Pittsburg Landing—The Surprise—The Battle—The Victory—
Sherman’s glorious part in the Struggle—The Testimony of
Officers—His Letter on the Contest.
PITTSBURG is the nearest point to Corinth on the river, three miles
from which, in the sparsely settled country, is the old log building
called Shiloh Church—a dilapidated sanctuary of primitive, or rather
_backwoods_ style. Around this desolate place of former worship lay
General Sherman’s division, bordering both sides of the lower road to
Corinth.
Sunday morning, April 6th, the fifty thousand men or more, under such
leaders as Beauregard, Johnston, Breckinridge, and Polk, fell upon the
army of the Republic, emerging from their forest paths like spectres in
the early light. “Carleton,” who was there, and carefully went over the
field of conflict to know all that was done, thus notices our hero:
“Sherman’s pickets were being driven back by the rapid advance of the
rebel lines. It was a little past sun-rise when they came in,
breathless, with startling accounts that the entire rebel army was at
their heels. The officers were not out of bed. The soldiers were just
stirring, rubbing their eyes, putting on their boots, washing at the
brook, or tending their camp kettles. Their guns were in their tents;
they had a small supply of ammunition. It was a complete surprise.
Officers jumped from their beds, tore open the tent-flies, and stood in
undress to see what it was all about. The rebel pickets rushed up within
close musket range and fired.
“‘Fall in! Form a line! here, quick!’ were the orders from the officers.
“There was running in every direction. Soldiers for their guns, officers
for their sabres, artillerists to their pieces, teamsters to their
horses. There was hot haste, and a great hurly-burly.
“General Hardee made a mistake at the outset. Instead of rushing up with
a bayonet charge upon Sherman’s camp, and routing his unformed brigades
in an instant, as he might have done, he unlimbered his batteries and
opened fire.
“When the alarm was given General Sherman was instantly on his horse. He
sent a request to McClernand to support Hilderbrand. He also sent word
to Prentiss that the enemy were in front, but Prentiss had already made
the discovery, and was contending with all his might against the
avalanche rolling upon him from the ridge south of his position. He sent
word to Hurlbut that a force was needed in the gap between the church
and Prentiss. He was everywhere present, dashing along his lines, paying
no attention to the constant fire aimed at him and his staff by the
rebel skirmishers, within short musket range. They saw him, knew that he
was an officer of high rank, saw that he was bringing order out of
confusion, and tried to pick him off. While galloping down to
Hilderbrand, his orderly, Halliday, was killed.
“Sherman tried to hold his position by the church. He considered it to
be of the utmost importance. He did not want to lose his camp. He
exhibited great bravery. His horse was shot, and he mounted another.
That also was killed, and he took a third, and, before night, lost his
fourth. He encouraged his men, not only by his words but by his reckless
daring. Captain Behr had been posted on the Purdy road with his battery,
and had had but little part in the fight. He was falling back, closely
followed by Pond.
“‘Come into position out there on the right,’ said Sherman, pointing to
the place where he wanted him to unlimber. Then came a volley from the
woods. A shot struck the captain from his horse. The drivers and gunners
became frightened and rode off with the caissons, leaving five unspiked
guns to fall into the hands of the rebels! Sherman and Taylor, and other
officers, by their coolness, bravery, and daring, saved Buckland’s and
McDowell’s brigades from a panic; and thus, after four hours of hard
fighting, Sherman was obliged to leave his camp and fall back behind
McClernand, who now was having, a fierce fight with the brigades which
had pushed in between Prentiss and Sherman.”
You shall hear from the general’s fellow-officers about his appearance
and gallantry on this terrible field of strife. A brave cavalry officer
said of him: “Having occasion to report personally to General Sherman,
about noon of the first day of Shiloh, I found him dismounted, his arm
in a sling, his hand bleeding, his horse dead, himself covered with
dust, his face besmeared with powder and blood. He was giving directions
at the moment to Major Taylor, his chief of artillery, who had just
brought a battery into position. Mounted orderlies were coming and going
in haste; staff officers were making anxious inquiries; everybody but
himself seemed excited. The battle was raging terrifically in every
direction. Just then there seemed to be universal commotion on our
right, where it was observed our men were giving back. ‘I was looking
for that,’ said Sherman, ‘but I am ready for them.’ His quick, sharp eye
flashed, and his war-begrimed face beamed with satisfaction. The enemy’s
packed columns now made their appearance, and as quickly the guns which
Sherman had so carefully placed in position began to speak. The deadly
effect on the enemy was apparent. While Sherman was still managing the
artillery, Major Sanger, a staff officer, called his attention to the
fact that the enemy’s cavalry were charging toward the battery. ‘Order
up those two companies of infantry,’ was the quick reply, and the
general coolly went on with his guns. The cavalry made a gallant charge,
but their horses carried back empty saddles. The enemy was evidently
foiled. Our men, gaining fresh courage, rallied again, and for the first
time that day the enemy was held stubbornly in check. A moment more and
he fell back over the piles of his dead and wounded.”
General Rousseau, a division officer of Buell’s Army of the Cumberland,
speaks of him in the following handsome manner:
“He gave us our first lessons in the field in the face of an enemy; and
of all the men I ever saw he is the most untiring, vigilant, and
patient. No man that ever lived could surpass him. His enemies say that
he was surprised at Shiloh. I tell you no. He was not surprised nor
whipped, for he fights by the week. Devoid of ambition, incapable of
envy, he is brave, gallant, and just. At Shiloh his old legion met him
just as the battle was ended; and at the sight of him, placing their
hats upon their bayonets, gave him three cheers. It was a touching and
fitting compliment to the gallant chieftain. I am thankful for this
occasion to do justice to a brave, honest, and knightly gentleman.”
Nor did he escape the attention of his commanding officer. General
Grant, in a letter to the War Department, under date of July 25, 1863,
said:
“At the battle of Shiloh, on the last day, he held, with raw troops, the
key point of the landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to
say that I do not believe there was another division commander on the
field who had the skill and experience to have done it. To his
individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that battle.”
Writes Colonel Bowman: “He formed his first line of battle on the brow
of a hill, or rather ridge, on the west of Lick and Owl Creeks, which
served as a natural fortification. The men, by lying down or retiring a
few steps, were well covered, and, by rising and advancing a few paces,
could deliver their fire with terrible effect. But his troops were
mostly green, and wholly untrained in the art of war. The rebel onset
was well directed, rapid, and most persistent. Some of Sherman’s
regiments broke and fled, while others fought like veterans. The fight
soon became general; Beauregard hurled his massed columns with great
impetuosity against our attenuated lines, which, though yielding to the
pressure, did not break. The rebels gained ground inch by inch, but
could do no more than compress the semicircle of our line of battle.
Beauregard had promised his troops to drive us into the Tennessee that
day before three o’clock, but nightfall found him contemplating the
chances of successful retreat; for Buell had arrived. Sherman’s conduct
on that day showed him to be a man of the first order of military
talent. He was not disconcerted by the panic among his green troops,
and, indeed, had expected it. All he asked was, that a reasonable number
should remain and obey orders; and in an American army there can always
be found a goodly proportion of officers and men incapable of being
cowards under any circumstances. With such he did battle on the 6th of
April, 1862—a day long to be remembered, as the day of the battle of
Shiloh. There was not a commanding general on the field who did not rely
on Sherman, and look to him as our chief hope; and there is no question
that but for Sherman our army would have been destroyed. He rode from
place to place, directing his men; he selected from time to time the
positions for his artillery; he dismounted and managed the guns; he sent
suggestions to commanders of divisions; he inspired everybody with
confidence; and yet it never occurred to him that he had accomplished
any thing worthy of remark.”
General Nelson, a few days before his death, in conversation with Larz
Anderson and two or three other gentlemen, said: “During eight hours,
the fate of the army on the field of Shiloh depended on the life of one
man: if General Sherman had fallen, the army would have been captured or
destroyed.”
General Halleck, in his despatch to the Secretary of War, recommending
General Sherman for promotion, said of him: “It is the unanimous opinion
here that Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day
on the 6th of April, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of
the 7th. He was in the thickest of the fight on both days, having three
horses killed under him, and being wounded twice. I respectfully request
that he be made a major-general of volunteers, to date from the 6th
instant.”
Acting upon this recommendation, General Sherman was promoted to the
rank designated, to date from May 1st, 1862.
I shall give you now a letter of considerable length, written by General
Sherman himself about the battle. Some of my readers may not care to
read it all; but it should have a place in the annals of his life,
because it is one of many illustrations of his power with the pen, and
is also his honest and truthful record of the great contest at Pittsburg
Landing:
“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSISSIPPI.
“_Professor Henry Coppee, Philadelphia_:
“DEAR SIR: In the June number of the _United States Service
Magazine_ I find a brief sketch of Lieutenant-General U. S.
Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error,
which General Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to
correct. To General Buell’s noble, able, and gallant conduct you
attribute the fact that the disaster of April 6th, at Pittsburg
Landing, was retrieved, and made the victory of the following
day. As General Taylor is said in his later days to have doubted
whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at all, on account
of the many things having transpired there, according to the
historians, which he did not see, so I begin to doubt whether I
was at the battle of Pittsburg Landing of modern description.
But I was at the battles of April 6th and 7th, 1862. General
Grant visited my division in person about ten A. M., when the
battle raged fiercest. I was then on the right.
“After some general conversation, he remarked that I was doing
right in stubbornly opposing the progress of the enemy; and, in
answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me he had
anticipated their want, and given orders accordingly; he then
said his presence was more needed over at the left. About two P.
M. on the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his attack on me,
and about four P. M. I deliberately made a new line behind
McArthur’s drill field, placing batteries on chosen ground,
repelled easily a cavalry attack, and watched the cautious
approach of the enemy’s infantry, that never dislodged me there.
I selected that line in advance of a bridge across Snake Creek,
by which we had all day been expecting the approach of Lew.
Wallace’s division from Crump’s Landing. About five P. M.,
before the sun set, General Grant came again to me, and, after
hearing my report of matters, explained to me the situation of
affairs on the left, which were not as favorable. Still the
enemy had failed to reach the landing of the boat.
“We agreed that the enemy had expended the _furore_ of his
attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our then
strength, including Lew. Wallace’s fresh division, expected each
minute. He then ordered me to get all things ready, and at
daylight the next day to assume the offensive. That was before
General Buell had arrived, but he was known to be near at hand.
General Buell’s troops took no essential part in the first day’s
fight, and Grant’s army, though collected together hastily,
green as militia, some regiments arriving without cartridges
even, and nearly all hearing the dread sound of battle for the
first time, had successfully withstood and repelled the first
day’s terrific onset of a superior enemy, well commanded and
well handled. I know I had orders from General Grant to assume
the offensive before I knew General Buell was on the west side
of the Tennessee. I think General Buell, Colonel Fry, and others
of General Buell’s staff, rode up to where I was about sunset,
about the time General Grant was leaving me. General Buell asked
me many questions, and got of me a small map, which I had made
for my own use, and told me that by daylight he could have
eighteen thousand fresh men, which I knew would settle the
matter.
“I understood Grant’s forces were to advance on the right of the
Corinth road and Buell’s on the left, and accordingly at
daylight I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance
being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the
battle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon for
Buell’s troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced
and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that with
the exception of one or two struggles, the fighting of April 7th
was easy as compared with that of April 6th.
“I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question any thing done
by General Buell and his army, and know that, approaching our
field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sickening
crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his contempt and
that of his army, who never gave full credit to those in the
front line, who did fight hard, who had, at two P. M., checked
the enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the
offensive. I remember the fact the better from General Grant’s
anecdote of the Donelson battle, which he told me then for the
first time—that, at a certain period of the battle, he saw that
either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold
front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on
the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered.
“At four P. M. of April 6th, he thought the appearances the
same, and he judged, with Lew. Wallace’s fresh division, and
such of our startled troops as had recovered their equilibrium,
he would be justified in dropping the defensive and assuming the
offensive in the morning. And, I repeat, I received such orders
before I knew General Buell’s troops were at the river. I admit
that I was glad Buell was there, because I knew his troops were
older than ours, and better systematized and drilled, and his
arrival made that certain which before was uncertain. I have
heard this question much discussed, and must say that the
officers of Buell’s army dwelt too much on the stampede of some
of our raw troops, and gave us too little credit for the fact
that for one whole day, weakened as we were by the absence of
Buell’s army, long expected, of Lew. Wallace’s division, only
four miles off, and of the fugitives from our ranks, we had
beaten off our assailants for the time. At the same time our
Army of the Tennessee have indulged in severe criticism at the
slow approach of that army which knew the danger that threatened
us from the concentrated armies of Johnston, Beauregard, and
Bragg, that lay at Corinth.
“In a war like this, where opportunities for personal prowess
are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek them at the
front, all such criminations should be frowned down; and were it
not for the military character of your journal, I would not
venture to offer a correction to a very popular error.
“I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another
very common mistake in attributing to General Grant the
selection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran
soldier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division
to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston Railroad. This
order was subsequently modified by his ordering Hurlbut’s
division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Tennessee to
the mouth of Yellow Creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville.
But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, when General
Smith ordered me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg
Landing, and take post well out, so as to make plenty of room,
with Snake and Lake Creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand
army of invasion.
“It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and it
was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been
overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake Creeks forced the enemy to
confine his movements to a direct front attack, which new troops
are better qualified to resist than where flanks are exposed to
a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army
were arranged in that camp by General Smith’s orders, my
division forming, as it were, the outlying pickets, whilst
McClernand’s and Prentiss’s were the real line-of-battle, with
W. H. L. Wallace in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut on
the left; Lew. Wallace’s division being detached. All these
subordinate dispositions were made by the order of General
Smith, before General Grant succeeded him in the command of all
the forces up the Tennessee—headquarters, Savannah.
“If there were any error in putting that army on the west side
of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy
also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant’s;
but there was no mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce
and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come
off, and that was as good as any. It was not then a question of
military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am
convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary; for
otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have
found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude
and untutored as we then were, we could fight as well as they.
“Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual for me; but of
course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I happen to
be a witness to certain truths which are now beginning to pass
out of memory, and form what is called history.
“I also take great pleasure in adding that nearly all the new
troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure have more
than redeemed their good name; among them that very regiment
which first broke, the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appen. Under
another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every campaign and
expedition of mine since, is with me now, and can march, and
bivouac, and fight as well as the best regiment in this or any
army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from the State
of Ohio.
“I am, with respect, yours truly,
“W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.”
Rarely for young and old is there a finer example of Professor
Longfellow’s words in the Psalm of Life—
“Learn to labor and to wait,”
than this part of General Sherman’s career affords. He did his work
well, and two years afterwards the military genius, unrecognized then by
the country, filled the land with his praise.