FOOTNOTE:

[1] Hedge is a Teutonic word, cf. Dutch _heg_, Ger. _Hecke_; the root

appears in other English words, e.g. "haw," as in "hawthorn."

HEDON, a municipal borough in the Holderness parliamentary division of

the East Riding of Yorkshire, England, 8 m. E. of Hull by a branch of

the North-Eastern railway. Pop. (1901), 1010. It stands in a low-lying,

flat district bordering the Humber. It is 2 m. from the river, but was

formerly reached by a navigable inlet, now dry, and was a considerable

port. There is a small harbour, but the prosperity of the port has

passed to Hull. The church of St Augustine is a splendid cruciform

building with central tower. It is Early English, Decorated and

Perpendicular, the tower being of the last period. The west front is

particularly fine, and the church, with its noble proportions and lofty

clerestories, resembles a cathedral in miniature. There are a

manufacture of bricks and an agricultural trade. The corporation

consists of a mayor, 3 aldermen and 9 councillors; and possesses a

remarkable ancient mace, of 15th-century workmanship. Area, 321 acres.

According to tradition the men of Hedon received a charter of liberties

from King Aethelstan, but there is no evidence to prove this or indeed to

prove any settlement in the town until after the Conquest. The manor is

not mentioned in the Domesday Survey, but formed part of the lordship of

Holderness which William the Conqueror granted to Odo, count of

Albemarle. A charter of Henry II., which is undated, contains the first

certain evidence of settlement. By it the king granted to William,

count of Albemarle, free borough rights in Hedon so that his burgesses

there might hold of him as freely and quietly as the burgesses of York

or Lincoln held of the king. An earlier charter granted to the

inhabitants of York shows that these rights included a trade gild and

freedom from many dues not only in England but also in France. King John

in 1200 granted a confirmation of these liberties to Baldwin, count of

Albemarle, and Hawisia his wife and for this second charter the

burgesses themselves paid 70 marks. In 1272 Henry III. granted to

Edmund, earl of Lancaster, and Avelina his wife, then lord and lady of

the manor, the right of holding a fair at Hedon on the eve, day, and

morrow of the feast of St Augustine and for five following days. After

the countess's death the manor came to the hands of Edward I. In 1280 it

was found by an inquisition that the men of Hedon "were few and poor"

and that if the town were demised at a fee-farm rent the town might

improve. The grant, however, does not appear to have been made until

1346. Besides this charter Edward III. also granted the burgesses the

privilege of electing a mayor and bailiffs every year. At that time

Hedon was one of the chief ports in the Humber, but its place was

gradually taken by Hull after that town came into the hands of the king.

Hedon was incorporated by Charles II. in 1661, and James II. in 1680

gave the burgesses another charter granting among other privileges that

of holding two extra fairs, but of this they never appear to have taken

advantage. The burgesses returned two members to parliament in 1295, and

from 1547 to 1832 when the borough was disfranchised.

See _Victoria County History, Yorkshire_; J. R. Boyle, _The Early

History of the Town and Port of Hedon_ (Hull and York, 1895); G. H.

Park, _History of the Ancient Borough of Hedon_ (Hull, 1895).

HEDONISM (Gr. [Greek: hedone], pleasure, from [Greek: hedys], sweet,

pleasant), in ethics, a general term for all theories of conduct in

which the criterion is pleasure of one kind or another. Hedonistic

theories of conduct have been held from the earliest times, though they

have been by no means of the same character. Moreover, hedonism has,

especially by its critics, been very much misrepresented owing mainly to

two simple misconceptions. In the first place hedonism may confine

itself to the view that, as a matter of observed fact, all men do in

practice make pleasure the criterion of action, or it may go further and

assert that men ought to seek pleasure as the sole human good. The

former statement takes no view as to whether or not there is any

absolute good: if merely denies that men aim at anything more than

pleasure. The latter statement admits an ideal, _summum bonum_--namely,

pleasure. The second confusion is the tacit assumption that the pleasure

of the hedonist is necessarily or characteristically of a purely

physical kind; this assumption is in the case of some hedonistic

theories a pure perversion of the facts. Practically all hedonists have

argued that what are known as the "lower" pleasures are not only

ephemeral in themselves but also productive of so great an amount of

consequent pain that the wise man cannot regard them as truly

pleasurable; the sane hedonist will, therefore, seek those so-called

"higher" pleasures which are at once more lasting and less likely to be

discounted by consequent pain. It should be observed, however, that this

choice of pleasures by a hedonist is conditioned not by "moral"

(absolute) but by prudential (relative) considerations.

The earliest and the most extreme type of hedonism is that of the

Cyrenaic School as stated by Aristippus, who argued that the only good

for man is the sentient pleasure of the moment. Since (following

Protagoras) knowledge is solely of momentary sensations, it is useless

to try, as Socrates recommended, to make calculations as to future

pleasures, and to balance present enjoyment with disagreeable

consequences. The true art of life is to crowd as much enjoyment as

possible into every moment. This extreme or "pure" hedonism regarded as

a definite philosophic theory practically died with the Cyrenaics,

though the same spirit has frequently found expression in ancient and

modern, especially poetical, literature.

The confusion already alluded to between "pure" and "rational" hedonism

is nowhere more clearly exemplified than in the misconceptions which

have arisen as to the doctrine of the Epicureans. To identify

Epicureanism with Cyrenaicism is a complete misunderstanding. It is true

that pleasure is the _summum bonum_ of Epicurus, but his conception of

that pleasure is profoundly modified by the Socratic doctrine of

prudence and the eudaemonism of Aristotle. The true hedonist will aim at

a life of enduring rational happiness; pleasure is the end of life, but

true pleasure can be obtained only under the guidance of reason.

Self-control in the choice of pleasures with a view to reducing pain to

a minimum is indispensable. "Of all this, the beginning, and the

greatest good, is prudence." The negative side of Epicurean hedonism was

developed to such an extent by some members of the school (see HEGESIAS)

that the ideal life is held to be rather indifference to pain than

positive enjoyment. This pessimistic attitude is far removed from the

positive hedonism of Aristippus.

Between the hedonism of the ancients and that of modern philosophers

there lies a great gulf. Practically speaking ancient hedonism advocated

the happiness of the individual: the modern hedonism of Hume, Bentham

and Mill is based on a wider conception of life. The only real happiness

is the happiness of the community, or at least of the majority: the

criterion is society, not the individual. Thus we pass from Egoistic to

Universalistic hedonism, Utilitarianism, Social Ethics, more especially

in relation to the still broader theories of evolution. These theories

are confronted by the problem of reconciling and adjusting the claims of

the individual with those of society. One of the most important

contributions to the discussion is that of Sir Leslie Stephen (_Science

of Ethics_), who elaborated a theory of the "social organism" in

relation to the individual. The end of the evolution process is the

production of a "social tissue" which will be "vitally efficient."

Instead, therefore, of the criterion of "the greatest happiness of the

greatest number," Stephen has that of the "health of the organism." Life

is not "a series of detached acts, in each of which a man can calculate

the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different courses." Each

action must be regarded as directly bearing upon the structure of

society.

A criticism of the various hedonistic theories will be found in the

article ETHICS (_ad fin._). See also, beside works quoted under

CYRENAICS, EPICURUS, &c., and the general histories of philosophy, J.

S. Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_ (3rd ed., 1897); J. H. Muirhead,

_Elements of Ethics_ (1892); J. Watson, _Hedonistic Theories_ (1895);

J. Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_ (2nd ed., 1886); F. H.

Bradley, _Ethical Studies_ (1876); H. Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_

(6th ed., 1901); Jas. Seth, _Ethical Principles_ (3rd ed., 1898);

other works quoted under ETHICS.

HEEL. (1) (O. Eng. _hela_, cf. Dutch _hiel_; a derivative of O. Eng.

hoh, hough, hock), that part of the foot in man which is situated below

and behind the ankle; by analogy, the calcaneal part of the tarsus in

other vertebrates. The heel proper in digitigrades and ungulates is

raised off the ground and is commonly known as the "knee" or "hock,"

while the term "heel" is applied to the hind hoofs. (2) (A variant of

the earlier _hield_; cf. Dutch _hellen_, for _helden_), to turn over to

one side, especially of a ship. It is this word probably, in the sense

of "tip-up," used particularly of the tilting or tipping of a cask or

barrel of liquor, that explains the origin of the expression "no

heel-taps," a direction to the drinkers of a toast to drain their

glasses and leave no dregs remaining. "Tap" is a common word for liquor,

and a cask is said to be "heeled" when it is tipped and only dregs or

muddy liquor are left. This suits the actual sense of the phrase better

than the explanations which connect it with tapping the "heel" or bottom

of the glass (see _Notes and Queries_, 4th series, vols. xi.-xii., and

5th series, vol. i.).

HEEM, JAN DAVIDSZ VAN (or JOHANNES DE), (c.1600-c.1683), Dutch painter.

He was, if not the first, certainly the greatest painter of still life

in Holland; no artist of his class combined more successfully perfect

reality of form and colour with brilliancy and harmony of tints. No

object of stone or silver, no flower humble or gorgeous, no fruit of

Europe or the tropics, no twig or leaf, with which he was not familiar.

Sometimes he merely represented a festoon or a nosegay. More frequently

he worked with a purpose to point a moral or illustrate a motto. Here

the snake lies coiled under the grass, there a skull rests on blooming

plants. Gold and silver tankards or cups suggest the vanity of earthly

possessions; salvation is allegorized in a chalice amidst blossoms,

death as a crucifix inside a wreath. Sometimes de Heem painted alone,

sometimes in company with men of his school, Madonnas or portraits

surrounded by festoons of fruit or flowers. At one time he signed with

initials, at others with Johannes, at others again with the name of his

father joined to his own. At rare intervals he condescended to a date,

and when he did the work was certainly of the best. De Heem entered the

gild of Antwerp in 1635-1636, and became a burgher of that city in 1637.

He steadily maintained his residence till 1667, when he moved to

Utrecht, where traces of his presence are preserved in records of 1668,

1669 and 1670. It is not known when he finally returned to Antwerp, but

his death is recorded in the gild books of that place. A very early

picture, dated 1628, in the gallery of Gotha, bearing the signature of

Johannes in full, shows that de Heem at that time was familiar with the

technical habits of execution peculiar to the youth of Albert Cuyp. In

later years he completely shook off dependence, and appears in all the

vigour of his own originality.

Out of 100 pictures or more to be met with in European galleries

scarcely eighteen are dated. The earliest after that of Gotha is a

chased tankard, with a bottle, a silver cup, and a lemon on a marble

table, dated 1640, in the museum of Amsterdam. A similar work of 1645,

with the addition of fruit and flowers and a distant landscape, is in

Lord Radnor's collection at Longford. A chalice in a wreath, with the

radiant host amidst wheatsheaves, grapes and flowers, is a masterpiece

of 1648 in the Belvedere of Vienna. A wreath round a Madonna of life

size, dated 1650, in the museum of Berlin, shows that de Heem could

paint brightly and harmoniously on a large scale. In the Pinakothek at

Munich is the celebrated composition of 1653, in which creepers,

beautifully commingled with gourds and blackberries, twigs of orange,

myrtle and peach, are enlivened by butterflies, moths and beetles. A

landscape with a blooming rose tree, a jug of strawberries, a selection

of fruit, and a marble bust of Pan, dated 1655, is in the Hermitage at

St Petersburg; an allegory of abundance in a medallion wreathed with

fruit and flowers, in the gallery of Brussels, is inscribed with de

Heem's monogram, the date of 1668, and the name of an obscure artist

called Lambrechts. All these pieces exhibit the master in full

possession of his artistic faculties.

CORNELIUS DE HEEM, the son of Johannes, was in practice as a flower

painter at Utrecht in 1658, and was still active in his profession in

1671 at the Hague. His pictures are not equal to those of his father,

but they are all well authenticated, and most of them in the galleries

of the Hague, Dresden, Cassel, Vienna and Berlin. In the Staedel at

Frankfort is a fruit piece, with pot-herbs and a porcelain jug, dated

1658; another, dated 1671, is in the museum of Brussels. DAVID DE HEEM,

another member of the family, entered the gild of Utrecht in 1668 and

that of Antwerp in 1693. The best piece assigned to him is a table with

a lobster, fruit and glasses, in the gallery of Amsterdam; others bear

his signature in the museums of Florence, St Petersburg and Brunswick.

It is well to guard against the fallacy that David de Heem above

mentioned is the father of Jan de Heem. We should also be careful not to

make two persons of the first artist, who sometimes signs Johannes,

sometimes Jan Davidsz or J. D. Heem.

HEEMSKERK, JOHAN VAN (1597-1656), Dutch poet, was born at Amsterdam in

1597. He was educated as a child at Bayonne, and entered the university

of Leiden in 1617. In 1621 he went abroad on the grand tour, leaving

behind him his first volume of poems, _Minnekunst_ (The Art of Love),

which appeared in 1622. He was absent from Holland four years. He was

made master of arts at Bourges in 1623, and in 1624 visited Hugo Grotius

in Paris. On his return in 1625 he published _Minnepligt_ (The Duty of

Love), and began to practise as an advocate in the Hague. In 1628 he was

sent to England in his legal capacity by the Dutch East India Company,

to settle the dispute respecting Amboyna. In the same year he published

the poem entitled _Minnekunde_, or the Science of Love. He proceeded to

Amsterdam in 1640, where he married Alida, sister of the statesman Van

Beuningen. In 1641 he published a Dutch version of Corneille's _The

Cid_, a tragi-comedy, and in 1647 his most famous work, the pastoral

romance of _Batavische Arcadia_, which he had written ten years before.

During the last twelve years of his life Heemskerk sat in the upper

chamber of the states-general. He died at Amsterdam on the 27th of

February 1656.

The poetry of Heemskerk, which fell into oblivion during the 18th

century, is once more read and valued. His famous pastoral, the

_Batavische Arcadia_, which was founded on the _Astree_ of Honore

d'Urfe, enjoyed a great popularity for more than a century, and passed

through twelve editions. It provoked a host of more or less able

imitations, of which the most distinguished were the _Dordrechtsche

Arcadia_ (1663) of Lambert van den Bos (1610-1698), the _Saanlandsche

Arcadia_ (1658) of Hendrik Sooteboom (1616-1678) and the

_Rotterdamsche Arcadia_ (1703) of Willem den Elger (d. 1703). But the

original work of Heemskerk, in which a party of nymphs and shepherds

go out from the Hague to Katwijk, and there indulge in polite and

pastoral discourse, surpasses all these in brightness and versatility.

HEEMSKERK, MARTIN JACOBSZ (1498-1574), Dutch painter, sometimes called

Van Veen, was born at Heemskerk in Holland in 1498, and apprenticed by

his father, a small farmer, to Cornelisz Willemsz, a painter at Haarlem.

Recalled after a time to the paternal homestead and put to the plough or

the milking of cows, young Heemskerk took the first opportunity that

offered to run away, and demonstrated his wish to leave home for ever by

walking in a single day the 50 miles which separate his native hamlet

from the town of Delft. There he studied under a local master whom he

soon deserted for John Schoreel of Haarlem. At Haarlem he formed what is

known as his first manner, which is but a quaint and _gauche_ imitation

of the florid style brought from Italy by Mabuse and others. He then

started on a wandering tour, during which he visited the whole of

northern and central Italy, stopping at Rome, where he had letters for a

cardinal. It is evidence of the facility with which he acquired the

rapid execution of a scene-painter that he was selected to co-operate

with Antonio da San Gallo, Battista Franco and Francesco Salviati to

decorate the triumphal arches erected at Rome in April 1536 in honour of

Charles V. Vasari, who saw the battle-pieces which Heemskerk then

produced, says they were well composed and boldly executed. On his

return to the Netherlands he settled at Haarlem, where he soon (1540)

became president of his gild, married twice, and secured a large and

lucrative practice. In 1572 he left Haarlem for Amsterdam, to avoid the

siege which the Spaniards laid to the place, and there he made a will

which has been preserved, and shows that he had lived long enough and

prosperously enough to make a fortune. At his death, which took place on

the 1st of October 1574, he left money and land in trust to the

orphanage of Haarlem, with interest to be paid yearly to any couple who

should be willing to perform the marriage ceremony on the slab of his

tomb in the cathedral of Haarlem. It was a superstition which still

exists in Catholic Holland that a marriage so celebrated would secure

the peace of the dead within the tomb.

The works of Heemskerk are still very numerous. "Adam and Eve," and "St

Luke painting the Likeness of the Virgin and Child" in presence of a

poet crowned with ivy leaves, and a parrot in a cage--an altar-piece in

the gallery of Haarlem, and the "Ecce Homo" in the museum of Ghent, are

characteristic works of the period preceding Heemskerk's visit to Italy.

An altar-piece executed for St Laurence of Alkmaar in 1538-1541, and

composed of at least a dozen large panels, would, if preserved, have

given us a clue to his style after his return from the south. In its

absence we have a "Crucifixion" executed for the Riches Claires at Ghent

(now in the Ghent Museum) in 1543, and the altar-piece of the Drapers

Company at Haarlem, now in the gallery of the Hague, and finished in

1546. In these we observe that Heemskerk studied and repeated the forms

which he had seen at Rome in the works of Michelangelo and Raphael, and

in Lombardy in the frescoes of Mantegna and Giulio Romano. But he never

forgot the while his Dutch origin or the models first presented to him

by Schoreel and Mabuse. As late as 1551 his memory still served him to

produce a copy from Raphael's "Madonna di Loretto" (gallery of Haarlem).

A "Judgment of Momus," dated 1561, in the Berlin Museum, proves him to

have been well acquainted with anatomy, but incapable of selection and

insensible of grace, bold of hand and prone to daring though tawdry

contrasts of colour, and fond of florid architecture. Two altar-pieces

which he finished for churches at Delft in 1551 and 1559, one complete,

the other a fragment, in the museum of Haarlem, a third of 1551 in the

Brussels Museum, representing "Golgotha," the "Crucifixion," the "Flight

into Egypt," "Christ on the Mount," and scenes from the lives of St

Bernard and St Benedict, are all fairly representative of his style.

Besides these we have the "Crucifixion" in the Hermitage of St

Petersburg, and two "Triumphs of Silenus" in the gallery of Vienna, in

which the same relation to Giulio Romano may be noted as we mark in the

canvases of Rinaldo of Mantua. Other pieces of varying importance are in

the galleries of Rotterdam, Munich, Cassel, Brunswick, Karlsruhe, Mainz

and Copenhagen. In England the master is best known by his drawings. A

comparatively feeble picture by him is the "Last Judgment" in the palace

of Hampton Court.

HEER, OSWALD (1809-1883), Swiss geologist and naturalist, was born at

Nieder-Utzwyl in Canton St Gallen on the 31st of August 1809. He was

educated as a clergyman and took holy orders, and he also graduated as

doctor of philosophy and medicine. Early in life his interest was

aroused in entomology, on which subject he acquired special knowledge,

and later he took up the study of plants and became one of the pioneers

in palaeo-botany, distinguished for his researches on the Miocene flora.

In 1851 he became professor of botany in the university of Zurich, and

he directed his attention to the Tertiary plants and insects of

Switzerland. For some time he was director of the botanic garden at

Zurich. In 1863 (with W. Pengelly, _Phil. Trans._, 1862) he investigated

the plant-remains from the lignite-deposits of Bovey Tracey in

Devonshire, regarding them as of Miocene age; but they are now classed

as Eocene. Heer also reported on the Miocene flora of Arctic regions, on

the plants of the Pleistocene lignites of Durnten on lake Zurich, and on

the cereals of some of the lake-dwellings (_Die Pflanzen der

Pfahlbauten_, 1866). During a great part of his career he was hampered

by slender means and ill-health, but his services to science were

acknowledged in 1873 when the Geological Society of London awarded to

him the Wollaston medal. Dr Heer died at Lausanne on the 27th of

September 1883. He published _Flora Tertiaria Helvetiae_ (3 vols.,

1855-1859); _Die Urwelt der Schweiz_ (1865), and _Flora fossilis

Arctica_ (1868-1883).

HEEREN, ARNOLD HERMANN LUDWIG (1760-1842), German historian, was born on

the 25th of October 1760 at Arbergen, near Bremen. He studied

philosophy, theology and history at Gottingen, and thereafter travelled

in France, Italy and the Netherlands. In 1787 he was appointed one of

the professors of philosophy, and then of history at Gottingen, and he

afterwards was chosen aulic councillor, privy councillor, &c., the usual

rewards of successful German scholars. He died at Gottingen on the 6th

of March 1842. Heeren's great merit as an historian was that he regarded

the states of antiquity from an altogether fresh point of view. Instead

of limiting himself to a narration of their political events, he

examined their economic relations, their constitutions, their financial

systems, and thus was enabled to throw a new light on the development of

the old world. He possessed vast and varied learning, perfect calmness

and impartiality, and great power of historical insight, and is now

looked back to as the pioneer in the movement for the economic

interpretation of history.

Heeren's chief works are: _Ideen uber Politik, den Verkehr, und den

Handel der vornehmsten Volker der alten Welt_ (2 vols., Gottingen,

1793-1796; 4th ed., 6 vols., 1824-1826; Eng. trans., Oxford, 1833);

_Geschichte des Studiums der klassischen Litteratur seit dem

Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften_ (2 vols., Gottingen, 1797-1802; new

ed., 1822); _Geschichte der Staaten des Altertums_ (Gottingen, 1799;

Eng. trans., Oxford, 1840); _Geschichte des europaischen

Staatensystems_ (Gottingen, 1800; 5th ed., 1830; Eng. trans., 1834);

_Versuch einer Entwicklung der Folgen der Kreuzzuge_ (Gottingen, 1808;

French trans., Paris, 1808), a prize essay of the Institute of

France. Besides these, Heeren wrote brief biographical sketches of

Johann von Muller (Leipzig, 1809); Ludwig Spittler (Berlin, 1812); and

Christian Heyne (Gottingen, 1813). With Friedrich August Ukert

(1780-1851) he founded the famous historical collection, _Geschichte

der europaischen Staaten_ (Gotha, 1819 seq.), and contributed many

papers to learned periodicals.

A collection of his historical works, with autobiographical notice,

was published in 15 volumes (Gottingen, 1821-1830).

HEFELE, KARL JOSEF VON (1809-1893), German theologian, was born at

Unterkochen in Wurttemberg on the 15th of March 1809, and was educated

at Tubingen, where in 1839 he became professor-ordinary of Church

history and patristics in the Roman Catholic faculty of theology. From

1842 to 1845 he sat in the National Assembly of Wurttemberg. In December

1869 he was enthroned bishop of Rottenburg. His literary activity, which

had been considerable, was in no way diminished by his elevation to the

episcopate. Among his numerous theological works may be mentioned his

well-known edition of the _Apostolic Fathers_, issued in 1839; his _Life

of Cardinal Ximenes_, published in 1844 (Eng. trans., 1860); and his

still more celebrated _History of the Councils of the Church_, in seven

volumes, which appeared between 1855 and 1874 (Eng. trans., 1871, 1882).

Hefele's theological opinions inclined towards the more liberal school

in the Roman Catholic Church, but he nevertheless received considerable

signs of favour from its authorities, and was a member of the commission

that made preparations for the Vatican Council of 1870. On the eve of

that council he published at Naples his _Causa Honorii Papae_, which

aimed at demonstrating the moral and historical impossibility of papal

infallibility. About the same time he brought out a work in German on

the same subject. He took rather a prominent part in the discussions at

the council, associating himself with Felix Dupanloup and with Georges

Darboy, archbishop of Paris, in his opposition to the doctrine of

Infallibility, and supporting their arguments from his vast knowledge of

ecclesiastical history. In the preliminary discussions he voted against

the promulgation of the dogma. He was absent from the important sitting

of the 18th of June 1870, and did not send in his submission to the

decrees until 1871, when he explained in a pastoral letter that the

dogma "referred only to doctrine given forth _ex cathedra_, and therein

to the definitions proper only, but not to its proofs or explanations."

In 1872 he took part in the congress summoned by the Ultramontanes at

Fulda, and by his judicious use of minimizing tactics he kept his

diocese free from any participation in the Old Catholic schism. The last

four volumes of the second edition of his _History of the Councils_ have

been described as skilfully adapted to the new situation created by the

Vatican decrees. During the later years of his life he undertook no

further literary efforts on behalf of his church, but retired into

comparative privacy. He died on the 6th of June 1893.

See Herzog-Hauck's _Realencyklopadie_, vii. 525.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831), German philosopher, was born

at Stuttgart on the 27th of August 1770. His father, an official in the

fiscal service of Wurttemberg, is not otherwise known to fame; and of

his mother we hear only that she had scholarship enough to teach him the

elements of Latin. He had one sister, Christiana, who died unmarried,

and a brother Ludwig, who served in the campaigns of Napoleon. At the

grammar school of Stuttgart, where Hegel was educated between the ages

of seven and eighteen, he was not remarkable. His main productions were

a diary kept at intervals during eighteen months (1785-1787), and

translations of the _Antigone_, the _Manual_ of Epictetus, &c. But the

characteristic feature of his studies was the copious extracts which

from this time onward he unremittingly made and preserved. This

collection, alphabetically arranged, comprised annotations on classical

authors, passages from newspapers, treatises on morals and mathematics

from the standard works of the period. In this way he absorbed in their

integrity the raw materials for elaboration. Yet as evidence that he was

not merely receptive we have essays already breathing that admiration of

the classical world which he never lost. His chief amusement was cards,

and he began the habit of taking snuff.

In the autumn of 1788 he entered at Tubingen as a student of theology;

but he showed no interest in theology: his sermons were a failure, and

he found more congenial reading in the classics, on the advantages of

studying which his first essay was written. After two years he took the

degree of Ph.D., and in the autumn of 1793 received his theological

certificate, stating him to be of good abilities, but of middling

industry and knowledge, and especially deficient in philosophy.

As a student, his elderly appearance gained him the title "Old man," but

he took part in the walks, beer-drinking and love-making of his fellows.

He gained most from intellectual intercourse with his contemporaries,

the two best known of whom were J. C. F. Holderlin and Schelling. With

Holderlin Hegel learned to feel for the old Greeks a love which grew

stronger as the semi-Kantianized theology of his teachers more and more

failed to interest him. With Schelling like sympathies bound him. They

both protested against the political and ecclesiastical inertia of their

native state, and adopted the doctrines of freedom and reason. The story

which tells how the two went out one morning to dance round a tree of

liberty in a meadow is an anachronism, though in keeping with their

opinions.

On leaving college, he became a private tutor at Bern and lived in

intellectual isolation. He was, however, far from inactive. He compiled

a systematic account of the fiscal system of the canton Bern, but the

main factor in his mental growth came from his study of Christianity.

Under the impulse given by Lessing and Kant he turned to the original

records of Christianity, and attempted to construe for himself the real

significance of Christ. He wrote a life of Jesus, in which Jesus was

simply the son of Joseph and Mary. He did not stop to criticize as a

philologist, and ignored the miraculous. He asked for the secret

contained in the conduct and sayings of this man which made him the hope

of the human race. Jesus appeared as revealing the unity with God in

which the Greeks in their best days unwittingly rejoiced, and as lifting

the eyes of the Jews from a lawgiver who metes out punishment on the

transgressor, to the destiny which in the Greek conception falls on the

just no less than on the unjust.

The interest of these ideas is twofold. In Jesus Hegel finds the

expression for something higher than mere morality: he finds a noble

spirit which rises above the contrasts of virtue and vice into the

concrete life, seeing the infinite always embracing our finitude, and

proclaiming the divine which is in man and cannot be overcome by error

and evil, unless the man close his eyes and ears to the godlike presence

within him. In religious life, in short, he finds the principle which

reconciles the opposition of the temporal mind. But, secondly, the

general source of the doctrine that life is higher than all its

incidents is of interest. He does not free himself from the current

theology either by rational moralizing like Kant, or by bold speculative

synthesis like Fichte and Schelling. He finds his panacea in the

concrete life of humanity. But although he goes to the Scriptures, and

tastes the mystical spirit of the medieval saints, the Christ of his

conception has traits that seem borrowed from Socrates and from the

heroes of Attic tragedy, who suffer much and yet smile gently on a

destiny to which they were reconciled. Instead of the Hebraic doctrine

of a Jesus punished for our sins, we have the Hellenic idea of a man who

is calmly tranquil in the consciousness of his unity with God.

During these years Hegel kept up a slack correspondence with Schelling

and Holderlin. Schelling, already on the way to fame, kept Hegel abreast

with German speculation. Both of them were intent on forcing the

theologians into the daylight, and grudged them any aid they might

expect from Kant's postulation of God and immortality to crown the

edifice of ethics. Meanwhile, Holderlin in Jena had been following

Fichte's career with an enthusiasm with which he infected Hegel.

It is pleasing to turn from these vehement struggles of thought to a

tour which Hegel in company with three other tutors made through the

Bernese Oberland in July and August 1796. Of this tour he left a minute

diary. He was delighted with the varied play of the waterfalls, but no

glamour blinded him to the squalor of Swiss peasant life. The glaciers

and the rocks called forth no raptures. "The spectacle of these

eternally dead masses gave me nothing but the monotonous and at last

tedious idea, 'Es ist so.'"

Towards the close of his engagement at Bern, Hegel had received hopes

from Schelling of a post at Jena. Fortunately his friend Holderlin, now

tutor in Frankfort, secured a similar situation there for Hegel in the

family of Herr Gogol, a merchant (January 1797). The new post gave him

more leisure and the society he needed.

About this time he turned to questions of economics and government. He

had studied Gibbon, Hume and Montesquieu in Switzerland. We now find him

making extracts from the English newspapers on the Poor-Law Bill of

1796; criticising the Prussian land laws, promulgated about the same

time; and writing a commentary on Sir James Steuart's _Inquiry into the

Principles of Political Economy_. Here, as in contemporaneous criticisms

of Kant's ethical writings, Hegel aims at correcting the abstract

discussion of a topic by treating it in its systematic interconnexions.

Church and state, law and morality, commerce and art are reduced to

factors in the totality of human life, from which the specialists had

isolated them.

But the best evidence of Hegel's attention to contemporary politics is

two unpublished essays--one of them written in 1798, "On the Internal

Condition of Wurttemberg in Recent Times, particularly on the Defects in

the Magistracy," the other a criticism on the constitution of Germany,

written, probably, not long after the peace of Luneville (1801). Both

essays are critical rather than constructive. In the first Hegel showed

how the supineness of the committee of estates in Wurttemberg had

favoured the usurpations of the superior officials in whom the court had

found compliant servants. And though he perceived the advantages of

change in the constitution of the estates, he still doubted if an

improved system could work in the actual conditions of his native

province. The main feature in the pamphlet is the recognition that a

spirit of reform is abroad. If Wurttemberg suffered from a bureaucracy

tempered by despotism, the Fatherland in general suffered no less.

"Germany," so begins the second of these unpublished papers, "is no

longer a state." Referring the collapse of the empire to the retention

of feudal forms and to the action of religious animosities, Hegel looked

forward to reorganization by a central power (Austria) wielding the

imperial army, and by a representative body elected by the geographical

districts of the empire. But such an issue, he saw well, could only be

the outcome of violence--of "blood and iron." The philosopher did not

pose as a practical statesman. He described the German empire in its

nullity as a conception without existence in fact. In such a state of

things it was the business of the philosopher to set forth the outlines

of the coming epoch, as they were already moulding themselves into

shape, amidst what the ordinary eye saw only as the disintegration of

the old forms of social life.

His old interest in the religious question reappears, but in a more

philosophical form. Starting with the contrast between a natural and a

positive religion, he regards a positive religion as one imposed upon

the mind from without, not a natural growth crowning the round of human

life. A natural religion, on the other hand, was not, he thought, the

one universal religion of every clime and age, but rather the

spontaneous development of the national conscience varying in varying

circumstances. A people's religion completes and consecrates their whole

activity: in it the people rises above its finite life in limited

spheres to an infinite life where it feels itself all at one. Even

philosophy with Hegel at this epoch was subordinate to religion; for

philosophy must never abandon the finite in the search for the infinite.

Soon, however, Hegel adopted a view according to which philosophy is a

higher mode of apprehending the infinite than even religion.

At Frankfort, meanwhile, the philosophic ideas of Hegel first assumed

the proper philosophic form. In a MS. of 102 quarto sheets, of which the

first three and the seventh are wanting, there is preserved the original

sketch of the Hegelian system, so far as the logic and metaphysics and

part of the philosophy of nature are concerned. The third part of the

system--the ethical theory--seems to have been composed afterwards; it

is contained in its first draft in another MS. of 30 sheets. Even these

had been preceded by earlier Pythagorean constructions envisaging the

divine life in divine triangles.

Circumstances soon put Hegel in the way to complete these outlines. His

father died in January 1799; and the slender sum which Hegel received as

his inheritance, 3154 gulden (about L260), enabled him to think once

more of a studious life. At the close of 1800 we find him asking

Schelling for letters of introduction to Bamberg, where with cheap

living and good beer he hoped to prepare himself for the intellectual

excitement of Jena. The upshot was that Hegel arrived at Jena in January

1801. An end had already come to the brilliant epoch at Jena, when the

romantic poets, Tieck, Novalis and the Schlegels made it the

headquarters of their fantastic mysticism, and Fichte turned the results

of Kant into the banner of revolutionary ideas. Schelling was the main

philosophical lion of the time; and in some quarters Hegel was spoken of

as a new champion summoned to help him in his struggle with the more

prosaic continuators of Kant. Hegel's first performance seemed to

justify the rumour. It was an essay on the difference between the

philosophic systems of Fichte and Schelling, tending in the main to

support the latter. Still more striking was the agreement shown in the

_Critical Journal of Philosophy_, which Schelling and Hegel wrote

conjointly during the years 1802-1803. So latent was the difference

between them at this epoch that in one or two cases it is not possible

to determine by whom the essay was written. Even at a later period

foreign critics like Cousin saw much that was alike in the two

doctrines, and did not hesitate to regard Hegel as a disciple of

Schelling. The dissertation by which Hegel qualified for the position of

_Privatdozent_ (_De orbitis planetarum_) was probably chosen under the

influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature. It was an unfortunate

subject. For while Hegel, depending on a numerical proportion suggested

by Plato, hinted in a single sentence that it might be a mistake to look

for a planet between Mars and Jupiter, Giuseppe Piazzi (q.v.) had

already discovered the first of the asteroids (Ceres) on the 1st of

January 1801. Apparently in August, when Hegel qualified, the news of

the discovery had not yet reached him, but critics have made this

luckless suggestion the ground of attack on a priori philosophy.

Hegel's lectures, in the winter of 1801-1802, on logic and metaphysics

were attended by about eleven students. Later, in 1804, we find him with

a class of about thirty, lecturing on his whole system; but his average

attendance was rather less. Besides philosophy, he once at least

lectured on mathematics. As he taught, he was led to modify his original

system, and notice after notice of his lectures promised a text-book of

philosophy--which, however, failed to appear. Meanwhile, after the

departure of Schelling from Jena in the middle of 1803, Hegel was left

to work out his own views. Besides philosophical studies, where he now

added Aristotle to Plato, he read Homer and the Greek tragedians, made

extracts from books, attended lectures on physiology, and dabbled in

other sciences. On his own representation at Weimar, he was in February

1805 made a professor extraordinarius, and in July 1806 drew his first

and only stipend--100 thalers. At Jena, though some of his hearers

became attached to him, Hegel was not a popular lecturer any more than

K. C. F. Krause (q.v.). The ordinary student found J. F. Fries (q.v.)

more intelligible.

Of the lectures of that period there still remain considerable notes.

The language often had a theological tinge (never entirely absent), as

when the "idea" was spoken of, or "the night of the divine mystery," or

the dialectic of the absolute called the "course of the divine life."

Still his view was growing clearer, and his difference from Schelling

more palpable. Both Schelling and Hegel stand in a relation to art, but

while the aesthetic model of Schelling was found in the contemporary

world, where art was a special sphere and the artist a separate

profession in no intimate connexion with the age and nation, the model

of Hegel was found rather in those works of national art in which art

is not a part but an aspect of the common life, and the artist is not a

mere individual but a concentration of the passion and power of beauty

in the whole community. "Such art," says Hegel, "is the common good and

the work of all. Each generation hands it on beautified to the next;

each has done something to give utterance to the universal thought.

Those who are said to have genius have acquired some special aptitude by

which they render the general shapes of the nation their own work, one

in one point, another in another. What they produce is not their

invention, but the invention of the whole nation; or rather, what they

find is that the whole nation has found its true nature. Each, as it

were, piles up his stone. So too does the artist. Somehow he has the

good fortune to come last, and when he places his stone the arch stands

self-supported." Hegel, as we have already seen, was fully aware of the

change that was coming over the world. "A new epoch," he says, "has

arisen. It seems as if the world-spirit had now succeeded in freeing

itself from all foreign objective existence, and finally apprehending

itself as absolute mind." These words come from lectures on the history

of philosophy, which laid the foundation for his _Phanomenologie des

Geistes_ (Bamberg, 1807).

On the 14th of October 1806 Napoleon was at Jena. Hegel, like Goethe,

felt no patriotic shudder at the national disaster, and in Prussia he

saw only a corrupt and conceited bureaucracy. Writing to his friend F.

J. Niethammer (1766-1848) on the day before the battle, he speaks with

admiration of the "world-soul," the emperor, and with satisfaction of

the probable overthrow of the Prussians. The scholar's wish was to see

the clouds of war pass away, and leave thinkers to their peaceful work.

His manuscripts were his main care; and doubtful of the safety of his

last despatch to Bamberg, and disturbed by the French soldiers in his

lodgings, he hurried off, with the last pages of the _Phanomenologie_,

to take refuge in the pro-rector's house. Hegel's fortunes were now at

the lowest ebb. Without means, and obliged to borrow from Niethammer, he

had no further hopes from the impoverished university. He had already

tried to get away from Jena. In 1805, when several lecturers left in

consequence of diminished classes, he had written to Johann Heinrich

Voss (q.v.), suggesting that his philosophy might find more congenial

soil in Heidelberg; but the application bore no fruit. He was,

therefore, glad to become editor of the _Bamberger Zeitung_ (1807-1808).

Of his editorial work there is little to tell; no leading articles

appeared in his columns. It was not a suitable vocation, and he gladly

accepted the rectorship of the Aegidien-gymnasium in Nuremberg, a post

which he held from December 1808 to August 1816. Bavaria at this time

was modernizing her institutions. The school system was reorganized by

new regulations, in accordance with which Hegel wrote a series of

lessons in the outlines of philosophy--ethical, logical and

psychological. They were published in 1840 by Rosenkranz from Hegel's

papers.

As a teacher and master Hegel inspired confidence in his pupils, and

maintained discipline without pedantic interference in their

associations and sports. On prize-days his addresses summing up the

history of the school year discussed some topic of general interest.

Five of these addresses are preserved. The first is an exposition of the

advantages of a classical training, when it is not confined to mere

grammar. "The perfection and grandeur of the master-works of Greek and

Roman literature must be the intellectual bath, the secular baptism,

which gives the first and unfading tone and tincture of taste and

science." In another address, speaking of the introduction of military

exercises at school, he says: "These exercises, while not intended to

withdraw the students from their more immediate duty, so far as they

have any calling to it, still remind them of the possibility that every

one, whatever rank in society he may belong to, may one day have to

defend his country and his king, or help to that end. This duty, which

is natural to all, was formerly recognized by every citizen, though

whole ranks in the state have become strangers to the very idea of it."

On the 16th of September 1811 Hegel married Marie von Tucher

(twenty-two years his junior) of Nuremberg. She brought her husband no

fortune, but the marriage was entirely happy. The husband kept a careful

record of income and expenditure. His income amounted at Nuremberg to

1500 gulden (L130) and a house; at Heidelberg, as professor, he received

about the same sum; at Berlin about 3000 thalers (L300). Two sons were

born to them; the elder, Karl, became eminent as a historian. The

younger, Immanuel, was born on the 24th of September 1816. Hegel's

letters to his wife, written during his solitary holiday tours to

Vienna, the Netherlands and Paris, breathe of kindly and happy

affection. Hegel the tourist--recalling happy days spent together;

confessing that, were it not because of his sense of duty as a

traveller, he would rather be at home, dividing his time between his

books and his wife; commenting on the shop windows at Vienna; describing

the straw hats of the Parisian ladies--is a contrast to the professor of

a profound philosophical system. But it shows that the enthusiasm which

in his days of courtship moved him to verse had blossomed into a later

age of domestic bliss.

In 1812 appeared the first two volumes of his _Wissenschaft der Logik_,

and the work was completed by a third in 1816. This work, in which his

system was for the first time presented in what, with a few minor

alterations, was its ultimate shape, found some audience in the world.

Towards the close of his eighth session three professorships were almost

simultaneously put within his reach--at Erlangen, Berlin and Heidelberg.

The Prussian offer expressed a doubt that his long absence from

university teaching might have made him rusty, so he accepted the post

at Heidelberg, whence Fries had just gone to Jena (October 1816). Only

four hearers turned up for one of his courses. Others, however, on the

encyclopaedia of philosophy and the history of philosophy drew classes

of twenty to thirty. While he was there Cousin first made his

acquaintance, but a more intimate relation dates from Berlin. Among his

pupils was Hermann F. W. Hinrichs (q.v.), to whose _Religion in its

Inward Relation to Science_ (1822) Hegel contributed an important

preface. The strangest of his hearers was an Esthonian baron, Boris

d'Yrkull, who after serving in the Russian army came to Heidelberg to

hear the wisdom of Hegel. But his books and his lectures were alike

obscure to the baron, who betook himself by Hegel's advice to simpler

studies before he returned to the Hegelian system.

At Heidelberg Hegel was active in a literary way also. In 1817 he

brought out the _Enzyklopadie d. philos. Wissenschaften im Grundrisse_

(4th ed., Berlin, 1817; new ed., 1870) for use at his lectures. It is

the only exposition of the Hegelian system as a whole which we have

direct from Hegel's own hand. Besides this work he wrote two reviews for

the Heidelberg _Jahrbucher_--the first on F. H. Jacobi, the other a

political pamphlet which called forth violent criticism. It was entitled

a _Criticism on the Transactions of the Estates of Wurttemberg in

1815-1816_. On the 15th of March 1815 King Frederick of Wurttemberg, at

a meeting of the estates of his kingdom, laid before them the draft of a

new constitution, in accordance with the resolutions of the congress of

Vienna. Though an improvement on the old constitution, it was

unacceptable to the estates, jealous of their old privileges and

suspicious of the king's intentions. A decided majority demanded the

restitution of their old laws, though the kingdom now included a large

population to which the old rights were strange. Hegel in his essay,

which was republished at Stuttgart, supported the royal proposals, and

animadverted on the backwardness of the bureaucracy and the landed

interests. In the main he was right; but he forgot too much the

provocation they had received, the usurpations and selfishness of the

governing family, and the unpatriotic character of the king.

In 1818 Hegel accepted the renewed offer of the chair of philosophy at

Berlin, vacant since the death of Fichte. The hopes which this offer

raised of a position less precarious than that of a university teacher

of philosophy were in one sense disappointed; for more than a professor

Hegel never became. But his influence upon his pupils, and his

solidarity with the Prussian government, gave him a position such as

few professors have held.

In 1821 Hegel published the _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_

(2nd ed., 1840; ed. G. J. B. Bolland, 1901; Eng. trans., _Philosophy of

Right_, by S. W. Dyde, 1896). It is a combined system of moral and

political philosophy, or a sociology dominated by the idea of the state.

It turns away contemptuously and fiercely from the sentimental

aspirations of reformers possessed by the democratic doctrine of the

rights of the omnipotent nation. Fries is stigmatized as one of the

"ringleaders of shallowness" who were bent on substituting a fancied tie

of enthusiasm and friendship for the established order of the state. The

disciplined philosopher, who had devoted himself to the task of

comprehending the organism of the state, had no patience with feebler or

more mercurial minds who recklessly laid hands on established

ordinances, and set them aside where they contravened humanitarian

sentiments. With the principle that whatever is real is rational, and

whatever is rational is real, Hegel fancied that he had stopped the

mouths of political critics and constitution-mongers. His theory was not

a mere formulation of the Prussian state. Much that he construed as

necessary to a state was wanting in Prussia; and some of the reforms

already introduced did not find their place in his system. Yet, on the

whole, he had taken his side with the government. Altenstein even

expressed his satisfaction with the book. In his disgust at the crude

conceptions of the enthusiasts, who had hoped that the war of liberation

might end in a realm of internal liberty, Hegel had forgotten his own

youthful vows recorded in verse to Holderlin, "never, never to live in

peace with the ordinance which regulates feeling and opinion." And yet

if we look deeper we see that this is no worship of existing powers. It

is rather due to an overpowering sense of the value of organization--a

sense that liberty can never be dissevered from order, that a vital

interconnexion between all the parts of the body politic is the source

of all good, so that while he can find nothing but brute weight in an

organized public, he can compare the royal person in his ideal form of

constitutional monarchy to the dot upon the letter i. A keen sense of

how much is at stake in any alteration breeds suspicion of every reform.

During his thirteen years at Berlin Hegel's whole soul seems to have

been in his lectures. Between 1823 and 1827 his activity reached its

maximum. His notes were subjected to perpetual revisions and additions.

We can form an idea of them from the shape in which they appear in his

published writings. Those on _Aesthetics_, on the _Philosophy of

Religion_, on the _Philosophy of History_ and on the _History of

Philosophy_, have been published by his editors, mainly from the notes

of his students, under their separate heads; while those on logic,

psychology and the philosophy of nature are appended in the form of

illustrative and explanatory notes to the sections of his

_Encyklopadie_. During these years hundreds of hearers from all parts of

Germany, and beyond, came under his influence. His fame was carried

abroad by eager or intelligent disciples. At Berlin Henning served to

prepare the intending disciple for fuller initiation by the master

himself. Edward Gans (q.v.) and Heinrich Gustav Hotho (q.v.) carried the

method into special spheres of inquiry. At Halle Hinrichs maintained the

standard of Hegelianism amid the opposition or indifference of his

colleagues.

Three courses of lectures are especially the product of his Berlin

period: those on aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and the

philosophy of history. In the years preceding the revolution of 1830,

public interest, excluded from political life, turned to theatres,

concert-rooms and picture-galleries. At these Hegel became a frequent

and appreciative visitor and made extracts from the art-notes in the

newspapers. In his holiday excursions, the interest in the fine arts

more than once took him out of his way to see some old painting. At

Vienna in 1824 he spent every moment at the Italian opera, the ballet

and the picture-galleries. In Paris, in 1827, he saw Charles Kemble and

an English company play Shakespeare. This familiarity with the facts of

art, though neither deep nor historical, gave a freshness to his

lectures on aesthetics, which, as put together from the notes of 1820,

1823, 1826, are in many ways the most successful of his efforts.

The lectures on the philosophy of religion are another application of

his method. Shortly before his death he had prepared for the press a

course of lectures on the proofs for the existence of God. In his

lectures on religion he dealt with Christianity, as in his philosophy of

morals he had regarded the state. On the one hand he turned his weapons

against the rationalistic school, who reduced religion to the modicum

compatible with an ordinary worldly mind. On the other hand he

criticized the school of Schleiermacher, who elevated feeling to a place

in religion above systematic theology. His middle way attempts to show

that the dogmatic creed is the rational development of what was implicit

in religious feeling. To do so, of course, philosophy becomes the

interpreter and the superior. To the new school of E. W. Hengstenberg,

which regarded Revelation itself as supreme, such interpretation was an

abomination.

A Hegelian school began to gather. The flock included intelligent

pupils, empty-headed imitators, and romantic natures who turned

philosophy into lyric measures. Opposition and criticism only served to

define more precisely the adherents of the new doctrine. Hegel himself

grew more and more into a belief in his own doctrine as the one truth

for the world. He was in harmony with the government, and his followers

were on the winning side. Though he had soon resigned all direct

official connexion with the schools of Brandenburg, his real influence

in Prussia was considerable, and as usual was largely exaggerated in

popular estimate. In the narrower circle of his friends his birthdays

were the signal for congratulatory verses. In 1826 a formal festival was

got up by some of his admirers, one of whom, Herder, spoke of his

categories as new gods; and he was presented with much poetry and a

silver mug. In 1830 the students struck a medal in his honour, and in

1831 he was decorated by an order from Frederick William III. In 1830 he

was rector of the university; and in his speech at the tricentenary of

the Augsburg Confession in that year he charged the Catholic Church with

regarding the virtues of the pagan world as brilliant vices, and giving

the crown of perfection to poverty, continence and obedience.

One of the last literary undertakings in which he took part was the

establishment of the Berlin _Jahrbucher fur wissenschaftliche Kritik_,

in which he assisted Edward Gans and Varnhagen von Ense. The aim of this

review was to give a critical account, certified by the names of the

contributors, of the literary and philosophical productions of the time,

in relation to the general progress of knowledge. The journal was not

solely in the Hegelian interest; and more than once, when Hegel

attempted to domineer over the other editors, he was met by vehement and

vigorous opposition.

The revolution of 1830 was a great blow to him, and the prospect of

democratic advances almost made him ill. His last literary work, the

first part of which appeared in the _Preussische Staatszeitung_, was an

essay on the English Reform Bill of 1831. It contains primarily a

consideration of its probable effects on the character of the new

members of parliament, and the measures which they may introduce. In the

latter connexion he enlarged on several points in which England had done

less than many continental states for the abolition of monopolies and

abuses. Surveying the questions connected with landed property, with the

game laws, the poor, the Established Church, especially in Ireland, he

expressed grave doubt on the legislative capacity of the English

parliament as compared with the power of renovation manifested in other

states of western Europe.

In 1831 cholera first entered Europe. Hegel and his family retired for

the summer to the suburbs, and there he finished the revision of the

first part of his _Science of Logic_. On the beginning of the winter

session, however, he returned to his house in the Kupfergraben. On this

occasion an altercation occurred between him and his friend Gans, who in

his notice of lectures on jurisprudence had recommended Hegel's

_Philosophy of Right_. Hegel, indignant at what he deemed patronage,

demanded that the note should be withdrawn. On the 14th of November,

after one day's illness, he died of cholera and was buried, as he had

wished, between Fichte and Solger.

Hegel in his class-room was neither imposing nor fascinating. You saw a

plain, old-fashioned face, without life or lustre--a figure which had

never looked young, and was now prematurely aged; the furrowed face bore

witness to concentrated thought. Sitting with his snuff-box before him,

and his head bent down, he looked ill at ease, and kept turning the

folios of his notes. His utterance was interrupted by frequent coughing;

every sentence came out with a struggle. The style was no less

irregular. Sometimes in plain narrative the lecturer would be specially

awkward, while in abstruse passages he seemed specially at home, rose

into a natural eloquence, and carried away the hearer by the grandeur of

his diction.

_Philosophy._--Hegelianism is confessedly one of the most difficult of

all philosophies. Every one has heard the legend which makes Hegel

say, "One man has understood me, and even he has not." He abruptly

hurls us into a world where old habits of thought fail us. In three

places, indeed, he has attempted to exhibit the transition to his own

system from other levels of thought; but in none with much success. In

the introductory lectures on the philosophy of religion he gives a

rationale of the difference between the modes of consciousness in

religion and philosophy (between _Vorstellung_ and _Begriff_). In the

beginning of the _Encyklopadie_ he discusses the defects of dogmatism,

empiricism, the philosophies of Kant and Jacobi. In the first case he

treats the formal or psychological aspect of the difference; in the

latter he presents his doctrine less in its essential character than

in special relations to the prominent systems of his time. The

_Phenomenology of Spirit_, regarded as an introduction, suffers from a

different fault. It is not an introduction--for the philosophy which

it was to introduce was not then fully elaborated. Even to the last

Hegel had not so externalized his system as to treat it as something

to be led up to by gradual steps. His philosophy was not one aspect of

his intellectual life, to be contemplated from others; it was the ripe

fruit of concentrated reflection, and had become the one all-embracing

form and principle of his thinking. More than most thinkers he had

quietly laid himself open to the influences of his time and the

lessons of history.

The Phenomenology.

The _Phenomenology_ is the picture of the Hegelian philosophy in the

making--at the stage before the scaffolding has been removed from the

building. For this reason the book is at once the most brilliant and

the most difficult of Hegel's works--the most brilliant because it is

to some degree an autobiography of Hegel's mind--not the abstract

record of a logical evolution, but the real history of an intellectual

growth; the most difficult because, instead of treating the rise of

intelligence (from its first appearance in contrast with the real

world to its final recognition of its presence in, and rule over, all

things) as a purely subjective process, it exhibits this rise as

wrought out in historical epochs, national characteristics, forms of

culture and faith, and philosophical systems. The theme is identical

with the introduction to the _Encyklopadie_; but it is treated in a

very different style. From all periods of the world--from medieval

piety and stoical pride, Kant and Sophocles, science and art, religion

and philosophy--with disdain of mere chronology, Hegel gathers in the

vineyards of the human spirit the grapes from which he crushes the

wine of thought. The mind coming through a thousand phases of mistake

and disappointment to a sense and realization of its true position in

the universe--such is the drama which is consciously Hegel's own

history, but is represented objectively as the process of spiritual

history which the philosopher reproduces in himself. The

_Phenomenology_ stands to the _Encyklopadie_ somewhat as the dialogues

of Plato stand to the Aristotelian treatises. It contains almost all

his philosophy--but irregularly and without due proportion. The

personal element gives an undue prominence to recent phenomena of the

philosophic atmosphere. It is the account given by an inventor of his

own discovery, not the explanation of an outsider. It therefore to

some extent assumes from the first the position which it proposes

ultimately to reach, and gives not a proof of that position, but an

account of the experience (_Erfahrung_) by which consciousness is

forced from one position to another till it finds rest in _Absolutes

Wissen_.

The _Phenomenology_ is neither mere psychology, nor logic, nor moral

philosophy, nor history, but is all of these and a great deal more. It

needs not distillation, but expansion and illustration from

contemporary and antecedent thought and literature. It treats of the

attitudes of consciousness towards reality under the six heads of

consciousness, self-consciousness, reason (_Vernunft_), spirit

(_Geist_), religion and absolute knowledge. The native attitude of

consciousness towards existence is reliance on the evidence of the

senses; but a little reflection is sufficient to show that the reality

attributed to the external world is as much due to intellectual

conceptions as to the senses, and that these conceptions elude us when

we try to fix them. If consciousness cannot detect a permanent object

outside it, so self-consciousness cannot find a permanent subject in

itself. It may, like the Stoic, assert freedom by holding aloof from

the entanglements of real life, or like the sceptic regard the world

as a delusion, or finally, as the "unhappy consciousness"

(_Ungluckliches Bewusstseyn_), may be a recurrent falling short of a

perfection which it has placed above it in the heavens. But in this

isolation from the world, self-consciousness has closed its gates

against the stream of life. The perception of this is reason. Reason

convinced that the world and the soul are alike rational observes the

external world, mental phenomena, and specially the nervous organism,

as the meeting ground of body and mind. But reason finds much in the

world recognizing no kindred with her, and so turning to practical

activity seeks in the world the realization of her own aims. Either in

a crude way she pursues her own pleasure, and finds that necessity

counteracts her cravings; or she endeavours to find the world in

harmony with the heart, and yet is unwilling to see fine aspirations

crystallized by the act of realizing them. Finally, unable to impose

upon the world either selfish or humanitarian ends, she folds her arms

in pharisaic virtue, with the hope that some hidden power will give

the victory to righteousness. But the world goes on in its life,

heedless of the demands of virtue. The principle of nature is to live

and let live. Reason abandons her efforts to mould the world, and is

content to let the aims of individuals work out their results

independently, only stepping in to lay down precepts for the cases

where individual actions conflict, and to test these precepts by the

rules of formal logic.

So far we have seen consciousness on one hand and the real world on

the other. The stage of _Geist_ reveals the consciousness no longer as

critical and antagonistic but as the indwelling spirit of a community,

as no longer isolated from its surroundings but the union of the

single and real consciousness with the vital feeling that animates the

community. This is the lowest stage of concrete consciousness--life,

and not knowledge; the spirit inspires, but does not reflect. It is

the age of unconscious morality, when the individual's life is lost in

the society of which he is an organic member. But increasing culture

presents new ideals, and the mind, absorbing the ethical spirit of its

environment, gradually emancipates itself from conventions and

superstitions. This _Aufklarung_ prepares the way for the rule of

conscience, for the moral view of the world as subject of a moral law.

From the moral world the next step is religion; the moral law gives

place to God; but the idea of Godhead, too, as it first appears, is

imperfect, and has to pass through the forms of nature-worship and of

art before it reaches a full utterance in Christianity. Religion in

this shape is the nearest step to the stage of absolute knowledge; and

this absolute knowledge--"the spirit knowing itself as spirit"--is not

something which leaves these other forms behind but the full

comprehension of them as the organic constituents of its empire; "they

are the memory and the sepulchre of its history, and at the same time

the actuality, truth and certainty of its throne." Here, according to

Hegel, is the field of philosophy.

The preface to the _Phenomenology_ signalled the separation from

Schelling--the adieu to romantic. It declared that a genuine

philosophy has no kindred with the mere aspirations of artistic minds,

but must earn its bread by the sweat of its brow. It sets its face

against the idealism which either thundered against the world for its

deficiencies, or sought something finer than reality. Philosophy is to

be the science of the actual world--it is the spirit comprehending

itself in its own externalizations and manifestations. The philosophy

of Hegel is idealism, but it is an idealism in which every idealistic

unification has its other face in the multiplicity of existence. It is

realism as well as idealism, and never quits its hold on facts.

Compared with Fichte and Schelling, Hegel has a sober, hard, realistic

character. At a later date, with the call of Schelling to Berlin in

1841, it became fashionable to speak of Hegelianism as a negative

philosophy requiring to be complemented by a "positive" philosophy

which would give reality and not mere ideas. The cry was the same as

that of Krug (q.v.), asking the philosophers who expounded the

absolute to construe his pen. It was the cry of the Evangelical school

for a personal Christ and not a dialectical Logos. The claims of the

individual, the real, material and historical fact, it was said, had

been sacrificed by Hegel to the universal, the ideal, the spiritual

and the logical.

There was a truth in these criticisms. It was the very aim of

Hegelianism to render fluid the fixed phases of reality--to show

existence not to be an immovable rock limiting the efforts of thought,

but to have thought implicit in it, waiting for release from its

petrifaction. Nature was no longer, as with Fichte, to be a mere

spring-board to evoke the latent powers of the spirit. Nor was it, as

in Schelling's earlier system, to be a collateral progeny with mind

from the same womb of indifference and identity. Nature and mind in

the Hegelian system--the external and the spiritual world--have the

same origin, but are not co-equal branches. The natural world proceeds

from the "idea," the spiritual from the idea and nature. It is

impossible, beginning with the natural world, to explain the mind by

any process of distillation or development, unless consciousness or

its potentiality has been there from the first. Reality, independent

of the individual consciousness, there must be; reality, independent

of all mind, is an impossibility. At the basis of all reality, whether

material or mental, there is thought. But the thought thus regarded as

the basis of all existence is not consciousness with its distinction

of ego and non-ego. It is rather the stuff of which both mind and

nature are made, neither extended as in the natural world, nor

self-centred as in mind. Thought in its primary form is, as it were,

thoroughly transparent and absolutely fluid, free and mutually

interpenetrable in every part--the spirit in its seraphic scientific

life, before creation had produced a natural world, and thought had

risen to independent existence in the social organism. Thought in this

primary form, when in all its parts completed, is what Hegel calls the

"idea." But the idea, though fundamental, is in another sense final,

in the process of the world. It only appears in consciousness as the

crowning development of the mind. Only with philosophy does thought

become fully conscious of itself in its origin and development.

Accordingly the history of philosophy is the pre-supposition of logic,

or the three branches of philosophy form a circle.

Logic.

The exposition or constitution of the "idea" is the work of the Logic.

As the total system falls into three parts, so every part of the

system follows the triadic law. Every truth, every reality, has three

aspects or stages; it is the unification of two contradictory

elements, of two partial aspects of truth which are not merely

contrary, like black and white, but contradictory, like same and

different. The first step is a preliminary affirmation and

unification, the second a negation and differentiation, the third a

final synthesis. For example, the seed of the plant is an initial

unity of life, which when placed in its proper soil suffers

disintegration into its constitutents, and yet in virtue of its vital

unity keeps these divergent elements together, and reappears as the

plant with its members in organic union. Or again, the process of

scientific induction is a threefold chain; the original hypothesis

(the first unification of the fact) seems to melt away when confronted

with opposite facts, and yet no scientific progress is possible unless

the stimulus of the original unification is strong enough to clasp the

discordant facts and establish a reunification. Thesis, antithesis and

synthesis, a Fichtean formula, is generalized by Hegel into the

perpetual law of thought.

In what we may call their psychological aspect these three stages are

known as the abstract stage, or that of understanding (_Verstand_),

the dialectical stage, or that of negative reason, and the speculative

stage, or that of positive reason (_Vernunft_). The first of these

attitudes taken alone is dogmatism; the second, when similarly

isolated, is scepticism; the third, when unexplained by its elements,

is mysticism. Thus Hegelianism reduces dogmatism, scepticism and

mysticism to factors in philosophy. The abstract or dogmatic thinker

believes his object to be one, simple and stationary, and intelligible

apart from its surrounding. He speaks, e.g., as if species and genera

were fixed and unchangeable; and fixing his eye on the ideal forms in

their purity and self-sameness, he scorns the phenomenal world, whence

this identity and persistence are absent. The dialectic of negative

reason rudely dispels these theories. Appealing to reality it shows

that the identity and permanence of forms are contradicted by history;

instead of unity it exhibits multiplicity, instead of identity

difference, instead of a whole, only parts. Dialectic is, therefore, a

dislocating power; it shakes the solid structures of material thought,

and exhibits the instability latent in such conceptions of the world.

It is the spirit of progress and change, the enemy of convention and

conservatism; it is absolute and universal unrest. In the realm of

abstract thought these transitions take place lightly. In the worlds

of nature and mind they are more palpable and violent. So far as this

Hegel seems on the side of revolution. But reason is not negative

only; while it disintegrates the mass or unconscious unity, it builds

up a new unity with higher organization. But this third stage is the

place of effort, requiring neither the surrender of the original unity

nor the ignoring of the diversity afterwards suggested. The stimulus

of contradiction is no doubt a strong one; but the easiest way of

escaping it is to shut our eyes to one side of the antithesis. What is

required, therefore, is to readjust our original thesis in such a way

as to include and give expression to both the elements in the process.

The universe, then, is a process or development, to the eye of

philosophy. It is the process of the absolute--in religious language,

the manifestation of God. In the background of all the absolute is

eternally present; the rhythmic movement of thought is the

self-unfolding of the absolute. God reveals Himself in the logical

idea, in nature and in mind; but mind is not alike conscious of its

absoluteness in every stage of development. Philosophy alone sees God

revealing Himself in the ideal organism of thought as it were a

possible deity prior to the world and to any relation between God and

actuality; in the natural world, as a series of materialized forces

and forms of life; and in the spiritual world as the human soul, the

legal and moral order of society, and the creations of art, religion

and philosophy.

This introduction of the absolute became a stumbling-block to

Feuerbach and other members of the "Left." They rejected as an

illegitimate interpolation the eternal subject of development, and,

instead of one continuing God as the subject of all the predicates by

which in the logic the absolute is defined, assumed only a series of

ideas, products of philosophic activity. They denied the theological

value of the logical forms--the development of these forms being in

their opinion due to the human thinker, not to a self-revealing

absolute. Thus they made man the creator of the absolute. But with

this modification on the system another necessarily followed; a mere

logical series could not create nature. And thus the material universe

became the real starting-point. Thought became only the result of

organic conditions--subjective and human; and the system of Hegel was

no longer an idealization of religion, but a naturalistic theory with

a prominent and peculiar logic.

The logic of Hegel is the only rival to the logic of Aristotle. What

Aristotle did for the theory of demonstrative reasoning, Hegel

attempted to do for the whole of human knowledge. His logic is an

enumeration of the forms or categories by which our experience exists.

It carried out Kant's doctrine of the categories as a priori synthetic

principles, but removed the limitation by which Kant denied them any

constitutive value except in alliance with experience. According to

Hegel the terms in which thought exhibits itself are a system of their

own, with laws and relations which reappear in a less obvious shape in

the theories of nature and mind. Nor are they restricted to the small

number which Kant obtained by manipulating the current subdivision of

judgments. But all forms by which thought holds sensations in unity

(the formative or synthetic elements of language) had their place

assigned in a system where one leads up to and passes over into

another.

The fact which ordinary thought ignores, and of which ordinary logic

therefore provides no account, is the presence of gradation and

continuity in the world. The general terms of language simplify the

universe by reducing its variety of individuals to a few forms, none

of which exists simply and perfectly. The method of the understanding

is to divide and then to give a separate reality to what it has thus

distinguished. It is part of Hegel's plan to remedy this one-sided

character of thought, by laying bare the gradations of ideas. He lays

special stress on the point that abstract ideas when held in their

abstraction are almost interchangeable with their opposites--that

extremes meet, and that in every true and concrete idea there is a

coincidence of opposites.

The beginning of the logic is an illustration of this. The logical

idea is treated under the three heads of being (_Seyn_), essence

(_Wesen_) and notion (_Begriff_). The simplest term of thought is

being; we cannot think less about anything than when we merely say

that it is. Being--the abstract "is"--is _nothing_ definite, and

nothing at least is. Being and not being are thus declared

identical--a proposition which in this unqualified shape was to most

people a stumbling-block at the very door of the system. Instead of

the mere "is" which is as yet nothing, we should rather say "becomes,"

and as "becomes" always implies "something," we have determinate

being--"a being" which in the next stage of definiteness becomes

"one." And in this way we pass on to the quantitative aspects of

being.

The terms treated under the first head, in addition to those already

mentioned, are the abstract principles of quantity and number, and

their application in measure to determine the limits of being. Under

the title of essence are discussed those pairs of correlative terms

which are habitually employed in the explanation of the world--such as

law and phenomenon, cause and effect, reason and consequence,

substance and attribute. Under the head of notion are considered,

firstly, the subjective forms of conception, judgment and syllogism;

secondly, their realization in objects as mechanically, chemically or

teleologically constituted; and thirdly, the idea first of life, and

next of science, as the complete interpenetration of thought and

objectivity. The third part of logic evidently is what contains the

topics usually treated in logic-books, though even here the province

of logic in the ordinary sense is exceeded. The first two

divisions--the "objective logic"--are what is usually called

metaphysics.

The characteristic of the system is the gradual way in which idea is

linked to idea so as to make the division into chapters only an

arrangement of convenience. The judgment is completed in the

syllogism; the syllogistic form as the perfection of subjective

thought passes into objectivity, where it first appears embodied in a

mechanical system; and the teleological object, in which the members

are as means and end, leads up to the idea of life, where the end is

means and means end indissolubly till death. In some cases these

transitions may be unsatisfactory and forced; it is apparent that the

linear development from "being" to the "idea" is got by transforming

into a logical order the sequence that has roughly prevailed in

philosophy from the Eleatics; cases might be quoted where the

reasoning seems a play upon words; and it may often be doubted whether

certain ideas do not involve extra-logical considerations. The order

of the categories is in the main outlines fixed; but in the minor

details much depends upon the philosopher, who has to fill in the gaps

between ideas, with little guidance from the data of experience, and

to assign to the stages of development names which occasionally deal

hardly with language. The merit of Hegel is to have indicated and to a

large extent displayed the filiation and mutual limitation of our

forms of thought; to have arranged them in the order of their

comparative capacity to give a satisfactory expression to truth in the

totality of its relations; and to have broken down the partition which

in Kant separated the formal logic from the transcendental analytic,

as well as the general disruption between logic and metaphysic. It

must at the same time be admitted that much of the work of weaving the

terms of thought, the categories, into a system has a hypothetical and

tentative character, and that Hegel has rather pointed out the path

which logic must follow, viz. a criticism of the terms of scientific

and ordinary thought in their filiation and interdependence, than

himself in every case kept to the right way. The day for a fuller

investigation of this problem will partly depend upon the progress of

the study of language in the direction marked out by W. von Humboldt.

Philosophy of nature.

The Philosophy of Nature starts with the result of the logical

development, with the full scientific "idea." But the relations of

pure thought, losing their inwardness, appear as relations of space

and time; the abstract development of thought appears as matter and

movement. Instead of thought, we have perception; instead of

dialectic, gravitation; instead of causation, sequence in time. The

whole falls under the three heads of mechanics, physics and

"organic"--the content under each varying somewhat in the three

editions of the _Encyklopadie_. The first treats of space, time,

matter, movement; and in the solar system we have the representation

of the idea in its general and abstract material form. Under the head

of physics we have the theory of the elements, of sound, heat and

cohesion, and finally of chemical affinity--presenting the phenomena

of material change and interchange in a series of special forces which

generate the variety of the life of nature. Lastly, under the head of

"organic," come geology, botany and animal physiology--presenting the

concrete results of these processes in the three kingdoms of nature.

The charges of superficial analogies, so freely urged against the

"Natur-philosophie" by critics who forget the impulse it gave to

physical research by the identification of forces then believed to be

radically distinct, do not particularly affect Hegel. But in general

it may be said that he looked down upon the mere natural world. The

meanest of the fancies of the mind and the most casual of its whims he

regarded as a better warrant for the being of God than any single

object of nature. Those who supposed astronomy to inspire religious

awe were horrified to hear the stars compared to eruptive spots on the

face of the sky. Even in the animal world, the highest stage of

nature, he saw a failure to reach an independent and rational system

of organization; and its feelings under the continuous violence and

menaces of the environment he described as insecure, anxious and

unhappy.

His point of view was essentially opposed to the current views of

science. To metamorphosis he only allowed a logical value, as

explaining the natural classification; the only real, existent

metamorphosis he saw in the development of the individual from its

embryonic stage. Still more distinctly did he contravene the general

tendency of scientific explanation. "It is held the triumph of science

to recognize in the general process of the earth the same categories

as are exhibited in the processes of isolated bodies. This is,

however, an application of categories from a field where the

conditions are finite to a sphere in which the circumstances are

infinite." In astronomy he depreciates the merits of Newton and

elevates Kepler, accusing Newton particularly, a propos of the

distinction of centrifugal and centripetal forces, of leading to a

confusion between what is mathematically to be distinguished and what

is physically separate. The principles which explain the fall of an

apple will not do for the planets. As to colour, he follows Goethe,

and uses strong language against Newton's theory, for the barbarism of

the conception that light is a compound, the incorrectness of his

observations, &c. In chemistry, again, he objects to the way in which

all the chemical elements are treated as on the same level.

Philosophy of mind. 1. Psychology.

The third part of the system is the Philosophy of Mind. Its three

divisions are the "subjective mind" (psychology), the "objective mind"

(philosophic jurisprudence, moral and political philosophy) and the

"absolute mind" (the philosophy of art, religion and philosophy). The

subjects of the second and third divisions have been treated by Hegel

with great detail. The "objective mind" is the topic of the

_Rechts-Philosophie_, and of the lectures on the Philosophy of

History; while on the "absolute mind" we have the lectures on

Aesthetic, on the Philosophy of Religion and on the History of

Philosophy--in short, more than one-third of his works.

The purely psychological branch of the subject takes up half of the

space allotted to _Geist_ in the _Encyklopadie_. It falls under the

three heads of anthropology, phenomenology and psychology proper.

Anthropology treats of the mind in union with the body--of the natural

soul--and discusses the relations of the soul with the planets, the

races of mankind, the differences of age, dreams, animal magnetism,

insanity and phrenology. In this obscure region it is rich in

suggestions and rapprochements; but the ingenuity of these

speculations attracts curiosity more than it satisfies scientific

inquiry. In the Phenomenology consciousness, self-consciousness and

reason are dealt with. The title of the section and the contents

recall, though with some important variations, the earlier half of his

first work; only that here the historical background on which the

stages in the development of the ego were represented has disappeared.

Psychology, in the stricter sense, deals with the various forms of

theoretical and practical intellect, such as attention, memory, desire

and will. In this account of the development of an independent, active

and intelligent being from the stage where man like the Dryad is a

portion of the natural life around him, Hegel has combined what may be

termed a physiology and pathology of the mind--a subject far wider

than that of ordinary psychologies, and one of vast intrinsic

importance. It is, of course, easy to set aside these questions as

unanswerable, and to find artificiality in the arrangement. Still it

remains a great point to have even attempted some system in the dark

anomalies which lie under the normal consciousness, and to have traced

the genesis of the intellectual faculties from animal sensitivity.