CIVILIZATION.
Mr. Guizot's and Mr. W. von Humboldt's definitions examined. Its
elements.
The reader will here pardon me an indispensable digression. I make use
at almost every moment of a term comprising in its extensive
signification a collection of ideas which it is important to define
accurately: _civilization_. The greater or less degree in which this
term is applicable to the social condition of various nations, is my
only standard for the comparative merit of races. I also speak of a
_European_ civilization, in contradistinction to others of a different
character. It is the more necessary to avoid the least vagueness, as I
am under the disagreeable necessity of differing from a celebrated
writer, who has assumed the special task of determining the meaning and
comprehensiveness of this expression.
Mr. Guizot, in his _History of Civilization in Modern Europe_, makes
use of a term which seems to me to give rise to a serious confusion of
ideas, and lead to positive errors. He says that civilization is a
_fact_.
Now, either the word fact must here be understood in a sense much less
strict and precise than common usage requires, a sense so indistinct--I
might almost say elastic--as has never pertained to it, or what we
comprehend under the term civilization cannot be expressed by the word
fact. Civilization is not _a fact_; it is a _series_, a _concatenation
of facts_, more or less logically united, and resulting from ideas often
sufficiently diverse: ideas and facts continually reproduce each other.
Civilization is a term applied to a certain state or condition in which
a society exists--a condition which is of its own creation, bears its
character, and, in turn, reacts upon it. This condition is of so
variable a nature, that it cannot be called a fact; for a fact cannot be
variable without ceasing to be a fact. In other words, there is more
than one civilization: there are various kinds. Thus, a civilization may
flourish under every form of government, and it does not cease to exist
when civil commotions destroy or alter that form.
Let it not be understood that I esteem governmental forms of little
importance. Their choice is intimately connected with the prosperity of
the society: if judicious, promoting and developing it; if unpractical,
endangering its destruction. But I speak not here of the temporary
prosperity or misery of a society. I speak of its civilization; and this
is a phenomenon whose causes must be sought elsewhere, and deeper than
in transient political forms. Its character, its growth, fecundity, or
barrenness, depends upon elementary principles of far greater
importance.
But, in Mr. Guizot's opinion, civilization is a fact, a unity; and it is
of an essentially political character. Let us see how he defines it. He
has chosen a series of hypotheses, describing society in various
conditions, and then asks if the state so described is, in the general
opinion of mankind, the state of a people advancing in civilization--if
it answers to the signification which mankind generally attaches to this
word.[94]
"First imagine a people whose outward circumstances are easy and
agreeable; few taxes; few hardships; justice is fairly administered; in
a word, physical existence, taken altogether, is satisfactorily and
happily regulated. But, with all this, the moral and intellectual
energies of this people are studiously kept in a state of torpor and
inertness. It can hardly be called oppression; its tendency is not of
that character--it is rather compression. We are not without examples of
this state of society. There have been a great number of little
aristocratic republics, in which the people have been thus treated like
a flock of sheep, carefully tended, physically happy, but without the
least intellectual and moral activity. Is this civilization? Do we
recognize here a people in a state of moral and social advancement?"
I know not whether such a people is in a state of advancement, but it
certainly may be in a very advanced state of civilization, else we
should find ourselves compelled to class among the savages or barbarians
all those aristocratic republics of ancient and modern times, which
answer Mr. Guizot's description. But the common sense of mankind would
never ratify a method which ejected from within the pale of civilization
not only the Phenicians, Carthaginians, and Lacedæmonians, but even
Venice, Genoa, Pisa, the free cities of Germany--in fact, all the
powerful municipalities of the last centuries. But, besides this mode of
proceeding being too paradoxical and restrictive, it seems to me to
encounter another difficulty. Those little aristocratic states, to whom,
on account of their form of government, Mr. Guizot denies the aptitude
for civilization, have, for the most part, never been in possession of a
special culture peculiar to themselves. Powerful as many of them have
been, they assimilated, in this respect, with nations differently
governed, but of consanguineous affinity; they formed a fragment only of
a greater and more general civilization. Thus, the Carthaginians and
Phenicians, though at a great distance from one another, had a similar
mode of culture, the type of which must be sought in Assyria. The
Italian republics participated in the same ideas and opinions which
developed themselves in the bosom of neighboring monarchies. The
imperial cities of Thuringia and Suabia, although perfectly independent
in a political point of view, were nevertheless intimately united with
the general progressive or retrogressive movement of the whole German
race. Mr. Guizot, therefore, by assigning to the people of different
countries degrees of merit proportionate to the degree and form of their
liberty, creates unjustifiable subdivisions in the same race, and makes
distinctions without a difference. A lengthy discussion is not in its
place here, and I shall therefore proceed rapidly. If, however, it were
necessary to enter into a controversy, might we not justly protest
against recognizing any inferiority in the case of Genoa, Pisa, Venice,
and others, when compared with countries like Milan, Naples, or Rome?
Mr. Guizot has himself foreseen this difficulty, and removed the
objection. If he does not recognize a state of civilization among a
people "mildly governed, but in a state of compression," neither does he
accord this prerogative to another, "whose outward circumstances are
less favorable and agreeable, although supportable, but whose
intellectual and moral cravings have not been entirely neglected; among
whom pure and elevated sentiments have been cultivated, and religious
and moral notions reached a certain degree of improvement, but among
whom the desire of liberty has been stifled; where a certain portion of
truth is doled out to each, but no one permitted to seek for it himself.
This is the condition to which most of the populations of Asia are sunk,
because theocratical governments there restrain the progress of mankind;
such, for instance, is the state of the Hindoos."
Thus, besides the aristocratic nations of the earth, we must moreover
exclude from the pale of civilization the Hindoos, Egyptians, Etruscans,
Peruvians, Thibetans, Japanese--nay, even modern Rome and her
territories.
I omit the last two hypotheses, because, thanks to the first two, the
state of civilization is already restricted within boundaries so
contracted that scarce any people on the globe is justified in
pretending to it. A nation, then, can be called civilized only when it
enjoys institutions happily blending popular liberty and the requisite
strength of authority for maintaining order; when its progress in
material well-being and its moral development are co-ordinate in a
certain manner, and no other; where religion, as well as government, is
confined within limits accurately defined, which neither ever
transgresses; where each individual possesses clearly determinate and
inalienable rights. According to this formula, no nation can be
civilized unless its political institutions are of the constitutional
and representative form, and consequently it is impossible to save many
European nations from the reproach of barbarism. Then, measuring the
_degree_ of civilization by the perfection of this same and only
political form, we are compelled to place in a second rank all those
constitutional states which have ill employed the engine of parliament,
to reserve the crown exclusively for those who know how to make good use
of it. By this reasoning, I am forced to consider as truly civilized,
in the past as well as the present, none but the single English
nation.[95]
I sincerely respect and admire that great people, whose victories,
industry, and universal commerce have left no portion of our globe
ignorant of its puissance and the prodigies it has performed. But
still, I do not feel disposed to respect and admire in the world no
other: it would seem to me too humiliating and cruel to humanity to
confess that, since the beginning of time, it has never succeeded in
producing a civilization anywhere but upon a small island of the Western
Ocean, has never discovered the laws and forms which produce this state
until the reign of William and Mary. Such a conception of civilization
might seem to many rather a little too narrow and restrictive. But there
is another objection. If we attach the idea of civilization to a
political form, reason, observation, and science will soon lose their
vote in the decision of the question, which must thenceforth be left to
the passions and prejudices of parties. There will be some whose
preferences will lead them stoutly to deny that the institutions of the
British Isles are the "perfection of human reason:" their enthusiasm,
perchance, will be expended in praising the order established in St.
Petersburg or in Vienna. Many, again, and perhaps the greater number of
all living between the Rhine and the Pyrenees, will sustain to the last
that, notwithstanding a few blemishes, the most polished, the most
civilized country of the world is _la belle France_. The moment that the
decision of the degree of intellectual culture becomes a matter of
preference, a question of sentiment, to come to an understanding is
impossible. Each one will think him the man most advanced in
civilization who shall coincide with his views about the respective
duties of the governing and the governed; while those who are
unfortunate enough to differ, will be set down as men behind the age,
little better than barbarians, mere "old fogies," whose visual organs
are too weak for the dazzling lights of the epoch; or else as daring,
incendiary innovators, who wish to destroy all established order, and
sap the very foundation of civilization. I think few will differ from me
in considering Mr. Guizot's definition as defective, and the source from
which he derives civilization as not the real one.
Let us now examine Baron W. Von Humboldt's definition. "Civilization,"
says that celebrated statesman, "is the humanization of nations in their
outward institutions, in their manners, and in the inward feelings upon
which these depend."[96]
Here we meet with a defect of the very opposite kind to that which I
took the liberty to point out in Mr. Guizot's definition. The formula is
too vague, the boundary lines too indistinct. If civilization consists
in a softening of manners, more than one untutored tribe, some extremely
low in the scale of races, might take precedence over several European
nations whose character contains more acerbity. There are in the South
Sea Islands, and elsewhere, very inoffensive populations, of
exceedingly gentle manners, and kind, accommodating dispositions; yet,
though we may praise them, no one would think of placing them, in the
scale of civilization, above the rough Norwegians, or even above the
ferocious Malays, who, dressed in brilliant garments of their own
fabric, and upon skilfully constructed vessels of their own making,
traverse the Indian seas, at the same time the terror and scourge of
maritime commerce, and its most successful votaries. This observation
could not escape so great a mind as William Von Humboldt's; and he
therefore imagines, besides civilization, a higher degree of
development, which he calls _culture_, and by which he declares that
nations gain, above their gentle manners, "_science and the arts_."[97]
When the world shall have arrived at this higher state, it will be
peopled by _affectionate_ and _sympathetic_ beings, very erudite,
poetic, and artistic, but, by reason of this same reunion of qualities,
ignoring the grosser wants of existence: strangers to the necessity of
war, as well as those of rude mechanical toil.
When we reflect upon the limited leisure that the mass of even those
can enjoy whose lot is cast in the happiest epoch, to abandon themselves
to purely intellectual occupations--when we consider how incessant and
arduous must ever be the strife of man with nature and the elements to
insure the mere means of subsistence, it will soon be perceived that the
philosopher of Berlin aimed less at depicting realities than at drawing
from the domain of abstraction certain entities which appeared to him
beautiful and sublime, and which are so, indeed, and at causing them to
act and move in a sphere as ideal as themselves. If any doubts should
still remain in this respect, they are soon dispelled when we arrive at
the culminating point of the system, consisting of a third and last
degree superior to the two others. This greatest point of perfection is
that upon which stands the _finished_ man (_der Gebildete_); that is to
say, the man who, in his nature, possesses "something higher and more
inward or essential; a clear and comprehensive faculty of seeing all
things in their true light; a recognition and appreciation of the
ultimate goal of man's moral and intellectual aspirations, which
diffuses itself harmoniously over all his feelings and his
character."[98]
We here have a regular gradation from man in a civilized or "humanized"
state, to the man of cultivation--the philosopher, the poet, the artist;
and thence still higher to the _finished_, the _perfect_ man, who has
attained the greatest elevation possible to our species; a man who, if I
seize rightly Mr. Humboldt's idea, had his living counterpart in
Goethe, as that towering mind is described to us in its olympic
serenity. This theory rests upon no other basis than Mr. Von Humboldt's
perception of the immense difference between the civilization of a
nation and the comparative height of perfection attained by great,
isolated individualities. This difference is so great that civilizations
different from ours, and perhaps inferior to it, have produced men in
some respects superior to those we admire most.
Upon this point I fully coincide with the great philosopher whose theory
I am unfolding. It is perfectly correct, that our state of
development--what we call the European civilization--produces neither
the profoundest nor the sublimest thinkers, nor the greatest poets, nor
the most skilful artists. Yet I venture to differ from the illustrious
philologist in believing that to give a practical meaning to the word
civilization, it is necessary to divest one's self, if but for a moment,
from the prejudices or prepossessions resulting from the examination of
mere details in any particular civilization. We must take the aggregate
result of the whole, and not make the requisites too few, as in the case
of the man of the first degree, whom I persist in not acknowledging as
civilized merely because his manners are gentle; nor too many, as in the
case of the sage of the third, for then the development of human
faculties would be limited to a few individuals, and would produce
results purely isolated and typical.
The Baron Von Humboldt's system, however, does honor to that exquisite
and generous sensibility, that grand sublimity which was the dominant
characteristic of this great mind; and in its purely abstract nature may
be compared to the fragile worlds of Brahmin philosophy. Born from the
brain of a slumbering god, they rise in the air like the irised bubbles
that the child blows from the suds, bursting and succeeding one another
as the dreams that amuse the celestial sleeper.
But the character of my researches permits me not to indulge in mere
abstractions, however brilliant and attractive; I must arrive at results
tangible to practical sense and common experience. I do not wish, like
Mr. Guizot, to investigate the conditions more or less favorable to the
prosperity of societies, nor, like Mr. William Von Humboldt, to
speculate upon the isolated elevation of individual intelligences; my
purpose is to encompass, if possible, the aggregate power, moral as well
as material, which is developed in great masses of men. It is not
without trepidation that I engage in a path in which two of the most
admired men of our century have lost themselves; and to avoid the errors
into which they have fallen, I shall descend to first principles, and
define civilization by first investigating from what causes it results.
If the reader, then, will follow me patiently and attentively through
the mazes into which I am forced to enter, I shall endeavor to throw as
much light as I am capable of, upon this inherently obscure and abstruse
subject.
There is no human being so degraded, so brutish, in whom a twofold
instinct, if I may be permitted so to call it, is not manifest; the
instinct which incites to the gratification of material wants, and that
which leads to higher aspirations. The degree of intensity of either of
these two is the first and principal measure of the differences among
races. In none, not even in the lowest tribes, are the two instincts
precisely balanced. Among some, the physical wants or animal
propensities preponderate; in others, these are subordinate to the
speculative tendencies--the cravings for the abstract, the supernatural.
Thus, the lowest of the yellow races seem to me to be dominated rather
by the first, the physical instinct, without, however, being absolutely
deprived of all capacity for abstractions. On the contrary, among the
majority of the black races of corresponding rank, the habits are less
active than pensive; imagination there attaches greater value to the
things of the invisible than to those of the visible world. I do not
thence deduce any conclusion of superior capacity for civilization on
the part of those latter races over the former, for history demonstrates
that both are equally insusceptible to attain it. Centuries, thousands
of years, have passed by without either of them doing aught to
ameliorate their condition, because they have never been able to
associate a sufficient number of ideas with the same number of facts, to
begin the march of progress. I wish merely to draw attention to the
fact, that even among the lowest races we find this double current
differently constituted. I shall now follow the ascending scale.
Above the Samoyedes on the one hand, and the Fidas and Pelagian negroes
on the other, we must place those tribes who are not content with a mere
hut of branches, and a social condition based upon force only, but who
are capable of comprehending and aspiring to a better condition. These
are one degree above the most barbarous.
If they belong to the first category of races--those who act more than
they think, among whom the material tendency predominates over that for
the abstract--their development will display itself in a greater
perfection of their instruments of labor, and of war, in a greater care
and skill in their ornaments, etc. In government, the warriors will
take precedence over the priests; in their intercourse with others, they
will show a certain aptitude and readiness for trafficking. Their wars,
though still characterized by cruelty, will originate rather in a love
of gain, than in the mere gratification of vindictive passions. In one
word, material well-being, physical enjoyments, will be the main pursuit
of each individual. I find this picture realized among several of the
Mongol races, and also, to some extent, among the Quichuas and Azmaras
of Peru.
On the other hand, if they belong to the second category--to those who
have a predominating tendency for the speculative, the abstract--less
care will be bestowed upon the material interests; the influence of the
priests will preponderate in the government; in fact, we perceive a
complete antithesis to the condition above described. The Dahomees, of
Western Africa, and the Caffres of the south, are examples of this
state.
Leaving those races whose progressive tendency is not sufficiently
vigorous to enable them to extend their influence over great
multitudes,[99] we come to those of a higher order, in whom this
tendency is so vigorous that they are capable of incorporating, and
bringing within their sphere of action, all those they come in contact
with. They soon ingraft their own social and political system upon
immense multitudes, and impose upon vast countries the dominion of that
combination of facts and ideas--more or less co-ordinate--which we call
a _civilization_. Among these races, again, we find the same difference,
the same division, that I already pointed out in those of inferior
merit--in some the speculative, in others the more materially active
tendency predominates. It is, indeed, among these races only, that this
difference has important consequences, and is clearly perceptible. When
a tribe, by incorporating with it great multitudes, has become a people,
has founded a vast dominion, we find that these two currents or
tendencies have augmented in strength, according to the character of the
populations which enter into the combination, and there become blended.
Whatever tendency prevails among these populations, they will
proportionably modify the character of the whole. It will be remarked,
moreover, that at different periods of the life of a people, and in
strict accordance with the mixture of blood and the fusion of different
elements, the oscillation between the two tendencies becomes more
violent, and it may happen that their relative proportion changes
altogether; that one, at first subordinate, in time becomes predominant.
The results of this mobility are important, as they influence, in a
sensible manner, the character of a civilization, and its
stability.[100]
For the sake of simplicity, I shall distinguish the two categories of
races by designations expressive of the tendency which predominates in
them, and shall call them accordingly, either _speculative_ or
_utilitarian_.[101] As I have before observed, these terms imply neither
praise nor blame. I use them merely for convenience, to designate the
leading characteristic, without thereby expressing a total absence of
the other. Thus, the most utilitarian of the speculative races would
closely approximate to the most speculative of the utilitarian. At the
head of the utilitarian category, as its type, I place the Chinese; at
the head, and as the type of the other, the Hindoos. Next to the Chinese
I would put the majority of the populations of ancient Italy, the first
Romans of the time of the republic, and the Germanic tribes. On the
opposite side, among the speculative races, I would range next to the
Hindoos, the Egyptians, and the nations of the Assyrian empire.
I have said already that the oscillations of the two principles or
tendencies sometimes result in the preponderance of one, which before
was subordinate, and thus the character of the civilization is changed.
Minor modifications, the history of almost every people presents. Thus,
even the materialistic utilitarian tendency of the Chinese has been
somewhat modified by their amalgamation with tribes of another blood,
and a different tendency. In the south, the Yunnan particularly, where
this population prevailed, the inhabitants are much less exclusively
utilitarian than in the north, where the Chinese element is more pure.
If this admixture of blood operated so slight a change in the genius of
that immense nation, that its effects have ceased, or make themselves
perceptible only in an exceedingly slow manner, it is because its
quantity was so extremely small, compared to the utilitarian population
by which it was absorbed.
Into the actual populations of Europe, the Germanic tribes infused a
strong utilitarian tendency, and in the north, this has been continually
recruited by new accessions of the same ethnical element; but in the
south (with some exceptions, Piedmont, and the North of Spain, for
example), the Germanic element forms not so great a portion of the whole
mass, and the utilitarian tendency has there been overweighed by the
opposite genius of the native populations.
Among the speculative races we have signalized the Hindoos. They are
endowed in a high degree with the tendency for the supernatural, the
abstract. Their character is more meditative than active and practical.
As their ancient conquests incorporated with them races of a similar
disposition, the utilitarian element has never prevailed sufficiently to
produce decided results. While, therefore, their civilization has
arrived at a high degree of perfection in other respects, it has lagged
far behind in all that promotes material comfort, in all that is
strictly useful and practical.
Rome, at first strictly utilitarian, changed its character gradually as
the fusion with Greek, Asiatic, and African elements proceeded, and when
once the ancient utilitarian population was absorbed in this ethnical
inundation, the practical character of Rome was lost.
* * * * *
From the consideration of these and similar facts, I arrive at the
conclusion, that all intellectual or moral activity results from the
combined action and mutual reaction of these two tendencies, and that
the social system can arrive at that development which entitles it to
the name of civilization, only in races which possess, in a high degree,
either of the two, without being too much deficient in the other.
I now proceed to the examination of other points also deserving of
notice.
FOOTNOTES:
[94] Hazlitt's translation, vol. i. p 21. New York, 1855.--H.
[95] A careful comparison of Mr. Guizot's views with those expressed by
Count Gobineau upon this interesting subject convinced me that the
differences of opinion between these two investigators required a more
careful and minute examination than the author has thought necessary.
With this view, I subjoin further extracts from the celebrated "_History
of Civilization in Europe_," from which, I think, it will appear that
few of the great truths comprised in the definition of _civilization_
have escaped the penetration and research of the illustrious writer, but
that, being unable to divest himself of the idea of _unity_ of
civilization, he has necessarily fallen into an error, with which a
great metaphysician justly charges so many reasoners. "It is hard," says
Locke, speaking of the abuse of words, "to find a discourse written on
any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe,
if he read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the most
material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used
sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for
another.... A man, in his accompts with another, might with as much
fairness, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and
sometimes for another collection of units (_e. g._, this character, 3,
stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight),
as, in his discourse or reasoning, make the same words stand for
different collections of simple ideas."
* * * * *
Mr. Guizot opens his first lecture by declaring his intention of giving
a "general survey of the history of _European civilization_, of its
_origin_, its _progress_, its _end_, its _character_. I say European
civilization, because there is evidently so striking a uniformity in the
civilization of the different states of Europe, as fully to warrant this
appellation. Civilization has flowed to them all from sources so much
alike, it is so connected in them all--notwithstanding the great
differences of time, of place, and circumstances--by the same
principles, and it tends in them all to bring about the same results,
that no one will doubt of there being _a civilization essentially
European_."
Here, then, Mr. Guizot acknowledges one great truth contended for in
this volume; he virtually recognizes the fact that there may be other
civilizations, having different origins, a different progress, different
characters, different ends.
"At the same time, it must be observed, that this civilization cannot be
found in--its history cannot be collected from--the history of any
single state of Europe. However similar in its general appearance
throughout the whole, its variety is not less remarkable, nor has it
ever yet developed itself completely in any particular country. Its
characteristic features are widely spread, and we shall be obliged to
seek, as occasion may require, in England, in France, in Germany, in
Spain, for the elements of its history."
This is precisely the idea expressed in my introduction, that according
to the character of a nation, its civilization manifests itself in
various ways; in some, by perfection in the arts, useful or polite; in
others, by development of political forms, and their practical
application, etc. If I had then wished to support my opinion by a great
authority, I should, assuredly, have quoted Mr. Guizot, who, a few pages
further on, says:--
"Wherever the exterior condition of man becomes enlarged, quickened, and
improved; wherever the intellectual nature of man distinguishes itself
by its energy, brilliancy, and its grandeur; wherever these signs occur,
notwithstanding the gravest imperfections in the social system, there
man proclaims and applauds a civilization."
"_Notwithstanding the gravest imperfections in the social system_," says
Mr. Guizot, yet in the series of hypotheses, quoted in the text, in
which he attempts a negative definition of civilization, by showing what
civilization is _not_, he virtually makes a political form the test of
civilization.
In another passage, again, he says that civilization "is a course for
humanity to run--a destiny for it to accomplish. Nations have
transmitted, from age to age, something to their successors which is
never lost, but which grows, and continues as a common stock, and will
thus be carried on to the end of all things. For my part (he continues),
I feel assured that human nature has such a destiny; that a general
civilization pervades the human race; that at every epoch it augments;
and that there, consequently, is a universal history of civilization to
be written."
It must be obvious to the reader who compares these extracts, that Mr.
Guizot expresses a totally distinct idea or collection of ideas in each.
First, the civilization of a particular nation, which exists "wherever
the intellectual nature of man distinguishes itself by its energy,
brilliancy, and grandeur." Such a civilization may flourish,
"notwithstanding the greatest imperfections in the social system."
Secondly, Mr. Guizot's _beau-idéal_ of the best, most perfect
civilization, where the political forms insure the greatest happiness,
promote the most rapid--yet well-regulated--progress.
Thirdly, a great system of particular civilizations, as that of Europe,
the various elements of which "are connected by the same principles, and
tend all to bring about the same general results."
Fourthly, a supposed general progress of the whole human race toward a
higher state of perfection.
To all these ideas, provided they are not confounded one with another, I
have already given my assent. (See _Introduction_, p. 51.) With regard
to the latter, however, I would observe that it by no means militates
against a belief in the intellectual imparity of races, and the
permanency of this imparity. As in a society composed of individuals,
all enjoy the fruits of the general progress, though all have not
contributed to it in equal measure, and some not at all: so, in that
society, of which we may suppose the various branches of the human
family to be the members, even the inferior participate more or less in
the benefits of intellectual labor, of which they would have been
incapable. Because I can transport myself with almost the swiftness of a
bird from one place to another, it does not follow that--though I profit
by Watt's genius--I could have invented the steam-engine, or even that I
understand the principles upon which that invention is based.--H.
[96] W. Von Humboldt, _Ueber die Kawi-Sprache auf der Insel Java;
Einleitung_, vol. i. p. 37. Berlin. "Die _Civilization_ ist die
Vermenschlichung der Völker in ihren äusseren Einrichtungen und
Gebräuchen, und der darauf Bezug habenden inneren Gesinnung."
[97] William Von Humboldt. "Die Kultur fügt dieser Veredlung des
gesellschaftlichen Zustandes Wissenschaft und Kunst hinzu."
[98] W. Von Humboldt, _op. cit._, p. 37: "Wenn wir in unserer Sprache
_Bildung_ sagen, so meinen wir damit etwas zugleich Höheres und mehr
Innerlicheres, nämlich die Sinnesart, die sich aus der Erkenntniss und
dem Gefühle des gesammten geistigen und sittlichen Streben harmonish auf
die Empfindung und den Charakter ergiesst."
As nothing can exceed the difficulty of rendering an abstract idea from
the French into English, except to transmit the same from German into
French, and as if _all_ these processes must be undergone, the identity
of the idea is greatly endangered, I have thought proper to translate at
once from the original German, and therefore differ somewhat from Mr.
Gobineau, who gives it thus: "L'homme formé, c'est-à-dire, l'homme qui,
dans sa nature, possède quelque chose de plus haut, de plus intime à la
fois, c'est-à-dire, une façon de comprendre qui répand harmonieusement
sur la sensibilité et le charactère les impressions qu'elle reçoit de
l'activité intellectuelle et morale dans son ensemble." I have taken
great pains to express clearly Mr. Von Humboldt's idea, and have
therefore amplified the word _Sinnesart_, which has not its precise
equivalent in English.--TRANS.
[99] See page 154.
[100] Mr. Klemm (_Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit_, Leipzig,
1849) adopts, also, a division of all races into two categories, which
he calls respectively the _active_ and the _passive_. I have not had the
advantage of perusing his book, and cannot, therefore, say whether his
idea is similar to mine. It would not be surprising that, in pursuing
the same road, we should both have stumbled over the same truth.
[101] The translator has here permitted himself a deviation from the
original. Mr. Gobineau, to express his idea, borrows from the symbolism
of the Hindoos, where the feminine principle is represented by Prakriti,
and the masculine by Purucha, and calls the two categories of races
respectively feminine and masculine. But as he "thereby wishes to
express nothing but a mutual fecundation, without ascribing any
superiority to either," and as the idea seems fully rendered by the
words used in the translation, the latter have been thought preferable,
as not so liable to misrepresentation and misconception.--H.