is proof? what is consequence? what is
contradiction? what is truth? what is falsehood?
2. Thus the third point is necessary through the second, and the second
through the first. But the most necessary of all, and that when we
should rest, is the first, But we do the contrary. For we linger on the
third point, and spend all our zeal on that, while of the first we are
utterly neglectful, and thus we are liars; but the explanation of how it
is shown to be wrong to lie we have ever ready to hand.
CHAPTER XXVI.
MEMORABILIA.
Hold in readiness for every need, these--
"Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny, whithersoever ye
have appointed me to go, and may I follow fearlessly. But
if in an evil mind I be unwilling, still must I follow."
"That man is wise among us, and hath understanding of
things divine, who hath nobly agreed with Necessity."
But the third also--
"O Crito, if so it seem good to the Gods so let it be.
Anytus and Meletus are able to kill me indeed, but to
harm me, never."[1]
THE END.
NOTES.
CLEANTHES HYMN TO ZEUS.
[1] Professor Mahaffy, in his _Greek Life and Thought_, quotes
the full text of this noble Hymn, which, he thinks, "would
alone redeem the Hellenistic age, as it stands before us, from
the charge of mere artificiality and pedantry."
[2] [Greek: iês mimêma lachontes mounon]. This is Zeller's
reading, but not Professor Mahaffy's, who has [Greek: henos
mimêma].
NOTES.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
1. "Enter by the door" (_cf._ S. John, x. 1). The parallelisms in
thought and expression between Epictetus and the New Testament have
often been noticed, and the reader will discover many others, to which I
have not thought it necessary to draw attention.
"Conceit:" [Greek: oiêsis], _Einbildung_.
3. "To be elated:" [Greek: epairesthai]. One might translate, "to be
puffed up," except that that expression is only used in a bad sense, and
one may be "elated" in anything that is truly of the nature of the good.
The Stoics distinguished between [Greek: chara], joy, and [Greek:
hêdonê], pleasure; not rejecting or despising the former.
CHAPTER II.
1. [Greek: ta men eisin eph' hêmin, ta de ouk eph' hêmin]. A
fundamental distinction in the Epictetean system, which he sometimes
expresses by the phrases, [Greek: ta hêmetera] and [Greek: ta tôn
allôn]--things that are our own and things that belong to others; or
[Greek: ta idia] and [Greek: ta allotria]--things that are our
proper concern, and things that are alien to us.
2. On the Mons Palatinus in Rome there stood a temple to Fever. Upton
quotes from Gruter, p. xcvii., an interesting inscription to this
divinity: Febri. Divæ. Febri. Sanctæ. Febri. Magnæ. Camilla. Amata. Pro.
Filio. Male. Affecto. P.
CHAPTER III.
1. There is excellent MS. authority for this reading of the passage,
which, however, is not Schweighäuser's. The latter reads: "Be content
with them, and pray to the Gods."
2. "Steward of the winds." A quotation from Homer, _Od._ x. 21.
CHAPTER IV.
1. "Through not being dazzled," etc. [Greek: An tas hylas mê
thaumasê].
CHAPTER VI.
1. Note that in this passage "God" and "the Gods" and "the Divine" are
all synonymous terms.
2. Or "of names."
3. Some texts add "such as Good or Evil."
CHAPTER VII.
1. Apparently a proverb, which maybe paralleled in its present
application by Luther's "Pecca fortiter."
2. A complex or conjunctive proposition is one which contains several
assertions so united as to form a single statement which will be false
if any one of its parts is false--_e.g._, "Brutus was the lover and
destroyer both of Cæsar and of his country." The disjunctive is when
alternative propositions are made, as "Pleasure is either good or bad,
or neither good nor bad."
3. I have followed Lord Shaftesbury's explanation of this passage, which
the other commentators have given up as corrupt. It seems clear that
whether the passage can stand exactly in the form in which we have it,
or not, Lord Shaftesbury's rendering represents what Epictetus
originally conveyed.
4. According to the usual reading, a scornful exclamation--"_Thou_
exhort them!" I have followed the reading recommended by Schw. in his
notes, although he does not adopt it in his text.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. The founder of the Cynic school was Antisthenes, who taught in the
gymnasium named the Cynosarges, at Athens; whence the name of his
school. Zeller takes this striking chapter to exhibit Epictetus's
"philosophisches Ideal," the Cynic being the "wahrer Philosoph," or
perfect Stoic. (Phil. d. Gr. iii. S. 752.) This view seems to me no more
true than that the missionary or monk is to be considered the ideal
Christian. Epictetus takes pains to make it clear that the Cynic is a
Stoic with a special and separate vocation, which all Stoics are by no
means called upon to take up. Like Thoreau, that modern Stoic, when he
went to live at Walden, the Cynic tries the extreme of abnegation in
order to demonstrate practically that man has resources within himself
which make him equal to any fate that circumstances can inflict.
2. [Greek: tribônion], a coarse garment especially affected by the
Cynics, as also by the early Christian ascetics.
3. "Nor pity." Upton, in a note on _Diss._ i. 18. 3. (Schw.), refers to
various passages in Epictetus where pity and envy are mentioned
together as though they were related emotions, and aptly quotes Virgil
(_Georg._ ii. 499):--
"Aut doluit miserans inopem, aut invidit habenti."
It will be clear to any careful reader that when Epictetus asserts that
certain emotions or acts are unworthy of a man, he constantly means the
"man" to be understood as his highest spiritual faculty, his deepest
sense of reason, his soul. That we are not to pity or grieve means that
that side of us which is related to the divine and eternal is not to be
affected by emotions produced by calamities in mere outward and material
things. St. Augustine corroborates this view in an interesting passage
bearing on the Stoic doctrine of pity (_De Civ. Dei._ ix. 5; _Schw._ iv.
132):--
"Misericordiam Cicero non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos
inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti
nobilissimi Stoici ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui hujus sectæ
primas partes habuerunt, hujuscemodi passiones in animum Sapientis
admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberam esse volunt. Unde fit consequens,
ut hæc ipsa non putent vitia, quando Sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra
virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possunt."
The particular utterances of Epictetus here alluded to by St. Augustine
must have been contained in some of the lost books of the
_Dissertations_, as nothing like them is to be found explicitly in those
which survive, although the latter afford us abundant means for deducing
the conclusion which St. Augustine confirms.
4. This cake seems to form a ridiculous anti-climax. But it appears to
have been a vexed question in antiquity whether an ascetic philosopher
might indulge in this particular luxury ([Greek: plakous]). Upton
quotes Lucian and Diogenes Laertius for instances of this question being
propounded, and an affirmative answer given (in one instance by the
Cynic, Diogenes). The youth in the text is being addressed as a novice
who must not use the freedom of an adept.
Upton quotes from Cymbeline:--
"Hath Britain all the sun that shines? Day, night,
Art they not, but in Britain? Prythee, think,
There's living out of Britain!"
But Epictetus means more than this in his allusion to sun and
stars.--See Preface, xxiv. This passage would lead us to suppose that
Epictetus believed in a personal existence continued for some time after
death. In the end, however, even sun and stars shall vanish.--See ii.
13, 4.
6. Being arrested by Philip's people, and asked if he were a spy,
Diogenes replied, "Certainly I am, O Philip; a spy of thine ill-counsel
and folly, who for no necessity canst set thy life and kingdom on the
chances of an hour."
7. According to Upton's conjecture, these were gladiators famous for
bodily strength; and also, one would suspect, for some remarkable
calamity.
8. This highly crude view of the Trojan war might have been refuted out
of the mouth of Epictetus himself. Evil-doers are not to be allowed
their way because they are unable to hurt our souls, but the hurt may be
in the cowardice or sloth that will not punish them.
9. By wearing his cloak half falling off, in negligent fashion. Nothing
is finer or more characteristic in Epictetus than his angry scorn of the
pseudo-Stoics of his day.
10. [Greek: anakrinon to daimonion]. The allusion evidently is to
the genius or divine spirit by which Socrates felt himself guided.
11. Crates was a disciple of Diogenes. His wife was named Hipparchia.
Upton quotes Menander (_apud Diog. L._), "Thou wilt walk about with me
in a cloak as once did his wife with Crates the Cynic."
12. Danaus, father of the fifty Danaidæ. Æolus is mentioned in _Od._ x.
as having six sons and six daughters.
13. [Greek: trapezêas pylaôrous]. _Il._ xxi. 69.
14. That is, he capped the quotation by quoting the following line
(_Il._ ii. 24, 25). Not a very striking intellectual effort; but
Epictetus evidently considered it a meritorious thing to know Homer well
enough to quote him in one's sleep, and he was right.
15. From a poem of Cleanthes.
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
1. According to the view of James Harris, in a long and valuable note
communicated to Upton, the "master-argument" was so called from the
supreme importance of the issues with which it dealt. On these issues
different leaders of the Stoics took different sides, Diodorus holding
both future and past things to be _necessary_, Cleanthes both
_contingent_, and Chrysippus past things to be necessary and future
contingent. Any two of the three propositions mentioned in the text
exclude the third. For modern philosophy the distinction between the
possible and the certain in the phenomenal world has, of course, no real
existence; the possible being simply that of which we do not know
whether it will come to pass or not.
2. Of course Epictetus here speaks ironically; all this is just what it
_is_ the business of a thinker to do.
3. Epictetus, I suppose, means to complain that the current phrases of
philosophy are dealt out in glib answer to great ethical questions, just
as Homer might be quoted for an event in the life of Odysseus, by
persons who in neither case think of gaining that vital conviction
which only the strenuous exercise of one's own reason can produce. A
little later he represents Hellanicus, the historian, as quoted on the
distinction between good and evil, who never treated that subject. If it
is to be a mere question of _authority_, one _name_ is as good as
another, since none is any use at all.
"Indifferent," be it observed, is _morally_ indifferent--that which has
in _itself_ no bearing on our moral state. See Chap. II. 2.
4. The followers of Aristotle called themselves Peripatetics.
CHAPTER II.
1. The word in the Greek is [Greek: peristaseis], literally
_circumstances_, but the word is evidently used in a bad sense, as
equivalent to afflictions. Doom is likewise etymologically a neutral
word, but one which has received an evil meaning.
2. Socrates's faith in his genius or "Dæmon" was well known. In this
passage from his _Apologia_ (which Epictetus gives from a bad text), it
is doubtless the manner only that conveyed the idea of mockery. Neither
Socrates nor any one else ever had better evidence of God's existence
than His voice in our conscience.
CHAPTER IV.
1. Briefly, the three divisions seem to be Action, Character, and
Judgment. The last is to be approached through training in logic, in the
penetration of fallacies, etc., by which means a man is to arrive at
such an inward and vital conviction of the truth that he can never for a
moment be taken off his guard by the delusion of Appearance.
2. Passions, passionless, [Greek: ta pathê, apathês].--See Index of
Philosophic Terms.
CHAPTER V.
1. Euripides.--Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus, is reported to
have said, "Take the chance of dying nobly when thou canst, lest after a
little death indeed come to thee, but a noble death no more."
2. This phrase of the "open door" occurs frequently in Epictetus,
usually when, as here, he is telling the average non-philosophic man
that it is unmanly to complain of a life which he can at any time
relinquish. The philosopher has no need of such exhortation, for he does
not complain, and as for death, is content to wait God's time. But the
Stoics taught that the arrival of this time might be indicated by some
disaster or affliction which rendered a natural and wholesome life
impossible. Self-destruction was in such cases permissible, and is
recorded to have been adopted by several leaders of the Stoics,
generally when old age had begun to render them a burden to their
friends.
3. _Nay, thou shalt exist_, etc.--This is the sense given by Zeller's
punctuation. Schweighäuser's text would be rendered, "Thou shalt not
exist, but something else will," etc. Upton changes the text (on his own
authority) by transposing an [Greek: ouk]. "Thou shalt exist, but as
something else, whereof the universe has now no need."
4. This does not appear to have been the law in Epictetus's time, for he
himself was educated while a slave. But it was a common provision in
antique states.
5. The ceremony in manumitting a slave.
CHAPTER VI.
1. Chap. VI. i. is a passage from the lost Fifth Book of the Discourses,
preserved for us in a rather obscure Latin translation by Aulus Gellius.
During a storm at sea, a certain Stoic on board was observed by him to
look pale and anxious, though not indeed showing the signs of panic
exhibited by the other passengers. Questioned afterwards by Gellius on
this apparent feebleness in his professed faith, the Stoic produced the
Fifth Book of Epictetus, and read this passage.
2. The third Earl of Shaftesbury, an enthusiastic student of Epictetus,
had this dish of water and ray of light engraved, and placed, with the
inscription, [Greek: panta hypolêpsis]--All is Opinion--as an emblem
at the front of his _Characteristics_. The passage, though interesting,
is obscure. At one time the "appearances," [Greek: phantasiai], are
compared to the ray of light; at another, the doctrines (literally
"arts," _i. e._, arts of life taught by philosophy) and virtues.
Probably the explanation is to be found in the view of the Stoics that
at birth the human soul is a _tabula rasa_, or blank sheet; all our
knowledge coming from without; that is, from the "appearances" which
surround us. Moral and philosophic convictions are thus, like all other
mental states, the result of external impressions.
CHAPTER VII.
1. The school of Plato was continued at Athens under the title of the
Academy. In its later days it produced little except logical puzzles.
2. "Friend, if indeed, escaping from this war, we were destined
thereafter to an ageless and deathless life, then neither would I fight
in the van nor set thee in the press of glorious battle. But now, since
death in a thousand kinds stands everywhere against us, which no man
shall fly from nor elude, we go; either we shall give glory to another,
or he to us."--Sarpedon's speech, _Iliad_, xii. 322-8.
3. General consent.--The well-known philosophic doctrine, that what all
men unite in believing must be true, which has so often been made the
basis of arguments against Skepticism in various forms.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. See chap. IV. i.
2. He drew water by night for his gardens, and studied philosophy in the
day.--_Diog. Laert._ [Upton.]
3. A most characteristic feature of the whole Stoic school was its
treatment of ancient mythology and legend. These things were closely and
earnestly studied, with a constant view to the deeper meanings that
underlay the vesture of fable, an attitude which contrasts very
favorably with Plato's banishment of the poets from his Republic for
"teaching false notions about the Gods."
CHAPTER IX.
1. Gyara, an island in the Ægean, used as a penal settlement.
CHAPTER X.
1. _The captain ... the driver_--literally, "to him who has knowledge"
(of the given art).
2. Liberator--[Greek: karpistês]. The person appointed by law to carry
out the ceremony of the manumission of slaves.
CHAPTER XI.
1. This chapter seems to me to contain a truth expressed so baldly and
crudely as to appear a falsehood. The reader's mind will be fixed upon
the truth or falsehood according as he is or is not capable of reading
Epictetus with understanding.
2. This earthen lamp was sold, according to Lucian, at the death of
Epictetus for 3,000 drachmæ (about £120).--_Adv. Indoct._ 13.
CHAPTER XIII.
1. Parodying a verse of Euripides on the stream of Dirce in Boeotia.
The Marcian aqueduct brought water to Rome.
2. I adopt Upton's conjecture for the inexplicable [Greek: en boos
koilia].
CHAPTER XVIII.
1. An eminent Cynic (also mentioned by Seneca and Tacitus).
CHAPTER XXV.
1. This is the reading of one of the Christian Paraphrases. The other
versions add the words [Greek: pros allêlous] after [Greek: ex hôn
ou diapherometha], giving the sense "from things in which we do not
differ from each other." It is no uncommon thing for all the versions of
Epictetus to unite in a manifestly corrupt reading, and though in this
case the received text is not an impossible one, I have thought myself
justified in following the variant of the Paraphrase.
CHAPTER XXVII.
1. There is an allusion to this curious feature of the Olympic contests
in the Fourth Idyll of Theocritus. Casaubon (_Lect. Theocr._ ad Idyll.
4) quoted by Schweighäuser, in his note on this passage (_Diss._ III.
xv. 4), shows from Festus Pompeius that there was a statue in the
Capitol of a youth bearing a spade after the manner of the Olympic
combatants.
2. Euphrates, a Stoic philosopher, and contemporary of Epictetus. He was
tutor of Pliny, the younger.
3. The pentathlos contended in five athletic exercises--viz., running,
leaping, throwing the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling.
4. Much of this must refer to the period of probation or discipleship,
for Epictetus is clear that the ordinary Stoic (who had not embraced the
special mission of Cynicism) was not required to forsake his family, or
his affairs, or his duties as a citizen, nor even justified in doing so.
BOOK III.
CHAPTER II.
1. The husk is, of course, the body. If it is maintained that Nature has
made the ease of this our only proper pursuit, of course the altruistic,
or social instincts have to be rejected and denied.
2. The text is here almost certainly corrupt. It runs [Greek: pôs oun
hyponoêtikoi esmen, hois mê physikê esti pros ta ekgona
philostorgia]. All the MSS. agree in [Greek: hyponoêtikoi], for which
Schweighäuser desires to read [Greek: pronoêtikoi], and Wolf, [Greek:
eti koinônikoi]. Salmasius declares emphatically for [Greek: pôs
oun epinoeis hoti koinônikoi esmen], and this, with a slight
alteration suggested to me by an eminent living scholar, is the reading
I have adopted: Let us suppose that Epictetus said [Greek: pôs oun
hyponoeis hoti k.e.], and that this was written in the short lines
common in Greek MSS.:--
[Greek:
PÔSOUNYPO
NOEISOTIKOI
NÔNIKOI]
The second line, beginning with the same letter as the third, might
easily be dropped by a transcriber, and the next transcriber would
certainly change the resulting [Greek: hyponônikoi] to [Greek:
hyponoêtikoi]. The existing reading might give the sense, "How are we,
then, suspicious of those (if any there be) to whom Nature has given no
affection for their offspring?"
3. Outward things--such as making provision for one's family, serving
the State, etc.,--actions which are not directly concerned with our
spiritual good.
CHAPTER III.
1. Phrygia, the birthplace of Epictetus, was one of the great centers
of the wild and fearful cult of Cybele, whose priests gashed and
mutilated themselves in the excitement of the orgie.
2. Philosophy is brought upon the scene, speaking first through the
mouth of a Stoic, afterwards through that of an Epicurean, and the
practical results of each system are exhibited.
3. The Athenians, rather than submit to Xerxes, abandoned their city to
be plundered, and took to their fleet, the victory at Salamis rewarding
their resolve.
Those who died at Thermopylæ were the three hundred Spartans under
Leonidas, who held the pass against the Persian host till all were
slain. Often as their heroism has been celebrated, perhaps nothing more
worthy of their valor has been written than the truly laconic epitaph
composed for them by Simonides:
"Stranger, the Spartans bade us die:
Go, tell them, thou, that here we lie."
CHAPTER IV.
1. The sense of human dignity was strong in Epictetus, and he would have
it practically observed in men's relations with each other. Compare Ch.
v. 7. Zeller must have overlooked these Fragments of Epictetus when he
asserted (p. 301) that no Stoic philosopher had ever condemned slavery.
So far as we know, however, this is the only condemnation of that
institution ever uttered by any Pagan thinker. The usual Stoic view was
laid down by Chrysippus, who defined the slave very much as Carlyle
does, as a "perpetuus mercenarius"--a man "hired for life, from whom
work was to be required, a just return for it being accorded (_operam
exegendam, justa proebenda_)". This utterance of Epictetus, as of one
who knew slavery from within, and certainly was not inclined to
exaggerate its discomforts, is noteworthy enough.
CHAPTER V.
1. Administrator, [Greek: diorthôtês]; in Latin, _Corrector_--a State
officer of whom inscriptions, etc., make frequent mention, but of whose
functions not much appears to be known beyond what the present chapter
of Epictetus reveals.
2. Cassiope was a port of Epirus, not far from Nicopolis, where
Epictetus taught. Schw. conjectures that Maximus was sending his son to
study philosophy at Nicopolis under Epictetus.
3. "For a correct view of these matters will reduce every movement of
preference and avoidance to health of body and tranquillity of soul; for
this is the perfection of a happy life."--Epicurus, _Diog. Laert._ x.
128. Epictetus's analysis of the Epicurean theory amounts to this, that
the pleasure of the soul is the chief good, but that it is only felt
through the body and its conditions.
4. _The overseer of youth._--An officer in certain Greek cities. See
Mahaffy's _Greek Life and Thought_, ch. xvii., on the organization of
the _ephebi_.
5. _Aid in works that are according to Nature._--The Greek is--[Greek:
en tois kata physin ergois parakratê]. There is some difference
of opinion among commentators as to the meaning of [Greek: parakratê].
Wolf translates, "hold the chief place" in natural works. Upton, Schw.,
and Long render it by "keep us constant," "sustain us," in such works. I
do not see why we should not take the word in its plainest sense--that
pleasure should _act together with other forces_ in leading us to do
well.
CHAPTER VII.
1. _Zealous for evil things._--Epictetus must mean things which they
know to be evil--evil things _as_ evil. It was a Socratic doctrine which
we find again alluded to in this chapter, that no evil is ever willingly
or wittingly done.
2. A favorite theme of later Greek and of Roman comedy was the rivalship
in love of a father and a son.
3. Admetus, husband of Alcestis, being told by an oracle that his wife
must die if no one offered himself in her stead, thought to lay the
obligation on his father, as being an old man with but few more years to
live. The first verse quoted is from the _Alcestis_ of Euripides; the
second is not found in any extant version of that play.
4. Eteocles and Polyneices, sons of Oedipus, quarreled with each other
about the inheritance of their father's kingdom. Eteocles having gained
possession of it, Polyneices brought up the famous seven kings, his
allies, against Thebes, and fell in battle there by his brother's hand,
whom he also killed. The verses quoted are from the _Phoenissæ_ of
Euripides.
5. Schweighäuser interprets this passage to mean that these men occupy
the public places as wild beasts do the mountains, to prey on others. If
we might read [Greek: hôs ta thêria] for [Greek: hôs ta orê], we
should get a less obscure sense, "haunt the wilderness--I should say the
public places--like wild beasts." The passage is clearly corrupt
somewhere.
6. Polyneices bribed Eriphyle with the gift of this necklace to persuade
her unwilling husband to march with him against Thebes where he died.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. The allusion is to _Odyssey_, v. 82-4. "But he was sitting on the
beach and weeping, where he was wont; and tormented his spirit with
tears and groanings and woes, and wept as he gazed over the barren sea."
2. _Let him pity._--See Bk. I., ch. viii., _note_ 3.
CHAPTER IX.
1. _The conflagration._--See Preface for an account of the Stoic
Doctrine of the _Weltverbrennung_.
2. Long suggests that the words translated "air to air" might be equally
well rendered "spirit to spirit" ([Greek: hoson pneumatiou eis
pneumation]), thus finding a place for the soul in this enumeration of
the elements of man. But this metaphysical division of man's nature into
a spiritual part and a material part would have been wholly contrary to
Stoic teaching, which admitted no existence that was not material. As a
matter of fact, if any of the terms in this enumeration is to be
understood as meaning soul or spirit, it will be fire rather than air.
3. Gods and Powers.--[Greek: theôn kai Daimonôn].
CHAPTER X.
1. _To strangle lions or embrace statues._--Hercules did the former, and
ostentatious philosophers sometimes did the latter in winter-time, by
way of showing their power of endurance.
2. _The stamp of Nero._--I believe there is no other record than this of
any rejection of Nero's coins, and those which have come down to us are
of perfectly good quality. He was declared a public enemy by the Senate,
and possibly it was decreed at the same time that his coins should be
withdrawn from circulation. Dion, quoted by Wise (_apud_ Schweighäuser),
reports that this was done in the case of Caligula, after the death of
that tyrant.
3. _Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes._--"A proverb about the
Spartans, who were defeated in Asia," notes the Scholiast on Aristoph.
Pac., 1188-90.
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER II.
1. _Nor can I move without thy knowledge._--From Homer, _Il._ x. 279,
280, Odysseus to Athene.
2. _The Genius of each man._--[Greek: ton ekaston Daimona].
CHAPTER III.
1. _A way wherein to walk._--Literally, the power of using a way. It
seems to me likely that this term, way--[Greek: hodos], here signifies
the Stoic philosophy, just as in the early Church it was used to signify
Christianity (_e. g._, _Acts_ xxii. 4, and xix. 9, 23).
CHAPTER IV.
1. _Nor have any object in themselves._--Readers of Lotze will be
reminded of the term Fürsichseinheit, used by him to denote the
self-centered quality of true Being. The Greek here is [Greek: ouk
auta proêgoumena], [Greek: proêgoumena], being the word used in Bk. I. viii.
13, and Bk. III. v. 5, for the leading objects or obligations of man.
2. _Would that I had you with me!_--In Long's translation the pronoun
_you_ is explained to mean God. I can see no reason for this
interpretation. The words are, I think, supposed to be uttered by a
disciple to his master: they are such as Epictetus may have heard from
many of his own disciples as they left him to take their part in the
world of action.
3. _Cautious assent_--_i. e._, caution in allowing oneself to entertain
the impressions of appearances.
CHAPTER V.
1. The strong and growing yearning for some direct, personal revelation
of God, some supernatural manifestation of His existence and care for
men, is noted by Zeller as a special trait of Hellenistic times. Such a
revelation must have been longed for by many as the only satisfying
answer to the destructive logic of the Pyrrhonists, and men's minds were
also of course led that way by the insistence of the Stoic thinkers upon
the communion of the individual with God, as the most important of all
possible relations. Hence the growth of many wild and orgiastic cults at
this epoch--all based on the state of ecstasy connected with their rites,
which was ascribed to supernatural influence. With the Stoics this
movement took the comparatively sober shape of attention to the
established system of oracular divination. Zeller, however, shows that
some Stoics were disposed to rationalize the revelations of the oracles
by supposing a certain sympathy between the mind of the seer and the
future events which led to the unconscious selection of means of
divination which would exhibit the proper signs.--(Z. 339, 340.)
Epictetus evidently thought more of God's revelation in the conscience
than any other.
2. The story is told by Simplicius in his commentary on this chapter.
Two friends, journeying together to inquire of the oracle at Delphi,
were set upon by robbers; one of them resisted, and was murdered, the
other either fled or made no effort on his companion's behalf. Arriving
at the temple of Apollo, he was greeted with the following deliverance
of the oracle:--
"Thou saw'st thy friend all undefended die--
Foul with that sin, from Phoebus' temple fly."
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
1. Simplicius explains that the oath was to be refused, because to call
God to witness in any merely personal and earthly interest implies a
want of reverence towards Him; but that if there were a question of
pledging one's faith on behalf of friends, or parents, or country, it
was not improper to add the confirmation of an oath.
2. Upton quotes allusions to these recitations from Juvenal, Martial,
and Pliny. Authors would read their own works and invite crowds of
flatterers to attend. Epict. _Diss._ iii. 23. (Schweighäuser) is a
scornful diatribe against the pretentious people who held forth on
these occasions, and the people who assembled to hear and applaud them.
He contrasts with fashionable reciters and lecturers his own master,
Rufus. "Rufus was wont to say, _I speak to no purpose, if ye have time
to praise me_. And, verily, he spoke in such a way that every man who
sat there thought that some one had accused him to Rufus, he so handled
all that was going on, he so set before each man's eyes his faults."
3. Into vulgarity--[Greek: eis idiôtismon].
CHAPTER II.
1. The sophism, or puzzle, called the Liar, ran thus:--A liar says he
lies: if it is true, he is no liar; and if he lies, he is speaking
truth. The Quiescent ([Greek: ho hêsychazôn]) was an invention
attributed by Cicero to Chrysippus (Acad. ii. 29). When asked of a
gradually-increasing number of things to say when they ceased to be few
and became many, he was wont to cease replying, or be "quiescent,"
shortly before the limit was reached--a device which we have some
difficulty in regarding as a fair example of Chrysippus's contributions
to the science of logic. For the master sophism see Bk. II. chap. i.,
_note_ 1.
2. Plato, _Laws_, ix.:--"When any of such opinions visit thee, go to the
purifying sacrifices, go and pray in the temples of the protecting Gods,
go to the society of men whom thou hast heard of as good; and now hear
from others, now say for thine own part, that it behooves every man to
hold in regard the things that are honorable and righteous. But from the
company of evil men, fly without a look behind. And if in doing these
things thy disease give ground, well; but if not, hold death the better
choice, and depart from life."
3. _The true athlete._--Literally, ascetic, [Greek: askêtês]; _i. e._,
practicer.
4. The Dioscuri, or Twins, Castor and Pollux, were the patron deities of
sailors.
CHAPTER VI.
1. _If viewed disjunctively._--That is, if we say, It is day, or, It is
night. This is a difficult chapter, and full of corruptions. The feast
alluded to is, doubtless, the feast of life, where the Gods are the
hosts.
CHAPTER VII.
1. _Winter training._--Such as the Roman troops underwent when in
winter-quarters. They were accustomed to exercise themselves with arms
of double the normal weight, and prepare themselves by marching,
running, leaping, etc., for active service.
CHAPTER XII.
1. The Pancratium was a contest in which boxing and wrestling were both
allowable. For the Pentathlon, see Bk. II. chap, xvii., _note_ 3.
CHAPTER XVI.
1. This means, apparently, that the judgment has no right to do more
than endorse the deliverances of the perceptive faculty. If a man
commits any error, he does it under the conviction that it is in some
way for his profit or satisfaction; that is, that there is something of
the nature of the Good in it. He may be mistaken in this; but so long as
he does not know where Good and Evil really lie, he can do no other than
he does. The true course, then, for the philosopher is not to condemn
him for his actions, but to show him the fundamental error from which
they proceed. The expression, "assent," [Greek: synkatatithesthai], is
that used by Epictetus in II. vi., etc., where he speaks of the mind as
being imposed on, or taken captive, by the outward shows of things.
CHAPTER XX.
1. The Greek is [Greek: Epeidê logos estin ho diarthrôn kai
exergazomenos ta loipa]. [Greek: diarthroô] means, literally, to
fashion with joints, hence constitute organically, with interdependence
of parts. Long translates "analyze."
2. _Modius._--A measure of about two gallons.
3. Antisthenes, about 400 B. C., founder of the Cynic school, which was
established by him in the gymnasium called the Cynosarges (hence the
name). As a Cynic, his authority would, of course, be respected by the
hearers of Epictetus. This investigation of terms, or names, is, indeed,
the beginning of philosophy and the guide to truth in any sphere, but
perhaps not every one is competent to undertake it. There must be a real
and not merely a formal appreciation of the contents of each term. A
primrose is one thing to Peter Bell and another to Wordsworth. The term,
let us say, Duty, is one thing to a Herbert Spencer and another to a
Kant.
CHAPTER XXII.
1. "My friends, fly all culture," is an injunction reported of Epicurus
(_Diog. L._ x. 6). However, neglect of form in literary style was a
characteristic of philosophic writers of the Hellenistic period, which
was by no means confined to the Epicureans.
2. This passage is corrupt. I follow the reading adopted by
Schweighäuser (after Wolf); but it may be noted that Schweighäuser's
translation follows another reading than that which he adopts in his
text, viz.--[Greek: kinoumenou] (being moved), instead of [Greek:
teinomenou] (being strained). The original, in all versions, is [Greek:
ginomenou], which makes no sense at all.--See Preface, xxiii.
3. The writings enumerated are, of course, works of Epicurus. When
dying, he wrote in a letter to a friend (_Diog. L._ x. 22) that he was
spending a happy day, and his last.
4. Stoic [Greek: apatheia] was anything but insensibility. Chrysippus
held that many things in the Kosmos were created for their beauty
alone.--_Zeller_, 171.
5. There is another short chapter on the arts of ratiocination and
expression (I. viii. _Schw._), which glances at the subject from a
somewhat different point of view from that taken in the chapter which I
have given. There Epictetus dwells chiefly on the danger that weak
spirits should lose themselves in the fascination of these arts: "For,
in general, in every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and feeble
there is danger lest they be elated and puffed up through it. For how
could one contrive to persuade a young man who excels in such things
that he must not be an appendage to them, but make them an appendage to
him?"
CHAPTER XXVI.
1. The first of these quotations is from the Stoic Cleanthes, the second
from a lost play of Euripides; in the third Epictetus has joined
together two sayings of Socrates, one from the _Crito_ and one from the
_Apologia_. Anytus and Meletus were the principal accusers of Socrates
in the trial which ended in his sentence to death.
NOTES ON PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHIC TERMS USED BY EPICTETUS.
[I give under this head only those terms the exact force
of which may not be apparent to the reader in a mere
translation.]
[Greek: Aidêmôn].--Pious, reverent, modest. The
substantive is [Greek: aidôs], the German Ehrfurcht
(_Wilhelm Meister_, _Wanderjahre_, Bk. II. ch. ii.), a
virtue in high regard with Epictetus, who generally
mentions it in connection with that of "faithfulness,"
[Greek: pistis]. In Wordsworth's poem, "My heart leaps
up when I behold a rainbow in the sky," the "natural
piety" which he prays may abide with him in his old age
seems to be just that moral sensitiveness or [Greek:
aidôs] which passes into reverence and worship in the
presence of certain things, and into shame and dread in
that of others.
[Greek: Apatheia].--Peace--that is, peace from passion,
[Greek: pathê]. [Greek: Pathos] was any affection of
the mind causing joy or grief. As it appears from Bk. II.
iii. I., [Greek: apatheia] is not, in Epictetus, the
state of absolute freedom from these passions, but that
of being able to master them so that they shall not
overwhelm the inner man.
[Greek: Diarthrôtikos].--That which _organizes_,
constitutes organically, forms into a system. From
[Greek: arthron], a joint. The word "analyze," by which
Long translates [Greek: diarthroun], seems to me wanting
in the formative sense expressed by the original.
[Greek: Dogma].--An opinion, that which seems ([Greek:
dokein]) true; generally in the special sense of a
philosophic dogma.
[Greek: Euroein].--To prosper; literally, to flow
freely, [Greek: euroia], prosperity. A common Stoic
phrase for a happy life.
[Greek: Eusebeia].--Religion, piety. [Greek:
sebomai]--"_to feel awe_ or _fear_ before God and man,
especially when about to do something disgraceful"
(_Liddell and Scott_); to worship, respect, reverence.
[Greek: Hêgemonikon to].--The Ruling Faculty--that in
a man which chooses, determines, takes cognizance of good
and evil, and sways the inferior faculties ([Greek:
dynameis], powers) to its will. Lotze notes this
_hegemonic_ quality in the human soul as that which
distinguishes it from the bundle of sensations into which
the Association Philosophy would resolve it.
[Greek: thaumazein].--To admire, be dazzled with
admiration by, to worship, to be taken up with a thing so
as to lose the power of cool judgment. A frequent word in
Epictetus, the sense of which is precisely rendered in
Hor. _Sat._ I, 4, 28, "Hunc capit argenti splendor,
_stupet_ Albius ære."
[Greek: Idiôtês].--One of the vulgar, an unlettered
person; in Epictetus, one uninstructed in philosophy.
Originally the word meant one who remained in private
life, not filling any public office, or taking part in
State affairs. A man might be an [Greek: idiôtês], or
"layman," with respect to any branch of science or art.
[Greek: Kalos kai agathos].--The good and wise
man--literally, beautiful and good. A standing phrase to
denote the perfection of human character. [Greek: kalos]
is a word sometimes difficult to render. Curtius connects
it etymologically with Sanscrit, _kalyas_; Gothic,
_hails_=healthy.
[Greek: Oiêsis].--"Conceit"--defined by Cicero as
"Opinatio"--intellectual self-sufficiency, the supposing
one's self to know something when one does not. "The first
business of a philosopher," says Epictetus, "is to cast
away [Greek: oiêsis], for it is impossible that one can
begin to learn the things that he thinks he knows"
(_Diss._ II. xvii. 1.) He is not, in short, to be "wise in
his own conceit."
[Greek: orexis, ekklisis, hormê, aphormê].--Pursuit,
avoidance, desire, aversion. According to Simplicius
(Comment. _Ench._ i.), [Greek: orexis] and [Greek: ekklisis]
were used by the Stoics to express the counterparts
in outward action of the mental affections, [Greek: hormê]
and [Greek: aphormê], and were regarded as consequent upon
the latter.
[Greek: proairesis].--The Will; but as used in
Epictetus, this word implies much more than the mere
faculty of volition. Literally, it means a choosing of
one thing before another; in Epictetus, the power of
deliberately resolving or purposing, the exercise of the
reflective faculty being implied. It is hardly to be
distinguished from [Greek: to hêgemonikon], _q. v._
[Greek: prolêpseis].--"Natural Conceptions." See
Preface, xxviii., xxix. The "primary truths" of Lord
Herbert of Cherbury.
[Greek: Synkatatithesthai].--To assent to or acquiesce
in anything, to ratify by the judgment the emotions
produced by external things or events, such as the sense
of dread, or pleasure, or reprobation, which they arouse
in us. To be on one's guard against the hasty yielding of
this assent is one of Epictetus's main injunctions to the
aspirant in philosophy.
[Greek: Tarassesthai].--To be troubled; [Greek:
a-taraxia], tranquillity. [Greek: Tarassein] is
primarily to stir up, confuse, throw into disorder.
[Greek: phantasia].--An appearance; with the Stoics, any
mental impression as received by the perceptive faculty
before the Reason has pronounced upon it, a bare
perception.
INDEX OF REFERENCES.
[The references in the right-hand column are to the
books, chapters, and verses of the _Dissertations_, to
the chapters of the _Encheiridion_, and to the
_Fragments_, in Schweighäuser's edition of Epictetus.]
BOOK I.
Chap. I. 1 _Frag._ III.
Chap. I. 2-5 _Diss._ II. xi. 1-25.
Chap. II. _Diss._ I. xxii. 1-16.
Chap. III. _Diss._ I. i. 1-17.
Chap. IV. 1 _Diss._ III. iii. 1-4.
Chap. IV. 2 _Diss._ I. xxix. 1-4 to [Greek: labe]
Chap. IV. 3 _Diss._ I. xxv. 1-6.
Chap. V. _Ench._ I.
Chap. VI. _Diss._ II. xiv.
Chap. VII. 1, 2 _Ench._ II.
Chap. VII. 3 _Diss._ I. xv. 7, 8.
Chap. VII. 4-6 _Diss._ II. ix. 1-12.
Chap. VII. 7 _Frag._ LXXII.
Chap. VII. 8 _Diss._ III. xiii. 20-23.
Chap. VIII. _Diss._ III. xxii.
BOOK II.
Chap. I. _Diss._ II. xix.
Chap. II. 1 _Frag._ LXIX.
Chap. II. 2, 3 _Diss._ II. v. 1-9.
Chap. II. 4 _Diss._ II. xvi. 15.
Chap. II. 5, 6 _Diss._ II. vi. 9-19.
Chap. II. 7, 8 _Diss._ II. v. 10-20.
Chap. III. 1, 2 _Ench._ III., IV.
Chap. III. 3 _Diss._ III. xix.
Chap. III. 4, 5 _Ench._ V., VI.
Chap. IV. 1, 2 _Diss._ III. ii. 1-10.
Chap. V. 1-3 _Diss._ II. i. 1-20.
Chap. V. 4 _Diss._ III. xxiv. 94.
Chap. V. 5 _Diss._ II. i. 21-29.
Chap. VI. 1 _Frag._ CLXXX.
Chap. VI. 2 _Diss._ III. iii. 20-22.
Chap. VII. 1-4 _Diss._ I. xxvii.
Chap. VIII. 1 _Diss._ I. ix. 1-8.
Chap. VIII. 2-6 _Diss._ III. xxvi. 1-36.
Chap. IX. 1 _Diss._ I. ix. 10-18.
Chap. IX. 2 _Diss._ I. xxv. 14-20.
Chap. IX. 3 _Diss._ I. xxix. 29.
Chap. X. 1-4 _Diss._ I. xix. 1-17.
Chap. X. 5-6 _Diss._ IV. vii. 12-18.
Chap. X. 7 _Diss._ I. xviii. 17.
Chap. X. 8 _Diss._ IV. vii. 19-24.
Chap. XI. _Diss._ I. xviii. 1-16.
Chap. XII. _Ench._ VII.
Chap. XIII. 1, 2 _Ench._ VIII.-IX.
Chap. XIII. 3-6 _Diss._ II. xvi. 24-47.
Chap. XIV. _Ench._ X.
Chap. XV. _Ench._ XI.
Chap. XVI. _Ench._ XII.
Chap. XVII. _Ench._ XIII.
Chap. XVIII. 1, 2 _Ench._ XIV.
Chap. XVIII. 3 _Diss._ I. xxv. 22-25.
Chap. XVIII. 4 _Ench._ XV.
Chap. XIX. _Ench._ XVI.
Chap. XX. 1 _Ench._ XVII.
Chap. XX. 2 _Diss._ IV. x. 9-17.
Chap. XXI. _Ench._ XVIII.-XXI.
Chap. XXII. _Ench._ XXII.-XXIII.
Chap. XXIII. _Ench._ XXIV.
Chap. XXIV. _Ench._ XXV.
Chap. XXV. _Ench._ XXVI., XXVII.
Chap. XXVI. _Ench._ XXVIII.
Chap. XXVII. _Ench._ XXIX.
BOOK III.
Chap. I. _Ench._ XXX.
Chap. II. 1, 2 _Diss._ I. xxiii.
Chap. II. 3-7 _Diss._ II. v. 24-30.
Chap. III. 1-9 _Diss._ II. xx. 1-27.
Chap. IV. 1 _Diss._ I. xiii.
Chap. IV. 2, 3 _Frag._ XLIII., XLIV.
Chap. V. _Diss._ III. vii.
Chap. VI. 1 _Frag._ LXXXII.
Chap. VI. 2 _Frag._ XLV.
Chap. VI. 3 _Frag._ LXVII.
Chap. VII. _Diss._ II. xxii.
Chap. VIII. 1-10 _Diss._ III. xxiv. 1-49.
Chap. VIII. 11 _Diss._ III. xxiv. 58-63.
Chap. VIII. 12 _Diss._ III. xxiv. 88-93.
Chap. IX. 1, 2 _Diss._ III. xiii. 1-17.
Chap. IX. 3 _Frag._ CLXXVI.
Chap. IX. 4 _Diss._ III. xiii. 18, 19.
Chap. X. 1 _Frag._ LXX.
Chap. X. 2 _Diss._ IV. v. 1-4.
Chap. X. 3-5 _Diss._ IV. v. 8-21.
Chap. X. 6 _Diss._ IV. v. 30-32.
Chap. X. 7 _Diss._ IV. v. { 33 to [Greek: agnômonos].
{ 35-37.
BOOK IV.
Chap. I. _Ench._ XXXI.
Chap. II. 1, 2 _Diss._ I. xii. 1-7.
Chap. II. 3, 4 _Diss._ I. xiv. 1-17.
Chap. III. _Diss._ I. xvi.
Chap. IV. 1, 2 _Diss._ II. viii. 1-8.
Chap. IV. 3 _Diss._ I. vi. 13 from [Greek: allo]--22.
Chap. IV. 4-8 _Diss._ II. viii. 9-29.
Chap. V. _Ench._ XXXII.
BOOK V.
Chap. I. 1-5 _Ench._ XXXIII. 1-6,
Chap. I. 6 _Diss._ III. xvi. 5-9.
Chap. I. 7-16 _Ench._ XXXIII. 7-16.
Chap. II. 1-4 _Diss._ II., xviii. 1-21 to [Greek: apothanontôn]
Chap. II. 5, 6 _Diss._ II. xviii. 23-32.
Chap. II. 7 _Diss._ IV. xii. 19-21.
Chap. III. 1, 2 _Diss._ II. xii. 1-4.
Chap. III. 3, 4 _Diss._ II. xii. 17-25.
Chap. IV. _Ench._ XXXIV.
Chap. V. _Ench._ XXXV.
Chap. VI. _Ench._ XXXVI.
Chap. VII. 1 _Ench._ XXXVII.
Chap. VII. 2 _Diss._ I. ii. 30-32.
Chap. VIII. _Ench._ XXXVIII.
Chap. IX. _Ench._ XXXIX.
Chap. X. _Ench._ XL.
Chap. XI. _Ench._ XLI.
Chap. XII. 1 _Diss._ III. i. 1-9.
Chap. XII. 2 _Diss._ III. i. 40-44.
Chap. XII. 3, 4 _Diss._ IV. xi. 22-29.
Chap. XII. 5 _Diss._ IV. xi. 35, 36.
Chap. XIII. _Ench._ XLII.
Chap. XIV. _Ench._ XLIII.
Chap. XV. _Ench._ XLIV.
Chap. XVI. 1, 2 _Ench._ XLV.
Chap. XVI. 3 _Diss._ 1. xxviii. 1-9.
Chap. XVI. 4 _Diss._ 1. xxviii. 11-25
Chap. XVII. _Ench._ XLVI.
Chap. XVIII. _Ench._ XLVII.
Chap. XIX. _Ench._ XLVIII.
Chap. XX. 1 _Diss._ I. xvii. 1, 2.
Chap. XX. 2-4 _Diss._ I. xvii. 4-12.
Chap. XXI. _Ench._ XLIX.
Chap. XXII. 1, 2 _Diss._ II. xxiii. 1-10.
Chap. XXII. 3-7 _Diss._ II. xxiii. 20-47.
Chap. XXIII. _Ench._ L.
Chap. XXIV. _Ench._ LI.
Chap. XXV. _Ench._ LII.
Chap. XXVI. _Ench._ LIII.