The Place of Battle—The Battle-ground—General Sherman’s Part in
the Struggle—Desperate Valor—Victory—Pursuit—No Rest—
General Burnside in Peril—General Sherman hastens to his Relief
—The Bridge breaks down—It is Rebuilt, and the Heroic
Battalions save Knoxville—General Sherman again at Chattanooga.
MY reader cannot even imagine, in his peaceful home, the dread
interest which broods over preparation for a great and decisive battle.
Thoughts of the loved and absent throng the minds of brave men; hasty
letters are written, and messages left, should they fall in mortal
combat. Bibles are read, prayers offered, and hope rekindled in many
heroic hearts. Ambulances and “stretchers” are made ready for the
wounded, and surgeons arrange their instruments, lint, and bandages,
while orders are passed from the commanding general down to the
lieutenant. This work of preparation went forward at Chattanooga during
the hours of November 23d.
Writes Colonel Bowman, the friend of General Sherman, a scholar, a
gentleman, and a gallant soldier: “In the plan of the battle, Hooker was
to hold the enemy at Lookout Mountain, and carry it, if possible.
General Sherman was to vigorously assault Missionary Ridge. As that was
their vital point, the enemy would mass to defend it. This would weaken
the centre, upon which Thomas would rush, to penetrate it. Simple and
plausible as this plan seemed, and successful as it proved, to most men
who looked up at the frowning and precipitous heights which towered even
into the clouds, above Chattanooga, with rebel works studded with
artillery commanding every rugged approach, the idea of carrying them
seemed little short of madness. The rebels felt so secure as to risk
sending Longstreet’s entire corps to Knoxville, where it closely
besieged the army of Burnside. ‘By half-past three P. M. of the 24th,’
says Grant, ‘the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to
near the tunnel, was in Sherman’s possession. During the night he
fortified the position thus secured, making it equal, if not superior,
in strength to that held by the enemy.’
“Before dawn of the 25th of November General Sherman was in the saddle,
and had made the entire tour of his position in the dim light. It was
seen that a deep valley lay between him and the precipitous sides of the
next hill in the series, which was only partially cleared, and of which
the crest was narrow and wooded. The farther point of the hill was held
by the enemy, with a strong breastwork of logs and fresh earth, crowded
with men, and carrying two guns. On a still higher hill beyond the
tunnel he appeared in great force, and had a fair plunging fire on the
intermediate hill in dispute. The gorge between these two latter hills,
through which the railroad-tunnel passes, could not be seen from
Sherman’s position, but formed the natural _place d’armes_, where the
enemy covered his masses ‘to resist our turning his right flank, and
thus endangering his communications with the Chickamauga depot.’ General
Corse was to have the advance; ‘and the sun had hardly risen,’ says
Sherman, ‘before his bugle sounded the “Forward.”’
“His men moved briskly down into the valley and up the steep sides of
the hill in front, and, in spite of all opposition, carried and held a
sort of secondary crest on the enemy’s hill, which, however, was swept
with a murderous fire from the breastworks in front. And now for more
than an hour a very bloody and desperate conflict raged, our line now
swaying up close to the breastwork, as though it would sweep over and
engulf it, and anon dashed back, receding far away to its first
conquest. Meanwhile, Sherman’s left, on the outer spur of the ridge, and
his right abreast of the tunnel, were hotly engaged, and partially drew
the enemy’s fire from the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Our
artillery also plumped shot and shell into the breastwork, and strove to
clear the hill in Corse’s front. About ten A. M. the fight raged
furiously, and General Corse was severely wounded. Two brigades of
reënforcements were sent up; but the crest was so crowded that they had
to fall away to the west of the hill. At once the heavy masses of the
enemy in a gorge, under cover of the thick undergrowth, moved out on
their right and rear. So suddenly overwhelmed, the two supporting
brigades fell back in some confusion to the lower edge of the field,
where they reformed in good order; but, as they constituted no part of
the real attack, the temporary rebuff was unimportant. General Corse,
Colonel Loomis, and General M. L. Smith still stubbornly held the
attacking column proper up at the crest. General Grant says of them,
‘The assaulting column advanced to the very rifle-pits of the enemy, and
held their position firmly and without wavering.’ ‘When the two reserved
brigades fell back,’ says Sherman, ‘the enemy made a show of pursuit,
but was caught in flank by the well-directed fire of one brigade on the
wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill.’
“The desperate and incessant attack of General Sherman was triumphantly
successful. It was directed against, in the words of Grant, ‘the enemy’s
most northern and vital point,’ and ‘was vigorously kept up all day.’
Sherman’s position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but
also his rear and stores at Chickamauga. The enemy, therefore, began
very early to mass his line down against the single gallant storming
party. ‘At three P. M.,’ writes Sherman, ‘column after column of the
enemy was streaming toward me, gun after gun poured its concentric shot
on us from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the
ground.’ Long and anxiously he waited for the centre to open its part of
the contest, and meanwhile held stubbornly to his bloody ridge under
murderous fire. Grant, keeping his eye fixed on this key point, sent a
division to Sherman’s support, but he sent it back with the note that
‘he had all the force necessary.’ Now at last the time had come for
seizing victory out of doubtful battle. Hooker on the right had
gallantly swept round the enemy’s left. ‘Discovering that the enemy,’
says General Grant, ‘in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress
of Sherman, was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me
to order the advance at once.’ It was ordered and gallantly executed.
The huge masses with which Sherman was contending, now, to their dismay,
found Thomas on their left flank, and the centre of their long line
broken in. They turned; but it was too late. The white line of Thomas’s
musketry swept up from ridge to ridge, and the army of Bragg was flung
back, in overwhelming defeat, into the valleys of Georgia. Thus was the
great victory of Chattanooga won.
“And now pursuit swiftly followed victory. The same night Sherman pushed
his skirmishers out, and, finding that enemy had given way, sent a
division after him to the depot, and followed it up at four A. M. with a
part of Major-General’s Howard’s Eleventh Corps. As the column advanced,
wagons, guns, caissons, forage, stores, pontoons, and all the ruins of a
defeated army and an abandoned camp, were found on the route. At night
of the 26th, so rapid was the pursuit that the rear-guard of the enemy
was reached, and a sharp fight ensued, till darkness closed in. The next
day all three armies pressed on, Hooker and Thomas sharing with Sherman
the marching and fighting. General Sherman meanwhile detached Howard to
move against the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, and destroy it.
This was done, and communication thereby cut between Bragg and
Longstreet. The same movement also turned the flank of the enemy, who
were engaging Hooker so heavily further south at Ringgold that the
latter sent to Sherman to turn their position. It was already done
before Hooker’s messenger arrived. Continuing to Ringgold, he found
General Grant. The enemy had been driven from Tennessee, and Sherman was
ordered to move leisurely back to Chattanooga. The next day he
effectually destroyed the railroad from half-way between Graysville and
Ringgold to the State line, and General Grant ‘consented that, instead
of returning to Chattanooga, he might send back all my artillery,
wagons, and impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the
Hiawassee.’ This, too, was effected, with the destruction of more
railroad and the capture of more stores. ‘This,’ says Sherman, ‘was to
have been the limit of our journey. Officers and men had brought no
baggage or provisions; and the weather was bitter cold.’ But at this
time Grant received an urgent appeal for relief from Burnside, stating
that his supplies could only last until the 3d of December. Nothing but
incomparable energy would save Knoxville and its gallant commander.
Granger had already been ordered thither, but ‘had not yet got off,’
says General Grant, ‘nor would he have the number of men I directed.
Besides, he moved with reluctance and complaint. I therefore determined,
notwithstanding the fact that two divisions of Sherman’s forces had
marched from Memphis and had gone into battle immediately on their
arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command.’ Accordingly
General Sherman received command of all the troops designed for
relieving Knoxville, including Granger’s. ‘Seven days before,’ he
writes, ‘we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee, with
two days’ rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight,
with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to the private
included. Of course, we then had no provisions, save what we gathered by
the road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that
twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the mountain
town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant, that they needed relief,
and must have it in three days. This was enough; and it had to be done.’
“That night General Howard repaired and planked the railroad-bridge, and
at daylight the army passed the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen
miles. On the 2d of December the army hurried thence toward London,
twenty-six miles distant, and the cavalry pushed ahead to save the
pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, held by Vaughn’s brigade of the
enemy. They moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket, but
found Vaughn posted strongly in earthworks containing artillery in
position. They were forced to wait till night, when Howard’s infantry
came up. During the night the enemy retreated, destroying the pontoons,
running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee, and
leaving for Howard to capture at daylight a large quantity of
provisions, four guns, and other material.
“The bridge was gone, and but one day of the allotted three remained.
The same night, therefore, Sherman sent word to Colonel Long, commanding
the cavalry brigade, that Burnside must know within twenty-four hours of
his approach—ordering him to select his best material, to start at
once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, ‘at whatever
cost of life and horse-flesh.’ The distance to be travelled was forty
miles, and ‘the road villanous.’ Before dawn they were off. At daylight
the Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia to Morgantown; but even
at this place the Little Tennessee was found too deep for fording. A
bridge was skilfully extemporized by General Wilson—‘working partly
with crib-work and partly with square trestles made of the houses of the
late town of Morgantown;’ and by dark of December 4th the bridge was
down and the troops passing. Next morning came the welcome message from
Burnside, dated December 4th, that Long’s cavalry had reached Knoxville
on the night of the 3d, and all was well. Just before this news, the
diagonal bracings of Wilson’s bridge had broken, from want of proper
spikes, and there was delay. But the bridge was mended, and the forced
march continued, till, at Marysville, on the night of the 5th, a staff
officer of General Burnside rode up to announce that Longstreet had
raised the siege the night before. Sending forward Granger’s two
divisions to Knoxville, General Sherman at once ordered the rest of his
gallant army to halt and rest; for their work was done.
“General Sherman rode from Marysville to Knoxville, greeted General
Burnside, and freely expressed his admiration at the skilful
fortification of the place, including Fort ‘Saunders,’ where
Longstreet’s assaulting columns had met a bloody repulse. Knoxville
being saved, it was obviously best for Sherman’s army, excepting
Granger’s two divisions, to return to support the suspended movement
against Bragg. But before General Sherman left he received the following
letter:
KNOXVILLE, _December 7th, 1863_.
TO MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:
I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty
thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief
during the siege of Knoxville, and am satisfied your approach
served to raise the siege.
A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General.
“General Sherman now leisurely returned to Chattanooga, his cavalry
giving chase for some distance to a rebel wagon-train on the way. On the
14th of December his command reached the banks of the Hiawassee. Four
days of easy marches brought them to Chattanooga, after a three-months’
campaign unparalleled in the history of the war. His losses had amounted
to something over two thousand men. His official report states that his
men had marched for long periods, without regular rations or supplies of
any kind, through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a
murmur. Without a moment’s rest, after a march of over four hundred
miles, without sleep for three successive nights, they crossed the
Tennessee River, fought their part in the battle of Chattanooga, pursued
the enemy out of Tennessee, then turned more than a hundred miles north
and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which had been
the source of anxiety to the whole country. ‘The praises of Confederate
generals,’ says the London _Spectator_, in reviewing some of these
facts, ‘have been sung abundantly on this side the water: the facts are,
that all military skill and military perseverance and courage are not on
one side. . . . Such a display of genuine military qualities should not
pass without some record; and we offer it to our readers as some proof
that, with all their faults, the Federal officers and soldiers are not
without great virtues, which soldiers at least should admire.’”
General Sherman repaired to Vicksburg to look after the affairs of the
widening field of the Union army under his leadership. Here, in answer
to inquiries from Adjutant-General Sawyer, at Huntsville, Alabama, he
wrote a splendid letter, both in comprehensiveness of views and the
clear vigorous style of composition. If you begin it you will want to
finish it, though long. It is full of fire, historical knowledge, and
yet so plain a child can understand it. The matter discussed, is the
treatment of rebels in a conquered territory:
“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
VICKSBURG, _Jan. 31, 1864_. }
“Major R. M. SAWYER, _Assistant Adjutant-General,_
_Army of the Tennessee, Huntsville_:
“DEAR SAWYER: In my former letter I have answered all your
questions save one, and that relates to the treatment of
inhabitants known or suspected to be hostile or ‘secesh.’ This
is in truth the most difficult business of our army as it
advances and occupies the Southern country. It is almost
impossible to lay down rules, and I invariably leave the whole
subject to the local commanders, but am willing to give them the
benefit of my acquired knowledge and experience.
“In Europe, whence we derive our principles of war, as developed
by their histories, wars are between kings or rulers, through
hired armies, and not between peoples. These remain, as it were,
neutral, and sell their produce to whatever army is in
possession.
“Napoleon, when at war with Prussia, Austria, and Russia, bought
forage and provisions of the inhabitants, and consequently had
an interest to protect farms and factories which ministered to
his wants. In like manner, the allied armies in France could buy
of the French inhabitants whatever they needed, the produce of
the soil or manufactures of the country. Therefore, the rule was
and is, that wars are confined to the armies, and should not
visit the homes of families or private interests.
“But in other examples a different rule obtained the sanction of
historical authority. I will only instance that, when in the
reign of William and Mary the English army occupied Ireland,
then in a state of revolt, the inhabitants were actually driven
into foreign lands, and were dispossessed of their property, and
a new population introduced. To this day a large part of the
north of Ireland is held by the descendants of the Scotch
emigrants sent there by William’s order and an act of
Parliament.
“The war which now prevails in our land is essentially a war of
races. The Southern people entered into a clear compact of
government, but still maintained a species of separate
interests, history, and prejudices. These latter became stronger
and stronger, till they have led to a war which has developed
fruits of the bitterest kind.
“We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful
cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people
of the South have prejudices, which form a part of their nature,
and which they cannot throw off without an effort of reason or
the slower process of natural change. Now, the question arises,
should we treat as absolute enemies all in the South who differ
from us in opinion or prejudice, kill or banish them; or, should
we give them time to think, and gradually change their conduct
so as to conform to the new order of things, which is slowly and
gradually creeping into their country?
“When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we are
compelled to use force, because then all reason and argument
fail. When the provisions, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used
by the enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them,
because otherwise they might be used against us.
“In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people
are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses,
hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwellings
used by women, children, and non-combatants. So long as the
non-combatants remain in their homes and keep to their
accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices in nowise
influence the war, and therefore should not be noticed. But if
any one comes out into the public streets and creates disorder,
he or she should be punished, restrained, or banished either to
the rear or front, as the officer in command adjudges. If the
people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence with parties in
hostility, they are spies, and can be punished with death, or
minor punishment.
“These are well-established principles of war, and the people of
the South having appealed to war, are barred from appealing to
our Constitution, which they have practically and publicly
defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide its rules and
laws. The United States, as a belligerent party claiming right
in the soil as the ultimate sovereign, have a right to change
the population, and it may be and is both politic and just we
should do so in certain districts. When the inhabitants persist
too long in hostility, it may be both politic and right we
should banish them and appropriate their lands to a more loyal
and useful population. No man will deny that the United States
would be benefited by dispossessing a single, prejudiced,
hard-headed and disloyal planter, and substitute in his place a
dozen or more patient, industrious, good families, even if they
be of foreign birth. I think it does good to present this view
of the case to many Southern gentlemen, who grow rich and
wealthy, not by virtue alone of their industry and skill, but by
reason of the protection and impetus to prosperity given by our
hitherto moderate and magnanimous Government. It is all idle
nonsense for these Southern planters to say that they made the
South, that they own it, and that they can do as they
please—even to break up our Government, and to shut up the
natural avenues of trade, intercourse, and commerce.
“We know, and they know, if they are intelligent beings, that,
as compared with the whole world, they are but as five millions
are to one thousand millions; that they did not create the land;
that their only title to its use and usufruct is the deed of the
United States, and that if they appeal to war, they hold their
ally by a very insecure tenure.
“For my part, I believe that this war is the result of false
political doctrines, for which we are all as a people
responsible, viz.: That any and every people have a right to
self-government; and I would give all a chance to reflect, and
when in error to recant. I know slaveowners, finding themselves
in possession of a species of property in opposition to the
growing sentiment of the whole civilized world, conceived their
property in danger, and foolishly appealed to war; and by
skilful political handling involved with themselves the whole
South on the doctrines of error and prejudice. I believe that
some of the rich and slaveholding are prejudiced to such an
extent that nothing but death and ruin will extinguish, but hope
that as the poorer and industrial classes of the South will
realize their relative weakness, and their dependence upon the
fruits of the earth and good will of their fellow men, they will
not only discover the error of their ways, and repent of their
hasty action, but bless those who persistently maintained a
constitutional Government, strong enough to sustain itself,
protect its citizens, and promise peaceful homes to millions yet
unborn.
“In this behalf, while I assert for our Government the highest
military prerogatives, I am willing to bear in patience that
political nonsense of slave rights, State rights, freedom of
conscience, freedom of press, and such other trash, as have
deluded the Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshed, and
the foulest crimes that have disgraced any time or any people.
“I would advise the commanding officers at Huntsville, and such
other towns as are occupied by our troops, to assemble the
inhabitants and explain to them these plain, self-evident
propositions, and tell them it is for them now to say whether
they and their children shall inherit the beautiful land which
by the accident of nature has fallen to their share. The
Government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all
rights which they choose to enforce in war, to take their lives,
their homes, their lands, their every thing, because they cannot
deny that the war does exist there, and war is simply power
unrestrained by constitution or compact. If they want eternal
war, well and good—we will accept the issue and dispossess
them, and put our friends in possession.
“I know thousands and millions of good people who, at simple
notice, would come to North Alabama and accept the elegant
houses and plantations now there. If the people of Huntsville
think different, let them persist in war three years longer, and
then they will not be consulted. Three years ago, by a little
reflection and patience they could have had a hundred years of
peace and prosperity, but they preferred war; very well, last
year they could have saved their slaves, but now it is too late;
all the powers on earth cannot restore to them their slaves any
more than their dead grandfathers. Next year their lands will be
taken, for in war we can take them, and rightfully, too, and in
another year they may beg in vain for their lives. A people who
will persevere in war beyond a certain limit, ought to know the
consequences. Many, many people, with less pertinacity than the
South, have been wiped out of national existence.
“My own belief is, that even now the non-slaveholding classes of
the South are alienating from their associations in war. Already
I hear criminations. Those who have property left, should take
warning in time.
“Since I have come down here I have seen many Southern planters
who now hire their negroes, and acknowledge that they knew not
the earthquake they were to make by appealing to Secession. They
thought that the politicians had prepared the way, and that they
could depart in peace. They now see that we are bound together
as one nation in indissoluble ties, and that any interest or any
people that set themselves up in antagonism to the nation must
perish.
“While I would not remit one jot or tittle of our nation’s right
in peace or war, I do make allowances for past political errors
and false prejudices. Our national Congress and Supreme Courts
are the proper arenas in which to discuss conflicting opinions,
and not the battle-field.
“You may not hear from me again, and if you think it will do any
good call some of the better people together and explain these
my views. You may even read to them this letter and let them use
it, so as to prepare them for my coming.
“To those who submit to the rightful law and authority, all
gentleness and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent
secessionists, why, death is mercy, and the quicker he or she is
disposed of the better. Satan, and the rebellious saints of
heaven, were allowed a continuance of existence in hell, merely
to swell their just punishment. To such as would rebel against a
Government so mild and just as ours was in peace, a punishment
equal would not be unjust.
“We are progressing well in this quarter. Though I have not
changed my opinion that we may soon assume the existence of our
National Government, yet years will pass before ruffianism,
murder, and robbery will cease to afflict this region of our
country.
“Truly, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-Gen. Commanding.”
As it was at the beginning of the war, so in this earnest declaration of
views, the great commander keeps in advance of the popular and ruling
ideas of the conflict.
Like Napoleon in military genius and sublimely daring marches, he is
vastly his superior in principles of human progress, and the foundations
of true national prosperity.