THE RIGHT TO TAKE ONESELF OFF

A PERSON who loses heart and hope through a personal bereavement is like

a grain of sand on the seashore complaining that the tide has washed

a neighboring grain out of reach. He is worse, for the bereaved grain

cannot help itself; it has to be a grain of sand and play the game of

tide, win or lose; whereas he can quit--by watching his opportunity

can "quit a winner." For sometimes we do beat "the man who keeps the

table"--never in the long run, but infrequently and out of small stakes.

But this is no time to "cash in" and go, for you can not take your

little winning with you. The time to quit is when you have lost a big

stake, your fool hope of eventual success, your fortitude and your love

of the game. If you stay in the game, which you are not compelled to do,

take your losses in good temper and do not whine about them. They are

hard to bear, but that is no reason why you should be.

But we are told with tiresome iteration that we are "put here" for some

purpose (not disclosed) and have no right to retire until summoned--it

may be by small-pox, it may be by the bludgeon of a blackguard, it may

be by the kick of a cow; the "summoning" Power (said to be the same as

the "putting" Power) has not a nice taste in the choice of messengers.

That "argument" is not worth attention, for it is unsupported by either

evidence or anything remotely resembling evidence. "Put here." Indeed!

And by the keeper of the table who "runs" the "skin game." We were put

here by our parents--that is all anybody knows about it; and they had no

more authority than we, and probably no more intention.

The notion that we have not the right to take our own lives comes of

our consciousness that we have not the courage. It is the plea of the

coward--his excuse for continuing to live when he has nothing to live

for--or his provision against such a time in the future. If he were not

egotist as well as coward he would need no excuse. To one who does not

regard himself as the center of creation and his sorrow as the throes of

the universe, life, if not worth living, is also not worth leaving. The

ancient philosopher who was asked why he did not the if, as he taught,

life was no better than death, replied: "Because death is no better than

life." We do not know that either proposition is true, but the matter is

not worth bothering about, for both states are supportable--life despite

its pleasures and death despite its repose.

It was Robert G. Ingersoll's opinion that there is rather too little

than too much suicide in the world--that people are so cowardly as to

live on long after endurance has ceased to be a virtue. This view is but

a return to the wisdom of the ancients, in whose splendid civilization

suicide had as honorable place as any other courageous, reasonable and

unselfish act. Antony, Brutus, Cato, Seneca--these were not of the kind

of men to do deeds of cowardice and folly. The smug, self-righteous

modern way of looking upon the act as that of a craven or a lunatic is

the creation of priests, Philistines and women. If courage is manifest

in endurance of profitless discomfort it is cowardice to warm oneself

when cold, to cure oneself when ill, to drive away mosquitoes, to go in

when it rains. The "pursuit of happiness," then, is not an "inalienable

right," for that implies avoidance of pain. No principle is involved in

this matter; suicide is justifiable or not, according to circumstances;

each case is to be considered on its merits and he having the act under

advisement is sole judge. To his decision, made with whatever light

he may chance to have, all honest minds will bow. The appellant has

no court to which to take his appeal. Nowhere is a jurisdiction so

comprehensive as to embrace the right of condemning the wretched to

life.

Suicide is always courageous. We call it courage in a soldier merely to

face death--say to lead a forlorn hope--although he has a chance of life

and a certainty of "glory." But the suicide does more than face death;

he incurs it, and with a certainty, not of glory, but of reproach. If

that is not courage we must reform our vocabulary.

True, there may be a higher courage in living than in dying--a moral

courage greater than physical. The courage of the suicide, like that of

the pirate, is not incompatible with a selfish disregard of the rights

and interests of others--a cruel recreancy to duty and decency. I have

been asked: "Do you not think it cowardly when a man leaves his family

unprovided for, to end his life, because he is dissatisfied with life

in general?" No, I do not; I think it selfish and cruel. Is not that

enough to say of it? Must we distort words from their true meaning

in order more effectually to damn the act and cover its author with a

greater infamy? A word means something; despite the maunderings of

the lexicographers, it does not mean whatever you want it to mean.

"Cowardice" means the fear of danger, not the shirking of duty. The

writer who allows himself as much liberty in the use of words as he is

allowed by the dictionary-maker and by popular consent is a bad writer.

He can make no impression on his reader, and would do better service at

the ribbon-counter.

The ethics of suicide is not a simple matter; one can not lay down laws

of universal application, but each case is to be judged, if judged

at all, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, including

the mental and moral make-up of the person taking his own life--an

impossible qualification for judgment. One's time, race and religion

have much to do with it. Some people, like the ancient Romans and

the modern Japanese, have considered suicide in certain circumstances

honorable and obligatory; among ourselves it is held in disfavor. A man

of sense will not give much attention to considerations of that kind,

excepting in so far as they affect others, but in judging weak offenders

they are to be taken into the account. Speaking generally, then, I

should say that in our time and country the following persons (and some

others) are justified in removing themselves, and that to some of them

it is a duty:

One afflicted with a painful or loathsome and incurable disease.

One who is a heavy burden to his friends, with no prospect of their

relief.

One threatened with permanent insanity.

One irreclaimably addicted to drunkenness or some similarly destructive

or offensive habit.

One without friends, property, employment or hope.

One who has disgraced himself.

Why do we honor the valiant soldier, sailor, fireman? For obedience to

duty? Not at all; that alone--without the peril--seldom elicits remark,

never evokes enthusiasm. It is because he faced without flinching the

risk of that supreme disaster--or what we feel to be such--death. But

look you: the soldier braves the danger of death; the suicide braves

death itself! The leader of the forlorn hope may not be struck. The

sailor who voluntarily goes down with his ship may be picked up or cast

ashore. It is not certain that the wall will topple until the fireman

shall have descended with his precious burden. But the suicide--his

is the foeman that never missed a mark, his the sea that gives nothing

back; the wall that he mounts bears no man's weight And his, at the end

of it all, is the dishonored grave where the wild ass of public opinion

"Stamps o'er his head but can not break his sleep."

The Shadow On The Dial, and Other Essays 1909 · 第 67 / 67 题