ANSW. The duty which God requireth of man, is, obedience to his
revealed will.
QUEST. XCII. _What did God at first reveal unto man as the rule of
his obedience?_
ANSW. The rule of obedience revealed to Adam in the estate of
innocency, and to all mankind in him, beside a special command, not
to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,
was, the moral law.
Having, in the former part of the Catechism, been led to consider what
we are to believe concerning God, and those works of nature and grace,
wherein he has displayed his glory to man, whether considered as created
after his image, or having lost it by sin, and afterwards redeemed, and
made partaker of those blessings that are consequent thereupon; we are
now to consider him as under an indispensable obligation to yield
obedience to God. They who have received most grace from him, are laid
under the strongest ties and engagements hereunto; accordingly we may
observe,
I. That, obedience is due from man to God. This results from the
relation we stand in to him as creatures;[196] who ought to say with the
Psalmist, _O come let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the
Lord our Maker_, Psal. xcv. 6. and particularly when considered as
intelligent creatures, having excellencies superior to all others in
this lower world, whereby we are rendered capable, not only of
subserving the ends of his providence, but performing obedience, as
subjects of moral government: But if we are redeemed, justified, and
sanctified, and made partakers of all the blessings that accompany
salvation; this obligation to duty, is greater than that of all others,
as the apostle says, _Ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God
in your body, and in your spirit, which are God’s_, 1 Cor. vi. 2. And
this may be considered, not only as our duty, but our highest wisdom; as
it is said, _The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from
evil, is understanding_, Job xxviii. 28. hereby, in some measure, we
answer the end for which we came into the world. And it is our interest,
inasmuch as it is conducive to, and inseparably connected with our
present and future blessedness: Nevertheless we are to be very sensible
that this is out of our own power, as our Saviour says, _Without me ye
can do nothing_, John xv. 5. Therefore we should exercise a constant
dependence on him, who works in his people both to will and to do, of
his own good pleasure. We might here consider the nature and properties
of that duty and obedience which we owe to God.
1. If it be such as we hope God will accept or approve of, it must
proceed from a renewed nature, and as a consequence thereof, from a
principle of love to God, as a reconciled Father; not from a slavish
fear and dread of his wrath, as a sin-revenging Judge. Thus the Psalmist
says, _There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared_,
Psal. cxxx. 4.
2. It ought to be without the least reserve, as containing a ready
compliance with whatever he commands; and hereby we ought to approve
ourselves to him, as our sovereign Lord and Law-giver, and consider that
we are under his all-seeing eye; and accordingly his glory is to be
assigned as the highest end of all we do.
3. It ought to be performed with constancy; and therefore it doth not
consist barely in a sudden fit of devotion, arising from the dictates of
an awakened conscience, or the dread we have of his wrath, when under
some distressing providence; but it ought to be the constant work and
business of life. And,
4. When we have done or suffered most for God, we are not only to
consider ourselves as _unprofitable servants_, Luke xvii. 10. as our
Saviour expresses it; but we must lament our imperfections, and be
deeply humbled for the iniquities that attend our holy things; inasmuch
as _there is not a just man upon earth that doth good, and sinneth not_,
Eccles. vii. 20.
II. In order to our yielding obedience, it is necessary that God should
signify to us, in what instances he will be obeyed, and the manner how
it is to be performed; otherwise it would rather be a fulfilling our own
will than his. None but those who are authorized hereto, and receive
what they impart to us by divine inspiration, can, without the boldest
presumption, assume this prerogative to themselves, so as to prescribe
to us a rule of duty to God; and therefore it follows, that this
obedience must be to his revealed will. The secret purposes of God are
the rule and measure of his own actings; but his revealed will is the
rule of our obedience. _Secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but
those things which are revealed, belong unto us and to our children_,
Deut. xxix. 29.
III. The will of God, as thus made known to us, is called a Law: Which,
that we may farther understand, let us consider, that a law is the
decree or revealed will of a sovereign, designed to direct and govern
the actions of his subjects, and thereby to secure his own honour and
their welfare. And if this be applied to the law of God, we must
consider him as our Lord and Sovereign, whose will is the rule of our
actions; and he being infinitely wise and good, is able and inclined to
direct us in those things that are conducive to his own honour and our
safety and happiness; and this he has been pleased to do, and
accordingly has given us a law as the rule of life.
The laws of God are either such as take their rise from his holy nature,
and accordingly our obligation to yield obedience thereto, proceeds not
only or principally from the command of God, but from their being
agreeable to his divine perfections, which must be assigned as the
reason of his prescribing them as matter of duty. These are all
reducible to what we call, in general, the law of nature; which, because
it is agreeable to the dictates of reason, it is called, by way of
eminency, _The moral law_. Thus when we consider ourselves as creatures,
we are led to confess that we are subject to God, and therefore bound to
obey him; and when we think of him as a God of infinite perfection, this
obedience must be agreeable thereunto; and because he is a Spirit, it
must be performed in a spiritual manner; and as he is a holy God, he is
to be worshipped with reverence and holy fear. Thus far we are induced
to yield obedience by the law of nature.
But, on the other hand, there are many laws relating to the
circumstances or manner in which God will be worshipped, which are
founded in his sovereign will; and these we call positive laws. Of this
kind was that law given to our first parents, not to eat of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil; and, doubtless, there were many other laws
given to them relating to their conduct of life, and mode of worship,
though they are not particularly mentioned in that short history we have
of the state of man before the fall. As for the moral law, it is said,
in one of the answers we are explaining, to have been revealed to Adam
in his state of innocency, and to all mankind in him. Its being revealed
to man, must be supposed to be a less proper way of speaking; inasmuch
as that method of discovery is more especially applicable to positive
laws; and therefore I would rather chuse to express it as it is in a
foregoing answer[197], by God’s writing his laws in the hearts of our
first parents, or impressing the commands of the moral law on their
nature; so that by the power of reasoning, with which they were endowed,
they might attain to the knowledge thereof. So that man, by the light of
nature, knew all things contained in the moral law.
As to what is farther said in this answer, that the moral law was given
to man in innocency; that has been considered elsewhere. And as all
mankind were represented by him, so we are to understand those words,
that it was given to all mankind in him. But these things have been
insisted on in another place, as also what relates to his being
prohibited from eating the tree of knowledge of good and evil, I shall
pass it over, and proceed to speak more particularly concerning the
moral law, together with the use thereof to all sorts of men.
Footnote 196:
“It may be asked, Is there no _reason_ or _nature_ of things? Yes; as
certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things,
considered _independently_ of the divine Will, or _without_ it, have
no more _obligation_ in them, than a _divine worship_ considered
independently of, and without any regard to the _existence_ of God.
For the _Will_ of God is as absolutely necessary to found all _moral
obligation_ upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the
foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of _moral
obligations_, without the _Will_ of God, is only like the fitness of a
_religious_ worship without the _existence_ of God.
And it is as just to say, that he destroys the _reason_ of religion
and piety, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to
say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon
the Will of God. And as religion cannot be justly or solidly defended,
but by shewing its connexion with, and dependance upon, God’s
existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with strength
and reason, but by shewing them to be the Will of God.
It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in _its self_, which is
in _its self absolutely_ unfit to be done?
This question consists of improper terms. For God’s Will no more makes
actions to be fit _in themselves_, than it makes _things_ to exist
_in, or of themselves_. No things, nor any actions, have any
_absolute_ fitness, and in _themselves_.
A _gift_, a _blow_, the making a _wound_, or _shedding_ of _blood_,
considered in themselves, have no _absolute_ fitness, but are fit or
unfit according to any variety of incidental circumstances.
When therefore God, by his Will, makes any thing fit to be done, he
does not make the thing fit in _its self_, which is just in the _same
state_ considered in _its self_, as it was before; but, it becomes fit
for the person to do it, because he can be happy, or do that which is
fit for him to do, by doing the Will of God.
For instance, the _bare eating_ a fruit, considered in _its self_, is
neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit be appointed by God for our food and
nourishment, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If
a fruit be poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit
self-murder. If eating of a fruit be prohibited by an express order of
God, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to eat our own damnation.
But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered
in _its self_, _fit_ or _unfit_; but has all its fitness, or
unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the Will
of God.
Supposing, therefore, God to require a person to do something, which,
according to his present circumstances, _without_ that command, he
ought not to do, God does not make that which is _absolutely_ unfit in
_itself_, fit to be done; but only adds _new circumstances_ to an
action, that is neither fit nor unfit, moral nor immoral in _itself_,
but _because_ of its circumstances.
To instance, in the case of _Abraham_ required to sacrifice his son.
The killing of a man is neither good nor bad, considered _absolutely_
in _its self_. It was unlawful for _Abraham_ to kill his son, because
of the _circumstances_ he was in with regard to his son. But when the
divine Command was given, _Abraham_ was in a _new state_; the action
had _new circumstances_; and then it was as lawful for _Abraham_ to
kill his son, as it was lawful for God to require any man’s life,
either by _sickness_, or any _other means_ he should please to
appoint.
And it had been as unlawful for _Abraham_ to have disobeyed God in
this extraordinary command, as to have cursed God at any _ordinary
calamity_ of providence.—
Again, it is objected, _If there be nothing right or wrong, good or
bad, antecedently and independently of the Will of God, there can be
no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than
another_.
It is answered, _first_, That all goodness, and all possible
perfection, is as _eternal_ as God, and as _essential_ to him as his
existence. And to say, that they are either _antecedent_ or
_consequent_, _dependent_ or _independent_ of his Will, would be
equally absurd. To ask, therefore, whether there be not something
right and wrong, antecedent to the Will of God, to render his Will
_capable_ of being right, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent
cause of his existence, that he may be proved to exist necessarily.
And to ask, how God can be good, if there be not something good
independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be
not something infinite independently of him. And, to seek for any
other _source_ or _reason_ of the divine Goodness, besides the divine
Nature, is like seeking for some external cause, and help of the
divine omnipotence.
The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and
to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither
_antecedent_, nor _consequent_ to his Will.—”