the policies of the Government had produced discontent not only with the
management of the war but with the war itself. And now Alexander H.
Stephens becomes, for a season, very nearly the central figure of
Confederate history. Early in 1864 the new act suspending the writ of
habeas corpus had aroused the wrath of Georgia, and Stephens had become
the mouthpiece of the opposition. In an address to the Legislature, he
condemned in most exaggerated language not only the Habeas Corpus Act
but also the new Conscription Act. Soon afterward he wrote a long letter
to Herschel V. Johnson, who, like himself, had been an enemy of
secession in 1861. He said that if Johnson doubted that the Habeas
Corpus Act was a blow struck at the very "vitals of liberty," then he
"would not believe though one were to rise from the dead." In this
extraordinary letter Stephens went on "most confidentially" to state his
attitude toward Davis thus: "While I do not and never have regarded him
as a great man or statesman on a large scale, or a man of any marked
genius, yet I have regarded him as a man of good intentions, weak and
vacillating, timid, petulant, peevish, obstinate, but not firm. Am now
beginning to doubt his good intentions.... His whole policy on the
organization and discipline of the army is perfectly consistent with the
hypothesis that he is aiming at absolute power."
That a man of Stephens's ability should have dealt in fustian like this
in the most dreadful moment of Confederate history is a psychological
problem that is not easily solved. To be sure, Stephens was an extreme
instance of the martinet of constitutionalism. He reminds us of those
old-fashioned generals of whom Macaulay said that they preferred to lose
a battle according to rule than win it by an exception. Such men find it
easy to transform into a bugaboo any one who appears to them to be
acting irregularly. Stephens in his own mind had so transformed the
President. The enormous difficulties and the wholly abnormal
circumstances which surrounded Davis counted with Stephens for nothing
at all, and he reasoned about the Administration as if it were operating
in a vacuum. Having come to this extraordinary position, Stephens passed
easily into a rôle that verged upon treason. ¹
¹ There can be no question that Stephens never did anything which in his
own mind was in the least disloyal. And yet it was Stephens who, in the
autumn of 1864, was singled out by artful men as a possible figurehead
in the conduct of a separate peace negotiation with Sherman. A critic
very hostile to Stephens and his faction might here raise the question
as to what was at bottom the motive of Governor Brown, in the autumn of
1864, in withdrawing the Georgia militia from Hood's command. Was there
something afoot that has never quite revealed itself on the broad pages
of history? As ordinarily told, the story is simply that certain
desperate Georgians asked Stephens to be their ambassador to Sherman to
discuss terms; that Sherman had given them encouragement; but that
Stephens avoided the trap, and so nothing came of it. The recently
published correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, however,
contains one passage that has rather a startling sound. Brown, writing
to Stephens regarding his letter refusing to meet Sherman, says, "It
keeps the door open and I think this is wise." At the same time he made
a public statement that "Georgia has power to act independently but her
faith is pledged by implication to her Southern sisters ... will triumph
with her Southern sisters or sink with them in common ruin." It is still
to be discovered what "door" Stephens was supposed to have kept open.
Peace talk was now in the air, and especially was there chatter about
reconstruction. The illusionists seemed unable to perceive that the
reëlection of Lincoln had robbed them of their last card. These dreamers
did not even pause to wonder why after the terrible successes of the
Federal army in Georgia, Lincoln should be expected to reverse his
policy and restore the Union with the Southern States on the old
footing. The peace mania also invaded South Carolina and was espoused by
one of its Congressmen, Mr. Boyce, but he made few converts among his
own people. The Mercury scouted the idea; clear-sighted and
disillusioned, it saw the only alternatives to be victory or
subjugation. Boyce's argument was that the South had already succumbed
to military despotism and would have to endure it forever unless it
accepted the terms of the invaders. News of Boyce's attitude called
forth vigorous protest from the army before Petersburg, and even went so
far afield as New York, where it was discussed in the columns of the
Herald.
In the midst of the Northern elections, when Davis was hoping great
things from the anti-Lincoln men, Stephens had said in print that he
believed Davis really wished the Northern peace party defeated,
whereupon Davis had written to him demanding reasons for this astounding
charge. To the letter, which had missed Stephens at his home and had
followed him late in the year to Richmond, Stephens wrote in the middle
of December a long reply which is one of the most curious documents in
American history. He justified himself upon two grounds. One was a
statement which Davis had made in a speech at Columbia, in October,
indicating that he was averse to the scheme of certain Northern peace
men for a convention of all the States. Stephens insisted that such a
convention would have ended the war and secured the independence of the
South. Davis cleared himself on this charge by saying that the speech at
Columbia "was delivered after the publication of McClellan's letter
avowing his purpose to force reunion by war if we declined
reconstruction when offered, and therefore warned the people against
delusive hopes of peace from any other influence than that to be exerted
by the manifestation of an unconquerable spirit."
As Stephens professed to have independence and not reconstruction for
his aim, he had missed his mark with this first shot. He fared still
worse with the second. During the previous spring a Northern soldier
captured in the southeast had appealed for parole on the ground that he
was a secret emissary to the President from the peace men of the North.
Davis, who did not take him seriously, gave orders to have the case
investigated, but Stephens, whose mentality in this period is so
curiously overcast, swallowed the prisoner's story without hesitation.
He and Davis had a considerable amount of correspondence on the subject.
In the fierce tension of the summer of 1864 the War Department went so
far as to have the man's character investigated, but the report was
unsatisfactory. He was not paroled and died in prison. This episode
Stephens now brought forward as evidence that Davis had frustrated an
attempt of the Northern peace party to negotiate. Davis contented
himself with replying, "I make no comment on this."
The next step in the peace intrigue took place at the opening of the
next year, 1865. Stephens attempted to address the Senate on his
favorite topic, the wickedness of the suspension of habeas corpus; was
halted by a point of parliamentary law; and when the Senate sustained an
appeal from his decision, left the chamber in a pique. Hunter, now a
Senator, became an envoy to placate him and succeeded in bringing him
back. Thereupon Stephens poured out his soul in a furious attack upon
the Administration. He ended by submitting resolutions which were just
what he might have submitted four years earlier before a gun had been
fired, so entirely had his mind crystallized in the stress of war! These
resolutions, besides reasserting the full state rights theory, assumed
the readiness of the North to make peace and called for a general
convention of all the States to draw up some new arrangement on a
confessed state rights basis. More than a month before, Lincoln had been
reëlected on an unequivocal nationalistic platform. And yet Stephens
continued to believe that the Northerners did not mean what they said
and that in congregated talking lay the magic which would change the
world of fact into the world of his own desire.
At this point in the peace intrigue the ambiguous figure of Napoleon the
Little reappears, though only to pass ghostlike across the back of the
stage. The determination of Northern leaders to oppose Napoleon had
suggested to shrewd politicians a possible change of front. That
singular member of the Confederate Congress, Henry S. Foote, thought he
saw in the Mexican imbroglio means to bring Lincoln to terms. In
November he had introduced into the House resolutions which intimated
that "it might become the true policy of ... the Confederate States to
consent to the yielding of the great principle embodied in the Monroe
Doctrine." The House referred his resolutions to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and there they slumbered until January.
Meanwhile a Northern politician brought on the specter of Napoleon for a
different purpose. Early in January, 1865, Francis P. Blair made a
journey to Richmond and proposed to Davis a plan of reconciliation
involving the complete abandonment of slavery, the reunion of all the
States, and an expedition against Mexico in which Davis was to play the
leading rôle. Davis cautiously refrained from committing himself, though
he gave Blair a letter in which he expressed his willingness to enter
into negotiations for peace between "the two countries." The visit of
Blair gave new impetus to the peace intrigue. The Confederate House
Committee on Foreign Affairs reported resolutions favoring an attempt to
negotiate with the United States so as to "bring into view" the
possibility of coöperation between the United States and the Confederacy
to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. The same day saw another singular
incident. For some reason that has never been divulged Foote determined
to counterbalance Blair's visit to Richmond by a visit of his own to
Washington. In attempting to pass through the Confederate lines he was
arrested by the military authorities. With this fiasco Foote passes from
the stage of history.
The doings of Blair, however, continued to be a topic of general
interest throughout January. The military intrigue was now simmering
down through the creation of the office of commanding general. The
attempt of the congressional opposition to drive the whole Cabinet from
office reached a compromise in the single retirement of the Secretary of
War. Before the end of the month the peace question was the paramount
one before Congress and the country. Newspapers discussed the movements
of Blair, apparently with little knowledge, and some of the papers
asserted hopefully that peace was within reach. Cooler heads, such as
the majority of the Virginia Legislature, rejected this idea as
baseless. The Mercury called the peace party the worst enemy of the
South. Lee was reported by the Richmond correspondent of the Mercury as
not caring a fig for the peace project. Nevertheless the rumor persisted
that Blair had offered peace on terms that the Confederacy could accept.
Late in the month, Davis appointed Stephens, Hunter, and John A.
Campbell commissioners to confer with the Northern authorities with
regard to peace.
There followed the famous conference of February 3, 1865, in the cabin
of a steamer at Hampton Roads, with Seward and Lincoln. The Confederate
commissioners represented two points of view: that of the
Administration, unwilling to make peace without independence; and that
of the infatuated Stephens who clung to the idea that Lincoln did not
mean what he said, and who now urged "an armistice allowing the States
to adjust themselves as suited their interests. If it would be to their
interests to reunite, they would do so." The refusal of Lincoln to
consider either of these points of view--the refusal so clearly foreseen
by Davis--put an end to the career of Stephens. He was "hoist with his
own petard."
The news of the failure of the conference was variously received. The
Mercury rejoiced because there was now no doubt how things stood.
Stephens, unwilling to coöperate with the Administration, left the
capital and went home to Georgia. At Richmond, though the snow lay thick
on the ground, a great public meeting was held on the 6th of February in
the precincts of the African Church. Here Davis made an address which
has been called his greatest and which produced a profound impression. A
wave of enthusiasm swept over Richmond, and for a moment the President
appeared once more to be master of the situation. His immense audacity
carried the people with him when, after showing what might be done by
more drastic enforcement of the conscription laws, he concluded: "Let us
then unite our hands and our hearts, lock our shields together, and we
may well believe that before another summer solstice falls upon us, it
will be the enemy that will be asking us for conferences and occasions
in which to make known our demands."
CHAPTER XI.
An Attempted Revolution
Almost from the moment when the South had declared its independence
voices had been raised in favor of arming the negroes. The rejection of
a plan to accomplish this was one of the incidents of Benjamin's tenure
of the portfolio of the War Department; but it was not until the early
days of 1864, when the forces of Johnston lay encamped at Dalton,
Georgia, that the arming of the slaves was seriously discussed by a
council of officers. Even then the proposal had its determined
champions, though there were others among Johnston's officers who
regarded it as "contrary to all true principles of chivalric warfare,"
and their votes prevailed in the council by a large majority.
From that time forward the question of arming the slaves hung like a
heavy cloud over all Confederate thought of the war. It was discussed in
the army and at home around troubled firesides. Letters written from the
trenches at Petersburg show that it was debated by the soldiers, and the
intense repugnance which the idea inspired in some minds was shown by
threats to leave the ranks if the slaves were given arms.
Amid the pressing, obvious issues of 1864, this project hardly appears
upon the face of the record until it was alluded to in Davis's message
to Congress in November, 1864, and in the annual report of the Secretary
of War. The President did not as yet ask for slave soldiers. He did,
however, ask for the privilege of buying slaves for government use--not
merely hiring them from their owners as had hitherto been done--and for
permission, if the Government so desired, to emancipate them at the end
of their service. The Secretary of War went farther, however, and
advocated negro soldiers, and he too suggested their emancipation at the
end of service.
This feeling of the temper of the country, so to speak, produced an
immediate response. It drew Rhett from his retirement and inspired a
letter in which he took the Government severely to task for designing to
remove from state control this matter of fundamental importance.
Coinciding with the cry for more troops with which to confront Sherman,
the topic of negro soldiers became at once one of the questions of the
hour. It helped to focus that violent anti-Davis movement which is the
conspicuous event of December, 1864, and January, 1865. Those who
believed the President unscrupulous trembled at the thought of putting
into his hands a great army of hardy barbarians trained to absolute
obedience. The prospect of such a weapon held in one firm hand at
Richmond seemed to those opponents of the President a greater menace to
their liberties than even the armies of the invaders. It is quite likely
that distrust of Davis and dread of the use he might make of such a
weapon was increased by a letter from Benjamin to Frederick A. Porcher
of Charleston, a supporter of the Government, who had made rash
suggestions as to the extraconstitutional power that the Administration
might be justified by circumstances in assuming. Benjamin deprecated
such suggestions but concluded with the unfortunate remark: "If the
Constitution is not to be our guide I would prefer to see it suppressed
by a revolution which should declare a dictatorship during the war,
after the manner of ancient Rome, leaving to the future the care of
reëstablishing firm and regular government."
In the State of Virginia, indeed, the revolutionary suggestions of the
President's message and the Secretary's report were promptly taken up
and made the basis of a political program, which Governor Smith embodied
in his message to the Legislature--a document that will eventually take
its place among the most interesting state papers of the Confederacy. It
should be noted that the suggestions thrown out in this way by the
Administration to test public feeling involved three distinct questions:
Should the slaves be given arms? Should they, if employed as soldiers,
be given their freedom? Should this revolutionary scheme, if accepted at
all, be handled by the general Government or left to the several States?
On the last of the three questions the Governor of Virginia was silent;
by implication he treated the matter as a concern of the States. Upon
the first and second questions, however, he was explicit and advised
arming the slaves. He then added:
Even if the result were to emancipate our slaves, there is not a man who
would not cheerfully put the negro into the Army rather than become a
slave himself to our hated and vindictive foe. It is, then, simply a
question of time. Has the time arrived when this issue is fairly before
us?... For my part standing before God and my country, I do not hesitate
to say that I would arm such portion of our able-bodied slave population
as may be necessary, and put them in the field, so as to have them ready
for the spring campaign, even if it resulted in the freedom of those
thus organized. Will I not employ them to fight the negro force of the
enemy? Aye, the Yankees themselves, who already boast that they have
200,000 of our slaves in arms against us. Can we hesitate, can we doubt,
when the question is, whether the enemy shall use our slaves against us
or we use them against him; when the question may be between liberty and
independence on the one hand, or our subjugation and utter ruin on the
other?
With their Governor as leader for the Administration, the Virginians
found this issue the absorbing topic of the hour. And now the great
figure of Lee takes its rightful place at the very center of Confederate
history, not only military but civil, for to Lee the Virginia
politicians turned for advice. ¹ In a letter to a State Senator of
Virginia who had asked for a public expression of Lee's views because "a
mountain of prejudices, growing out of our ancient modes of regarding
the institution of Southern slavery will have to be met and overcome" in
order to attain unanimity, Lee discussed both the institution of slavery
and the situation of the moment. He plainly intimated that slavery
should be placed under state control; and, assuming such control, be
considered "the relation of master and slave ... the best that can exist
between the black and white races while intermingled as at present in
this country." He went on to show, however, that military necessity now
compelled a revolution in sentiment on this subject, and he came at last
to this momentous conclusion:
¹ Lee now revealed himself in his previously overlooked capacity of
statesman. Whether his abilities in this respect equaled his abilities
as a soldier need not here be considered; it is said that he himself had
no high opinion of them. However, in the advice which he gave at this
final moment of crisis, he expressed a definite conception of the
articulation of civil forces in such a system as that of the
Confederacy. He held that all initiative upon basal matters should
remain with the separate States, that the function of the general
Government was to administer, not to create conditions, and that the
proper power to constrain the State Legislatures was the flexible,
extra-legal power of public opinion.
Should the war continue under existing circumstances, the enemy may in
course of time penetrate our country and get access to a large part of
our negro population. It is his avowed policy to convert the able-bodied
men among them into soldiers, and to emancipate all.... His progress
will thus add to his numbers, and at the same time destroy slavery in a
manner most pernicious to the welfare of our people. Their negroes will
be used to hold them in subjection, leaving the remaining force of the
enemy free to extend his conquest. Whatever may be the effect of our
employing negro troops, it cannot be as mischievous as this. If it end
in subverting slavery it will be accomplished by ourselves, and we can
devise the means of alleviating the evil consequences to both races. I
think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished
by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves
at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social
institutions ...
The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops
at all render the effect of the measures ... upon slavery immaterial,
and in my opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity
of this auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a
well-digested plan of gradual and general emancipation. As that will be
the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if
the enemy succeed, it seems to me most advisable to adopt it at once,
and thereby obtain all the benefits that will accrue to our cause....
I can only say in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted
should be adopted at once. Every day's delay increases the difficulty.
Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and
action may be deferred until it is too late.
Lee wrote these words on January 11, 1865. At that time a fresh wave of
despondency had gone over the South because of Hood's rout at Nashville;
Congress was debating intermittently the possible arming of the slaves;
and the newspapers were prophesying that the Administration would
presently force the issue. It is to be observed that Lee did not advise
Virginia to wait for Confederate action. He advocated emancipation by
the State. After all, to both Lee and Smith, Virginia was their
"country."
During the next sixty days Lee rejected two great opportunities--or, if
you will, put aside two great temptations. If tradition is to be
trusted, it was during January that Lee refused to play the rôle of
Cromwell by declining to intervene directly in general Confederate
politics. But there remained open the possibility of his intervention in
Virginia politics, and the local crisis was in its own way as momentous
as the general crisis. What if Virginia had accepted the views of Lee
and insisted upon the immediate arming of the slaves? Virginia, however,
did not do so; and Lee, having made public his position, refrained from
further participation. Politically speaking, he maintained a splendid
isolation at the head of the armies.
Through January and February the Virginia crisis continued undetermined.
In this period of fateful hesitation, the "mountains of prejudice"
proved too great to be undermined even by the influence of Lee. When at
last Virginia enacted a law permitting the arming of her slaves, no
provision was made for their manumission.
Long before the passage of this act in Virginia, Congress had become the
center of the controversy. Davis had come to the point where no
tradition however cherished would stand, in his mind, against the needs
of the moment. To reinforce the army in great strength was now his
supreme concern, and he saw but one way to do it. As a last resort he
was prepared to embrace the bold plan which so many people still
regarded with horror and which as late as the previous November he
himself had opposed. He would arm the slaves. On February 10, 1865,
bills providing for the arming of the slaves were introduced both in the
House and in the Senate.
On this issue all the forces both of the Government and the opposition
fought their concluding duel in which were involved all the other basal
issues that had distracted the country since 1862. Naturally there was a
bewildering criss-cross of political motives. There were men who, like
Smith and Lee, would go along with the Government on emancipation,
provided it was to be carried out by the free will of the States. There
were others who preferred subjugation to the arming of the slaves; and
among these there were clashings of motive. Then, too, there were those
who were willing to arm the slaves but were resolved not to give them
their freedom.
The debate brings to the front of the political stage the figure of
R. M. T. Hunter. Hitherto his part has not been conspicuous either as
Secretary of State or as Senator from Virginia. He now becomes, in the
words of Davis, "a chief obstacle" to the passage of the Senate bill
which would have authorized a levy of negro troops and provided for
their manumission by the War Department with the consent of the State in
which they should be at the time of the proposed manumission. After long
discussion, this bill was indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile a very
different bill had dragged through the House. While it was under debate,
another appeal was made to Lee. Barksdale, who came as near as any one
to being the leader of the Administration, sought Lee's aid. Again the
General urged the enrollment of negro soldiers and their eventual
manumission, but added this immensely significant proviso:
I have no doubt that if Congress would authorize their [the negroes']
reception into service, and empower the President to call upon
individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with
the condition of emancipation to all enrolled, a sufficient number would
be forthcoming to enable us to try the experiment [of determining
whether the slaves would make good soldiers]. If it proved successful,
most of the objections to the measure would disappear, and if
individuals still remained unwilling to send their negroes to the army,
the force of public opinion in the States would soon bring about such
legislation as would remove all obstacles. I think the matter should be
left, as far as possible, to the people and to the States, which alone
can legislate as the necessities of this particular service may require.
The fact that Congress had before it this advice from Lee explains why
all factions accepted a compromise bill, passed on the 9th of March,
approved by the President on the 13th of March, and issued to the
country in a general order on the 23d of March. It empowered the
President to "ask for and accept from the owners of slaves" the service
of such number of negroes as he saw fit, and if sufficient number were
not offered to "call on each State ... for her quota of 300,000 troops
... to be raised from such classes of the population, irrespective of
color, in each State as the proper authorities thereof may determine."
However, "nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize a change
in the relation which the said slaves shall bear toward their owners,
except by consent of the owners and of the States in which they may
reside and in pursuance of the laws thereof."
The results of this act were negligible. Its failure to offer the
slave-soldier his freedom was at once seized upon by critics as evidence
of the futility of the course of the Administration. The sneer went
round that the negro was to be made to fight for his own captivity.
Pollard--whose words, however, must be taken with a grain of salt--has
left this account of recruiting under the new act: "Two companies of
blacks, organized from some negro vagabonds in Richmond, were allowed to
give balls at the Libby Prison and were exhibited in fine fresh uniforms
on Capitol Square as decoys to obtain recruits. But the mass of their
colored brethren looked on the parade with unenvious eyes, and little
boys exhibited the early prejudices of race by pelting the fine uniforms
with mud."
Nevertheless both Davis and Lee busied themselves in the endeavor to
raise black troops. Governor Smith coöperated with them. And in the mind
of the President there was no abandonment of the program of
emancipation, which was now his cardinal policy. Soon after the passage
of the act, he wrote to Smith: "I am happy to receive your assurance of
success [in raising black troops], as well as your promise to seek
legislation to secure unmistakable freedom to the slave who shall enter
the Army, with a right to return to his old home, when he shall have
been honorably discharged from military service."
While this final controversy was being fought out in Congress, the
enthusiasm for the Administration had again ebbed. Its recovery of
prestige had run a brief course and was gone, and now in the midst of
the discussion over the negro soldiers' bills, the opposition once more
attacked the Cabinet, with its old enemy, Benjamin, as the target.
Resolutions were introduced into the Senate declaring that "the
retirement of the Honorable Judah P. Benjamin from the State Department
will be subservient of the public interests"; in the House resolutions
were offered describing his public utterances as "derogatory to his
position as a high public functionary of the Confederate Government, a
reflection on the motives of Congress as a deliberative body, and an
insult to public opinion."
So Congress wrangled and delayed while the wave of fire that was
Sherman's advance moved northward through the Carolinas. Columbia had
gone up in smoke while the Senate debated day after day--fifteen in
all--what to do with the compromise bill sent up to it from the House.
It was during this period that a new complication appears to have been
added to a situation which was already so hopelessly entangled, for this
was the time when Governor Magrath made a proposal to Governor Vance for
a league within the Confederacy, giving as his chief reason that
Virginia's interests were parting company with those of the lower South.
The same doubt of the upper South appears at various times in the
Mercury. And through all the tactics of the opposition runs the constant
effort to discredit Davis. The Mercury scoffed at the agitation for
negro soldiers as a mad attempt on the part of the Administration to
remedy its "myriad previous blunders."
In these terrible days, the mind of Davis hardened. He became possessed
by a lofty and intolerant confidence, an absolute conviction that, in
spite of all appearances, he was on the threshold of success. We may
safely ascribe to him in these days that illusory state of mind which
has characterized some of the greatest of men in their over-strained,
concluding periods. His extraordinary promises in his later messages, a
series of vain prophecies beginning with his speech at the African
Church, remind one of Napoleon after Leipzig refusing the Rhine as a
boundary. His nerves, too, were all but at the breaking-point. He sent
the Senate a scolding message because of its delay in passing the Negro
Soldiers' Bill. The Senate answered in a report that was sharply
critical of his own course. Shortly afterward Congress adjourned
refusing his request for another suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Davis had hinted at important matters he hoped soon to be able to submit
to Congress. What he had in mind was the last, the boldest, stroke of
this period of desperation. The policy of emancipation he and Benjamin
had accepted without reserve. They had at last perceived, too late, the
power of the anti-slavery movement in Europe. Though they had already
failed to coerce England through cotton and had been played with and
abandoned by Napoleon, they persisted in thinking that there was still a
chance for a third chapter in their foreign affairs.
The agitation to arm the slaves, with the promise of freedom, had
another motive besides the reinforcement of Lee's army: it was intended
to serve as a basis for negotiations with England and France. To that
end D. J. Kenner was dispatched to Europe early in 1865. Passing through
New York in disguise, he carried word of this revolutionary program to
the Confederate commissioners abroad. A conference at Paris was held by
Kenner, Mason, and Slidell. Mason, who had gone over to England to sound
Palmerston with regard to this last Confederate hope, was received on
the 14th of March. On the previous day, Davis had accepted temporary
defeat, by signing the compromise bill which omitted emancipation. But
as there was no cable operating at the time, Mason was not aware of this
rebuff. In his own words, he "urged upon Lord P. that if the President
was right in his impression that there was some latent, undisclosed
obstacle on the part of Great Britain to recognition, it should be
frankly stated, and we might, if in our power to do so, consent to
remove it." Palmerston, though his manner was "conciliatory and kind,"
insisted that there was nothing "underlying" his previous statements,
and that he could not, in view of the facts then existing, regard the
Confederacy in the light of an independent power. Mason parted from him
convinced that "the most ample concessions on our part in the matter
referred to would have produced no change in the course determined on by
the British Government with regard to recognition." In a subsequent
interview with Lord Donoughmore, he was frankly told that the offer of
emancipation had come too late.
The dispatch in which Mason reported the attitude of the British
Government never reached the Confederate authorities. It was dated the
31st of March. Two days later Richmond was evacuated by the Confederate
Government.
CHAPTER XII.
The Last Word
The evacuation of Richmond broke the back of the Confederate defense.
Congress had adjourned. The legislative history of the Confederacy was
at an end. The executive history still had a few days to run. After
destroying great quantities of records, the government officials had
packed the remainder on a long train that conveyed the President and
what was left of the civil service to Danville. During a few days,
Danville was the Confederate capital. There, Davis, still unable to
conceive defeat, issued his pathetic last Address to the People of the
Confederate States. His mind was crystallized. He was no longer capable
of judging facts. In as confident tones as ever he promised his people
that they should yet prevail; he assured Virginians that even if the
Confederate army should withdraw further south the withdrawal would be
but temporary, and that "again and again will we return until the
baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his endless and
impossible task of making slaves of a people resolved to be free."
The surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, compelled another
migration of the dwindling executive company. General Johnston had not
yet surrendered. A conference which he had with the President and the
Cabinet at Greensboro ended in giving him permission to negotiate with
Sherman. Even then Davis was still bent on keeping up the fight; yet,
though he believed that Sherman would reject Johnston's overtures, he
was overtaken at Charlotte on his way South by the crushing news of
Johnston's surrender. There the executive history of the Confederacy
came to an end in a final Cabinet meeting. Davis, still blindly resolute
to continue the struggle, was deeply distressed by the determination of
his advisers to abandon it. In imminent danger of capture, the
President's party made its way to Abbeville, where it broke up, and each
member sought safety as best he could. Davis with a few faithful men
rode to Irwinsville, Georgia, where, in the early morning of the 10th of
May, he was surprised and captured. But the history of the Confederacy
was not quite at an end. The last gunshots were still to be fired far
away in Texas on the 13th of May. The surrender of the forces of the
Trans-Mississippi on May 26, 1865, brought the war to a definite
conclusion.
There remains one incident of these closing days, the significance of
which was not perceived until long afterward, when it immediately took
its rightful place among the determining events of American history. The
unconquerable spirit of the Army of Northern Virginia found its last
expression in a proposal which was made to Lee by his officers. If he
would give the word, they would make the war a duel to the death; it
should drag out in relentless guerrilla struggles; and there should be
no pacification of the South until the fighting classes had been
exterminated. Considering what those classes were, considering the
qualities that could be handed on to their posterity, one realizes that
this suicide of a whole people, of a noble fighting people, would have
maimed incalculably the America of the future. But though the heroism of
this proposal of his men to die on their shields had its stern charm for
so brave a man as Lee, he refused to consider it. He would not admit
that he and his people had a right thus to extinguish their power to
help mold the future, no matter whether it be the future they desired or
not. The result of battle must be accepted. The Southern spirit must not
perish, luxuriating blindly in despair, but must find a new form of
expression, must become part of the new world that was to be, must look
to a new birth under new conditions. In this spirit he issued to his
army his last address:
After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and
fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to
overwhelming numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so
many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that
I have consented to the result from no distrust of them; but feeling
that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate
for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I
determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services
have endeared them to their countrymen.... I bid you an affectionate
farewell.
How inevitably one calls to mind, in view of the indomitable valor of
Lee's final decision, those great lines from Tennyson:
Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
There is no adequate history of the Confederacy. It is rumored that a
distinguished scholar has a great work approaching completion. It is
also rumored that another scholar, well equipped to do so, will soon
bring out a monumental life of Davis. But the fact remains that as yet
we lack a comprehensive review of the Confederate episode set in proper
perspective. Standard works such as the History of the United States
from the Compromise of 1850, by J. F. Rhodes (7 vols., 1893-1906), even
when otherwise as near a classic as is the work of Mr. Rhodes, treat the
Confederacy so externally as to have in this respect little value. The
one searching study of the subject, The Confederate States of America,
by J. C. Schwab (1901), though admirable in its way, is wholly
overshadowed by the point of view of the economist. The same is to be
said of the article by Professor Schwab in the 11th edition of The
Encyclopædia Britannica.
Two famous discussions of the episode by participants are: The Rise and
Fall of the Confederate Government, by the President of the Confederacy
(2 vols., 1881), and A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the
States, by Alexander H. Stephens (2 vols., 1870). Both works, though
invaluable to the student, are tinged with controversy, each of the
eminent authors aiming to refute the arguments of political antagonists.
The military history of the time has so overshadowed the civil, in the
minds of most students, that we are still sadly in need of careful,
disinterested studies of the great figures of Confederate civil affairs.
Jefferson Davis, by William E. Dodd (American Crisis Biographies, 1907),
is the standard life of the President, superseding older ones. Not so
satisfactory in the same series is Judah P. Benjamin, by Pierce Butler
(1907), and Alexander H. Stephens, by Louis Pendleton (1907). Older
works which are valuable for the material they contain are: Memoir of
Jefferson Davis, by his Wife (1890); The Life and Times of Alexander H.
Stephens, by R. M. Johnston and W. M. Browne (1878); The Life and Times
of William Lowndes Yancey, by J. W. Du Bose (1892); The Life, Times, and
Speeches of Joseph E. Brown, by Herbert Fielder (1883); Public Life and
Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason, by his Daughter (1903); The
Life and Time of C. G. Memminger, by H. D. Capers (1893). The writings
of E. A. Pollard cannot be disregarded, but must be taken as the violent
expression of an extreme partizan. They include a Life of Jefferson
Davis (1869) and The Lost Cause (1867). A charming series of essays is
Confederate Portraits, by Gamaliel Bradford (1914). Among books on
special topics that are to be recommended are: The Diplomatic History of
the Southern Confederacy by J. M. Callahan (1901); France and the
Confederate Navy, by John Bigelow (1888); and The Secret Service of the
Confederate States in Europe, by J. D. Bulloch (2 vols., 1884). There is
a large number of contemporary accounts of life in the Confederacy.
Historians have generally given excessive attention to A Rebel War
Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, by J. B. Jones (2
vols., 1866) which has really neither more nor less value than a
Richmond newspaper. Conspicuous among writings of this type is the
delightful Diary from Dixie, by Mrs. Mary B. Chestnut (1905) and My
Diary, North and South, by W. H. Russell (1862).
The documents of the civil history, so far as they are accessible to the
general reader, are to be found in the three volumes forming the fourth
series of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128
vols., 1880-1901); the Journals of the Congress of the Confederate
States (8 vols., 1904) and Messages and Papers of the Confederacy,
edited by J. D. Richardson (2 vols., 1905). Four newspapers are of first
importance: the famous opposition organs, the Richmond Examiner and the
Charleston Mercury, which should be offset by the two leading organs of
the Government, the Courier of Charleston and the Enquirer of Richmond.
The Statutes of the Confederacy have been collected and published; most
of them are also to be found in the fourth series of the Official
Records.
Additional bibliographical references will be found appended to the
articles on the Confederate States of America, Secession, and Jefferson
Davis, in The Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition.
INDEX
A
Alabama, represented at South Carolina convention, 3; secedes, 7;
convention, 8; situation in, 74, 114-120; iron for munitions from, 106;
questions of state sovereignty in, 116-119.
Alabama, The (ship), 53, 135, 139.
Anderson, Major Robert, transfers garrison to Sumter, 6; refuses
Beauregard's demands, 15-16; see also Sumter.
Antietam campaign, 53, 58.
Appomattox, surrender at, 201.
Arkansas, 14, 74, 112, 113, 114.
Arman, shipbuilder of Bordeaux, 132, 133, 135, 140, 143-144.
Army, composition and size of, 36-37; state armies, 38, 72; difficulty
of enlisting, 76; lack of shoes for, 77-78; desertion, 110, 120, 162,
166; surrenders, 201-202; see also Conscription, Military policy.
Ayer, L. M., of South Carolina, 88.
B
Baldwin, of Virginia, tells of martial law, 84.
Barksdale, Ethelbert, of Mississippi, 82, 84-85, 192.
Beauregard, General P. G. T., and the surrender of Fort Sumter, 15-24;
in Georgia, 148, 149.
Benjamin, J. P., signs To Our Constituents, 3; Attorney-General, 27;
Secretary of War, 34, 79 (note); Secretary of State, 34, 40; complaints
against, 40, 63-64; life and character, 69-71; denounces Napoleon, 144;
on extraconstitutional power, 185; attacked by Congress, 195; accepts
policy of emancipation, 197.
Blair, F. P., plan of reconciliation, 179-180.
Blockade, 51, 56, 77, 105.
Bocock, T. S., Speaker of House, 156.
Bonds, see Finance.
Boyce, of South Carolina, argument for peace, 175.
Bragg, General Braxton, plan to invade Kentucky, 44; attitude toward
press, 59; Davis's confidence in, 69; army conditions under, 96; resigns
command, 113-114.
Breckinridge, General J. C., Secretary of War, 79 (note).
Brown, J. E., Governor of Georgia, on secession, 5, 6-7; on
conscription, 65-66, 75-76; opponent of Administration, 145-149;
motives, 174 (note).
Bull Run, Battle of, see Manassas.
Bullock, Captain James, 135-136.
Butler, A. P., of South Carolina, 4.
C
Cabinet, 14-15, 27, 34, 40, 69.
Campbell, J. A., Confederate commissioner at Hampton Roads, 180.
Canada, Confederate agents in, 126-127.
Chancellorsville, 89.
Charleston, 15 et seq., 97.
Charleston Courier, 18, 21-22, 61-62, 94, 95, 97.
Charleston Mercury, describes siege of Sumter, 20; opposes
Administration, 33, 39, 43, 61-62, 95, 151, 152, 154; on conscription,
64; on Seddon's appointment, 79; on Impressment Act, 80; on Tax Act, 81;
on suspension of habeas corpus, 82-83, 85-86; issue of conduct of war,
89, 90; account of President's visit to Charleston, 97; on peace, 175,
180; doubts upper South, 196; on negro soldiers, 196.
Chattanooga, 113.
Chestnut, James, 18 (note).
Chevalier, Michel, 138.
Chickamauga campaign, 96, 113.
Clay, C. C., 127.
Cobb, Howell, 146, 154-155.
Cold Harbor, 126.
Columbia and Augusta Railroad Company, 152-153.
"Confederate Societies," 95.
Confederate States, provisional government organized, 10-11; status of
belligerent accorded by England, 35; clash with state authority, 38-40;
archives threatened, 42; period of elation, 43-44; foreign affairs, 46
et seq.; 130 et seq.; secrecy of government, 59, 60, 65, 66; divided
into separate units, 74; impotence of government, 160; anti-war factions
in, 165-167; war ended, 202; see also Davis, South.
Congress, Confederate, 9-11.
Congress, U. S., House committee of thirty-three, 2, 13.
Conscription, adopted, 37-38; constitutionality attacked, 39; Pollard's
criticism of enforcement, 64; correspondence of Davis and Brown on,
65-66; Rhett's opinion of, 73; opposition to, 75-77; exemptions, 102,
123-124; hiring of substitutes, 103; failure of State and Confederate
governments to coöperate, 116, 151; age limits, 122-123.
Constitution, Confederate, 10-11.
Corinth, 53.
Cotton, to solve financial problem, 45-46; necessary to English, 46;
effect of blockade, 51-57; powerless to coerce England, 56.
D
Danville, Confederate capital, 200.
Davis, Jefferson, signs To Our Constituents, 3; elected President in
provisional Government, 11; as President, 15, 24 et seq.; from
Mississippi, 29; born in Kentucky, 30; early life, 31-32; personal
characteristics, 32; military activities, 33; criticism of, 33-34, 43,
61-65, 89-90, 159-160, 175; President at first regular election, 34;
inauguration, 35-36; message to Congress (1862), 36; proposes
conscription, 37; vetoes Texas Regiment Bill, 38; clash with state
authority, 38-40; use of martial law, 40-42; at height of powers, 43;
shortcomings, 67-69; relations with Lee, 68; Cabinet, 69; personal
loyalty, 70; statecraft, 71; endorses "Confederate Societies," 95;
journeys during Administration, 96-97; message to Congress (1863), 114;
message to Congress (1864), 119-120; in Georgia, 144, 148-149; forced to
reorganize army, 163-164; confident of Confederate success, 182,
196-197; signs compromise bill, 198; Address to the People of the
Confederate States, 200-201; resolute to continue struggle, 201; capture
at Irwinsville, Ga., 201.
Davis, Mrs. Jefferson, quoted, 67-68, 163.
Davis, Reuben, quoted, 67.
Deserters, 110, 120, 162, 166.
Desperadoes, 111, 166-167.
Donelson, Fort, 36, 40, 58.
Donoughmore, Lord, Mason interviews, 199.
Draft, see Conscription.
E
Egypt enters cotton competition, 56-57.
Elmore, of Alabama, addresses South Carolina convention, 3.
Emancipation, 184, 197, 198; Proclamation, 53, 77.
England, attitude toward Confederacy, 35, 46-47, 54, 56, 198-199;
mission to, 46; effort to coerce, 51-52; Mason in, 52-53; cotton famine
in, 53; bitterness against, 77, 137-138; "Southern party," 135, 136;
shipbuilding investigations, 135-136; decides France's attitude, 142.
Erlanger, Émile, 54-56, 131, 133.
Exemptions, 102, 123-124.
F
Finance, 45, 48; specie seized, 49; "fifteen million loan," 49; war tax,
49-50; loans, 50; note issues, 50; "hundred million loan," 51; "Erlanger
bonds," 54-56; price fixing, 78; 79, 80, 90-91, 95; Impressment Act, 80;
tax in kind, 80-81, 91, 92, 125; licensing of occupations, 81, 91;
income tax, 81, 91; property tax, 81; Funding Act, 81 (note), 125;
financial breakdown, 157-158.
Florida, 7, 74.
Florida, The, Confederate cruiser, 139.
Floyd, J. B., U. S. Secretary of War, resignation, 5, 6.
Food situation, 77, 108-109, 160-161.
Foote, H. S., 29, 84, 178, 179-180.
Forey, General, dispatched to Mexico, 132.
France, see Napoleon.
France, Mexico, and the Confederate Slates, 138.
G
Georgia, 74; secession issue in, 4-8; state sovereignty in, 65-66,
75-76; unrest in, 94, 158, 172; invaded, 127-129, 145-150.
Gettysburg, Battle of, 88, 89.
Grant, General U. S., crosses Rapidan, 126; at Cold Harbor, 126.
H
Habeas corpus acts, 41, 59, 82-86, 116-118, 119-120; 122, 197.
"Heroes of America," 120-121.
Hindman, General T. C., 84.
Holden, W. W., of North Carolina, 93, 170-171.
Hood, General J. B., 129, 147.
Hooker, of Mississippi, 3.
Houston, Sam, Governor of Texas, 8-9.
Hunter, R. M. T., Secretary of State, 34, 69; in Senate, 177;
Confederate commissioner at Hampton Roads, 180; opposes levy of negro
troops, 192.
Huntsville (Ala.), 118-119.
I
Impressment Act, 80, 90-91, 159.
Index, The, Confederate foreign organ, 62 (note).
India begins to export cotton, 56.
Industries in the South, 105-107.
Ismail Pasha, 56, 57.
J
Johnson, H. V., 172.
Johnston, A. S., 42-43.
Johnston, General J. E., 69; succeeds Bragg in command, 114; lower South
demands removal of, 128; superseded by Hood, 129; appeals for
restoration of, 154, 156; restored to command, 164; surrenders, 201.
Johnston, Fort, 17, 20.
K
Kenesaw Mountain, 127.
Kenner, D. J., dispatched to Europe, 197-198.
Kentucky, 63; plan of Confederacy to win, 44.
L
Labor, 100-102, 152-153.
Laird rams controversy, 135-136, 137.
Lee, General R. E., inspires army, 43-44; to invade Maryland, 44; and
Davis, 68-69; demand of full command for, 154, 156; conspiracy to set up
as dictator, 155; made commanding general, 163; opinion of peace
project, 180; as statesman, 187-190; officers propose to continue
fighting, 202-203; address to army, 203.
Lee, Stephen, 18 (note).
Lincoln, Abraham, reëlection, 175, 178; conference at Hampton Roads,
181.
Louisiana, 7, 42, 74, 112, 113, 114.
M
McClellan, General G. B., 42, 127.
Magrath, A. G., Governor of South Carolina, 152, 153-154, 196.
Manassas, Battle of, 33; Second, 43, 59.
Mann, A. D., Confederate commissioner at Brussels, 46, 132-133, 142.
Martial law, see Habeas corpus. Maryland, plan of Confederate States to
win, 44.
Mason, J. M., capture of, 46; replaces Yancey as commissioner, 47; in
England, 52-53, 55, 198-199; in Paris, 137-138, 198.
Memminger, C. G., Secretary of Treasury, attempts to establish foreign
credit, 48; resigns, 157; see also Finance.
Mexico, 114; Napoleon III and, 131, 132-133, 134, 138, 139; Confederate
negotiations with, 139-140, 144; project condemned by French people,
143; expedition suggested, 179.
Military policy, 33, 43-44.
Mississippi, represented in South Carolina convention, 3; secedes, 7;
typical of new order in South, 29-31; sense of Southern nationality, 31;
status of, 74, 114-115.
Mobile Bay, capture of, 129.
Montgomery (Ala.), general Congress of seceding States at, 9-11.
Montgomery Mail, 162.
Moultrie, Fort, 6, 20.
Munitions, 33, 48, 61, 65, 105-106.
N
Napoleon III, offers mediation, 54, 77; intrigues with Confederacy, 130
et seq.; Italian policy, 134, 143; purpose exposed, 142; influence in
Mexican policy of the South, 178.
New Orleans, loss of, 42, 74.
New York Herald, 175.
Niter and Mining Bureau supplies powder for South, 106.
North Carolina, resolutions concerning Congress of seceding States,
9-10; against secession, 12; secedes, 14; state rights, 12, 39;
political life in, 74; protests tithes, 92; disorder in, 93-94;
anti-Davis tendencies in, 94; peace illusion in, 169-170; see also
Vance.
North Carolina Standard, 93.
P
Palmerston, Lord, British Prime Minister, Mason interviews, 198.
Peace, 93, 120, 121-122, 126-127, 169-170, 175-182, 202.
Peace Convention, 13.
"Peace Society," 121-122.
Peninsular campaign, 42, 59.
Perryville, Battle of, 53.
Petersburg (Va.), 107-108.
Pierce, Bishop, quoted, 109.
Pike, General Albert, 84.
Pollard, E. A., 62, 66, 69, 87; The First Year of the War, 62-64.
Porcher, F. A., 185.
Prentiss, S. S., 29.
Press, Freedom of, 59.
Preston, General J. S., 151.
Preston, General William, 140, 144.
Price-fixing, see Finance.
Profiteering, 78-79, 95, 108-109, 161-162.
Pryor, R. A., 13, 17-18 (note).
Pulaski, Fort, seized, 6.
Q
Quitman, J. A., 29.
R
Raleigh Progress, 93.
Ramsdell, C. W., The Confederate Government and the Railroads, cited,
108 (note).
Randolph, G. W., Secretary of War, 79 (note).
Refugees, 110-111.
Rhett, R. B., leader of secession movement of 1850-1851, 4; candidate
for President of Confederate States, 24; disappointment, 25, 26; on
state army, 72-73; retires, 87, 88-89; on arming the negroes, 184.
Rhodes, J. F., History of the United States, cited, 6 (note).
Richmond (Va.), capital of Confederacy, 34-35; martial law in, 41-42,
85; evacuated, 199.
Richmond Enquirer, government organ, 62, 82-83, 94, 95.
Richmond Examiner, opposition newspaper, 43, 62, 64-65, 80.
Richmond Sentinel, government organ, 94, 95, 161.
Richmond Whig, 80.
Rives, W. C., 155.
Roanoke Island, 36, 40, 63.
Roebuck, J. A., 136-137.
Rost, Confederate commissioner to Europe, 46.
S
Secession movement, 1 et seq.; of 1850-51, 3-4.
Secrecy of Administration, 59, 60, 65, 66.
Seddon, J. A., Secretary of War, 79, 112, 113, 147; resigns, 163, 180.
Selma (Ala.), foundry at, 105.
Seven Pines (Va.), 59.
Seward, W. H., at Hampton Roads conference, 181.
Sherman, General W. T., Georgia campaign, 126, 127-129, 150.
Slaves, 53, 167: not directly taxed, 91, 125; relation of Government to,
99-102; "Fifteen Slave" Law, 102-103; arming of, 183 et seq.; see also
Emancipation.
Slave-trade, African, prohibited, 11 (note), 99-100.
Slidell, John, capture of, 46; Confederate commissioner at Paris, 54;
and Napoleon, 130 et seq.; conference at Paris, 198.
Smith, G. W., 79 (note).
Smith, William, Governor of Virginia, 161, 186-187.
South, division in, 28 et seq.; life in, 99 et seq.
South Carolina, convention (1860), 2-4; secedes, 4; community of
aristocratic class, 28-29; question of state sovereignty in, 72;
political life in, 73-75; anti-Davis, 88; situation in 1864, 150-152;
passes State Conscription Act, 151.
Southern Advertiser, 117.
State sovereignty, 8, 12, 39, 56, 65-66, 71 et seq., 116-118, 169.
Stephens, A. H., leads opposition to secession, 7; on state sovereignty,
8; Vice-President in provisional Government, 11; a conservative, 27;
elected Vice-President at first regular election, 34; as central figure
in South, 172-174; on question of peace, 175-178; commissioner at
Hampton Roads conference, 180, 181.
Stephens, Linton, 76.
Substitutes, Hiring, 92, 103.
Sumter, Fort, 6; attack on, 14-23.
T
Taxation, see Finance.
Tennessee, 14, 74.
Texas, secedes, 7; secession issue in, 9; proposes regiment for home
defense, 38; last gunshots of war, 202; see also Trans-Mississippi.
Thompson, Jacob, 29, 127.
To Our Constituents, 2-3.
Toombs, Robert, gives information about Fort Pulaski, 6; a secessionist,
7; Secretary of State, 14, 27, 69; and Sumter, 14-15; candidate for
President, 24; leaves Cabinet, 34.
Trans-Mississippi, 74, 112, 113, 114.
Transportation, 107-108.
Tredegar Iron Works, 105.
Trenholm, G. A., 157.
V
Vance, Z. B., Governor of North Carolina, on military arrangements,
76-77; seeks to regulate prices, 78; proclamation to urge order, 93-94;
urges political changes, 154; reëlection, 170-171; policy, 171-172.
Van Dorn, General Earl, 44, 59.
Vicksburg (Miss.), 89-90, 96, 112-113.
Virginia, and secession, 11-14; calls Peace Convention, 13; political
life in, 74-75, 161, 186-187; see also Richmond.
Voruz, shipbuilder of Nantes, 140.
W
Walker, L. P., 34, 79 (note).
Walker, R. J., 29.
Wheeler, Joseph, 118.
Winder, J. H., 41.
Women, position in Confederacy, 104-105, 110-111.
Worth, Jonathan, 93, 169.
Y
Yancey, W. L., influence of, 25-26, commissioner to England, 25, 46, 47;
relieved by Mason, 47; incident at Havana, 47; attempts to abolish
secrecy of Government, 59-60; death, 87.
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Transcriber's Notes
Introduction:
The Chronicles of America Series has two similar editions of each volume
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