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UNION AND DEMOCRACY
by
ALLEN JOHNSON
Professor of American History
Yale University
[Illustration: From the original portrait by Stuart, at Bowdoin College.
Th. Jefferson [Handwritten]]
[Illustration]
Houghton Mifflin Company
Boston New York Chicago
The Riverside Press Cambridge
Copyright, 1915, by Allen Johnson
All Rights Reserved
The Riverside Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
U. S. A.
PREFACE
The title of this volume must be regarded as suggestive rather than as
strictly accurate, for the beginnings of union are to be found farther
back than 1783, and democracy in its largest sense has even yet been
only imperfectly realized. At the close of the Revolution, union was but
a name. What Metternich said of the Italy of his day might have been
said of the United States in 1783: it was only a geographical
expression. The formation of the new federal union under the
Constitution is properly the main, though not the sole, theme of this
volume. Behind the thirteen Atlantic communities lay a vast region which
almost at once invited the colonizing activities of the people. The rise
of this western world is a movement of immense significance. Out of the
bosom of the West emerged the new democracy which transformed the face
of society in the old States. Whether viewed economically or
politically, this forms the second theme in any history of the times.
Around these two movements, therefore, I have endeavored to group the
events of forty-five years.
Within the last few years special studies have added much to the common
stock of historical information, and in many ways effected changes in
the historian's point of view. The time seemed proper to restate the
salient factors in the history of this formative period. I have frankly
appropriated the labors of others. Had the plan of the series permitted
the use of footnotes, I would gladly have made particular acknowledgment
of my indebtedness. At the same time I have not hesitated to present the
results of my own studies where they have led away from the conventional
view of men and events.
In preparation of the maps showing the popular vote in the elections of
1800 and 1824, I have drawn largely upon the data which Dr. Charles O.
Paullin, of the Carnegie Institution, has generously put at my disposal.
In States where the presidential electors were not chosen directly by
the voters, other votes, such as those for governor, have been made the
basis for determining the popular choice among party candidates for the
presidency. Two of my graduate students, Miss Isabel S. Mitchell and Mr.
Joseph E. Howe, have given me valuable assistance in the execution of
the maps. I am under particular obligation to my colleague, Professor
Stewart L. Mims, for reading critically both manuscript and proof.
Allen Johnson.
CONTENTS
I. The Ordeal of the Confederation 1
II. The Making of the Constitution 25
III. The Restoration of Public Credit 46
IV. The Testing of the New Government 68
V. Anglomen and Jacobins 89
VI. The Revolution of 1800 105
VII. Jeffersonian Reforms 123
VIII. The Purchase of the Province of Louisiana 143
IX. Faction and Conspiracy 161
X. Peaceable Coercion 179
XI. The Approach of War 197
XII. The War of 1812 212
XIII. The Results of the War 231
XIV. The Westward Movement 245
XV. Hard Times 266
XVI. The National Awakening 282
XVII. The New Democracy 298
XVIII. Politics and State Rights 318
XIX. The Rise of National Sovereignty 331
Index i
MAPS AND CHARTS
The United States in 1783 _facing_ 1
State-making in the West, 1783-87 9
Distribution of Votes in Ratification of The Constitution:
The New England States 37
The Middle States 39
The Southern States 42
Distribution of Population, 1790 49
Vote on Assumption 59
The Northwest, 1785-95 71
Vote on the Repeal of the Alien and Sedition
Acts, February 25, 1799 _between_ 112 _and_ 113
Presidential Election of 1800 _between_ 116 _and_ 117
Distribution of Population, 1800 125
Vote on the Repeal of the Judiciary Act, March 2, 1802
_between_ 134 _and_ 135
The Yazoo-Georgia Land Controversy 168
The Tonnage of the United States, 1807 185
Vote on the Embargo, December 21, 1807
_between_ 190 _and_ 191
Vote on the Declaration of War, June 4, 1812
_between_ 208 _and_ 209
Land Sales and Land Offices To 1821 248
The Cotton Crop in the United States, 1801-34 250
The West As an Economic Section in 1820 253
Treaty With Spain, 1819 263
Distribution of Slaves in 1820 270
Vote on the Missouri Compromise, March 2, 1820 278
Russian Claims in North America 293
Distribution of Population, 1820 299
States Admitted To the Union Between 1812 and 1821 306
Vote on the Tariff Bill, April 16, 1824
_between_ 310 _and_ 311
Presidential Election of 1824 _between_ 314 _and_ 315
Vote on the Tariff Bill, April 22, 1828
_between_ 328 _and_ 329
Canals in the United States About 1825 341
Highways of the United States About 1825 344
UNION AND DEMOCRACY
[Map: The United States in 1783]
UNION AND DEMOCRACY
CHAPTER I
THE ORDEAL OF THE CONFEDERATION
It was characteristic of the people of the United States that once
assured of their political independence they should face their economic
future with buoyant expectations. As colonizers of a new world they were
confident in their own strength. When once the shackles of the British
mercantile system were shaken off, they did not doubt their ability to
compete for the markets of the world. Even Washington, who had fewer
illusions than most of his contemporaries, told his fellow citizens of
America that they were "placed in the most enviable condition, as sole
lords and proprietors of a vast tract of continent, comprehending all
the various soils and climates of the world, and abounding with all the
necessaries and conveniences of life." Independence was the magic word
which the common man believed would open wide the gates of prosperity.
Yet within a year after the ratification of the Peace of Paris, American
society was in the throes of a severe industrial depression.
Contrary to the accepted view, the latter years of the war were not
years of penury and want among the people. Outside of those regions of
Virginia and the Carolinas, which were devastated by the marching and
countermarching of the combatants, the people were living in comparative
comfort. North of the Potomac, indeed, there was even a tendency to
speculation in business and extravagance in living. Throughout the war
farmers had found a ready market for their produce within the lines of
the British and French armies. The temporary suspension of commerce had
encouraged many forms of productive industry. As the war continued,
venturesome skippers eluded British men-of-war and found their way to
European or Dutch West India ports, bringing home rich cargoes in
exchange for tobacco, flour, and rice. The prizes brought in by
privateers added largely to the stock of desirable and attractive
merchandise in the shops of Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston. If
such prosperity could follow in the wake of war, what commercial gains
might not be expected in the piping times of peace? In anticipation of
immediate returns, merchants drew heavily upon their foreign creditors
and stocked their shops with imported commodities. Southern planters
indulged similar expectations and bought land and slaves on credit,
regardless of the price. "A rage for running in debt became epidemical,"
wrote a contemporary observer. "Individuals were for getting rich by a
_coup de main_; a good bargain--a happy speculation--was almost every
man's object and pursuit."
During the hard times of 1785-86 these golden dreams vanished. Instead
of sharing as the people of an independent nation in the trade and
commerce of the world, American shippers found themselves no better off
than they were as dependents of Great Britain. Orders in council at once
closed the ports of the British West Indies to all staple products which
were not carried in British bottoms. Certain commodities,--fish, pork,
and beef,--which might compete with the products of British
dependencies, were excluded altogether. The policy of France and Spain
was scarcely less illiberal. The effect was immediate. Cut off from
their natural markets, American shipowners were forced either to leave
their vessels to rot at their wharves or to seek new markets. For months
there seemed to be no other alternative. At the same time the new
industries which had sprung up during the war had to meet the shock of
foreign competition, as the British manufacturer dumped on American
wharves the accumulated stock of his warehouses. The plight of the small
farmer and of the large planter was much the same; for both had incurred
debts in expectation of continued prosperity.
Everywhere people complained of hard times. Discouragement and ill-humor
displaced the buoyant optimism with which peace had been heralded. "What
is independence?" asked a writer in _A Shorter Catechism_. "Dependence
upon nothing" was the cynical answer. In many States the popular
discontent found vent in a vindictive crusade against the Tories. Even
sober-minded citizens shared the general detestation of these
unfortunate people. In the heat of war Washington had declared them to
be "abominable pests of society" who ought to be hanged as traitors.
The States had quite generally confiscated their property and in some
cases had passed acts of attainder against them. In communities like New
York, which had long remained in the hands of the British, the popular
animosity was exceedingly bitter. To aid those citizens who had been
dispossessed of their estates, the legislature passed the Trespass Act,
which permitted suits for the recovery of property that had passed into
the hands of the enemy upon the flight of the owners. The terms of the
act were in flat contradiction to the treaty of peace. Further to aid
claimants, it was provided that no military order could be pleaded in
court in justification of the seizure of property.
In a famous case brought before the Mayor's Court of New York by the
widow Rutgers to recover her property from Joshua Waddington, a wealthy
Tory, Alexander Hamilton appeared as counsel for the defendant. It was a
daring act which brought down upon him the unmitigated wrath of the
radical elements. Nevertheless, in an opinion which has considerable
interest for students of constitutional law, the court ruled that the
Trespass Act, "by a reasonable interpretation," must be construed in
harmony with the treaty of peace, which was obligatory upon every State.
It was not to be presumed that the legislature would intentionally
violate the law of nations. The judgment of the court therefore, was in
favor of the defendant. With chagrin and resentment the popular party
declared that the court had set aside a law of the State and had
presumed to set itself above the legislature. Wherever the radicals got
the upper hand, confiscation was the order of the day; and even where
the conservatives succeeded in restraining their radical brethren from
legislative reprisals, no Tory was safe from the assaults of
irresponsible mobs. Thousands took refuge in flight, to the infinite
delight of the wits in the coffee-houses who jested of the "Independence
Fever" which was carrying off so many worthy people.
Financially the Confederation was hopelessly embarrassed. Having sowed
the wind by its issues of bills of credit, it was now reaping the
whirlwind. By the end of the war this paper money had so far depreciated
that it ceased to pass as currency. "Not worth a continental" has passed
into our native idiom. Without power to levy taxes, Congress could only
make requisitions upon the States. The returns were pitifully inadequate
to the needs of government. All told, less than a million and a half of
dollars came into the treasury between 1781 and 1784, although Morris,
as Superintendent of Finance, had earnestly besought the governors of
the States for two millions for the year 1783 alone, in order to meet
outstanding obligations and current expenses. Without foreign and
domestic loans the war could never have been carried to a successful
conclusion; but in 1783 even that source was drained. In sheer
desperation Congress authorized the Superintendent of Finance to draw
bills of exchange, at his discretion, upon the credit of loans _which
were to be procured_ in Europe. In vain Morris warned Congress that no
more loans could be secured. "Our public credit is gone," he declared.
The obvious remedy for the financial ills of the Confederation was to
give Congress the power to levy taxes. Early in 1781, indeed, before the
Articles of Confederation had been ratified by Maryland, the proposal
had been made that Congress should be vested with power to levy a five
per cent duty on imports; but the obstinate opposition of Rhode Island
effectually blocked the amendment. "She considered it the most precious
jewel of sovereignty that no State be called upon to open its purse but
by the authority of the State and by her own officers." Again, in 1783,
Congress submitted to the States an amendment which would confer upon it
the power to place specific duties for a term of twenty-five years upon
certain classes of imported commodities. The tardy response of the
States to this proposal left little hope that it would be adopted.
In fact, the Confederation and its woes hardly occupied the thoughts of
the people at all, except as a subject for jest and ridicule. The
newspapers made merry over the peregrinations of Congress. Frightened
away from Philadelphia by the riotous conduct of some troops of the
Pennsylvania line, who had imbibed too freely, the delegates had
withdrawn first to Princeton and then to Annapolis. Thither Washington
repaired to resign his commission; but even so notable an occasion as
this brought together delegates from only seven of the States. The best
talent in America was drafted into the service of the several States.
Men had ceased to think continentally. "A selfish habitude of thinking
and reasoning," wrote one who styled himself Yorick, in the _New York
Packet_, "leads us into a fatal error the moment we begin to talk of the
interests of America. The fact is, by the interests of America we mean
only the interests of that State to which property or accident has
attached us." "Of the affairs of Georgia," Madison confessed in 1786, "I
know as little as those of Kamskatska."
On all sides intelligent men agreed that the return of prosperity
depended upon the opening-up of foreign trade. Their immediate concern
was the recovery of old markets. When John Adams went to London in 1785
as the first representative of the United States, he bent all his
energies to the task of securing a commercial treaty which would provide
for unrestricted intercourse between the countries. It was an impossible
task. At every turn he encountered the hostility of the mercantile
classes, of whom Lord Sheffield was the most conspicuous representative.
"What have you to give us in exchange for this and that?" "What have you
to give us as reciprocity for the benefit of going to our islands?"
"What assurance can you give that the States will agree to a treaty?"
These were the embarrassing questions which Adams had to encounter.
Baffled by the cool indifference of the English Ministry, Adams wrote
home in despair that there was not the slightest prospect of relief for
American commerce unless the States would confer the power of passing
navigation laws upon Congress or themselves pass retaliatory acts
against Great Britain.
Congress had, indeed, already urged upon the States the necessity of
yielding the power to enact navigation laws; but they had replied with
such deliberation and with so many conditions that Congress was as
powerless as ever. Meantime, each State struck blindly at the common
enemy with little or no regard for its neighbors. "The States are every
day giving proofs," wrote Madison, "that separate regulations are more
likely to set them by the ears than to attain the common object." When
the other New England States closed their ports to British shipping,
Connecticut hastened to profit at their expense by throwing her ports
wide open. New Jersey, with New York on one side and Pennsylvania on the
other, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends. To find a historical
parallel to the annals of this period, one must go back to the
bickerings and jealousies of the states of ancient Greece.
In this dark picture, however, there are cheering rays of light. One by
one the States were redeeming their promises and ceding their western
lands. It seemed as though the Confederation, hitherto a disembodied
spirit, was about to tenant a body. By the year 1786 the United States
were in joint possession of the greater part of the vast region between
the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Great Lakes--a domain of imperial
dimensions. In anticipation of these cessions, Congress took under
consideration an ordinance reported by a committee of which Thomas
Jefferson was chairman. This ordinance contemplated the division of the
land north of the thirty-first parallel into fourteen or sixteen States.
The settlers in these rectangular areas were not to form state
governments at once, but for their temporary government were to borrow
such constitutions as they thought best from the older States. When a
State had twenty thousand inhabitants, it might frame a permanent
constitution and send a delegate to Congress. Admission to the Union was
to be granted only when a State had as many free inhabitants as "the
least numerous of the thirteen original States." Two features of
Jefferson's report do not appear in the Ordinance of 1784; the fantastic
names which Jefferson had selected and the fifth of the fundamental
conditions which were to be a charter of compact between the old States
and the new. It is perhaps no misfortune that the names Assenisipia,
Polypotamia, Pelisipia, do not appear on the map; the article
prohibiting slavery after the year 1800 might well have been retained.
[Map: State-Making In the West 1783-1787]
More important than the Ordinance of 1784, which indeed is interesting
chiefly because it was the forerunner of the final ordinance for the
Northwest Territory, is that adopted by Congress in the following year.
The so-called Land Ordinance of 1785 provided in general for the survey
of a series of townships six miles square in the region immediately west
of Pennsylvania, and for the further division of each township into
thirty-six lots, or, as they were later styled, "sections," one mile
square. After satisfying the claims of the soldiers of the Continental
Army, Congress proposed to distribute these lands among the States, to
be sold at auction for a minimum price of one dollar an acre, reserving
certain sections in each township and one third of the mineral ore which
might be found. The sixteenth section in each township was to be set
aside for the support of education. Each purchaser was to receive with
his deed a definite description of his holding. Subsequent amendments to
the Land Ordinance made the terms of purchase somewhat easier. Instead
of making an out-and-out purchase, prospective settlers might pay one
third in cash and receive a credit of three months for the balance of
the purchase price. Yet even with these inducements only seventy-three
thousand acres had been sold to individuals down to 1788. The hazards of
western settlement were still too great.
Disappointed in the sales under the Land Ordinance, Congress was
persuaded to consider the alternative course of selling large tracts to
companies. The collapse of national credit left the public domain almost
the only available source of revenue. Early in 1787 the Ohio Company
offered to purchase a tract of land between the Ohio and Muskingum
Rivers. The promoters of this company had been interested in an earlier
project of army officers for the founding of a military colony beyond
the Ohio. Organized at Boston in March, 1786, with a nominal capital of
one million dollars, it had within a year raised one fourth of that
amount and sent first General Samuel Parsons and then the Reverend
Manasseh Cutler to secure the desired grant from Congress. The labors of
this astute divine at the seat of government form an interesting chapter
in the evolution of American legislative methods. By devices well known
to the modern lobbyist he not only secured the grant of land, but also
took a hand in the shaping of a new ordinance for the Northwest
Territory. In order to secure the grant to his associates, he had to
resort to log-rolling and agree to procure for a group of land
speculators an option to lands on the Scioto River. The grant to the
Ohio Company contained a million and a half acres; that to the Scioto
Company, five million acres. But while the one paid down half a million
dollars, the other made no payment, expecting to dispose of their
"rights" before the first payment was due. In the following year a third
grant of a million acres on the Great and Little Miami Rivers in Ohio
was made to John Cleve Symmes.
From these sales Congress expected to realize over three and a half
million dollars in public securities and at the same time to satisfy
military bounty warrants amounting to about eight hundred thousand
acres. The actual amount realized was less than six hundred thousand
dollars. The Scioto Company succeeded in disposing of rights to about
three million acres to a company organized in France, which in turn
sold them to unsuspecting royalist emigrants. Neither company ever
secured a clear title to these lands, and Congress had eventually to
come to the relief of the unhappy French settlers with a donation of
twenty-four thousand acres. Unforeseen circumstances prevented either
the Ohio Company or Symmes from complying with the conditions of sale;
and in both cases Congress consented to alter the terms of contract.
On July 13, 1787, Congress adopted the ordinance which it had long had
under consideration. The authorship of this "charter of the west," after
long controversy, is still in dispute. Like all legislative measures it
bears the mark of many hands. Certain features of Jefferson's ordinance
reappear: the provision for temporary government and eventual statehood,
and the fundamental articles of compact. Other provisions are stated in
a detailed fashion and suggest the probability that Congress had
definite conditions to meet. The ordinance took final form while the
Reverend Manasseh Cutler was representing the Ohio Company in New York.
Perhaps the most striking departure from the Ordinance of 1784 is the
provision for not less than three nor more than five States north of the
Ohio, where Jefferson planned for ten. Admission to the Union was to be
gained only after the population had reached sixty thousand. Temporary
government was to consist of a governor, a secretary, and three judges
appointed by Congress, who were to adopt such laws from other States as
they believed suited to local conditions. In each and every case
Congress reserved the right to disallow these laws. Whenever a territory
attained a population of five thousand, it was to pass to the second
grade of government, with a representative assembly, an appointive
council, and a delegate in Congress.
Six articles of compact were also written into the ordinance, which were
to remain forever unalterable except by the common consent of the
parties thereto--"the original States and the people and States in the
said territory." Freedom of worship, the usual rights of person and
property, and the obligation of private contracts were guaranteed.
Religion, morality, and education were to be forever encouraged. Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude was to be permitted. In imposing these
conditions Congress undoubtedly exceeded its powers under the Articles
of Confederation, for that document nowhere confers upon Congress the
power to make binding contracts, nor for that matter to legislate in any
wise for the government of the common domain.
The Ohio Company hastened to colonize its broad acres on the Muskingum.
Before the end of the year 1787, the vanguard of the first colony was on
the march through Pennsylvania to the upper waters of the Ohio. There
they spent the winter constructing the craft which was to carry them to
their destination. As soon as the ice broke up in the spring, they
embarked on the Mayflower,--for so they had christened the craft,--and
within five days set foot on the soil of Ohio. Other bands joined them,
and by midsummer their rude huts and a blockhouse marked the site of
what was to be the town of Marietta, the first New England settlement
in the West. Across the Muskingum, at Fort Harmar, the new governor,
General St. Clair, had already taken up his official residence. Farther
down the river, Symmes planted a colony from New Jersey on the tract
which he had purchased; and within the next few years settlements were
made in the adjoining district, which Virginia had reserved as bounty
land for her soldiers. The vision of virgin lands in the Ohio country
was beginning to dawn upon the small farmer of the East. Emigration grew
apace. Between February and June, 1788, an observer noted not less than
forty-five hundred settlers drifting past Fort Harmar in their
flatboats, in search of new homes in the wilderness.
While the colonization of the Northwest was going on under the eye of
Governor St. Clair, hardy pioneers were laying the foundations of a new
society in the Southwest, without the protecting arm of the Government.
Before the war Daniel Boone had made his famous trace to "the country of
Kentucke" through the Cumberland Gap; and Robertson had led his colony
from North Carolina to the upper waters of the Tennessee. Settlers had
followed the long-rangers; and numerous communities sprang up by salt
lick and water course. In all these settlements there was much local
independence. For a time the people on the Watauga had established a
government of their own. Upon the cession by North Carolina of her
western lands, the settlers of eastern Tennessee took matters into their
own hands and prepared to organize as a State. Congress had just adopted
the Ordinance of 1784, and one of Jefferson's prospective States
included most of the land already appropriated by these pioneers. They
nourished, too, long-standing grievances. They were taxed for the
support of a government which treated them with contumely and ignored
their administrative needs. The movement toward independence acquired
such headway that not even the repeal of the act of cession by North
Carolina could stay its course. With a confidence born of frontier
conditions these "modern Franks, the hardy mountain men," as a
contemporary called them, drafted a constitution, organized a
government, and appealed to Congress for recognition as a State of the
Confederation. For three years the State of Franklin, as it was
officially christened, under the able leadership of Governor John
Sovier, refused to recognize the authority of North Carolina, even to
the point of resisting the militia by arms. But Congress turned a deaf
ear to the petitions of the insurgents; and in the year 1788, diplomacy
succeeding where coercion had failed, the people of Franklin returned to
their first allegiance.
Much the same centrifugal forces were at work in northwestern Virginia
and western Pennsylvania, a region which felt its isolation keenly.
"Separated by a vast, extensive and almost impassible Tract of
Mountains, by Nature itself formed and pointed out as a Boundary between
this Country and those below it," the settlers of this trans-Alleghany
region besought Congress to recognize them as a "sister colony and
fourteenth province of the American Confederacy."
More menacing to the integrity of Virginia was a movement for
independent statehood among the people of Kentucky. Rivers were the
highways of their commerce and the current of all bore their flatboats
away from the parent State. New Orleans was their inevitable _entrepot_.
The forces of nature seemed to conspire to throw these western
settlements into the hands of Spain. Washington was deeply impressed by
the necessity of connecting the headwaters of the James and the Potomac
with the tributaries of the Ohio, if the trade and allegiance of the
people of Kentucky were to be secured to Virginia and to the Union. "The
western States," he wrote to Governor Harrison of Virginia, "stand as it
were upon a pivot. The touch of a feather would turn them any way." The
situation in Kentucky became more acute as intimations reached the
people that John Jay was proposing to renounce the free navigation of
the Mississippi.
In the summer of 1785, Don Diego de Gardoqui, the first accredited
Minister from Spain, arrived in the United States to settle all
outstanding differences between the two countries. Congress appointed
John Jay as its diplomatic agent and instructed him to hold insistently
to the thirty-first parallel as the southern boundary of the States and
to the free navigation of the Mississippi. The prospect of agreement was
very slight. The American claims were based solely on the Treaty of 1783
which the King of Spain was determined not to recognize. Negotiations
dragged on for months. Reporting to Congress in August, 1786, Jay
advised the abandonment of the claim of free navigation of the
Mississippi for the sake of securing an advantageous commercial treaty
with Spain. The delegates from Northern States were ready to barter away
the Southwest; but the Southern delegates succeeded in postponing action
until the impotent Confederation gave way to a more perfect union.
At the Court of St. James, John Adams was having no better luck in
pressing the rights of the moribund Confederation. Notwithstanding the
explicit terms of the Treaty of 1783, British garrisons still held
strategic posts along the Great Lakes, exercising a strong influence
upon the Indians and guarding the interests of British fur traders. Such
a situation would have been intolerable to a self-respecting nation.
Smothering his pride, Adams mustered all the diplomacy which his nature
permitted and sought an explanation of this extraordinary conduct from
the ministers. He was finally told that he need not expect Great Britain
to relinquish the Western posts so long as the States continued to put
obstacles in the way of the collection of British debts.
A general reluctance to meet financial obligations was a deplorable
aspect of the depression to which American society had succumbed. In all
the States there was a more or less numerous class of debtors who were
convinced that the Government could help them out of all their
distresses. As the cause of all their woes was the scarcity of money,
why, let the Government manufacture money and so put an end to the
stringency. What Madison called "the general rage for paper money"
seized upon Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and
Georgia. Coupled with paper-money acts were others designed to alleviate
the distress of the unfortunate. Stay laws of one sort or another were
devised to keep the wolf, in the guise of the sheriff, from the door.
Legal-tender acts made cattle and produce equivalent to money when
offered in payment of debts. Nor was this legislation inspired
altogether by dishonest intent. Many believed with Luther Martin, of
Maryland, that there were times of great public distress and extreme
scarcity of specie when it was the duty of the Government to pass stay
laws and legal-tender acts, "to prevent the wealthy creditor and the
moneyed man from totally destroying the poor, though even industrious,
debtor."
No State suffered more from the paper-money aberration than Rhode
Island. Under pressure from the radical elements the legislature passed
an act for the emission of bills of credit which were to be issued to
any freeholder who would offer as security real estate of any sort to
double the amount of the loan. "Many from all parts of the State made
haste to avail themselves of their good fortune, and mortgaged fields
strewn thick with stones and covered with cedars and stunted pines for
sums such as could not have been obtained for the richest pastures." But
when they sought their creditors, not a merchant nor a shop-keeper could
be found. Nobody fished to have a just debt discharged in such currency.
Not to be thwarted in their purpose, the radicals then enacted a law
which threatened with a summary trial and a heavy fine any one who
refused to accept paper money in payment of debt.
Under this Force Act, one John Weeden, a butcher, was brought to trial
for refusing to receive the paper offered by a customer in payment for
meat. To the discomfiture of the legislature the court refused to
enforce the law in this instance, on the ground that the statute was
contrary to the constitution of Rhode Island; and when summoned before
the legislature to answer for their defiance, the judges boldly stood
their ground. The case of _Trevett_ v. _Weeden_ was not without its
lesson to those who were casting about for ways and means to defend
property from the assaults of popular majorities. In Virginia, too, the
highest state court, in the case of _Commonwealth_ v. _Caton_, boldly
asserted the right of the judiciary to declare void such acts of the
legislature as were repugnant to the constitution.
Meantime the debtor and creditor classes in Massachusetts were locked in
a struggle which menaced the peace of the country. Here as elsewhere
hard times had forced the small farmers of the interior counties to the
wall. No doubt their difficulties were caused in part by their own
improvidence, but they were increased by the prevailing scarcity of
money. So dire was the want of a medium of exchange that many
communities resorted to barter. The editor of a Worcester paper
advertised that he would accept Indian corn, rye, wheat, wood, or
flaxseed, in payment of debts owed to him, up to the amount of twenty
shillings. It seemed to the ignorant farmer that his creditors were
taking an unfair advantage of circumstances in demanding currency to
settle debts which had been contracted when money was abundant. The
law, however, favored the creditor. The jails were filled to overflowing
with men imprisoned for debt; the courts were overwhelmed with actions.
In Worcester County, with a population of less than fifty thousand
people, there were in 1784 two thousand cases on the docket of the
Inferior Court of Common Pleas. In this age of litigation only one class
appeared to thrive--the lawyers. The anger of the poor debtors, inflamed
by attachments and foreclosures, vented itself upon the ostensible cause
of their misfortunes. The excessive costs of courts and the immoderate
fees of lawyers are grievances which bulk large in every indictment
drawn by town meeting or county convention. Young John Quincy Adams,
then a senior in Harvard College, was so affected by the odium which had
fallen upon the practice of law that he was almost ready to abandon the
career which he had chosen.
The adjournment of the General Court in July, 1786, without authorizing
an issue of paper money or passing a legal-tender act or fixing the fees
of lawyers and the costs of courts, contributed to the unrest which was
now assuming a threatening aspect. During August and September riotous
mobs prevented the courts from sitting at Northampton, Worcester, Great
Barrington, and Concord. Alarmed by these disorders Governor Bowdoin
convened the legislature in special session and summoned the militia to
the protection of the capital. While the legislature was devising ways
and means of allaying the public excitement, another demonstration
occurred at Worcester which resulted in the dispersion of the Court of
General Sessions by a force of armed men. From Worcester the disorders
spread into adjoining counties; and something like a concerted movement
upon Boston and Cambridge seemed to be preparing. The prompt action of
the state authorities however, balked the plans of the insurgents. The
main body of insurgents under Shays scattered; but a month later they
rallied around Springfield to prevent the holding of court. Governor
Bowdoin then dispatched troops, four thousand strong, under the command
of General Lincoln, to the assistance and protection of the civil
authorities. A civil war seemed imminent. Shays had planned an attack
upon the national arsenal at Springfield, but he could not bring his
rustics to act together. Before the determined resistance of the local
militia his undisciplined troops broke and fled. The arrival of the
state militia under Lincoln completed the demoralization of Shays' army.
Retreating through the hilly country of Hampshire, they wore finally
overtaken and routed at Petersham. Some of the insurgents went to their
homes, completely humbled and subdued; others fled across the border to
await better times; and still others, unrepentant and unsubdued,
continued to harass the countryside. It was not until the following
September that Governor Bowdoin ventured to disband the militia.
To these disturbances in Massachusetts, Congress had not remained
indifferent. Aside from the direct interest that all members were bound
to take in a rebellion which seemed to threaten the very foundations of
a sister State and which might easily recur in their own, Congress was
concerned for the fate of the national arsenal at Springfield. But no
forces were available for the protection of the property of the
Confederation. The few hundred men who comprised the army were scattered
in garrisons along the western frontier. Acting as intermediary between
Congress and Governor Bowdoin, General Knox as Secretary of War made
what provision he could for the defense of the arsenal by local militia;
but these measures were confessedly inadequate. Upon his report Congress
was finally moved to increase the army, ostensibly for the protection of
the frontier, where in truth Indian hostilities required the presence of
additional troops. As these forces would be raised chiefly in New
England, they could be employed first to protect Springfield. Any open
avowal of this plan was avoided, however, lest the insurgents should
take alarm and immediately attack the arsenal. But these plans were
wrecked on the reef of financial bankruptcy. Congress could only
supplicate the States for money and borrow what it might on its
expectations. Recruiting went on so slowly that the rebellion was
practically over when two companies of artillery, numbering
seventy-three men each, which had been raised in Massachusetts, were
finally marched to Springfield. All the other recruits were dismissed.
The inefficiency of Congress and its want of moral influence were
self-confessed.
In his famous circular letter of 1783, Washington had spoken of the
times as a period of "political probation." The moment had come for the
United States to determine, said he, "whether they will be respectable
and prosperous, or contemptible and miserable, as a nation." Three years
had now passed and the period of probation seemed to have ended in the
ruin of national hopes. The events of the years 1786 made a profound
impression upon the minds of all responsible and conservative men. In
undisguised alarm, Washington wrote: "There are combustibles in every
State which a spark might set fire to.... I feel ... infinitely more
than I can express to you, for the disorders which have arisen in these
States. Good God! Who, besides a Tory, could have foreseen, or a Briton,
predicted them?" Rightly or wrongly, men of the upper classes believed
that the foundations of society were threatened and that the State
Governments would fall a prey to the radical and unpropertied elements,
unless a stronger Federal Government were created. "With this idea, they
are thinking, very seriously," wrote an interested observer at the seat
of Federal Government in New York, "in what manner to effect the most
easy and natural change of the present form of the Federal Government to
one more energetic, that will, at the same time, create respect, and
secure properly life, liberty, and property. It is, therefore, not
uncommon to hear the principles of government stated in common
conversation. Emperors, kings, stadtholders, governors-general, with a
senate or house of lords, and house of commons, are frequently the
topics of conversation." There were those who frankly advocated a
monarchical government as the only way of escape from the ills under
which American society was laboring. There is reason to believe that a
project was on foot to invite Prince Henry of Prussia to become the head
of a new consolidated government. The influence of the Order of the
Cincinnati was much feared by friends of republican institutions.
Individually members of the order did not hesitate to express their
impatience with popular government. What was to come out of this
political chaos, no man could tell.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The two most extensive histories dealing with the period of the
Confederation are George Bancroft's _History of the Formation of
the Constitution of the United States of America_ (2 vols., 1882)
and G. T. Curtis's _History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption
of the Constitution of the United States_ (2 vols., 1854). In the
fourth volume of Hildreth's _History of the United States_ (6
vols., 1849-52), a concise but rather dry account of the
Confederation may be found. More entertaining is John Fiske's _The
Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789_ (1888). Valuable
information bearing on the social as well as the political history
of the times is contained in the first volume of J. B. McMaster's
_History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to
the Civil War_ (7 vols., 1883-1913). More recent histories of the
period are A. C. McLaughlin's _The Confederation and the
Constitution, 1783-1789_ (in _The American Nation_, vol. 10,
1905), and Edward Channing's _History of the United States_, vol.
III (3 vols., 1905- ). A vigorous narrative of the exploits of the
pioneers beyond the Alleghanies has been written by Theodore
Roosevelt, _Winning of the West_ (4 vols., 1889-96). A more
restrained account of the beginnings of Western settlement is B.
A. Hinsdale's _The Old Northwest, the Beginnings of our Colonial
System_ (1899).