[Transcriber's Note:
Footnotes:
There are two styles of footnotes used in this work.
Footnotes enclosed in square brackets are by the editor
Footnotes not enclosed in square brackets are by the author.
So example footnotes would be:
[Footnote 1: [This note is by the editor]]
[Footnote 2: This note is by the author]]
THE
GREVILLE MEMOIRS
(SECOND PART)
VOL. III.
PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON
_THE GREVILLE MEMOIRS_
(_SECOND PART_)
A JOURNAL OF THE REIGN
OF
QUEEN VICTORIA
FROM 1837 TO 1852
BY THE LATE
CHARLES C. F. GREVILLE, ESQ.
CLERK OF THE COUNCIL
IN THREE VOLUMES--VOL. III.
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1885
_All rights reserved_
CONTENTS
OF
THE THIRD VOLUME.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Death of Mr. Thomas Grenville--Russian Measures in Poland--French
Overtures to England--The Confidential Correspondence on the
Spanish Marriage--Relations with France--Hostility of Lord
Palmerston to France--Visit to Paris--Princess Lieven's Version
of the Transaction--Lord Cowley's Opinion--Conversation with
M. Guizot--M. Duch‚tel's Opinion--The exact Truth as to the
Spanish Marriage--Conversation with M. Thiers--A Dinner at M.
Thiers'--Further Argument with M. Guizot--Character of Queen
Christina--Papers laid before the Chamber--Relations of the
British Embassy with the French Opposition--At the Tuileries--Mr.
Baring's Opinion--Debate in the Chamber of Deputies--Mrs.
Austin's Salon in Paris--Debates in England--Bad Effect of Lord
Normanby's Intrigues with Thiers--Another Misunderstanding--M.
de Tocqueville--Ball at the HÙtel de Ville--Animosity of Guizot
and Lord Palmerston--A Call at the Sorbonne and at the HÙtel
Lambert--Change of Government in Spain--Farewell Visit to M.
Guizot--Effect of the English Blue Book--Conversation with M.
Thiers _page_ 1
CHAPTER XXIV.
Return to Paris--Possibility of a Tory Government--Hostility
to Lord Palmerston--Lord Aberdeen's Dissatisfaction--The
Duke's short View of the Case--Sir Robert Peel's Repugnance
to take Office--Lord John Russell--Further Disputes of Guizot
and Lord Normanby--The Quarrel with the Embassy--Lord Stanley
attacks the Government--The Normanby Quarrel--Lord Palmerston
threatens to break off Diplomatic Relations with France--Sir
Robert Peel's Opinion of Lord Palmerston--Mr. Walter--The
'Times'--The Normanby Quarrel made up--Mr. Greville's Opinion
of his own Journals--Income of the Royal Family--Lord George
Bentinck--Lord Normanby's _…tourderies_--The Government gains
Strength--The Irish Poor Law--The Czar places a large Sum with
the Bank of France--State of Ireland--Lord George Bentinck
as a Leader--Foreign Affairs--Archbishop Whately--Birthday
Reflexions--Lord Dudley's Diary--Power of the Press--Mr.
Disraeli and Mr. Moxon--The Defence of the Country--Troubles
in Portugal--Illness of Lord Bessborough--The Duke of
Wellington on the Army--Spain and Portugal--Abolition of the
Lord-Lieutenancy contemplated by Lord John--Difficulty of
abolishing the Lord-Lieutenancy--Deaths of Lord Bessborough
and of O'Connell--Lord Clarendon's Appointment--The End of
O'Connell--The Governor-Generalship of India--Sir James Graham
thought of--Failure of Debates on the Portuguese Question--The
Duke's Statue--The Governor-Generalship of India offered to
Sir James Graham--Sir Robert Peel's Position--Failures of the
Government--The Duke of Wellington's Popularity--Opinion in
Liverpool--Bitter Hostility of Mr. Croker to Peel _page_ 50
CHAPTER XXV.
Panic in the Money Market--The Bank Act--Sir Robert Peel's
Authority--Suspension of the Banking Act of 1844--Death of
the Archbishop of York--Meeting of Parliament--Irish Coercion
Bill--Opinion of the Lord-Lieutenant--Weakness of the Irish
Measures--Sir Robert Peel on the Bank Charter Act--The Duke of
Wellington on the Defences of the Country--English Catholic
Affairs at Rome--Illness of Lord Chancellor Cottenham--Bishop
Hampden's Appointment'--Chloroform--Lamartine's 'Girondins'--The
Hampden Dispute--Death of Lord Harrowby--Taxation--Leadership of
the Opposition--The Hampden War--Scenes in Spain--Visit to Lord
Melbourne--Lord Melbourne at Windsor--Burnham Beeches--Letter to
Cobden--Leadership of the Opposition--Views of Sir James Graham
on the Colonies--Archbishop Sumner--Baron Alderson--Diplomatic
Relations with Rome--Weakness of the Government--Bad Effects of
Lord John's Speech 99
CHAPTER XXVI.
The Revolution in France--Princess Lieven's Narrative--Lamartine's
Position--M. Guizot in London--Proposed Addition to the Income
Tax--Sir Robert Peel spoken of--The State of Paris--The
King's Narrative to Lady Granville--The State of France--The
Convulsion in Europe--State of Ireland--Lord Palmerston invites
Guizot to Dinner--M. Delessert on the State of France--The
Revolution in Vienna--Fall of Metternich--State of England
and Ireland--Lamartine's Reply to the Irish--The Duke's
Preparations--Contemplated Measures of Repression--Lord John
Russell's Coldness--Defence of the Public Offices--Failure of
the Chartist Demonstration--Scene on April 10th--Effect of
April 10th abroad--Measures of the Government--Measures of
Relief for Ireland--Louis Philippe's Defence of the Spanish
Marriages--Lord Palmerston's Conduct in Spain--Lord Clarendon
on Ireland--Lord Palmerston's Affront in Spain--The West India
Interest--Conversation with Sir James Graham _page_ 132
CHAPTER XXVII.
Anarchy in France--Another Omission of Lord Palmerston's--His
Spanish Interference attacked--Sir H. Bulwer's Account of his
Expulsion from Madrid--Conviction of John Mitchell--Lord Grey
objects to Palmerston's Conduct--Mirasol's Mission--Death
of Princess Sophia--Weakness of the Spanish Case--Further
Evasions of Palmerston--The Queen's Attachment to the Orleans
Family--Blunders and Weakness of the Government--Danger
of a Tory Government and a Dissolution--Disturbed State
of London--The Spanish Debate--Measures taken against the
Chartists--Perturbation of Society--Abolition of the Navigation
Laws--The Oaths Bill--Chartist Demonstration--Lord John's
West India Bill--Isturitz leaves England--Sir Henry Bulwer's
Intrigues in Madrid--Lord Clarendon's Distrust of the Irish
Catholics--Dangerous Position of the Government--Prospect
of a Tory Government--Attitude of the Peelites--Lord Grey's
Defence--Defeat of Sir J. Pakington's Amendment--Ferocious
Contest in Paris--Improved Position of the Government--Louis
Philippe's Opinion of the French Generals--Endsleigh--The West
of England--State of Ireland--State of England--Suspension
of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland--Collapse of the Irish
Insurrection--Sir Robert Adair--Lord Hardinge's Appointment
to Ireland as Commander-in-Chief--Lord Hardinge in India--The
Sikh Battles--A Chartist Establishment--Capture of Smith
O'Brien--Sicilian Independence--The Sale at Stowe--Anecdote of
Peel and Huskisson--Lord Clarendon on Ireland--Lord Palmerston's
Conduct to Austria and Italy--Debate on Foreign Affairs--State
of France--Irish Troubles--Charles Buller's Schemes for
Ireland--Close of the Session--Death of Lord George Bentinck--Lord
George Bentinck's Political Career--At the Jockey Club 177
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Louis Blanc on France--The Catholic Priesthood--Failure of
Scheme for Ireland--Evils of Total Repeal of Duties--Reaction
in Prussia--A Message from M. Thiers--Conversation of Louis
Philippe with Lord Clarendon--Dinner at Mr. Reeve's--Death of
Lord Melbourne--Death of Charles Buller--Their Characters--Plans
for Ireland--A Dinner of Historians--Election of Louis
Napoleon as President of the French Republic--Death of Lord
Auckland--The Saturnalia of 1848--The Admiralty offered to
Sir James Graham--Graham declines--Lord Palmerston's Attacks
on Austria--Grounds of Sir J. Graham's Refusal--Opening of
Parliament--Debate in the Lords--Debate in the Commons--Mr.
Disraeli the Leader of the Tories--The Irish Policy of the
Government--Lord John Russell limits the Suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act to Six Months--The Irish Grant--Dreadful State
of Ireland--Admiral CÈcille Ambassador in London--The Ceylon
Committee--Affair of the Sicilian Stores--The Fall of Hudson,
the Railway King--Sir Charles Napier's Appointment to command in
India--The Sicilian Arms _page_ 235
CHAPTER XXIX.
Difficult Position of the Government--A Cloud in the East--Italian
Affairs--Suppression of a Despatch--Sir Charles Napier goes
to India--Sir James Graham's Alarms--Lord John Russell's
Position--Battle of Novara--Opposition to the Repeal of the
Navigation Laws--Sir James Graham's Pusillanimity--State of
France--Conflicting Views on Irish Relief--Lord John contemplates
a Peerage--Interview of Lord Clarendon with Sir Robert Peel--The
Navigation Bill--Maiden Speech of Sir R. Peel's second Son--An
omission of Lord Palmerston's--Lord Palmerston's Opponents--Lord
Palmerston's Defence--A Trip to Scotland--Dr. Candlish's
Sermon--History of the Debates on Foreign Affairs--Extension
of the Suffrage--The Queen's Visit to Ireland--A Council
at Balmoral--Prince Albert's Conversation--Lord Aberdeen's
Views--Lord John's Defence of Lord Palmerston 278
CHAPTER XXX.
The Case of Gorham _v._ the Bishop of Exeter--Death of Lord
Alvanley--The Session opened--State of Parties--Clouds
arise--The Greek Affair--The Ceylon Committee--The Removal of
Lord Roden--The Pacifico Affair--Lord Clarendon arrives--The
Dolly's Brae Debate--The Irish Encumbered Estates Act--The Greek
Affair--Conversation with Sir Robert Peel--The Roden Affair--The
Queen's View of Lord Palmerston's Foreign Policy--Debate on Mr.
Disraeli's Motion--Mr. Gladstone's Equivocal Position--Grillon's
Club--Precarious Position of the Government--The Gorham
Judgement--The African Squadron--Ministerial Troubles--The Greek
Dispute--Lord Campbell Lord Chief Justice--Negotiation between
the Branches of the House of Bourbon--The French Ambassador
recalled from London--Lord Palmerston's Prevarications--The Case
of the French Government--Intention to remove Lord Palmerston
from the Foreign Office--First Speech of Mr. Stanley--Sir James
Graham's Schemes of Reform--Debate in the Lords on the Greek
Dispute--Effects of the Division--Lord Palmerston's Great Speech
300
CHAPTER XXXI.
Accident to Sir Robert Peel--Triumphant Success of Lord
Palmerston--Death of Sir Robert Peel--Sir James Graham's
Position--Lord Palmerston's Policy--Lord Palmerston's
Ovation--Death of Mr. Arbuthnot--Death of King Louis
Philippe--The Papal Hierarchy in England--German Affairs--Papal
Aggression--General Radowitz invited to Windsor--Papal
Aggression--Conversation with Lord John Russell--And with
Lord Palmerston--Mr. Green's Lecture--Visit to Brocket--Bear
Ellice--Lord Melbourne's Papers _page_ 347
CHAPTER XXXII.
Difficulties ahead--Lord John Russell resigns--Conduct of
the Opposition--Lord Stanley waits on the Queen--Sir James
Graham's Views--Ministerial Negotiations--Lord Stanley attempts
to form a Ministry--Lord Stanley fails--The Whig Ministry
returns to Office--Sir James Graham stands aloof--Dislocation
of Parties--Embarrassments arising from the Papal Aggression
Bill--Weakness of the Government--Relations of Sir James Graham
and the Whigs--Debate on the Papal Aggression Bill--A Measure
of Chancery Reform--Lord Stanley at Newmarket--Hostility of
the Peelites--Opening of the Great Exhibition--Defeats of the
Ministry--The Exhibition saves the Government--M. Thiers in
London--Close of the Season--The Jew Bill--Overture to Sir James
Graham--Which is declined--Autumn Visits and Agitation--Lord
John Russell's Reform Bill--The Creed of a Capuchin--Kossuth's
Reception in England--The Kossuth Agitation in England--Mr.
Disraeli on Lord George Bentinck--Sir James Graham's Fears of
Reform--Dangers from Lord Palmerston's arbitrary Conduct--Case of
Greece--Case of Sicily--The Coup d'…tat of the 2nd December 377
CHAPTER XXXIII.
Disraeli's Life of Lord George Bentinck--An approaching
Storm--Peel's Conduct on the East Retford Franchise in 1830--Death
of Mr. Luttrell--Dismissal of Lord Palmerston--Lord Clarendon
declines the Foreign Office--Lord Granville takes the Foreign
Office--Causes of Lord Palmerston's Dismissal--Effects of the
Change--The Complete Story--Lord John negotiates with the
Peelites--Whigs and Peelites--Lord Normanby's Relations with
Louis Napoleon--Foreign Policy of the Country--Thiers' Account of
the Coup d'…tat--Further Details on Palmerston's Dismissal--Lord
Normanby's Recall--Lord John's Explanations--Change of
Government--Lord Derby's First Ministry--Lord Palmerston's
Position--Discredit of the Derby Government--Disraeli's Speech on
the Budget 423
CHAPTER XXXIV.
The Trial of Strength--Defeat of the Government--Shuffling of
Ministers--The No-Popery Cry--Dissolution of Parliament--Character
of the Derby Government--The Ministers--The Opposition--A
Difficult Situation--Public Indifference--Results of the
Elections--Macaulay's Election--Policy of the Opposition--Scheme
of a Coalition under Lord Lansdowne--Lord Derby at
Goodwood--The Herefordshire Election--Sir James Graham's
View of the Situation--Death of Count D'Orsay--Difficulties
of Reconciliation--Lord John Russell's Position--A Divided
Opposition--Lord Granby's Dissatisfaction--Lord John Russell
on Reform--Lord Cowley's Proxy--A Plan to catch Lord
Palmerston--Death of the Duke of Wellington _page_ 452
* * * * *
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX A. DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY 481
APPENDIX B. THE ANTI-PAPAL AGITATION 486
INDEX 493
A JOURNAL
OF THE
REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA.
FROM 1837 TO 1852.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Death of Mr. Thomas Grenville--Russian Measures in Poland--French
Overtures to England--The Confidential Correspondence on the
Spanish Marriage--Relations with France--Hostility of Lord
Palmerston to France--Visit to Paris--Princess Lieven's Version
of the Transaction--Lord Cowley's Opinion--Conversation with
M. Guizot--M. Duch‚tel's Opinion--The exact Truth as to the
Spanish Marriage--Conversation with M. Thiers--A Dinner at M.
Thiers'--Further Argument with M. Guizot--Character of Queen
Christina--Papers laid before the Chamber--Relations of the
British Embassy with the French Opposition--At the Tuileries--Mr.
Baring's Opinion--Debate in the Chamber of Deputies--Mrs.
Austin's Salon in Paris--Debates in England--Bad Effect of Lord
Normanby's Intrigues with Thiers--Another Misunderstanding--M.
de Tocqueville--Ball at the HÙtel de Ville--Animosity of Guizot
and Lord Palmerston--A Call at the Sorbonne and at the HÙtel
Lambert--Change of Government in Spain--Farewell Visit to M.
Guizot--Effect of the English Blue Book--Conversation with M.
Thiers.
[Sidenote: CHARACTER OF MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.]
_December 19th, 1846._--On Thursday evening at seven o'clock Mr.
Grenville died, after a week's illness which was no more than a severe
cold or influenza. If he had lived till the 31st of this month, he would
have completed his ninety-first year. I had only known him with any sort
of intimacy for the last five or six years, during which I saw a good
deal of him. He was a remarkable man, not so much from great ability as
from a singular healthiness of mind and body and the greenness of his
old age. I never saw so old a man in possession of such mental and
bodily faculties; his only infirmity was deafness; till about a year ago
he used to walk vigorously; he never had an illness till the one with
which he was attacked the year before last, and from which he recovered
entirely though with strength somewhat impaired. His memory was
remarkable; his cheerfulness, vivacity, and kindness of disposition
delightful. He evinced an affection for his relations and a cordiality
to his friends that were pleasant to behold, and he was not only
entirely free from the moroseness and captiousness which so often attend
old age, but he blended an extreme suavity of manner and sweetness of
temper with the high-bred politeness of the more ceremonious age in
which he had flourished. He was certainly the most amiable and engaging
specimen of an old man I ever beheld. I do not conceive that his
abilities were ever first-rate, and latterly (whatever may have been the
case early in life) he entertained very strong prejudices and often very
unreasonable ones; these prejudices caused him to act in some instances
in a manner inconsistent with the urbanity of his disposition. He never
could endure the Reform Bill or forgive its authors; he never would set
his foot in Holland House after that measure; and he estranged himself
from all his old political friends, even those with whom he had been the
most intimate, not indeed absolutely quarrelling with them, but
desisting from all intimacy. He was a scholar and a well-informed man,
and he retained till the last all his literary tastes and habits; he
loved the society of literary men, and to the last entered with zest and
spirit and unimpaired intelligence into all questions both of literature
and politics. It is difficult to say what the exact colour of his
political opinions was. He used to be a Whig; but he was, at all events
latterly, a moderate anti-reforming Whig, with a horror of organic
changes and not fond of any changes, disliking free trade and disliking
Cobden more; favourable to Catholic emancipation and the establishment
of a Catholic Church, but abhorring O'Connell who was his _bÍte noire_,
and in his eyes the incarnation of all evil and mischief. He never was
married, but when he was young he was desperately in love with the
Duchess of Devonshire, and he never married because her image remained
enthroned in his breast, and he never could find any other woman to be
compared with her. For many years he was a poor man, and he never became
a rich one till the death of Lord Glastonbury, who left him an estate
and a great deal of money; the estate, which was entailed on his nephew
George Neville, he generously gave up to him at once. He lived
hospitably and handsomely, and was, I am told, very generous and
charitable. His greatest expense was in books; he had collected a
library of extraordinary value, and which for the size of it has always
been reckoned the most complete of any private collection. It continued
to interest and occupy him to the last, and he never ceased to add to it
as occasion offered; he was, indeed, one of the last of the great
collectors, of the bibliomaniacs; he collated every book himself, and
placed in the title-page of each, in his own handwriting, an account of
the book, where purchased, and its history when of any interest. His
society in latter years was restricted, and he was not fond of making
new acquaintances unless he fell in with them by accident, when he was
easily approachable and always disposed to carry them on. He had
constantly dinners and very agreeable ones, and it was wonderful to see
him at ninety years old doing the honours of his table with all the
energy, gaiety, and gallantry of a man in the prime of life. A happier
life and an easier death it would be difficult to discover; his life was
extended to nearly a century without any intermission of bodily health,
any decay of mental faculties, and, what is more extraordinary and more
valuable, without any deadness or coldness of human affections. He was
blessed with affluence, with the love of rational and elevating
pursuits, and with ample leisure and power to enjoy them. He was a
philosopher, a gentleman, and a Christian, and he lived in constant
social intercourse with the relations to whom he was attached, or the
friends of his predilection, to all of whom he was an object of the
deepest respect and affection. A life so tranquil and prosperous was
terminated by a death no less easy and serene; his indisposition was not
such as to interfere with his usual habits; he rose at his accustomed
hour and dressed himself to the last, even on the day of his death. He
had always a book, latterly the Prayer Book, before him, and his mind
was undisturbed and unclouded. He dined and went to sleep in his chair,
and from that sleep he never awoke.
_December 20th._--On Friday morning an article in the 'Times' announced
that the Emperor of Russia was going to annex Poland to his empire,
putting an end to the last vestige of Polish nationality. Yesterday
morning the 'Chronicle' declared this report was exaggerated, if not
erroneous, and that all that was contemplated was the abrogation of
custom-house regulations between the Russian and Polish frontiers. The
history of these contradictory articles is this: On Wednesday at the
Cabinet dinner Palmerston brought this piece of news, communicated to
him by Bunsen, who was in a great state of alarm and indignation, and
said that Metternich was equally alarmed and eager to do something. The
Austrian and Prussian proposals were severally these: Metternich wished
for a declaration that the annexation of Cracow should not be used as a
precedent, but considered as an exceptional case. Bunsen suggested that
a naval demonstration should be made in the Baltic by us, of course in
conjunction with Austria and Prussia. These two Powers now begin to see
what an egregious folly they have committed in the Cracow affair, and
are filled with shame and terror. The next morning, Friday, Palmerston
saw Brunnow, and he asked him whether this story was true. Brunnow said
he was glad he had asked him, and that he could assure him he had never
heard one word of it and did not believe it, that he believed it to be a
mere fiscal regulation which would be advantageous to the Poles and not
agreeable to the Russians, but that the reported political move he
disbelieved. He had, however, written to Nesselrode to ask what the
real truth was. Palmerston, without doubt, on this sent the article to
the 'Morning Chronicle;' there is a phrase at the end of it about Guizot
quite Palmerstonian. It is amusing to see the two papers moved by
different ministerial interests. John Russell told me at Windsor
yesterday that he believed the first account. It certainly seems to me
that it is a very bad piece of policy of the Emperor's, if true; he has
accomplished the absorption of Poland already in fact, and what can it
signify to him to do so in form? By degrees he has stripped the Poles of
almost all national distinctions, and he has only to go on as he has
been doing for some time past to complete his work; nobody opposed,
nobody remonstrated with him at each successive violation of those
privileges which all Europe guaranteed; and now the Powers, who
patiently and tamely endured the most flagrant violations in fact, are
ready to explode with indignation at an announcement of them in form.
[Sidenote: RUSSIAN MEASURES IN POLAND.]
James Rothschild is come over here, partly on his own concerns, and
partly on Louis Philippe's, who is very intimate with him and talks to
him often and confidentially. He has been with our Ministers, at least
with Lord Lansdowne and Lord Clarendon (I do not know if he has been
with any others), and said a great deal about the King's intense desire
to be well with England again, asked if we wanted to get rid of Guizot,
and intimated that if his fall would facilitate the reconciliation he
would be sacrificed without scruple. They have no doubt whatever that he
is authorised by the King to convey this to our Government. Clarendon
told him that Palmerston would not walk across the room to get rid of
Guizot, and did not care one farthing whether he was in or out; but that
he was not surprised that they should fancy he might desire it, knowing
as he did that they had left no stone unturned to bring about his
removal from the Foreign Office, so far as they were able to say or to
do anything to that end.
_December 24th._--Jarnac was with me for three hours yesterday, and I am
going to him to-day to see some of his papers. The whole of our
conversation resolves itself into this: he said that they really had
believed that the Coburg marriage was _imminent_; that they had given
ample and repeated notice (especially in the note of February 27) that,
if ever they saw this, they should act accordingly, consider the Eu
engagement at an end, and take their own line; that they never could get
Palmerston to put on paper distinctly that we did not and would not
encourage this match. This, involved in a vast deal of phraseology, and
many minute details, with a great deal of false reasoning, and facts
contradictory of each other, made up his whole discourse. I endeavoured
to pin him down to one or two points, from which he was always trying to
escape, and to cover his retreat by verbiage.
I have made up my mind to go to Paris, Lady Normanby having offered to
take me in at the Embassy: this temptation decides me.
_December 25th._--Yesterday I was with Jarnac for three hours and a
half, reading papers. He showed me everything: the copy of the famous
despatch of July 19 (Palmerston to Bulwer), which was (as they say) the
_fons et origo mali_; all Guizot's private letters to him, and his to
Guizot; _ditto_, between him and the king; his _procËs-verbaux_ of
conferences with Palmerston; copy of the note of February 27 (on which
they so much rely); the letter of Guizot's which was sent to John
Russell, and John's admirable answer; Jarnac's own rejoinder; Guizot and
the King on this correspondence: in short, he gave me to read all that
was material, and that I had time to read in these three or four hours.
At all events, I believe I am now as completely in the possession of the
case on both sides as it is possible to be, and all this information and
knowledge has not changed my opinion.
It is clear that we have been jockeyed by France in a very shabby,
uncandid, underhand way. Guizot's private letters, admirably written,
bear on them all the stamp of sincerity and conviction, and are
calculated to impress anybody with the belief that he was sincere, and
that he thought he was doing what he had a right to do as regarded
England, and what it was his duty to do as to France. But where rights
and duties are clear, there is no need of concealment; everything may
be, and ought to be, open and above board; and besides the object of
defeating a Coburg scheme and securing the Spanish bride, there was that
of preserving the _entente cordiale_, which he could not expect to do,
acting as he did.
[Sidenote: THE SPANISH MARRIAGES.]
When disentangled from all its envelopments of verbiage and mutual
insinuations, the case resolves itself into one of two very simple
points, and lies in a very narrow compass:--The new ministers came into
office about July 7; it was then about a fortnight afterwards that
Jarnac spoke to Palmerston about the Queen of Spain's marriage (not a
word about the Infanta _de part ou d'autre_). Palmerston had written to
Bulwer on the 19th, and he read this despatch to Jarnac, and gave him a
copy of it (confidentially) to send to Paris. This was the despatch on
which they ground their whole case. It treated of two subjects: the
marriage of the Queen, and the internal government of Spain. It was very
able, very sound, but it was extremely imprudent to communicate it to
the French Government. The substance of it was this: that we always had
considered the marriage as a Spanish question, in which no foreign power
had any right to interfere. That there were three candidates left in the
field (Trapani and young Carlos being out of the field), 'Prince of
Coburg and two sons of Don Francisco;' that we only desired that the
Queen might take whichever of them would most conduce to her own
happiness and the good of Spain. We neither supported nor objected to
any of them; that therefore there were no instructions to be given to
Bulwer, as it was only necessary to refer to those of his predecessor,
on which he would continue to act. Then came a severe criticism on the
Spanish Government, and the overthrow of all law and constitutional
rights, still desiring Bulwer not to interfere in any way, but not to
conceal the sentiments of the English Government thereupon. This was
very strong, very bitter, and necessarily very offensive to the Spanish
Government, and to their abettors and protectors at Paris; however
true, and however fit to be written by Palmerston to Bulwer, it was not
wise to put it in the hands of the French Minister.
After the communication of this despatch, various letters and
conversations passed with remonstrances, and not without some vague
threats. Jarnac at once objected to what was said about the Prince of
Coburg, complained it was different from the understanding with
Aberdeen, and asked if it could not be _reconsidered_. The reply was
that it was already gone. Guizot's reply to the receipt of this despatch
was confirmatory of Jarnac's objections, and the latter made various
attempts to obtain from Palmerston something on paper to the same effect
as the verbal assurances which Palmerston gave him. Palmerston replied
(as Jarnac reported) that he could not do this without consulting his
colleagues. In the meanwhile (I don't exactly recollect the date),
Jarnac spoke to the Duke of Bedford and Clarendon, and had an interview
with John Russell. From all of these he admits, as well as from
Palmerston himself, he received the most positive assurances that we did
not, and would not, support the pretensions of the Prince of Coburg, and
that we had no thoughts of departing from the principle laid down by
Lord Aberdeen. It was certainly very imprudent of Palmerston to show
this despatch of the 19th, and it is clear to me that he did it for the
pleasure of provoking the French Government, and showing them what we
thought of the whole management of Spanish affairs. It was, in fact, a
covert and indirect but a bitter attack on them. Next, he was
inexcusable for not giving them in writing that which they required, and
for allowing nearly five weeks to pass away after their urgent demand
for it, before he wrote (on August 28) the despatch, which did not reach
Madrid till long after the marriages had been settled and proclaimed.
The despatch of the 19th, which Bulwer was not desired to communicate to
the Court of Spain, having been placed in Guizot's hands, he forthwith
sent it to Bresson, who lost no time (but without Bulwer's knowledge) in
communicating it to the Spanish Ministers, to whom it was sure to be
most offensive. Taking dates into consideration, it is difficult to
doubt that at the same time, or very shortly after, Bresson was ordered
to settle the marriages of both princesses, for this despatch is dated
July 19, and on August 28 the 'Gazette' at Madrid published the Royal
announcement of the Queen's marriage. Not one word, however, was ever
hinted to our Government of any such instructions being given or being
contemplated. In one of Guizot's letters to Jarnac he gives him to
understand that, much as he is dissatisfied, he shall do nothing fresh;
and, during the whole of this interval, Jarnac continued to press
Palmerston for some positive and written disclaimer--that is, he did
when he had the opportunity, for during a considerable part of this time
Palmerston was sailing with the Queen. There was, indeed, one letter of
Guizot's hinting at his taking a line of his own, 'une politique
isolÈe;' but this was too vague (if it were communicated, which is not
clear) to excite any serious apprehension in anybody's mind. It is,
however, clear that well-informed persons did think it imprudent of
Palmerston not to give the French Government at once the satisfaction
they demanded, and, as I have before said, both Normanby and William
Hervey wrote over very strongly on the subject.
[Sidenote: BREACH OF THE ENGAGEMENT.]
At last, early in September, the news came like a thunderclap that both
the marriages were settled and declared; and then began the feeling of
indignation and resentment which broke up the intimacy between the two
Courts, and infused such bitterness into our diplomatic relations. The
war of notes began, and the world will judge whether Palmerston or
Guizot had the best of it. The flimsiness of their pretext for breaking
an engagement they admit to have made is the more obvious the more it is
considered; and that it was a pretext, and one of which they wanted to
avail themselves, is evident from the care they took to make no previous
allusion to the note of February 27, which they have since endeavoured
to turn to so much account. This was a note not delivered but read to
Aberdeen, in which they said that, if the Coburg marriage appeared to be
imminent, they should hold themselves disengaged from their pledges.
They now pretend that they forgot this note was not delivered, and did
not know that Palmerston was not cognisant of it, but they never took
any opportunity of finding out whether he was, nor of renewing to him
the menace or intimation it contained. This omission and their secret
instructions to Bresson, while they not only kept us in the dark, but
did their best to blind us, are sufficient to convict them of duplicity
and bad faith. Palmerston, on his side, may be blamed for imprudence and
negligence. The way in which it was taken up here, and especially the
things Palmerston said, exasperated Guizot prodigiously, and no doubt
the King still more; and it was under this irritation that he wrote his
letter (September 15) to Jarnac, containing a bitter philippic against
Palmerston, his whole character and policy, and a comparison between him
and John Russell, much to the advantage of the latter. This letter
Jarnac was instructed to send to John Russell. He told me that he was so
well aware of its imprudence that he remonstrated against the order, and
delayed several days to obey it. His remonstrance was disregarded, and
he was desired to give the letter to John Russell. He took it, however,
to Palmerston, told him he had a letter which he was charged to show to
John Russell, but, as it contained matter relating to him (Palmerston),
he thought it right to place it in his hands that he might read it first
and forward it to Lord John after. Palmerston said he did not want to
see it, and would not look at it. On this he sent it to Lord John, who
showed it to Palmerston, and wrote Jarnac an admirable but very severe
answer, commenting in strong terms on the conduct of France, and
expressing his entire concurrence with Palmerston in every particular.
This reply must have been gall and wormwood to Louis Philippe, and very
disagreeable to Guizot. Jarnac wrote an answer to Lord John, rather a
rigmarole, but defending the King. This answer seems to have had great
success at Paris, whatever it may have had here, for there were letters
from both the King and Guizot; the first thanking his champion in very
warm terms, and the latter praising his zeal and eloquence.
[Sidenote: THE RUPTURE.]
The estrangement was now complete, and resentment openly testified. The
two Courts were _brouillÈs_; the Ministers collectively, Palmerston
individually, and Normanby at Paris, all put themselves in a cold and
forbidding attitude. Our refusal to join with France in the Cracow
affair was received as a hostile expression, and it is evident that the
King and Guizot have been getting more and more uneasy at the
estrangement, in which we persist. It is, however, not easy to discover
how far the Monarch and the Minister are acting in real conjunction, and
whether the former is faithful or false to the latter. Guizot's conduct
and the tone of his letters do not entirely correspond; the latter
evince a strong desire to obtain a sufficient security about the Coburg
alliance, and certainly strenuous efforts were made by Jarnac to extract
some document which might have been so considered; while, if we judge by
his acts, it would seem that all the French wanted was a pretext for
concluding the marriage, and such a written assurance as he kept
demanding would have counteracted their clever scheme of deception and
fraud. It strikes me as very possible that the King and Guizot were not
acting together; that the intrigue was the King's, which Guizot did not
dare or could not defeat or obstruct, but that while he was obliged to
work out the King's design, he would have been really glad if we had
given such clear and formal assurances as would have rendered the
execution of the plan impossible. I did not conceal from Jarnac my
opinion that he had failed to make his case any better; he was not a
little mortified at the admiration I expressed of John Russell's letter,
in which I in vain attempted to get him to join.
The next morning, just as I was setting off to Badminton, he came to me
in consequence of letters he had received from Paris, in which he was
informed that Normanby had openly said that the two countries could
never be on good terms again till Guizot was turned out and we had
obtained a renunciation from the Duchess de Montpensier; this they
believed, and that it was the echo of sentiments entertained here. I
told him I did not believe a word of it, either that Normanby had said
it, or that anybody here wanted to turn Guizot out; that lies of this
sort were always rife on such occasions, and I had just heard a story of
Louis Philippe's abusing our Queen at the tea-table at Neuilly, which I
had no doubt was just as false as the one he had told me, and they might
be set against one another. He then asked if our Government were not
going to lay papers before Parliament in which Guizot would be
implicated, and if so, if they would not first give him a copy of them,
and he glanced at the printed papers to which I had referred in my
conversation with him. He said in Aberdeen's time such things were
always done in concert, and each Government previously communicated to
the other everything it meant to publish, but of course this could not
be the case now. I told him I did not believe anything was decided about
papers; I knew of none, and what he saw in my hands was nothing but the
notes of the recent correspondence printed at the Foreign Office by the
Government press for the exclusive use of the Cabinet, to whom it would
have been too long a process to send written copies; that such was the
practice here with regard to all important papers of any length.
_Broadlands, December 30th._--I came to town on Monday from Badminton,
where I went to spend Christmas. When I got back I wrote a long letter
to the Duke of Bedford giving him an account of my communications with
Jarnac and my opinion of Palmerston's conduct of the affair. I told him
I was going to Paris, begged he would show Lord John my letter, and said
that if he (Lord John) wished me to say anything or to take any
particular tone, to let me know. I received an answer this morning, cold
enough. Lord John only replied that as I was coming here it was not
necessary for him to see me. There was a very foolish passage about our
relations with France, 'that there could be no reconciliation, and the
spirit of Lord John's letter to Jarnac must be maintained.' The sort of
disposition they evince, half desirous to make it up, and half to
_bouder_ on, seems to me exceedingly little and unwise.
[Sidenote: PROPOSED REVIVAL OF THE SALIC LAW.]
Yesterday I found Clarendon at the Board of Trade, and had a very long
conversation with him; he is now all for trying to make something of the
proposal to get the Salic Law re-established in Spain, having in the
first instance scouted it. It was first proposed to him by Baron Billing
as a solution of the difficulty; he at once rejected it as impossible.
Now he has changed his mind, and he wrote to Palmerston and Lord John to
say so, and to propose writing to Billing to ask whether he had made
this proposal with the knowledge and assent of Guizot, and if the French
Government was prepared to assist in procuring such a settlement at
Madrid. Lord John expressed doubts, and thought nothing would come of it
but some fresh falsehood and deceit. Palmerston thought the plan a good
one, and that it was worth while to write to Billing, which Clarendon
had done, and he showed me the letter. I think the scheme utterly
chimerical, and so I told him; in fact, it strikes me as one of the most
absurd and impracticable that ever entered the mind of man. I stated the
different objections that occurred to me, one (not the least) being that
no Spaniard would be likely to support a measure almost sure eventually
to produce another civil war. He said that before Olozaga left Paris he
had been to William Hervey, who asked him if he would be willing to
support such a measure. He replied that he would, and he thought all the
Progressista party would likewise; but while he now looks to this as a
possible solution of our difficulty, Clarendon is very anxious by some
means to restore a good understanding, and he begged me to tell Guizot
that if his language in the King's Speech and in the Chambers was
moderate, he would compel a corresponding moderation here, but at the
same time he informed me that it was Palmerston's intention to supply
Thiers with information to use against Guizot; and he said this without
any expression of disapprobation. It was at the end of our conversation,
but the next day, upon reflecting on this, I wrote him a very strong
letter denouncing the impolicy and the danger of such a communication to
such a man. I might have also urged the immorality of it, and its
inconsistency with the profession of not wanting to injure Guizot or
turn him out; the more I think of this the more shocked I am. If it is
done, and Thiers exhibits good information, the French Government will
know well enough how he came by it.
[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON ON THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.]
Here I have had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, from which I
infer that Palmerston's fixed idea is to humble France and to make her
feel her humiliation, and, in order to do so, to connect himself more
closely with the three Powers, who appear to be ready to do anything for
him if he will break with France. She abused Aberdeen, and said he had
made his agents all over the world act in subserviency to the French;
this system Palmerston considers it his mission to put an end to, and I
gather that he means on the contrary to thwart and oppose France
whenever and wherever he can. She told me that these Powers were now
better disposed than ever to us, and regarding France as the most
encroaching Power, only wanted to join us in keeping her down. I took an
opportunity of telling Palmerston that Bunsen and Prince Albert want to
have a pamphlet written about Cracow and German affairs, and that the
former had proposed to Reeve to write it; Reeve said he had no objection
provided Palmerston was first consulted and approved, and this he wrote
to Bunsen.[1] I told Palmerston that Reeve wished him to be apprised of
this. He said he was much obliged to me for giving him an opportunity of
thinking of it, but that his impression was that it would be better not
to write anything, as Cracow was now an affair settled and done, and it
was not desirable to say anything offensive to the three Powers, whose
co-operation with us was essential in the far more important concern of
the Spanish marriages. From this I infer that he means to continue to
wage war on the Montpensier marriage, and to form a sort of preparatory
league against France. I am greatly alarmed at the spirit he evinces,
and fully expect we shall sooner or later get into some scrape. This
evening (31st) I had a long conversation with him, in which he discussed
Jarnac's communications with me (which I had told Lady Palmerston) and
with him. He declares he gave him the verbal assurances he asked for as
strongly as possible, and he does not believe anything else he might
have done would have produced any effect in arresting the progress of
the intrigue at Madrid. The French pretend that the Spanish Court
insisted on having Montpensier, and that the Queen only consented to
marry her cousin on condition that the King gave his son to the Infanta;
that this match was therefore a Spanish and not a French object. He said
that Villa Franca (Montemolin's man) told him that when he was at Paris
Louis Philippe said to him that he wished the Count de Montemolin to
marry the Queen; that he had only to renounce his claims, which would be
a mere form, as he would declare himself King as soon as he was married,
and that he contemplated the restoration of the Salic Law, which at all
events he should insist on, as far as the Infanta was concerned,
whenever the Duke de Montpensier married her. Palmerston's present idea
is that this restoration of the Salic Law may be effected, and that the
Spaniards will adopt such a course. I pointed out the difficulty and the
levity of such a proceeding: enacting a law one day which cuts off the
contingent rights of Don Carlos and his family and lets in Ferdinand's
two daughters; then abrogating this law and restoring the former course
of succession, but preserving only one of the sisters thus let in and
excluding the other, and excluding also the heir under the abrogated law
now again to be restored, thus re-establishing the law but not
re-establishing the rights which that law conferred. All this would make
such a mass of confusion and contradictions, and abrogating some rights
and creating others so partially, arbitrarily, and capriciously, that
the certain result would be a future state of uncertainty, rivalry, and
strife. He did not say a word to me of my journey to Paris, nor I to
him.
[Footnote 1: [No pamphlet was written, but the substance of the Prince's
views on the seizure of Cracow was published in an article in the
'Edinburgh Review,' vol. lxxxv. p. 261.]]
_London, January 2nd, 1847._--Returned from Broadlands yesterday; I had
written from thence to Clarendon, and told him my impressions. He
thinks that part of what was said of Aberdeen is true. English agents
everywhere _were_ made subservient to the French, and to such an extent
that they did not dare complain of any French misconduct, because they
knew they should be reproved and run the risk of being humiliated in
their public capacities, and he attributes to this _laissez faire_ of
Aberdeen's much of Louis Philippe's success in his intrigues, and the
uncomfortable state of things in Europe. He had been over to John
Russell at Chorley Wood, and found him in no state of bitterness, but
sick of foreign affairs and the plots and intrigues he had been so
troubled with, and so absorbed with the much more important subject of
Ireland that he could take no interest in the former. In short,
Clarendon has in great measure succeeded in dissipating my alarm. He
recommends that I should advise moderation, and give the French
Government to understand that a moderate tone there will secure one
here, and he has sent me a letter for Duch‚tel, with whom he wishes me
to communicate confidentially.[2]
[Footnote 2: He endeavoured to tranquillise me about the information to
Thiers, and said of course it would be given with great caution. It did
not tranquillise me, however, and my soul was prophetic. What mischief
has resulted from this false and profligate step! (February 21st).]
_January 3rd._--I saw M. de St. Aulaire and Jarnac yesterday, and had
much conversation with both. St. Aulaire said he saw he had nothing to
do but remain _les bras croisÈs_, and say as little as possible.
I go to-night.
[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT'S EXPLANATION.]
_Paris, January 6th._--Arrived here yesterday morning at half-past
twelve o'clock, travelling all night from Boulogne. I had no sooner got
here than Normanby put into my hands a box of papers, copies of his
despatches to Palmerston, containing details he was anxious I should
know, and filling up gaps in the history of the Spanish affair. The most
essential of these papers are despatches to Palmerston, giving an
account of two interviews with Guizot, and as to which there could be no
mistake, as he read to Guizot his letter, giving the details of one of
them (the most important). Guizot acknowledged its general accuracy, and
made a verbal amendment or two in it. I take for granted these papers
will be published. Normanby is very anxious they should, and justly
considers that unless they are, the strength of our case will never be
known. There are certain things contained in them which Guizot never can
explain away satisfactorily, and which must leave a stain on his candour
and good faith. On August 28 Normanby formally proposed to Guizot a
joint action in favour of Enrique; he replied that this would suit him
perfectly, and that he would write to Bresson and instruct him
accordingly. On that very day the announcement of the two marriages
appeared in the Spanish Gazette. Normanby of course subsequently asked
for an explanation of this extraordinary conduct. Guizot seems to have
lost his head in the excitement of his exploit, for he replied that
hearing nothing to satisfy him, and on the strength of his note of
February 27, 'J'ai agi'--that is, that he had already acted
independently and hostilely long before the day on which he pretended
that he would give instructions to Bresson to act conjointly with us. He
endeavoured to excuse this duplicity by saying that Bresson had acted on
general, not on particular instructions; but this was inconsistent with
his 'J'ai agi.' Then about the time of the celebration of the marriages,
he had said they would not take place at _the same time_; again, on
being pressed on this point, he said he had meant that they would not
take place _together_, and that such had not been the intention when he
said so. Jarnac told me the other day that he had heard great stress was
laid on this by us, and that we meant to make it a matter of grave
charge. I said I did not believe it was so seriously considered, and
doubted that much more was thought about it, though at first it had been
considered as a proof of insincerity; but I find that it is of
importance, for upon the expectation thus conveyed by Guizot rests
Palmerston's defence for one of the weakest points of his case, his long
silence after hearing of the marriages being settled. Palmerston's
conduct and his delays throughout have been quite inconceivable, and
certainly will, if not weaken his case, draw considerable censure upon
him if it all comes out. There was, in the first place, his neglect and
obstinacy in not giving in writing the assurances he had given verbally;
next, as to the proposal of joint action, Jarnac came to him, intending
to make the proposal, but in consequence of the despatch of July 19 he
did not make it. He then went to Paris, and on his return he did make
it. He could get no answer, and none was sent till August 22. Bulwer was
then instructed to propose Enrique, and the French Government was
invited to instruct Bresson to co-operate, but he allowed a month to
elapse before he wrote this instruction; then when the conclusion of the
marriages was imparted to him, he suffered three weeks to elapse before
he took any notice, and then sent his protest. It never would have been
effectual, but the only chance for him would have been an instantaneous
remonstrance by return of post. All these delays, such tardiness,
coupled with other slight circumstances, give some colour to the
proceedings of the French Government, and, to a certain degree, help out
their case. Normanby is fully conscious of the damage thus done to ours,
and the only excuse for the last delay is, that Palmerston was reposing
on the assurance that the marriage of the Infanta was not to take place
at the same time with that of the Queen; but this, when examined, will
appear hardly any excuse.
[Sidenote: PRINCESS LIEVEN ON THE QUARREL.]
I called yesterday afternoon on Madame de Lieven, who was very glad to
see me, and we forthwith broke into the subject, without, however, any
sort of agreement. She abused Palmerston, and said if Aberdeen had been
in office it would not have happened. As to argument, she really had
none to offer, but repeated over and over that 'we had departed from the
agreement with Aberdeen;' and if not, 'pourquoi nommer le Cobourg?' She
said all Europe was against us, that we had with little dignity knocked
at the doors of the three Powers who turned their backs on us, and that
we had done good to France and harm to ourselves by this useless appeal,
as they were now more alienated from us and better inclined to the
French, and that they all thought us in the wrong. She said much about
Normanby, his _greenness_ as ambassador, and the follies he committed;
asking advice of different people, and very incompetent people too; and
she repeated the story Jarnac had told me of his saying we never should
have harmony restored till Guizot was turned out and the Infanta had
renounced, which, she said, had been told her by Apponyi, who had heard
it from Normanby himself. She had got other stories of the same kind,
and a heap of little charges of holding communications with Thiers,
MolÈ, and others hostile to the Government. She said that the King was
very angry with our Queen for having said that he had broken his word,
and never would be reconciled to her till she had withdrawn that
accusation. I said that between his word and hers I could not for a
moment doubt, and that I suspected he would have a long time to wait if
he did so till she withdrew the charge she had made. She said Guizot was
very strong, the King very firm, the marriage very popular, and that
they all desired nothing so much as to make known all that had passed,
secure that in so doing they should have public opinion all the world
over on their side. We parted wide as the poles asunder, but very good
friends.
_January 7th._--Guizot appointed me at four o'clock yesterday, but when
I went there he was not returned from the Council. I called again and
saw him for a moment; but as he said he had his courier to despatch, and
'avait ‡ me parler sÈrieusement,' he begged me to go to him to-day at
half-past four.
I called on Lord Cowley,[3] and had a long conversation with him. He is
impatient for a reconciliation, and thinks that far too great importance
has been attached to the question itself. He blames Palmerston severely
for his despatch of July 19, and thinks that more warning and menace
were held out than I had conceived;[4] that _his_ communications ought
to have satisfied Palmerston that the French Government were in an
excited state and prepared to do something unless he prevented them.
This makes his delays still more inexcusable. He also fancies that it
would never have happened if Aberdeen had remained in office.
[Footnote 3: [Henry, Lord Cowley, younger brother of the Duke of
Wellington (born 1773), had been Ambassador at the Court of France under
the late Government. He resigned on the fall of Sir Robert Peel's
Administration, but remained as a private gentleman in Paris until his
death, which took place in April 1847, shortly after this interview.]]
[Footnote 4: Miraflores came to Paris for (see _post_) the purpose of
getting something settled. He told the King that Trapani was out of the
question, the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula almost impossible from
the Queen's dislike of both, especially of Don Enrique, on account of
his insolent letter to her from Bayonne. If, therefore, His Majesty
would not give them his own son, he entreated him to leave them alone
and let them choose for themselves. The King answered very angrily, said
he would not give the Duke de Montpensier, still urged one of the
Spanish Princes, but above all recommended delay, and to take time for
consideration. This Miraflores told to Lord Cowley, who wrote it home to
Palmerston. This is the communication which Palmerston alludes to in his
long note, but he is very incorrect in his allusion.]
At night to the Opera, where I met Thiers and was introduced to MolÈ. I
am to call on Thiers to-morrow afternoon. MolÈ told Normanby that he was
very uneasy about two things,--the arrest of Olozaga in Spain, and the
intervention of the Austrians in Italy, which he expected to take place.
MolÈ, by Normanby's account, speaks very disparagingly of Guizot, and,
by Madame de Lieven's, very contemptuously of Normanby. It is amusing
enough to hear all the stories the people here tell and the opinions
they express of one another.
[Sidenote: DISCUSSION WITH M. GUIZOT.]
_At night._--This morning I called on Madame de St. Aulaire, whom I
found, and Madame de Gontaut, whom I did not; then, Madame de Lieven.
Much talk on the old subject, and the fire of my tongue extinguished the
fire of hers, for, without the least convincing her, I reduced her to
silence. The great gun I brought to bear on her was Aberdeen's despatch
to the Duke de Sotomayor, which proved that Palmerston had in no way
departed from the system of conduct pursued by Aberdeen. From her I went
to Guizot, and was with him for an hour and a half. We began with an
agreement that we should be mutually frank and sincere. He went through
the whole case and exhibited all his causes of complaint and suspicion
against Palmerston, that when he came into office he never said a word
(in public or private) expressive of a desire to be on good terms with
France, neither in his speech at Tiverton, nor in the House of Commons,
nor to Jarnac; that he never alluded to the Spanish question nor sought
to establish or confirm an understanding thereupon with France; that the
despatch he wrote to Bulwer (19th), which contained instructions for his
conduct, was not imparted to the French Government; and that when Jarnac
spoke to him, and Palmerston showed him the despatch, it was already
gone. All this apparent reserve and uncommunicativeness excited
suspicions that he was not well disposed and, above all, not going to
tread in the footsteps of Aberdeen. I defended him by saying that he
ought to have considered Palmerston's situation--just come into office,
encumbered with business, occupied with questions of much more urgent
importance in the House of Commons. Nothing new having occurred about
Spain, he contented himself with desiring Bulwer to abide by his
predecessor's instructions, and really had nothing to say on the
subject; that it was his habit to write in a rather familiar, offhand
style, and his despatch to Bulwer, which was not intended to be
published or communicated, was of that description, but that it meant
nothing; and when asked, and the objection urged to the obnoxious
passage, he gave the most positive assurance that no change of policy
was contemplated. Guizot insisted that it did not signify what he meant;
that the question was, what impression it was calculated to convey. Then
he went into the various delays, and the impossibility of getting an
answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a
different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the
note of February 27 gave him a right to act, _le cas ÈchÈant_, and that
in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated
his intention by saying that if England adopted _une politique isolÈe_,
he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have
understood what this meant--and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I
said I did not mean to acquit Palmerston of much negligence and
tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a
satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was
greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than
justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he
supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the
engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the
matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously;
that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep
interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was
convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn
French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others
did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of
England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been
charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed
each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was
resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that
this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the
Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means
of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he
supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that
he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the
Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that
this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and
for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these
reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired
Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he
was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way
he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.[5]
[Footnote 5: I said that the idea of _intimidating_ France had never
entered his head, that he was _un homme de coeur_ himself, and knew
that France was too great and too powerful to be intimidated by anyone.]
[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.]
I replied that he was entirely mistaken: that he exaggerated
Palmerston's disposition and mistook his position; that in Melbourne's
time he did what he chose in his own department, but that was not now
the case; that all important affairs were decided by the Government, and
that John Russell was far from having any bitter feeling against France,
and had always entertained sentiments of esteem towards Guizot
personally; that neither he nor anyone else (not even Palmerston) wished
to see him out of office. It was true that they did think there had been
on different occasions and in various places an undue succumbing to
France, but that there was no desire to commence a general struggle
against French interests; that they would certainly see with pleasure
the Liberal party in Spain again lift up its head, and some such
reaction as should promise a Government disposed to act in a
constitutional manner, and put an end to the despotism that now
prevailed. He said that he considered this the best and most
constitutional Government that Spain had ever had; that it was far more
so than Espartero's; that every change had been effected in a legal,
constitutional manner by the Cortes itself; while all former changes,
especially the expulsion of Queen Christina, had been effected by
violence. I said I was amazed to hear him say so, and begged to ask him
how the Cortes itself was constituted, and whether it had not been
packed by stratagem and force, and by the most unscrupulous use of
despotic power--the municipalities having been suppressed and all free
opinion overborne. He only replied that the municipal question was made
the instrument of the Queen's deposition, and that it had been voted by
the Cortes.
It is very difficult to record accurately a conversation in which we
often diverged and then returned to the same topic. I pressed him hard
on his want of openness and confidence, and urged that when the two
countries had been so long on such terms of amity, and the two
Sovereigns also, that before he proceeded to act in so serious and
decisive a manner and which could not fail to offend England, he ought
to have left nothing vague, but have said distinctly and at once what he
intended to do. He ought, if he took the note of February 27 as his
justification, to ascertain that Palmerston was cognisant of that note.
Why did he not as soon as he came into office renew to Palmerston the
notice he had thought it necessary to convey to Aberdeen, and why not
say frankly that he regarded the state of the case to be such that,
acting on the right he had reserved to himself, he should send
instructions to Bresson to conclude the marriages. His answers to this
were very weak. He said that it was not his business to look after
Palmerston's affairs, and that he had a right to conclude, since
Aberdeen had communicated with him, that he had imparted to him this
note; that he showed confidence to those who showed confidence to him,
and that he did not think Palmerston had acted towards him in such a
manner as to require such confidential communication on his part. His
real reason was (though I did not think it necessary to charge him with
it), that if he had given notice to Palmerston, the latter would have
sent off to Madrid and probably counteracted his scheme. He insisted
that his letters to Jarnac, and the conversation he had had with Lord
Cowley (which he repeated to me word for word as Lord Cowley had done),
were warning enough and were sufficient indication of his intentions.
Besides that Bresson's instructions were general, he had had them above
a year with a discretionary power to act upon them whenever he had
reason to believe the Coburg marriage was _imminent_, which case he
contended had arrived. I said if its imminence arose from our despatch,
Bresson had himself created it, inasmuch as he had shown it to the
Spanish Government. He said that was not true, that Bresson had given
him his most positive assurance that though he had spoken of it to
different people he had never shown it to the Spanish Ministers. He
spoke with great energy of the King's feelings and of his own,
especially at the strong language that had been applied to him
personally, and of his having been accused in a formal document as well
as in a letter, of _bad faith_; that it was impossible to transact
business with any confidence and in a useful manner with those who
charged him with bad faith. Such accusations were intolerable. He then
spoke of his letter to John Russell; that he had only intended to call
his attention to the difficulty of going on with Palmerston while he put
such a tone into the discussions; that it was absurd to suppose that he
had ever thought or dreamt of effecting Palmerston's removal from
office. He excused this letter very clumsily, and said he had not
expected any answer to it (being evidently to the last degree nettled at
that which he had received). I admitted that this letter was very
imprudent, that it was very strong, and spoke of Palmerston in terms he
was likely to feel and not easily to forgive; that he should have
recollected what a situation he placed John Russell in, who really was
compelled to answer it as he did, or to quarrel outright with
Palmerston; that if he had not answered it as he did, the indignation
and resentment of Palmerston would have been very great, and he would
probably have resigned; and that he might have found means of conveying
his sentiments in some manner less dangerous and offensive. He insisted
on the clear intention of Palmerston, from the despatch, the delays, and
various circumstances, to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. I
said that we could prove that Aberdeen himself had laid down precisely
the same rule of conduct on which Palmerston had acted, and expressed
the very same sentiments; that they were recorded in a former despatch
addressed to the Duke de Sotomayor for the information of the Spanish
Government; that this was very different from the letter to Bulwer which
was neither to be shown nor any thing done upon it, but was a reply to
two important questions: the first, whether if the Spaniards chose a
husband for the Queen not a Bourbon prince, such choice would be
displeasing to England; and secondly, if France attempted to coerce
their choice, whether England would support them. His reply was plain
and decisive: viz. that their choice would not be objected to by
England, whatever it might be; and that while it was impossible to
conceive that France ever would attempt coercion, if she did, Spain
would have the 'sympathy' of England and of all Europe. He said he had
no copy of this despatch, and did not well recollect its contents. I
said, 'But you have seen it.' He 'had not had it in his hands, it had
been read to him.' He was evidently much put out by the citation of it.
[Sidenote: EFFECT OF LORD PALMERSTON'S DESPATCH.]
After a great deal more talk he spoke of his intentions. First, however,
he complained of our refusal to join with him in the Cracow affair, and
that we had done so in an offensive manner, giving him to understand
that his breach of the Treaty of Utrecht made it improper to join with
him in enforcing that of Vienna, but that, nevertheless, he was resolved
to observe the greatest moderation and to evince no _rancune_; that he
should lay the papers he thought necessary before the House of Peers,
and make such a statement of the whole case as he was convinced would
prove to demonstration to France, to Europe, and even to many people in
England itself, that he was clear and blameless in the transaction; that
he might deceive himself, but that such was his sincere belief; that he
should, however, do this in language of moderation and with an earnest
desire to avoid furnishing any fresh matter for irritation; that he
should continue his endeavours to act towards England in a friendly
spirit, and he should not be deterred by her past conduct from offering
to communicate and consult with her on all those subjects which it was
desirable they should consider with reference to their mutual or common
interests. He said he had a great deal more to say to me, hoped to see
me again, and that I would dine with him, and so we parted.
_January 10th._--On Friday I called by appointment on Duch‚tel. There is
nothing of much interest to record of my conversation with him. He
talked in the same strain as Guizot, expressed great desire for
reconciliation, confidence in the goodness of their case, said their
majority was stronger and more secure than ever, and any change of
government impossible.
[Sidenote: LORD COWLEY'S VIEW OF THE CASE.]
Yesterday morning I went to Lord Cowley, who showed me his letters to
Palmerston giving him an account of the state of the Spanish question
and of his conversations thereupon with the King and Guizot. These
communications ought certainly to have drawn Palmerston's attention to
the subject, and have induced him to lose no time in coming to some
understanding with the French Government. At the same time the anxiety
of the King to gain time, and his urgent recommendations to Miraflores
to have patience, may have misled Palmerston and made him think there
was no danger. It is clear to me that what they took alarm at was
Miraflores' communication; that they really did believe the Coburg
alliance was _imminent_, and that when it was followed up by
Palmerston's despatch of the 19th their fears were still more increased.
They all along suspected both Palmerston and Bulwer; and they did, in
truth, think that between Christina's impatience, the difficulty of
finding an eligible Bourbon, the probable intrigues of Bulwer, and the
suspected co-operation of Palmerston, unless they settled the matter
themselves _somehow_ it would be settled in the way they most dreaded.
They knew, or at least they thought, that their difficulty would be very
agreeable to Palmerston, and that it was not likely he would help them
out of it. In this state of things I have no doubt that Guizot wrote to
Bresson and told him to settle the affair if he could, and that Bresson
was furnished with fresh instructions on which he did act, and not on
the old discretionary ones on which they now pretend that he acted. Lord
Cowley thinks Christina told Bresson that if he would at once strike a
bargain and give the Duke de Montpensier for the Infanta, Don Francisco
should have the Queen; that he instantly accepted this proposal, sent it
off to Paris by telegraph, where it was confirmed at once. Whether this
was the exact mode or not, or whoever took the initiative, I believe
this is the way it was done; certainly the King seemed anxious to put
the question off. Lord Cowley thinks he expected to be able to bring
back Trapani. Guizot's vehemence (for he spoke much more strongly than
the King) ought to have alarmed Palmerston. The mischief has arisen from
Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and
alarmed.
Yesterday morning at two o'clock I called on Thiers by appointment,
found him in a very pretty apartment full of beautiful drawings, copies
of Italian frescoes, pictures, bronzes, books and _cahiers_ of MS., the
sheets (much corrected and interlined I could see) of his work. These he
told me were his 'seul dÈlassement,' and that politics never interrupted
his literary labour. We then talked about the present state of affairs,
and very amusing he was, sparing nobody and talking with his usual
abundance and openness. He said he had read the notes that had passed
between Palmerston and Guizot; that his own opinion was that Guizot
would break down on the _procÈdÈs_, but that at all events it was a
quarrel _‡ outrance_; that each accused the other of bad faith, and
could only justify himself by fixing that imputation on his antagonist;
that moderation became impossible when such charges were bandied, and he
had read with astonishment the strong things contained in these notes;
that if Guizot had the worst of this encounter he would fall, not
however by the desertion of the majority, not by this Chamber, but
through the King. 'You must not,' he said, 'believe what you hear of the
strength of the Government and of its security; don't believe all Madame
de Lieven tells you; c'est une bavarde, une menteuse, et une sotte; vous
l'avez beaucoup connue, vous avez ÈtÈ son amant, n'est-ce pas?' I
defended myself from the imputation, and assured him that though she had
had lovers when first she came to England I never had had the honour of
being one of them. He then said he would tell me what would happen: the
King _se faisait illusion_ that the Whig Government could not stand; but
when he found out that this was an error _il aurait peur_; and if we
continued to refuse to be reconciled, he would get rid of Guizot. The
present Chamber would not overthrow him, but the King would. 'Savez-vous
ce que c'est que le Roi? Le mot est grossier, mais vous le comprendrez.
Eh bien, c'est un poltron.'[6] I said I was surprised to hear this, for
we thought he was _un homme de coeur_, and had given proofs of his
courage very often. 'Non, non, je vous dis qu'il est poltron, et quand
il se trouvera dÈfinitivement mal avec vous il aura peur; alors il
suscitera des embarras ‡ Guizot; il y a quarante ou cinquante hommes
dans la Chambre, je les connais, qui tourneront contre lui, et de cette
maniËre il tombera, pas par la Chambre, encore moins par vous.' He said
the accusations had been so strong that each Minister was bound to prove
his own case and the _mauvaise foi_ of his adversary, and Guizot would
stand or fall by the result of the explanations. 'Vous pouvez Ítre s˚r
que ce que je vous dis est la vÈritÈ, d'autant plus que ce n'est pas moi
qui lui succÈderai, c'est MolÈ. Cependant je vous parle franchement, et
je vous avoue que je serais enchantÈ de sa chute; d'abord parce que je
le dÈteste, et aprËs, parce que l'alliance anglaise est impossible avec
lui; c'est un traÓtre et un menteur qui s'est conduit indignement envers
moi, mais je ne serai pas ministre.' However, he could afford to wait;
he was forty-eight years old, and his health excellent. As long as the
King was in no danger he would never send for him; as soon as he was he
would send for him. The King could endure nobody who would not consent
to be his tool; he would never take office without being his master, _et
j'en viendrai ‡ bout_; he would rather continue in his independence than
take office on any other terms. He told me he had seen the notes, and
was amazed at the sharpness of their contents. We then went out
together, and walked to the Faubourg St. HonorÈ, talking about his book,
Napoleon, etc.
[Footnote 6: [Louis Philippe was certainly not wanting in physical
courage, but in moral courage he appeared in his later years to be
deficient. M. Thiers was in the habit of using exaggerated language, and
he disliked the King; for M. Thiers' great defect was that he could not
_serve_ anyone. The Revolution of February 1848 proved that there was a
good deal of truth in these predictions. But the want of resolution
which M. Thiers imputed to the King arose solely from his honourable and
consistent aversion to violence and war.]]
[Sidenote: CONVERSATION WITH M. THIERS.]
_At night._--I have been dining with Thiers, and met Odilon Barrot,
Cousin, RÈmusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, Mignet, and several others I
can't remember. They were all prodigiously civil to me, and with Cousin
and Mignet I had a great deal of conversation. Palmerston's note arrived
this morning. It is very clever and well done, but too long, and his
_polÈmique_ about the Treaty of Utrecht in my opinion _dÈplacÈe_ and
mischievous. But he is determined to urge this point, and is
endeavouring to get the Allied Powers to join with him in a protest or
some formal expression of opinion upon it. I don't believe they will
ever do this; but if they did, it would probably produce most serious
consequences. His policy in this is perfectly inconceivable to me.
Normanby read it to Guizot this afternoon, and at the same time offered
him the despatch of the 19th July (to Bulwer), and Aberdeen's to
Sotomayor to publish with the other pieces, _both or neither_, but he
refused them. I had another furious set-to with Madame de Lieven, who is
the most imprudent woman I ever saw; but we always part friends.
Normanby has shown Thiers several papers, and MolÈ _many more_ he tells
me. I have begged him to be cautious.
[Sidenote: FEAR OF THE COBURG MARRIAGE.]
_January 12th._--I called on Guizot yesterday by appointment; found him
more stiff and reserved than the first time, and not apparently in good
sorts. He did not appear to have anything particular to say, but
reverted to the old topics; that he would not go again over the same
arguments; but it was clear that from the beginning Lord Palmerston had
a fixed policy which he had immediately begun to carry out: to raise the
Progressista party in Spain, and destroy the Moderado and French
influence with it; that we fancied ourselves obliged to substitute
English for French influence there as an indispensable security for our
power in the Mediterranean; and we appealed to the Treaty of Utrecht;
that great changes had taken place since that time. It was true France
had acquired Algeria, and through it a certain power in the
Mediterranean; but that we had acquired Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu,
which we had not been possessed of before, and which were quite
sufficient to secure our power there. He said a great deal more of
Palmerston, for he still insists, and either believes, or at all events
pretends to believe, that Palmerston was bent on the Coburg marriage,
and doing his utmost to bring it about. He really thinks it was sound
policy on his part, and for that reason was pursuing it. I again and
again assured him he was mistaken. 'You forget,' I said, 'that when this
affair began, Palmerston had not been ten days in office, was
overwhelmed with business, and had many other things more pressing to
occupy his attention. He had found an understanding concluded with
Aberdeen, which he accepted. He had no thoughts of doing anything; he
knew of nothing urgent that had occurred, and the truth is, _il n'y
pensait pas_.' 'Comment!' he said, rather angrily, 'il n'y pensait pas?
Est-ce que vous nous prenez pour dupes que vous voulez nous faire croire
cela? 'I said I believed it was so; that this Spanish question which was
of such deep interest to them was of much less interest to us; and
'why,' I said, 'if you considered the matter so urgent, if you knew what
was going on in Spain (which Lord Palmerston did not), and considered
the marriage you so feared to be _imminent_, why did not you go at once
to Palmerston and tell him so?' 'Ce n'Ètait pas ‡ moi,' he replied, 'de
faire l'Èducation de Lord Palmerston.' 'No,' I said; 'mais c'Ètait ‡
vous de faire vos propres affaires, and to communicate frankly with him
when you wanted his assistance.' He would not allow this. I said, since
I had been here and had seen and heard a great many things I did not
know before, I had become convinced that his alarm about the Coburg
marriage was perfectly sincere, that he really did believe it was likely
to take place, and that the real object of the King had been to get the
Spanish Court to wait and not insist on an immediate marriage; that it
was not the despatch of July 19, but the mission of Miraflores and what
he had said to the King which had really alarmed them. He said this was
not exact; it was not that which had given them the alarm, but from
various circumstances they were convinced that the Coburg marriage would
have been settled offhand if they had not taken decisive steps to
prevent it; that this marriage it was impossible for France to tolerate.
There was already a Coburg in England, another in Portugal, and to have
had a third at Madrid would have been to make Spain a part of Portugal,
and to have exhibited to all the world the triumph of English over
French influence; that this combination which we wanted to bring about,
they were bound to defeat, and then again assuming that _our Court_ was
bent on it, he said: 'Le fait est que vous Ítes meilleurs courtisans que
nous.' I told him that I was assured the Court had never sought this
alliance, and that Prince Albert had long ago written to his cousin to
say that he must not think of it, as it was impossible.
I then asked him why Christina had been so impatient to conclude a
marriage of some sort, and why she could not wait as the King had
advised. He said, for reasons partly personal and partly political; that
Queen Christina was a very extraordinary woman--'trËs habile, avec un
esprit trËs impartial'--that she had no prejudices, and he had heard her
talk of her greatest enemies, of Espartero even, without rancour and
with candour; that she had great courage, patience and perseverance, and
never quitted a purpose she had once conceived; that royalty was irksome
to her, and government and political power she did not care about except
so far as they were instrumental to the real objects of her life, which
were to live easily, enjoy herself, and amass money for her children,
who were numerous, and whom she was very anxious to enrich; that she was
aware of the precarious nature of her influence, and felt the necessity
of connecting herself with, and obtaining the support of, one of the
great Powers--England or France--the latter by preference, but the
former if not the latter; that she had, therefore, always wanted the
King to give her his son for the Queen, and when he refused this, she
had got angry and turned to the Coburg alliance and the English
connexion; that besides, the young Queen was impatient to be married,
and that if they had not found her a husband, she would infallibly have
taken a lover. 'Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est que ces princesses
Espagnoles et Siciliennes; elles ont le diable au corps, et on a
toujours dit que si nous ne nous h‚tions pas, l'hÈritier viendrait avant
le mari.' For these reasons she was impatient to conclude, and she
infallibly would have concluded the marriage with the Prince of Coburg
if we had persisted in refusing the Duke de Montpensier, and had not
effected some other arrangement. She trusted that the King, her uncle,
would have accepted _the fait accompli_, and at all events that she
should have been secure of English support.
[Sidenote: THE FRENCH PAPERS.]
I then said that after all what was now most important was to look to
the future, that our quarrel must be fought out, but that a short time
would bring those discussions to an end. What was to happen then? I
believed and hoped that he was not likely to be _renversÈ_ here, and I
was satisfied Lord Palmerston would not be in England, and how were the
affairs of the two Governments to be conducted between them? If Spain,
which had once been a military _champ de bataille_, was henceforward to
be a political _champ de bataille_ between the two countries, I did not
see how any _entente_ was possible. Must this last for ever? or was it
impossible that the two Governments should unite in bringing about a
better state of things in Spain, and giving to her in reality something
of the freedom and independence which she possessed in name? He seemed
by no means disposed to enter on this subject, and as I thought I
observed in his manner some symptoms of a desire that our conversation
should terminate, I rose and took leave of him. He was very civil, but
rather formal and ceremonious on my going away.
_Paris, January 13th._--This morning we read in the newspapers the
_piËces remises_ by Guizot to the Chamber of Peers, and among them, to
our great surprise, an extract of Palmerston's despatch to Bulwer of
July 19, Guizot having refused Palmerston's offer to place it (with
Aberdeen's to Sotomayor) at his disposal. Normanby immediately wrote him
a very strong note complaining of this publication after what had passed
between them. In the afternoon I saw Madame de Lieven, who made very
light of it, and treated it as a frivolous complaint. Bacourt, who was
there, endeavoured to find excuses for Guizot, but was obliged to
confess that he had no right to use this without our permission. When I
got home I found Guizot's reply had come. He said he had given nothing
more than he had quoted in one of his notes, and had done no more than
produce the English version of what he had quoted in French, and he
asserted his right to do this. He finished, however, by saying that if
Normanby would send him the two despatches, he would add them to the
other documents. Normanby wrote back word that he regretted he should
have produced this extract in a manner calculated to give a false
impression of the tenor of the despatch, sent him the documents, and
hoped, as he was going to publish more, he would produce Palmerston's
last note. There has been a schism here in the Opposition; Billault,
Dufaure, and thirty or forty deputies have separated from Thiers, and
are preparing to join MolÈ if Guizot falls. It seems clear that neither
party will take our side on the marriage question, and that the
Government will not be attacked at all in the Peers, and very probably
very feebly in the Deputies.
_January 16th._--For the last two days I have been sightseeing, HÙtel
Cluny, Churches, Notre-Dame, Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, the Gallery of
the Louvre, and all day yesterday was at Versailles. I had not seen it
for above thirty years, and was struck with the vast dimensions and the
ugliness of the building; it is, however, interesting on the whole.
I dined with Guizot on Friday; had very little talk on politics. He came
into one of the rooms where Bacourt and I were talking and joined us. I
then said that though I had come here without any mission I had come not
without the hope of being able to take back with me something which
promised a renewal of good understanding. Guizot said he was ready to be
on good terms with us, but he could _do_ nothing of any sort or kind,
and this he repeated in a very peremptory tone. He was probably (though
very civil to me) not in the best of humours in consequence of the
article which had appeared that morning in the 'Constitutionnel'
(Thiers's paper), with a circumstantial and quite accurate account of
what has recently passed between Guizot and Normanby about the
despatches. This, which could only come from the Embassy, has shocked I
suppose everybody, and made Guizot and his friends indignant. Normanby
was himself very much annoyed when he read the article, and at once
perceived the bad effect it would have. He said he did not know how it
got there, but he suspects Thiers who probably sent it or caused it to
be sent; however, both William Hervey and Craven are so hot and so
unreserved that the Opposition paper might very easily get over it.
Normanby has told Thiers and MolÈ everything, and Thiers came twice in
three days to the Embassy. All this is well known, and Normanby passes
for an ambassador in constant and confidential communication with the
enemies and rivals of the Ministers. In spite of all this, within the
last two days I have found a less excited tone. We had, however, our own
complaint to make, which probably kept them more quiet about the
'Constitutionnel.' When all the papers came out it appeared that Guizot
had published another fragment that he had no right to do of one of
Palmerston's despatches, about 'the only fit husband.' This had been
read to him, but no copy given to him, and he took the words down with
his pencil at the time. These words he published in a formal official
shape. His excuse is the same, that the words had been quoted in one of
his notes.
[Sidenote: AT THE TUILERIES.]
_January 19th._--Went last night to the Tuileries; the King was very
civil, but did not talk to me on any subject. We were there only twenty
minutes. I saw all the Princesses, the Duchesse de Montpensier decidedly
the best; she is a pretty, plump little thing, and looks three or four
years older than she is. The Duchesse d'OrlÈans is still in mourning.
The King looks very well, and is grossly caricatured by 'Punch;' he is a
very good-looking old gentleman, and seems to have many years of life in
him still.
Normanby saw Guizot on Sunday about the affairs of the Plate, when he
took the opportunity to speak to him about his second extract (from the
despatch which was not communicated to him); he made the same sort of
excuse as for the other, and reminded him that he had taken the words
down in pencil.
Went last night to a ball at the Duchesse de Galiera's, where I met
Francis Baring,[7] who told me a good deal about French politics. He
says Thiers is quite out of the question, and that his own errors and
the schism in his party hare demolished him. Billault and Dufaure are
making a second opposition. He thinks Guizot has more to fear from the
effects of the very grave financial embarrassment which exists, and that
if he got the country into any political difficulty in the midst of it
he might be sacrificed, but MolÈ is a man without courage; the majority
is the King's majority on the whole, but still Guizot has many followers
and is not without power. It would not, therefore, be quite so simple
and easy to dismiss Guizot unless some good opportunity presented
itself. Everybody here will support the Government in its present
contest with us. He said he should not dare to speak a contrary language
to his wife, who would tear both his eyes out if he did. He thinks we
were right to decline joint operation in the affair of Cracow, but that
it is an enormous blunder to make so much of the Treaty of Utrecht; that
it would have been wise to have made a protest, the more vague and
general the better, but reserving to ourselves to take any course we
thought fit in respect to Spanish marriages and successions, keeping all
treaties and laws bearing on the subject in reserve, to be used or not
according to our discretion. This is what I have always thought: the
Treaty of Utrecht, the renunciations, the laws of Spain, and the other
treaties between Spain and Austria furnish materials for a very good
argument such as an astute counsel might turn to excellent account; but
Palmerston has made the Treaty so prominent, and has been so decisive
and peremptory, that he has got into a position where he can neither
advance without danger nor recede without discredit. I saw the other day
his protest at Madrid against the marriage in which he declared that
England would _never_ acknowledge the issue of the Duchesse de
Montpensier as heirs to the crown of Spain.
[Footnote 7: [Mr. Francis Baring had married Clara, the daughter of
Maret, Duc de Bassano, and was well versed in French affairs.]]
[Sidenote: THE DUC DE BROGLIE'S SPEECH.]
_January 21st._--Was at Madame de Lieven's on Tuesday afternoon when
Guizot came in from the Chamber. He said the Duc de Broglie had spoken
for an hour and a half _avec un grand succËs_. The next morning I read
this successful speech, which was as bad as it well could be, and
calculated to make matters worse with us. The Queen's Speech arrived
yesterday, and was thought very moderate, as it is, but very ill
written. In consequence of the passage about Cracow none of the
Ambassadors of the three Courts would appear at the _sÈance royale_.
Yesterday Guizot spoke for two hours, and certainly very adroitly in
reference to his position and his object; being quite sure of whatever
he said being accepted as all-sufficient by the Chamber, he could afford
to glide over the difficult points and not attempt to grapple with them,
and he carefully abstained from saying anything irritating or offensive
to us, sparing even Palmerston as much as he could. I went to Madame de
Lieven to-day, when she asked me what I thought of the debate. I said,
'If you want my candid opinion, I will give it you. Le discours du Duc
de Broglie a ÈtÈ mauvais; il est indigne de lui et de la rÈputation
qu'il s'est acquise; il n'est ni juste, ni vrai, ni sage. S'il avait eu
le dÈsir d'envenimer l'affaire, ce que je ne crois pas, il n'aurait pas
pu parler autrement.' I then said that the speech of M. Guizot was of a
very different character, that I did not attach much value to his
argument, and that he had eluded all the real difficulties of the
question, but that he had contrived to make a defence which was quite
sufficient for his purpose here (though if it had been addressed to an
English Parliament or court of justice it might have been easily
answered), and to do so with a perfect reserve and moderation, and
without allowing one word to escape him of a violent or offensive
character; that it was very clever, very adroit, admirably adapted to
the occasion, and I thought would produce a salutary effect _chez nous_.
She was much pleased, and expressed her satisfaction that I thought
this; when I said she must not forget that I said so always with a
reserve as to the argument, and that I only meant to speak of the tone;
that as to the value of the speech in reference to the question at
issue, I agreed entirely with the 'Constitutionnel.' She laughed at
this, affected to treat it with derision, and said that all the world
knew the articles in that paper came from the Embassy, which I treated
with derision in my turn. Guizot then came in, but only stayed a moment;
she told him that I admired his speech, but would tell him more of what
I had said when he came to her in the evening. I then told her of the
absence of the Ambassadors at the House of Lords, which struck her
prodigiously, and she would hardly believe it. We afterwards talked of
the future and how matters could be got right, and we both agreed that
where 'la confiance avait ÈtÈ ÈbranlÈe' entirely, it was very difficult
to restore it. I said the only way I knew was to act with mutual truth
and good faith, to have no _dessous des cartes_ on either side, and then
by degrees each party would discover that the other really was doing so,
and by degrees confidence might revive. But the notion of Palmerston's
hatred of Guizot is so strong, of his independent power in the
Government and his disposition to use it, that it is very difficult to
bring them into anything like a quiet and confiding state of mind. I
told her it was an error to suppose Palmerston was so powerful and that
he could drag his colleagues with him unreasonably, and that if they
found him wantonly and unfairly endangering the peace of the two
countries, they would force him to desist or to go. Guizot's speech
seems to have been received very favourably by most people for one
reason or another, and it certainly was very able and judicious.
I dined to-day with Madame Graham (a dull party), and went afterwards to
Mrs. Austin's, where I met M. de Tocqueville, Mignet, Alfred de Vigny,
M. de Circourt, Mr. Wheaton, and several others whose names I cannot
recollect. There was also a Mr. Schwabe, who has been travelling all
over Spain with Cobden, and has a great deal to say about the country
and the people. He says there is a sprinkling of Free Trade tendencies,
but not at Barcelona. They were well received everywhere, and by nobody
better than by the French consuls (especially Lesseps at Barcelona),
whom they found advocates of Free Trade. The country appeared miserably
desolate and depopulated, but they were told that the improvement within
the last ten or twelve years was prodigious. The Infanta's marriage was
unpopular, French influence on the wane, and he is convinced that if the
country is only left alone, the feeling of Spanish independence will be
enough to provide an opposition to French influence.
[Sidenote: THE DEBATE IN ENGLAND.]
_January 24th._--On Friday the newspapers brought the English debate on
the Address, which has made a great sensation here. The speeches,
especially Lord Lansdowne's, all so moderate and expressive of an
earnest desire for a reconciliation with France. Everybody, those who
hoped and those who feared, were astonished; Guizot delighted, but
taking it coolly. We think that Lansdowne's tone was too low, that he
was too _empressÈ_, and that it will be misunderstood at Paris. Then the
'Times' has been writing articles abusing Palmerston and giving out that
public opinion is all against him, and inclines to Guizot, doing all the
mischief it can. These articles were received with a great deal of
chuckling by Guizot and his people, and the low tone taken by Government
and others corroborated their impressions. John Russell spoke very
properly, very conciliatorily, but with more of firmness. There was a
ball here on Friday night, where I had some conversation with MolÈ,
Cousin, Duvergier, and Francis Baring. All are struck with our
discussion. MolÈ, who wishes for reconciliation and rejoices at the
spirit that has been evinced, told me he thought Broglie's speech very
bad, and Guizot's very good and discreet, but that the latter was
already triumphing. 'Avez-vous vu,' he asked him, 'les journaux anglais?
Eh bien, vous voyez qu'on recule.' Cousin said that it was impossible
for them to say anything for us in the Chamber when we did not seem
disposed to say anything for ourselves. Duvergier said the same thing,
and he with Thiers and his people are excessively disgusted and
disappointed at the ground appearing to be taken from under their feet.
M. de Beaumont said to me last night, 'Il paraÓt que vous avez mis bas
les armes.' They now write from England that it is probable there will
be no discussion in either House, a conclusion so impotent and
discreditable that I hope it will not end thus. Palmerston can never
permit this; both he and the Embassy and Thiers will cut a ridiculous
figure enough.
With great imprudence and impropriety, in my opinion, Normanby, with
Palmerston's concurrence, has been in confidential communication with
Thiers for the purpose of enabling the latter to attack the Government
in the Chamber, it being of course expected and understood that we were
to make a strong case against Guizot at home. All the world here knows
of this connexion and blames it. Guizot is of course indignant at it,
and it renders all communication between him and Normanby as cold and
distant as possible. Thiers is as sulky as a bear; he knows that his
alliance with the Embassy has done him no good, and now it seems
unlikely to enable him to do anybody else any harm. It is clear to me
that we are in great danger of cutting a contemptible figure and
something more, for nothing can be so impolitic as to create a belief
here that the people of England are resolved to submit to anything
rather than go to war, and that the French Government may follow their
own devices without hindrance, for if the Minister for Foreign Affairs
(especially Palmerston) remonstrates and complains he will probably not
be supported at home. The fact is, Palmerston's mismanagement of his
case and his most unwise persistence in his argument about the Treaty of
Utrecht have ruined him and given _gain de cause_ to Guizot. I must say
that I begin to think no reliance is to be placed on him, and that he
really is a very bad and dangerous Minister. It appears that before the
Session opened Lansdowne wrote to Palmerston and desired to know what he
meant to do, what to insist on, and, in short, how they stood. He wrote
back word that he had no thoughts of insisting on any renunciations, as
it was clearly impossible to obtain them, and that he was ready to go on
with France amicably and frankly on all matters of common interest,
though of course there could not be the same confidence as heretofore.
On this Lansdowne made his speech. But yesterday morning in the midst of
all these honeyed words there arrives a letter from Palmerston to
Normanby desiring him to go and complain formally of the affair of the
extracts, and particularly that what he did publish was not textually
correct, and that Guizot's _excuses_ were not satisfactory. Normanby
never told me of this till the evening when he had done it. He went to
him and read the letter, and Guizot was very angry and said _excuses_
was not a proper word between gentlemen, and that it was difficult to
carry on communications when such expressions were used. Normanby said
he could only answer for the English word in which sense he ought to
have understood it.
[Sidenote: M. DE TOCQUEVILLE.]
_Evening._--I saw the despatch this morning; it was short enough, but it
would have been better not to have read it to Guizot. This evening,
however, Normanby met him at Madame de Lieven's, when he told him he
thought it not worth while to write to Palmerston what had passed
between them yesterday, as he had misunderstood the meaning of the
_English_ word. Guizot said as that was the case he had nothing to say,
and thought too it would be as well to say nothing to Palmerston about
it. So this matter is in a manner blown over, but the same _animus_ will
probably generate fresh things of the same kind.
This morning I called on Tocqueville and sat some time with him and his
wife, an Englishwoman. He looks as clever as he is, and is full of
vivacity, and at the same time of simplicity, in his conversation. He
gave me an account of the state of parties in France substantially the
same as I had heard before; the schism of Billault and Dufaure, to whose
section he belongs; they could not go on any longer with Thiers, who, he
says, does not command above twenty or thirty votes, and is out of the
question. He had formerly belonged rather to Odilon Barrot than to
Thiers; said the marriage question was most decidedly popular in France,
because considered as having given us a check which had paid off old
scores, and that the being now _quits_ had rendered a future good
understanding more easy; and never did he remember so general a
disposition to be on friendly terms with us, and to act in concert with
us; he thinks the King could turn out Guizot and make another
Government, but that he is not likely to do it.
I went last night to a ball at the HÙtel de Ville, where amongst many
fine people were all the _bourgeoisie_. It was a magnificent ball and
very well worth seeing, many of the women very good-looking and all well
dressed. There must have been two thousand people there, and the house
extraordinarily fine. From thence to a ball at Madame Pozzo di Borgo's,
the most beautiful house I ever saw, fitted up with the greatest luxury,
and _recherchÈ_ and in excellent taste. There were to be seen all the
exquisitely fine people, the cream of Parisian society, all the Faubourg
St. Germain, the adherents of the old and _frondeurs_ of the new dynasty
who keep aloof from the Court, and live in political obedience to, but
in social defiance of, the ruling powers. They are knit together by a
sort of compact of disloyalty to the _de facto_ sovereign, and if any
one of them suffers himself or herself to be attracted to Court the
offender immediately loses caste, is treated with the utmost scorn and
indignation, and if a man very probably does not escape without some
personal quarrel and is sure to be deserted by his friends.
[Sidenote: M. GUIZOT AND LORD NORMANBY.]
_January 26th._--Yesterday morning the 'Morning Chronicle' came with a
bitter and violent article against Guizot's speech in the Chamber; the
courier at the same time brought copies of our printed papers, and I
took one to Madame de Lieven. There I found Guizot furious at this
article, which he said he was sure had been dictated by Palmerston
himself. I said I was as much shocked at it as he was, and that Normanby
regretted it very much, but that I was persuaded Palmerston had had no
hand in it, and no knowledge of it; that he had written to Lord
Lansdowne the day after his speech saying he entirely approved of it and
agreed in all he said, and it was impossible he should have at the same
time written such a letter and sanctioned such an article, but that I
was sorry he had not taken means to prevent such diatribes, and inspired
the 'Chronicle' with a better spirit. It was preaching to the winds. His
dislike of Palmerston is so great, and his conviction of the reciprocity
of the sentiment so rooted, that he will not allow himself to doubt. I
left them because I was engaged, and promised to return in the
afternoon to her. When I did return I found the perusal of the papers
had made a great impression on her. She said there were many curious
things she did not know before. I said 'Certainly, so I told you,' and I
then pointed out to her certain letters and asked her if they did not
prove to demonstration, first, that the proposal of a Coburg came
entirely from Madrid and was the desire of the Spanish Court; secondly,
that we had constantly refused to lend ourselves to it; and thirdly,
that if we had answered the appeal to us according to the disposition
they always had imputed to us, the marriage might have been made. She
was obliged to own that it was so, but then again returned to the old
question 'Why, then, did you name him?' I said once more for the
fiftieth time that it never had entered into the head of Palmerston or
of anybody else that _the mention of his name_ would have raised such a
notion or suspicion in them or in anybody, and that it was wonderful
they would not see that if he had had the intention and that this letter
contained the expression of it, the last thing he would have done would
have been to show it to them. She then talked again about the
'Chronicle' and the difficulty of going on, of the unsatisfactory
relations between the Foreign Office and the Embassy, and of the great
difficulty of ever restoring them to such a condition as they ought to
be in for any useful purpose. 'How,' she asked, 'could M. Guizot open
his mind to Normanby, or talk confidentially to him, when he knows he is
intimately connected with the Opposition, and that what he says may be
repeated the next moment to Thiers and appear in the "Constitutionnel"
on the following morning?' This is the real embarrassment, and it is not
easy to see how it is to be got over. Guizot and Normanby are on civil
terms, and that is all. When they meet on business they discuss the
particular matter in hand, and never anything more; to William Hervey
Guizot does not speak at all; when they meet at Madame de Lievens,
Guizot appears not to see him. She says that I am the only Englishman to
whom he can talk openly, and consequently they are very sorry for my
departure.
After I left her in the morning I drove all over Paris: to the
University to see Cousin, who lives up a staircase just like a Bencher
or a Collegian. He was not at home, nor anybody there to answer the
bell, so I stuffed my card through a crevice in the door. He is a Peer.
Then to Prince Czartoryski's, who lives in a great old house in the Isle
St. Louis, close to the Pont d'Austerlitz. The establishment is curious
and interesting. The Princess told me she wanted a house which was
spacious and cheap, and not therefore in the fashionable and dear part
of the town. They were fortunate enough to find this, which exactly
suits them. It was the hotel of the Duc de Sully, and there was formerly
a subterraneous passage with a communication to the Arsenal. It
afterwards fell into the hands of Lambert, a great financier, and is
still called the HÙtel Lambert. Madame du Ch‚telet had it, and they show
the apartment which Voltaire occupied for many years. At the Revolution
it became a shop or _magasin_, I forget of what, but no change was made
in the building. The Czartoryskis found it all _dÈlabrÈ_ and dirty,
bought it very cheap, and spent twice as much as the purchase-money in
restorations. It is a great fine house, handsome staircase and gallery,
very vast, with court and garden, and a delightful airy prospect towards
the river and the Jardin des Plantes. The thick coat of dirt which was
cleared away had preserved the original painting and gilding, which have
come out, not indeed bright and fresh, but still very handsome, and they
have furnished it in a corresponding style. It is not, however, for the
purpose of being well lodged that they have thus provided themselves,
but to perform a great work of beneficence and charity. The Princess has
converted the whole of the upper stories into a great school for the
daughters of distressed Polish officers and gentlemen, where they are
lodged, fed, clothed, and educated, and what is left of their fortune
they spend in this manner. She took me all over the apartments; they are
like those in a very well-regulated pauper school, clean to an extreme
nicety, but modest and economical. The girls crowded about her to kiss
her hand. There they are prepared to become governesses; the Princess's
daughter is their 'Professeur d'Anglais,' she told me. It is a very
striking sight and well worth support. I went from thence to the Place
Royale; then to where the Bastille formerly stood, and down the whole
length of the Boulevards, which is the way to see this curious town.
[Sidenote: FALL OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.]
_Wednesday._--Yesterday morning news came that the Spanish Ministry was
out; a majority in the Cortes on the question of the Presidency,
composed of Progressistas and discontented Moderados, turned them out.
The movement is anti-French and said to be brought about by a coalition
of the two brothers against the Queen-mother. Guizot is evidently
disconcerted by it; Madame de Lieven affects a supreme indifference; she
told me that Sotomayor was making a Government, a _Moderado_ Government,
that he had proposed to Mon to remain. Mon would not without Pidal (his
brother-in-law), and the others were willing to have Mon, but would not
have Pidal, because the two would make the Cabinet too French. They now
acknowledge that 'sans contestation vous n'avez jamais voulu ni rien
fait pour le Cobourg.' I asked her whether this was Guizot's opinion,
and she said 'parfaitement.' This is incomparably cool. After having had
the most reiterated assurances _before the fact_, which they utterly
disregarded, and did not choose to believe, now that the fact is
accomplished, and it suits their purpose to make it up, they acknowledge
that they were in error, and acted on a mistaken notion.
I went last night to Madame de Circourt, who has a brilliant salon, but
I knew none of the people; then to Madame de Girardin, where were people
of a totally different description.
_Thursday._--I prevented Normanby from going to Thiers' salon the night
before last, and yesterday morning I gave him to understand as
delicately as I could that all his communications with him and others in
opposition to the Government were noted, reported, and much resented. He
is, however, still impressed with the notion that Guizot may be got out,
and that his connexion with his opponents may conduce to that object,
in my opinion a dangerous error.
Kisseleff gave me an account of what had passed between him and Guizot
about the despatch which he read in the Chamber. Kisseleff said it was
very irregular and improper, but he did not think it had done any harm.
Kisseleff received it the morning of the debate in the Peers, and took
it to Guizot, telling him it might be of use to him to know the
contents. Kisseleff left it with him to read at his ease, and begged him
to return it directly, giving him no authority to produce it. Guizot
read it _in extenso_. He said afterwards that he believed it was the
best thing he could do for France and Russia too. Strange that a man so
formal should be so loose in his transaction of business.
_Friday._--I saw Guizot yesterday, my last day; he is very sorry I am
going, being the only Englishman he could speak to; he does not see how
he can go on with Normanby in his notorious relations _avec tous ses
ennemis_; then as to the press, the 'Morning Chronicle;' Palmerston's
connexion with it is so notorious that one might as well try and
persuade him day was night as that Palmerston was not concerned in the
'Morning Chronicle.' I told him frankly that I regretted both the
appearance and the existence of intimacy between the Embassy and the
Opposition, that it was exaggerated, but that I could not be surprised
at its producing an effect on him. I did not think it worth while to go
again into the case or to triumph over the effect produced by our blue
book; I only said 'that he now admitted himself that he had been wrong
about Palmerston before, and that this might inspire him with more
confidence for the future;' but he said, 'No, he did not admit it; that
Palmerston had come into office with the resolution of attacking him
anywhere; that the Marriage question in Spain was merely subsidiary to
that object, and he had only put forward Don Enrique in order to set up
the Progressista party against him and French influence.' He said the
greatest danger proceeded from _les agents subalternes_; that he had
given a proof of his resolution to act justly by at once recalling the
French Consul at the Mauritius, for which he was well aware he should
be attacked here, but that it was right, and he had therefore done it.
He said he would communicate with me, but he thinks the disposition of
the other Ministers of little consequence so long as Palmerston's are
what they are. All our conversation ran on this; his on the difficulty
of going on after all that had passed, mine on the necessity of trying.
I said what I could for Normanby, and assured him he would find him
personally easy to deal with. I then went to Madame de Lieven, who
followed in the same strain, and said what is true enough, that
Normanby, once having let himself drop into Thiers' hands, will find it
difficult to get out again. This has always struck me. I have said what
I could to Normanby, but I came too late for that. I am certain they are
very uneasy at the effect produced both in England (even in the midst of
its apathy) and here by the publication of our papers. Here it is
unquestionably great, although they have not yet been distributed fully.
I met Cousin last night, who was vehement on the subject, and told me,
if he had been aware of their contents, nothing should have prevented
his replying to the Duke de Broglie. Tocqueville told me that they had
produced a very great effect; that men like himself who approved of what
had been done were inexpressibly shocked at the way in which it had been
done, and at the revelation of so much that was false and dishonourable
in the conduct of the French Government.
[Sidenote: THE EMBASSY AND THE OPPOSITION.]
_Saturday._--Just setting off to London and not sorry to leave Paris,
where I am, after all, a fish out of water. I have been most kindly and
hospitably entertained, interested, and amused, but the excitement of
the particular question once over, I feel that I have no business here,
that I am not fit for the society, and should never take root in it; the
exertion required, the stretch and the continual alacrity of attention,
would be intolerable. I have fallen in here with Scrope Davies, a social
refugee, whom I have not seen these twenty-five years, almost the last
remnant of a circle of clever men of the world, and once the intimate
friend of B.
Yesterday I went about taking leave and went to both the clubs: with
Mrs. Austin to M. de Triqueti's studio, and then of course to Madame de
Lieven. At the clubs I learnt the confirmation of what I had been led to
believe the day before, the extraordinary impression made here by the
publication of our blue book. It quite surprised me, not because I do
not think it very strong; but having been myself long ago convinced and
familiar with most of the details, I did not know that people here were
so little prepared for what they had seen. There can be no doubt of the
reality and vivacity of the impression. Francis Baring told me that men
who had before told him they thought Guizot had the advantage, now came
to tell him how entirely their opinions were changed; in short, if it be
any advantage, it has done our case infinite good and prodigiously
disconcerted the Government. I found Madame de Lieven very low and full
of resentment, especially for the publication of Normanby's conversation
with Guizot, which she said must make their personal relations still
more difficult and unpleasant. It is, however, this document which has
produced the strongest effect of all. I told her all I had heard, and
that Guizot must make up his mind to be bitterly attacked in the Chamber
by Lamartine, Billault, and Thiers. She said that she had no doubt of
his coming triumphantly out of the fight.
[Sidenote: BITTERNESS OF M. THIERS.]
Last night there was a party at the Embassy, at which Thiers and
Duvergier were present. Thiers had been with Normanby in the morning. He
made an attack on me for believing all Madame de Lieven told me; said I
was 'une Èponge trempÈe dans le liquide de Madame de Lieven,' and tried
his best to persuade me that Guizot was weak, his majority not worth a
rush, and that the King could and would get rid of him whenever he found
himself in any sort of danger. 'Tell Lord Palmerston,' he said, 'when he
speaks, to say "beaucoup de bien de la France, et beaucoup de mal de
Monsieur Guizot."' I said I should give him one-half the advice and not
the other, and that Palmerston's wisest course would be to hold moderate
language, tell his story, and leave everybody to draw the inferences. I
have no doubt he will make a very powerful speech and present an
admirable _rÈsumÈ_ of the whole question. But this new vigour infused
into the Opposition, which will bring on an acrimonious debate, though
it may cover Guizot with mud, will not shake him from his seat. I told
Thiers he was quite mistaken in supposing that I took my opinions from
Madame de Lieven or believed one half she told me, but nevertheless I
could not believe that the King would part with Guizot if he could
possibly help it, for he would look in vain for so supple an instrument,
and one so well able to defend him and his measures in the Chambers.
However, Thiers thinks of nothing but mischief, of gratifying his own
personal passions and resentments. He has evidently persuaded Normanby,
and I have no doubt Normanby tries to persuade Palmerston of the same.
The cool people here meanwhile tell me that Guizot will not be turned
out, and I am inclined to believe it. I leave the Embassy in certainly a
very painful and unbecoming condition. Normanby seems not to care who
sees his intimacy with Thiers, and he has none whatever with Guizot.
They do not and cannot converse on anything but the merest matters of
business, and their relations get worse, and seem likely to do so; the
obstacles to an understanding sufficiently frank to be useful appear
almost insurmountable. Thiers, having got Normanby into his clutches,
will not easily let him go again, and the resentment of Guizot will
hardly be appeased, nor do I see any chance of their ever being on
really good terms. So ends my _mission_, and it only now remains for me
to give the truest account I can of the state of affairs here to those
whom it most concerns to know it; but then it will be very difficult for
them to adopt any decisive and satisfactory course.