CHAPTER XIV

THE COMPLETED CANAL.

We may now begin to consider the canal as a whole and in its completed

state. From deep water in Limon Bay, 41-foot depth at mean tide, to deep

water outside Panama, 45-foot depth at mean tide, is just about 50

miles. The greater part of the canal is at high elevation, only 15 miles

of it being at sea-level. We shall note the varying depths and widths of

the channel when we take our imaginary journey along it. Here it is

enough to say that the minimum width will be 300 feet, the minimum depth

41 feet, the breadth and depth being, however, for the greater portion

of its course, greater than these dimensions. Its highest point above

sea-level, as the reader already knows, is 85 feet--that is, 85 feet at

the surface of the water, and 40 feet at the canal bottom. The depth

along this stretch is therefore 45 feet. The Panama Canal, though not

so long as the Kiel and Suez Canals, is very much broader and deeper.

Suez is 108 feet wide and 31 feet deep as _minima_; Kiel, 72 feet and

29-1/2 feet. The Manchester Ship Canal is 120 feet by 26 feet. In length

Panama, with its 50 miles, comes third, Suez being 90, Kiel 61, and

Manchester 35-1/2 miles long.

During the building of the canal the department of construction and

engineering was arranged in three divisions--the Atlantic, embracing the

engineering construction from deep water in the Caribbean Sea to include

the Gatun locks and dam; the central division, extending from Gatun to

Pedro Miguel; and the Pacific division, from Pedro Miguel to deep water

in the Pacific Ocean. For the ordinary student, however, the channel

divides naturally into four sections, the Atlantic level, the lake, the

cutting, and the Pacific section (in two levels separated by locks).

The invisible channel of the waterway begins at the mouth of Limon Bay,

about eight miles from Gatun locks. Limon, also known as Colon or Navy

Bay, is about three miles wide and three and a half miles long from

north to south. It is shallow, from three to seven fathoms deep, and

seems to be steadily growing shallower. This is not surprising, as it is

fully exposed to the "northers," which blow with terrific force from the

Caribbean, and no doubt carry into the bay a good deal of detritus from

the bottom of the sea. The heavy rains of the isthmus must also scour

the land perpetually down into the bay. On the east side of the bay is

the flat Manzanillo Island, a mile long by three-quarters broad, on

which stands the city of Colon. This town, which was once known as

Aspinwall, owes its existence to the Panama Railway, of which it is the

northern or Caribbean terminus. Its position on the railway gave it an

advantage over the old town of Chagres, a little distance along the

coast to the west, which, though once a flourishing port, has now fallen

on evil days. Near Colon is Cristobal, the new Atlantic terminal of the

canal.

[Illustration: Gatun Upper Lock, looking North from Lighthouse.]

Without some protection the entrance to the canal would have been

exposed to the extremely violent storms which occur in the Caribbean

during the winter months. During these storms vessels cannot lie safely

in Colon harbour, and could not safely enter or issue from the canal.

So a breakwater two miles long has been run out from Toro point in an

easterly direction, covering the extremity of the canal. A glance at the

map will suggest a thought that this barrier will not provide sufficient

protection, and that another breakwater will have to be run out from the

eastern shore. Such a further protection will be provided if the need

should arise.

At this point then, west of Colon and at the mouth of Limon Bay, our

vessel enters the buoyed submarine channel of the canal and speeds

onwards along the first section of the waterway, 500 feet in

bottom-width and 41 feet deep, towards the locks at Gatun. But the locks

are not yet visible. It is not until the fifth mile--that is, at

Mindi--that a bend of the canal opens that gigantic structure to view,

and by that time the vessel has left the broad waters and is enclosed

within banks. The experience which awaits the traveller who has looked

forward with some excitement to see the world's greatest wonder of

to-day has been vividly imagined by Mr. Bryce. Our late American

Ambassador writes:--

The voyager of the future, in the ten or twelve hours of his

passage from ocean to ocean, will have much variety. The

level light of the fiery tropic dawn will fall on the houses

of Colon as he approaches it in the morning, when vessels

usually arrive. When his ship has mounted the majestic

staircase of the three Gatun locks from the Atlantic level,

he will glide slowly and softly along the waters of a broad

lake which gradually narrows toward its head--a lake

enclosed by rich forests of that velvety softness one sees

in the tropics, with vistas of forest-girt islets stretching

far off to right and left among the hills; a welcome change

from the restless Caribbean Sea which he has left. Then the

mountains will close in upon him, steep slopes of grass or

brushwood rising two hundred feet above him as he passes

through the great Cut. From the level of the Miguel lock he

will look southward down the broad vale that opens on the

ocean flooded with the light of the declining sun, and see

the rocky islets rising, between which in the twilight his

course will lie out into the vast Pacific. At Suez the

passage from sea to sea is through a dreary and monotonous

waste of shifting sand and barren clay. Here one is for a

few hours in the centre of a verdant continent, floating on

smooth waters, shut off from sight of the ocean behind and

the ocean before--a short sweet present of tranquillity

between a stormy past and a stormy future.

The Gatun locks, each chamber of which is a sort of "canyon of cement,"

will almost oppress the imagination with the sense of immensity. At the

foot of the locks the vessel will surrender its own volition and entrust

itself wholly to the canal operators. It will be attached to the

electric apparatus ashore and gently towed into the lock-chambers. In

less than an hour it should have climbed the three gigantic steps and be

afloat on the surface of the lake, 85 feet above sea-level. The

traveller might fail even to notice of himself the great dam which abuts

on the locks to the west. He may be surprised to hear that the whole

being of the canal depends upon that earthwork, and that with the

Culebra Cut it absorbed the greater part of the labour and skill and

solicitude of the canal-builders. The Gatun dam has indeed been so

adopted and transfigured by Nature that it appears only a part, and not

a very conspicuous part, of the landscape. Nor would our traveller,

without previous information, guess the history of the great expanse of

water which stretches to right and left up many a distant arm or loch

and round many a picturesque island, and over which his vessel, once

more resuming its own power and control, begins to advance. The buoys

alone indicate that the channel, the true and well-wrought link between

the two oceans, still holds its course through the bed of the lake. Mr.

Bryce has pointed out what a pleasant interlude in a long ocean journey

will be afforded by this placid glide of 22 miles over the inland lake

from Gatun to Gamboa. The bottom widths through the lake are 1,000 feet

for 16 miles, 800 feet for 4 miles, and 500 feet for about 3 miles.

At Gamboa the vessel enters the eight-mile section of the Culebra Cut.

Here again, though the traveller in future days will need no reminding

of the enterprise represented by this tremendous trench driven through

the backbone of the isthmus, he will have to imagine the busy scene

during the days of construction which will then have disappeared. He

must try to reproduce what was little less than a manufacturing town at

Gorgona, just near the entrance to the Cut, where stood the machine

shops, boiler shops, smith shops, car shops, pattern shops, where

repairs of all kinds were made and machines of all sorts and sizes

constructed. He should think of that model residential town to the west

of the Cut where the chief engineer and his assistants lived, surrounded

by the quarters of the men, each dwelling protected with its fine wire

netting to exclude the mosquitoes, the whole settlement scrupulously

clean and bright with well-kept lawns and flowerbeds. All this will have

passed away with the crowds of workers who interrupted for a dozen years

the stillness of the primeval forest. Nature and silence will in a large

degree have resumed their sway, but the world will not forget the debt

it owes to that conquering industrial army which divided the land here

in order to unite the nations.

Through the cutting the bottom width of the canal is 300 feet. Having

accomplished the eight or nine mile passage through the deep gorge, the

vessel reaches the end of the high-level section at the Pedro Miguel

locks. Here she is gently lowered 30 feet down to the bosom of little

Miraflores Lake, held at 55 feet above sea-level. The length of this

subsection is about a mile and a half, and it ends at the Miraflores

locks, where the ship is lowered by two steps to the level of the

Pacific. Then follows the last stage of this eventful transit--the

eight-mile tidal section along which the vessel glides between low

swamps to her own element of deep sea-water beyond the new port of

Balboa, west of Panama, whose wharves are being constructed from the

waste material of the inland excavations. The new breakwater which runs

out from Balboa to Naos Island suggests wind and storm. But eternal calm

reigns along these shores, and the object of the breakwater is to

protect the line of the canal, not from heavy seas, but from the

silt-bearing currents from the east which set at right angles to the

channel. Constant dredging was necessary to prevent the bed of the canal

becoming filled with this sediment. The dyke has proved very effectual

for this purpose.

Such is the Panama Canal which has for so many centuries been the desire

of the nations, and which is now one of the permanent geographical

features of the globe. It is so well and truly constructed that nothing

short of an earthquake could ever seriously damage it. The question

naturally arises whether this ultimate danger needs to be seriously

considered. Panama is rather suspiciously close to a region where

geological conditions are not remarkable for stability. The earthquake

at Kingston a few years ago was as destructive a calamity as those of

Messina and San Francisco. Costa Rica, too, almost an isthmian country,

enjoys a very bad reputation for this kind of friskiness. Panama,

however, seems happily to lie outside the zone of such disturbances.

Slight earthquake shocks have been felt, probably only the reflections

of severer shocks elsewhere. But there is no record or tradition of a

really serious convulsion. There is, indeed, one visible and reassuring

evidence of the self-possession of the earth's surface in this region.

To the east of the modern city of Panama is the site of old Panama, of

which the lofty tower of the old cathedral--a pathetic and picturesque

object--is still standing. This shows that there has been no serious

earthquake here for the greater part of four centuries. Still, the

danger--great or small--does exist, and it threatens a high-level canal,

with its elaborate lock-machinery and masonry, far more than it would

have affected a canal at sea-level. No very severe convulsion might be

necessary to throw one of these locks out of gear, and the entire canal,

therefore, out of operation for a considerable time. But against such

perils there is no guarding, and every precaution having been taken

against foreseeable and preventable dangers, all else must be left to

the disposal of that Providence "which by his strength setteth fast the

mountains," "who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not

be removed for ever."

[Illustration: Gatun Upper Lock--West Chamber.]

It seems incredible that the canal should ever be in danger of injury or

destruction from the attack of any civilized Power, because all nations

are apparently interested in its preservation. What, then, is the

meaning of these slopes which are being prepared for forts and batteries

at either end of the canal? "With the two great forts at the two ends

of the canal," writes Mr. Showalter, "fitted with four 14-inch guns, six

6-inch guns, and twelve 12-inch mortars, with twelve companies of coast

artillery, one battery of field artillery, four regiments of infantry,

and one squad of cavalry, there is not likely to arise a time when these

fortifications, backed up by the American navy, will fail to command a

proper and wholesome respect from other nations." Yet if the object were

simply to maintain the neutrality of the canal, the best course would

seem to have been to leave the canal entirely unfortified, as is the

case at Suez, and trust to the moral influence of the great Powers and

their common interest in keeping the canal free and open to the world's

traffic. Obviously the idea of making the canal zone a big military camp

and arsenal is not so much to "police" the passage as a great

international waterway, but to defend it and the zone as a position of

immense strategic importance to the United States. President Hayes, in a

message to the Senate in 1880, spoke of the canal as "the great ocean

thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific ports, and _virtually a

part of the coastline of the United States_." The words I have

italicized seem to show that the United States regard the new passage

rather as wholly proprietary, like those of Kiel and Corinth, than as

international in status, like the Suez Canal.

In the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty there is no specific reference to

fortification. The only allusion to the defence of the canal occurs in

the second subsection of the third clause: "The United States shall be

at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be

necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder." The

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is rather more specific in its provisions on

this subject, though even that instrument seems scarcely to have

contemplated an armament and garrison on the large and permanent scale

intended at the isthmus.[17]

England has, however, acquiesced in the proposed fortification. The

decision is not likely to be challenged in any other quarter. The United

States have built the canal with their own money and enterprise. They

are more closely and immediately interested in the passage than any

other Power, and so long as they fulfil their undertaking to afford

equal treatment in tolls and other respects to the commerce of all

nations, nobody is likely to protest against the presence of American

men and guns at the isthmus.

Indeed, there is some force in the plea that the complete neutralization

of the canal would be inconsistent with American control and operation.

In time of war the Americans would have had either to refrain from using

the canal for their warships (an unthinkable proposition) or to permit

their enemy or enemies to use it on equal terms. This would have meant a

rather painful experience for the American engineers, managers, workmen,

and others on the isthmus. They would have been obliged to put the

enemy's vessels through the canal, and thus commit a sort of legalized

treason against their own government by giving "aid and comfort" to the

enemy. So it comes to this--that the canal will be neutral at all times

except when the United States are themselves a belligerent. Then it will

become part and parcel of the sovereign dominions of the great American

Republic.

But the United States will have to stand all the ulterior possibilities

of this position. If they were at war the canal would be at once liable

to attack. In fact it would invite attack as a very vulnerable point in

their armour. It has been truly said that the canal zone will have all

the disadvantages, without any of the advantages, of an island. It will

be entirely dependent on imported supplies and isolated from the centre

of American power. If the American fleet lost the command of the sea

even for a short time, the enemy could land troops at any part of the

isthmus, march them against any point of the extended canal line and

inflict on the United States a wound in a very sensitive, if not a vital

region. So that instead of simply doubling the efficiency of the

existing American fleet, by enabling it to be transferred swiftly and

bodily from the western to the eastern coast, it may rather add to the

naval responsibilities of the States and compel a considerable increase

in their sea-power. To Englishmen, however, this development of the

power and resources of the United States ought to bring no feelings but

those of pleasure and satisfaction. In view of the great secular

struggle between East and West for supremacy in the Pacific, which some

people think will fill the pages of future world history, anything that

strengthens the position and prestige of Anglo-Saxondom as the main

guardian of Western ideas and principles should be welcome to all the

members of that race.

It is estimated that the fortification of the canal will cost about

$12,000,000. This added to the $375,000,000, the estimated cost of

construction, will bring the entire bill up to the round and goodly sum

of $400,000,000 or L80,000,000. This puts all other expenditure on

artificial water-channels into the shade, as the Suez Canal cost only

L19,000,000, the Manchester Ship Canal L15,000,000, and the Kiel Canal

L8,000,000. As regards this expense and the possibilities of revenue

returns, Colonel Goethals has written an interesting passage:--

Much has been said and predicted as to the commercial value

of the canal to the United States. In this connection it

must be remembered that the commercial shipping of this

country never required the canal. The trip of the _Oregon_

in 1898 settled the question of the advisability of

constructing an isthmian canal, and had the canal been built

at that time, thereby saving that trip around the Horn,

there is no question that it would have been agreed

generally that the canal, even at an expenditure of

$375,000,000, was worth while.

In whatever light the Panama Canal is viewed, it will have

paid for itself if in time of war or threatened war a

concentration of the fleet is effected without that long,

tedious, uncertain route followed by the _Oregon_.

It will practically double the efficiency of that fleet,

and, notwithstanding the fact that we are a peaceful nation,

our outlying possessions make the Panama Canal a military

necessity, and it must be so recognized. From this point of

view the debt should be charged to the account which

necessitated its construction, and whatever revenues are

derived from other sources are so much to the good. The

traffic that will utilize the canal depends upon the tolls

that will be charged, and the President has asked the

Congress for legislation which will enable the establishment

of rates.

There is another policy which, if adopted, will have a

material bearing on the revenues of the enterprise. Through

the Panama railroad a large expenditure of money has been

made for providing the present working forces with supplies

of all kinds. Though the railroad has been reimbursed for

this plant through fixed charges on sales, it should not be

abandoned, but utilized for furnishing shipping with its

needed supplies. Suitable coaling plants should be erected

for the sale of coal to vessels touching at or passing

through the canal. In addition, since oil is now used on a

number of ships plying in the Pacific, such fuel should also

be on hand for sale by the canal authorities.

The extensive machine shops now located at Gorgona must be

moved before the completion of the canal, and they should be

established in connection with a dry dock that will be

needed for commercial purposes, and utilized as a revenue

producer for the canal. This policy also needs

Congressional action.

With properly regulated tolls, and with facilities for fully

equipping, supplying, and repairing ships, the Panama route

would offer many advantages and bring to it a sufficiently

remunerative return to pay, not only the operating expenses,

but to gradually absorb the debt which the United States has

incurred by its construction.

We shall return to the question of tolls in a later chapter.

[Illustration: Pedro Miguel Locks, from Hill on East Bank.]

FOOTNOTES:

[17] See _ante_, page 71.

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