Nothing can appear more contradictory than the principles on which the
old governments began, and the condition to which society, civilisation
and commerce are capable of carrying mankind. Government, on the old
system, is an assumption of power, for the aggrandisement of itself; on
the new, a delegation of power for the common benefit of society.
The former supports itself by keeping up a system of war; the latter
promotes a system of peace, as the true means of enriching a nation.
The one encourages national prejudices; the other promotes universal
society, as the means of universal commerce. The one measures its
prosperity, by the quantity of revenue it extorts; the other proves its
excellence, by the small quantity of taxes it requires.
Mr. Burke has talked of old and new whigs. If he can amuse himself with
childish names and distinctions, I shall not interrupt his pleasure. It
is not to him, but to the Abbe Sieyes, that I address this chapter. I
am already engaged to the latter gentleman to discuss the subject of
monarchical government; and as it naturally occurs in comparing the old
and new systems, I make this the opportunity of presenting to him my
observations. I shall occasionally take Mr. Burke in my way.
Though it might be proved that the system of government now called the
New, is the most ancient in principle of all that have existed, being
founded on the original, inherent Rights of Man: yet, as tyranny and
the sword have suspended the exercise of those rights for many centuries
past, it serves better the purpose of distinction to call it the new,
than to claim the right of calling it the old.
The first general distinction between those two systems, is, that the
one now called the old is hereditary, either in whole or in part;
and the new is entirely representative. It rejects all hereditary
government:
First, As being an imposition on mankind.
Secondly, As inadequate to the purposes for which government is
necessary.
With respect to the first of these heads--It cannot be proved by what
right hereditary government could begin; neither does there exist
within the compass of mortal power a right to establish it. Man has no
authority over posterity in matters of personal right; and, therefore,
no man, or body of men, had, or can have, a right to set up hereditary
government. Were even ourselves to come again into existence, instead of
being succeeded by posterity, we have not now the right of taking from
ourselves the rights which would then be ours. On what ground, then, do
we pretend to take them from others?
All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. An heritable crown,
or an heritable throne, or by what other fanciful name such things may
be called, have no other significant explanation than that mankind are
heritable property. To inherit a government, is to inherit the people,
as if they were flocks and herds.
With respect to the second head, that of being inadequate to the
purposes for which government is necessary, we have only to consider
what government essentially is, and compare it with the circumstances to
which hereditary succession is subject.
Government ought to be a thing always in full maturity. It ought to
be so constructed as to be superior to all the accidents to which
individual man is subject; and, therefore, hereditary succession, by
being subject to them all, is the most irregular and imperfect of all
the systems of government.
We have heard the Rights of Man called a levelling system; but the
only system to which the word levelling is truly applicable, is the
hereditary monarchical system. It is a system of mental levelling.
It indiscriminately admits every species of character to the same
authority. Vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom, in short, every
quality good or bad, is put on the same level. Kings succeed each other,
not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies not what their mental or
moral characters are. Can we then be surprised at the abject state of
the human mind in monarchical countries, when the government itself is
formed on such an abject levelling system?--It has no fixed character.
To-day it is one thing; to-morrow it is something else. It changes with
the temper of every succeeding individual, and is subject to all the
varieties of each. It is government through the medium of passions and
accidents. It appears under all the various characters of childhood,
decrepitude, dotage, a thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or in
crutches. It reverses the wholesome order of nature. It occasionally
puts children over men, and the conceits of nonage over wisdom and
experience. In short, we cannot conceive a more ridiculous figure of
government, than hereditary succession, in all its cases, presents.
Could it be made a decree in nature, or an edict registered in heaven,
and man could know it, that virtue and wisdom should invariably
appertain to hereditary succession, the objection to it would be
removed; but when we see that nature acts as if she disowned and sported
with the hereditary system; that the mental character of successors, in
all countries, is below the average of human understanding; that one is
a tyrant, another an idiot, a third insane, and some all three together,
it is impossible to attach confidence to it, when reason in man has
power to act.
It is not to the Abbe Sieyes that I need apply this reasoning; he has
already saved me that trouble by giving his own opinion upon the
case. "If it be asked," says he, "what is my opinion with respect to
hereditary right, I answer without hesitation, That in good theory, an
hereditary transmission of any power of office, can never accord with
the laws of a true representation. Hereditaryship is, in this sense, as
much an attaint upon principle, as an outrage upon society. But let
us," continues he, "refer to the history of all elective monarchies and
principalities: is there one in which the elective mode is not worse
than the hereditary succession?"
As to debating on which is the worst of the two, it is admitting both
to be bad; and herein we are agreed. The preference which the Abbe has
given, is a condemnation of the thing that he prefers. Such a mode of
reasoning on such a subject is inadmissible, because it finally amounts
to an accusation upon Providence, as if she had left to man no other
choice with respect to government than between two evils, the best of
which he admits to be "an attaint upon principle, and an outrage upon
society."
Passing over, for the present, all the evils and mischiefs which
monarchy has occasioned in the world, nothing can more effectually
prove its uselessness in a state of civil government, than making it
hereditary. Would we make any office hereditary that required wisdom and
abilities to fill it? And where wisdom and abilities are not necessary,
such an office, whatever it may be, is superfluous or insignificant.
Hereditary succession is a burlesque upon monarchy. It puts it in the
most ridiculous light, by presenting it as an office which any child or
idiot may fill. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but
to be a king requires only the animal figure of man--a sort of breathing
automaton. This sort of superstition may last a few years more, but it
cannot long resist the awakened reason and interest of man.
As to Mr. Burke, he is a stickler for monarchy, not altogether as a
pensioner, if he is one, which I believe, but as a political man. He
has taken up a contemptible opinion of mankind, who, in their turn, are
taking up the same of him. He considers them as a herd of beings that
must be governed by fraud, effigy, and show; and an idol would be as
good a figure of monarchy with him, as a man. I will, however, do him
the justice to say that, with respect to America, he has been very
complimentary. He always contended, at least in my hearing, that the
people of America were more enlightened than those of England, or of
any country in Europe; and that therefore the imposition of show was not
necessary in their governments.
Though the comparison between hereditary and elective monarchy,
which the Abbe has made, is unnecessary to the case, because the
representative system rejects both: yet, were I to make the comparison,
I should decide contrary to what he has done.
The civil wars which have originated from contested hereditary
claims, are more numerous, and have been more dreadful, and of longer
continuance, than those which have been occasioned by election. All the
civil wars in France arose from the hereditary system; they were either
produced by hereditary claims, or by the imperfection of the hereditary
form, which admits of regencies or monarchy at nurse. With respect to
England, its history is full of the same misfortunes. The contests
for succession between the houses of York and Lancaster lasted a whole
century; and others of a similar nature have renewed themselves
since that period. Those of 1715 and 1745 were of the same kind. The
succession war for the crown of Spain embroiled almost half Europe. The
disturbances of Holland are generated from the hereditaryship of the
Stadtholder. A government calling itself free, with an hereditary
office, is like a thorn in the flesh, that produces a fermentation which
endeavours to discharge it.
But I might go further, and place also foreign wars, of whatever kind,
to the same cause. It is by adding the evil of hereditary succession
to that of monarchy, that a permanent family interest is created, whose
constant objects are dominion and revenue. Poland, though an elective
monarchy, has had fewer wars than those which are hereditary; and it is
the only government that has made a voluntary essay, though but a small
one, to reform the condition of the country.
Having thus glanced at a few of the defects of the old, or hereditary
systems of government, let us compare it with the new, or representative
system.
The representative system takes society and civilisation for its basis;
nature, reason, and experience, for its guide.
Experience, in all ages, and in all countries, has demonstrated that it
is impossible to control Nature in her distribution of mental powers.
She gives them as she pleases. Whatever is the rule by which she,
apparently to us, scatters them among mankind, that rule remains
a secret to man. It would be as ridiculous to attempt to fix the
hereditaryship of human beauty, as of wisdom. Whatever wisdom
constituently is, it is like a seedless plant; it may be reared when
it appears, but it cannot be voluntarily produced. There is always a
sufficiency somewhere in the general mass of society for all purposes;
but with respect to the parts of society, it is continually changing
its place. It rises in one to-day, in another to-morrow, and has most
probably visited in rotation every family of the earth, and again
withdrawn.
As this is in the order of nature, the order of government must
necessarily follow it, or government will, as we see it does, degenerate
into ignorance. The hereditary system, therefore, is as repugnant to
human wisdom as to human rights; and is as absurd as it is unjust.
As the republic of letters brings forward the best literary productions,
by giving to genius a fair and universal chance; so the representative
system of government is calculated to produce the wisest laws, by
collecting wisdom from where it can be found. I smile to myself when I
contemplate the ridiculous insignificance into which literature and all
the sciences would sink, were they made hereditary; and I carry the same
idea into governments. An hereditary governor is as inconsistent as an
hereditary author. I know not whether Homer or Euclid had sons; but
I will venture an opinion that if they had, and had left their works
unfinished, those sons could not have completed them.
Do we need a stronger evidence of the absurdity of hereditary government
than is seen in the descendants of those men, in any line of life, who
once were famous? Is there scarcely an instance in which there is not
a total reverse of the character? It appears as if the tide of mental
faculties flowed as far as it could in certain channels, and then
forsook its course, and arose in others. How irrational then is the
hereditary system, which establishes channels of power, in company
with which wisdom refuses to flow! By continuing this absurdity, man is
perpetually in contradiction with himself; he accepts, for a king, or a
chief magistrate, or a legislator, a person whom he would not elect for
a constable.
It appears to general observation, that revolutions create genius and
talents; but those events do no more than bring them forward. There is
existing in man, a mass of sense lying in a dormant state, and which,
unless something excites it to action, will descend with him, in that
condition, to the grave. As it is to the advantage of society that
the whole of its faculties should be employed, the construction of
government ought to be such as to bring forward, by a quiet and regular
operation, all that extent of capacity which never fails to appear in
revolutions.
This cannot take place in the insipid state of hereditary government,
not only because it prevents, but because it operates to benumb. When
the mind of a nation is bowed down by any political superstition in its
government, such as hereditary succession is, it loses a considerable
portion of its powers on all other subjects and objects. Hereditary
succession requires the same obedience to ignorance, as to wisdom;
and when once the mind can bring itself to pay this indiscriminate
reverence, it descends below the stature of mental manhood. It is fit
to be great only in little things. It acts a treachery upon itself, and
suffocates the sensations that urge the detection.
Though the ancient governments present to us a miserable picture of the
condition of man, there is one which above all others exempts itself
from the general description. I mean the democracy of the Athenians. We
see more to admire, and less to condemn, in that great, extraordinary
people, than in anything which history affords.
Mr. Burke is so little acquainted with constituent principles of
government, that he confounds democracy and representation together.
Representation was a thing unknown in the ancient democracies. In those
the mass of the people met and enacted laws (grammatically speaking) in
the first person. Simple democracy was no other than the common hall of
the ancients. It signifies the form, as well as the public principle of
the government. As those democracies increased in population, and the
territory extended, the simple democratical form became unwieldy and
impracticable; and as the system of representation was not known, the
consequence was, they either degenerated convulsively into monarchies,
or became absorbed into such as then existed. Had the system of
representation been then understood, as it now is, there is no reason
to believe that those forms of government, now called monarchical or
aristocratical, would ever have taken place. It was the want of
some method to consolidate the parts of society, after it became too
populous, and too extensive for the simple democratical form, and also
the lax and solitary condition of shepherds and herdsmen in other parts
of the world, that afforded opportunities to those unnatural modes of
government to begin.
As it is necessary to clear away the rubbish of errors, into which the
subject of government has been thrown, I will proceed to remark on some
others.
It has always been the political craft of courtiers and
court-governments, to abuse something which they called republicanism;
but what republicanism was, or is, they never attempt to explain. Let us
examine a little into this case.
The only forms of government are the democratical, the aristocratical,
the monarchical, and what is now called the representative.
What is called a republic is not any particular form of government. It
is wholly characteristical of the purport, matter or object for which
government ought to be instituted, and on which it is to be employed,
Res-Publica, the public affairs, or the public good; or, literally
translated, the public thing. It is a word of a good original, referring
to what ought to be the character and business of government; and in
this sense it is naturally opposed to the word monarchy, which has a
base original signification. It means arbitrary power in an individual
person; in the exercise of which, himself, and not the res-publica, is
the object.
Every government that does not act on the principle of a Republic, or
in other words, that does not make the res-publica its whole and sole
object, is not a good government. Republican government is no other than
government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as
well individually as collectively. It is not necessarily connected
with any particular form, but it most naturally associates with the
representative form, as being best calculated to secure the end for
which a nation is at the expense of supporting it.
Various forms of government have affected to style themselves a
republic. Poland calls itself a republic, which is an hereditary
aristocracy, with what is called an elective monarchy. Holland calls
itself a republic, which is chiefly aristocratical, with an hereditary
stadtholdership. But the government of America, which is wholly on the
system of representation, is the only real Republic, in character and in
practice, that now exists. Its government has no other object than the
public business of the nation, and therefore it is properly a republic;
and the Americans have taken care that This, and no other, shall
always be the object of their government, by their rejecting everything
hereditary, and establishing governments on the system of representation
only. Those who have said that a republic is not a form of government
calculated for countries of great extent, mistook, in the first
place, the business of a government, for a form of government; for
the res-publica equally appertains to every extent of territory and
population. And, in the second place, if they meant anything with
respect to form, it was the simple democratical form, such as was the
mode of government in the ancient democracies, in which there was no
representation. The case, therefore, is not, that a republic cannot be
extensive, but that it cannot be extensive on the simple democratical
form; and the question naturally presents itself, What is the best form
of government for conducting the Res-Publica, or the Public Business
of a nation, after it becomes too extensive and populous for the simple
democratical form? It cannot be monarchy, because monarchy is subject
to an objection of the same amount to which the simple democratical form
was subject.
It is possible that an individual may lay down a system of principles,
on which government shall be constitutionally established to any extent
of territory. This is no more than an operation of the mind, acting by
its own powers. But the practice upon those principles, as applying to
the various and numerous circumstances of a nation, its agriculture,
manufacture, trade, commerce, etc., etc., a knowledge of a different
kind, and which can be had only from the various parts of society. It is
an assemblage of practical knowledge, which no individual can possess;
and therefore the monarchical form is as much limited, in useful
practice, from the incompetency of knowledge, as was the democratical
form, from the multiplicity of population. The one degenerates, by
extension, into confusion; the other, into ignorance and incapacity, of
which all the great monarchies are an evidence. The monarchical form,
therefore, could not be a substitute for the democratical, because it
has equal inconveniences.
Much less could it when made hereditary. This is the most effectual of
all forms to preclude knowledge. Neither could the high democratical
mind have voluntarily yielded itself to be governed by children and
idiots, and all the motley insignificance of character, which attends
such a mere animal system, the disgrace and the reproach of reason and
of man.
As to the aristocratical form, it has the same vices and defects with
the monarchical, except that the chance of abilities is better from the
proportion of numbers, but there is still no security for the right use
and application of them.*[17]
Referring them to the original simple democracy, it affords the true
data from which government on a large scale can begin. It is incapable
of extension, not from its principle, but from the inconvenience of its
form; and monarchy and aristocracy, from their incapacity. Retaining,
then, democracy as the ground, and rejecting the corrupt systems of
monarchy and aristocracy, the representative system naturally presents
itself; remedying at once the defects of the simple democracy as to
form, and the incapacity of the other two with respect to knowledge.
Simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of
secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, we arrive
at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the
various interests and every extent of territory and population; and that
also with advantages as much superior to hereditary government, as the
republic of letters is to hereditary literature.
It is on this system that the American government is founded. It is
representation ingrafted upon democracy. It has fixed the form by a
scale parallel in all cases to the extent of the principle. What Athens
was in miniature America will be in magnitude. The one was the wonder of
the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration of the present.
It is the easiest of all the forms of government to be understood and
the most eligible in practice; and excludes at once the ignorance and
insecurity of the hereditary mode, and the inconvenience of the simple
democracy.
It is impossible to conceive a system of government capable of acting
over such an extent of territory, and such a circle of interests, as is
immediately produced by the operation of representation. France, great
and populous as it is, is but a spot in the capaciousness of the system.
It is preferable to simple democracy even in small territories. Athens,
by representation, would have outrivalled her own democracy.
That which is called government, or rather that which we ought to
conceive government to be, is no more than some common center in which
all the parts of society unite. This cannot be accomplished by any
method so conducive to the various interests of the community, as by the
representative system. It concentrates the knowledge necessary to the
interest of the parts, and of the whole. It places government in a state
of constant maturity. It is, as has already been observed, never young,
never old. It is subject neither to nonage, nor dotage. It is never
in the cradle, nor on crutches. It admits not of a separation between
knowledge and power, and is superior, as government always ought to be,
to all the accidents of individual man, and is therefore superior to
what is called monarchy.
A nation is not a body, the figure of which is to be represented by
the human body; but is like a body contained within a circle, having a
common center, in which every radius meets; and that center is formed by
representation. To connect representation with what is called monarchy,
is eccentric government. Representation is of itself the delegated
monarchy of a nation, and cannot debase itself by dividing it with
another.
Mr. Burke has two or three times, in his parliamentary speeches, and in
his publications, made use of a jingle of words that convey no ideas.
Speaking of government, he says, "It is better to have monarchy for its
basis, and republicanism for its corrective, than republicanism for its
basis, and monarchy for its corrective."--If he means that it is
better to correct folly with wisdom, than wisdom with folly, I will no
otherwise contend with him, than that it would be much better to reject
the folly entirely.
But what is this thing which Mr. Burke calls monarchy? Will he explain
it? All men can understand what representation is; and that it must
necessarily include a variety of knowledge and talents. But what
security is there for the same qualities on the part of monarchy? or,
when the monarchy is a child, where then is the wisdom? What does
it know about government? Who then is the monarch, or where is the
monarchy? If it is to be performed by regency, it proves to be a farce.
A regency is a mock species of republic, and the whole of monarchy
deserves no better description. It is a thing as various as imagination
can paint. It has none of the stable character that government ought
to possess. Every succession is a revolution, and every regency a
counter-revolution. The whole of it is a scene of perpetual court cabal
and intrigue, of which Mr. Burke is himself an instance. To render
monarchy consistent with government, the next in succession should
not be born a child, but a man at once, and that man a Solomon. It is
ridiculous that nations are to wait and government be interrupted till
boys grow to be men.
Whether I have too little sense to see, or too much to be imposed upon;
whether I have too much or too little pride, or of anything else,
I leave out of the question; but certain it is, that what is called
monarchy, always appears to me a silly, contemptible thing. I compare it
to something kept behind a curtain, about which there is a great deal of
bustle and fuss, and a wonderful air of seeming solemnity; but when, by
any accident, the curtain happens to be open--and the company see what
it is, they burst into laughter.
In the representative system of government, nothing of this can happen.
Like the nation itself, it possesses a perpetual stamina, as well of
body as of mind, and presents itself on the open theatre of the world in
a fair and manly manner. Whatever are its excellences or defects, they
are visible to all. It exists not by fraud and mystery; it deals not in
cant and sophistry; but inspires a language that, passing from heart to
heart, is felt and understood.
We must shut our eyes against reason, we must basely degrade our
understanding, not to see the folly of what is called monarchy. Nature
is orderly in all her works; but this is a mode of government that
counteracts nature. It turns the progress of the human faculties upside
down. It subjects age to be governed by children, and wisdom by folly.
On the contrary, the representative system is always parallel with the
order and immutable laws of nature, and meets the reason of man in every
part. For example:
In the American Federal Government, more power is delegated to the
President of the United States than to any other individual member of
Congress. He cannot, therefore, be elected to this office under the
age of thirty-five years. By this time the judgment of man becomes more
matured, and he has lived long enough to be acquainted with men and
things, and the country with him.--But on the monarchial plan (exclusive
of the numerous chances there are against every man born into the world,
of drawing a prize in the lottery of human faculties), the next in
succession, whatever he may be, is put at the head of a nation, and of
a government, at the age of eighteen years. Does this appear like an
action of wisdom? Is it consistent with the proper dignity and the manly
character of a nation? Where is the propriety of calling such a lad the
father of the people?--In all other cases, a person is a minor until the
age of twenty-one years. Before this period, he is not trusted with the
management of an acre of land, or with the heritable property of a flock
of sheep, or an herd of swine; but, wonderful to tell! he may, at the
age of eighteen years, be trusted with a nation.
That monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure money,
is evident (at least to me) in every character in which it can be
viewed. It would be impossible, on the rational system of representative
government, to make out a bill of expenses to such an enormous amount
as this deception admits. Government is not of itself a very chargeable
institution. The whole expense of the federal government of America,
founded, as I have already said, on the system of representation, and
extending over a country nearly ten times as large as England, is but
six hundred thousand dollars, or one hundred and thirty-five thousand
pounds sterling.
I presume that no man in his sober senses will compare the character
of any of the kings of Europe with that of General Washington. Yet, in
France, and also in England, the expense of the civil list only, for the
support of one man, is eight times greater than the whole expense of
the federal government in America. To assign a reason for this, appears
almost impossible. The generality of people in America, especially the
poor, are more able to pay taxes, than the generality of people either
in France or England.
But the case is, that the representative system diffuses such a body
of knowledge throughout a nation, on the subject of government, as to
explode ignorance and preclude imposition. The craft of courts cannot be
acted on that ground. There is no place for mystery; nowhere for it
to begin. Those who are not in the representation, know as much of
the nature of business as those who are. An affectation of mysterious
importance would there be scouted. Nations can have no secrets; and the
secrets of courts, like those of individuals, are always their defects.
In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly
appear. Every man is a proprietor in government, and considers it a
necessary part of his business to understand. It concerns his interest,
because it affects his property. He examines the cost, and compares it
with the advantages; and above all, he does not adopt the slavish custom
of following what in other governments are called Leaders.
It can only be by blinding the understanding of man, and making him
believe that government is some wonderful mysterious thing, that
excessive revenues are obtained. Monarchy is well calculated to ensure
this end. It is the popery of government; a thing kept up to amuse the
ignorant, and quiet them into taxes.
The government of a free country, properly speaking, is not in the
persons, but in the laws. The enacting of those requires no great
expense; and when they are administered, the whole of civil government
is performed--the rest is all court contrivance.