THE GREAT HARVEST
THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
German historians generally place the military aspects of the Napoleonic
wars so prominently in the foreground, that the economic aspects of
these wars are entirely overlooked. The Continental Blockade established
by Napoleon is considered as the only event of economic importance. The
truth is, however, that the military events were, to a much larger
extent than is generally supposed, determined by economic causes. Peez
and Dehn have reproduced an utterance of Lord Granville’s, which the
latter made in 1800 to the effect that Napoleon would derive from peace
considerable advantages to the commerce, trade, and manufactures of the
republic, whilst England would be left merely in its present situation.
The noble Lord should have added that the future prospects for England’s
commerce and industry would have been considerably less rosy, had peace
been maintained. Even Continental war—as we have seen again and
again—filled English barns and purses alike. But as soon as peace
returned, Europe recovered some of its strength, and endeavored to
satisfy its own wants by means of its own efforts.
France was immoral and criminal enough to flourish thanks to the
protection afforded by her tariff! Napoleon did not fulfil England’s
hope, that France would conclude with her neighbor at the other side of
the Channel a treaty of commerce profitable solely to the latter. In
general, Napoleon did not manifest the intention of placing his country
in the service of Albion. The English waxed terribly indignant at such
impertinence; and the entire nation was agreed that the power and wealth
of the immoral French people must under all circumstances be broken. The
most sacred rights of the Chosen People were menaced; and this implied,
of course, that the liberties of Europe were jeopardised. Noble England
wished to “save Europe from Napoleon.” Needless to say she wanted no
recompense—nay, she would even give of her own money for the purpose, in
order to induce as many European nations as possible to participate in
her glorious fight for liberty. The states which remained neutral sinned
against Europe; and England was obviously fulfilling the behests of
Providence in destroying their shipping and their industry. The time was
past, when there was any reason to fear “armed neutrality.” The English
fleets ruled the seas, and blockaded the French and Spanish coasts—in
fact, they blockaded, directly or indirectly, the entire Western coast
of Europe. In the Mediterranean, Malta had fallen into English hands.
Some years previously, Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign had failed. Its
failure was inevitable, because the French fleet was insufficient;
consequently the Egyptian Army was isolated, after Nelson had destroyed
the French squadron at Aboukir. The lack of success of the expedition to
Egypt signified a defeat of Europe at the hands of England. By way of
the Pyramids, and with India as his goal, Bonaparte had intended dealing
a heavy blow at Albion’s power. He would have succeeded, if it had not
been necessary for him to cross the Mediterranean. The matter would
to-day be much easier for a Power placed directly or indirectly in a
position to march from Turkish territory into Egypt. The analogy is a
remarkable and a timely one! In order to realise the plan, it would only
be necessary for the Turks to march against Egypt through the desert; or
else an European Power, finding the road through the Balkan Peninsula
open, would itself send troops to the Egyptian frontier via Turkey. If
these conditions should one day be realised, England would have no arms
wherewith to defend herself against the Continent; she would have no
means wherewith to defend Egypt and India, or her world-power in
general. She could fill the seas with her ships, she could bombard
coasting towns and sink the enemy’s vessels—but it would be of no avail.
Sea power is in the long run impotent, when it is limited to the surface
of the waters.
Napoleon’s unsuccessful Egyptian undertaking was not, at bottom, an
attack on England, but a measure destined to safeguard France’s position
in the Mediterranean. Nature has given France far more rights in those
waters than England. We must also remember that Great Britain, by a
series of wars of aggression, during which the European nations had been
forced to do her business for her, had driven France and French trade
from India.
Napoleon had failed in Egypt, but his determination to protect the
position and interests of France, at home and abroad, by all the means
in his power, against Great Britain—this determination was stronger than
ever. Never has a Continental monarch or statesman recognised so clearly
and completely the essence and the methods of English policy, as
Napoleon. He knew that, for England, trade is the beginning and end of
everything. He saw through all the masks and disguises which she had
always put on, from the very first day when she had begun to consider
Europe exclusively as a territory to be exploited in England’s
interests. He knew well the strength of his mortal enemy, and he knew
also that the French fleet could not, either as regards quantity or
quality, compare with the British. England, on the other hand, was aware
that Napoleon was capable of becoming a terribly dangerous foe on the
seas, if only she were to give him time. This is one of the chief
reasons why she left him no leisure, why she stirred up one war after
another against him, why she looked upon every day of peace as
constituting an increased danger for herself. Napoleon was likewise
acquainted with this fact; hence his efforts to establish peace in
Europe. He had recognised in England the firebrand of the Western world;
and he knew that she had systematically carried on arson as a trade for
the last 200 years. Unlike the statesmen of other European Powers, and
unlike a large number of Germans who, a hundred years later, fell from
the clouds of dreamland when England declared war on us in 1914—Napoleon
was to be deceived by no phrases or attitudes.
When England recommenced war in 1803, Napoleon resolved to attack the
hereditary enemy on his own soil—in other words, to cross the Channel
with an army of invasion. The plan, as is well known, was frustrated by
the battle of Trafalgar, when Nelson destroyed the allied fleets of
France and Spain. Henceforth was France’s chance of obtaining even a
temporary command of the Channel gone. What remained of the French navy
lay bottled up in the harbors of the Atlantic coast. We must not take
Napoleon’s boast, to the effect that “six hours’ command of the sea
would have made him master of the world,” too seriously. But on the
other hand, the possibility is not to be denied, that a landing might
none the less have been rendered feasible by a happy combination of
circumstances. The problem of landing troops in large numbers on English
soil was at that time much less complicated than it is to-day. The
sailing ships which formed the navy of friend and foe alike, were at the
mercy of wind and weather. Twenty-four hours without any wind might
possess decisive importance for the success of a landing expedition. The
speed of ships in those days was very small, and the range of their guns
was insignificant by comparison with that of modern artillery. Frigate
could only fight against frigate at a very short distance, whereas a
naval battle can to-day be fought while the vessels are a long way from
each other. Mines and torpedoes, submarines and airships, were then
unknown. When we take all the new methods of warfare into consideration,
it is evident that the transporting of troops over the Channel is to-day
infinitely more dangerous; and, on the other hand, it is far more
difficult to protect the transports. In addition to this, we must
recollect that large masses of troops would be required, in order to
permit a successful landing developing into a fruitful military
operation. The invading army must be sure of receiving reinforcements
without interruption; otherwise it would be infallibly doomed to early
perdition in the hostile country. An uninterrupted supply of
reinforcements presupposes lasting command of the Channel. Another
factor has also to be borne in mind: the population of Great Britain has
enormously increased during the last 110 years. The island is filled
with munitions of all descriptions. A large number of men capable of
bearing arms is available; and even if the overwhelming majority of them
have no military training, yet they are capable of shouldering a rifle,
and they know every corner of their country. Movements of troops in
England are easy to effect in this age of railroads, cables, and
telephones; and they can take place with a rapidity which would render
the ulterior development even of a successful landing operation a far
more difficult affair than it was in Napoleon’s time. As matters stand
to-day, there is no doubt that the population of England would form a
single vast body of franc-tireurs, who would carry on the war against
the invading army by all the means available, and to the bitter end.
These necessarily brief reflections show us that a landing of troops in
Great Britain is possible only if the invading Power possess, in one way
or another, effective command of the sea. If this be not the case, then
all plans of invasion are illusions—and illusions that are liable to
become a source of danger.
As to whether Napoleon really believed it possible to realise his plan
of invading England, after the French fleet had been destroyed at
Trafalgar is an open question. Did he think it possible to rebuild the
navy, and to train the necessary crews? We may consider it probable or
improbable, as we like. But at all events the feasibility of the plan,
from the military point of view, is incontestable.
The battle of Trafalgar made England the uncontested mistress of the
seas, and ensured for her that supremacy which she maintained up till
1914. When the epoch-making battle in Spanish waters, amidst the scenes
of former British piratical activity, was decided, Great Britain had
attained her object. She could now take everywhere what she wanted. No
one was in a position to oppose her, with the single exception of the
United States of America, her former colony. The importance of Trafalgar
was first properly appreciated at the end of the nineteenth century, and
it was then exaggerated by some writers. All historians are in agreement
upon one point: namely, that Napoleon’s chances of success were not
destroyed in Russia or at Waterloo, but at Trafalgar. This is none the
less doubtful; for Trafalgar did but give England the supremacy over the
seas, and frustrate for the time being Napoleon’s plan of invasion. If,
during the German War of Liberation in 1813, there had been no Blücher
nor Gneisenau, no Bülow, nor Yorck, but only generals such as
Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte, Napoleon would never have been defeated.
If the winter of 1812 had not been so abnormally cold, it is possible
that the Russian campaign might have ended differently. It is,
consequently, not exact to regard the battle of Trafalgar as alone
decisive in sealing the fate of Napoleon. Of course, England has never
ceased to represent Nelson and Wellington as the saviors of Europe,
which, it is said, they liberated from the “tyranny of the Corsican.”
The Continent was saved once more by England, who had spent “blood and
money” for the ideal of liberty, for the expulsion of the tyrant, and
for the maintenance of the principles of Legitimacy. Even to-day there
is no Englishman who does not consider it to be the sacred duty of every
European to accept this view of the matter.
Gourgaud and others tell us that Napoleon, at St. Helena, said that his
greatest mistake had been to believe it possible to unite permanently
all the nations of the Continent within a single empire. And here we
have certainly the nucleus of the whole question. It was this mistake
which caused Napoleon’s downfall. The forces inherent in every nation
would certainly have asserted themselves, at one time or another, with
elementary and irresistible violence, even without Trafalgar or the
Peninsular War. It was the consequences of the same mistake which gave
England her lasting victory. She would not have gained it, if Napoleon
had not endeavored to permanently crush and join together all the
peoples of Europe. Let us try and represent to ourselves France within
the boundaries traced for her by the Congress of Vienna, and governed by
Napoleon; after ten years of peace and systematic preparation, she would
have been in a position to fight England on the seas with every prospect
of success. A country possessing the coast and the natural wealth of
France would undoubtedly, if left in peace, have developed strength
enough to make her equal, if not superior, to Great Britain. This truth
is not often grasped at the present day; but Frederic the Great had
recognised it when he said how foolish it was of Louis XIV to make of
the Continent the center-point of his wars, instead of devoting all his
resources to fighting England. The great Prussian King admitted that the
methods of warfare adopted by the English were, from the standpoint of
the latter justifiable; the English concentrated their entire force on
the sea, and entrusted the European nations with the task of weakening
France on land. Napoleon would not have committed this error of Louis
XIV, for he knew England too well. His own mistake was that of believing
in the permanence of his conquests. Thanks to these conquests was
England able to find States ever ready to fight for English trading
interests.—What we have just said represents, of course, only the point
of view of France a century ago.
According to English writers and orators, Trafalgar is supposed to have
“saved Europe”! To-day, after more than a hundred years have passed, it
is possible to ask the question as to whether the consequences of
Trafalgar for Europe have in reality been so salutary. If we take the
view that Napoleon’s World-Empire would, for the reasons indicated by
Napoleon himself, have collapsed in any case one day or another; we can,
in truth, not discover a single consequence of Trafalgar which has been
favorable for the Continent. Trafalgar it was which ensured for England
the absolute supremacy on the seas.
When Napoleon had been compelled to give up his plan of invading
England, and to turn his attention to Austria, he knew that for the
immediate future he had no means wherewith to fight the Islanders
directly. English historians, and also Mahan, have rightly recognised
that everything henceforth undertaken by the Emperor against his chief
enemy was in the nature of enterprises embarked on _faute de mieux_.
This remark holds good of the Continental Blockade instituted by the
Berlin Decrees. The famous blockade is extremely interesting to
consider, for it shows us clearly the war between Napoleon and England
in its true light—namely, as a war between England and the Continent.
The fundamental idea on which the blockade was based, was derived from
the measures taken by the French Republic at the end of the preceding
century—measures, the object of which was to prevent the French market
from being overflooded by English goods. These measures were destined as
a counterblast to those taken (long before the French Revolution) by
England against enemies and neutrals alike. Such English blockades had
been organised in every single maritime war waged by England; their
object was, in part, to damage the trade of the adversary, but chiefly
to benefit her own trade and shipping. The weapon had been found so
useful, that the leaders of the Chosen People decided that they could
not apply it often enough. With a view to extending its application
still further, recourse was had to the “paper” blockades, wherever an
effective blockade could not be maintained.
The measures taken by the French Republic towards the close of the
eighteenth century, and which had been confined to France alone,
furnished Napoleon with the idea of the colossal European blockade
against English goods. A _conditio sine qua non_ of the success of that
blockade was that it should be applied _quod ubique et quod
omnibus_—that not a link should be missing in the vast chain of
prohibition. The English were cunning enough to understand this at once;
and they therefore directed all their efforts towards breaking as many
links as possible. The whole of the European coasts, from the Baltic to
Gibraltar and the Eastern Mediterranean, were declared to be closed;
they were to form a single impenetrable wall against all English
products. Napoleon employed also the Northern States for this
purpose—especially Denmark, who possessed the key to the Belt and the
Sound. Thereupon an English squadron suddenly appeared before Copenhagen
in 1807, and demanded of the absolutely neutral Danish State that it
should surrender its fleet! England pretended that she wished to take
the latter under her protection, and that she would give it back again
later on. Denmark refused; the English promptly bombarded Copenhagen
from the sea, and despatched also an army against the city. Denmark was
forced to capitulate; and the whole of her fleet, consisting of 33
ships, was taken over by the English Admiral, and brought to England.
The ships were all of them without crews; this proves beyond a doubt
that Denmark was attacked in the midst of peace, and had no intention of
abandoning her neutrality. As to whether Napoleon would have induced
Denmark to abandon her neutrality later on, is another question. He had
just come to an agreement with Czar Alexander I at Tilsit, and had drawn
up with him the outlines of a sort of general partition of Europe.
According to this scheme, Denmark was to be granted a considerable
increase of territory at the expense of Northern Germany, in the event
of her allying herself with France. Thus it was intended to make an
offer to Denmark; but there was not the slightest evidence of any
intention on the part of the latter to give up her neutrality, much less
of any hostile preparations. Denmark was wholly defenceless when
attacked by England, and this attack was nothing but a vile and
dastardly act of brigandage. England, at the same time, stole Heligoland
from the Danes, and the island became a basis of operations for the
English smugglers on the North Sea-coast.
The crime of Copenhagen was in so far profitable to Napoleon, that it
obliged Russia to declare war on England. After the seizure of the
Danish fleet, the Baltic was at the mercy of the English; whereas up
till now Russia and Denmark had been united by the bonds of a natural
solidarity, resulting from their respective geographical positions. But
Russia’s efforts to repair the breach made in the wall erected against
English importations, were vain. A second breach was made in the wall in
the South. Napoleon’s unskilful and psychologically false treatment of
the Spanish nation caused a guerilla war to break out in the Peninsula.
This war has become celebrated; but what is less well known, is that
Spanish blood was shed in order to further English interests. Spain was
ruined, her soil devastated; and when Napoleon’s power in the country
was definitely broken, the latter found itself tied hand and foot to
England, dependent on English industry and English financial assistance.
At the very moment when England hypocritically pretended to be fighting
in Spain “for Spain and Europe”—at that very moment she achieved the
last, decisive victory over the land of Cervantes, and trampled the
erstwhile greatest nation of the West under foot. The same fate had
previously overtaken England’s vassal Portugal.
Napoleon’s intentions were evident: Spain was for him but a means
wherewith to fight England on the Continent. The Spanish and Portuguese
coasts were to be closed to English products, as much as the Northern
ones were. Napoleon likewise intended taking Gibraltar by means of a
land attack. Viewed as a whole, the plan was at once a bold and a simple
one: England was to be completely ostracised, and all possibility of
selling anything to the Continent was to be withdrawn from her. Napoleon
thought that the English would not be able to hold out for long under
such circumstances—riots would break out, money would be scarce, etc.
The immediate “preventive” measures taken by England against Denmark,
Spain, and Portugal, showed that the British Government by no means
underestimated the possible consequences of the European blockade. The
Continental nations, for Napoleon, were so many instruments to be used
in fighting England; the latter, on the other hand, used them as weapons
against the French Emperor. But amidst all political changes, the
Continent remained, for England, the territory to be exploited in the
interests of her trade. The more the Continent was devastated and
impoverished, the better it was for Albion; for thereby was the market
assured for British producers. And when British warships captured or
sunk the vessels of those States which were compelled reluctantly to
obey Napoleon’s orders—this was, of course, done in the interests of
“European freedom.”
The Franco-Russian friendship did not last long, after having reached
its culminating point at the Congress of Erfurt in 1807. The two
Emperors had progressed further with their scheme for the partition of
Europe; but they had not, apparently, come to an agreement regarding
Constantinople. Then came Talleyrand’s betrayal of both Russia and
England. When the separation of Russia and France finally took place,
the Continental Blockade was at an end. None the less did England
continue her old system; and, in 1809, she managed to drive
Austria-Hungary into a war which ended disastrously, seeing that Austria
was not ready, and had to stand up alone against France and Russia. It
is possible that England may have feared a rapprochement between Austria
and the two last-mentioned Powers; but it was in any case not creditable
for the Austrian diplomatists, that they should have allowed themselves,
after so many experiences, to be once more made the puppets of England.
However, with the exception of Russia, no Continental Power had reason
to be proud of its diplomatists!
In view of the war raging at the present day, it is not without interest
to examine briefly the organisation of the struggle between Napoleon and
England, from the technical and military standpoint.
Napoleon thought it possible to bring about the economic downfall of
Great Britain; he therefore forbade all the countries under his sway or
influence to do any trade with the latter. An army of French officials
was placed all along the coasts—in fact, a main characteristic of the
Continental Blockade was, that it existed solely on land, and not on the
seas, which would have been the normal way of doing things. But England
ruled the seas in the fullest sense of the word, and herein lay _ab
initio_ an important source of weakness for the whole undertaking; for
it was impossible to close up effectively so long and irregular a coast.
Napoleon himself admitted that not the smallest fishing-boat could go
out to sea, without the English capturing it. The British Government, by
way of reprisals, blockaded every port in which the Berlin Decrees were
enforced. It further prohibited all neutral ships from trading with such
ports; at least neutral ships could only obtain permission to do so, if
they had beforehand visited a British port, where they had to pay a
heavy duty and to take a cargo of English goods on board. Consequently
did every neutral ship which entered a Continental harbor “break” the
French blockade. Napoleon replied by ordering the confiscation of all
neutral vessels which thus complied with the English regulations. Later
on another step in the same direction was taken, and all English goods
found on the continent were seized. We need not dwell upon the
consequences of all these measures for the sea trade. The French
shipping trade, which had re-flourished in spite of all wars,
disappeared completely with the exception of an insignificant coasting
trade. France was cut off from her colonies, and the latter were
compelled to purchase all the goods and foodstuffs they needed from the
United States. Owing to the interruption of all communications with her
colonies, France lost the lucrative colonial produce trade, which had
been hers down to the time of the English blockade.
The Continental blockade was not without creating difficulties for
England; in the first place, enormous quantities of unsaleable goods
were accumulated in the country; on the other hand, the raw material,
which Great Britain imported from Europe, arrived only in extremely
small quantities. Trade and industry suffered naturally, but the groans
that could be heard were much louder than the sufferings in question
were great. The English seized every opportunity to let themselves
appear as the martyrs to the cause of Europe; whereas, in reality, the
Continent was enduring martyrdom for the sake of England’s greed.
England was in the position of a rich and dishonest partner, who
willingly risks a large sum in an enterprise, because his experience
tells him that the business to be done, and which will ruin his
associates, will bring him in colossal profits. The harvest is some
little time in coming, and in the meantime matters do not always go
smoothly; so he groans and whines, in order to make believe that he is
undergoing agony, and that he is honest.
The English smuggling system was carried on on the very largest scale;
in addition to this, there came the port duties on neutral ships, of
which we have already spoken. In passing, we may observe that these port
duties imposed on neutral vessels show with particular clearness the
measurelessly arbitrary methods of dealing with foreign trade, adopted
by Great Britain. She even went farther still: the same ships, on
returning to their home across the seas, were obliged to call at an
English port and to submit to being searched. As a matter of fact, the
poor neutral countries have not been treated any better during the
present war. But this is by the way. The main consideration for England
was, not to impede neutral shipping, but to destroy it. The effect of
the English blockade on the German States, can best be understood if we
give a few examples. Owing to the blockade of the Hanoverian coast and
of the mouth of the Elbe, the Silesian linen industry was almost
entirely destroyed. The linen could no longer be exported by way of
Hamburg; and the exporting of it through other ports proved so
expensive, that foreign countries—especially England, America, and
Spain—were obliged to seek a cheaper source of production. Prussia, who
was entirely impotent, and whose statesmen were simple enough to suppose
that the destruction of one of the leading industries of the country was
not desired by England—Prussia protested in London against the closing
of the Elbe. The same fate overtook Prussia’s woollen export trade.
Later on, after the fall of Napoleon, when the blockades disappeared and
shipping became free again, Prussian industry found all its markets
absorbed by English industry. In addition to all this, England was at
that time the only Power possessing a trading fleet; with the result
that the European States had to pay her a further tribute in the shape
of freight. The through transit from South to North Germany ceased
altogether. In the whole of Germany the standard of living diminished,
the State revenues sank in a truly disquieting manner, and everything
was at a low level. The genius of Napoleon discovered, for France and
the conquered countries, means whereby industry and commerce attained a
surprising development in a short time. He also lessened, for these
regions, the inevitable hardships inflicted by the blockade, by awarding
so-called licences; he subventioned, in the most difficult days,
industrial undertakings with cash, and in this way succeeded in creating
a prosperity which exerted its salutary influence on various branches of
industry and trade in Germany. But precisely these branches were
subsequently ruined after the break-up of the Continental system and the
fall of Napoleon; for then the vast quantities of goods accumulated in
England overflooded the European, and especially the German, markets,
and effectively crushed all competition.
English politicians of those days, and also later on, often raised their
eyes piously to Heaven, and declared sanctimoniously that God had been
exceedingly good to England; for He had permitted her to become ever
richer and richer, and had saved her from the fury of war which had
devastated the unfortunate continental countries. There was, certainly,
a certain depression among English business-men at times, during the
Continental Blockade. This is comprehensible; for all business-men are
not equally far-sighted, neither are they always strong-minded. The
tests to which they were put, were often hard; and if Napoleon had been
in a position permanently and absolutely to close all the coasts of
Europe, it may well be doubted whether England could have survived. The
Continent, on the other hand, would have been able to do so, had
Napoleon not abandoned his principle of ruining the States subjugated by
him—and notably Prussia—for the benefit of France.
The War of Liberation resulted in the yoke, which Napoleon had imposed
on Europe, being thrown off. The European nations were once more free.
In those days, when the national spirit, long held in check, rose again
unfettered, they knew not that another yoke had been laid upon them, the
weight of which they were soon destined to feel—and to feel more and
more with each advancing year: namely, the yoke formed by Great
Britain’s industry, and by her uncontested command of the seas. The
position of England, alike as an European and as a World-Power, was
indeed, at the time of the War of Liberation, an unique one. The
Continent, to a large extent a mere series of battlefields, had been
completely ruined by loss of life, by economic impoverishment, by
political anarchy. An extraordinary wave of idealism had permitted the
poorest of all continental countries, Prussia, to accomplish the most
difficult of all tasks. Prussia fought for liberty, and sacrificed
everything for it. The land of the Chosen People had not been profaned
by the presence of the enemy. England had suffered scarcely any loss of
life during the Napoleonic wars, outside that of some hundreds of men in
the naval battles. Very few English had fought on the Continent—but all
the more Germans! In Spain, England had made the Spaniards fight,
besides the Germans. From a military point of view, in fact, England had
done nothing at all. An expedition which she had despatched to Antwerp,
failed miserably in its attempt to take the city. But even in this case,
the British Government could truly say that everything necessary had
been done to save the precious blood of Englishmen.
Napoleon had not, from the outset, menaced the existence of England as
an independent Power and as a seafaring nation. His attempts to effect a
landing in the island, and subsequently to exhaust the resources of the
English by means of the Continental Blockade, were purely defensive
measures. England it was who began the attack on France, for reasons
which—as is always the case with such English attacks—were based on
trading interests. It was in order to consolidate and develop her empire
of the seas that England continually fanned the flames of war in Europe
during twenty years—and at the end of that time she came proudly forward
as the “liberator of Europe”! The simple-minded Germans believed it; and
there are some who still believe it to-day. Innumerable historical works
prove this, and endeavor to make out that we owe an incalculable debt of
thanks to England for having safeguarded the liberty of the nations.
There is, in fact, a legend circulated in Germany, to the effect that
the English of those days were entirely different to their descendants
to-day. Other people, again, are of opinion that the “golden age” of
liberty-loving Britain came to an end with the wars of the Revolution;
but they are firmly convinced that such an age existed prior to that
date. The one view is as erroneous as the other. The methods and aims of
the English nation have remained exactly the same, from the day when
England, as an “island,” was definitely differentiated from the
“Continent”—when, in consequence, the egotistical interests of the
former entered into conflict with the interests of Europe.