It will be obvious that I am not here speaking of co-operation and

co-ordination, economic as well as military, between the Allies for

the speeding on of victory. That exists, and has existed in greater or

less measure since the beginning; whatever strengthens it is plainly

sound and desirable. What is spoken of is the attempt to encumber

purely military issues with a whole new economic programme, and to make

the length of the war turn as much on the latter as on the former. It

is time for somebody to say quite brutally that this is a struggle to

destroy Prussian militarism, not to establish British Protectionism.

To this last we may come, but blood and more especially the blood

of men enrolled on another appeal, must not be the argument of the

innovators. Nor is it suggested that the influence of economic on

military resources should be overlooked. The economic factor has indeed

proved to be far less decisive, or far less rapidly decisive, than many

forecasters of events had anticipated, and for two very valid reasons.

For one thing the enemy has at his command the whole centre of Europe,

a vast geographical _bloc_ interknit in almost all its parts by an

uninterrupted system of intercourse which so far remains intact. For

another the operation of the economic motive turns on the assumption of

a minimum standard of life below which man will not consent to fall,

willingly or at all. In normal times of peace this is rigid, and any

serious depression of it will produce widespread commotion and revolt.

But in war, when the struggle is or is conceived to be for national

existence, belligerent peoples will agree to the lopping away of luxury

after luxury and conventional necessary after conventional necessary.

For a considerable part of the process they find the society in which

they live actually stronger and not weaker. Even when the weakening

pinch comes it is countered by a spirit of sacrifice, altogether

abnormal and not easily to be measured. So long as the army has a rag

to its back, a crust of bread, and a cartridge, economic exhaustion

is not complete. The end will probably come sooner, and defeat will

be accepted out of calculation before it is accepted out of sheer

necessity. What is much more probable is that a military decision will

have been obtained at a much earlier stage, but with all this said

there remains a perfectly clear distinction between assigning their

due rôle to economic conditions on the one hand, and transforming an

honour-war into a trade-war on the other hand.

The worst sin of those who desire or seem to desire such a change is

that of effecting a deterioration of the moral ideal of the Allies.

This is no affair of fine words but of abiding realities. Either

this is on our part a war into which we were forced by aggressive

militarism--come to overt baseness in the Prussian breach of faith

with Belgium and assault on peaceful France, and the Austrian blow of

destruction at Serbia--or else it is a mere struggle for domination

between greedy Powers. If it were the latter it would be wise to say

no more of the antithesis between barbarism and civilisation. It would

be wise to finish the nightmare of blood as well as we could, to

pouch the spoils, and be silent. But since it is the former we must

resist any debasement of purpose. Since it is a war for the ending

of militarism it must include in its ultimate historical sweep the

liberation of all peoples who desire liberation, even the Germans. So

long as it continues unwarped from its original intention that hope may

be fulfilled. Not only is a _locus pœnitentiæ_ left for the democracy

which must one day arise even in Prussia, but much more is involved. An

opportunity is given for that immediate repudiation of a government by

a people which in the past has always taken the form of a revolution.

Nobody is able to say dogmatically that there is any prospect of such

a development within the Central Powers, and nobody is able to say

dogmatically that there is not: we are not allowed to know. It is the

habit of those countries to surround their frontiers with a wall of

brass. We do catch, through the species of man like Liebknecht and

Haase, certain rumblings and rumours of discontent, but cannot even

guess at their significance. When certain writers profess to find the

solidarity in crime of the whole body of the Germanic populations

established by the absence of protest against notorious outrages they

show little acquaintance with the condition of public opinion in these

countries. Prussian militarism and intellectualism begin by lying to

and mentally debauching their own citizens. Every German newspaper

has represented the Zeppelin raids as successful attacks on purely

military and naval establishments, any other damage being incidental

and not designed. Till the end of the war the average ignorant peasant

and mechanic will have heard no other story than that the _Lusitania_

was a war-ship treacherously disguised. One has only to read the German

White Book on Belgium, as translated by Professor Morgan, to understand

the sort of scientific denigration of that little people that has

been invoked to justify so much of the tale of Louvain and Aerschot

and the rest as has been allowed to penetrate to the masses. Penny

editions of the Bryce Report do not circulate under either Habsburgs

or Hohenzollerns. If fragments of the truth do find a surreptitious

way in, the police are there to see that natural indignation shall not

express itself. We gather from Liebknecht that the official shepherding

of opinion in this regard goes as far as penal servitude and even

capital punishment. The actual state of mind of a democratic remnant

that may exist is, therefore, to us a clasped and sealed book.

But we do know by the mere inner light of our own principles a great

deal that is relevant. The decree of democracy to a whole nation,

however bedevilled and misled, can never be one of unconditional

destruction. It is not our message to the Germans. So long as their

populations identify themselves with the policy of their present

miscreant governments they must share their fate. Defeat and, after

defeat, outlawry will be their portion. That outlawry will continue

until the historical crime of 1914 is purged by chastisement. But

the moment the first internal fissure appears a new order has begun.

A Germany that has punished her own crowned and helmeted criminals

will come before Europe in a very different guise from one that has

naturally adopted them. The breaking away of Austria from Prussia--an

unnatural alliance--will fix for us a very wide gulf between Austrian

and Prussian. There have been wars in which the greatest internal

changes took place without influencing the course of the conflict. The

fall of Napoleon III did not bring the struggle of 1870 to an end. But

the fall of Wilhelm II would undoubtedly bring this war to an end. If

the Teutonic masses desire an early peace, and an early re-entry into

the fabric of civilisation, they have but to destroy the false gods

they adored. The diplomatist of the old pattern will tell us that these

are fantastic suggestions. But the truth is that nothing could seem

to our awakened eyes half as fantastic as the old diplomacy, with its

suave blindness and sham omniscience. The new diplomacy should help to

release imprisoned forces. The inner disruption of the Central Alliance

is never very far from practical politics. When the full toll of blood

and disillusionment, exacted by Hohenzollernism, comes to be realised,

strange births may issue into being. So many men have died for liberty

that we have no right to disbelieve in any of its possibilities. And so

long as we adhere, as we must adhere, with a loyalty even meticulous,

to the true cause and first spirit of the Allies, no such possibility

is ruled out.

But consent to the substitution of “trade” for “honour” as our device,

and mark the malign transformation. Some of our less well-inspired

publicists have already done something to communicate to the _bloc_

of enemy countries a unity which does not inhere in its nature.

Things breaking up from within may be held together by pressure from

without, and such pressure has been in some measure supplied by

those to whom reference is made. By steadily ignoring every impulse

of disintegration, racial, economic and moral, they have plastered

over although they have not sealed up the structural cracks. The new

programme, if adopted, will, however, go far to harden the plaster

into cement. The spokesmen of Prussianism will be presented with a

complete triumph over any faint voice of civilisation that may still

be lifted within the enemy realms. They will say quite legitimately:

“Our opponents babbled of honour, and moral ideas. We said that that

was all hypocrisy, and that their real aim was to isolate, impoverish,

and if possible destroy the whole Germanic race. Who now is right? The

shopkeepers’ programme has now been openly proclaimed. The struggle

of the Germanies is now a struggle for the mere right to exist. What

have you to say now in reply to the Kaiser’s resolve to arm every man

and boy and woman, aye, and every cat and dog in the Fatherland before

submitting to extinction?”

In truth there would be nothing to say. Our ideal would have fallen in

the common mud, the last hope of humanity would have perished, and the

war must be indefinitely prolonged. If you have driven an enemy into a

corner and hold your bayonet pointed at his breast; if he asks on what

terms you will accept his surrender and your answer is that in that

case he will be not bayoneted but hanged, you must expect resistance _à

outrance_. It will become an affair not of courage but of mere sanity.

Whatever the divagations of their statesmanship, the Allies will,

of course, win. The nations, however stampeded, will not sacrifice

the least element of their unity, and the armies, to whatever new

deflection their inspiration be submitted, will fight their unwavering

way to victory. But it will be a victory tainted with ambiguous and

selfish ends. History will write of us that we began nobly, but that

our purpose corrupted. The Great War for freedom will not, indeed, have

been waged in vain; that is already decided: but it will have but half

kept its promises. Blood and iron will have been once more established

as the veritable masters of men, and nothing will open before the world

save a vista of new wars.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a

predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they

were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation

marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left

unbalanced.

Two unclosed parentheses were silently corrected.

In the original book, multi-section chapter headings (with Roman

Numerals) included repetitions of the chapter title. In this eBook,

those chapter titles only appear above the first section.

The Ways of War · 第 13 / 13 段