THE FALL OF THE GIRONDISTS.
♦Submission of the country.♦
The departments accepted passively the results of the insurrection of
August 10. Men feared lest by offering opposition they might render
easier the advance of the allies. Lafayette, while he prepared to
defend the road to Paris, refused to recognise the validity of what had
been done. The Assembly declared him a traitor, his soldiers abandoned
him, and, in company with three other members of the late constituent
Assembly, he fled across the frontier, where all four were arrested and
imprisoned by the Austrians. The Assembly itself had lost all control
over the course of events. The men who had refused to take the right
step of deposing Louis had now to pay the penalty. That which might
have been effected without shock by the constituent or legislative
Assembly had been done by a violent explosion of popular wrath. The
Assembly had failed to take the lead, and after its flagrant subjection
to mob dictation, it was without moral energy or force. Yet a mob,
however powerful to destroy, is powerless to reconstruct. The one
organised force in Paris which could translate the feelings of the
populace into action was that of the sixty or seventy commissioners
who had dispersed the legal Municipal Council on the night before the
insurrection. A few days afterwards they raised their number by fresh
elections to 288. From henceforth this irregularly-elected body is
known to history as the Commune of Paris. With this new Commune supreme
power for the moment practically resided. It was strong because it
knew its own mind, and because it fully accepted the work of those of
its members who had swept away a king suspected of being in alliance
with a foreign enemy. Among the newly-chosen members was Robespierre,
the only one who had hitherto been of note. Other names, such as those
of Billaud-Varennes, Collot d’Herbois, Hébert and Chaumette now rose
first into prominence. Of the mass many were unprincipled adventurers,
others timid timeservers. ♦The insurrectionary Commune.♦ To a few the
holding of municipal office was merely a step in their career upwards.
The better men resigned office or kept out of sight, the more ruffianly
and unscrupulous came to the front. The ministers were thwarted and
disobeyed, the Assembly threatened, public property plundered, numbers
of arrests made, liberty of speech suppressed. Constitutionalists
for the most part kept away from the Assembly, and laws were passed
which before the insurrection had been rejected by large majorities.
Nonjurors were required to leave the country within fifteen days on
pain of ten years’ imprisonment; and unbeneficed ecclesiastics, on
whom the oath had never been imposed, were subjected to the same fate
whenever six citizens of their department joined in demanding their
exile. Emigrants’ property was confiscated and offered for sale.
Administrative bodies and municipalities were authorised to issue
warrants of arrest against persons suspected of political crime. This
law, which may be likened to a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in
England, destroyed at a blow the safeguards against arbitrary arrest
and imprisonment which the constituent Assembly had toiled to build up.
Yet, in spite of the terror that reigned, the position of the Commune
was insecure. In the departments it had no supporters. In Paris it
could only reckon on some hundreds of arms and votes. The artisans of
St. Antoine had taken part in the insurrection to destroy the throne,
not with the intention of placing power in the hands of the present
holders of office, most of whom were men entirely unknown to fame. The
Assembly resented their ascendancy, and there was no doubt that one of
the first acts of the Convention would be to attempt to establish its
own authority over the Commune.
♦The September massacres.♦
With the object of obtaining political supremacy an atrocious scheme
was devised, in the execution of which the advance of the enemy
assisted. The allies, marching from Coblentz, arrived before Longwy
on August 20. The place surrendered in four days. Verdun was next
besieged. Dumouriez, who commanded in Lafayette’s place, was at Sedan
with 20,000 men; Kellermann with another 20,000 at Metz. Unless these
forces should unite before Verdun surrendered, the way to Paris would
be open to the enemy. Strenuous exertions were being made by all
authorities to send men to the frontier, and Danton devoted to the
task unflagging vigour and energy. He dominated in the ministry over
his Girondist colleagues, and by his stirring appeals excited the
passion and enthusiasm of whatever audience he addressed. ‘The bells
that ring,’ he cried, as recruits hastened to the Champs de Mars,
‘are no signal of alarm. They sound the charge upon our country’s
enemies. To conquer them we need audacity, and again audacity, and
ever audacity, and France is saved.’ On his proposition the Assembly
decreed that commissioners should go from house to house and make an
inventory of arms, horses and carts. Of this decree the Commune took
advantage for its own purposes. For two days and nights the barriers
were closed, and many hundred persons arrested, principally nobles
and constitutionalists. Twenty-four hours later, while the church
bells were ringing and Danton exciting citizens to enlist, bands of
assassins, hired by the Commune, visited the prisons and massacred
their inmates. The work was carried out under the special direction
of a committee composed of the municipal officers at the head of the
police, to whom Marat and a few other persons, who, like himself,
were not members of the Commune, joined themselves. Besides political
prisoners, a number of ordinary criminals perished, including women
and boys, though in most cases the women were spared. At two of the
chief prisons, the Abbey and La Force, some show of judicial forms
was observed. At the Abbey a dozen individuals appointed themselves
judges with a president at their head. Each prisoner was called in turn
before them. He was asked one or two questions, and without further
discussion, either acquitted or ordered to be taken to the other
prison, La Force, a formula which meant death. As the condemned passed
through the prison gates, executioners stationed without rained blows
upon his back and head. The street became strewn with corpses and ran
with blood.
Similar scenes were enacted at La Force, where Hébert acted as
president of the tribunal. The massacres effected in eight prisons
went on continuously for five days and nights (September 2–7),
during which it is calculated that more than a thousand prisoners
were butchered. No action was taken to interfere with the murderers.
Ministers and deputies were afraid even to denounce the Commune in
vigorous language lest the weapons of the assassins should be turned
against themselves. They had no material force on which to rely.
Santerre, who commanded the national guard, obeyed the Commune. The
inhabitants of Paris remained perfectly passive, the violence of
party strife having destroyed enthusiasm for political ideals, and
the sense of common duty. In the midst of the butchery the news came
that Verdun had fallen, and the uncertainty of their own fate deadened
men’s sympathy for the fate of those charged justly or unjustly with
being in connivance with the enemy. So far as Paris was concerned the
contrivers of the massacres succeeded in their object. The elections
to the Convention were held while terror reigned over the city, and
twenty-four men, some of whom were partners in the crime, and none of
whom were prepared to denounce it, were returned for Paris. An attempt
was made to influence, by like means, the elections in the departments.
A circular, signed by Marat and his colleagues, was sent out inviting
the country to follow the example of the capital and to murder
traitors. This incitation to massacre, was, however, attended with
small success. In a few towns murders were committed at the instigation
of agents of the Commune; but generally the elections were conducted
without disturbance.
♦The Campaign of 1792.♦
When Verdun surrendered Dumouriez was still at Sedan, and Kellermann
at Metz. Between the allies and the plain of Champagne was only a
natural barrier, the forest of Argonnes, a range of wooded hills.
Fortunately for France the allies were dilatory in all their movements.
The campaign, instead of being commenced in the spring, had been
delayed till autumn, when the season was less favourable and France
better prepared to resist. The Duke of Brunswick was a cautious
commander, who had acquired his military reputation in the Seven Years’
War. With 80,000 men he did not believe it possible to maintain his
communications and occupy Paris in safety. His proposal, therefore, had
been to capture the fortresses on the Meuse, and to reserve operations
against the capital for the ensuing spring. But the King of Prussia,
who in person took part in the war, was eager to push on to Paris
and to release the royal family. After the fall of Verdun the Duke
assented, but advanced slowly and reluctantly. Meanwhile Dumouriez by
rapid marches got before him to the forest, and occupied the passes
leading through it. Driven from his positions as Brunswick advanced,
he rallied his men in the plain and made a stand near St. Menehould,
where he was joined by Kellermann. Recruits were incessantly pouring
in, so that the united French forces numbered 60,000 men. The allies
on their descent into the plain took up a position between the French
army and Paris. The weather was very wet, the roads nearly impassable,
and the invading army with difficulty supplied with bread. The placing
of garrisons in Longwy and Verdun, together with sickness, had reduced
the effective force under Brunswick’s command to 40,000 men, and he
could not push on to Paris leaving Dumouriez’ army unbeaten behind him.
The King was eager to fight, but Brunswick persuaded him, in place of
attempting to storm the French positions, merely to open a cannonade
on Kellermann’s forces, which were stationed in advance of Dumouriez’
men on some heights near the village of Valmy (September 20). This
cannonade was the turning point of the campaign. The young French
recruits stood fire so well that the allies determined on retreat. The
Austrian troops were afterwards called off for the defence of Belgium,
and thus Brunswick’s plan of holding the line of the Meuse was rendered
impracticable. Verdun and Longwy were evacuated, and the Prussians
retreated to Coblentz (October).
♦The Convention.♦
The Legislative Assembly gave place to the Convention on September
21, the day after the cannonade of Valmy. At once, the abolition of
monarchy was decreed, and the following day was henceforth accounted
as the first of the French Republic. The new Assembly consisted of
749 members, of whom 186 had belonged to the legislative, 77 to the
constituent Assembly, and 486 were new men. The constitutionalists,
through intimidation or want of public spirit, had kept away from the
poll, and among all the deputies were none who did not vote for the
abolition of monarchy with real or feigned enthusiasm. The Girondists
now sat on the right, forming the conservative side of the House.
Vergniaud, Brissot, Gensonné, and Guadet were all re-elected, and
around them gathered a knot of new comers, amongst whom were Buzot,
Pétion, Barbaroux, Louvet, and others who shared their views. The
deputation of Paris, together with about thirty deputies from the
departments, now formed the Mountain, sitting as in the last Assembly
on the topmost benches of the left. Here were Marat and other directors
of the massacres, several municipal officers, including Robespierre,
Billaud-Varennes, and Collot d’Herbois, the Duke of Orleans, who to
flatter the mob now called himself Philip Egalité, Desmoulins, and
Danton, who resigned the post of minister of justice in order to retain
his seat in the Assembly.
♦The Girondists and the Mountain.♦
From the opening of the Convention irreconcilable hostility was
declared between the Girondists and the Mountain. To secure the
independence of the Convention and supremacy for their own party, the
Girondists sought to bring to justice the contrivers of the massacres,
and to destroy the ascendancy of the Commune. They resented the stain
cast on the revolution, and were eager to prove to Europe that the
massacres were the work of a few hired assassins, and not, as the
deputies of Paris strove to represent, of the people of the capital
rising spontaneously to take vengeance on traitors. In appearance
their position was strong. Through their supporters, who occupied
the ministries, they directed the government and foreign relations.
They were enthusiastic, brilliant, eloquent; they had right on their
side, and both the country and the Convention shared their abhorrence
of the crimes committed. Yet the difficulties in their way were not
to be easily overcome. The Commune ruled the capital and had in
its pay bands of thieves and assassins, whose crimes bound them to
its support. The departments had taken no part in the insurrection
of August 10, yet had accepted without question the result, and the
predominance of Paris over them had thus acquired all the strength of
uncontested fact. Public spirit, moreover, no longer existed amongst
large masses of men. Primary assemblies were nearly deserted, and few
of the many thousands whose names were inscribed as national guards
rendered active service. Under such circumstances the task of crushing
the criminal band which, through the Commune and the sections, ruled
the city, was in any case difficult, and for the Girondists especially
impracticable. They were unversed in the conduct of affairs and were
strong party men, intensely credulous and suspicious in relation to all
that was outside their own circle. They stood on very narrow ground.
Republican fervour and hatred of Catholicism rendered them harsh and
intolerant towards whatever savoured of reaction. Abhorrence of crime
and pride in their own cause made them averse to compromise, and to
having dealings with men whose hands they believed to be soiled with
the blood of the September massacres. They had neither the traditions
of office nor the large capacity which creates a government by its
power of taking the lead in a distracted nation. Hence they did not
attempt to conciliate constitutionalists, nor yet to break the power
of the Commune by dividing its leaders, and bribing its followers with
money and office. As a party they did not inspire confidence. They were
without organisation or union, and being constantly divided in opinion
amongst themselves, they often voted on contrary sides. Their chief
orator, Vergniaud, possessed talent of a high order, and qualities
in which the party, as a body, was notably deficient--moderation
and foresight; but he was a man of retired habits and unassuming
disposition, who had neither taste nor inclination for the position of
a party leader. Hence the Girondists never brought forward any series
of well-concerted measures for gaining their objects, nor were they
ever able to obtain a working majority in the Convention. Impetuous
orators vaguely threatened to bring the Commune to justice, made
vehement attacks on the whole Paris deputation, and, singling out the
two most powerful men belonging to it, Robespierre and Danton, accused
them of aspiring, in conjunction with Marat, to form a triumvirate, and
Robespierre especially of aiming at a dictatorship. General charges of
this character could not be substantiated and were easily repelled.
Where, asked Robespierre, were the arms and the men by which he could
obtain a dictatorship, while he accused the Girondists of seeking to
sow disunion by calumniating Paris. It was no easy matter to fix even
on him the charge of being an author of the massacres. All members
of the Commune were, without doubt, immediately responsible for what
had taken place, but to allege mere inaction as proof of guilt was
hardly befitting to men who had formed part of the legislature at the
time Robespierre had been at the Hôtel de Ville, and had expressed
hostility towards the Girondists; but to this day it is a matter of
dispute how deeply he was implicated. Danton, though not a member of
the insurrectionary Commune, had been Minister of Justice. He, indeed,
had made no effort to stay the assassins’ hands, but there is no
proof whatever that it was he who gave the signal for the shedding of
blood, and officially he was no more responsible than Roland, who was
Minister of the Interior. It was, however, Danton whom the Girondists
regarded with most suspicion and distrust, whom they were readiest to
attack, and most eager to crush. To them he was vice personified. His
language was cynical; he affected to despise scruples of conscience
in action; crime could not revolt him; they believed him corrupt and
blood-stained, while he despised them as squeamish politicians, who
did not comprehend the conditions under which they worked, and who,
from being over-scrupulous in their choice of tools, let power slip
from their grasp. Nevertheless, he desired reconciliation with them.
He recognised the value of their disinterestedness and patriotism,
and was aware that the more narrow and criminal the base on which the
republic rested, the less would be its power of endurance, and the less
room would there be for himself to exert influence. Not easily moved by
petty considerations, and devoid of envy and resentment, Danton was the
one man on the left, as Vergniaud on the right, whose speeches bore no
trace of personal animosity.
♦Policy of the Centre.♦
The Centre of the Convention, often styled the Plain, consisted
mainly of new-comers from the departments, who abhorred Marat and his
doctrines, and resented the tyranny exercised by the Commune. But in
place of giving undisputed victory to the right, they followed the
safer course of a temporising policy between the two parties. They
feared to come into violent collision with the unscrupulous Commune,
and regarded the exaggerated charges brought against Robespierre and
Danton as what in fact they were--the fruits of violent party hate. It
was, indeed, no wonder that men who accepted the results of the last
insurrection should hesitate to send Danton to the scaffold, or should
doubt whether the revolution, having gone on thus far, could sustain
itself without him. The services that he had rendered in organising
the national defence were undoubted. There was no man so capable, with
his stentorian voice, his violent gesticulations, his abrupt vigorous
language, of rousing popular enthusiasm. The Girondists were no mob
orators, but Danton was at home alike in the Convention and in the
streets.
♦Re-election of the Commune.♦
The contest, incessantly renewed by the Girondists but never ending in
victory, resulted in strengthening the position of the Mountain. The
galleries of the House were ordinarily occupied by adherents of the
Jacobins, who applauded the deputies on the left and hooted those on
the right. Petitioners, often accompanied by armed mobs, invaded the
Convention, menacing insurrection unless their demands were complied
with. A project was brought forward by the Girondists for giving the
Convention a paid guard of 4,000 men, drawn in equal proportions
from the departments. But it never became law; and in case of a
breach with the Commune, the Convention had nothing to rely on except
recruits passing through Paris on their way to the frontier. A law was
finally carried for the re-election of the Commune. As, however, the
inhabitants of the city, through fear or indifference, did not attend
the sections, the result of the elections was merely to confirm the
existing party in power. Although since August 10 manhood suffrage had
prevailed, in many sections there were no more than 150 or 200 voters
present out of the many thousands who had the right to take part in
the elections. Chaumette and Hébert, as well as other members of the
revolutionary Commune, were re-elected. This new Commune was not fully
organised until July 1793. In the meantime its Council at the Hôtel de
Ville, often reduced to twenty members in place of its full complement
of ninety-six, ruled Paris under the guidance of Chaumette and Hébert.
♦Conquest of Savoy, Mainz, and Belgium.♦
The war increased the difficulties of the internal situation. Success
at first attended the French arms. During September French troops
occupied Nice and Savoy, part of the dominions of the King of
Sardinia, whose unconcealed hostility had given France a pretext for
a declaration of war. At the time when the Austrians and Prussians
invaded Lorraine, the French General Custine, with 18,000 men, marched
from Alsace against the smaller lay and ecclesiastical states on the
Rhine. Nowhere was serious opposition attempted. The petty rulers
proclaimed their neutrality, or fled to Coblentz. The important
fortress of Mainz surrendered. From this point it was open to Custine
to intercept the retreat of the Prussians from Lorraine; but, eager to
push his conquests further, he crossed the Rhine and took Frankfort,
whence he commanded the surrounding country (November). After the
retreat of the allied army through the Argonnes, Dumouriez hastened to
carry out the project of invading Belgium, where the fortresses were
out of repair, and little preparation for resistance had been made. A
battle was fought near the village of Jemmapes (November 6), in which
the Austrians were defeated. They retreated behind the Meuse, leaving
the French in undisputed possession of the country.
♦Foreign policy of the Convention.♦
The victory of Jemmapes, the first pitched battle fought, was greeted
with a burst of applause from one end of France to the other. When the
Legislative Assembly had declared war on Austria, it had represented
France as acting on a purely defensive policy, and had repudiated wars
of conquest as contrary to the right of each people to shape its own
destinies. Now that France was in possession of conquered territories,
the question of the manner in which they were to be dealt with
necessarily arose. The idea of making a merely diplomatic use of them,
and of restoring them in case of convenience to their former rulers
without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants, found no supporters.
The point at issue was whether the inhabitants were to be left really
free to select their own form of government, or whether France should
influence their decision.
Since the commencement of the war the Convention had become inflamed
with the desire of spreading the principles of the revolution far
beyond the frontiers of France. With the advance of French armies
it hoped that peoples would rise against their rulers, and that
not only the Continental countries in which the old aristocratic
institutions were in full play would willingly accept French aid for
the constitution of society and government upon a new basis, but
that even in constitutional England the people would insist upon the
establishment of the French system. Exultant in what they had already
achieved, French enthusiasts underestimated the strength of the forces
opposed to them, and overlooked the fact that a strong sense of
nationality was to be found in England; and that, under circumstances
favourable to its development, it might spring into activity even in
countries where it seemed most dead, as in Germany and in Italy. Under
the influence of such crude impulses the Convention gave wanton offence
to governments at peace with France by the issue of a proclamation,
proffering assistance to all peoples desirous of obtaining their
freedom (November 19).
[Illustration: BELGIUM
E. Weller.
]
♦Question of annexation of Belgium.♦
The wish to spread revolutionary principles operated strongly upon
the policy pursued by the Convention in relation to its conquests.
The annexation of conquered territories involved carrying out in them
the changes already effected in France. For smaller territories the
maintenance of political independence was in reality impracticable
amidst the clash of the great powers. Hence it came to pass that the
Convention rapidly gravitated towards a policy of forced annexation,
which they attempted to conceal by accepting the vote of their own
partisans as the expression of the popular will. Other motives also
existed. The ambition was roused of extending the French frontier
to the Alps and the Rhine. In case of annexations, the financial
difficulties of the government would be decreased. Church property in
the newly-acquired territory would become national property, and the
possession of new securities would raise the value of the assignats.
In Savoy and in Nice, as also in Liége and the small states near the
Rhine, much discontent prevailed, and no small part of the population
desired union with France. But in the Austrian Netherlands the case
was different. The clergy and feudal aristocracy possessed much
influence; the forms of constitutional government existed, and there
was a powerful party which sought to maintain political independence
of France while discarding connection with Austria. The Convention
accordingly decreed the union of Nice and Savoy with France, but
hesitated to annex the Austrian Netherlands. Its hesitation was not
due merely to the fact that only a minority of the population desired
union. Further consequences had to be taken into consideration. The
attempt to unite Belgium was certain to involve France in hostilities
with a fresh and formidable enemy. For centuries it had been a
cardinal point of English foreign policy that Belgium was to be in
possession of a power capable of resisting French aggression, and
the extension of the war was deprecated by all deputies who cared
for the restoration of internal order and settled government. A war
with England would seriously increase the expenses of government,
which were already only met by fresh issues of assignats, whilst the
rapid rise of prices which had ensued inflicted suffering on the
working-classes, and placed means at the command of the Commune of
exciting discontent against the Convention. An alternative plan of
creating an independent Belgian republic was desired by Dumouriez and
by some members of the Convention. Yet it was unlikely that this plan
would succeed in averting war with England. English statesmen were as
averse to the establishment of a Belgian republic as to the annexation
of the country to France. In fact, the Convention could only maintain
peace by abandoning the principles on which it was acting, and by
giving a pledge that Belgium should be restored to Austria. There was,
moreover, an immediate ground of quarrel. After the French armies
were in occupation of Belgium, the Convention had proclaimed the free
navigation of the Scheldt, which by an European arrangement, agreeable
to England and Holland, but ruinous to the trade of Antwerp, was closed
to commerce. This measure gave great offence to England as increasing
French influence, and was regarded in itself as sufficient ground for
a declaration of war. Though in accordance with the new principles
of the rights of nations not recognised by cabinets, but which were
no more than the principles of justice itself, the liberation of the
Scheldt was in the teeth of treaties to which both England and France
had been parties. The decree of November 19 (p. 131), which the French
government refused to withdraw, was regarded as a direct incitation to
subjects to revolt. The passing of a new decree (December 15), ordering
French generals to proclaim wherever they went the sovereignty of the
people, the suppression of the existing authorities, and the abolition
of feudal rights and privileges, was a second clear intimation to
Europe that France was intent on spreading revolutionary principles
beyond her own borders.
A portion of the Convention desired, at whatever hazard, to carry out
an immediate annexation of Belgium, and afterwards to invade Holland,
in accordance with a plan proposed by Dumouriez. Holland was at peace
with France, but there was no doubt whatever that in case of war
between England and France, the stadt-holder, who was maintained in
his seat by English and Prussian influence, would join the coalition.
The majority, however, led by the Girondists, hesitated to adopt
this course. Although their minds were inflated with the desire of
rousing revolutionary movements in other countries, including England
itself, they sought, from a sense of internal peril which every day
grew stronger, to circumscribe the field of war, and both to maintain
peace with England and to withdraw Prussia from the coalition. To
attain their ends the ministers were prepared to abandon the project
of invading Holland, to suffer the King and his family to quit France,
and to defer the final settlement of Belgium till the making of peace.
But neither the disposition of the King of Prussia nor of the English
people rendered it possible for any understanding to be arrived at on
these terms.
♦Austria and Prussia unwilling to make peace.♦
The allied princes had not entered into the war out of pure chivalry,
and did not intend to withdraw from it until they had obtained what
in diplomatic language they called an indemnity--in other words,
territorial acquisitions, either at the cost of France or of some
neutral state. Shortly before hostilities broke out Catherine II.
proposed to Frederick William a second partition of Poland. The King,
though bound by two treaties to maintain the integrity of Poland,
entered into the agreement. It was, therefore, to Poland that he looked
for his indemnity, and his assistance in the war against France was
the price he paid for the Emperor’s consent to his making acquisitions
in the east. Francis, on his side, looked for conquests in France,
and also had in his mind the revival of Joseph’s project of making
over Belgium to the Elector of Bavaria in exchange for that country.
A study of the map of Europe shows clearly what would have been the
advantage of the exchange to Austria in consolidating her dominions and
giving her increased predominance within the Empire.
♦England and the revolution.♦
While the personal feeling of Frederick William involved his subjects
in a war for which they had no enthusiasm, public opinion in England
compelled the Government to take a hostile attitude. William Pitt,
supported by the King, the country gentlemen, and the commercial middle
classes, had fought his way to power in 1783 in a sharp struggle in
which the Whig aristocracy was overthrown. As the head of the Tory
party he professed a toryism very different from the past toryism
of Harley and of St. John, which had battled against dissenters and
the mercantile class, and from the future toryism of Eldon, which
was to battle against improvement. In one sense he was the Turgot of
England. He was pre-eminently a peace minister, and he had taken the
lead, sometimes far in advance of the public opinion of his day, in
advocating projects of financial and economical reform. Those projects
he had viewed from the point of view of the highest statesmanship. He
had sought to bind England and Ireland together by a commercial union,
which he was unable to carry into effect. He had sought to bind England
and France together by a commercial treaty which had increased the
communications between the two countries. It was not his fault that
even a Parliament in which he counted so many supporters had rejected
a scheme of Parliamentary reform, which would have gone far to bind
class to class in England itself. Yet, even in his failures, his
efforts after good had made his government inapproachably strong. The
fallen Whig aristocracy, indeed, was very different from the effete
privileged orders of France. It counted amongst its members and its
followers high-spirited and large-minded politicians, such as Fox and
Burke. Its traditions were those of men brought up to combat for their
ideas in the open light of publicity, and to support their cause by
argument before their fellows. Yet there was something in it of the
faults which had made the continental nobilities unpopular. It was
narrow and exclusive, and was apt to regard office and emolument as
the special perquisite of its own members. Against such an aristocracy
Pitt stood as the champion of so much of equality as the conditions
of English society admitted of. Representing, as he did, the King and
the middle classes, he advocated a rational government, founded on
the best political science of the day. It was impossible that if war
broke out with France he should continue his work of internal reform.
Events happening in France were but superficially comprehended in
England. At first some of the Whigs, following Fox, extended sympathy
to a revolutionary movement which put forward as its object the
establishment of constitutional government. As soon as disorder and
violence showed themselves in France a large section of the Whigs,
including most of the great landowners, joined the Tories in viewing
the movement with distrust, though the latter had confidence in Pitt,
who sought to maintain friendship between the two governments. Neither
party had any clear perception of the fact that the revolution was
produced by social as well as political causes, and that its real aim
was to complete the destruction of the old feudal order long since in
slow process of decay. The special causes of discontent operating in
France were left unnoted. The comparative excellence of government in
England made Englishmen callous to the past misgovernment of France.
The fact was patent that the revolution declared war on established
institutions, and exhibited propagandist tendencies. Public opinion,
therefore, soon set strongly against it. Already, in 1790, Burke,
breaking loose from Fox, published his ‘Reflections on the French
Revolution,’ in which his eloquent declamations against men who were
destroying continuity between the past and the present, helped to
ripen the distrust that already existed in the minds of his countrymen
into fear and hatred. After the fall of the throne and the September
massacres, intense alarm prevailed lest the spread of democratic
principles should produce similar convulsions in England. In reality
there was no danger. The middle classes were not jealous of the upper;
the people were not starving. Societies established for the promotion
of French principles obtained but a few hundred supporters, a strong
proof of the unmoved disposition of the people at large. The panic,
however, if unfounded, was genuine. To secure themselves against danger
the governing classes desired to suppress the revolution by force
of arms, and loudly demanded the reclosing of the Scheldt and the
evacuation of Belgium as the price of peace.
While his supporters clamoured for war, Pitt still strove to avert a
breach. In the hope of effecting a European peace he made offers of
mediation at Berlin and Vienna. His offers were, however, but coldly
received, since both the Emperor and the King expected to gain from
the continuance of hostilities. War, therefore, became inevitable. The
French ministers went to the full length of their tether when, for
the sake of the neutrality of England, they left Holland untouched,
and offered to defer the settlement of Belgium till the making of
peace. To obtain more of the Convention was not in their power, nor
was it their wish. To satisfy the demands of England by reclosing
the Scheldt and re-establishing the old order of things in Belgium,
appeared to the mass of deputies, irrespective of party, as a base and
cowardly abandonment of principle. As the hostility of England grew
more manifest, the party in the Convention for immediate annexation
gained strength; and in the meantime an event happened which caused the
balance of power hitherto on the side of the Gironde to fall on the
side of the Mountain.
♦Trial and Death of the King.♦
Since the fall of the throne the King and his family had been kept
under harsh durance in the Temple, an old keep once belonging to the
Knights Templars. The Convention, after long and stormy debates,
decreed that Louis should be brought to trial before itself. The charge
that could justly be made against him was that, having undertaken to
govern in accordance with the constitution, he had sought foreign aid
to overthrow it. But for this he had been dethroned, and neither the
country nor the Convention had ground or right to take vengeance on
him for seeking to free himself from the untenable position which the
constituent Assembly had required him to accept. The deputies, however,
judged Louis’s conduct in the light of their own theories. They set
the nation in the place of the King, and then accused Louis of treason
because he had conspired against the will of the sovereign people. None
had any doubt of his guilt; few that its due penalty was death. Many,
however, even of those who thought his crime merited death, desired not
to shed his blood, but merely to give satisfaction to their pride as
republicans by passing sentence against him either of banishment or of
captivity till the end of the war. The ministers hoped by suspending
the sword over his head to put pressure on Prussia, and to induce
her to abandon her alliance with Austria, in return for the liberty
of the royal family. The Montagnards, or members of the Mountain,
however, sought Louis’s life. They were eager to defy the sovereigns
of Europe, and to give proof of their passion for equality by sending
Louis to the scaffold. ‘Let us,’ said Danton, ‘cast down before Europe,
as the gauntlet of battle, the head of a king.’ The Montagnards were
determined, moreover, to involve the majority of their fellow deputies
in an act that should unite them by an indissoluble bond to themselves.
The trial could be but a form; Louis’s guilt was a foregone conclusion.
The question what sentence should be passed upon him became the object
of a fierce party conflict. The Mountain set all the machinery at its
command in motion to intimidate the Convention. In the clubs and in the
sections a cry was raised for ‘the tyrant’s blood,’ and the ignorant
populace was taught to believe that the existing high prices were in
some occult manner connected with Louis’s existence as a captive. As
the trial dragged on, the Girondists became alarmed at the danger of
their own situation and the possibility of defeat; but not for the
sake of France, much less for the sake of Louis, were they prepared to
belie the past acts of their political life by declaring him innocent.
For, if Louis had not been in connivance with the enemy, where was the
justification for the insurrection of August 10? They, as well as he,
had sworn to maintain the constitution. Twice Louis was brought before
the Convention, once to hear his accusation read, a second time when
his counsel spoke in his defence. He did not dispute the authority of
the Convention, but denied the truth of the charges brought against
him. The Convention unanimously pronounced him guilty of treason
against the nation; 361 deputies voted for the penalty of death; 72
for death, but with a demand for delay of execution or for some other
restriction; 288 for imprisonment or banishment, thus leaving only
a majority of one for immediate death, though when a final vote was
taken two days later, on a fresh proposal to delay execution, the
majority for immediate death was swollen to 60 (January 17). Each
deputy voted aloud, and during the whole sitting, which lasted many
hours, the galleries and corridors of the house were occupied by armed
adherents of the Commune and the Jacobins.
Since his imprisonment Louis’s time had been spent in preparation for
death. Towards his enemies he entertained no feeling of resentment or
hatred, and received intelligence of the sentence passed against him
with calmness and resignation. On January 21, while the city maintained
a mournful silence, the King was guillotined on the great square, now
known as the Place de la Concorde, which since August 10 had borne the
name of the Place de la Révolution.
♦War with England.♦
The execution of the King hastened the rupture with England. Pitt sent
the French agent in London out of the country. The Convention adopted
a decree for effecting the union of Belgium with France, and without a
voice being raised in opposition declared war on England and Holland
(February 1). About this time Spain and Portugal, the Empire, and most
of the Italian states joined the coalition.
♦French driven from Belgium.♦
The French generals had owed their brilliant successes in part to the
speed of their movements, in part also to the defenceless state of the
countries invaded. During the winter Frankfort had been stormed by the
Prussians (December 2, 1792), and Custine had been driven back to the
Rhine. For the recovery of Belgium and the territory of the Empire on
the left bank of the river, Austria and Prussia brought together more
than 200,000 men, and these formed two armies. The northern, commanded
by an Austrian, Coburg, was to operate against Belgium; the southern,
commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, was to besiege Mainz, and to drive
Custine out of the Palatinate.
The French government authorised Dumouriez to invade Holland, though
the probabilities of success were now small. Coburg was advancing
towards the Meuse, and the Dutch were prepared to defend the passage of
their rivers. Dumouriez had only 100,000 men for purposes of defence
and invasion. He made a rapid march through the west of Flanders as far
as the arm of the sea which forms the mouth of the Meuse, where he was
checked by want of means of transport. Meanwhile one of his officers,
Miranda, guarded the line of the Meuse and besieged Maestricht. Coburg
advanced and relieved the town. The French troops, three-fourths of
whom were untrained volunteers, fled in disorder and deserted by
thousands. The pursuit, however, was not closely pressed, and Miranda,
rallying his scattered forces, took up a strong position near Louvain.
♦Revolutionary Court.♦
These disasters reacted on the situation in the capital. The hold
that the Girondists possessed on the Convention grew feebler every
day. They had failed in all they had attempted. Their foreign policy
had broken down, and the reproach fell heavily on the ministry of not
having suffered Dumouriez to invade Holland when the proposition was
first made. They had failed to save the King’s life, so that the whole
constitutional party outside the Assembly was as fully estranged from
them as from the Mountain. In spite of the fresh municipal elections
in Paris, which they had decreed in hope of changing the character
of the Commune (p. 128), it was the same criminal band that still
exercised authority. To provide for the war expenditure resort was had
to new issues of assignats. Prices incessantly rose, and discontent
spread rapidly amongst the working population, taught by agitators to
regard the right side of the Convention as the cause alike of the
prevailing destitution and of military disaster. The deputies of the
centre, in alarm for their own safety, and without confidence in the
Girondists as leaders, followed a vacillating course, accordingly as
they were actuated by their principles, their fears, or their regard
for the necessities of the situation. When Miranda’s retreat was known
an attempt was made to get up an insurrection directed against the
Girondists. It failed, from want of union and support. But the bands
at the service of the Jacobins and the Commune gathered round the
Convention, filling the galleries and menacing deputies. The Mountain
made use of the occasion to obtain the adoption of a law for the
creation of an extraordinary criminal court, to judge without appeal
conspirators against the state (March 9). The Girondists opposed the
measure, but in vain; and thus were Robespierre and Marat provided with
a ready weapon with which to strike at the heads of those who had so
long menaced their own.
♦Treason of Dumouriez.♦
Affairs in Belgium assumed a yet more alarming aspect. Dumouriez,
hastening back from Holland, rejoined Miranda near Louvain. He returned
resolved to break with the Convention. He had no enthusiasm for
democratic or republican ideals, and was excessively irritated because
the Convention had not pursued the policy advocated by himself, of
creating Belgium into a separate republic. He resolved to make a stand
and to fight the Austrians, expecting after victory to be able to
dictate his own terms to the Convention and to mediate between France
and the allies. But a long contested battle, which raged fiercely
round the village of Neerwinden, ended in the defeat and flight of the
French (March 18). Dumouriez, with a remnant of his army, effected a
retreat to the frontier, where he sought to make good his position by
opening negotiations with Coburg. He offered to march to Paris and
place the Dauphin on the throne if Coburg would undertake to give him
moral and, in case of need, material support. As a pledge of good faith
he was prepared to admit Austrian troops into Lille and Valenciennes,
on condition that the towns were restored to France on the making of
peace. It had long been suspected at Paris that Dumouriez was not to be
trusted; but neither Girondists nor Montagnards had dared to propose
his dismissal, because they had no general of talent to take his place.
After the battle of Neerwinden he made no concealment of his hostile
intentions; and on the arrival of four deputies sent by the Convention
to summon him to Paris, gave them up to Coburg as hostages for the
safety of the royal family. In the meantime every effort was made
by the agents of the government to secure the fidelity of the army,
and with success. The soldiers refused to betray France to Austria,
and Dumouriez, to save himself from arrest, took refuge in Coburg’s
quarters (April 3).
♦Party strife at Paris.♦
Dumouriez’ treachery increased the violence of the party struggle at
Paris, where Girondists and Montagnards strove to cast on each other
the odium of being the traitor’s accomplices. It was against Danton
that the Girondists directed their most vehement attacks. They made
charges in support of which they had no evidence to bring, and which
have never been proved. According to them Danton had been bribed by
Louis; he had misapplied public money; in Belgium he had plundered
state property. They even accused him of plotting with Dumouriez the
restoration of the throne, because he had praised that general’s
talent in the Convention. Danton turned fiercely on his assailants,
threatening irreconcilable war. Counter accusations and menaces
were hurled from right to left, from left to right. Robespierre
came forward to represent the entire public life of the Girondists
as forming a long series of crimes directed against liberty and the
republic, and concluded with a formal proposal to send Brissot,
Vergniaud, Gensonné and Guadet, along with Marie Antoinette and the
Duke of Orleans, as Dumouriez’ accomplices, before the new criminal
court (April 9).
♦Committee of Public Safety.♦
Though the ascendancy which the Girondists once held was lost, their
eloquence was still a power, and the first deputy who was sent before
the court was a Montagnard, Marat, on the charge of inciting the people
to insurrection (April 14). But this isolated party victory served only
to irritate without weakening their adversaries. The court, composed
of judges and jurymen, both elected in Paris, acquitted the accused,
and his partisans restored him in triumph to his seat. The direction
of the government, possessed by the Girondists at the opening of the
convention, passed into other hands. The ministry had been broken
up. Roland had resigned, complaining that he had not the support of
the Convention. The Mountain and the Gironde struggled to obtain
appointments for their own candidates, and the ministers, fearful of
having their acts misinterpreted, refused to take a step on their
own responsibility. Hence the wheels of government, when expedition
and secrecy were most requisite, threatened to come to a standstill.
Under the influence of the alarm excited by the treason of Dumouriez,
the Convention established a Committee of Public Safety, composed of
nine members, but subsequently enlarged to twelve, who were subject to
re-election every month, and were empowered to deliberate in secret,
to superintend the action of the ministry, and to take provisionally
whatever measures were requisite for the national defence (April 6).
The deputies entrusted with these large powers were Danton and eight
others belonging to the Mountain and the Plain. From this time the
ministers sank into the position of chief clerks of their respective
departments, while the Committee of Public Safety stood at the head of
the executive government.
♦Committee of General Security.♦
A second committee, which had been created earlier, acquired special
importance about the same time. This was a Committee of General
Security, which had under its superintendence the measures taken for
the detection of political crime. Originally the Girondists possessed
a majority in it, but shortly after the King’s death it had been
reorganised, and was now composed of twelve Montagnards.
♦Deputies in mission.♦
The immediate object of the Convention in instituting the Committee of
Public Safety was to have an executive sufficiently strong to bring
large armies rapidly into the field. About 200,000 men were now under
arms. For the ensuing campaign it was determined to raise the number
to 500,000; 300,000 had, therefore, to be found in the course of a
few weeks. All national guards between the ages of eighteen and forty
were put in requisition. Every department had to furnish a definite
contingent; if the voluntary system failed to make up the required
number, conscription was resorted to. In most departments the call
for soldiers was responded to with enthusiasm, but in a few zeal was
wanting, and there was great difficulty everywhere in obtaining money
and arms. In order to bring local authorities under the immediate
control of the Government, the Convention took direct part in the
administration, and sent deputies into every department, authorised
to take all measures necessary for hastening the levy of recruits and
for providing supplies for the armies. These men established special
committees to act as their agents, compelled the sale of corn, horses,
and arms, and dismissed administrative officers whose attachment
to the republic was held in question. When they had completed their
work they returned to Paris, but the Convention continued to pursue
the system of sending its members into the departments, invested with
arbitrary and absolute power for carrying out the work entrusted to
them. Deputies were always present with the armies, to superintend
commissariat arrangements and to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of
general officers. They were responsible only to the Convention and to
the Committee of Public Safety, under whose immediate direction they
acted. Agents of the central government were thus established by the
side of the independent local authorities, and the way was prepared for
the complete submission of the country to whichever party triumphed
at Paris. For the first time since the fall of the old system of the
monarchy there was a Government in France.
♦Laws against emigrants and nonjurors.♦
As the situation grew more perilous, legislation assumed an
increasingly harsh and tyrannical character. In March, at the very time
when the retreat of Dumouriez from Belgium offered an opportunity to
the allies of attempting a march on Paris, a dangerous insurrection,
excited by the forced recruitment, broke out amongst the peasants
of La Vendée. The Convention, enraged against its adversaries, and
frightened at the unexpected danger, struck at random, regardless of
the fact that it was crushing the innocent along with the guilty. Those
who instigated resistance to the recruitment of the army were punished
by death. Priests, subject to banishment, who had remained in the
country, were to be transported to French Guiana. Banished priests who
returned were to be executed within twenty-four hours. The Legislative
Assembly had made it a crime to quit the country, and had confiscated
the property of the emigrants. The Convention laid a firmer grip on
their property by banishing them for ever from the republic, and by
forbidding them to return under penalty of death. Although many of the
exiles had had no intention of fighting against their country, but had
merely quitted France because their lives were in danger, no exceptions
were made, and no account taken of sex or circumstance.
♦Policy of the Mountain.♦
In the midst of internal strife and preparation for defence the
Convention was engaged on the task of framing a new constitution. When
abstract questions were under discussion but little difference of
view arose. In fact, the contention between the two parties did not
concern principles, but their immediate application. The Girondists
were prepared, without heed of circumstances, to carry into action
principles of decentralisation, popular election, and free trade, and
contended that the republic must rest upon the political virtue and
public spirit of the mass of the population. The Montagnards regarded
facts only. They recognised that active support to the republic was to
be looked for from the mob alone; that attempts to enforce principles
of free trade against the will of their own supporters must lead to
the overthrow of the Convention; that under the circumstances popular
election was a farce, and that amid the strife of parties and factions
decentralisation meant, as the experience of the past two years had
shown, that France would be without an effective Government at a time
when a powerful coalition was formed against her. A far lower motive
impelled them in the same direction. The safety of their country
appeared to them dependent on the triumph of their own party, and to
secure this they were prepared to act in the teeth of their theoretical
opinions. They denied liberty to the press. They sacrificed freedom
of trade to the clamours of the populace. They not only maintained
the right of Paris to act for the whole of France, but, in order the
more effectually to secure submission, sought by the agency of clubs
and special committees to stamp out all vestiges of public spirit that
yet remained in the departments, and were indifferent to the character
of their instruments, or to the commission of acts of injustice and
cruelty, so long as their own ascendancy was secured.
♦Economical situation.♦
The Girondists denounced the policy of their adversaries with eloquence
and fervent indignation. But the issue of the struggle was dependent,
not on their power of speech, but on the support which they could
obtain in Paris. Affection for the Convention was nowhere to be found.
The middle classes were alienated by the death of the King, the lower
classes by the dearness of food, while large numbers were estranged
by the indifference manifested by the Convention towards the Catholic
faith. The actual hostility of the working classes was excited in
consequence of the strenuous opposition made by the Girondists to the
economic theories which found favour in the streets. In July 1792, the
nominal value of assignats in circulation was about 87,500,000_l._
In May 1793, it had risen, owing to the war expenditure, to about
131,250,000_l._ The Church lands, the security on which the assignats
were first issued, were already sold. A new security had been found in
the property of emigrants, which was now in course of sale. This was
conveniently estimated to be worth the exact amount of the assignats
in circulation, 131,250,000_l._ The Government, however, remained no
better off. It had no credit on which to borrow, and taxes were only
partially paid. All foresaw that, to cover the war expenses, it would
be necessary to have recourse to new issues of assignats, and hence in
spite of the large security offered the paper money fell rapidly in
value. In March 1793, assignats could be exchanged for silver at about
half their nominal value. To supply the deficiency of small change the
Legislative Assembly had created notes for very small sums. Hence the
depreciation of the paper money inflicted great suffering on men living
on wages, who had nothing but these small notes on their hands. Since
the autumn of 1791 prices had been rising rapidly all over France,
while special causes contributed to produce dearness and scarcity of
food in Paris. In proportion as assignats were multiplied all persons
disliked to hold them. While purchasers were eager to pay with them,
sellers pressed for coin in exchange for their wares. The consequence
was that trade deserted Paris, where paper money was most abundant,
and where it was more difficult to get payment in gold and silver
than in the country. Corn-growers kept their corn in store or sent it
elsewhere. Few cattle came to market. Bread, meat, fish, wine, wood--in
short, all articles rose in price, some trebling in cost in the course
of six months. In the spring of 1793 the drawing off of men to the
frontier caused a rapid rise in wages, which before had not advanced
in proportion to prices. Nevertheless, real want existed amongst the
lower classes, and a not unfounded fear of want even amongst the upper
classes. Those who had money laid in stores, thus increasing the
scarcity; while wholesale dealers held back supplies, either because
they were unwilling to take paper money, or calculated on an increased
rise in prices.
Under this condition of things, while there were many sufferers, some
made large gains, more especially capitalists, speculators, wholesale
dealers, and contractors engaged in large transactions with the
Government and foreign countries. The depreciation of the paper money
benefited also to a certain extent the taxpayer and the purchaser of
State lands. But in proportion as individuals gained the State lost,
for while its revenue was received in assignats at their nominal
value, when it made purchases it was compelled to find hard cash or
else to pay in assignats at their depreciated value.
How to raise the value of the paper money and to lower prices was the
question that pressed hardest on the Convention during the spring
of 1793. The people, accustomed under the monarchy to arbitrary
interference with trade, were now raising all through France a
clamorous cry for compelling farmers to bring corn to market, and for
fixing the prices of articles of ordinary use and consumption. In the
capital a draconian code was proposed as the best means of keeping
assignats at par and ensuring plenty. Persons who exchanged assignats
for money, who speculated on variations in price, who held back goods
from sale, were to suffer the penalty of death. A special tax was to be
imposed for the maintenance of the war, a special rate for supplying
Paris with cheap bread. Petition followed petition, from the sections,
the clubs, and the Commune, calling on the Convention, under the threat
of insurrection, to legislate to such effect.
♦Popular remedies opposed by Girondists.♦
These demands were in direct contradiction to the free trade principles
maintained by a large majority of deputies. Laws for the suppression of
speculation and for the regulation of the corn trade were held by the
Girondists as an unjustifiable interference with individual liberty,
and as calculated to produce the contrary effect to that which their
proposers intended. ‘Do you wish,’ said Vergniaud, ‘to decree famine?’
They ascribed the scarcity of corn solely to fear of pillage, and had
the temerity to denounce the system of supplying Paris with cheap bread
as demoralising the inhabitants of the city and as unjust to those of
the country, who received lower wages but had to pay the market price
of the commodity. To the demand for a maximum price and the punishment
of forestallers and speculators, there was added soon the demand for
sending the Girondists before the revolutionary court, as standing in
the way of the popular remedies becoming law. The Montagnards supported
a coercive policy. The large issue of assignats and the consequent
breakdown of ordinary commercial relations appeared to some to justify
exceptional legislation. But the preponderating motive, leading the
Mountain, as a body, to support propositions for maximum laws, was
the dread of an insurrection directed against the entire Convention,
and the desire of maintaining against the Commune the leadership of
the populace. Several members of the centre, under the influence of
fear, and regarding as impracticable the policy of the right, seceded
to the Mountain. The Girondists had eloquence and courage, but no
practical programme able to rally supporters round them. They had no
means of protecting the Convention, yet it was impossible to abandon
the existing system of supplying cheap bread to Paris without having
to face an immediate insurrection. They were unable to set a limit to
the issue of assignats, yet it was evident that if the notes went on
falling in value, there must before long be famine prices in Paris.
Most deputies of the centre, though they still held the same opinions
as the Girondists, dared not emulate their courage. The exchange of
assignats for silver at less than their nominal value was prohibited,
under penalty of six years’ imprisonment (April 11). Restrictions
upon the corn trade, which had been in force under the monarchy, were
revived, and a variable maximum for corn was fixed, to be regulated in
each department by the local authorities (May 3). To provide for the
war expenses, a forced loan was to be raised of more than forty-three
millions (May 20). These concessions, however, failed to satisfy the
populace, while on the point which the leaders of the agitation had
most in view, the expulsion of the Girondists, the Convention stood
firm, and refused to proscribe its members. Plotting went on openly.
The Convention had lately instituted special committees to put in
force police laws regarding foreigners residing in France (March
21). There was one in every section of Paris, and ultimately in
most municipalities in the country. These committees, which usurped
the functions of the ordinary or civil committees of the sections,
became agents for the execution of the police laws generally, and
soon acquired celebrity under the name of revolutionary committees.
Nobles and ecclesiastics were excluded from sitting on them, and they
were most often composed of ruffianly and dissolute adventurers.
One insurrectionary committee was now formed at Paris of delegates
from these revolutionary committees; a second of delegates from the
sections. The Commune, under the leadership of its mayor, Pache, and
its two law officers, Hébert and Chaumette, set itself at the head of
the movement. Some Montagnards, including Robespierre, Marat, Collot
d’Herbois, Chabot, Tallien, and Desmoulins gave it undisguised support.
But those whose hostility was less, hesitated. For if the Mountain had
to call in the aid of the Commune in order to obtain victory over the
Girondists, what security was there that after their expulsion it would
be able to maintain its own independence? And what influence could
Danton hope to exercise over a brow-beaten and intimidated body of men,
in fear for their lives? Compromise with the Girondists was, however,
impracticable, and the Committee of Public Safety, in place of taking
active measures against the conspirators, sought merely to moderate
their violence.
♦June 23.♦
While their enemies plotted the Girondists made no efforts to secure
the Convention against attack, or to form a party in Paris for its
defence. They relied on their eloquence and the goodness of their cause
to keep the centre true to them. They made the useless proposition that
the primary assemblies should meet and decide which deputies should
be ejected, and which keep their seats. They obtained addresses from
the departments promising armed intervention in their support, and in
case of insurrection threatened Paris with annihilation. ‘If ever,’
said the unrestrainable Isnard, when President of the Convention, to
a deputation from the Commune, ‘it should happen that violence were
offered to the national representatives, I declare to you, in the name
of the whole of France, that Paris would be destroyed, and grass would
grow on the banks of the Seine.’ Such words were far more hurtful to
the Girondists themselves than to those whom they threatened. They
sounded in men’s ears like an echo of Brunswick’s proclamation, and
made the inhabitants of Paris fear more the consequences of the success
of the Girondists, in case of a collision between the two parties, than
those of submission to the one which posed itself as the defender of
Paris from violence. Meanwhile the enemies of the Girondists lost no
opportunity of turning opinion against them. They accused them, not
only of seeking to excite civil war, but also of being Federalists,
and of plotting to destroy the unity of the republic by making the
departments independent of the capital. Marat and his murderous
followers were ready to execute a second massacre, whilst amongst the
people propositions were heard for a redistribution of property. Such
ideas were not countenanced either by the Jacobins or the Commune.
Bloodshed might lead the departments to rise, and it was possible
that the middle classes in Paris might move for the defence of the
Girondists if they thought the city was to be given over to assassins
and assailants of the rights of property. Meanwhile the Convention,
encouraged by some movements in the sections against the tyranny of
the Commune, assumed a bolder attitude, and appointed a commission of
twelve deputies to investigate the conspiracies (May 18). Hébert and
other agitators were arrested. But these acts of vigour hastened the
crisis. To quiet the apprehensions of the middle classes the Commune
and the Jacobins made public declaration of their respect for property
and of their intention to maintain order.
The Convention a few days previously had removed from the Riding School
to a spacious hall in the Palace of the Tuileries, capable of holding
more than a thousand persons. On May 31 armed bands streamed through
the streets to impose their will on the representatives of the nation.
The terrorised Convention decreed the suppression of the Commission of
Twelve, but refused to proscribe its members. It was not allowed to
escape without bending its neck yet more beneath the yoke. On June 2
many thousand insurgents flooded the Chamber, demanding, with threats,
the arrest of the leaders of the right. The alarmed and indignant
deputies, with the exception of some thirty on the left rose in a body
and left the hall. But all issues out of the palace courts and garden
were closely guarded, and passage refused with insult. They returned,
and while intruders sat on the benches and voted with them, a decree
was carried that thirty-one deputies, including Vergniaud, Gensonné,
Guadet, Brissot, and other leading Girondists, should be kept under
arrest at their own houses.