I trust, Mr. President, that you--whom untoward circumstances have

made a biologist, but who still keep alive your sympathy with that

class of enquiries which nature intended you to pursue and adorn--will

excuse me to your brethren if I say that some of them seem to form an

inadequate estimate of the distance which separates the microscopic

from the molecular limit, and that, as a consequence, they sometimes

employ a phraseology which is calculated to mislead. When, for example,

the contents of a cell are described as perfectly homogeneous, as

absolutely structureless, because the microscope fails to distinguish

any structure, then I think the microscope begins to play a mischievous

part. A little consideration will make it plain to all of you that the

microscope can have no voice in the real question of germ structure.

Distilled water is more perfectly homogeneous than the contents of any

possible organic germ. What causes the liquid to cease contracting at

39° Fahr., and to grow bigger until it freezes? It is a structural

process of which the microscope can take no note, nor is it likely to

do so by any conceivable extension of its powers. Place this distilled

water in the field of an electro-magnet, and bring a microscope to

bear upon it. Will any change be observed when the magnet is excited?

Absolutely none; and still profound and complex changes have occurred.

First of all, the particles of water are rendered diamagnetically

polar; and secondly, in virtue of the structure impressed upon it

by the magnetic strain of its molecules, the liquid twists a ray of

light in a fashion perfectly determinate both as to quantity and

direction. It would be immensely interesting to both you and me if one

whom I hoped to see here present,[5] who has brought his brilliant

imagination to bear upon this subject, could make us see as he sees the

entangled molecular processes involved in the rotation of the plane

of polarisation by magnetic force. While dealing with this question,

he lived in a world of matter and of motion to which the microscope

has no passport, and in which it can offer no aid. The cases in which

similar conditions hold are simply numberless. Have the diamond, the

amethyst, and the countless other crystals formed in the laboratories

of nature and of man no structure? Assuredly they have; but what can

the microscope make of it? Nothing. It cannot be too distinctly borne

in mind that between the microscope limit and the true molecular limit

there is room for infinite permutations and combinations. It is in

this region that the poles of the atoms are arranged, that tendency

is given to their powers, so that when these poles and powers have

free action and proper stimulus in a suitable environment, they

determine first the germ and afterwards the complete organism. This

first marshalling of the atoms on which all subsequent action depends

baffles a keener power than that of the microscope. Through pure

excess of complexity, and long before observation can have any voice

in the matter, the most highly trained intellect, the most refined and

disciplined imagination, retires in bewilderment from the contemplation

of the problem. We are struck dumb by an astonishment which no

microscope can relieve, doubting not only the power of our instrument,

but even whether we ourselves possess the intellectual elements which

will ever enable us to grapple with the ultimate structural energies of

nature.

But the speculative faculty, of which imagination forms so large a

part, will nevertheless wander into regions where the hope of certainty

would seem to be entirely shut out. We think that though the detailed

analysis may be, and may ever remain, beyond us, general notions may

be attainable. At all events, it is plain that beyond the present

outposts of microscopic enquiry lies an immense field for the exercise

of the speculative power. It is only, however, the privileged spirits

who know how to use their liberty without abusing it, who are able to

surround imagination by the firm frontiers of reason, that are likely

to work with any profit here. But freedom to them is of such paramount

importance that, for the sake of securing it, a good deal of wildness

on the part of weaker brethren may be overlooked. In more senses

than one Mr. Darwin has drawn heavily upon the scientific tolerance

of his age. He has drawn heavily upon _time_ in his development

of species, and he has drawn adventurously upon _matter_ in

his theory of pangenesis. According to this theory, a germ already

microscopic is a world of minor germs. Not only is the organism as a

whole wrapped up in the germ, but every organ of the organism has there

its special seed. This, I say, is an adventurous draft on the power of

matter to divide itself and distribute its forces. But, unless we are

perfectly sure that he is overstepping the bounds of reason, that he

is unwittingly sinning against observed fact or demonstrated law--for

a mind like that of Darwin can never sin wittingly against either fact

or law--we ought, I think, to be cautious in limiting his intellectual

horizon. If there be the least doubt in the matter, it ought to be

given in favour of the freedom of such a mind. To it a vast possibility

is in itself a dynamic power, though the possibility may never be drawn

upon. It gives me pleasure to think that the facts and reasonings of

this discourse tend rather towards the justification of Mr. Darwin than

towards his condemnation, that they tend rather to augment than to

diminish the cubic space demanded by this soaring speculator; for they

seem to show the perfect competence of matter and force, as regards

divisibility and distribution, to bear the heaviest strain that he has

hitherto imposed upon them.

In the case of Mr. Darwin, observation, imagination, and reason

combined have run back with wonderful sagacity and success over a

certain length of the line of biological succession. Guided by analogy,

in his ‘Origin of Species,’ he placed at the root of life a primordial

germ, from which he conceived the amazing richness and variety of

the life that now is upon the earth’s surface might be deduced. If

this were true, it would not be final. The human imagination would

infallibly look behind the germ, and enquire into the history of its

genesis. Certainty is here hopeless, but the materials for an opinion

may be attainable. In this dim twilight of conjecture the enquirer

welcomes every gleam, and seeks to augment his light by indirect

incidences. He studies the methods of nature in the ages and the

worlds within his reach, in order to shape the course of speculation

in the antecedent ages and worlds. And though the certainty possessed

by experimental enquiry is here shut out, the imagination is not left

entirely without guidance. From the examination of the solar system,

Kant and Laplace came to the conclusion that its various bodies once

formed parts of the same undislocated mass; that matter in a nebulous

form preceded matter in a dense form; that as the ages rolled away,

heat was wasted, condensation followed, planets were detached,

and that finally the chief portion of the fiery cloud reached, by

self-compression, the magnitude and density of our sun. The earth

itself offers evidence of a fiery origin; and in our day the hypothesis

of Kant and Laplace receives the independent countenance of spectrum

analysis, which proves the same substances to be common to the earth

and sun. Accepting some such view of the construction of our system as

probable, a desire immediately arises to connect the present life of

our planet with the past. We wish to know something of our remotest

ancestry. On its first detachment from the central mass, life, as

we understand it, could hardly have been present on the earth. How

then did it come there? The thing to be encouraged here is a reverent

freedom--a freedom preceded by the hard discipline which checks

licentiousness in speculation--while the thing to be repressed, both in

science and out of it, is dogmatism. And here I am in the hands of the

meeting--willing to end, but ready to go on. I have no right to intrude

upon you, unasked, the unformed notions which are floating like clouds,

or gathering to more solid consistency in the modern speculative

scientific mind. But if you wish me to speak plainly, honestly, and

undisputatiously, I am willing to do so. On the present occasion--

You are ordained to call, and I to come.

Two views, then, offer themselves to us. Life was present potentially

in matter when in the nebulous form, and was unfolded from it by the

way of natural development, or it is a principle inserted into matter

at a later date. With regard to the question of time, the views of

men have changed remarkably in our day and generation; and I must

say as regards courage also, and a manful willingness to engage in

open contest, with fair weapons, a great change has also occurred.

The clergy of England--at all events the clergy of London--have nerve

enough to listen to the strongest views which any one amongst us would

care to utter; and they invite, if they do not challenge, men of the

most decided opinions to state and stand by those opinions in open

court. No theory upsets them. Let the most destructive hypothesis be

stated only in the language current among gentlemen, and they look it

in the face. They forego alike the thunders of heaven and the terrors

of the other place, smiting the theory, if they do not like it, with

honest secular strength. In fact, the greatest cowards of the present

day are not to be found among the clergy, but within the pale of

science itself.

Two or three years ago in an ancient London College--a clerical

institution--I heard a very remarkable lecture by a very remarkable

man. Three or four hundred clergymen were present at the lecture. The

orator began with the civilisation of Egypt in the time of Joseph;

pointing out that the very perfect organisation of the kingdom, and the

possession of chariots, in one of which Joseph rode, indicated a long

antecedent period of civilisation. He then passed on to the mud of the

Nile, its rate of augmentation, its present thickness, and the remains

of human handywork found therein; thence to the rocks which bound the

Nile valley, and which teem with organic remains. Thus in his own clear

and admirable way he caused the idea of the world’s age to expand

itself indefinitely before the mind of his audience, and he contrasted

this with the age usually assigned to the world. During his discourse

he seemed to be swimming against a stream; he manifestly thought that

he was opposing a general conviction. He expected resistance; so did

I. But it was all a mistake: there was no adverse current, no opposing

conviction, no resistance, merely here and there a half-humorous, but

unsuccessful attempt to entangle him in his talk. The meeting agreed

with all that had been said regarding the antiquity of the earth

and of its life. They had, indeed, known it all long ago, and they

good-humouredly rallied the lecturer for coming amongst them with so

stale a story. It was quite plain that this large body of clergymen,

who were, I should say, the finest samples of their class, had entirely

given up the ancient landmarks, and transported the conception of

life’s origin to an indefinitely distant past.

This leads us to the gist of our present enquiry, which is this:--Does

life belong to what we call matter, or is it an independent principle

inserted into matter at some suitable epoch--say when the physical

conditions became such as to permit of the development of life? Let us

put the question with all the reverence due to a faith and culture in

which we all were cradled--a faith and culture, moreover, which are the

undeniable historic antecedents of our present enlightenment. I say,

let us put the question reverently, but let us also put it clearly and

definitely. There are the strongest grounds for believing that during

a certain period of its history the earth was not, nor was it fit to

be, the theatre of life. Whether this was ever a nebulous period, or

merely a molten period, does not much matter; and if we revert to

the nebulous condition, it is because the probabilities are really

on its side. Our question is this:--Did creative energy pause until

the nebulous matter had condensed, until the earth had been detached,

until the solar fire had so far withdrawn from the earth’s vicinity

as to permit a crust to gather round the planet? Did it wait until

the air was isolated, until the seas were formed, until evaporation,

condensation, and the descent of rain had begun, until the eroding

forces of the atmosphere had weathered and decomposed the molten rocks

so as to form soils, until the sun’s rays had become so tempered by

distance and by waste as to be chemically fit for the decompositions

necessary to vegetable life? Having waited through those Æons until the

proper conditions had set in, did it send the fiat forth, ‘Let Life

be!’? These questions define a hypothesis not without its difficulties,

but the dignity of which was demonstrated by the nobleness of the men

whom it sustained.

Modern scientific thought is called upon to decide between this

hypothesis and another: and public thought generally will afterwards be

called upon to do the same. You may, however, rest secure in the belief

that the hypothesis just sketched can never be stormed, and that it is

sure, if it yield at all, to yield to a prolonged siege. To gain new

territory modern argument requires more time than modern arms, though

both of them move with greater rapidity than of yore. But however

the convictions of individuals here and there may be influenced, the

process must be slow and secular which commends the rival hypothesis

of Natural Evolution to the public mind. For what are the core and

essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked and you stand face to face

with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular

or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not

alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but

that the human mind itself--emotion, intellect, will, and all their

phenomena--were once latent in a fiery cloud. Surely the mere statement

of such a notion is more than a refutation. But the hypothesis would

probably go even further than this. Many who hold it would probably

assent to the position that at the present moment all our philosophy,

all our poetry, all our science, and all our art--Plato, Shakspeare,

Newton, and Raphael--are potential in the fires of the sun. We long to

learn something of our origin. If the Evolution hypothesis be correct,

even this unsatisfied yearning must have come to us across the ages

which separate the unconscious primeval mist from the consciousness

of to-day. I do not think that any holder of the Evolution hypothesis

would say that I overstate it or overstrain it in any way. I merely

strip it of all vagueness, and bring before you unclothed and

unvarnished the notions by which it must stand or fall.

Surely these notions represent an absurdity too monstrous to be

entertained by any sane mind. Let us, however, give them fair play. Let

us steady ourselves in front of the hypothesis, and, dismissing all

terror and excitement from our minds, let us look firmly into it with

the hard sharp eye of intellect alone. Why are these notions absurd,

and why should sanity reject them? The law of Relativity, of which we

have previously spoken, may find its application here. These Evolution

notions are absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual

gibbet in relation to the ideas concerning matter which were drilled

into us when young. Spirit and matter have ever been presented to us

in the rudest contrast, the one as all-noble, the other as all-vile.

But is this correct? Does it represent what our mightiest spiritual

teacher would call the Eternal Fact of the Universe? Upon the answer to

this question all depends. Supposing, instead of having the foregoing

antithesis of spirit and matter presented to our youthful minds, we had

been taught to regard them as equally worthy and equally wonderful; to

consider them in fact as two opposite faces of the self-same mystery.

Supposing that in youth we had been impregnated with the notion of

the poet Goethe, instead of the notion of the poet Young, looking

at matter, not as brute matter, but as ‘the living garment of God;’

do you not think that under these altered circumstances the law of

Relativity might have had an outcome different from its present one?

Is it not probable that our repugnance to the idea of primeval union

between spirit and matter might be considerably abated? Without this

total revolution of the notions now prevalent, the Evolution hypothesis

must stand condemned; but in many profoundly thoughtful minds such

a revolution has already taken place. They degrade neither member

of the mysterious duality referred to; but they exalt one of them

from its abasement, and repeal the divorce hitherto existing between

both. In substance, if not in words, their position as regards the

relation of spirit and matter is: ‘What God hath joined together let

not man put asunder.’ And with regard to the ages of forgetfulness

which lie between the unconscious life of the nebula and the conscious

life of the earth, it is, they would urge, but an extension of that

forgetfulness which preceded the birth of us all.

I have thus led you to the outer rim of speculative science, for

beyond the nebulæ scientific thought has never ventured hitherto, and

have tried to state that which I considered ought, in fairness, to be

outspoken. I do not think this Evolution hypothesis is to be flouted

away contemptuously; I do not think it is to be denounced as wicked.

It is to be brought before the bar of disciplined reason, and there

justified or condemned. Let us hearken to those who wisely support

it, and to those who wisely oppose it; and let us tolerate those, and

they are many, who foolishly try to do either of these things.[6] The

only thing out of place in the discussion is dogmatism on either side.

Fear not the Evolution hypothesis. Steady yourselves in its presence

upon that faith in the ultimate triumph of truth which was expressed

by old Gamaliel when he said:--‘If it be of God, ye cannot overthrow

it; if it be of man, it will come to nought.’ Under the fierce light

of scientific enquiry, this hypothesis is sure to be dissipated if it

possess not a core of truth. Trust me, its existence as a hypothesis

in the mind is quite compatible with the simultaneous existence of all

those virtues to which the term Christian has been applied. It does

not solve--it does not profess to solve--the ultimate mystery of this

universe. It leaves in fact that mystery untouched. For granting the

nebula and its potential life, the question, whence came they? would

still remain to baffle and bewilder us. At bottom, the hypothesis does

nothing more than ‘transport the conception of life’s origin to an

indefinitely distant past.’

Those who hold the doctrine of Evolution are by no means ignorant of

the uncertainty of their data, and they yield no more to it than a

provisional assent. They regard the nebular hypothesis as probable,

and in the utter absence of any evidence to prove the act illegal,

they extend the method of nature from the present into the past. Here

the observed uniformity of nature is their only guide. Within the long

range of physical enquiry, they have never discerned in nature the

insertion of caprice. Throughout this range the laws of physical and

intellectual continuity have run side by side. Having thus determined

the elements of their curve in a world of observation and experiment,

they prolong that curve into an antecedent world, and accept as

probable the unbroken sequence of development from the nebula to the

present time. You never hear the really philosophical defenders of the

doctrine of Uniformity speaking of _impossibilities_ in nature.

They never say, what they are constantly charged with saying, that

it is impossible for the Builder of the universe to alter His work.

Their business is not with the possible, but the actual--not with a

world which _might_ be, but with a world that _is_. This

they explore with a courage not unmixed with reverence, and according

to methods which, like the quality of a tree, are tested by their

fruits. They have but one desire--to know the truth. They have but one

fear--to believe a lie. And if they know the strength of science, and

rely upon it with unswerving trust, they also know the limits beyond

which science ceases to be strong. They best know that questions

offer themselves to thought which science, as now prosecuted, has not

even the tendency to solve. They keep such questions open, and will

not tolerate any unlawful limitation of the horizon of their souls.

They have as little fellowship with the atheist who says there is no

God, as with the theist who professes to know the mind of God. ‘Two

things,’ said Immanuel Kant, ‘fill me with awe: the starry heavens

and the sense of moral responsibility in man.’ And in his hours of

health and strength and sanity, when the stroke of action has ceased

and the pause of reflection has set in, the scientific investigator

finds himself overshadowed by the same awe. Breaking contact with the

hampering details of earth, it associates him with a power which gives

fulness and tone to his existence, but which he can neither analyse nor

comprehend.

SCIENTIFIC LIMIT OF THE IMAGINATION.[7]

THE CELEBRATED FICHTE, in his lectures on the ‘Vocation of the

Scholar,’ insisted on a culture for the scholar which should not

be one-sided, but all-sided. His intellectual nature was to expand

spherically and not in a single direction. In one direction, however,

Fichte required that the scholar should apply himself directly to

nature, become a creator of knowledge, and thus repay by original

labours of his own the immense debt he owed to the labours of others.

It was these which enabled him to supplement the knowledge derived

from his own researches, so as to render his culture rounded and not

one-sided.

As regards science Fichte’s idea is to some extent illustrated by

the constitution and the labours of the British Association. We have

here a body of men engaged in the pursuit of Natural Knowledge, but

variously engaged. While sympathizing with each of its departments,

and supplementing his culture by knowledge drawn from all of them,

each student amongst us selects one subject for the exercise of his

own original faculty--one line along which he may carry the light of

his private intelligence a little way into the darkness by which all

knowledge is surrounded. Thus, the geologist deals with the rocks; the

biologist with the conditions and phenomena of life; the astronomer

with stellar masses and motions; the mathematician with the relations

of space and number; the chemist pursues his atoms, while the physical

investigator has his own large field in optical, thermal, electrical,

acoustical, and other phenomena. The British Association then, as

a whole, faces physical nature on all sides and pushes knowledge

centrifugally outwards, the sum of its labours constituting what Fichte

might call the _sphere_ of natural knowledge. In the meetings of

the Association it is found necessary to resolve this sphere into its

component parts, which take concrete form under the respective letters

of our Sections.

This is the Mathematical and Physical Section. Mathematics and physics

have been long accustomed to coalesce. For, no matter how subtle a

natural phenomenon may be, whether we observe it in the region of

sense, or follow it into that of imagination, it is in the long run

reducible to mechanical laws. But the mechanical data once guessed or

given, mathematics become all powerful as an instrument of deduction.

The command of geometry over the relations of space, the far-reaching

power which organised symbolic reasoning confers, are potent both

as means of physical discovery, and of reaping the entire fruits of

discovery. Indeed, without mathematics, expressed or implied, our

knowledge of physical science would be friable in the extreme.

Side by side with the mathematical method we have the method of

experiment. Here, from a starting-point furnished by his own researches

or those of others, the investigator proceeds by combining intuition

and verification. He ponders the knowledge he possesses and tries to

push it further, he guesses and checks his guess, he conjectures and

confirms or explodes his conjecture. These guesses and conjectures

are by no means leaps in the dark; for knowledge once gained casts a

faint light beyond its own immediate boundaries. There is no discovery

so limited as not to illuminate something beyond itself. The force of

intellectual penetration into this penumbral region which surrounds

actual knowledge is not, as some seem to think, dependent upon method,

but upon the genius of the investigator. There is, however, no genius

so gifted as not to need control and verification. The profoundest

minds know best that Nature’s ways are not at all times their ways, and

that the brightest flashes in the world of thought are incomplete until

they have been proved to have their counterparts in the world of fact.

Thus the vocation of the true experimentalist may be defined as the

continued exercise of spiritual insight, and its incessant correction

and realization. His experiments constitute a body, of which his

purified intuitions are, as it were, the soul.

Partly through mathematical and partly through experimental research,

physical science has of late years assumed a momentous position in the

world. Both in a material and in an intellectual point of view it has

produced, and it is destined to produce, immense changes,--vast social

ameliorations, and vast alterations in the popular conception of the

origin, rule, and governance of natural things. By science, in the

physical world, miracles are wrought, while philosophy is forsaking

its ancient metaphysical channels and pursuing others which have been

opened or indicated by scientific research. This must become more and

more the case as philosophic writers become more deeply imbued with the

methods of science, better acquainted with the facts which scientific

men have won, and with the great theories which they have elaborated.

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