PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: LAST YEARS IN FRANCE
The war had not been long waging before overtures and soundings
concerning an accommodation, abetted and sometimes instigated by the
cabinet, began to come from England. Nearly all these were addressed to
Franklin, because all Europe persisted in regarding him as the one
authentic representative of America, and because Englishmen of all
parties had long known and respected him far beyond any other American.
In March, 1778, William Pulteney, a member of Parliament, came under an
assumed name to Paris and had an interview with him. But it seemed that
England would not renounce the theory of the power of Parliament over
the colonies, though willing by way of favor to forego its exercise.
Franklin declared an arrangement on such a basis to be impossible.
A few months later there occurred the singular and mysterious episode of
Charles de Weissenstein. Such was the signature to a letter dated at
Brussels, June 16, 1778. The writer said that independence was an
impossibility, and that the English title to the colonies, being
indisputable, would be enforced by coming generations even if the
present generation should have to "stop awhile in the pursuit to recover
breath;" he then sketched a plan of reconciliation, which included
offices or life pensions for Franklin, Washington, and other prominent
rebels. He requested a personal interview with Franklin, and, failing
that, he appointed to be in a certain spot in Notre Dame at a certain
hour, wearing a rose in his hat, to receive a written reply. The French
police reported the presence at the time and place of a man obviously
bent upon this errand, who was traced to his hotel and found, says John
Adams, to be "Colonel Fitz-something, an Irish name, that I have
forgotten." He got no answer, because at a consultation between the
American commissioners and de Vergennes it was so decided. But one had
been written by Franklin, and though de Weissenstein and Colonel
Fitz-something never saw it, at least it has afforded pleasure to
thousands of readers since that time. For by sundry evidence Franklin
became convinced, even to the point of alleging that he "knew," that the
incognito correspondent was the English monarch himself, whose letter
the Irish colonel had brought. The extraordinary occasion inspired him.
It is a rare occurrence when one can speak direct to a king as man with
man on terms of real equality. Franklin seized his chance, and wrote a
letter in his best vein, a dignified, vigorous statement of the American
position, an eloquent, indignant arraignment of the English measures
for which George III. more than any other one man was responsible. In
language which was impassioned without being extravagant, he mingled
sarcasm and retort, statement and argument, with a strenuous force that
would have bewildered the royal "de Weissenstein." To this day one
cannot read these stinging paragraphs without a feeling of
disappointment that de Vergennes would not let them reach their
destination. Such a bolt should have been sent hotly home, not dropped
to be picked up as a curiosity by the groping historians of posterity.
The good Hartley also was constantly toiling to find some common ground
upon which negotiators could stand and talk. One of his schemes, which
now seems an idle one, was for a long truce, during which passions might
subside and perhaps a settlement be devised. Franklin ever lent a
courteous ear to any one who spoke the word Peace. But neither this
strong feeling, nor any discouragement by reason of American reverses,
nor any arguments of Englishmen ever induced him to recede in the least
from the line of demands which he thought reasonable, nor to abate his
uncompromising plainness of speech.
With the outbreak of war Franklin's feelings towards England had taken
on that extreme bitterness which so often succeeds when love and
admiration seem to have been misplaced. "I was fond to a folly," he
said, "of our British connections, ... but the extreme cruelty with
which we have been treated has now extinguished every thought of
returning to it, and separated us forever. You have thereby lost limbs
that will never grow again." English barbarities, he declared, "have at
length demolished all my moderation." Often and often he reiterated such
statements in burning words, which verge more nearly upon vehemence than
any other reminiscence which survives to us of the great and calm
philosopher.
Yet in the bottom of his heart he felt that the chasm should not be made
wider and deeper than was inevitable. In 1780 he told Hartley that
Congress would fain have had him "make a school-book" from accounts of
"British barbarities," to be illustrated by thirty-five prints by good
artists of Paris, "each expressing one or more of the different horrid
facts, ... in order to impress the minds of children and posterity with
a deep sense of your bloody and insatiable malice and wickedness." He
would not do this, yet was sorely provoked toward it. "Every kindness I
hear of done by an Englishman to an American prisoner makes me resolve
not to proceed in the work, hoping a reconciliation may yet take place.
But every fresh instance of your devilism weakens that resolution, and
makes me abominate the thought of a reunion with such a people."
In point of fact the idea of an actual reunion seems never from the very
outset to have had any real foothold in his mind. In 1779 he said: "We
have long since settled all the account in our own minds. We know the
worst you can do to us, if you have your wish, is to confiscate our
estates and take our lives, to rob and murder us; and this ... we are
ready to hazard rather than come again under your detested
government."[77] This sentiment steadily gained strength as the struggle
advanced. Whenever he talked about terms of peace he took a tone so high
as must have seemed altogether ridiculous to English statesmen.
Independence, he said, was established; no words need be wasted about
that. Then he audaciously suggested that it would be good policy for
England "to act nobly and generously; ... to cede all that remains in
North America, and thus conciliate and strengthen a young power, which
she wishes to have a future and serviceable friend." She would do well
to "throw in" Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas, and "call it ... an
indemnification for the burning of the towns."
[Note 77: See also a strong statement in letter to Hartley of
October 14, 1777; _Works_, vii. 106.]
Englishmen constantly warned him of the blunder which the colonies would
commit, should they "throw themselves into the arms" of France, and they
assured him that the alliance was the one "great stumbling-block in the
way of making peace." But he had ever the reply, after the fashion of
Scripture: By their fruits ye shall know them. France was as liberal of
friendship and good services as England was of tyranny and cruelties.
This was enough to satisfy Franklin; he saw no Judas in the constant
and generous de Vergennes, and could recognize no inducement to drop the
substance France for the shadow England.[78] To his mind it seemed to
concern equally the honor and the interest of the States to stand
closely and resolutely by their allies, whom to abandon would be
"infamy;" and after all, what better bond could there be than a common
interest and a common foe? From this view he never wavered to the hour
when the definitive treaty of peace was signed.[79]
[Note 78: See Franklin's _Works_, vi. 303.]
[Note 79: See Franklin's _Works_, vi. 151, 303, 310; vii. 3, for
examples of his expressions on this subject.]
Such was Franklin's frame of mind when the surrender at Yorktown and the
events incident to the reception of the news in England at last brought
peace into really serious consideration. The States had already been
forward to place themselves in a position for negotiating at the first
possible moment. For in 1779 Congress had received from France an
intimation that it would be well to have an envoy in Europe empowered to
treat; and though it was seizing time very much by the forelock, yet
that body was in no mood to dally with so pleasing a hint, and at once
nominated John Adams to be plenipotentiary. This, however, by no means,
fell in with the schemes of the French ministry, for de Vergennes knew
and disliked Mr. Adams's very unmanageable character. Accordingly the
French ambassador at Philadelphia was instructed to use his great
influence with Congress to effect some amelioration of the distasteful
arrangement, and he soon covertly succeeded in inducing Congress to
create a commission by appointing Adams, Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, who
never went on the mission, and Laurens, who was a prisoner in England
and joined his colleagues only after the business had been substantially
concluded. Adams promptly came to Paris, created a great turmoil there,
as has been in part narrated, and passed on to Holland, where he still
remained. Jay, accredited to, but not yet received by, the Spanish
court, was at Madrid. Franklin therefore alone was on hand in Paris when
the great tidings of the capture of Cornwallis came.
It was on November 25, 1781, that Lord North got this news, taking it
"as he would have taken a ball in his breast." He recognized at once
that "all was over," yet for a short time longer he retained the
management of affairs. But his majority in Parliament was steadily
dwindling, and evidently with him also "all was over." In his despair he
caught with almost pathetic eagerness at what for a moment seemed a
chance to save his ministry by treating with the States secretly and
apart from France. He was a man not troubled with convictions, and
having been obstinate in conducting a war for which he really cared
little, he was equally ready to save his party by putting an end to it
with the loss of all that had been at stake. Franklin, however,
decisively cut off that hope. America, he assured Hartley, would not
forfeit the world's good opinion by "such perfidy;" and in the
incredible event of Congress instructing its commissioners to treat upon
"such ignominious terms," he himself at least "would certainly refuse to
act." So Digges, whom Franklin described as "the greatest villain I ever
met with," carried back no comfort from secret, tentative errands to
Adams in Holland and to Franklin in France. Simultaneous furtive
advances to de Vergennes met with a like rebuff. France and America were
not to be separated; Lord North and his colleagues were not to be saved
by the bad faith of either of their enemies. On February 22, 1782, an
address to the king against continuing the American war was moved by
Conway. It was carried by a majority of nineteen. A few days later a
second, more pointed, address was carried without a division. The next
day leave was granted to bring in a bill enabling the king to make a
peace or a truce with the colonies. The game was up; the ministry held
no more cards to play; on March 20 Lord North announced that his
administration was at an end.
In his shrewd, intelligent fashion, Franklin was watching these events,
perfectly appreciating the significance of each in turn. On March 22 he
seized an opportunity which chance threw in his way for writing to Lord
Shelburne a short note, in which he suggested a hope that the
"returning good disposition" of England towards America would "tend to
produce a general peace." It was a note of a few lines only, seemingly a
mere pleasant passage of courtesy to an old friend, but significant and
timely, an admirable specimen of the delicate tact with which Franklin
could meet and almost create opportunity. A few days later the cabinet
of Lord Rockingham was formed, composed of the friends of America. In it
Charles Fox was secretary for foreign affairs, and Lord Shelburne had
the home department, including the colonies. No sooner were the new
ministers fairly instated than Shelburne dispatched Richard Oswald, a
retired Scotch merchant, of very estimable character, of good temper,
reasonable views, and sufficient ability, to talk matters over with
Franklin at Paris. Oswald arrived on April 12, and had satisfactory
interviews with Franklin and de Vergennes. The important fact of which
he became satisfied by the explicit language of Franklin was, that the
hope of inducing the American commissioners to treat secretly and
separately from France was utterly groundless.[80] After a few days he
went back to London, carrying a letter from Franklin to Shelburne, in
which Franklin expressed his gratification at these overtures and his
hope that Oswald might continue to represent the English minister.
Oswald also carried certain "Notes for Conversation," which Franklin had
written out; "some loose thoughts on paper," as he called them, "which I
intended to serve as memorandums for my discourse, but without a fixed
intention of showing them to him." As matters turned out later, it would
have been better if Franklin had not been quite so free with these
"memorandums," which contained a suggestion that the English should cede
Canada and the Americans should recoup the losses of the royalists.
Indeed, no sooner had the paper left his hands than he saw his error,
and was "a little ashamed of his weakness." The letter only was shown to
the whole cabinet.
[Note 80: About the same time Laurens was released on parole and
sent to confer with Adams in Holland, concerning a separate treating,
and brought from Adams the like response as Oswald brought from
Franklin.]
On May 5 Oswald was again in Paris, charged to discuss terms with
Franklin. But on May 7 there arrived also Thomas Grenville, deputed by
Fox to approach de Vergennes with the design not only of treating with
France, but also of treating with the States through France. The double
mission indicated a division in the English cabinet. Fox and Shelburne
were almost as hostile to each other as were both to Lord North; and
each was aiming to control the coming negotiations with the States.
Which should secure it was a nice question. For English purposes of
classification the States, until independence was acknowledged, remained
colonies, and so within the charge of Shelburne. Hence came Fox's scheme
for reaching them indirectly through France, also his avowed
willingness to recognize their independence immediately, for foreign
business belonged to him. Shelburne, on the other hand, strenuously
resisted this; at worst, as he thought, independence must come through a
treaty, and with equivalents. Moreover it seems that he cherished an
odd, half-defined notion, apparently altogether peculiar to himself,
that he might escape the humiliation of a grant of full independence,
and in place thereof might devise some sort of "federal union." Perhaps
it was out of this strange fancy that there grew at this time a story
that the States were to be reconciled and joined to Great Britain by a
gift of the same measure of autonomy enjoyed by Ireland.
When Oswald and Franklin next met, they made at first little progress;
each seemed desirous to keep himself closed while the other unfolded.
The result was that Franklin wrote, with unusual _naïveté_: "On the
whole I was able to draw so little of the sentiments of Lord Shelburne
... that I could not but wonder at his being again sent to me." At the
same time Grenville was offering to de Vergennes to acknowledge the
independence of the United States, provided that in other respects the
treaty of 1763[81] should be reinstated. That is to say, France was to
agree to a complete restoration of the _status quo ante bellum_ in every
respect so far as her own interests were concerned, and to accept as
the entire recompense for all her expenditures of money and blood a
benefit accruing to the American States. This was a humorous assumption
of the ingenuousness of her most disinterested protestations. The French
minister, we are told, "seemed to smile" at this compliment to the
unselfishness of his chivalrous nation,[82] and replied that the
American States were making no request to England for independence. As
Franklin happily expressed it: "This seems to me a proposition of
selling to us a thing that was already our own, and making France pay
the price they [the English] are pleased to ask for it." But the design
of weaning the States from France, in the treating, was obvious.
[Note 81: Made between England and France at the close of the last
war, in which France had lost Canada.]
[Note 82: "The Peace Negotiations of 1782-83," etc., by John Jay; in
Winsor's _Narr. and Crit. Hist. of America_, vol. vii.]
Grenville, thus checked, next tried to see what he could do with
Franklin in the way of separate negotiation. But he only elicited a
statement that the States were under no obligations save those embodied
in the treaties of alliance and commerce with France, and a sort of
intimation, which might be pregnant of much or of little, that if the
purpose of the former were achieved through the recognition of
independence, then the commercial treaty alone would remain. This
somewhat enigmatical remark doubtless indicated nothing more than that
the States would not continue active and aggressive hostilities in order
to further purely French designs. Clearly it would depend upon the
demands of France whether the States might not find themselves in a
somewhat delicate position. Their obligation to make no separate peace
with England had been contracted upon the basis that France should ally
herself with them to obtain their independence; and the injury expected
to result therefrom to England, with the chance of commercial advantages
accruing to France, had been regarded as a full consideration. Yet it
would seem ungrateful, to say the least, to step out of the fight and
leave France in it, and to refuse to back her demands for the recoupment
of some of the losses which she had suffered in the previous war. But
now the French alliance with Spain threatened grave complications; she
had joined France in the war, and the two powers were held closely
together by the Bourbon family interests. Spain now had demands of her
own in the way of territory on the American continent, where she had
made extensive conquests, and even for the cession of Gibraltar. But the
States owed little to Spain, vastly less, indeed, than they had tried to
owe to her; for their incessant begging had elicited only small sums,
and they were more irritated at their failure to obtain much than
thankful for the trifles they had extorted. So they now easily and
gladly took the position of entire freedom from any obligation, either
by treaty or of honor, towards that power. But in the probable event of
France standing by Spain, peace might be deferred for the benefit of a
country with which the States had no lien, unless the States could treat
separately. It was not within the purview of the treaty that they should
remain tied to France for such purposes; and to this purport Fox wrote
to Grenville. But though it might be tolerably easy to enunciate a
theory by which the States could justly control their own affairs, with
no regard to France, it was only too probable that the application of
that theory to circumstances would be a very nice and perplexing task.
It strongly behooved a new country to preserve its good name and its
friendships.
If Fox had been able to carry his point, matters might have moved more
expeditiously. But pending the struggle between him and Shelburne no
advance could be made at Paris. Grenville and Oswald could not work in
unison. Franklin and de Vergennes became puzzled and suspicious, having
only an imperfect inkling by report and gossip concerning the true state
of affairs. They suspected, with good show of evidence, that the real
object of English diplomacy was to drive in a wedge between the allies.
Amid these perplexities, on April 22, Franklin wrote to Jay, begging him
to come to Paris: "Here you are greatly wanted, for messengers begin to
come and go, ... and I can neither make nor agree to conditions of peace
without the assistance of my colleagues.... I wish therefore you would
... render yourself here as soon as possible. You would be of infinite
service." Jay arrived on June 23, to Franklin's "great satisfaction,"
and the meeting was cordial. Jay was thirty-seven years old, and
Franklin was seventy-six, but Jay says: "His mind appears more vigorous
than that of any man of his age I have known. He certainly is a valuable
minister and an agreeable companion."
The deadlock continued. Grenville showed a commission to treat with
France and "any other prince or state." But the "enabling act," giving
the king authority to acknowledge the independence of the States, had
not yet been passed by Parliament; and it did not appear that England
recognized the ex-colonies as constituting either a prince or a state.
Oswald had no commission at all. Franklin, though he found himself "in
some perplexity with regard to these two negotiations," strove to set
things in motion. He preferred Oswald to Grenville, and intimated to
Lord Shelburne his wish that Oswald should receive exclusive authority
to treat with the American commissioners. He at the same time suggested
sundry _necessary_ articles to be disposed of by the treaty, namely:
independence, boundaries, and the fisheries; and sundry _advisable_
articles, namely: an indemnity to be granted by England to the sufferers
by the war; an acknowledgment of her error by England, and the cession
of Canada.
But the duel between Shelburne and Fox must first be settled, and it was
now about to be settled suddenly and in an unexpected manner. On July
1, 1782, Lord Rockingham died, and the crown, as Walpole facetiously
remarked, thereby descended to the king of England. The monarch at once,
though very reluctantly, requested Shelburne to accept the post of prime
minister, regarding him as in some degree less obnoxious than Fox.
Thereupon Fox and his friends retired in high dudgeon from office, and
Grenville promptly asked to be recalled. His opportune request was
granted very readily, and his place was given to Fitzherbert, who
brought personal letters to Franklin, but who was not accredited to
treat with the States. It seemed that this business was now again to
fall into the hands of Oswald, and accordingly, though he still remained
without any definite authority, active discussion was resumed between
him and Franklin. Early in August both believed that an understanding
upon all important points had been reached. Jay had been ill almost ever
since his arrival in Paris, and was only now recovering; Adams was still
in Holland; so that Franklin and Oswald had had the whole matter between
themselves.
Just at this time Parliament rose; and Shelburne sent Vaughan to Paris
to give private assurance to Franklin that there would be no change in
policy towards America. A commission was at the same time drawn up and
sent to Oswald empowering him to treat with commissioners of the
"colonies or plantations, and any body or bodies corporate or politic,
or any assembly or assemblies." This singular phraseology at once
produced trouble. Jay indignantly repudiated the colonial condition
imputed by this language, and resolutely said that independence must be
no item in any treaty, but must be recognized before he would even begin
to treat. The point was discussed by him with de Vergennes and Franklin.
The French minister at first had "objected to these general words as not
being particular enough;" but now he changed his mind and advised not to
stickle; for independence must be the result of the treaty, and it was
not to be expected that the effect should precede the cause. Franklin,
with evident hesitation and reluctance,[83] gave his opinion that the
commission "would do." Oswald then showed his instructions, which
directed him to concede "the complete independence of the thirteen
States." Unfortunately the enabling act had not even yet passed, so that
there was some doubt as to the power of the ministers to agree to this.
Jay's determination remained unchanged; for he suspected that the
motives of de Vergennes were not disinterested, and thought that
Franklin was hoodwinked by his French predilections. Franklin, on the
other hand, thought that the minister wished only to expedite the
negotiation as much as possible, a matter in which he himself also was
very zealous; for he understood the English political situation and
knew that Shelburne's tenure of power was precarious, and that any
possible successor of Shelburne would be vastly less well-disposed to
the States. This induced him to stretch a point in order to go on with
the treating. Parliament was to meet on November 26, and unless peace
could be concluded before that time, the chance for it thereafter would
be diminished almost to the point of hopelessness. But Adams wrote from
Holland that he also disapproved the unusual form of the commission,
though a commission to treat with envoys of "the United States of
America" would satisfy him, as a sufficient implication of independence
without an explicit preliminary acknowledgment of it.
[Note 83: Franklin's _Works_, viii. 99, 101, 150, note.]
About the middle of August Jay drew up a letter, suggesting very
ingeniously that it was incompatible with the dignity of the king of
England to negotiate except with an independent power; also that an
obstacle which meant everything to the States, but nothing to Great
Britain, should be removed by his majesty. Franklin thought that the
letter expressed too positively the resolve not to treat save upon this
basis of pre-acknowledged independence. He evidently did not wish to
bolt too securely the door through which he anticipated that the
commissioners might in time feel obliged to withdraw. Moreover Jay
thought that at this time "the doctor seemed to be much perplexed and
fettered by our instructions to be guided by the advice of this court,"
a direction correctly supposed to have been procured by the influence of
the French envoy at Philadelphia.
Jay's suspicions concerning the French minister happened now to receive
opportune corroboration. On September 4 Rayneval, secretary to de
Vergennes, had a long interview with Jay concerning boundaries, in which
he argued strongly against the American claims to the western lands
lying between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. This touched Jay
nearly, for the navigation of the Mississippi was the one object which
he had especially at heart. Six days later the famous letter of Marbois,
de la Luzerne's secretary, which had been captured _en route_ from
Philadelphia to de Vergennes at Paris, was put into the hands of Jay
through the instrumentality of the English cabinet. This outlined a
scheme for a secret understanding between England and France to deprive
the Americans of the Newfoundland fisheries. This evidence seemed to
prove Jay's case; yet Franklin remained strangely unshaken by it, for he
reflected that it came from the British ministry and was infected with
suspicion by this channel. But still another occurrence came to
strengthen Jay's conviction of some latent hostility in the French
policy, for he learned that Rayneval was making a rapid and secret
journey to London. He felt sure that this errand was to intimate to
Shelburne that France did not incline to support the demands of her
American allies. In the fullness of his faith he took a courageous,
very unconventional, but eminently successful step. He persuaded Vaughan
to hasten to London, and to present sundry strong arguments going to
show that it was the true policy of England to grant the demands of the
States rather than to fall in with the subtle plans of France. He felt
with regret that he could not consult Franklin regarding this
proceeding, which he undertook upon his own sole responsibility. It put
Shelburne in a singular position, as arbiter between two nations enemies
of England and allies of each other, but each manoeuvring to secure
its own advantage at the cost of its friend, and to that end presuming
to advise him upon English interests. He did not ponder long before
accepting the American arguments as the better, and deciding that the
English policy was rather to be liberal towards a kindred people than to
unite with a traditional foe in curtailing their prosperity. He said to
Vaughan: "Is the new commission necessary?" "It is," replied Vaughan;
and his lordship at once gave orders for making it out. Had he fallen in
with the French ideas, he would, upon the contrary, have cherished this
disagreement for a while, in order finally to sell out a concession on
this point at the price of some such substantial matter as the fisheries
or the western lands. Forthwith Vaughan was on his way back to Paris,
accompanied by a messenger who carried the amended document empowering
Oswald to treat with the commissioners of the "Thirteen United States of
America, viz.: New Hampshire," etc., naming them all. "We have put the
greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man, in the American
commissioners. It is now to be seen how far they or America are to be
depended upon.... There never was such a risk run; I hope the public
will be the gainer, else our heads must answer for it, and deservedly."
Such were the grave and anxious words of the prime minister.
Upon the receipt of this commission negotiations were actively resumed,
Franklin and Jay on one side, Oswald alone on the other. The old ground
was gone over again. On October 5-8, both parties assented to a sketch
of a treaty, which Oswald transmitted to London for consideration by the
ministry. But the raising of the siege of Gibraltar, and reflection upon
the probable results of the incipient estrangement between American
interests and those of France and Spain, now induced the English to hope
for more favorable terms in some particulars. So instead of adopting
this draft they sent over Mr. Strachey, a man especially well informed
concerning the disputed boundaries, to reinforce Oswald in an effort to
obtain modifications on these points.
Meantime another serious difference of opinion was developed between
Franklin and Jay. The influence of de Vergennes at Philadelphia had by
no means been exhausted in securing colleagues for Mr. Adams. He had
further desired to have the American envoys instructed that no American
demands outside of independence must be allowed to interpose obstacles
in the way of French purposes. In this he had been wholly successful. Of
the demands which Congress had at first intended to insist upon, one
after another was reduced to a mere recommendation, until at last
independence alone was left as an absolute and definitive ultimatum.
Moreover the closing paragraph of the instructions actually bade the
envoys to maintain constant communication with their generous ally the
king of France, and in the last resort to be governed in all matters by
his advice. This servility had raised the ire of Jay almost to the point
of inducing him to refuse a post so hedged around with humiliation. With
his views concerning the intentions of de Vergennes it now seemed to him
intolerable to jeopard American interests by placing them at the mercy
of a cabinet which unmistakably, as it seemed to him, designed to
sacrifice them to its own ends. Accordingly he was for disobeying this
unworthy instruction of Congress, and for conducting the negotiation in
strict secrecy as towards the French minister. But Franklin was no less
resolute on the other side. His established and grateful confidence in
de Vergennes remained unshaken, and he saw no error in consulting the
wisest, and by all proofs the best and truest friend whom the States had
ever had. Moreover he saw that the orders of Congress were imperative.
It was a serious division. Fortunately it was soon settled by the advent
of John Adams, about the end of October. That gentleman, prompt,
fearless, and suspicious, at once fell in with Jay's views. In a long
evening's talk he apparently read Franklin a pretty severe lecture, and
certainly ranged himself very positively on Jay's side. Franklin
listened to his vehement colleague, and at the moment held his peace in
his wise way. It was true that Adams brought the casting vote, though
Franklin of course might resist, and could make his resistance effectual
by communicating to de Vergennes all which passed, and in so doing he
would be backed by the authority and orders of Congress. But he
determined not to pursue this course. When next they all met for
conference he turned to Jay and said: "I am of your opinion, and will go
on without consulting this court." This was all that passed when thus
for a second time Franklin surrendered. Nothing indicates by what
motives he was influenced. Some writers suggest that he had a lurking
notion that Jay's views were not altogether ill founded; but later he
declared the contrary.[84] Others fancy that he simply yielded to a
majority vote. To me it seems more probable that, weighing comparative
importance, he gave in to what he conceived to be the supreme necessity
of advancing to a speedy conclusion; for, as has been said, he keenly
appreciated that time was pressing. Parliament was to meet in a few
weeks, on November 26, and it daily became more evident that if a treaty
was to be made at all, it must be consummated before that date. Now, as
in the question concerning the preliminary acknowledgment of
independence, peace overruled all considerations of minor points.
[Note 84: Franklin's _Works_, viii. 305, 306.]
If this was indeed his end, he achieved it, for negotiations were now
zealously pushed. The important question of the western boundaries and
the navigation of the Mississippi was the especial concern of Jay. Spain
covertly wished to see the States worsted upon these demands, and
confined between the Alleghanies and the sea; and the Bourbon family
compact influenced France to concur with the Spanish plans. But in the
secret treating Jay prevailed. The fisheries were the peculiar affair of
Adams, as the representative of New England. France would fain have had
the States shut out from them altogether; but Adams carried the day.
Some concessions were made concerning the collection of debts owing in
the States to Englishmen, and then there remained only the matter of
indemnification to American royalists. Upon this the fight was waged
with zeal by all; yet Franklin had the chief responsibility to bear. For
there now arose to plague him that unfortunate proposition of his for
the cession of Canada and the restoration of confiscated Tory property
in the States. This encouraged the English and gave them a sort of
argument. Moreover the indemnification was "uppermost in Lord
Shelburne's mind," because, unlike other matters, it seemed a point of
honor. With what face could the ministry meet Parliament with a treaty
deserting all those who had been faithful to their king? It was indeed a
delicate position, and the English were stubborn; but no less so was
Franklin, upon the other side. With the great province of Canada as an
offset, or quasi fund, the States might have assumed such an obligation,
but without it, never. Further the American commissioners reiterated the
explanation often given: that Congress had no power in the premises, for
the matter lay within the sovereign jurisdiction of each State. This
argument, however, really amounted to nothing; for if the fact was so,
it behooved the States to give their agent, the Congress, any power that
was necessary for making a fair treaty; and England was not to be a
loser by reason of defects in the American governmental arrangements.
For a while it really seemed that the negotiation would be wrecked upon
this issue, so immovable was each side. As Vaughan wrote: "If England
wanted to break, she could not wish for better ground on _her_ side.
_You_ do not break, and therefore I conclude you both sincere. But in
this way I see the treaty is likely of _itself_ to break."
Franklin now ingeniously counteracted his earlier imprudence by reviving
an old suggestion of his, that immense claims might be preferred
against England on behalf of Americans whose property had been wantonly
destroyed, especially by the burning and plundering of towns, and he
actually presented an article providing for such compensation, and an
elaborate written paper sustaining it.[85] At last the Englishmen sought
final instructions from Lord Shelburne. He replied with spirit that it
should be understood that England was not yet in a position to submit to
"humiliation," least of all at the hands of Americans; but finally he so
far yielded as to say that indemnification need not be absolutely an
ultimatum. This settled the matter; the negotiators who _could_ yield
_must_ yield, and they did so. A sort of compromise article was
inserted: "that Congress should recommend to the state legislatures to
restore the estates, rights, and properties of real British subjects."
The American envoys knew that this was worthless, and the English
negotiators certainly were not deceived. But the article sounded well,
and gave at least a standing ground for the ministry to defend
themselves.[86]
[Note 85: Franklin's _Works_, viii. 218, text and note.]
[Note 86: It is not without interest in this connection to remark
that Franklin was very ill disposed towards the "loyalists," having
scant toleration for their choice of a party. For a man of his
liberality and moderation his language concerning them was severe. He
objected to calling them "loyalists," thinking "royalists" a more
correct description. To indemnification of their losses by Parliament he
had "no objection," for the damnatory reason that "even a hired assassin
has a right to his pay from his employer." Franklin's _Works_, ix. 133.
He often spoke in the like tone about these people. See, for example,
_Works_, ix. 70, 72. But when the war was over and the natural mildness
of his disposition could resume its sway, he once at least spoke more
gently of them. _Ibid_. 415.]
On November 30 the articles were at last signed, with the stipulation
that they were for the present merely preliminary and provisional, and
that they should be executed as a definitive treaty only simultaneously
with the execution of a treaty of peace between France and England.
The business was finished none too soon. In order to cover it the
meeting of Parliament had been postponed until December 5. The danger
which had been escaped, and which would not have been escaped had
Franklin had a less correct appreciation of relative values in the
negotiation, at once became apparent. The howl of condemnation swelled
loud in the House of Commons; it was felt that the ministry had made not
a treaty but a "capitulation." The unfortunate Shelburne was driven out
of power, pursued by an angry outcry from persons altogether incapable
of appreciating the sound statesmanship and the wise forecast of the
future advantage of England which he had shown in preferring to give
the colonies a chance to become a great, English-speaking,
English-sympathizing, commercial people, rather than to feed fat the
aspirations of France and Spain. These proceedings would have been good
evidence, had evidence been wanting, that the American commissioners had
done a brilliant piece of work. De Vergennes also added his testimony,
saying: "The English have bought the peace rather than made it."
If the original instructions given to Oswald are compared with the
treaty it will be found that England had conceded much; on the other
hand the Americans, with no ultimatum save independence, had gained in
substance all that they had dared seriously to insist upon. One would
think that Franklin, Jay, and Adams had fairly won warm gratitude at the
hands of their countrymen. Posterity, at least since the publication of
long suppressed private papers and archives has shown what powerful
occult influences were at work to thwart them, regards their achievement
with unlimited admiration. But at that time a different feeling
prevailed.
No sooner were the preliminary or provisional articles signed than
Franklin informed de Vergennes of the fact. That minister was much
surprised. He had been quietly biding his time, expecting to be invoked
when the English and the Americans should find themselves stopped by
that deadlock which he had done his best to bring about by his secret
intimations to England. He was now astonished to learn that England had
not availed herself of his astute suggestions, but had given terms which
the Americans had gladly accepted. The business was all done, and the
clever diplomat had not had his chance. At first he said nothing, but
for a few days pondered the matter. Then on December 15 he disburdened
his mind in a very sharp letter to Franklin. "I am at a loss," he
wrote, "to explain your conduct and that of your colleagues on this
occasion. You have concluded your preliminary articles without any
communication between us, although the instructions from Congress
prescribe that nothing shall be done without the participation of the
king. You are about to hold out a certain hope of peace to America,
without even informing yourself of the state of the negotiation on our
part. You are wise and discreet, sir; you perfectly understand what is
due to propriety; you have all your life performed your duties; I pray
you consider how you propose to fulfill those which are due to the
king."
Franklin found himself in a painful position; for he could by no means
deny that he had duties, or at least something very near akin to duties,
to the king, imposed upon him by numerous and weighty obligations which
at his request had been conferred upon him and accepted by him on behalf
of the American people. The violation of the instructions of Congress
gave to the secret treating too much the air of an insulting distrust,
of the throwing over a friend when he had been sufficiently used; for
whatever might be suspected, it could by no means be proved that de
Vergennes was not still the sincere friend which he certainly long had
been. This bore hard upon Franklin. The policy which in fact had been
forced upon him against his will by his colleagues was now made a
matter of personal reproach against him especially, because he was
persistently regarded as the head and front of the commission; no
European yet dreamed of considering any other American as of much
consequence in any matter in which Franklin was concerned. During long
years de Vergennes had been his constant and efficient adviser and
assistant in many a day of trial and of stress, and Franklin believed
him to be still an honest well-wisher to the States. Moreover it
actually was only a very few weeks since Franklin had applied for and
obtained a new loan at a time when the king was so pressed for his own
needs that a lottery was projected, and bills drawn by his own officials
were going to protest. All this made the secrecy which had been
practiced seem almost like duplicity on Franklin's part, and he felt
keenly the ill light in which he was placed. It is true that if he had
known then all that we know now, his mind would have been at ease; but
he did not know it, and he was seriously disturbed at the situation into
which he had been brought.
But his usual skill did not desert him, and his reply was aptly framed
and prompt. "Nothing," he said, "had been agreed in the preliminaries
contrary to the interests of France; and no peace is to take place
between us and England till you have concluded yours. Your observation
is, however, apparently just that, in not consulting you before they
were signed, we have been guilty of neglecting a point of _bienséance_.
But as this was not from want of respect for the king, whom we all love
and honor, we hope it will be excused, and that the great work which has
hitherto been so happily conducted, is so nearly brought to perfection,
and is so glorious to his reign, will not be ruined by a single
indiscretion of ours. And certainly the whole edifice sinks to the
ground immediately if you refuse on that account to give us any further
assistance.... It is not possible for any one to be more sensible than I
am of what I and every American owe to the king for the many and great
benefits and favors he has bestowed upon us.... _The English, I just now
learn, flatter themselves they have already divided us._ I hope this
little misunderstanding will, therefore, be kept a secret, and that they
will find themselves totally mistaken."
This letter in a measure accomplished its soothing errand. Yet de
Vergennes did not refrain from writing to de la Luzerne that "the
reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the
promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly;"
and he said that it would be "proper that the most influential members
of Congress should be informed of the very irregular conduct of their
commissioners in regard to us," though "not in the tone of complaint."
"I accuse no person," he added, "not even Dr. Franklin. He has yielded
too easily to the bias of his colleagues, who do not pretend to
recognize the rules of courtesy in regard to us. All their attentions
have been taken up by the English whom they have met in Paris."
So soon as the facts were known in the States expressions of
condemnation were lavished upon the commissioners by members of Congress
who thought that the secrecy as towards France was an inexcusable slight
to a generous and faithful ally. Livingston, as secretary for foreign
affairs, wrote to the envoys, commending the treaty, but finding fault
with the manner of attaining it. Jay, angered at the injustice of a
reproof which belonged more especially to him, drew up an exculpatory
statement. But Franklin, showing his usual good sense and moderation,
sought to mitigate Jay's indignation, drew all the sting out of the
document, and insisted upon leaving the vindication to time and second
thoughts. For his own part Franklin not only had to take his full share
of the reproaches heaped upon the commissioners for insulting France,
but upon the other hand he was violently assaulted on the quite opposite
ground, that he had desired to be too subservient to that power. Many
persons insisted that he "favored, or did not oppose," the designs of
France to rule out the States from the fisheries, and to curtail their
boundaries; and that it was only due to the "firmness, sagacity, and
disinterestedness" of Jay and Adams that these mischiefs were escaped.
Such were the fault-findings and criminations to which the diplomatic
complexities, which it was impossible then to unravel, gave rise.
Fortunately they were soon rendered mere personal and abstract disputes,
of little practical consequence, by the simultaneous execution of
definitive treaties by France and the United States with Great Britain
on September 3, 1783. Many efforts had been made to insert additional
articles, especially as to commercial matters; but they were all
abortive. The establishment of peace had exhausted the capacity of the
States and England to agree together; and the pressure of war being
removed, they at once fell into very inimical attitudes. So the
definitive treaty was substantially identical with the provisional one.
Franklin, after a while, finding that these charges of his having
preferred France to his own country were being reiterated with such
innuendoes as to bring his integrity into serious question, felt it
necessary to appeal to his colleagues for vindication. He wrote to them
a modest, manly letter,[87] and in reply received from Jay a generous
testimonial,[88] and from Adams a carefully narrow acquittal.[89] The
subsequent publication of Franklin's papers written at, and long before,
the time of the negotiation, shows that he was inclined to demand from
Great Britain fully as much as any American upon either side of the
ocean.
[Note 87: _Works_, viii. 340; and see _Ibid._ 353.]
[Note 88: _Ibid._ 350.]
[Note 89: _Ibid._ 354.]
In taking leave of the subject it is interesting to know that in point
of fact the secret action of the American commissioners was very nearly
fraught with serious injury to France. For when the States were
practically eliminated from active war by the signing of the provisional
articles, five members of Shelburne's cabinet were in favor of breaking
off negotiations with France, and continuing the contest with her.[90]
[Note 90: I have not endeavored to give a detailed account of this
negotiation, though the narrative would be very interesting, because it
finds its proper place in the life of _John Jay_ in this Series. In that
volume there is a very full and accurate presentation of this entire
affair, drawn from those sources which have only very recently become
public, and which go far to remove former questions out of the realm of
discussion.]
During the negotiation Franklin wrote to Laurens: "I have never yet
known of a peace made that did not occasion a great deal of popular
discontent, clamor, and censure on both sides, ... so that the blessing
promised to peacemakers, I fancy, relates to the next world, for in this
they seem to have a greater chance of being cursed." The prognostication
was fulfilled. The act which gave peace to the warring nations brought
anything but good will among the American negotiators. Jay was so just,
conscientious, and irreproachable a gentleman in every respect that he
escaped unvexed by any personal quarrel; moreover he was not so
distinguished as to have become the victim of envy and jealousy. But the
antipathy previously so unhappily existing between Franklin and Adams
became greatly aggravated, and their respective advocates in historical
literature have not to this day reached an accord. Adams was a
relentless hater, and has bequeathed bitter diatribes, which, as they
can never be obliterated, can never cease to excite the ire of the
admirers of Franklin. On the other side, Franklin has at least the merit
of having left not a malicious line behind him. I have no mind to
endeavor to apportion merits and demerits between these two great
foemen, able men and true patriots both, having no room for these
personalities of history, which, though retaining that kind of interest
always pertaining to a feud, are really very little profitable. Perhaps,
after all, the discussion would prove to be not unlike the classic one
which led two knights to fight about the golden-silver shield.
Yet one dispute, which has been long waged, no longer admits of doubt.
The suspicions of the good faith of de Vergennes which Jay first
entertained, which Adams adopted, and which Franklin rejected, were
undoubtedly correct. As the years go by and collections of private
papers and of hitherto suppressed public archives find their way to the
light, the accumulated evidence to this effect has become overwhelming.
Such being the case, it must be admitted that the vital merit in the
conduct of this difficult negotiation rests with Jay; that Adams has the
credit belonging to one who accepts a correct view when presented to
him; and that Franklin did more wisely than he knew in twice assenting
to a course which seemed to him based upon erroneous beliefs.
There is abundant evidence that from the very outset Franklin was not
less resolute than was Adams about the fisheries; and that he was in
perfect accord with Jay about the western boundaries and the
Mississippi; though Adams and Jay did most of the talking concerning
these subjects, respectively. When it came to the even more difficult
matter of the royalists, Franklin in turn took the laboring oar. So far
therefore as the three cardinal points of the negotiation were concerned
honors were very evenly divided. But the value of Franklin's
contribution to the treating is not to be measured either by his
backwardness in supporting Jay in certain points, or by his firm
attitude about boundaries, royalists, and fisheries. All these things he
had outlined and arranged with Oswald at an early stage in the
negotiating. Later he fell seriously ill and was for a long while in no
fit condition for work. Yet the treaty seemed to be made under his
auspices. In reading the great quantity of diaries and correspondence
which relate to the transactions, many a passage indicates the sense of
respect with which he was looked up to. The high opinion entertained of
his ability, integrity, and fair-mindedness influenced very powerfully
the minds of the English ministry and their envoys. "I am disposed,"
said Shelburne, "to expect everything from Dr. Franklin's comprehensive
understanding and character." The like feeling, strengthened by personal
confidence and regard, went far to keep de Vergennes from untimely
intermeddling and from advancing embarrassing claims of supervision.
Altogether, it was again the case that Franklin's prestige in Europe was
invaluable to America, and it is certainly true that beneath its
protection Jay and Adams were able to do their work to advantage. Had
they stood alone they would have encountered difficulties which would
have seriously curtailed their efforts.[91] It is truth and not theory
that Franklin's mere name and presence were sufficient to balance the
scale against the abilities and the zeal of both his coadjutors.
[Note 91: See, for example, Franklin's _Works_, viii. 29, 67, note,
69, 70, 77, 109, 112, note, 133, note, 260.]
It seems hardly necessary to endeavor to palliate Franklin's error in
failing to detect the duplicity of de Vergennes. On the contrary, it
would give a less agreeable idea of him had he been ready to believe so
ill of an old and tried friend. For years Franklin had been the medium
through whom had passed countless benefits from France to the States,
benefits of which many had been costly and inconvenient for the giver;
he had been treated with high consideration at this court, when no other
court in all Europe would even receive an American ambassador; he had
enjoyed every possible token of esteem and confidence both personally
and in his official capacity; he had ever found fair words backed by no
less fair deeds. In short, the vast mass of visible evidence seemed to
him to lie, and in fact did lie, all on one side. On September 13, 1781,
writing to the president of Congress, he said that de Vergennes had just
read to him a copy of the instructions prepared by Congress for the
commissioners, and that the minister "expressed his satisfaction with
the unreserved confidence placed in his court by the Congress, assuring
me that they would never have cause to regret it, for that the king had
the honor of the United States at heart, as well as their welfare and
independence. Indeed, this has been already manifested in the
negotiations relative to the plenipotentiaries; and I have already had
so much experience of his majesty's goodness to us, in the aids afforded
us from time to time, and by the sincerity of this upright and able
minister, who never promised me anything that he did not punctually
perform, that I cannot but think the confidence well and judiciously
placed, and that it will have happy effects." Every event in the history
of many years made it natural and right for Franklin to feel in this
way; and it surely was no cause for distrust that de Vergennes had had
the interest of France in mind as an original motive for aiding America,
when throughout the war Franklin had witnessed France straining every
nerve and taxing every resource to aid her ally, in perfect sincerity;
and when also, upon the suggestion of negotiations, he had just seen de
Vergennes adhere rigidly to his word to do no treating save collaterally
with the Americans, and refuse to take advantage of Grenville's efforts
to reach the Americans through the French minister. Even though de
Vergennes had disapproved the delay caused by Jay's objection to the
form of the commission, still he had honorably stayed his own
negotiation until that matter was favorably settled. Early in the
negotiations Grenville said to Franklin that the States owed no
gratitude to France, since she had in fact only promoted her own
interests. The remark excited Franklin's indignation, and he says: "I
told him I was so strongly impressed with the kind assistance afforded
us by France in our distress, and the generous and noble manner in which
it was granted, without extracting or stipulating for a single privilege
or particular advantage to herself in our commerce, or otherwise, that I
could never suffer myself to think of such reasonings for lessening the
obligation, and I hoped, and indeed did not doubt, but my countrymen
were all of the same sentiments." The words do his heart none the less
honor, because it has been since discovered that his confidence was too
implicit. In truth de Vergennes had been extremely scrupulous and
delicate throughout, in all matters which could fall within the
observation of the Americans. At the outset he said to Franklin: the
English "want to treat with us for you; but this the king will not agree
to. He thinks it not consistent with the dignity of your state. You
will treat for yourselves; and every one of the powers at war will make
its own treaty. All that is necessary is that the treaties go hand in
hand, and are all signed on the same day." Thus, to one who could
believe de Vergennes, everything seemed fair and sincere, and Franklin
at least had a right to believe de Vergennes.
Furthermore it was not until negotiations actually began that the
previous condition of French relationship, as Franklin had well known it
for many years, underwent a sudden and complete change. Then at last
were presented new temptations before which friendship and good faith
could not stand, and each nation, keeping a decorous exterior, anxiously
studied its own advantage. It was the trying hour when the spoils were
to be divided. The States themselves preferred the profit of their enemy
England to that of their half-friend Spain. Franklin did not appreciate
this quick turning of the kaleidoscope, with the instant change of all
the previous political proximities; in view of his age, his infirmities,
his recent experience in France, and his habitual generous faith in his
fellow men, this failure should give rise neither to surprise nor
censure.
***
In 1782, after signing the preliminary articles, Franklin a second time
sent to Congress his resignation. He received no reply to this
communication, and again, therefore, after the execution of the
definitive treaty, he renewed his request to be relieved. But still
Congress delayed. They wished to enter into commercial treaties with the
European nations, and in spite of the rebukes which their chairman of
the committee for foreign affairs had administered to Franklin, Jay, and
Adams, they now showed no readiness to remove these gentlemen from the
diplomatic service. Franklin accordingly remained in Paris, probably
with no great reluctance, for he was attached to the place and the
people, and his affection was warmly returned. It was a light labor to
conduct the negotiations for the desired commercial treaties. Sweden,
Denmark, Portugal, and even Morocco, all made advances to him almost
immediately after the signing of the treaty of peace. For the most part
he had the gratification of success. His last official act, just before
his departure from Paris, was the signature of a treaty with Prussia, in
which it was agreed to abolish privateering,[92] and to hold private
property by land and sea secure from destruction in time of war. It was
pleasant thus to be introducing his country to the handshaking, so to
speak, of the old established nations of the world. So his life glided
on agreeably. He was recognized as one of the most illustrious men
living; and to enjoy such a reputation in Paris in those days,
especially when it was supplemented by personal popularity, was to find
one's self in the enjoyment of all which the world could bestow to make
delightful days.
[Note 92: See letter to Hartley, Franklin's _Works_, viii. 287.]
In August, 1784, Jefferson arrived to assist in the commercial business.
But it was not until March, 1785, that Congress at last voted that
Franklin might "return to America as soon as convenient," and that
Jefferson should succeed him as minister at the French court. Jefferson
has borne good testimony to Franklin's situation, as he observed it. A
few years later, in February, 1791, he wrote: "I can only therefore
testify in general that there appeared to me more respect and veneration
attached to the character of Dr. Franklin in France, than to that of any
other person in the same country, foreign or native. I had opportunities
of knowing particularly how far these sentiments were felt by the
foreign ambassadors and ministers at the court of Versailles.... I found
the ministers of France equally impressed with the talents and integrity
of Dr. Franklin. The Count de Vergennes particularly gave me repeated
and unequivocal demonstrations of his entire confidence in him." When
Jefferson was asked: "C'est vous, Monsieur, qui remplace le Docteur
Franklin?" he used to reply: "No one can replace him, sir; I am only his
successor;" and we may be sure that the Frenchmen appreciated and fully
agreed with an expression of courtesy which chimed so well with their
own customs of speech. Later, in 1818, Jefferson wrote an interesting
letter concerning the calumnies from which Franklin's reputation still
suffered:--
"Dr. Franklin had many political enemies, as every character must
which, with decision enough to have opinions, has energy and talent
to give them effect on the feelings of the adversary opinion. These
enmities were chiefly in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. In the
former they were merely of the proprietary party. In the latter
they did not commence till the Revolution, and then sprung chiefly
from personal animosities, which, spreading by little and little,
became at length of some extent. Dr. Lee was his principal
calumniator, a man of much malignity, who, besides enlisting his
whole family in the same hostility, was enabled, as the agent of
Massachusetts with the British government, to infuse it into that
State with considerable effect. Mr. Izard, the doctor's enemy also,
but from a pecuniary transaction, never countenanced these charges
against him. Mr. Jay, Silas Deane, Mr. Laurens, his colleagues
also, ever maintained towards him unlimited confidence and respect.
That he would have waived the formal recognition of our
independence, I never heard on any authority worthy notice. As to
the fisheries, England was urgent to retain them exclusively,
France neutral, and I believe that, had they ultimately been made a
_sine quâ non_, our commissioners (Mr. Adams excepted) would have
relinquished them rather than have broken off the treaty. To Mr.
Adams's perseverance alone, on that point, I have always understood
we were indebted for their reservation. As to the charge of
subservience to France, besides the evidence of his friendly
colleagues before named, two years of my own service with him at
Paris, daily visits, and the most friendly and confidential
conversation, convince me it had not a shadow of foundation. He
possessed the confidence of that government in the highest degree,
insomuch that it may truly be said that they were more under his
influence than he under theirs. The fact is that his temper was so
amiable and conciliatory, his conduct so rational, never urging
impossibilities, or even things unreasonably inconvenient to them,
in short so moderate and attentive to their difficulties, as well
as our own, that what his enemies called subserviency I saw was
only that reasonable disposition which, sensible that advantages
are not all to be on one side, yielding what is just and liberal,
is the more certain of obtaining liberality and justice. Mutual
confidence produces of course mutual influence, and this was all
which subsisted between Dr. Franklin and the government of
France."[93]
[Note 93: Jefferson's _Works_, vii. 108.]
When at last, in the summer of 1785, Franklin took his farewell of the
much-loved land of France, the distinguished attentions which he
received left no doubt of the admiration in which he was held. Indeed,
many persons pressed him to remain in France, and three offered him
homes in their own families, telling him that not even in America could
he expect esteem and love so unalloyed as he enjoyed in France, and
warning him also that he might not survive the voyage. But he said: "The
desire of spending the little remainder of life with my family is so
strong as to determine me to try at least whether I can bear the motion
of the ship. If not, I must get them to set me ashore somewhere in the
Channel and content myself to die in Europe." When the day of departure
from Passy came "it seemed," said Jefferson, "as if the village had lost
its patriarch." His infirmities rendered the motion of a carriage
painful to him, and the king therefore placed at his disposal one of the
queen's litters, which bore him by easy stages to the seacoast. He
carried with him the customary complimentary portrait of the king; but
it was far beyond the ordinary magnificence, for it was framed in a
double circle of four hundred and eight diamonds, and was of unusual
cost and beauty. On July 18 he arrived at Havre, and crossed the Channel
to take ship at Portsmouth. The British government offset the
discourtesy with which it was irritating Mr. Adams by ordering that the
effects of Dr. Franklin's party should be exempt from the usual
examination at the custom house. His old friend, the Bishop of St.
Asaph, "America's constant friend," came to see him. So also did his
Tory son, the ex-governor of New Jersey, with whom a sort of
reconciliation had been patched up. He sailed with Captain, afterward
Commodore, Truxton, who found him a most agreeable companion.
Of all things in the world a sea voyage most induces to utter idleness,
and it is a striking proof of the mental industry of this aged man that
during the seven weeks of this summer passage across the Atlantic he
wrote three essays, which remain among his best. But he never in his
life found a few weeks in which his mind was relieved from enforced
reflection upon affairs of business that he did not take his pen in hand
for voluntary tasks. During the last eighteen months of his life in
Paris all the social distractions incident to his distinguished position
had not prevented his writing some of the best papers which he has
bequeathed to literature.