Disraeli's Life of Lord George Bentinck--An approaching
Storm--Peel's Conduct on the East Retford Franchise in 1830--Death
of Mr. Luttrell--Dismissal of Lord Palmerston--Lord Clarendon
declines the Foreign Office--Lord Granville takes the Foreign
Office--Causes of Lord Palmerston's Dismissal--Effects of the
Change--The Complete Story--Lord John negotiates with the
Peelites--Whigs and Peelites--Lord Normanby's Relations with
Louis Napoleon--Foreign Policy of the Country--Thiers' Account of
the Coup d'…tat--Further Details on Palmerston's Dismissal--Lord
Normanby's Recall--Lord John's Explanations--Change of
Government--Lord Derby's First Ministry--Lord Palmerston's
Position--Discredit of the Derby Government--Disraeli's Speech on
the Budget.
_London, December 19th, 1851._--Mr. Disraeli has sent me his book, the
'Life of Lord George Bentinck,' which, though principally recording very
dry Parliamentary debates, he has managed to make very readable. He does
ample justice to his hero, but I think without exaggeration; and he
certainly makes him out to have been a very remarkable man, with great
ability and a superhuman power of work. It is the more extraordinary
because for above forty years George Bentinck was indolent, and addicted
to none but frivolous pursuits, though he always pursued his pleasurable
occupations in a business-like and laborious manner. The character of
Peel in this book is curious, but I do not think it is unfair, and it is
in a becoming spirit of seriousness and even respect, fully
acknowledging his great qualities, but freely criticising his character
and his career. The Jewish episode is amusing, and I like it for its
courage.
Something, but I know not what, has happened about Palmerston. This will
be no quarrel with Austria, because Buol has dined with Palmerston, and
the Emperor has, at last, received Westmorland;[142] but the Duke of
Bedford, who is by turns confidential and mysterious, and who delights
in raising my curiosity and then not satisfying it, has written to me
thus. After a good deal about Lord John's defending Palmerston and his
not approving his conduct, in one strain one day and another the next,
the Duke said there had been a correspondence between them on the
subject, which he was to see. He never said more about it, and to a
question I put to him thereon he sent no answer. In another letter I
alluded to this, but added that it did not now much signify, on which he
writes: 'You attach no importance to the correspondence I told you of,
and do not now care to know about it, but if I am not mistaken you will
ere long change your opinion.'
[Footnote 142: [It was supposed that the Austrian Government had
resented the reception by Lord Palmerston of Kossuth and the Hungarian
refugees. But more serious matters were impending.]]
_London, December 22nd._--A Cabinet has been suddenly called to-day,
which is about the matter the Duke alluded to.
I met Disraeli and told him what I thought of his book. It is difficult
to know what he is at, for, although he knows my opinion of George
Bentinck and of Peel and of Free Trade, he nevertheless wanted me to
review his book in the 'Times,' and he made a sort of indirect overture
to me for the purpose. Of course I said it was out of the question.
Graham is very indignant with Disraeli, and treats his character of Peel
as a great and malignant outrage. In my opinion he is quite wrong. I
sent him my own sketch, which he says is in a more kindly spirit; but he
is evidently not satisfied with it. He tells me one curious anecdote, if
it be true. I have criticised Peel's conduct about the East Retford
franchise just before the Reform Bill, and said he ought to have gone
with Huskisson. Graham says that he wished to do _more_ than Huskisson;
that Peel in the Cabinet supported the more Liberal measure, but was
overruled, and he yielded to the opinion of the majority, whereas
Huskisson took the other side in the Cabinet, but got frightened
afterwards, and supported in the House of Commons what he had opposed in
the Cabinet. If this be true, it was very disgraceful of Huskisson, but
it does not exonerate Peel. On the contrary, I think it makes his case
worse. He clearly ought to have resigned rather than take the course he
did, if such were his opinions.
[Sidenote: DEATH OF MR. LUTTRELL.]
On Friday last Mr. Luttrell died, at the age of eighty-one, having been
long ill and confined to his bed with great suffering. When I first came
into the world, nearly forty years ago, he was one of the most brilliant
members of society, celebrated for his wit and repartee, and for many
years we lived in great intimacy and in the same society. He was the
natural son of old Lord Carhampton, but was always on bad terms with his
father. He had been a member of the Irish Parliament, and obtained a
place, afterwards commuted for a pension, on which he lived. He never
took any part in public life, was always in narrow circumstances, and
had the air, and I think the feeling, of a disappointed man. He was, in
fact, conscious of powers which ought to have raised him to a higher
place than that which he occupied in the world. Why he never did
advance, whether it was from pride and shyness, or from disinclination,
or the unkind neglect of those who might have helped him on, I know not.
As it was, he never had any but a social position, but that was one of
great eminence and success. He was looked upon as one of the most
accomplished, agreeable, and entertaining men of his day; he lived in
the very best society, was one of the cherished and favoured _habituÈs_
of Holland House, and the intimate friend and associate of Sydney Smith,
Rogers, Lord Dudley, and all the men most distinguished in politics,
literature, or social eminence. Rogers and Luttrell especially were
always bracketed together, intimate friends, seldom apart, and always
hating, abusing, and ridiculing each other. Luttrell's _bons mots_ and
repartees were excellent, but he was less caustic, more good-natured,
but in some respects less striking in conversation, than his companion,
who had more knowledge, more imagination, and, though in a different
way, as much wit. His literary performances were few and far between,
consisting of little more than occasional verses, and 'Crockford House,'
an amusing but rather flimsy satire. His contribution to the pleasures
of society was in talk, and he was too idle and too much of a Sybarite
to devote himself to any grave and laborious pursuit. There are,
however, so many more good writers than good talkers, and the two
qualities are so rarely found united in the same person, that we owe a
debt of gratitude to Luttrell for having cultivated his conversational
rather than his literary powers, and for having adorned and delighted
society for so many years with his remarkable vivacity and wit. It used
to be said that he was less amusing, though in the same style, as his
father; but of this I cannot judge, as I do not remember Lord
Carhampton. Luttrell had excellent qualities, was an honourable,
high-minded gentleman, true and sincere, grateful for kindness and
attentions without being punctilious or exacting, full of good feelings
and warm affections, a man of excellent sense, a philosopher in all
things, and especially in religion. For several years past he had
disappeared from the world, and lived in great retirement, suffering
under much bad health and bodily pain, but cheerful and in possession of
his faculties nearly to the last. His death has removed one of the last
survivors of a brilliant generation, a conspicuous member of such a
society as the world has rarely seen, nothing approaching to which
exists at present, and such as perhaps it will never see again.
[Sidenote: THE FALL OF LORD PALMERSTON.]
_December 23rd._--_Palmerston is out!_--actually, really, and
irretrievably out. I nearly dropped off my chair yesterday afternoon,
when at five o'clock, a few moments after the Cabinet had broken up,
Granville rushed into my room and said, 'It is none of the things we
talked over; Pam is out, the offer of the Foreign Office goes to
Clarendon to-night, and if he refuses, which of course he will not, it
is to be offered to me!!' Well might the Duke of Bedford say I should
'change my opinion,' and soon think this correspondence did signify, for
it was on the matter which led to the fall of Palmerston. Granville came
to town on Saturday, not knowing (as none of the Ministers did) what the
Cabinet was about. On Sunday he received a note from John Russell,
begging him not to come to it, and telling him he would afterwards
inform him why. This of course surprised him, but after going about
amongst such of his colleagues as were here, he arrived at the
conclusion that the matter related to foreign affairs, that Normanby was
to be recalled, and the Paris Embassy offered to him, or that he was to
be sent to Paris on a special mission. We discussed these contingencies
together with all other changes of office which occurred to us, but we
neither of us dreamt of the truth. It now appears that the cause of
Palmerston's dismissal, for dismissed he is, is his having committed the
Government to a full and unqualified approval of Louis Napoleon's _Coup
d'…tat_, which he did in conversation with Walewski, but so formally and
officially, that Walewski wrote word to his own Government that ours
approved entirely of all that Louis Napoleon had done. Upon this piece
of indiscretion, to which it is probable that Palmerston attached no
importance, being so used to act off his own bat, and never dreaming of
any danger from it, Lord John determined to act. I do not know the
details of the correspondence, only that he signified to Palmerston his
displeasure at his having thus committed the Government to an
approbation they did not feel, and it ended in his turning Palmerston
out, for this was in fact what he did. But though this was the pretext,
the _causa causans_ was without any doubt the Islington speech and
deputations, and his whole conduct in that affair. The Queen had deeply
resented it, and had had a discussion with Lord John about it, for he
rather defended Palmerston, and accepted his excuses and denials. It is
evident that he did this, because he did not dare to quarrel with him on
grounds which would have enabled him to cast himself on the Radicals, to
appeal to all the Kossuthian sympathies of the country, and to represent
himself as the victim of our disgraceful subserviency to Austria. But
having thus passed over what would have been a sufficient cause of
quarrel, he at once seized upon one much less sufficient, but which was
not liable to the same difficulties and objections. In fully approving
Louis Napoleon's _coup d'Ètat_, Palmerston has taken a part against the
feelings of the Radicals, and if the cause of the quarrel is made
public, their approval will _ad hoc_ be rather with John Russell than
with him.
_December 24th._--To my unspeakable astonishment Granville informed me
yesterday that Clarendon had refused the Foreign Office, and that he had
accepted it. Lord John must have given notice to Clarendon the day
before the Cabinet that he was going to propose him, or they could not
have heard yesterday. Clarendon declined, and advised Lord John to offer
it to Granville, which he instantly did, and the thing was settled at
once. I have not yet heard from Clarendon, and am curious to know his
motives for refusing an appointment which I should have thought would be
not only peculiarly agreeable to him, but which would have enabled him
to quit Ireland in so honourable a manner. In no other way could he have
left his present post, just after the recent trial of Birch _v._
Somerville, and this trial with its disclosures must render it
particularly irksome to him to stay there. Granville, albeit conscious
of the greatness of the weight, accepted the office without a moment's
hesitation.
_Brocket, Christmas Day._--I received a letter from Clarendon yesterday
afternoon with his reasons for declining. They are very poor ones, and
amount to little more than his being afraid of Palmerston, first of his
suspecting it was an intrigue to get rid of him, and secondly, of the
difficulties Palmerston would throw in his way at the Foreign Office. He
had advised Lord John to take Granville, but he said if it was
absolutely necessary, he would accept. I can't help thinking he will be
mortified at his advice being so immediately taken. His conduct has been
to my mind very pusillanimous and unworthy of him.
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON'S VERSION.]
Beauvale has had a long letter from Lady Palmerston with her version of
the whole affair, which is true in the main, but as favourably coloured
towards Pam as the case will admit of. She is in a high state of
indignation and resentment, and bitter against Lord John and the
colleagues who did not support Palmerston. They evidently expected when
the Cabinet met the other day, that the colleagues would have
pronounced Lord John's ground of quarrel insufficient, and protested
against his dismissal, and they are extremely mortified that nothing of
the kind was done. She complained that Palmerston's best friends were
absent. Not one person at the Cabinet said a word for him or made an
effort to keep him, but this she does not know. Her account is as
follows. On December 3rd Palmerston told Walewski _in conversation_ that
he thought the President was fully justified in his _coup d'Ètat_, as
plots were hatching against him. He says that he expressed his
approbation in this conditional form. Walewski wrote to Turgot what
Palmerston had said, and at the same time Palmerston wrote a very strong
letter to Normanby, finding fault with his conduct, and advising him to
hold language calculated to satisfy the President that he was not
unfriendly to him, as he had reason to believe that the President did
regard him as so inimical, that he was meditating an application to the
British Government to recall him. Whatever Palmerston really did say to
Walewski, we may safely assume that Walewski made the most of it to
Turgot, and that he did convey to him the unqualified approbation of the
English Government, and Turgot probably communicated Walewski's despatch
to Normanby. Normanby was exceedingly annoyed at this communication, and
wrote to John Russell, conveying to him what had passed, and complaining
of the ill-usage he had received. Lord John shortly after wrote to
Palmerston, sent him a Minute of the Queen's, in which Her Majesty
expressed her displeasure at Palmerston's having committed her
Government by an unqualified approbation of the President's measures,
and he added from himself that he agreed with her, and thought
Palmerston had acted with great indiscretion, that he was tired of these
repeated difficulties and disputes, and he had to inform him that it was
the wish of the Queen to transfer the Foreign Office to other hands.
Palmerston wrote a reply, stating his readiness to give up the seals
whenever his successor should be appointed. He defended his own conduct,
denied that he had committed the Government, and said he had only
expressed his own individual opinion, and that a qualified one, and
then set forth the inconvenience there would be if a Minister could not
hold friendly communication with an Ambassador in his own person,
without being supposed to commit the whole Cabinet, in mere
conversation. It did not appear to me that the excuses he made,
according to Lady Palmerston's own account of them, were very good ones,
and they were not likely to produce any effect upon Lord John, who had
evidently already determined to get rid of him. What more passed I do
not know, but from her letter they clearly entertained some hopes that
Palmerston's position was still retrievable; that when the Cabinet met,
his colleagues would make an effort to retain him; and that in spite of
what Lord John had written to him he would have kept his post if he
could. It seems incredible that any man of high spirit and with a spark
of pride should consent to stay in office after being told by the Prime
Minister that he had been indiscreet, that the Prime Minister was tired
of his repeated misconduct, and that the Queen wished to get rid of him.
But it seems by what Lady Palmerston says, that he would have swallowed
all this if he could have made it up. She writes in a spirit of great
bitterness and resentment, and intimates her belief that the ground
taken by Lord John was merely a pretext, and not the real cause of what
had been done. In this she was quite right. The case is cumulative,
though the Paris communication is made the pretext of Lord John's _coup
d'Ètat_. Beauvale thinks the last and ostensible cause is insufficient,
and that Lord John would have done better to act at once on the matter
of the Islington deputations. I am inclined to think it is sufficient,
though far less strong than the other, and it would have been more
straightforward as well as bold to have acted on the first occasion, and
I believe it would have been quite as safe. Labouchere, a very
honourable man, told me, when all was known, he thought Lord John's
conduct would come out in a very favourable light. So probably there are
circumstances which Lady Palmerston suppresses, which would not improve
Palmerston's case. The most striking circumstance in all this affair is
the conduct of John Russell. He took it up, and without imparting what
he was about to any of his colleagues, leaving them all completely in
the dark, he and the Queen settled the whole thing between them. For
nearly three weeks a correspondence was going on between the Queen, Lord
John, and Palmerston, of which not one word transpired, and which was
known to nobody but the Duke of Bedford. None of the Ministers had the
least idea why they were summoned. Lord Grey and Lord Lansdowne and Sir
Francis Baring all came up together from the Grange, asking each other
what it was about; nor was it till they were all assembled in the
Cabinet room in Downing Street that they were apprised of the astounding
fact that Palmerston had ceased to be their colleague. The secret was as
well kept as Louis Napoleon's, and the _coup d'Ètat_ nearly as important
and extraordinary.
[Sidenote: LORD GRANVILLE FOREIGN SECRETARY.]
_London, December 27th._--A Council at Windsor. Palmerston did not come,
but desired Lord Eddisbury to send the seals to Lord John. Nevertheless
he was expected, and the Queen would wait for him above an hour. It now
turns out that the Foreign Office was not offered to Clarendon at all.
In his letter to me he says, It cannot be said that I refused what was
never offered me. Lord John wrote him word on Sunday that it would be
offered him; but the offer, which Granville told me on Monday afternoon
was gone, never did go. All along the Queen and Lord John wished to have
Granville instead of Clarendon. He tells me that when I know all that
has passed between John Russell and himself, I shall see he could not
possibly accept it. Lord Lansdowne was evidently put out by what he
heard yesterday. He said to me, 'You know it was offered to Clarendon.'
I said, 'He does not so consider it.' 'Oh! it certainly was. It was
clearly so understood in the Cabinet, when I left it on Monday, and I
wrote to him myself.' I said he had better enquire, and he would find no
offer was sent. He then talked to John Russell and Grey, and I asked him
afterwards, when he shrugged his shoulders and said I was right; but he
did not understand it. The truth is oozing out by degrees. Grey and I
had some talk about it, when I told him that I thought the former
ground, the reception of the deputations, the stronger of the two, and I
should have turned him out then, and he said he agreed with me. Madame
de Lieven writes in transports of joy, and on the whole the satisfaction
seems very general. Granville is very popular at Manchester and with the
Free Traders, which is a great thing; and as he is more of a Reformer
than Palmerston, he will not be attacked in that quarter. Brooks's and
the ultra Whigs and Radicals are sulky, but don't quite know what to
make of it. It seems Lord John struck the blow at last with great
reluctance; but having made up his mind, he did it boldly.
Bunsen told Reeve a version of the story, which he got from Stockmar,
and which came direct from the Court. Normanby wrote home for
instructions. At a Cabinet (on the 8th) it was determined that he should
be instructed to abstain from expressing any opinion, but to act with
perfect civility and every expression of international amity towards the
President, but with reserve. Lord John went down to Osborne on the 9th,
and informed the Queen of the resolution of the Cabinet. If, as Lady
Palmerston says, the conversation with Walewski had taken place before
this, Palmerston did not tell the Cabinet what he had said to the
Ambassador; but, be this as it may, they say he did not act in the
spirit of the Cabinet resolution, but in that of his own communication,
which was very different. I expect that it will not be easy to make a
good case out of this, especially as the Queen's name must not be
brought in. Palmerston, who is so adroit and unscrupulous, will deny
half he said, and find plausible excuses for the other half, and will
probably make it appear that the ostensible _casus querelÊ_ was not the
real one. However, in matters of this sort, Lord John is tolerably
dexterous too, and he may have better materials than I am aware of to
employ.
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON AND HIS SUCCESSOR.]
M. de Flahault arrived last night, and came here this morning to talk to
Granville. He said that Palmerston's dismissal and the cause of it, as
hinted at in the newspapers, had produced a disagreeable impression at
the ElysÈe, especially after all the violence of the press. He said he
had told the President that what he had done could not fail to shock
English feelings and prejudices, and the press was sure to hold such
language. He received from Granville assurances as pacific as he could
desire, and he will probably have little difficulty in satisfying the
President and his Government that they will lose nothing by the change.
I have seen to-day an admirable letter of Guizot's, full of a melancholy
resignation to a state of things he abhors, commiserating and ashamed of
the condition of his country. He says if he was disposed to triumph over
his enemies _il a bien de quoi_. Where, he asks, is Thiers, where is the
Republic, where is Palmerston? France is now so frightened at Socialism,
and so bent on averting the peril of anarchy, that she will submit to
anything. But this panic will one day pass away, and the Government
cannot be carried on for ever by soldiers and peasants, and in spite of
all the intellect and all the elevated classes in the country.
Yesterday Granville was with Palmerston for three hours. He received him
with the greatest cordiality and good humour. 'Ah, how are you,
Granville? Well, you have got a very interesting office, but you will
find it very laborious; seven or eight hours' work every day will be
necessary for the current business, besides the extraordinary and
Parliamentary, and with less than that you will fall into arrears.' He
then entered into a complete history of our diplomacy, gave him every
sort of information, and even advice; spoke of the Court without
bitterness, and in strong terms of the Queen's 'sagacity;' ended by
desiring Granville would apply to him when he pleased for any
information or assistance he could give him. This is very creditable,
and, whatever may come after it, very wise, gentlemanlike, becoming, and
dignified.
_London, January 2nd, 1852._--Though I have given the story of the late
rupture in scraps, and have not made many mistakes, I can now state the
case in a more clear and connected manner, and though this entails
repetition I am going to do it. It is best to go back to the first
Kossuth affair. I need only say as to this, that when Lord John brought
it before the Cabinet he was supported against Palmerston by every
member of it except one, and that was Lord Lansdowne. It is clear enough
why he took Palmerston's part. He had already committed himself by
receiving Pulsky at Bowood, two years ago. This made some noise at the
time, but it passed off. But he no doubt thought it would be
inconsistent to find fault with Palmerston for doing what he had already
done with regard to a refugee less celebrated, but not less obnoxious
than Kossuth. Then came the Islington deputations and the speeches. Upon
this, though very indignant, more than I was aware of, Lord John did not
think it safe and therefore expedient to quarrel with him, but he had a
correspondence with him, in which he expressed his opinion; and at the
end of it he (in the language of the Duke of Bedford) 'drew a moral,
which Palmerston accepted, as the rule for his future conduct.' That is,
he gave him to understand that if he continued his separate and
independent action without the knowledge, and often against the
opinions, of his colleagues, it was impossible to go on. I do not know
the words he employed, but am confident this was the sense. Palmerston
acquiesced in his reply, and said what Lord John considered to be
tantamount to a promise or engagement that the like should not happen
again. It was about a week after, on December 3, that Walewski went to
Palmerston and asked for an expression of his opinion upon the
President's _coup d'Ètat_.[143] Palmerston gave his unqualified
approbation, which, of course, Walewski instantly wrote off to Turgot.
Very soon after, if not before, Normanby wrote home for instructions as
to his conduct in the new state of things. The Cabinet met on the 8th,
and there it was agreed that he should be instructed to adopt a friendly
but reserved tone, and abstain from any expression of opinion one way or
another on the acts of the President. On receipt of this he went to
Turgot, and when he spoke to him in the prescribed tone the French
Minister said he was already acquainted with the sentiments of the
British Government, and he produced Walewski's despatch informing him of
Lord Palmerston's unqualified approval of all that had been done. Of
course Normanby was thunderstruck at this communication, which revealed
a complete difference between Palmerston's assurance to Walewski and his
instructions to himself. Indignant at this, and smarting under
Palmerston's rebukes, he wrote to John Russell and told him what had
occurred. When the Queen learned what had passed, she was disposed to
insist upon Lord John's taking this occasion to get rid of him; but
Stockmar very wisely advised her to do nothing, and told her that the
case was so flagrant, Lord John was almost sure to propose it to her,
which was much better than her proposing it to him. She took this
advice, and accordingly Lord John did come to her, and said this could
not be endured, for it was besides a breach of faith, and he himself
proposed to the Queen that Palmerston should be dismissed from the
Foreign Office. About the same time, too (on the 12th), the Notes of the
three Powers about the refugees had been presented to Palmerston, and he
had never said a word about them. Then ensued the second correspondence,
in which there seems to have been great asperity on both sides. Probably
Palmerston never dreamt of any danger from his conversation with
Walewski, and his surprise was, therefore, as great as his indignation.
He defended himself, as I have already stated, and he refused somewhat
scornfully the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. He said that John Russell
knew very well there were reasons why he could not accept it, and he
endeavoured to turn the offer itself against Lord John, by saying that
it was in itself a sufficient answer to his charge of indiscretion.
[Footnote 143: Flahault told me this, and that Walewski ought not to
have asked any opinion of Palmerston.]
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON ON THE COUP D'…TAT.]
_January 8th._--Graham came to me last night (as I am laid up with the
gout) at a quarter past nine, and went away at twenty minutes after one.
In the course of these four hours we discussed every subject of interest
that now engages attention and, as may be imagined, pretty fully. The
Palmerston catastrophe, its circumstances, merits, bearings and
probable results, Disraeli, the 'Life of George Bentinck,' in the course
of which he mentioned a great many things about Peel, and, lastly, the
political circumstances of the Government, its condition and prospects,
together with his own and those of the party with which he is connected,
or rather some of the leading men of it. It would be impossible, even
were I so disposed, to give even an outline of our long conversation. It
will be sufficient to preserve its general features, and his views on
the present state of things. I have never known him so confidential and
unreserved, nor has he ever before in his previous communications with
me spoken out so entirely. I gathered from him some things I only
imperfectly knew before of John Russell's proceedings with a view to
strengthen himself. What he has done has been with the Duke of
Newcastle, first through the Duke of Bedford, and then by direct
communication with himself. Newcastle came to Graham as soon as he
arrived in town and told him all that had passed. Lord John had invited
him to take office, which Newcastle declined, and he asked him to find
out what Sidney Herbert's disposition was. With regard to Gladstone
(whom Newcastle had alluded to), he had said that he was fully aware of
his great abilities, and should be glad if it was in his power to offer
him office, but he did not see how it could be done, intimating, with
expressions of respect, his disinclination to any connexion in that
quarter. With Cardwell it was different. He asked the Duke to make a
communication to Cardwell, but he would only consent to convey to
Cardwell that he might expect at some indefinite time an offer to be
made to him. This communication, together with what was intended, seems
rather strange; it was to this effect, that Lord Panmure would probably
very soon die being very old and very ill, and when he died and Fox
Maule must in consequence quit the War Office, Lord John would offer
Cardwell that place and a seat in the Cabinet. Graham remarked that this
was a strange proposal, considering that the life of Panmure (who has
been continually dying and recovering for years past) is a better one
than the life of the Government, the latter being the more sick of the
two.
[Sidenote: THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEELITES.]
Then as to himself. The Duke said John Russell had asked him to find out
what his (Graham's) disposition was. He could not say to 'sound him,'
for he had made no use of such a term, though he would do so for
shortness. To this Graham replied that the best answer he could make was
to tell him what had passed in September last, and to show him the
memorandum of Lord John to him, and his in return, which he had never
mentioned before but to Lord Aberdeen and one other person, and that the
sentiments he had then expressed he still retained. As the Duke of
Newcastle went to Windsor yesterday, where he was to meet Lord John and
Lord Lansdowne, he will no doubt have told them what passed, and to-day
at the Cabinet Lord John will have to announce that his attempts to
strengthen himself have failed.
Graham's opinions on the whole matter are pretty much the same as those
which Ellice has been circulating amongst his friends. He thinks the
present Government will not get through the next Session; that weak and
unpopular as they are, and still further weakened by the loss of
Palmerston, and surrounded by dangers and enemies on all sides, they
must fall; and he does not think that his joining them, or some of the
other Peelites doing so, with or without himself, would save them. It
will not do to try and patch up the old garment. This Government must be
broken up completely, there must be a _tabula rasa_, and then an attempt
made to construct another on a wider and more comprehensive plan. John
Russell ought to go to the Queen and tell her he cannot go on, and then
she ought to send for Aberdeen and Russell together, and desire them to
set about the formation of a Government. I suggested it would never do
to send for Aberdeen in this way; it would be taken as an insult to
Palmerston, and exasperate one half of the Whigs and render them
unmanageable. The Queen might indeed send for Aberdeen alone, and he
might decline everything for himself, refuse to take office, as no
doubt he would, but advise her to send for Lord John and Graham, and bid
them to form a Government. He agreed to my amendment; acknowledged the
antagonism of Palmerston and Aberdeen would make a difficulty; but
contended that they should be empowered to make a Government of men of
Liberal-Conservative principles, of which John Russell must himself be
the head; that it should be understood that they had _carte blanche_.
Nobody was to have pretensions or _quasi_ right to office on account of
previous tenure, but that they were to make the best and strongest
Administration they could, taking in any efficient men who might be
ready to unite with them on the principles above mentioned. He thought
the best thing for the country would be that this _break up_ should
happen now, before Parliament met, and the attempt at reconstruction
made, while people were still free and uncommitted; but he owned that it
would be very difficult for John Russell, after what had recently
passed, to take such a course. He would not do so himself in his place,
and could not expect him to do so. He might indeed have consistently
given the thing up when he quarrelled with Palmerston, because he had
always said, and repeated it a hundred times, that without Palmerston he
could not go on. But after the Cabinet had agreed to go on, and to
support him in what he had done, it was very difficult for him without
any fresh incident to turn round on them, say he had changed his mind,
and break up the Government. I suggested this last view, which he
concurred in. The end of it was, he said, that Lord John would be
obliged to meet Parliament, fight his battle as best he could, and he
would die in the open field with harness on his back. This result,
sooner or later, he considers certain. As to himself, besides his
general objections to join the Government, he is deeply impressed with
the difficulty of the new Reform Bill. He could not, he says, be a party
to advising the Queen to announce in her Speech that the present system
is all wrong, and must be amended, which he assumes must and will be
done. He recurs again and again to the folly of having moved this
matter, 'set a stone rolling' which they have no power to stop. I
differed from him considerably in what seemed to me the exaggerated view
he takes of this question, and said I did not see why any such
announcement need be made in the Queen's Speech. But he is evidently
afraid to encounter and be mixed up with this matter, on which he feels
deep displeasure, dislike, and much apprehension. He spoke amicably of
John Russell, but was not pleased with his sending George Lewis down to
him, and could not believe he ever seriously expected him to accept an
invitation at that time, and, he contemptuously added, to such an
office; and he rather complained of the formality and stiffness of Lord
John's Memorandum on that occasion. But he appears to have been still
more nettled at having been 'sounded' by Newcastle on the part of Lord
John. 'Why,' he says, 'did not Lord John ask him to come to Chesham
Place, and talk the whole matter over with him frankly?' They have had
so many and such confidential and friendly communications at different
times, that this would have been a most natural and becoming course, or
Lord John might have spoken to me about it; but to get the Duke of
Newcastle, with whom he was on no terms of intimacy or confidence, to
'sound him,' was not the way he might expect to be dealt with. I think
this is a pretty faithful summary of the essential part of what passed
between us on this the most important head. If other things occur to me
of any interest, I will subjoin them.
[Sidenote: PROJECTS FOR A COALITION.]
_January 11th._--Graham came to me again last night. He was more gloomy
in his expectations, and saw nothing but dangers ahead. He had seen
George Lewis and told him all he had said to me. George Lewis had seen
John Russell, and of course repeated it all to him, and the result was
at all events amicable, for he told me that Lord John had sent him a
message by George Lewis to say if he would come to town a day or two
before Parliament met he would tell him what he was going to do. He now
thinks that if this Government is defeated and resigns, Lord John will
refuse to have anything to do with the formation of another, and this
might again bring about a fresh Protectionist attempt. He wavers between
his apprehension of Palmerston joining the Protectionists, and his
doubts of the possibility of such an alliance in the teeth too of the
Queen's antipathy to Palmerston; but he is not at all sure the next
election may not make the Protectionists numerically strong enough to
undertake the task they failed in accomplishing last year. It is not
worth while to record a conversation which was to a certain degree a
repetition of the last, and without any novel matter. He shakes his head
at the prospect of explanations, and thinks John Russell will have a
good deal of difficulty in making out his case.
Then he is moved by the letters written by Lansdowne, Grey, and Charles
Wood to Palmerston expressive of regret at parting with him. It is
pretty evident, that however plausible may be the scheme of a
comprehensive administration, the personal predilections and antipathies
will create enormous difficulties. The Whigs generally hate the
Peelites, and Graham especially. The Peelites hate the Whigs. Mutual
dislike exists between Graham on one side, and Newcastle, Gladstone, and
Sidney Herbert on the other. The three latter are High Churchmen of a
deep colour, which makes it difficult to mix them up with any other
party, so that the Peelite leaders are extremely divided, and the party
is so scattered that it can hardly be called a party. The Whigs, who
really are a party, and, though in a state of great insubordination, do
generally consider themselves one army and under one chief, do not at
all like the idea of treating with the Peelites on anything like equal
terms. If ever the time comes I fully expect they will all resist any
such basis of arrangement, and that John Russell will not be disposed to
agree to a Government being formed by himself _and_ anybody else. These
difficulties and causes of future bickering looming in the distance
present themselves to me. I only hope they may prove visionary.
[Sidenote: THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA AND LOUIS NAPOLEON.]
There is certainly a great deal of sulky disapprobation at Palmerston's
dismissal, and all sorts of stories, and as many lies are rife about it.
The Palmerstons affect moderation, but their rage and resentment
overflow in every direction. He puts a good face on it, and appears calm
and cheerful; she holds different language to different people, but
loses no opportunity of getting up all the steam she can against Lord
John. Meanwhile Granville is doing well in his office, and the staff
there, who have been so long accustomed to Palmerston, and are critical
judges, think so. Cowley told me he had seen some of his papers, and
they were very good, and he particularly mentioned one to Russia. The
Emperor Nicholas has sent over to say that it is very possible Louis
Napoleon may any day be proclaimed Emperor, and that all the Powers were
bound by the Treaty of Vienna not to acknowledge any one of the family
as such, and he begged, should this event arrive, that we would do
nothing about it without previous communication with him, so that
England and Russia might act in concert. Granville replied with great
civility, and expressed a concurrence in the desire that England and
Russia should act in concert, but declined to engage that this
Government would wait till communication could be had with Russia,
representing that the news of any change in France would reach London in
an hour, and the official notification of it in a day, and that it might
be necessary for us to come to some early decision, whereas a
communication with Russia would take several weeks; and he also pointed
out that we had a much greater and more immediate interest than Russia
in what was passing in France, and must act for ourselves in certain
cases which might occur.
_January 13th._--Lord Normanby came to me yesterday to talk over his
affairs.[144] No love is lost between him and Palmerston. I asked him to
tell me frankly what he had ever said or done to provoke the enmity of
Louis Napoleon, and he declared that he was not conscious of having done
anything whatever; that he had continued to live as heretofore with his
old friends, and that was all. The President had always been as civil
and cordial in his manner as ever, and if he had any enmity towards him
he must be a great hypocrite, as he never testified any. When he last
saw him he begged Louis Napoleon, if he heard anything of him that he
thought he had a right to complain of, that he would tell it himself
frankly. Louis Napoleon replied that _la franchise_ was always best, and
he would. Napoleon complained much of Palmerston, not only for this last
affair but on various occasions, when he had given just offence to
France by his _procÈdÈs_. Normanby laughs at the notion of a plot, and
says the best proof that it was an after-thought is that when Turgot
immediately after the _coup d'Ètat_ gave him the reasons for what the
President had done, he never alluded to any plot; and whereas it has
been supposed that the refusal of the Chamber to vote the revision of
the Constitution was one of the causes, Turgot told him that one cause
was their having ascertained that the revision would be carried, as the
Reds were going to vote for it. They intended to take this course,
because they believed that with universal suffrage another Assembly
would be returned of their colour, and for the same reason therefore
Louis Napoleon hurried on his _coup d'Ètat_.
[Footnote 144: [The Marquis of Normanby formally resigned the office of
Ambassador to France on February 21, 1852, and one of the first acts of
Lord Granville as Foreign Secretary was to appoint the second Lord
Cowley in his place. The first Lord Cowley, who had been Ambassador at
Paris in the reign of Louis Philippe, died in April 1847.]]
[Sidenote: M. THIERS ON THE COUP D'…TAT.]
_January 14th._--Granville brought me yesterday a paper which by the
Queen's desire, communicated through Lord John, he has been obliged to
draw up. It is a developement of what the foreign policy of this country
ought to be. He read it to me that I might criticise it. He has not yet
had practice enough in composition to write well; but it is clear,
sensible, and right. But after all it was a series of commonplaces, for
the simple reason that there is nothing mysterious and abstruse in the
foreign policy of this country, and in the substance of it there can be
little or no difference between different governments or men. There was
not a word in Granville's paper to which both Palmerston and Aberdeen
might not subscribe. In diplomacy, above everything, _c'est le ton qui
fait la chanson_, and it has been Palmerston's tone and manner which
have done much more harm than his acts; they have undoubtedly been very
often unjustifiable and offensive to a great degree; but they have been
rendered ten times more so, and, therefore, ten times more mischievous
than they would have been by his _animus_ and his language. Besides
laying down the rights and the duties of this country, which he very
properly states may be resolved into the moral axiom of doing as we
would be done by, Granville enters upon a new subject, and that is the
improvement of the _personnel_ of our diplomacy--the advancement of men
of ability, and who display qualities which will fit them for high posts
abroad. He tells me, too, that he meditates a system of examination,
which will no doubt please the educational propensities of the Prince.
_January 15th._--I dined with Ellice yesterday--a _partie
carrÈe_--himself, Thiers, Mrs. Grote, and myself.[145] It was very
amusing. The little man was _intarissable_, and gave us an account of
all that had happened to him from the moment of his arrest to that of
his expulsion from Brussels--for such it really was, though he went
voluntarily, and the Belgian Ministers told him they would not expel him
if he chose to stay, and would refuse compliance with the demands of the
French Government. He has some idea of writing a narrative of the last
two months, and we encouraged him to do so. He positively denies not
only that there was any plot whatever, but that there was any intention
of taking active measures against the President; they only contemplated
defensive measures, and their object was to surround themselves with a
military force to protect the Assembly against the _coup d'Ètat_ which
the President was meditating, and which he was enabled to execute
because they were unprotected. The French troops will always obey their
commanders, and this accounts for the complete success of Louis
Napoleon; but 'les pantalons rouges' will not fire upon 'd'autres
pantalons rouges;' and if the Assembly had had its guard, the troops
under the order of the Minister at War would not have attacked their
comrades. Thiers knew of this intended _coup d'Ètat_ for a long time
before (in the beginning of October), and told us how it came to his
knowledge. M. de LariboissiËre, son of Napoleon's general, and a rich
man, was sent for by the President about the end of September. He told
him his project, asked him to join and take office. LariboissiËre
declined, and went back to his house in the country. Being a great
friend of Thiers, he thought he could not leave him to get into the
scrape that was preparing for him, and he accordingly employed a lady
who was staying with him to go to Paris and give Thiers _a hint_, merely
that he had better quit Paris, or he would get into trouble. Thiers knew
perfectly well what this meant, and did all he could to make his friends
aware of the danger that was impending over them, and to take
precautions instead of being caught 'comme des nigauds,' as they
eventually were. He spoke with prodigious contempt both of the character
and the talents of Louis Napoleon.
[Footnote 145: [M. Thiers had been compelled to leave France after the
_coup d'Ètat_, having been kept in arrest but a few days. He repaired
first to Brussels, and afterwards to London, where he remained for some
time.]]
_January 28th._--I have had two long conversations with the Duke of
Bedford, who has been very open and communicative, though I don't know
that he told me much that I did not know before. He gave me some minute
details, which were perhaps rather different from previous statements I
had heard and noted, but not materially so. These corrigenda related
principally to the communications between Lord John and Palmerston, and
are hardly worth noticing except for the sake of circumstantial
accuracy. He said that in the Kossuth question his first communication
with Palmerston was personal, and at Windsor; and on Palmerston's
persisting in his intention to see Kossuth, Lord John wrote him a
letter, and then on getting his impertinent answer he summoned the
Cabinet. After the Islington deputations he wrote again to Palmerston in
excessively mild terms, but took that opportunity of remonstrating with
him against his habit of separate and independent action, and it was
then he received what he considered tantamount to an engagement that he
would cease to pursue that course. It was a week after that, while he
was at Woburn, that he received from Normanby the information which he
conceived to be a violation on Palmerston's part of the engagement; and
then he said to the Duke that he could stand it no longer, and would get
rid of him. He accordingly wrote at once to Palmerston, recapitulated
his subjects of complaint, and asked him to authorise him to lay his
resignation before the Queen. His first step, therefore, was with
Palmerston himself, and not with the Queen. Having received the
authority (which Palmerston could not refuse), he proceeded to
communicate with the Queen, and the reply expressed the great
astonishment of both Her Majesty and the Prince, as they had taken it
for granted that this difference, like all preceding ones, would be
patched up. I told the Duke that I had reason to believe the Queen was
displeased at the offer of Ireland being made to Palmerston _‡ son
insu_; but this was a mistake. Lord John did communicate to her
immediately the letter he wrote to Palmerston, containing not _an
offer_, but an intimation that he would propose it to Her Majesty if he
was disposed to accept it. This was certainly the proper and
constitutional course for him to take. He does, indeed, understand his
duty in this respect, and is very different from Palmerston; he never
conceals anything from the Queen, and invariably enters into her
objections, admitting or refuting them, when she makes any. Palmerston's
way was to make no answer whatever when she made objections; to take no
notice of them; a practice which Lord John had himself blamed, and
remonstrated with him upon. This, and the still more monstrous habit he
had of treating with contempt alterations that had been prescribed to
him, and sending despatches from which the Queen or Lord John had struck
out certain passages with the same restored, had excited her resentment
to a high pitch.
I find Normanby has been in fact _recalled_, though it is agreed that he
is to _resign_ so as to be let down easily. He puts a good face on it,
but is very indignant, and thinks himself very ill-used. His vanity is
very amusing, for he talks of his great influence, and the respect and
consideration in which he was universally held, when everybody knows
that there never was an Ambassador so generally disliked and despised.
It was intended to send Clanricarde there, but it was altered, I do not
know why, and Cowley appointed, to his great delight and astonishment,
and to mine. Cowley, who was at Windsor the other day, told me he saw a
most curious and interesting paper there which Stockmar showed him. It
was a report from Van de Weyer to King Leopold of his interviews with
the President while he was at Paris. He complained very much of the
English newspapers, as well as of our Queen's hostile feeling towards
him. Van de Weyer told him he must not be surprised if in a
Constitutional country like England the press spoke the language it did;
and as to the Queen's friendship for the Orleans family, his own
chivalrous feeling could only approve of her continuing to them in their
adversity the friendship which had been formed in their prosperous days.
It seems Louis Napoleon had promised to leave Leopold alone, and not
meddle with Belgium, but held threatening language towards Switzerland
and Piedmont.
[Sidenote: EXPLANATIONS IN PARLIAMENT.]
_February 5th._[146]--I might have saved myself the trouble of writing
down a scattered and imperfect notice of the Palmerstonian dismissal,
since John Russell told the whole story on Tuesday night. The public
interest and curiosity to hear the 'explanations' were intense. Up to
almost the last moment the confidence and the _jactance_ of the
Palmerston clique were boundless. At length the moment arrived. In all
my experience I never recollect such a triumph as John Russell achieved,
and such complete discomfiture as Palmerston's. Lord John made a very
able speech, and disclosed as much as was necessary, and no more. Beyond
all doubt his great _coup_ was the Queen's Minute in 1850, which was
absolutely crushing. Some grave persons think the introduction of her
name was going too far, but it was irresistible. The effect was
prodigious. Palmerston was weak and inefficient, and it is pretty
certain that he was taken by surprise, and was unprepared for all that
John Russell brought forward. Not a man of weight or influence said a
word for him, nobody but Milnes and Dudley Stuart. The Queen's letter
was decisive, for it was evident that his conduct must have been
intolerable to elicit such charges and rebukes; and it cannot fail to
strike everybody that no man of common spirit, and who felt a
consciousness of innocence, would have brooked anything so insulting.
Such a man would have indignantly resigned, and have demanded what John
Russell meant by making himself the organ of such accusations; but he
submitted to them.
[Footnote 146: [Parliament was opened by the Queen in person on February
3rd, when full explanations were given by Lord John Russell and Lord
Palmerston of the transactions related in the preceding pages.]]
_London, March 26th._--I was taken ill before I had time to finish what
I was writing, and have been laid up ever since with a violent attack of
gout and fever, from which I am now slowly recovering. During all the
time of the change of Government[147] I was in my bed, and not allowed
to see anybody; but for the last few days I have been able to come into
my drawing-room and receive visitors, who have come in great numbers,
and of every imaginable variety, to see me, so that I have had enough of
occupation and amusement. I cannot pretend to write any account of what
has been passing, and not having recorded, as I heard them, the scraps
of unknown matters, I am now unable to do so. The new Government is
treated with great contempt, and many of the appointments are pitiable.
But, while it is the fashion to exalt Derby himself, and treat with
great scorn almost all his colleagues, I think Derby himself is quite as
unfit for the post of Prime Minister as any of them can be for those
they occupy. His extreme levity and incapacity for taking grave and
serious views, though these defects may be partially remedied by the
immensity of his responsibility, will ever weigh upon his character, and
are too deeply rooted in it to be eradicated. His oratory is his forte,
and without that he would be a very ordinary man. His speeches since he
took office have been excellent, and in a very becoming tone and spirit;
but the notion, which is generally entertained, of his being so
high-minded and chivalrous, is a mistake. He is not so in private
life--that is, in his transactions on the turf--and it is not likely
that a man should be one thing in private, and another in public, life.
[Footnote 147: [On February 16, Lord John brought in a Militia Bill, to
which Palmerston, who was burning with a desire to revenge himself for
his dismissal, moved an amendment, which he carried against the
Government by a majority of nine. On this John Russell resigned, and
Lord Derby was sent for. The resignation of the Russell Government was
announced to both Houses on the 23rd, and Lord Derby's first exposition
of policy as Prime Minister was made on February 27.]]
[Sidenote: LORD DERBY'S ADMINISTRATION.]
The great object of interest and curiosity this Session has been
Palmerston; everybody anxious to see to which side he leaned. A short
time ago he evinced a disposition towards reconciliation with John
Russell. The latter invited him to his meeting at Chesham Place;
Palmerston did not go, but was rather pleased at being invited; and soon
after John Russell went to one of Lady Palmerston's parties, and talked
to Palmerston a good while. But at this time his resentment was still
unappeased, for he got Clarendon to hear all his complaints, and showed
him all the correspondence. With his usual unfairness, he complained to
everybody of John Russell's having so unexpectedly sprung upon him the
Queen's Minute in the discussion on his dismissal, and he even did so to
Clarendon; whereas, so far from any surprise, Lord John wrote him word
three days before that he was going to read it in the House, and offered
him any papers he might desire to have. Clarendon asked him if he had
not received such a communication, and then he was forced to own he had.
Clarendon, however, did his best to bring about a renewal of their
intercourse, personal and political. Palmerston said John Russell had
given him his independence, and he meant to avail himself of that
advantage. The Whigs expect and desire that he will return to them, and,
in the event of a change, come again into office, but not the Foreign
Office, which he says himself he does not again wish for. Derby offered
him office, which he at once refused, on hearing that Protection was not
given up; but many think he will after all join Derby, as soon as this
question is finally disposed of. I doubt it, for he would not serve
under Disraeli, and Disraeli would hardly give up the leadership having
once enjoyed it. The Peelites sit together, all except Graham, who has
regularly joined John Russell, and sits beside him. Nobody knows what
they mean to do, nor which party they will eventually join. At present
Gladstone's speeches do not look like a junction with Derby, but nothing
is more possible than that, as soon as the great stumbling-block is
removed, they will go over to this Government, and the leaders take
office. They most of them hate the Whigs, and there is certainly no
great, if any, difference of opinion between them and the Derbyites,
except on the question of Free Trade. Graham rather expects this result.
I asked him if he thought Disraeli would consent to resign the lead to
anybody. He thought not, certainly not to Gladstone; possibly he might
to Palmerston. There are great complaints of Disraeli in the House of
Commons. They say he does not play his part as leader with tact and
propriety, and treats his opponents impudently and uncourteously, which
is egregiously foolish, and will end by exposing him to some great
mortification; the House of Commons will not stand such behaviour from
such a man.
_London, May 2nd._--I have been for some time past so disgusted with
politics and politicians, and have been driven to take such a gloomy
view of affairs and of our prospects, that I could not bring myself to
resume my task of noting down such matters as might appear not wholly
unworthy of being recorded. At last I have resolved to run over the
principal occurrences of the last few weeks. The Derby Government has
been sinking more and more in public opinion. The shuffling and reserve
of Derby in the House of Lords, coupled with the declarations on the
hustings of his adherents, especially Kelly, Solicitor-General, and the
extraordinary and still unexplained escapade of Walpole in the House of
Commons about giving votes to the Militia,[148] have all tended to
bring them into discredit and contempt. The Opposition were much elated
at seeing the Government in this state, and in fact they had a very good
game to play, when the petulance, obstinacy, and imprudence of John
Russell brought upon them a disastrous defeat, and set up the Government
completely. Without concert with his followers, and against the advice
and remonstrances of those who were apprised of his intention, he came
down to the House, and opposed the second reading of the Militia Bill.
The fault was enormous, for the inconsistency was glaring. Palmerston
instantly fell upon him with the greatest acrimony, and lashed him with
excessive severity, carrying the House along with him, and evidently
enjoying the opportunity of thus paying off old scores. Seymour spoke
against Lord John, and many of his own friends and supporters voted
against him, so that there was a majority of two to one in a full
House.[149] Nothing could exceed the exultation of the Ministerialists,
but the resentment and indignation of the Opposition, who saw all their
hopes and prospects marred by this extraordinary blunder on the part of
their chief. John Russell was denounced as unfit to lead a party; still
more, again, to be at the head of a Government. His best friends could
not defend him, and, while he has done irreparable damage to his own
political character and influence, he has thrown the Opposition into
such disorganisation and confusion, that it will be difficult for them
to act any more with union or effect. The Peelites are of course
disgusted, and, never liking John Russell, will be less than ever
inclined to form a junction with him. Palmerston's conduct in this
debate paves the way for his joining Derby if he chooses it, and it is
by no means improbable that a large proportion of the Peelites will do
the same. The probability of this is increased by Disraeli's speech the
night before last, on bringing on his Budget. This was a great
performance, very able, and was received with great applause in the
House. But the extraordinary part of it was the frank, full, and glowing
panegyric he passed on the effect of the Free Trade measures of Sir
Robert Peel, proving by elaborate statistics the marvellous benefits
which had been derived from his tariffs and reduction of duties--not,
however, alluding to Corn. All this was of course received with delight
and vehemently cheered by the Whigs and Peelites, but in silence and
discontent by his own side. It was neither more nor less than a
magnificent funeral oration upon Peel's policy, and as such it was
hailed, without any taunting, or triumphing, or reproaches, on account
of his former conduct to Peel, except a few words from Hume and Wakley.
It is difficult to say what may be the effect of this speech, but it
seems impossible that Protection in any shape can be attempted after it;
and it certainly opens a door to the admission of any Peelites who may
be disposed to join a Conservative Government, for even their personal
feelings against Dizzy will be mitigated by it. Graham has not been in
the House all this time, being laid up with the gout at Netherby.[150]
[Footnote 148: [Mr. Walpole, the Home Secretary in Lord Derby's
Administration, had announced that he should move on bringing up the
Militia Bill the insertion of a clause, 'That any person who shall serve
in the Militia for two years shall be entitled to a vote in the county
in which he resides.' This proposal excited a good deal of ridicule, and
was subsequently withdrawn. The Militia Bill passed the House of Commons
on June 7th, and the House of Lords on the 21st of the same month.]]
[Footnote 149: The second reading was carried by 355 to 165.]
[Footnote 150: [The Cabinet composed by the Earl of Derby in 1852
consisted of--
Earl of Derby First Lord of the Treasury.
Lord St. Leonards Lord Chancellor.
Mr. Disraeli Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Earl of Lonsdale Lord President of the Council.
Marquis of Salisbury Lord Privy Seal.
Earl of Malmesbury Foreign Secretary of State.
Sir John Pakington Colonial Secretary of State.
Mr. Spencer Walpole Home Secretary of State.
Earl of Hardwicke First Lord of the Admiralty.
Mr. Herries President of the Board of Control.
Lord John Manners First Commissioner of Works.]]
[Sidenote: ABANDONMENT OF PROTECTION.]