ALTHOUGH the loss of Detroit caused the greatest loss of territory that
ever before or since befell the United States, the public at large
understood little of the causes that made it inevitable, and saw in
it only an accidental consequence of Hull’s cowardice. Against this
victim, who had no friend in the world, every voice was raised. He was
a coward, an imbecile, but above all unquestionably a traitor, who had,
probably for British gold, delivered an army and a province, without
military excuse, into the enemy’s hands. If any man in the United
States was more responsible than Hull for the result of the campaign it
was Ex-President Jefferson, whose system had shut military efficiency
from the scope of American government; but to Jefferson, Hull and
his surrender were not the natural products of a system, but objects
of hatred and examples of perfidy that had only one parallel. “The
treachery of Hull, like that of Arnold, cannot be a matter of blame to
our government,” he wrote[283] on learning the story of Lewis Cass and
the Ohio militia officers, who told with the usual bitterness
of betrayed men what they knew of the causes that had brought their
betrayal to pass. “The detestable treason of Hull,” as Jefferson
persisted in calling it, was the more exasperating to him because,
even as late as August 4, he had written with entire confidence to
the same correspondent that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as
far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching,
and will give us experience for the attack of Halifax the next, and
the final expulsion of England from the American continent.” Perhaps
the same expectation explained the conduct of Hull, Madison, Eustis,
and Dearborn; yet at the moment when Jefferson wrote thus, Madison
was beginning to doubt. August 8, the often-mentioned day when Brock
reached Long Point and Hull decided to retreat from Canada, Madison
wrote to Gallatin:[284]--
[Illustration: MAP
OF THE
_STRAITS OF_
NIAGARA
from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario.
[_From “Memoirs of My Own Times,” By Gen. James Wilkinson,
Philadelphia, 1816._]
Struthers & Co., Engr’s and Pr’s, N.Y.]
[Illustration]
“Should he [Hull] be able to descend upon Niagara and an
adequate co-operation be there afforded, our prospect as to
Upper Canada may be good enough. But what is to be done with
respect to the expedition against Montreal? The enlistments for
the regular army fall short of the most moderate calculation;
the Volunteer Act is extremely unproductive; and even the
militia detachments are either obstructed by the disaffected
governors or chilled by the Federal spirit diffused throughout
the region most convenient to the theatre. I see nothing better
than to draw on this resource as far as the detachments consist
of volunteers, who, it may be presumed, will cross the line
without raising Constitutional or legal questions.”
In contrast with these admissions and their satirical “it may be
presumed,” the tone of the governor-general, Sir George Prevost, at the
same crisis was masterful.[285]
“The Eighth or King’s Regiment,” he wrote August 17 from
Montreal, “has arrived this morning from Quebec to relieve the
Forty-ninth Regiment. This fine and effective regiment of the
Eighth, together with a chain of troops established in the
vicinity of this place consisting of a regular and militia
force, the whole amounting to near four thousand five hundred
men, effectually serve to keep in check the enemy in this
quarter, where alone they are in any strength.”
The Canadian outnumbered the American forces at every point of
danger on the frontier. A week later Sir George claimed another just
credit:[286]--
“The decided superiority I have obtained on the Lakes in
consequence of the precautionary measures adopted during the
last winter has permitted me to move without interruption,
independently of the arrangement [armistice], both troops and
supplies of every description toward Amherstburg, while those
for General Hull, having several hundred miles of wilderness to
pass before they can reach Detroit, are exposed to be harassed
and destroyed by the Indians.”
Not only were the British forces equal or superior to the American
at Detroit, Niagara, and Montreal, but they could be more readily
concentrated and more quickly supplied.
The storm of public wrath which annihilated Hull and shook Eustis
passed harmless over the head of Dearborn. No one knew that Dearborn
was at fault, for he had done nothing; and a general who did nothing
had that advantage over his rivals whose activity or situation caused
them to act. Dearborn threw the whole responsibility on the War
Department. August 15 he wrote to President Madison:[287]
“The particular circumstances which have created the most
unfortunate embarrassments were my having no orders or
directions in relation to Upper Canada (which I had considered
as not attached to my command) until my last arrival at
this place, and my being detained so long at Boston _by
direction_. If I had been directed to take measures for
acting offensively on Niagara and Kingston, with authority
such as I now possess, for calling out the militia, we might
have been prepared to act on those points as early as General
Hull commenced his operations at Detroit; but unfortunately no
explicit orders had been received by me in relation to Upper
Canada until it was too late even to make an effectual diversion
in favor of General Hull. All that I could do was done without
any delay.”
For the moment, such pleas might serve; but after the capture of
Detroit, Dearborn’s turn came, and nothing could save him from a fate
as decided if not as fatal as that of Hull. His armistice indeed would
have answered the purpose of protection had the Government understood
its true bearing; but Dearborn’s letter announcing the armistice
reached Washington August 13, and the Secretary of War seeing the
dangers and not the advantages of a respite replied, August 15, in
language more decided than he had yet used:[288]--
“I am commanded by the President to inform you that there does
not appear to him any justifiable cause to vary or desist from
the arrangements which are in operation; and I am further
commanded to instruct you that from and after the receipt of
this letter and allowing a reasonable time in which you will
inform Sir George Prevost thereof, you will proceed with the
utmost vigor in your operations. How far the plan originally
suggested by you of attacking Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal at
the same time can be rendered practicable, you can best judge.
Presuming that not more than a feint, if that should be deemed
expedient, with the troops on Lake Champlain aided by volunteers
and militia can be immediately effected against Montreal, and
considering the urgency of a diversion in favor of General Hull
under the circumstances attending his situation, the President
thinks it proper that not a moment should be lost in gaining
possession of the British posts at Niagara and Kingston, or at
least the former, and proceeding in co-operation with General
Hull in securing Upper Canada.”
The same day, August 15, the eve of Hull’s surrender, Dearborn wrote to
the Secretary of War,[289]--
“If the troops are immediately pushed on from the southward, I
think we may calculate on being able to possess ourselves of
Montreal and Upper Canada before the winter sets in.... I am
pursuing measures with the view of being able to operate with
effect against Niagara and Kingston, at the same time that
I move toward Lower Canada. If the Governor of Pennsylvania
turns out two thousand good militia from the northwesterly
frontier of his State, as I have requested him to do, and the
quartermaster-general furnishes the means of transportation and
camp-equipage in season, I am persuaded we may act with effect
on the several points in the month of October at farthest.”
As yet nothing had been done. August 19 General Van Rensselaer
reported[290] from Lewiston that between Buffalo and Niagara he
commanded less than a thousand militia, without ordnance heavier
than 6-pounders and but few of these, without artillerists to serve
the few pieces he had, and the troops in a very indifferent state of
discipline. In pursuance of his orders he collected the force within
his reach, but August 18 received notice of Dearborn’s armistice and
immediately afterward of Hull’s surrender. August 23 Brock, moving
with his usual rapidity, reappeared at Fort George with Hull’s army as
captives.
Fortunately, not only were the Americans protected by the armistice,
but both Prevost and Brock were under orders, and held it good policy,
to avoid irritating the Americans by useless incursions. Prevost,
about the equal of Madison as a military leader, showed no wish to
secure the positions necessary for his safety. Had he at once seized
Sackett’s Harbor, as Brock seized Detroit, he would have been secure,
for Sackett’s Harbor was the only spot from which the Americans could
contest the control of Lake Ontario. Brock saw the opportunity,
and wanted to occupy the harbor, but Prevost did not encourage the
idea;[291] and Brock, prevented from making a correct movement, saw no
advantage in making an incorrect one. Nothing was to be gained by an
offensive movement at Niagara, and Brock at that point labored only to
strengthen his defence.
Van Rensselaer, knowing the whole American line to be at Brock’s mercy,
felt just anxiety. August 31 he wrote to Governor Tompkins,[292]--
“Alarm pervades the country, and distrust among the troops. They
are incessantly pressing for furloughs under every possible
pretence. Many are without shoes; all clamorous for pay; many
are sick.... While we are thus growing weaker our enemy is
growing stronger. They hold a very commanding position on the
high ground above Queenstown, and they are daily strengthening
themselves in it with men and ordnance. Indeed, they are
fortifying almost every prominent point from Fort Erie to Fort
George. At present we rest upon the armistice, but should
hostilities be recommenced I must immediately change my
position. I receive no reinforcements of men, no ordnance or
munitions of war.”
Dearborn replied to this letter September 2, and his alarm was
certainly not less than that of Van Rensselaer:[293]--
“From the number of troops which have left Montreal for Upper
Canada, I am not without fear that attempts will be speedily
made to reduce you and your forces to the mortifying situation
of General Hull and his army. If such an attempt of the enemy
should be made previous to the arrival of the principal part of
the troops destined to Niagara, it will be necessary for you to
be prepared for all events, and to be prepared to make good a
secure retreat as the last resort.”
To the Secretary of War, Dearborn wrote that he hoped there would be
nothing worse than retreat.[294] Under such circumstances the armistice
became an advantage, for the offensive had already passed into the
enemy’s hands. Detroit and Lake Erie were lost beyond salvation, but
on Lake Ontario supplies and cannon were brought to Niagara by water
from Oswego; the vessels at Ogdensburg were moved to Sackett’s Harbor
and became the nucleus of a fleet; while all the troops, regular
and militia, that could be gathered from New England, New York, and
Pennsylvania were hurried to the front. September 1 Dearborn wrote
to Eustis[295] that he had at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, or under
marching orders there, five thousand troops, more than half of them
regulars, while six thousand, including three regular regiments from
the southward, were destined for Niagara.
“When the regular troops you have ordered for Niagara arrive at
that post,” he wrote to Eustis, September 1, “with the militia
and other troops there or on their march, they will be able
I presume to cross over into Canada, carry all the works in
Niagara, and proceed to the other posts in that province in
triumph.”
Yet the movement of troops was slow. September 15 Van Rensselaer had
only sixteen hundred militia.[296] Not till then did the reaction from
Hull’s disaster make itself felt. Commodore Chauncey came to Lake
Ontario with unbounded authority to create a fleet, and Lieutenant
Elliott of the navy was detached to Lake Erie for the same purpose;
ordnance and supplies were hurried to Buffalo, and Dearborn sent two
regiments from Albany with two companies of artillery.
“When they arrive,” he wrote September 17 to Van
Rensselaer,[297] “with the regular troops and militia from the
southward and such additional numbers of militia as I reckon
on from this State, the aggregate force will I presume amount
to upward of six thousand. It is intended to have a force
sufficient to enable you to act with effect, though late.”
The alarm still continued; and even a week afterward Dearborn wrote as
though he expected disaster:[298]
“A strange fatality seems to have pervaded the whole
arrangements. Ample reinforcements of troops and supplies of
stores are on their way, but I fear their arrival will be too
late to enable you to maintain your position.... By putting
on the best face that your situation admits, the enemy may be
induced to delay an attack until you will be able to meet him
and carry the war into Canada. At all events we must calculate
on possessing Upper Canada before winter sets in.”
In Dearborn’s letters nothing was said of the precise movement
intended, but through them all ran the understanding that as soon
as the force at Niagara should amount to six thousand men a forward
movement should be made. The conditions supposed to be needed for
the advance were more than fulfilled in the early days of October,
when some twenty-five hundred militia, with a regiment of Light
Artillery without guns, and the Thirteenth U. S. Infantry were in the
neighborhood of Lewiston; while a brigade of United States troops,
sixteen hundred and fifty strong, commanded by Brigadier-General
Alexander Smyth, were on the march to Buffalo. October 13 Dearborn
wrote to Van Rensselaer:[299] “I am confidently sure that you will
embrace the first practicable opportunity for effecting a forward
movement.” This opportunity had then already arrived. Smyth reached
Buffalo, September 29, and reported by letter to General Van
Rensselaer; but before seeing each other the two generals quarrelled.
Smyth held the opinion that the army should cross into Canada above
the Falls, and therefore camped his brigade at Buffalo. Van Rensselaer
had made his arrangements to cross below the Falls. October 5 Van
Rensselaer requested Smyth to fix a day for a council of war, but
Smyth paid no attention to the request; and as he was independent
of Van Rensselaer, and could not be compelled to obey the orders of
a major-general of New York militia, Van Rensselaer decided to act,
without regard to Smyth’s brigade or to his opinions. He knew that the
force under his immediate orders below the Falls was sufficient for his
purpose.[300]
Van Rensselaer’s decision was supported by many different motives,--the
lateness of the season, the weather, the sickness and the discontent of
the militia threatening actual disbandment, the jealousy of a militia
officer toward the regular service, and the additional jealousy of a
Federalist toward the Government; for Van Rensselaer was not only a
Federalist, but was also a rival candidate against Tompkins for the
governorship of New York, and the Republicans were eager to charge him
with intentional delay. A brilliant stroke by Lieutenant Elliott at
the same moment added to the restlessness of the army. On the night
of October 8 Elliott and Captain Towson of the Second Artillery, with
fifty sailors and fifty soldiers of Smyth’s brigade, cut out two
British vessels under the guns of Fort Erie.[301] One of these vessels
was the “Adams,” captured by Brock at Detroit, the other had belonged
to the Northwestern Fur Company, and both were of great value to the
British as a reinforcement to their fleet on Lake Erie. The larger was
destroyed; the smaller, named the “Caledonia,” was saved, and served
to increase the little American fleet. Brock felt keenly the loss of
these two vessels, which “may reduce us to incalculable distress,” he
wrote to Prevost, October 11. He watched the progress of Elliott’s
and Chauncey’s naval preparations with more anxiety than he showed in
regard to Dearborn’s military movements, although he spared no labor in
fortifying himself against these.
General Van Rensselaer conceived a plan for a double attack by throwing
one body of troops across the river to carry Queenston, while a strong
force of regulars should be conveyed in boats by way of the Lake and
landed on the Lake shore in the rear of Fort George to take the fort by
storm,--a movement afterward successfully made; but owing to Smyth’s
conduct the double attack was abandoned, and Van Rensselaer decided to
try only the simpler movement against Queenston. Brock with less than
two thousand men guarded nearly forty miles of front along the Niagara
River, holding at Queenston only two companies of the Forty-ninth
Regiment with a small body of militia,--in all about three hundred men.
Brock was himself at Fort George, some five miles below Queenston, with
the greater part of the Forty-first Regiment, which he had brought
back from Detroit, and a number of Indians. The rest of his force was
at Chippawa and Fort Erie, opposite Buffalo, where the real attack was
expected.
Van Rensselaer fixed the night of October 10 for his movement, and
marched the troops to the river at the appointed time; but the crossing
was prevented by some blunder in regard to boats, and the troops after
passing the night exposed to a furious storm returned to camp. After
this miscarriage Van Rensselaer would have waited for a council of war,
but the tone of his officers and men satisfied him that any sign of
hesitation would involve him in suspicion and injure the service.[302]
He postponed the movement until the night of October 12, giving the
command of the attack to Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer of the State
militia, whose force was to consist of three hundred volunteers and
three hundred regular troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Christie of the
Thirteenth Regiment.
At three o’clock on the morning of October 13 the first body of troops
embarked. Thirteen boats had been provided. Three of these lost their
way, or were forced by the current down stream until obliged to
return. Colonel Christie was in one of the boats that failed to land.
The command of his men fell to young Captain Wool of the Thirteenth
Regiment. The British were on the alert, and although after a volley
of musketry they withdrew toward Queenston they quickly returned
with reinforcements and began a sharp action, in which Colonel Van
Rensselaer was severely wounded and the advance on Queenston was
effectually stopped. Daylight appeared, and at a quarter before seven
Brock himself galloped up and mounted the hill above the river to watch
the contest from an 18-pounder battery on the hill-top.[303] At the
same moment Captain Wool with a few men of his regiment climbed up the
same heights from the riverside by a path which had been reported to
Brock as impassable, and was left unguarded. Reaching the summit, Wool
found himself about thirty yards in the rear of the battery from which
Brock was watching the contest below. By a rapid flight on foot Brock
escaped capture, and set himself immediately to the task of recovering
the heights. He had early sent for the Forty-first Regiment under
General Sheaffe from Fort George, but without waiting reinforcements
he collected a few men--about ninety, it is said--of the Forty-ninth
Regiment who could be spared below, and sent them to dislodge Wool. The
first British attack was beaten back. The second, in stronger force
with the York Volunteers, was led by Brock in person; but while he was
still at the foot of the hill, an American bullet struck him in the
breast and killed him on the spot.
At ten o’clock in the morning, Captain Wool, though painfully wounded,
held the heights with two hundred and fifty men; but the heights had
no value except to cover or assist the movement below, where the
main column of troops with artillery and intrenching tools should
have occupied Queenston, and advanced or fortified itself. When
Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, at about seven o’clock, having succeeded
in crossing the river, took command of the force on the river bank,
he could do nothing for want of men, artillery, and intrenching
tools.[304] He could not even dislodge the enemy from a stone house
whence two light pieces of artillery were greatly annoying the boats.
Unable to move without support he recrossed the river, found General
Van Rensselaer half a mile beyond, and described to him the situation.
Van Rensselaer sent orders to General Smyth to march his brigade to
Lewiston “with every possible despatch,” and ordered Captain Totten of
the Engineers across the river, with intrenching tools, to lay out a
fortified camp.
Toward noon General Van Rensselaer himself crossed with Christie to
Queenston and climbed the hill, where Lieutenant-Colonel Winfield
Scott had appeared as a volunteer and taken the command of Captain
Wool’s force. Toward three o’clock Lieutenant-Colonel Christie joined
the party on the hill. Brigadier-General William Wadsworth of the New
York militia was also on the ground, and some few men arrived, until
three hundred and fifty regulars and two hundred and fifty militia are
said to have been collected on the heights. From their position, at
two o’clock, Van Rensselaer and Scott made out the scarlet line of the
Forty-first Regiment advancing from Fort George. From Chippawa every
British soldier who could be spared hurried to join the Forty-first,
while a swarm of Indians swept close on the American line, covering
the junction of the British forces and the turning movement of General
Sheaffe round the foot of the hill. About one thousand men, chiefly
regulars, were concentrating against the six hundred Americans on the
heights.[305] General Van Rensselaer, alarmed at the sight, hastened to
recross the river to Lewiston for reinforcements.
“By this time,” concluded Van Rensselaer in his report of
the next day,[306] “I perceived my troops were embarking
very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their
movements; but to my utter astonishment I found that at the
very moment when complete victory was in our hands the ardor
of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all
directions, urged the men by every consideration to pass over;
but in vain. Lieutenant-Colonel Bloom who had been wounded in
the action returned, mounted his horse, and rode through the
camp, as did also Judge Peck who happened to be here, exhorting
the companies to proceed; but all in vain.”
More unfortunate than Hull, Van Rensselaer stood on the American
heights and saw his six hundred gallant soldiers opposite slowly
enveloped, shot down, and at last crushed by about a thousand men who
could not have kept the field a moment against the whole American
force. Scott and his six hundred were pushed over the cliff down to the
bank of the river. The boatmen had all fled with the boats. Nothing
remained but to surrender; and under the Indian fire even surrender was
difficult. Scott succeeded only by going himself to the British line
through the Indians, who nearly killed him as he went.
In this day’s work ninety Americans were reported as killed. The
number of wounded can only be estimated. Not less than nine hundred
men surrendered, including skulkers and militia-men who never reached
the heights. Brigadier-General William Wadsworth of the New York
militia, Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick of the U. S. Light Artillery,
Lieutenant-Colonel Winfield Scott of the Second Artillery, and, among
officers of less rank, Captain Totten of the Engineers were among the
prisoners. Van Rensselaer’s campaign did not, like that of Hull, cost
a province, but it sacrificed nearly as many effective troops as were
surrendered by Hull.
General Van Rensselaer the next day sent his report of the affair to
General Dearborn, and added a request to be relieved of his command.
Dearborn, who knew little of the circumstances, ordered him to transfer
the command to General Smyth, and wrote to Washington a bitter
complaint of Van Rensselaer’s conduct, which he attributed to jealousy
of the regular service.[307]
Hitherto the military movements against Canada had been directed by
Eastern men. Alexander Smyth belonged to a different class. Born in
Ireland in 1765, his fortunes led him to Virginia, where he became a
respectable member of the Southwestern bar and served in the State
legislature. Appointed in 1808 by President Jefferson colonel of the
new rifle regiment, in 1812 he became inspector-general, with the rank
of brigadier. By his own request he received command of the brigade
ordered to Niagara, and his succession to Van Rensselaer followed of
course. Dearborn, knowing little of Smyth, was glad to intrust the
army to a regular officer in whom he felt confidence; yet an Irish
temperament with a Virginian education promised the possibility of a
campaign which if not more disastrous than that led by William Hull
of Massachusetts, or by Stephen Van Rensselaer of New York, might be
equally eccentric.
October 24 Smyth took command at Buffalo, and three weeks later the
public read in the newspapers an address issued by him to the “Men of
New York,” written in a style hitherto unusual in American warfare.
“For many years,” Smyth announced to the Men of New York,[308]
“you have seen your country oppressed with numerous wrongs.
Your government, although above all others devoted to peace,
has been forced to draw the sword, and rely for redress of
injuries on the valor of the American people. That valor has
been conspicuous. But the nation has been unfortunate in the
selection of some of those who have directed it. One army has
been disgracefully surrendered and lost. Another has been
sacrificed by a precipitate attempt to pass it over at the
strongest point of the enemy’s lines with most incompetent
means. The cause of these miscarriages is apparent. The
commanders were popular men, ‘destitute alike of theory and
experience’ in the art of war.”
Unmilitary as such remarks were, the address continued in a tone more
and more surprising, until at last it became burlesque.
“In a few days the troops under my command will plant the
American standard in Canada. They are men accustomed to
obedience, silence, and steadiness. They will conquer, or they
will die.
“Will you stand with your arms folded and look on this
interesting struggle? Are you not related to the men who fought
at Bennington and Saratoga? Has the race degenerated? Or have
you, under the baneful influence of contending factions, forgot
your country? Must I turn from you and ask the men of the Six
Nations to support the government of the United States? Shall
I imitate the officers of the British king, and suffer our
ungathered laurels to be tarnished by ruthless deeds? Shame,
where is thy blush! No!”
The respectable people of the neighborhood were not wholly discouraged
by this call or by a second proclamation, November 17, as little
military as the first; or even by an address of Peter B. Porter
offering to lead his neighbors into Canada under the command of the
“able and experienced officer” who within a few days could and would
“occupy all the British fortresses on the Niagara River.” A certain
number of volunteers offered themselves for the service, although
not only the attack but also its details were announced in advance.
The British responded by bombarding Black Rock and Fort Niagara; and
although their cannon did little harm, they were more effective than
the proclamations of the American generals.
November 25 General Smyth issued orders for the invasion, which were
also unusual in their character, and prescribed even the gestures
and attitudes of the attacking force:[309] “At twenty yards distance
the soldiers will be ordered to trail arms, advance with shouts,
fire at five paces distance, and charge bayonets. The soldiers will
be _silent_ above all things.” In obedience to these orders,
everything was prepared, November 27, for the crossing, and once more
orders were issued in an inspiring tone:[310]
“Friends of your country! ye who have ‘the will to do, the heart
to dare!’ the moment ye have wished for has arrived! Think on
your country’s honors torn! her rights trampled on! her sons
enslaved! her infants perishing by the hatchet! Be strong! be
brave! and let the ruffian power of the British king cease on
this continent!”
Two detachments were to cross the river from Black Rock before dawn,
November 28, to surprise and disable the enemy’s batteries and to
destroy a bridge five miles below; after this should be done the
army was to cross. The British were supposed to have not more than a
thousand men within twenty miles to resist the attack of three thousand
men from Buffalo. Apparently Smyth’s calculations were correct. His
two detachments crossed the river at three o’clock on the morning
of November 28 and gallantly, though with severe loss, captured and
disabled the guns and tore up a part of the bridge without destroying
it. At sunrise the army began to embark at the navy yard, but the
embarkation continued so slowly that toward afternoon, when all the
boats were occupied, only twelve hundred men, with artillery, were on
board. “The troops thus embarked,” reported Smyth,[311] “moved up the
stream to Black Rock without sustaining loss from the enemy’s fire. It
was now afternoon, and they were ordered to disembark and dine.”
This was all. No more volunteers appeared, and no other regulars fit
for service remained. Smyth would not cross without three thousand men,
and doubtless was right in his caution; but he showed want of courage
not so much in this failure to redeem his pledges, as in his subsequent
attempt to throw responsibility on subordinates, and on Dearborn who
had requested him to consult some of his officers occasionally, and be
prepared if possible to cross into Canada with three thousand men at
once.[312] Smyth consulted his officers at the moment when consultation
was fatal.
“Recollecting your instructions to cross with three thousand men
_at once_, and to consult some of my principal officers in
‘all important movements,’ I called for the field officers of
the regulars and twelve-months volunteers embarked.”
The council of war decided not to risk the crossing. Winder, who was
considered the best of Smyth’s colonels, had opposed the scheme from
the first, and reported the other officers as strongly against it.
Smyth was aware of their opinions, and his appeal to them could have
no object but to shift responsibility. After receiving their decision,
Smyth sent a demand for the surrender of Fort Erie, “to spare the
effusion of blood,” and then ordered his troops to their quarters.
The army obeyed with great discontent, but fifteen hundred men still
mustered in the boats, when two days afterward Smyth issued another
order to embark. Once more Smyth called a council of war, and once more
decided to abandon the invasion. With less than three thousand men in
the boats at once, the General would not stir.
Upon this, General Smyth’s army dissolved. “A scene of confusion
ensued which it is difficult to describe,” wrote Peter B. Porter soon
afterward,[313]--“about four thousand men without order or restraint
discharging their muskets in every direction.” They showed a preference
for General Smyth’s tent as their target, which caused the General to
shift his quarters repeatedly. A few days afterward Peter B. Porter
published a letter to a Buffalo newspaper, attributing the late
disgrace “to the cowardice of General Smyth.”[314] The General sent a
challenge to his subordinate officer, and exchanged shots with him.
Smyth next requested permission to visit his family, which Dearborn
hastened to grant; and three months afterward, as General Smyth did
not request an inquiry into the causes of his failure, the President
without express authority of law dropped his name from the army roll.
When Dearborn received the official report of Smyth’s grotesque
campaign, he was not so much annoyed by its absurdities as he was
shocked to learn that nearly four thousand regular troops sent to
Niagara in the course of the campaign could not supply a thousand for
crossing the river.[315] Further inquiry explained that sickness had
swept away more than half the army. The brigade of regulars at Buffalo,
which with the exception of Winder’s regiment had never fired a musket,
was reduced to less than half its original number, and both officers
and men were unfit for active duty.[316] Only rest and care could
restore the army to efficiency.
The failures of Hull, Van Rensselaer, and Smyth created a scandal
so noisy that little was thought of General Dearborn; yet Dearborn
still commanded on Lake Champlain the largest force then under arms,
including seven regiments of the regular army, with artillery and
dragoons. He clung to the idea of an attack on Montreal simultaneous
with Smyth’s movement at Niagara.[317] November 8, he wrote from Albany
to Eustis that he was about to join the army under General Bloomfield
at Plattsburg.[318]
“I have been detained several days by a severe rheumatic attack,
but I shall, by the aid of Dr. Mann, be able to set off this day
toward Lake Champlain, where I trust General Bloomfield will be
able to move toward Montreal, and with the addition of three
thousand regular troops that place might be carried and held
this winter; but I cannot consent to crossing the St. Lawrence
with an uncertainty of being able to remain there.”
Whatever were Dearborn’s motives for undertaking the movement,
his official report[319] explained that on arriving at Plattsburg
he found General Bloomfield ill, and was himself obliged to take
command, November 19, when he marched the army about twenty miles to
the Canadian line. At that point the militia declined to go further,
and Dearborn as quietly as possible, November 23, marched back to
Plattsburg. His campaign lasted four days, and he did not enter Canada.
Whether Dearborn, Smyth, or William Hull would have improved the
situation by winning a victory or by losing a battle was a question to
be answered by professional soldiers; but the situation at best was
bad, and when the report of Smyth’s crowning failure reached Dearborn
it seemed for a moment to overcome his sorely tried temper. “I had
anticipated disappointment and misfortune in the commencement of the
war,” he wrote to Eustis,[320] “but I did by no means apprehend such a
deficiency of regular troops and such a series of disasters as we have
witnessed.” He intimated his readiness to accept the responsibility
which properly belonged to him, and to surrender his command. “I shall
be happy to be released by any gentleman whose talents and popularity
will command the confidence of the Government and the country.” To the
President he wrote at the same time:[321] “It will be equally agreeable
to me to employ such moderate talents as I possess in the service of my
country, or to be permitted to retire to the shades of private life,
and remain a mere but interested spectator of passing events.”