“WE HAVE CONQUERED CANADA IN GERMANY”
FREDERIC THE GREAT AND ENGLAND
William Pitt was one of the greatest statesmen that England ever
produced, he was a man whom people never tire of praising for his
noble-heartedness. Around the middle of the eighteenth century he
expressed himself as follows: “France is chiefly ... to be dreaded by us
in the light of a maritime and commercial power.... All that we gain on
this system is fourfold to us by the loss which ensues to France....
Surrender (of St. Pierre and Miquelon) would enable her to recover her
marine.” This was, therefore, the point of view of that noble-hearted
statesman, in whose opinion not nearly enough loss and humiliation had
been inflicted on France. What England considered to be most
particularly advantageous was the loss suffered by her rival. This was
after the war of the Austrian Succession, during which England had
employed Austria against France, according to her usual methods. Whilst
France was busy with the war on land, England captured enormous booty on
sea. Mahan tells us that the commerce of all three nations—France,
Holland, and England—had suffered enormously; “but,” he continues, “the
balance of prizes in favor of Great Britain was estimated at
£2,000,000.... France was forced to give up her conquests for want of a
navy, and England saved her position by her sea power, though she had
failed to use it to the best advantage.” Mahan’s last statement is
correct, but this was more than compensated for by the fact that England
possessed obliging Continental Allies, who took upon themselves to
weaken France. As usual it was England’s chief partner, i. e., Austria,
who did the worst business; she lost Silesia, and a large part of
Northern Italy (which she surrendered to the King of Sardinia); and she
was compelled, as the result of these losses, to enter into her alliance
with France.
While these sudden and unforeseen changes were taking place in the
political system of Europe, English ships were chasing the French ones,
and finally forced, by their unceasing attacks and vexations, the King
of France to declare war.
This brings us to the part played by England in the Seven Years’ War. In
the opinion of the English statesmen, the moment had come to complete
the theft of the French Colonial Empire. Too much had also remained of
the French trading fleet. Six months before the declaration of war an
English fleet sailed into the Bay of Biscay, and did not leave it before
capturing 300 French trading ships, worth $6,000,000. Subsequently
England blockaded the French coasts, and captured all the
ships—belligerent or neutral—bound for French ports. Not only did the
English recognise that the time of the harvest had come, but, with the
unerring instinct of the bandit, they determined to reap the maximum.
Frederic the Great waged with true heroism a long and desperate war on
the Continent, in which he earned for himself immortal fame; only with
great difficulty did he manage to safeguard the frontiers of his
country, whereas England filled, thanks to him, the pockets of her
shopkeepers. “Without the victories of the Prussian grenadiers there
would be to-day no English world-trade”: such is the verdict of
Schmoller.
Frederic the Great was obliged to ally himself with England, and to
accept English subsidies. He was fighting for the existence of Prussia,
England—as usual—for her own purse; she knew that the subsidies were in
the nature of an investment yielding immense profits. The result of the
war was that England received Canada and Florida, besides the whole of
the United States east of the Mississippi. Spain received from France
the territory west of that river. In India, France renounced the right
of exerting political influence. England’s aim had been realised. Her
booty on sea and oversea was colossal; whereas the Continental nations
were exhausted by the loss of blood and money, and the distribution of
territory in Europe remained almost the same as it had been previously.
It is interesting to notice what Frederic the Great thought about his
ally, England, during the Seven Years’ War. It was clear to him, from
the beginning, that England, if she wanted to do so, could render him
very efficacious assistance—all the more so as Frederic had recognised
the great error committed by France in giving up the fundamental
principle of the policy she had hitherto pursued: namely, the energetic
carrying on of the maritime war with England. Under these circumstances
it was much easier for the latter to come to Prussia’s help. “Nothing,”
we read, “was of greater importance to the King of Prussia at this time,
than the news of the English preparations for a Continental war.”
History tells us what became of all these preparations.
Frederic’s verdict concerning the part played by England is well known,
and he has himself put it on paper: “When she concluded peace with
France, England sacrificed Prussia’s interests in the most shameless
manner. She then committed an even more disgraceful breach of faith. She
offered Austria the re-conquest of Silesia, and in return for this
humiliation inflicted on Prussia the Court of Vienna was to be allowed
to resume its former friendly relations with England. As if all this
treachery were not yet enough, English diplomacy was busy in St.
Petersburg trying to stir up a feud between the King of Prussia and Czar
Peter III. So much malignity and so much open hostility destroyed all
the links once uniting Prussia and England. The alliance, which common
interests had concluded, was replaced by bitter enmity and intense
hatred.” From the very beginning of the war Frederic had rightly desired
that England should send a fleet into the Baltic and bombard the port of
Cronstadt. He attached the greatest value to such a manœuvre. But
“England ruled the ocean and all the other seas; she cared,
consequently, nothing for the Baltic or the Sound. She attached little
importance to the measures taken by the three Northern Powers, whose
ships barred the entrance to the Baltic. The English Admirals had taken
Cape Breton (at the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence), and had
occupied the island of Gorea (on the African coast). India offered them
every opportunity for conquests; and they would have had none on the
coasts of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.
“The great successes of the English in no wise diminished the weight of
the burden borne by the King of Prussia, any more than they safeguarded
his throne. He asked them in vain for a fleet to protect his Baltic
ports, which were menaced alike by Russia and Sweden. The overweeningly
arrogant English nation, which has hitherto been uniformly favored by
luck, and which considers exclusively its own business interests,
despised its allies as if they were mercenaries. England was perfectly
indifferent to everything outside trade. Neither Parliament nor people
paid the smallest attention either to the war in Germany or to Prussian
interests. Everything that was not English was looked down on. The
English were, in fact, such unreliable allies that they even stood in
the way of the King during the negotiations, when common decency would
have required them to support him.” Frederic was here referring to his
efforts to conclude an alliance with the Sublime Porte, in view of
inducing Turkey to march against Austria. England obstructed these
negotiations by all the means at her disposal, because she feared that
an increase of Prussian influence in the Near East would entail an
increase of Prussian trade.
Such was Frederic’s opinion of his English allies, whose help he had
been forced to accept owing to the extremely unfavorable circumstances
in which he was placed. We will ourselves complete the information
imparted by the Prussian King: during the war, and especially towards
its close, England endeavored to negotiate with all the enemies of
Prussia—not only with Austria and Russia, but also with France. She
informed the Czar of her readiness to obtain from Prussia any
territorial concessions which the former might wish for, and exactly at
the same time she offered Austria Silesia; she also proposed to the
French Government that the latter should, after the conclusion of peace,
enter into possession of Wesel, Geldern, and the surrounding districts.
We unfortunately lack space to discuss in detail the perfidious game
then played by English statesmen. But the spectacle teaches us once more
the time-honored truth, which is still ignored by some to-day, and which
Frederic expressed by saying that the English care for nothing outside
their own trading interests, and that they despise their allies as
mercenaries. One can go still further, and say that England never really
espouses the cause of another country, even when she is allied with it;
such a country merely appears to her as useful for the moment, in so far
as it serves England’s mercantile interests. These interests are not
always to be found on the surface; but they are always at the bottom of
every political combination entered into by the politicians in London.
As soon as England, during the Seven Years’ War, had reaped her own
abundant harvest and was certain that the conclusion of peace could not
in any way diminish her profits, she at once sacrificed without
hesitation the interests of Prussia, and broke the treaty she had signed
with Frederic. And yet, without Prussia and Frederic, England would
never have been able to drive France either from North America or India!
Had France not been weakened by the war with Prussia, the former would
have been able to play a very different part on the seas. But all that
counted for nothing. Prussia was not to be permitted to extend her
boundaries, nor to increase her strength; France had been sufficiently
weakened; as for Austria and Russia, they could, by means of skilful
wire-pulling, be made to serve Great Britain’s interests usefully.
Consequently did England desire the prompt conclusion of peace. No one
was allowed to gain anything by such a peace, except England.
Pitt had spoken truly, when he said: “We have won Canada in Germany.”
Although the Seven Years’ War, with its oversea expeditions and its
subsidies, had cost England a good deal of money; it was very soon seen
that one of its first results was to bring about an astonishing
development of all the branches of England trade and industry. In other
writings of his, Frederic the Great has noted down this rise of
prosperity, not without surprise; he remarks that the national debt was
enormous, but that, on the other hand, the general level of wealth was
extraordinarily high. After the war it was all the easier to reduce
progressively the national debt, as an ever-growing income of gigantic
proportions was accruing, not only to individuals, but also to the
state—especially from India. But treasures and products of all sorts
arrived also from all the other colonies. The British trading fleet
ruled the seas; for the Royal Navy had conscientiously done its duty,
and thousands of foreign trading ships—the property of enemies,
neutrals, friends, and allies alike (for England is always delightfully
impartial in these matters)—had disappeared. As usual, after a
Continental war, industry, commerce (with the exception of a little
coasting trade), and the entire force of production, were ruined. Under
the influence of peace, the wants of the population asserted themselves
once more; but its strength did not allow it to satisfy those wants
itself, to build up a new trading fleet, to develop a new industry.
England’s industry did the work. It must also be observed that the
capital wealth of Great Britain had immeasurably increased, and had
assumed ever more and more the aspect of an octopus sucking the
life-blood of the other European nations. The more numerous the wars
which those nations were compelled to wage for England, the more
crushing did England’s superiority in this respect become. Ever less and
less grew the competition capable of exerting an influence either on the
selling or on the purchasing prices of English industry. Gold and raw
materials flowed free of cost, and in an uninterrupted stream, into
England; they either came from England oversea possessions, or from
Spanish and Portuguese colonies, the exploitation of which England had
reserved by treaty to herself. Thus was business doubly profitable. We
must also remember that the great majority of freights were shipped on
board England vessels; and that in this way also money flowed into
English purses.
During the Continental wars England acquired an immense colonial empire;
that is to say, she robbed a quantity of territories belonging to other
people, after having reduced the European nations to impotence on sea by
stirring them up one against another. The same policy enabled England to
acquire practically the whole of the shipping trade, and to establish
herself as mistress of the seas.
France had lost many vitally important things, both in the shape of
territory and in that of prestige. But the French only came to recognise
the extent of their losses later on; and they soon forgot the lesson.
An interesting page in the history of the Seven Years’ War is that which
deals with the attitude of England towards Spain. France had signed a
convention with Spain, with a view to obtaining Spanish assistance. This
assistance was to be rendered a year after the signing of the agreement;
it was thus in the nature of a long-term bill. England seized the
opportunity to attack Spain, and to pounce with her usual vulture-like
rapacity on the Spanish colonies and on Spanish vessels; she likewise
continued her piratical forays against the French coasts. It was
especially the silver cargoes which excited the greed of the pious
English heroes of the sea. English historians still regret that Pitt’s
advice to attack Spain was not followed earlier. If it had been, many
more “glorious” successes could have been obtained. Campbell wrote in
his Lives of British Admirals the following exquisite passage: “Spain is
just the country which England can always fight with the best chances of
acquiring fame and success. Her immense empire is weak in its
center-point; the sources from which help can be obtained are far away;
and the Power which commands the sea will be able to obtain without
difficulty the wealth and the commerce of Spain.” We are here told
candidly that an attack on the weak Spanish empire offered every
prospect of success, and of the acquisition of fame (!). For this reason
was Spain attacked at every possible opportunity, and her still wealthy
and immense empire perpetually plundered. The center-point of that
empire was weak. Spain’s weakness resided in the fact that her sea power
had been destroyed; she believed erroneously that local garrisons placed
in the colonies would be able, by means of coast defences to maintain
the cohesion of a great imperium. But between Spain and her colonies the
British fleet had wedged itself in. In a similar manner was France
separated from her oversea possessions. It was by means of robbery and
piracy that England had developed into a world-Power at the expense of
Europe.