PROPOSED TO HIM.
Another time being asked whether courage can be learnt as an art or was a
gift of Nature, he answered: "In my opinion, as we see many bodies that
are naturally more vigorous than others, and that better endure fatigue,
so there are some souls that are naturally more brave, and look dangers
in the face with greater resolution. For I see some men, who live under
the same laws, who are brought up in the same customs, and who are not
all equally valiant. Nevertheless, I believe that education and exercise
add much to natural courage. Whence comes it to pass that the Scythians
and the Thracians durst not face the Lacedemonians with pikes and
targets; and, on the contrary, that the Lacedemonians would not fight
against the Thracians with shields and darts, nor against the Scythians
with bows? I see it to be the same in all other things, and that when
some men are better inclined by nature for certain things than other men
are, they very much advance and perfect themselves in those things by
study and diligence. This shows that they who are most favoured by
Nature, as well as those to whom she has been less indulgent, ought to
apply themselves assiduously to the things by which they would gain
themselves a reputation."
He allowed no difference between knowledge and temperance; and he held
that he who knows what is good and embraces it, who knows what is bad and
avoids it, is learned and temperate; and when he was asked whether he
believed that they who know very well what ought to be done, but do quite
otherwise, were learned and temperate? "On the contrary," answered he,
"they are very ignorant and very stupid, for, in my opinion, every man
who, in the great number of possible things that offer themselves to him,
can discern what is most advantageous for him to do, never fails to do
it; but all who govern not themselves well and as they ought, are neither
learned nor men of good morals."
He said likewise that justice and every other virtue is only a science,
because all the actions of justice and of the other virtues are good and
honourable; and that all who know the beauty of these actions think
nothing more charming; as, on the contrary, they who are ignorant of them
cannot perform any one virtuous action, or, if they attempt to do it, are
sure to perform it in a wrong manner. So that the persons only who
possess this science can do just and good actions; but all just and good
actions are done by the means of virtue, therefore justice and virtue is
only a science.
He said, moreover, that folly is contrary to knowledge, and yet he did
not allow ignorance to be a folly; but that not to know oneself, or to
imagine one knows what he does not know, is a weakness next to folly. And
he observed that among the vulgar a man is not accused of folly for being
mistaken in things that are unknown to most of the world, but for
mistaking in things which no man mistakes that knows anything at all; as
if any man should think himself so tall as to be obliged to stoop when he
came in at the gates of the city; or if he thought himself so strong as
to undertake to carry away whole houses on his back, or to do any other
thing visibly impossible, the people would say that he had lost his wits,
which they do not say of those who commit only some slight extravagances;
and as they give the name of love to a violent affection only, so they
give the name of folly only to an extraordinary disorder of the mind.
Reflecting on the nature of envy, he said that it is a certain grief of
mind, which proceeds, not from the misfortune of friends or good fortune
of enemies, but (which is very surprising) only from the prosperity of
friends. "For," said he, "those may be truly said to be envious who
cannot endure to see their friends happy." But, some wondering whether
it were possible for a man to be grieved at the good fortune of his
friend, he justified the truth of what he had advanced, by telling them
plainly that there are some men so variously affected towards their
friends, that, while they are in calamity and distress, they will
compassionate and succour them, but when they are well and in prosperity
will fret at and envy them. "But this," he said, "is a fault from which
wise and good men are free, and never to be found but in weak and wicked
minds."
As to idleness, he said that he had observed that most men were always in
action, for they who play at dice, or who serve to make others laugh, are
doing something, but in effect they are idle, because they might employ
themselves more usefully. To which he added, that no man finds leisure
to quit a good employment for an ill one, and that if he did he would
deserve the greater blame, in that he wanted not something to do before.
He said likewise that the sceptre makes not the king, and that princes
and governors are not they whom chance or the choice of the people has
raised to those dignities, nor those who have established themselves in
them by fraud or force, but they who know how to command; for if it were
allowed that it is the duty of a prince to command, as it is the duty of
a subject to obey, he showed in consequence of it that in a ship, where
there are several persons, the honour of commanding it is given to him
who is most capable of it, and that all obey him, without excepting even
the owner of the vessel; that likewise in husbandry, he to whom the land
belongs obeys his own servants, if they understand agriculture better
than himself; that thus the sick obey the physicians, and they who learn
exercises, their masters; nay, that even women are masters of the men in
working with the needle, because they understand it better than they; in
short, that in all things which require care and industry men govern
themselves when they think they are capable of doing so; otherwise, they
leave themselves to the conduct of such as they judge to have more
capacity, and take care to have them near at hand for that purpose. And
if any man made him this objection, that a tyrant is at liberty not to
believe the best advices, he answered, "Why do you say he is at liberty
not to do so, seeing he will bear the smart of it? for every man who
shuts his ears to good counsel commits a fault, and this fault is always
attended with some damage." And if it were said that a tyrant is
permitted to put to death the men of the best parts and understanding in
his State, he replied again, "Do you think he is not punished in losing
his chief supports, or that he will be quit for a slight punishment? Is
to govern in this manner the way to preserve himself? or rather, is it
not the certain means to hasten his own ruin?"
Being asked what was the best study for man to apply himself to, he
answered, "To do well;" and being asked farther whether good fortune was
the effect of study, "On the contrary," said he, "I think good fortune
and study to be two opposite things; for what I call good fortune is,
when a man meets with what is necessary for him, without the trouble of
seeking it; but when he meets with any good success after a tedious
search and labour, it is an effect of study. This is what I call to do
well; and I think that all who take delight in this study are for the
most part successful, and gain the esteem of men, and the affection of
the Deity. Such are they as have rendered themselves excellent in
economy, in physic, and in politics; but he who knows not any one thing
perfectly is neither useful to men, nor beloved by the gods."