IN the midst of confusion the election took place. Few moments in
the national history were less cheerful. In the Northwest the force
organized to recapture Detroit, commanded by General Harrison, was
still at Franklinton in the centre of Ohio, unable to advance and
preparing to disband. At Niagara, Van Rensselaer had failed, and
Smyth was in command. At sea, the “Guerriere” and the “Frolic” had
been captured, but Decatur’s victory over the “Macedonian” was still
unknown. Napoleon, though supposed to be dictating peace at Moscow,
was actually in full retreat. Every hope of the war party had already
proved mistaken. Canada was not in their hands; no army had been
enlisted; the people were less united than ever; taxation and debt
could no longer be avoided; and military disgrace had been incurred
beyond the predictions of John Randolph and Josiah Quincy. All this
took place before the country had seen five hundred enemies except its
own Indians on its soil, and when it had no reason to fear immediate
attack.
Once more the steadiness of Pennsylvania saved the Administration from
its worst perils. The election took place, and the electoral votes
of New England, except Vermont, were duly thrown for De Witt Clinton,
while under the management of Martin Van Buren the Republicans of the
New York legislature chose Clinton electors by Federalist aid. New
Jersey and Delaware also voted for Clinton. Maryland gave five of her
electoral votes to Clinton, six to Madison, and elected a legislature
strongly Federalist. A change of twenty electoral votes would have
turned the scale. In 1808, under all the disadvantages of the embargo,
Madison received one hundred and twenty-two votes in an Electoral
College of one hundred and seventy-five; but in 1812 he obtained
only one hundred and twenty-eight votes in an Electoral College of
two hundred and seventeen, although the three new votes of Louisiana
increased his proportion. In Massachusetts the Federalists surprised
even themselves by their immense majority of twenty-four thousand,
and the peace party swept the Congressional districts throughout New
England and New York, doubling Federalist strength in the Thirteenth
Congress.
If John Taylor of Caroline was to be believed, the support given by
Virginia to the Administration was hardly more flattering than the
sweeping condemnation of the North and East. The County of Caroline,
south of the Rappahannock on the road to Richmond, was distinguished
by no peculiarities from the other seaboard counties in the Southern
States, and Colonel Taylor himself did not openly oppose the war; but
he saw no enthusiasm for it among his neighbors. November 8 he wrote
to Monroe,[360]--
“I think I expressed my opinion to you during the last Congress
that the people were not for the war in these parts, though
they were attached to Mr. Monroe and Mr. Madison. In that
opinion I am confirmed by the apathy in choosing electors.
Those respectable and popular men, Colonel James Taylor and Dr.
Bankhead, could not, I am told, get more than about one hundred
and thirty out of about seven hundred free-holders to attend
and vote for Mr. Madison. Among these were the most prominent
minority-men.”
This apathy extended through the three great States of Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and North Carolina. Only along the Indian frontier, west of
the Alleghany Mountains, could enthusiasm be said to exist, and even
there took rather the form of hostilities against the Indians than
against the British.
The effect of these embarrassments and difficulties showed itself in
wavering and uncertain judgment in the Government, and especially in
its diplomacy. The President and the Cabinet hoped and believed, when
the news of Hull’s surrender arrived, that it would produce an outburst
of patriotism. So strong was Monroe’s faith in the people that he
talked to Serurier, September 1, as though the nation were alive with
his own ardor.[361]
“‘We want no armistice for the present,’ said Mr. Monroe to me
with great energy; ‘our resolution is taken. It has been done
after long and cool deliberation, and by consent of the whole
nation; we shall not easily renounce it. Never, certainly,
have we been more determined on war; the disgraceful affront
we have lately experienced at Detroit renders its prolongation
indispensable until our honor is restored.... For myself,’ he
cried, with indignation altogether military and worthy one of
the founders of Independence, ‘Secretary of State as I am, if
to-morrow a British minister should arrive in Washington to
negotiate peace, I would say to him, No; I will not treat with
you now! wait till we have given you a better opinion of us!
When our honor shall be avenged, when you shall have recrossed
the rivers, when our generals shall occupy the best part of your
Canada, then I shall be disposed to listen, and to treat of
peace.’”
These remarks were made in September. In about six weeks the French
minister talked again with the Secretary of State, who assured him, to
his astonishment, that peace might be made with England at any moment.
Serurier, who took Monroe’s pacific temper as seriously as he had taken
his warlike expressions, wrote in alarm to his Government,[362]--
“The English want peace with America; they want it at any price;
they offer all that America asks, and negotiations are about to
open, or rather are continuing, and henceforward openly. Mr.
Monroe made me this communication in nearly these terms....
‘We did not flatter ourselves on obtaining so quickly such
important concessions. Mr. Russell had occasion to see Lord
Castlereagh. Discussing with this minister the repeal of the
Orders in Council, he asked why the repealing Order treated with
such vagueness the renunciation of paper blockades, and whether
the Ministry had in fact wholly abandoned them. Lord Castlereagh
answered: ‘They fall to dust of themselves, and we shall think
no more of them.’ Mr. Russell having noticed the caution with
which the Prince Regent seemed to retain the right to restore at
any time the abolished Orders, Lord Castlereagh observed that,
indeed, something had to be said for the public, but the phrase
did no harm.’”
Monroe added that “very certainly the American government would not
consent to sign the peace without having obtained from England the
renunciation of impressments;” but Serurier had reason for alarm, for
Monroe expected an immediate renewal of negotiations. He had received
from Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren at Halifax another offer of
armistice and negotiation, dated September 30; and soon after the
interview with Serurier, Monroe wrote to Admiral Warren a reply, dated
October 27,[363] which accepted the armistice on condition that,
pending the cessation of hostilities, the practice of impressments
should be suspended, while he made the additional offer of negotiating
without an armistice if the suspension of impressments should be
conceded in principle.
Nothing remained of the refusal to hear England’s advances until “our
honor shall be restored and our generals shall occupy the best parts of
your Canada.” The unexpected indifference to the war which made itself
so evident in all the Atlantic States paralyzed the government. Even
the Federalists of New England, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland
spoke to Monroe in tones hardly more emphatic than those used by
his oldest Virginia friend, Colonel Taylor, who wrote:[364] “If the
President thinks that defeat has raised the spirit of the nation, and
goes on with the war on that ground, he will find himself mistaken.”
The President clearly came to the same conclusion, for he renewed
attempts at negotiation a week before Congress met, and a fortnight
before the election of November 8.
Thenceforward, Madison risked the charge of continuing the war only
to satisfy himself that England could not be forced into an express
renunciation of what she called her right of impressment,--a result
which the opposition already knew to be certain. The experiment was
worth trying, and after the timidity of the American government in
past years was well suited to create national character, if it did not
destroy the nation; but it was not the less hazardous in the face of
sectional passions such as existed in New England, or in the hands of
a party which held power by virtue of Jefferson’s principles. That the
British government should expressly renounce its claim to impressment
was already an idea hardly worth entertaining; but if the war could
not produce that result, it might at least develop a government strong
enough to attain the same result at some future time. If a strong
government was desired, any foreign war, without regard to its object,
might be good policy, if not good morals; and in that sense President
Madison’s war was the boldest and most successful of all experiments
in American statesmanship, though it was also among the most reckless;
but only with difficulty could history offer a better example of its
processes than when it showed Madison, Gallatin, Macon, Monroe, and
Jefferson joining to create a mercenary army and a great national debt,
for no other attainable object than that which had guided Alexander
Hamilton and the Federalists toward the establishment of a strong
government fifteen years before.
Unnatural as Madison’s position was, that of Monroe was more
surprising. Such were the revolutions of politics that Madison found
himself master of the situation, and Monroe was obliged to forego
his ancient distrust of Executive power in the effort to prevent his
rivals from sharing it. Somewhat to the amusement of the Federalists,
who held no high opinion of Monroe’s abilities, the Secretary of State
was placed before the country in the attitude of Cromwell. He could
no longer follow the path of ambition in civil life. If he were to
maintain his hold upon the Presidency, he must serve his country in
the field where his services were needed, or some bolder man would
capture Quebec and the Presidency by a single stroke.
The President himself gave Monroe an early hint to this effect. After
the adjournment of Congress, July 6, 1812, and some two months before
Hull’s surrender was known, Madison suggested[365] to his Secretary of
State the idea of leading the advance upon Montreal. Fortunately for
Monroe, he could neither out-rank Dearborn, nor serve as a subordinate.
Unable to overcome this objection, Madison laid the subject aside,
and soon afterward, toward the end of August, left Washington for
Montpelier, where he enjoyed only a few days’ rest before the news of
Hull’s surrender arrived. The idea that he was himself in any degree
responsible for Hull’s disaster, or for Eustis’s or Dearborn’s supposed
shortcomings, did not distress the President; but he was anxious to
restore confidence in the military administration, and Monroe was
earnest in the wish to assist him. September 2, immediately after
receiving the news, Monroe wrote to the President offering to take a
volunteer commission, and to assume command of the fresh force then
gathering in Kentucky and Ohio to recapture Detroit. Madison replied
September 5,[366] balancing the advantages and objections, but leaning
toward the step. The next day he wrote more strongly,[367] urging
Monroe to go as a volunteer without rank, if no sufficient commission
could be given him. Again, September 10,[368] the President wrote,
offering to risk issuing a volunteer commission under a doubt as to
the meaning of the Act: “I see no evil in risking your appointment
comparable to that which may be obviated by it. The Western country is
all in motion and confusion. It would be grievous if so much laudable
ardor and effort should not be properly concentrated and directed.”
Neither the President nor the Secretary was aware that Governor
William Henry Harrison had taken steps long in advance for occupying
the field on which Monroe’s eyes were fixed. Monroe actually made his
arrangements, sent off cannon to besiege Detroit, and was himself on
the point of starting westward, when letters arrived which showed
that Harrison was not only the popular idol of the moment in Kentucky
and Ohio, but that he had received from the governor of Kentucky the
commission of major-general.[369]
This double set-back from men so inferior as Dearborn and Harrison
irritated Monroe, who could not command in the North on account
of Dearborn, or in the West without a contest with Harrison and
Winchester. Evidently, if he was to take any military position, he
must command in chief.
This idea became fixed not only in Monroe’s mind, but also in that of
the public, particularly among Monroe’s personal following. The man who
stood closest in his confidence and whose advice weighed most with him
in personal matters was his son-in-law, George Hay. September 22 Hay
wrote to him from Richmond,[370]--
“It is rumored here that you are to be appointed
lieutenant-general. Such an appointment would give, I believe,
universal satisfaction.... This is indeed a critical moment.
Some great effort must be made. Unless something important is
done, Mr. Madison may be elected again, but he will not be able
to get along. But Mr. Madison ought not to exact any further
sacrifices from you. If you go into the army you ought to go
with the supreme power in your hand. I would not organize an
army for Dearborn or anybody else. Mr. Madison ought not to
expect it, and if he did I would flatly and directly reject
the proposal. Everybody is looking forward to an event of this
kind, and I do not believe that any man calculates that you are
to go in a subordinate character. The truth is that Dearborn is
laughed at, not by Federalists but by zealous Republicans. I do
not give on this subject a reluctant, hesitating opinion. I am
clear that if you go into the army (about which I say nothing),
you should go as the commander-in-chief.”
Monroe also felt no doubt that if he went to the field at all he must
go in chief command; but he hesitated. As compared with Madison’s
major-generals, Monroe was young, being only fifty-four years old; in
the Revolutionary War he had risen to the rank of captain, and had seen
as much service as made him the military equal of Dearborn or Pinckney,
but he felt no such special fitness for carrying out a campaign as for
planning and superintending it. Probably he could reconcile the two
careers only by some expedient, such as by taking the War Department,
and as Secretary of War accompanying the general in command; or by
accepting the post of lieutenant-general, and from headquarters
advising the Secretary of War as to the conduct of the campaign.
The former course seemed to Monroe to imply serious Constitutional
difficulties, and he inclined to the latter.
Secretary Eustis waited until Dearborn returned from Lake Champlain
to Albany, Smyth failed at Niagara, and Harrison became stationary
in Ohio, then, December 3, sent his resignation to the President.
Instantly informed of this event, and having reason to suppose that
the place would be offered to him, Monroe called his friends to a
consultation,[371] the result of which was narrated in a letter written
to Jefferson six months afterward:[372]--
“I stated [to the President] that if it was thought necessary to
remove me from my present station in the idea that I had some
military experience, and a change in the command of the troops
was resolved on, I would prefer it to the Department of War in
the persuasion that I might be more useful. In the Department of
War a man might form a plan of a campaign and write judicious
letters on military operations; but still these were nothing but
essays,--everything would depend on the execution. I thought
that with the army I should have better control over operations
and events, and might even aid, so far as I could give aid at
all, the person in the Department of War. I offered to repair
instantly to the Northern army, to use my best efforts to form
it, to promote the recruiting business in the Eastern States, to
conciliate the people to the views of the Government, and unite
them so far as it might be possible in the war. The President
was of opinion that if I quitted my present station, I ought to
take the command of the army. It being necessary to place some
one immediately in the Department of War to supply the vacancy
made by Mr. Eustis’s retreat, the President requested me to take
it _pro tempore_, leaving the ultimate decision on the
other question open to further consideration. I did so.”
Monroe, with only the model of Washington before his eyes, felt
aggrieved that the Clintons and Armstrongs of the North thought him
greedy of power; but the curious destiny which had already more than
once made a sport of Monroe’s career promised at last to throw the
weight of a continent upon his shoulders. Secretary of State, acting
Secretary of War, general-in-chief by a double guarantee, and President
thereafter, what more could the witches promise on the blasted heath
of politics that could tempt ambition? Neither Cromwell nor Napoleon
had, at any single moment, laid a broader claim upon the favors of
Fortune.
Monroe grasped too much, and the prizes which would have destroyed
him slipped through his fingers. The story that he was to be
general-in-chief as well as Secretary of War, exaggerated by jealousy,
roused a storm of protest. Even the patient Gallatin interposed there,
and gave the President to understand that if Monroe were transferred
to the army, he should himself claim the vacant Department of State;
and Madison admitted the justice of the claim, although the difficulty
of filling the Treasury created a new obstacle to the scheme. A
greater difficulty arose from sectional jealousies. The loss of New
York to the Republican party, due chiefly to dislike of Virginia and
to Monroe’s previous promotion, was too recent and serious to allow
further experiments. The Republican leaders in New York--Governor
Tompkins, Judge Spencer, and their connections--felt their hopes
depend on checking the open display of Virginia favoritism. Finally,
the Federalists made a scandal of the subject. January 5, Josiah
Quincy, in a speech which for literary quality was one of the best ever
delivered in the House, after giving a keen if not an exact, account
of the “Cabinet, little less than despotic, composed, to all efficient
purposes, of two Virginians and a foreigner, which had for twelve years
ruled the nation,” rose to a climax by averring that all the new
Cabinet projects--the loan of twenty millions, an army of fifty-five
thousand regulars, the scheme of mock negotiation--had no other object
than to satiate the ambition of a single man:--
“The army for the conquest of Canada will be raised,--to be
commanded by whom? This is the critical question. The answer
is in every man’s mouth. By a member of the American Cabinet;
by one of the three; by one of that trio who at this moment
constitute in fact, and who efficiently have always constituted,
the whole Cabinet. And the man who is thus intended for the
command of the greatest army this New World ever contained,--an
army nearly twice as great as was at any time the regular army
of our Revolution,--I say the man who is intended for this
great trust is the individual who is notoriously the selected
candidate for the next Presidency.”
In face of these difficulties, Madison could not carry out his scheme.
His only object in pushing Monroe forward was to strengthen himself by
using what he supposed to be Monroe’s popularity; but from the moment
it appeared that Monroe, in the War Department or at the head of the
Northern army, would be a source of weakness rather than of strength,
Madison had no motive to persist; so that Monroe, failing to take
a decided step, suddenly found himself--he hardly knew how--in the
awkward attitude of a disappointed Cromwell. His rival first withdrew
the War Department from his hands. He described to Jefferson[373] the
way in which he lost this vantage ground:--
“It was soon found to be improper, at a period of so much
danger and urgency, to keep that Department in the hands of a
temporary occupant; it ought to be filled by the person who
would have to form the plan of the campaign in every quarter,
and be responsible for it. It being indispensable to fill it
with a prominent character, and the question remaining undecided
relative to the command of the army, more persons thinking a
change urgent, and the opinion of the President in regard to me
being the same, General Armstrong was put in the Department of
War. Had it been decided to continue the command of the army
under General Dearborn, and the question been with me, ‘Would
I take the Department of War, the President and other friends
wishing it?’ I would not have hesitated a moment in complying;
but it never assumed that form.”
If Monroe was more jealous of one man than of another, his antipathies
centred upon John Armstrong, the late American minister at Paris. As
has been already shown, Monroe came into the State Department expecting
rivalry with Armstrong; but he had no occasion to begin active measures
of hostility. Armstrong’s opinions of Madison and Monroe were known to
be the same as those of other New Yorkers; if he came to the support of
the Administration he came not in order to please the Virginians, but
to rescue the government from what he thought Virginian incompetence or
narrowness; and that Armstrong would shut the door of military glory in
the face of the Secretary of State was as certain as that the Secretary
of State would, sooner or later, revenge the insult by ejecting
Armstrong from the Cabinet if he could.
No one denied that Monroe had reason for fearing Armstrong, whose
abilities were undoubted and whose scruples were few. Since his return
from Paris, Armstrong had been known as a discontented Republican,
grumbling without reserve at the manner in which public affairs were
conducted; yet this was no more than many other Northern Republicans
had done, and Armstrong behaved better than most. On the declaration of
war he avoided the mistakes of the Clintons, and acted with Governor
Tompkins and Ambrose Spencer in support of the Administration. July 6,
1812, to the surprise and anger of the Clinton Republicans, Armstrong
accepted the commission of brigadier-general, and was placed in command
of New York city and its defences. His knowledge of the theory and
practice of war was considerable, and his influence as a politician
was likely to be great. In the chronic chaos of New York politics,
Armstrong stood between De Witt Clinton, who wished to win the
Presidency by intrigue, and Governor Daniel D. Tompkins, who hoped to
become President by regular party promotion. Ambrose Spencer, who liked
neither Clinton nor Tompkins, preferred Armstrong as the candidate
of New York. The influence of Spencer in the contest with De Witt
Clinton became for the moment absolute; and the necessity of securing
re-election as governor, in April, 1813, drove Tompkins himself to
support Spencer in urging Armstrong’s appointment as Secretary of War,
although he knew that the appointment of Armstrong to the Cabinet
opened to him the door to the Presidency.[374]
In spite of Armstrong’s services, abilities, and experience,
something in his character always created distrust. He had every
advantage of education, social and political connection, ability and
self-confidence; he was only fifty-four years old, which was also the
age of Monroe; but he suffered from the reputation of indolence and
intrigue. So strong was the prejudice against him that he obtained
only eighteen votes against fifteen in the Senate on his confirmation;
and while the two senators from Virginia did not vote at all, the two
from Kentucky voted in the negative. Under such circumstances, nothing
but military success of the first order could secure a fair field for
Monroe’s rival.
The nomination of Armstrong to be Secretary of War was made Jan. 8,
1813, and was accompanied by that of William Jones of Pennsylvania to
succeed Paul Hamilton as Secretary of the Navy.
The resignation of Paul Hamilton was supposed to be made at the
President’s request, for reasons not given to the public. His
successor, William Jones, long a prominent Republican, a member of
Congress at the beginning of Jefferson’s administration, had been
offered the Navy Department in 1801, when that Department was offered
to almost every leading Republican before falling into the hands
of Robert Smith. Jones then declined the task, and soon retired
from Congress to follow his private business as a ship-owner in
Philadelphia. His appointment in 1812 was probably as good as the party
could supply. He was confirmed by the Senate without opposition; but he
had little to do with the movement of politics or with matters apart
from business.
These changes left no one except Gallatin who belonged to the Cabinet
of President Jefferson. Attorney-General Rodney had resigned his
position a year before, in natural displeasure because the President
nominated Gabriel Duval, the Comptroller of the Treasury, to the vacant
seat of Justice Chase on the Supreme Bench, thus passing over the
Attorney-General in a manner which could be regarded only as a slight.
The President, Dec. 10, 1811, nominated William Pinkney, the late
minister at London, to succeed Rodney. The influence and activity of
the Attorney-General in the Cabinet were at that time less than they
subsequently became; and Pinkney, like Rodney, and like William Wirt
afterward, had little responsibility beyond the few cases in which the
United States were a party before the Courts.
With this reorganization of the Cabinet Madison’s first term of
Presidency drew toward a close. Only Congress required his attention,
and as some compensation for the cares of war, the cares of Congress
diminished. After the general election of Nov. 8, 1812, serious
opposition or even faction in Congress became impossible. Madison
had no reason to fear anything that could happen in the Legislature,
provided he had no difficulties with his Cabinet.
President Madison’s Annual Message of Nov. 4, 1812, was an interesting
paper. Gliding gently over the disasters of the Northern campaign;
dilating on British iniquity in using Indians for allies; commenting
on the conduct of Massachusetts and Connecticut with disfavor, because
it led to the result that the United States were “not one nation for
the purpose most of all requiring it;” praising Rodgers and Hull for
the results of their skill and bravery,--the Message next touched upon
the diplomatic outlook and the future objects of the war in a paragraph
which needed and received much study:--
“Anxious to abridge the evils from which a state of war cannot
be exempt, I lost no time, after it was declared, in conveying
to the British government the terms on which its progress might
be arrested without awaiting the delays of a formal and final
pacification; and our _chargé d’affaires_ at London was at
the same time authorized to agree to an armistice founded upon
them. These terms required that the Orders in Council should be
repealed as they affected the United States, without a revival
of blockades violating acknowledged rules; and that there should
be an immediate discharge of American seamen from British
ships, and a stop to impressment from American ships, with an
understanding that an exclusion of the seamen of each nation
from the ships of the other should be stipulated; and that the
armistice should be improved into a definite and comprehensive
adjustment of depending controversies. Although a repeal of
the orders susceptible of explanations meeting the views of
this Government had taken place before this pacific advance
was communicated to that of Great Britain, the advance [made
by us] was declined [by the British government] from an avowed
repugnance to a suspension of the practice of impressments
during the armistice, and without any intimation that the
arrangement proposed with respect to seamen would be accepted.
Whether the subsequent communications from this Government,
affording an occasion for reconsidering the subject on the part
of Great Britain, will be viewed in a more favorable light
remains to be known. It would be unwise to relax our measures in
any respect on a presumption of such a result.”
Not without difficulty could one understand from this statement
precisely what prevented the restoration of peace. England had never
refused to discharge American seamen on sufficient evidence of wrongful
impressment. According to the Message, the President asked only “an
immediate discharge of American seamen from British ships, and a stop
to impressment from American ships.” The demand of this point seemed
to imply that England had made or would probably make satisfactory
concessions on all others. The Message therefore narrowed the cause
of war to the requirement of a formal suspension of impressments from
American ships, though not of American citizens on shore, pending
negotiations, and to be made permanent by treaty. The demand was
proper, and its only fault was to fall short of full satisfaction; but
considered in its effect upon the politics of the moment the attitude
was new, unsupported by a precedent, unwarranted by any previous
decision or declaration of President or Congress, and open to the
Federalist charge that Madison sought only an excuse for continuing to
stake the national existence on the chance of success in his alliance
with Bonaparte. The rest of the Message helped to strengthen the
impression that a policy of permanent war was to be fixed upon the
country; for it recommended higher pay for recruits and volunteers,
an increase in the number of general officers, a reorganization of
the general staff of the army, and an increase of the navy. The
impression was not weakened by the President’s silence in regard to
the financial wants of the government, which left to the Secretary of
the Treasury the unpleasant duty of announcing that the enormous sum
of twenty million dollars must be borrowed for the coming year. Every
one knew that such a demand was equivalent to admitting the prospect of
immediate bankruptcy.
“I think a loan to that amount to be altogether unattainable,”
Gallatin told Madison in private.[375] “From banks we can expect
little or nothing, as they have already lent nearly to the full
extent of their faculties. All that I could obtain this year
from individual subscriptions does not exceed three million two
hundred thousand dollars.”
The President refrained from presenting this demand to Congress, and
not until after the election was the financial situation made known;
but then Gallatin’s report, sent to the House December 5, estimated
the military expenses at seventeen millions, the naval at nearly five
millions, and the civil at fifteen hundred thousand, besides interest
on the public debt to the amount of three million three hundred
thousand, and reimbursements of loans, treasury notes, etc., reaching
five million two hundred thousand more,--in all, thirty-one million
nine hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars. This estimate omitted
every expenditure not already authorized by law, such as the proposed
increase of army and navy.
To meet these obligations, amounting probably to thirty-three million
dollars, Gallatin counted on a revenue of eleven million five hundred
thousand dollars from imports, and half a million from the sale of
lands,--making twelve millions in all; leaving a sum of at least twenty
millions to be borrowed, with an increase of debt to the amount of
fifteen millions.
The state of war brought the advantage of compelling the Legislature
to act or perish; and although Congress had seldom if ever been so
unanimously dissatisfied, it was never so docile. For the first time
Madison could recommend a measure with some certainty that Congress
would listen, and with some confidence that it would act. Faction began
to find its limits, and an Executive order had no longer to excuse
itself; while Congress, on its side, with shut eyes, broke through the
barriers hitherto set to its powers, and roamed almost at will beyond
the limits which the Republican party assigned to the Constitution.