CHAPTER II

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND CORSICA

"They seek to destroy the Revolution by attacking my person: I will

defend it, for I am the Revolution." Such were the words uttered by

Buonaparte after the failure of the royalist plot of 1804. They are a

daring transcript of Louis XIV.'s "L'état, c'est moi." That was a bold

claim, even for an age attuned to the whims of autocrats: but this of

the young Corsican is even more daring, for he thereby equated himself

with a movement which claimed to be wide as humanity and infinite as

truth. And yet when he spoke these words, they were not scouted as

presumptuous folly: to most Frenchmen they seemed sober truth and

practical good sense. How came it, one asks in wonder, that after the

short space of fifteen years a world-wide movement depended on a

single life, that the infinitudes of 1789 lived on only in the form,

and by the pleasure, of the First Consul? Here surely is a political

incarnation unparalleled in the whole course of human history. The

riddle cannot be solved by history alone. It belongs in part to the

domain of psychology, when that science shall undertake the study, not

merely of man as a unit, but of the aspirations, moods, and whims of

communities and nations. Meanwhile it will be our far humbler task to

strive to point out the relation of Buonaparte to the Revolution, and

to show how the mighty force of his will dragged it to earth.

The first questions that confront us are obviously these. Were the

lofty aims and aspirations of the Revolution attainable? And, if so,

did the men of 1789 follow them by practical methods? To the former of

these questions the present chapter will, in part at least, serve as

an answer. On the latter part of the problem the events described in

later chapters will throw some light: in them we shall see that the

great popular upheaval let loose mighty forces that bore Buonaparte on

to fortune.

Here we may notice that the Revolution was not a simple and therefore

solid movement. It was complex and contained the seeds of discord

which lurk in many-sided and militant creeds. The theories of its

intellectual champions were as diverse as the motives which spurred on

their followers to the attack on the outworn abuses of the age.

Discontent and faith were the ultimate motive powers of the

Revolution. Faith prepared the Revolution and discontent accomplished

it. Idealists who, in varied planes of thought, preached the doctrine

of human perfectibility, succeeded in slowly permeating the dull

toiling masses of France with hope. Omitting here any notice of

philosophic speculation as such, we may briefly notice the teachings

of three writers whose influence on revolutionary politics was to be

definite and practical. These were Montesquieu, Voltaire, and

Rousseau. The first was by no means a revolutionist, for he decided in

favour of a mixed form of government, like that of England, which

guaranteed the State against the dangers of autocracy, oligarchy, and

mob-rule. Only by a ricochet did he assail the French monarchy. But he

re-awakened critical inquiry; and any inquiry was certain to sap the

base of the _ancien régime_ in France. Montesquieu's teaching inspired

the group of moderate reformers who in 1789 desired to re-fashion the

institutions of France on the model of those of England. But popular

sentiment speedily swept past these Anglophils towards the more

attractive aims set forth by Voltaire.

This keen thinker subjected the privileged classes, especially the

titled clergy, to a searching fire of philosophic bombs and barbed

witticisms. Never was there a more dazzling succession of literary

triumphs over a tottering system. The satirized classes winced and

laughed, and the intellect of France was conquered, for the

Revolution. Thenceforth it was impossible that peasants who were

nominally free should toil to satisfy the exacting needs of the

State, and to support the brilliant bevy of nobles who flitted gaily

round the monarch at Versailles. The young King Louis XVI., it is

true, carried through several reforms, but he had not enough strength

of will to abolish the absurd immunities from taxation which freed the

nobles and titled clergy from the burdens of the State. Thus, down to

1789, the middle classes and peasants bore nearly all the weight of

taxation, while the peasants were also encumbered by feudal dues and

tolls. These were the crying grievances which united in a solid

phalanx both thinkers and practical men, and thereby gave an immense

impetus to the levelling doctrines of Rousseau.

Two only of his political teachings concern us here, namely, social

equality and the unquestioned supremacy of the State; for to these

dogmas, when they seemed doomed to political bankruptcy, Napoleon

Buonaparte was to act as residuary legatee. According to Rousseau,

society and government originated in a social contract, whereby all

members of the community have equal rights. It matters not that the

spirit of the contract may have evaporated amidst the miasma of

luxury. That is a violation of civil society; and members are

justified in reverting at once to the primitive ideal. If the

existence of the body politic be endangered, force may be used:

"Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do

so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be

forced to be free." Equally plausible and dangerous was his teaching

as to the indivisibility of the general will. Deriving every public

power from his social contract, he finds it easy to prove that the

sovereign power, vested in all the citizens, must be incorruptible,

inalienable, unrepresentable, indivisible, and indestructible.

Englishmen may now find it difficult to understand the enthusiasm

called forth by this quintessence of negations; but to Frenchman

recently escaped from the age of privilege and warring against the

coalition of kings, the cry of the Republic one and indivisible was a

trumpet call to death or victory. Any shifts, even that of a

dictatorship, were to be borne, provided that social equality could be

saved. As republican Rome had saved her early liberties by intrusting

unlimited powers to a temporary dictator, so, claimed Rousseau, a

young commonwealth must by a similar device consult Nature's first law

of self-preservation. The dictator saves liberty by temporarily

abrogating it: by momentary gagging of the legislative power he

renders it truly vocal.

The events of the French Revolution form a tragic commentary on these

theories. In the first stage of that great movement we see the

followers of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau marching in an

undivided host against the ramparts of privilege. The walls of the

Bastille fall down even at the blast of their trumpets. Odious feudal

privileges disappear in a single sitting of the National Assembly; and

the _Parlements_, or supreme law courts of the provinces, are swept

away. The old provinces themselves are abolished, and at the beginning

of 1790 France gains social and political unity by her new system of

Departments, which grants full freedom of action in local affairs,

though in all national concerns it binds France closely to the new

popular government at Paris. But discords soon begin to divide the

reformers: hatred of clerical privilege and the desire to fill the

empty coffers of the State dictate the first acts of spoliation.

Tithes are abolished: the lands of the Church are confiscated to the

service of the State; monastic orders are suppressed; and the

Government undertakes to pay the stipends of bishops and priests.

Furthermore, their subjection to the State is definitely secured by

the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (July, 1790) which invalidates

their allegiance to the Pope. Most of the clergy refuse: these are

termed non-jurors or orthodox priests, while their more complaisant

colleagues are known as constitutional priests. Hence arises a serious

schism in the Church, which distracts the religious life of the land,

and separates the friends of liberty from the champions of the

rigorous equality preached by Rousseau.

The new constitution of 1791 was also a source of discord. In its

jealousy of the royal authority, the National Assembly seized very

many of the executive functions of government. The results were

disastrous. Laws remained without force, taxes went uncollected, the

army was distracted by mutinies, and the monarchy sank slowly into the

gulf of bankruptcy and anarchy. Thus, in the course of three years,

the revolutionists goaded the clergy to desperation, they were about

to overthrow the monarchy, every month was proving their local

self-government to be unworkable, and they themselves split into

factions that plunged France into war and drenched her soil by

organized massacres.

* * * * *

We know very little about the impression made on the young Buonaparte

by the first events of the Revolution. His note-book seems even to

show that he regarded them as an inconvenient interference with his

plans for Corsica. But gradually the Revolution excites his interest.

In September, 1789, we find him on furlough in Corsica sharing the

hopes of the islanders that their representatives in the French

National Assembly will obtain the boon of independence. He exhorts

his compatriots to favour the democratic cause, which promises a

speedy deliverance from official abuses. He urges them to don the new

tricolour cockade, symbol of Parisian triumph over the old monarchy;

to form a club; above all, to organize a National Guard. The young

officer knew that military power was passing from the royal army, now

honeycombed with discontent, to the National Guard. Here surely was

Corsica's means of salvation. But the French governor of Corsica

intervenes. The club is closed, and the National Guard is dispersed.

Thereupon Buonaparte launches a vigorous protest against the tyranny

of the governor and appeals to the National Assembly of France for

some guarantee of civil liberty. His name is at the head of this

petition, a sufficiently daring step for a junior lieutenant on

furlough. But his patriotism and audacity carry him still further. He

journeys to Bastia, the official capital of his island, and is

concerned in an affray between the populace and the royal troops

(November 5th, 1789). The French authorities, fortunately for him, are

nearly powerless: he is merely requested to return to Ajaccio; and

there he organizes anew the civic force, and sets the dissident

islanders an example of good discipline by mounting guard outside the

house of a personal opponent.

Other events now transpired which began to assuage his opposition to

France. Thanks to the eloquent efforts of Mirabeau, the Corsican

patriots who had remained in exile since 1768 were allowed to return

and enjoy the full rights of citizenship. Little could the friends of

liberty at Paris, or even the statesman himself, have foreseen all the

consequences of this action: it softened the feelings of many

Corsicans towards their conquerors; above all, it caused the heart of

Napoleon Buonaparte for the first time to throb in accord with that of

the French nation. His feelings towards Paoli also began to cool. The

conduct of this illustrious exile exposed him to the charge of

ingratitude towards France. The decree of the French National

Assembly, which restored him to Corsican citizenship, was graced by

acts of courtesy such as the generous French nature can so winningly

dispense. Louis XVI. and the National Assembly warmly greeted him, and

recognized him as head of the National Guard of the island. Yet,

amidst all the congratulations, Paoli saw the approach of anarchy, and

behaved with some reserve. Outwardly, however, concord seemed to be

assured, when on July 14th, 1790, he landed in Corsica; but the hatred

long nursed by the mountaineers and fisherfolk against France was not

to be exorcised by a few demonstrations. In truth, the island was

deeply agitated. The priests were rousing the people against the newly

decreed Civil Constitution of the Clergy; and one of these

disturbances endangered the life of Napoleon himself. He and his

brother Joseph chanced to pass by when one of the processions of

priests and devotees was exciting the pity and indignation of the

townsfolk. The two brothers, who were now well known as partisans of

the Revolution, were threatened with violence, and were saved only by

their own firm demeanour and the intervention of peacemakers.

Then again, the concession of local self-government to the island, as

one of the Departments of France, revealed unexpected difficulties.

Bastia and Ajaccio struggled hard for the honour of being the official

capital. Paoli favoured the claims of Bastia, thereby annoying the

champions of Ajaccio, among whom the Buonapartes were prominent. The

schism was widened by the dictatorial tone of Paoli, a demeanour which

ill became the chief of a civic force. In fact, it soon became

apparent that Corsica was too small a sphere for natures so able and

masterful as those of Paoli and Napoleon Buonaparte.

The first meeting of these two men must have been a scene of deep

interest. It was on the fatal field of Ponte Nuovo. Napoleon doubtless

came there in the spirit of true hero-worship. But hero-worship which

can stand the strain of actual converse is rare indeed, especially

when the expectant devotee is endowed with keen insight and habits of

trenchant expression. One phrase has come down to us as a result of

the interview; but this phrase contains a volume of meaning. After

Paoli had explained the disposition of his troops against the French

at Ponte Nuovo, Buonaparte drily remarked to his brother Joseph, "The

result of these dispositions was what was inevitable." [13]

For the present, Buonaparte and other Corsican democrats were closely

concerned with the delinquencies of the Comte de Buttafuoco, the

deputy for the twelve nobles of the island to the National Assembly of

France. In a letter written on January 23rd, 1791, Buonaparte

overwhelms this man with a torrent of invective.--He it was who had

betrayed his country to France in 1768. Self-interest and that alone

prompted his action then, and always. French rule was a cloak for his

design of subjecting Corsica to "the absurd feudal _régime_" of the

barons. In his selfish royalism he had protested against the new

French constitution as being unsuited to Corsica, "though it was

exactly the same as that which brought us so much good and was wrested

from us only amidst streams of blood."--The letter is remarkable for

the southern intensity of its passion, and for a certain hardening of

tone towards Paoli. Buonaparte writes of Paoli as having been ever

"surrounded by enthusiasts, and as failing to understand in a man any

other passion than fanaticism for liberty and independence," and as

duped by Buttafuoco in 1768.[14] The phrase has an obvious reference

to the Paoli of 1791, surrounded by men who had shared his long exile

and regarded the English constitution as their model. Buonaparte, on

the contrary, is the accredited champion of French democracy, his

furious epistle being printed by the Jacobin Club of Ajaccio.

After firing off this tirade Buonaparte returned to his regiment at

Auxonne (February, 1791). It was high time; for his furlough, though

prolonged on the plea of ill-health, had expired in the preceding

October, and he was therefore liable to six months' imprisonment. But

the young officer rightly gauged the weakness of the moribund

monarchy; and the officers of his almost mutinous regiment were glad

to get him back on any terms. Everywhere in his journey through

Provence and Dauphiné, Buonaparte saw the triumph of revolutionary

principles. He notes that the peasants are to a man for the

Revolution; so are the rank and file of the regiment. The officers

are aristocrats, along with three-fourths of those who belong to "good

society": so are all the women, for "Liberty is fairer than they, and

eclipses them." The Revolution was evidently gaining completer hold

over his mind and was somewhat blurring his insular sentiments, when a

rebuff from Paoli further weakened his ties to Corsica. Buonaparte had

dedicated to him his work on Corsica, and had sent him the manuscript

for his approval. After keeping it an unconscionable time, the old man

now coldly replied that he did not desire the honour of Buonaparte's

panegyric, though he thanked him heartily for it; that the

consciousness of having done his duty sufficed for him in his old age;

and, for the rest, history should not be written in youth. A further

request from Joseph Buonaparte for the return of the slighted

manuscript brought the answer that he, Paoli, had no time to search

his papers. After this, how could hero-worship subsist?

The four months spent by Buonaparte at Auxonne were, indeed, a time of

disappointment and hardship. Out of his slender funds he paid for the

education of his younger brother, Louis, who shared his otherwise

desolate lodging. A room almost bare but for a curtainless bed, a

table heaped with books and papers, and two chairs--such were the

surroundings of the lieutenant in the spring of 1791. He lived on

bread that he might rear his brother for the army, and that he might

buy books, overjoyed when his savings mounted to the price of some

coveted volume.

Perhaps the depressing conditions of his life at Auxonne may account

for the acrid tone of an essay which he there wrote in competition for

a prize offered by the Academy of Lyons on the subject--"What truths

and sentiments ought to be inculcated to men for their happiness." It

was unsuccessful; and modern readers will agree with the verdict of

one of the judges that it was incongruous in arrangement and of a bad

and ragged style. The thoughts are set forth in jerky, vehement

clauses; and, in place of the _sensibilité_ of some of his earlier

effusions, we feel here the icy breath of materialism. He regards an

ideal human society as a geometrical structure based on certain

well-defined postulates. All men ought to be able to satisfy certain

elementary needs of their nature; but all that is beyond is

questionable or harmful. The ideal legislator will curtail wealth so

as to restore the wealthy to their true nature--and so forth. Of any

generous outlook on the wider possibilities of human life there is

scarcely a trace. His essay is the apotheosis of social mediocrity. By

Procrustean methods he would have forced mankind back to the dull

levels of Sparta: the opalescent glow of Athenian life was beyond his

ken. But perhaps the most curious passage is that in which he preaches

against the sin and folly of ambition. He pictures Ambition as a

figure with pallid cheeks, wild eyes, hasty step, jerky movements and

sardonic smile, for whom crimes are a sport, while lies and calumnies

are merely arguments and figures of speech. Then, in words that recall

Juvenal's satire on Hannibal's career, he continues: "What is

Alexander doing when he rushes from Thebes into Persia and thence into

India? He is ever restless, he loses his wits, he believes himself

God. What is the end of Cromwell? He governs England. But is he not

tormented by all the daggers of the furies?"--The words ring false,

even for this period of Buonaparte's life; and one can readily

understand his keen wish in later years to burn every copy of these

youthful essays. But they have nearly all survived; and the diatribe

against ambition itself supplies the feather wherewith history may

wing her shaft at the towering flight of the imperial eagle.[15]

At midsummer he is transferred, as first lieutenant, to another

regiment which happened to be quartered at Valence; but his second

sojourn there is remarkable only for signs of increasing devotion to

the revolutionary cause. In the autumn of 1791 he is again in Corsica

on furlough, and remains there until the month of May following. He

finds the island rent by strifes which it would be tedious to

describe. Suffice it to say that the breach between Paoli and the

Buonapartes gradually widened owing to the dictator's suspicion of all

who favoured the French Revolution. The young officer certainly did

nothing to close the breach. Determined to secure his own election as

lieutenant-colonel in the new Corsican National Guard, he spent much

time in gaining recruits who would vote for him. He further assured

his success by having one of the commissioners, who was acting in

Paoli's interest, carried off from his friends and detained at the

Buonapartes' house in Ajaccio--his first _coup_[16] Stranger events

were to follow. At Easter, when the people were excited by the

persecuting edicts against the clergy and the closing of a monastery,

there was sharp fighting between the populace and Buonaparte's

companies of National Guards. Originating in a petty quarrel, which

was taken up by eager partisans, it embroiled the whole of the town

and gave the ardent young Jacobin the chance of overthrowing his

enemies. His plans even extended to the seizure of the citadel, where

he tried to seduce the French regiment from its duty to officers

whom he dubbed aristocrats. The attempt was a failure. The whole

truth can, perhaps, scarcely be discerned amidst the tissue of

lies which speedily enveloped the affair; but there can be no

doubt that on the second day of strife Buonaparte's National

Guards began the fight and subsequently menaced the regular troops in

the citadel. The conflict was finally stopped by commissioners sent by

Paoli; and the volunteers were sent away from the town.

Buonaparte's position now seemed desperate. His conduct exposed him to

the hatred of most of his fellow-citizens and to the rebukes of the

French War Department. In fact, he had doubly sinned: he had actually

exceeded his furlough by four months: he was technically guilty, first

of desertion, and secondly of treason. In ordinary times he would have

been shot, but the times were extraordinary, and he rightly judged

that when a Continental war was brewing, the most daring course was

also the most prudent, namely, to go to Paris. Thither Paoli allowed

him to proceed, doubtless on the principle of giving the young madcap

a rope wherewith to hang himself.

On his arrival at Marseilles, he hears that war has been declared by

France against Austria; for the republican Ministry, which Louis XVI.

had recently been compelled to accept, believed that war against an

absolute monarch would intensify revolutionary fervour in France and

hasten the advent of the Republic. Their surmises were correct.

Buonaparte, on his arrival at Paris, witnessed the closing scenes of

the reign of Louis XVI. On June 20th he saw the crowd burst into the

Tuileries, when for some hours it insulted the king and queen. Warmly

though he had espoused the principles of the Revolution, his patrician

blood boiled at the sight of these vulgar outrages, and he exclaimed:

"Why don't they sweep off four or five hundred of that _canaille_ with

cannon? The rest would then run away fast enough." The remark is

significant. If his brain approved the Jacobin creed, his instincts

were always with monarchy. His career was to reconcile his reason with

his instincts, and to impose on weary France the curious compromise of

a revolutionary Imperialism.

On August 10th, from the window of a shop near the Tuileries, he

looked down on the strange events which dealt the _coup de grâce_ to

the dying monarchy. Again the chieftain within him sided against the

vulture rabble and with the well-meaning monarch who kept his troops

to a tame defensive. "If Louis XVI." (so wrote Buonaparte to his

brother Joseph) "had mounted his horse, the victory would have been

his--so I judge from the spirit which prevailed in the morning."

When all was over, when Louis sheathed his sword and went for

shelter to the National Assembly, when the fierce Marseillais were

slaughtering the Swiss Guards and bodyguards of the king, Buonaparte

dashed forward to save one of these unfortunates from a southern

sabre. "Southern comrade, let us save this poor wretch.--Are you

of the south?--Yes.--Well, we will save him."

Altogether, what a time of disillusionment this was to the young

officer. What depths of cruelty and obscenity it revealed in the

Parisian rabble. What folly to treat them with the Christian

forbearance shown by Louis XVI. How much more suitable was grapeshot

than the beatitudes. The lesson was stored up for future use at a

somewhat similar crisis on this very spot.

During the few days when victorious Paris left Louis with the sham

title of king, Buonaparte received his captain's commission, which was

signed for the king by Servan, the War Minister. Thus did the

revolutionary Government pass over his double breach of military

discipline at Ajaccio. The revolutionary motto, "La carrière ouverte

aux talents," was never more conspicuously illustrated than in the

facile condoning of his offences and in this rapid promotion. It was

indeed a time fraught with vast possibilities for all republican or

Jacobinical officers. Their monarchist colleagues were streaming over

the frontiers to join the Austrian and Prussian invaders. But National

Guards were enrolling by tens of thousands to drive out the Prussian

and Austrian invaders; and when Europe looked to see France fall for

ever, it saw with wonder her strength renewed as by enchantment. Later

on it learnt that that strength was the strength of Antæus, of a

peasantry that stood firmly rooted in their native soil. Organization

and good leadership alone were needed to transform these ardent masses

into the most formidable soldiery; and the brilliant military

prospects now opened up certainly knit Buonaparte's feelings more

closely with the cause of France. Thus, on September 21st, when the

new National Assembly, known as the Convention, proclaimed the

Republic, we may well believe that sincere convictions no less than

astute calculations moved him to do and dare all things for the sake

of the new democratic commonwealth.[17]

For the present, however, a family duty urges him to return to

Corsica. He obtains permission to escort home his sister Elise, and

for the third time we find him on furlough in Corsica. This laxity of

military discipline at such a crisis is explicable only on the

supposition that the revolutionary chiefs knew of his devotion to

their cause and believed that his influence in the island would render

his informal services there more valuable than his regimental duties

in the army then invading Savoy. For the word Republic, which fired

his imagination, was an offence to Paoli and to most of the

islanders; and the phrase "Republic one and indivisible," ever on the

lips of the French, seemed to promise that the island must become a

petty replica of France--France that was now dominated by the authors

of the vile September massacres. The French party in the island was

therefore rapidly declining, and Paoli was preparing to sever the

union with France. For this he has been bitterly assailed as a

traitor. But, from Paoli's point of view, the acquisition of the

island by France was a piece of rank treachery; and his allegiance to

France was technically at an end when the king was forcibly dethroned

and the Republic was proclaimed. The use of the appellation "traitor"

in such a case is merely a piece of childish abuse. It can be

justified neither by reference to law, equity, nor to the popular

sentiment of the time. Facts were soon to show that the islanders were

bitterly opposed to the party then dominant in France. This hostility

of a clannish, religious, and conservative populace against the

bloodthirsty and atheistical innovators who then lorded it over France

was not diminished by the action of some six thousand French

volunteers, the off-scourings of the southern ports, who were landed

at Ajaccio for an expedition against Sardinia. In their zeal for

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, these _bonnets rouges_ came to

blows with the men of Ajaccio, three of whom they hanged. So fierce

was the resentment caused by this outrage that the plan of a joint

expedition for the liberation of Sardinia from monarchical tyranny had

to be modified; and Buonaparte, who was again in command of a

battalion of Corsican guards, proposed that the islanders alone should

proceed to attack the Madalena Isles.

These islands, situated between Corsica and Sardinia, have a double

interest to the historical student. One of them, Caprera, was destined

to shelter another Italian hero at the close of his career, the noble

self-denying Garibaldi: the chief island of the group was the

objective of Buonaparte's first essay in regular warfare. After some

delays the little force set sail under the command of Cesari-Colonna,

the nephew of Paoli. According to Buonaparte's own official statement

at the close of the affair, he had successfully landed his men near

the town to be assailed, and had thrown the Sardinian defences into

confusion, when a treacherous order from his chief bade him to cease

firing and return to the vessels. It has also been stated that this

retreat was the outcome of a secret understanding between Paoli and

Cesari-Colonna that the expedition should miscarry. This seems highly

probable. A mutiny on board the chief ship of the flotilla was

assigned by Cesari-Colonna as the cause of his order for a retreat;

but there are mutinies and mutinies, and this one may have been a

trick of the Paolists for thwarting Buonaparte's plan and leaving him

a prisoner. In any case, the young officer only saved himself and his

men by a hasty retreat to the boats, tumbling into the sea a mortar

and four cannon. Such was the ending to the great captain's first

military enterprise.

On his return to Ajaccio (March 3rd, 1793), Buonaparte found affairs

in utter confusion. News had recently arrived of the declaration of

war by the French Republic against England and Holland. Moreover,

Napoleon's young brother, Lucien, had secretly denounced Paoli to the

French authorities at Toulon; and three commissioners were now sent

from Paris charged with orders to disband the Corsican National

Guards, and to place the Corsican dictator under the orders of the

French general commanding the army of Italy.[18]

A game of truly Macchiavellian skill is now played. The French

commissioners, among whom the Corsican deputy, Salicetti, is by far

the most able, invite Paoli to repair to Toulon, there to concert

measures for the defence of Corsica. Paoli, seeing through the ruse

and discerning a guillotine, pleads that his age makes the journey

impossible; but with his friends he quietly prepares for resistance

and holds the citadel of Ajaccio. Meanwhile the commissioners make

friendly overtures to the old chief; in these Napoleon participates,

being ignorant of Lucien's action at Toulon. The sincerity of these

overtures may well be called in question, though Buonaparte still used

the language of affection to his former idol. However this may be, all

hope of compromise is dashed by the zealots who are in power at Paris.

On April 2nd they order the French commissioners to secure Paoli's

person, by whatever means, and bring him to the French capital. At

once a cry of indignation goes up from all parts of Corsica; and

Buonaparte draws up a declaration, vindicating Paoli's conduct and

begging the French Convention to revoke its decree.[19] Again, one

cannot but suspect that this declaration was intended mainly, if not

solely, for local consumption. In any case, it failed to cool the

resentment of the populace; and the partisans of France soon came to

blows with the Paolists.

Salicetti and Buonaparte now plan by various artifices to gain the

citadel of Ajaccio from the Paolists, but guile is three times foiled

by guile equally astute. Failing here, the young captain seeks to

communicate with the French commissioners at Bastia. He sets out

secretly, with a trusty shepherd as companion, to cross the island:

but at the village of Bocognano he is recognized and imprisoned by the

partisans of Paoli. Some of the villagers, however, retain their old

affection to the Buonaparte family, which here has an ancestral

estate, and secretly set him free. He returns to Ajaccio, only to find

an order for his arrest issued by the Corsican patriots. This time he

escapes by timely concealment in the grotto of a friend's garden; and

from the grounds of another family connection he finally glides away

in a vessel to a point of safety, whence he reaches Bastia.

Still, though a fugitive, he persists in believing that Ajaccio is

French at heart, and urges the sending of a liberating force. The

French commissioners agree, and the expedition sails--only to meet

with utter failure. Ajaccio, as one man, repels the partisans of

France; and, a gale of wind springing up, Buonaparte and his men

regain their boats with the utmost difficulty. At a place hard by, he

finds his mother, uncle, brothers and sisters. Madame Buonaparte, with

the extraordinary tenacity of will that characterized her famous son,

had wished to defend her house at Ajaccio against the hostile

populace; but, yielding to the urgent warnings of friends, finally

fled to the nearest place of safety, and left the house to the fury of

the populace, by whom it was nearly wrecked.

For a brief space Buonaparte clung to the hope of regaining Corsica

for the Republic, but now only by the aid of French troops. For the

islanders, stung by the demand of the French Convention that Paoli

should go to Paris, had rallied to the dictator's side; and the aged

chief made overtures to England for alliance. The partisans of France,

now menaced by England's naval power, were in an utterly untenable

position. Even the steel-like will of Buonaparte was bent. His career

in Corsica was at an end for the present; and with his kith and kin he

set sail for France.

The interest of the events above described lies, not in their

intrinsic importance, but in the signal proof which they afford of

Buonaparte's wondrous endowments of mind and will. In a losing cause

and in a petty sphere he displays all the qualities which, when the

omens were favourable, impelled him to the domination of a Continent.

He fights every inch of ground tenaciously; at each emergency he

evinces a truly Italian fertility of resource, gliding round obstacles

or striving to shatter them by sheer audacity, seeing through men,

cajoling them by his insinuations or overawing them by his mental

superiority, ever determined to try the fickle jade Fortune to the

very utmost, and retreating only before the inevitable. The sole

weakness discoverable in this nature, otherwise compact of strength,

is an excess of will-power over all the faculties that make for

prudence. His vivid imagination only serves to fire him with the full

assurance that he must prevail over all obstacles.

And yet, if he had now stopped to weigh well the lessons of the past,

hitherto fertile only in failures and contradictions, he must have

seen the powerlessness of his own will when in conflict with the

forces of the age; for he had now severed his connection with the

Corsican patriots, of whose cause he had only two years before been

the most passionate champion. It is evident that the schism which

finally separated Buonaparte and Paoli originated in their divergence

of views regarding the French Revolution. Paoli accepted revolutionary

principles only in so far as they promised to base freedom on a due

balance of class interests. He was a follower of Montesquieu. He

longed to see in Corsica a constitution similar to that of England or

to that of 1791 in France. That hope vanished alike for France and

Corsica after the fall of the monarchy; and towards the Jacobinical

Republic, which banished orthodox priests and guillotined the amiable

Louis, Paoli thenceforth felt naught but loathing: "We have been the

enemies of kings," he said to Joseph Buonaparte; "let us never be

their executioners." Thenceforth he drifted inevitably into alliance

with England.

Buonaparte, on the other hand, was a follower of Rousseau, whose ideas

leaped to power at the downfall of the monarchy. Despite the excesses

which he ever deplored, this second Revolution appeared to him to be

the dawn of a new and intelligent age. The clear-cut definitions of

the new political creed dovetailed in with his own rigid views of

life. Mankind was to be saved by law, society being levelled down and

levelled up until the ideals of Lycurgus were attained. Consequently

he regarded the Republic as a mighty agency for the social

regeneration not only of France, but of all peoples. His insular

sentiments were gradually merged in these vaster schemes.

Self-interest and the differentiating effects of party strifes

undoubtedly assisted the mental transformation; but it is clear that

the study of the "Social Contract" was the touchstone of his early

intellectual growth. He had gone to Rousseau's work to deepen his

Corsican patriotism: he there imbibed doctrines which drew him

irresistibly into the vortex of the French Revolution, and of its wars

of propaganda and conquest.

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The Life of Napoleon I (Volume 1 of 2) · 第 2 / 22 章