FOR civil affairs Americans were more or less trained; but they had
ignored war, and had shown no capacity in their treatment of military
matters. Their little army was not well organized or equipped; its
civil administration was more imperfect than its military, and its
military condition could hardly have been worse. The ten old regiments,
with half-filled ranks, were scattered over an enormous country on
garrison service, from which they could not be safely withdrawn; they
had no experience, and no organization for a campaign, while thirteen
new regiments not yet raised were expected to conquer Canada.
If the army in rank and file was insufficient, its commanding
officers supplied none of its wants. The senior major-general
appointed by President Madison in February, 1812, was Henry Dearborn,
who had retired in 1809 from President Jefferson’s Cabinet into
the Custom-House of Boston. Born in 1751, Dearborn at the time
of his nomination as major-general was in his sixty-second year,
and had never held a higher grade in the army than that of deputy
quartermaster-general in 1781, and colonel of a New Hampshire regiment
after active service in the Revolutionary War had ended.
The other major-general appointed at the same time was Thomas Pinckney,
of South Carolina, who received command of the Southern Department.
Pinckney was a year older than Dearborn; his military service was
chiefly confined to the guerilla campaigns of Marion and Sumter, and to
staff duty as aide to General Gates in the Southern campaign of 1780;
he had been minister in England and Envoy Extraordinary to Spain, where
he negotiated the excellent treaty known by his name; he had been also
a Federalist member of Congress in the stormy sessions from 1797 to
1801,--but none of these services, distinguished as they were, seemed
to explain his appointment as major-general. Macon, whose opinions
commonly reflected those of the Southern people, was astonished at the
choice.
“The nomination of Thomas Pinckney for major-general,” he
wrote,[227] “is cause of grief to all men who wish proper
men appointed; not that he is a Federal or that he is not a
gentleman, but because he is thought not to possess the talents
necessary to his station. I imagine his nomination must have
been produced through the means of P. Hamilton, who is about as
fit for his place as the Indian Prophet would be for Emperor of
Europe. I never was more at a loss to account for any proceeding
than the nomination of Pinckney to be major-general.”
Even the private report that Pinckney had become a Republican did not
reconcile Macon, whose belief that the “fighting secretaries” would not
do for real war became stronger than ever, although he admitted that
some of the military appointments were supposed to be tolerably good.
Of the brigadier-generals the senior was James Wilkinson, born in 1757,
and fifty-five years old in 1812. Wilkinson had recently been tried by
court-martial on a variety of charges, beginning with that of having
been a pensioner of Spain and engaged in treasonable conspiracy; then
of being an accomplice of Aaron Burr; and finally, insubordination,
neglect of duty, wastefulness, and corruption. The court acquitted him,
and February 14 President Madison approved the decision, but added an
irritating reprimand. Yet in spite of acquittal Wilkinson stood in the
worst possible odor, and returned what he considered his wrongs by
bitter and contemptuous hatred for the President and the Secretary of
War.
The next brigadier was Wade Hampton, of South Carolina, who entered
the service in 1808, and was commissioned as brigadier in 1809. Born
in 1754, he was fifty-seven years old, and though understood to be a
good officer, he had as yet enjoyed no opportunity of distinguishing
himself. Next in order came Joseph Bloomfield of New Jersey, nominated
as brigadier-general of the regular army March 27, 1812; on the same
day James Winchester, of Tennessee, was named fourth brigadier; and
April 8 William Hull, of Massachusetts, was appointed fifth in rank.
Bloomfield, a major in the Revolutionary War, had been for the last ten
years Governor of New Jersey. Winchester, another old Revolutionary
officer, originally from Maryland, though mild, generous, and rich, was
not the best choice that might have been made from Tennessee. William
Hull, civil Governor of Michigan since 1805, was a third of the same
class. All were sixty years of age or thereabout, and none belonged to
the regular service, or had ever commanded a regiment in face of an
enemy.
Of the inferior appointments, almost as numerous as the enlistments,
little could be said. Among the officers of the regiment of Light
Artillery raised in 1808, after the “Chesapeake” alarm, was a young
captain named Winfield Scott, born near Petersburg, Virginia, in 1786,
and in the prime of his energies when at the age of twenty-six he saw
the chance of distinction before him. In after life Scott described the
condition of the service as he found it in 1808.
“The army of that day,” he said,[228] “including its general
staff, the three old and the nine new regiments, presented no
pleasing aspect. The old officers had very generally sunk into
either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking....
Many of the appointments were positively bad, and a majority
of the remainder indifferent. Party spirit of that day knew no
bounds, and of course was blind to policy. Federalists were
almost entirely excluded from selection, though great numbers
were eager for the field, and in New England and some other
States there were but very few educated Republicans; hence the
selections from those communities consisted mostly of coarse and
ignorant men. In the other States, where there was no lack of
educated men in the dominant party, the appointments consisted
generally of swaggerers, dependants, decayed gentlemen, and
others, ‘fit for nothing else,’ which always turned out utterly
unfit for any military purpose whatever.”
This account of the army of 1808 applied equally, said Scott, to the
appointments of 1812. Perhaps the country would have fared as well
without a regular army, by depending wholly on volunteers, and allowing
the States to choose general officers. In such a case Andrew Jackson
would have taken the place of James Winchester, and William Hull would
never have received an appointment from Massachusetts.
No one in the government gave much thought to the military dangers
created by the war, yet these dangers seemed evident enough to warrant
keen anxiety. The sea-shore was nowhere capable of defence; the
Lakes were unguarded; the Indians of the Northwestern Territory were
already in arms, and known to be waiting only a word from the Canadian
governor-general; while the whole country beyond the Wabash and Maumee
rivers stood nearly defenceless. At Detroit one hundred and twenty
soldiers garrisoned the old British fort; eighty-five men on the
Maumee held Fort Wayne; some fifty men guarded the new stockade called
Fort Harrison, lately built on the Wabash; and fifty-three men, beyond
possibility of rescue, were stationed at Fort Dearborn, or Chicago;
finally, eighty-eight men occupied the Island of Michillimackinaw in
the straits between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan. These were all the
military defences of a vast territory, which once lost would need
another war to regain; and these petty garrisons, with the settlers
about them, were certain, in the event of an ordinary mischance, to be
scalped as well as captured. The situation was little better in the
South and Southwest, where the Indians needed only the support of a
British army at New Orleans or Mobile to expel every American garrison
from the territory.
No serious preparations for war had yet been made when the war
began. In January, Congress voted ten new regiments of infantry, two
of artillery, and one of light dragoons; the recruiting began in
March, and in June the Secretary of War reported to Congress that
although no returns had been received from any of the recruiting
offices, yet considering the circumstances “the success which has
attended this service will be found to have equalled any reasonable
expectations.”[229] Eustis was in no way responsible for the failure
of the service, and had no need to volunteer an opinion as to the
reasonable expectations that Congress might entertain. Every one
knew that the enlistments fell far below expectation; but not the
enlistments alone showed torpor. In February, Congress authorized the
President to accept fifty thousand volunteers for one year’s service.
In June, the number of volunteers who had offered themselves was even
smaller than that of regular recruits. In April, Congress authorized
the President to call out one hundred thousand State militia. In
June, no one knew whether all the States would regard the call, and
still less whether the militia would serve beyond the frontier. One
week after declaring war, Congress fixed the war establishment at
twenty-five regiments of infantry, four of artillery, two of dragoons,
and one of riflemen,--making, with the engineers and artificers, an
army of thirty-six thousand seven hundred men; yet the actual force
under arms did not exceed ten thousand, of whom four thousand were
new recruits. Toward no part of the service did the people show a
sympathetic spirit before the war was declared; and even where the war
was most popular, as in Kentucky and Tennessee, men showed themselves
determined to fight in their own way or not at all.
However inexperienced the Government might be, it could not overlook
the necessity of providing for one vital point. Detroit claimed early
attention, and received it. The dangers surrounding Detroit were
evident to any one who searched the map for that remote settlement,
within gunshot of British territory and surrounded by hostile
Indian tribes. The Governor of Michigan, William Hull, a native of
Connecticut, had done good service in the Revolutionary War, but had
reached the age of sixty years without a wish to resume his military
career. He preferred to remain in his civil post, leaving to some
officer of the army the charge of military operations; but he came to
Washington in February, 1812, and urged the Government to take timely
measures for holding the Indians in check. He advised the President
and Cabinet to increase the naval force on Lake Erie, although he
already had at Detroit an armed brig ready to launch, which he thought
sufficient to control the upper lakes. The subject was discussed; but
the delay necessary to create a fleet must have risked, if it did not
insure, the loss of the whole Northwestern Territory, and the President
necessarily decided to march first a force to Detroit strong enough to
secure the frontier, and, if possible, to occupy the whole or part of
the neighboring and friendly British territory in Upper Canada. This
decision Hull seems to have suggested, for he wrote,[230] March 6, to
Secretary Eustis,--
“A part of your army now recruiting may be as well supported and
disciplined at Detroit as at any other place. A force adequate
to the defence of that vulnerable point would prevent a war
with the savages, and probably induce the enemy to abandon the
province of Upper Canada without opposition. The naval force on
the Lakes would in that event fall into our possession, and we
should obtain the command of the waters without the expense of
building such a force.”
This hazardous plan required energy in the American armies, timely
co-operation from Niagara if not from Lake Champlain, and, most of
all, assumed both incompetence and treason in the enemy. Assuming that
Hull would capture the British vessels on the Lakes, the President
made no further provision for a fleet; but, apparently to provide for
simultaneous measures against Lower Canada, the Secretary of War sent
to Boston for General Dearborn, who was to command operations on Lake
Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. Dearborn hastened to Washington
in February, where he remained until the last of April. He submitted
to the Secretary of War what was called a plan of campaign,[231]
recommending that a main army should advance by way of Lake Champlain
upon Montreal, while three corps, composed chiefly of militia, should
enter Canada from Detroit, Niagara, and Sackett’s Harbor. Neither
Dearborn, Hull, Eustis, nor Madison settled the details of the plan or
fixed the time of the combined movement. They could not readily decide
details before Congress acted, and before the ranks of the army were
filled.
While these matters were under discussion in March, the President,
unable to find an army officer fitted to command the force ordered
to Detroit, pressed Governor Hull to reconsider his refusal; and
Hull, yielding to the President’s wish, was appointed, April 8, 1812,
brigadier-general of the United States army, and soon afterward set out
for Ohio. No further understanding had then been reached between him
and Dearborn, or Secretary Eustis, in regard to the military movements
of the coming campaign.
The force destined for Detroit consisted of three regiments of Ohio
militia under Colonels McArthur, Findlay, and Cass, a troop of
Ohio dragoons, and the Fourth Regiment of United States Infantry
which fought at Tippecanoe,--in all about sixteen hundred effective
men, besides a few volunteers. April 1 the militia were ordered to
rendezvous at Dayton, and there, May 25, Hull took command. June
1 they marched, and June 10 were joined at Urbana by the Fourth
Regiment. Detroit was nearly two hundred miles away, and the army as
it advanced was obliged to cut a road through the forest, to bridge
streams and construct causeways; but for such work the militia were
well fitted, and they made good progress. The energy with which the
march was conducted excited the surprise of the British authorities in
Canada,[232] and contrasted well with other military movements of the
year; but vigorous as it was it still lagged behind events. Hull had
moved only some seventy-five miles, when, June 26,[233] he received
from Secretary Eustis a despatch, forwarded by special messenger from
the Department, to warn him that war was close at hand. “Circumstances
have recently occurred,” wrote Secretary Eustis, “which render it
necessary you should pursue your march to Detroit with all possible
expedition. The highest confidence is reposed in your discretion, zeal,
and perseverance.”
[Illustration: THE SEAT OF WAR ABOUT LAKE ERIE.
_Engraved from a Map Published by John Conrad._
Struthers & Co., Engr’s, N. Y.]
The despatch, dated June 18, was sent by the secretary on the morning
of that day in anticipation of the vote taken in Congress a few
hours later.[234] Hull had every reason to understand its meaning,
for he expected to lead his army against the enemy. “In the event of
hostilities,” he had written June 24,[235] “I feel a confidence that
the force under my command will be superior to any which can be opposed
to it. It now exceeds two thousand rank and file.” On receiving the
secretary’s pressing orders Hull left his heavy camp-equipage behind,
and hurried his troops to the Miami, or Maumee, River thirty-five miles
away. There he arrived June 30, and there, to save transportation,
loading a schooner with his personal baggage, his hospital stores,
entrenching tools, and even a trunk containing his instructions and
the muster-rolls of his army, he despatched it, July 1, up the Lake
toward Detroit. He took for granted that he should receive from his
own government the first notice of war; yet he knew that the steamboat
from New York to Albany and the road from Albany to Buffalo, which
carried news to the British forces at Malden, was also the regular mode
of conveyance for Detroit; and he had every reason to suspect that as
his distance in time from Washington was greater, he might learn of war
first from actual hostilities. Hull considered “there was no hazard”
in sending his most valuable papers past Malden;[236] but within
four-and-twenty hours he received a despatch from Secretary Eustis
announcing the declaration of war, and the same day his schooner was
seized by the British in passing Malden to Detroit.
This first disaster told the story of the campaign. The declaration
made at Washington June 18 was published by General Bloomfield at New
York June 20, and reached Montreal by express June 24; the same day
it reached the British Fort George on the Niagara River and was sent
forward to Malden, where it arrived June 30. The despatch to Hull
reached Buffalo two days later than the British express, for it went
by ordinary mail; from Cleveland it was forwarded by express, June
28, by way of Sandusky, to Hull, whom it reached at last, July 2, at
Frenchtown on the river Raisin, forty miles below Detroit.
The slowness of transportation was made conspicuous by another
incident. John Jacob Astor, being engaged in extensive trade with the
Northwestern Indians, for political reasons had been encouraged by
government. Anxious to save the large amount of property exposed to
capture, he not only obtained the earliest intelligence of war, and
warned his agents by expresses, but he also asked and received from
the Treasury orders[237] addressed to the Collectors on the Lakes,
directing them to accept and hold such goods as might be brought from
Astor’s trading-posts. The business of the Treasury as well as that of
Astor was better conducted than that of the War Department. Gallatin’s
letters reached Detroit before Eustis’s despatch reached Hull; and
this incident gave rise to a charge of misconduct and even of treason
against Gallatin himself.[238]
Hull reached Detroit July 5. At that time the town contained about
eight hundred inhabitants within gunshot of the British shore. The fort
was a square enclosure of about two acres, surrounded by an embankment,
a dry ditch, and a double row of pickets. Although capable of standing
a siege, it did not command the river; its supplies were insufficient
for many weeks; it was two hundred miles distant from support, and its
only road of communication ran for sixty miles along the edge of Lake
Erie, where a British fleet on one side and a horde of savages on the
other could always make it impassable. The widely scattered people
of the territory, numbering four or five thousand, promised to become
a serious burden in case of siege or investment. Hull knew in advance
that in a military sense Detroit was a trap.
July 9, four days after his arrival, Hull received orders from
Washington authorizing him to invade Canada:--
“Should the force under your command be equal to the enterprise,
consistent with the safety of your own post, you will take
possession of Malden, and extend your conquests as circumstances
may justify.”
He replied immediately the same day:[239]--
“I am preparing boats, and shall pass the river in a few days.
The British have established a post directly opposite this
place. I have confidence in dislodging them, and of being in
possession of the opposite bank.... The British command the
water and the savages. I do not think the force here equal to
the reduction of Amherstburg (Malden); you therefore must not be
too sanguine.”
Three days later, July 12, his army crossed the river. Not a gun was
fired. The British militia force retired behind the Canard River,
twelve miles below, while Hull and his army occupied Sandwich, and were
well received by the inhabitants.
Hull had many reasons for wishing to avoid a battle. From the first he
looked on the conquest of Canada as a result of his mere appearance.
He began by issuing a proclamation[240] intended to win a peaceful
conquest.
“You will be emancipated,” said the proclamation to the
Canadians, “from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the
dignified station of freemen.... I have a force which will break
down all opposition, and that force is but the vanguard of a
much greater.... The United States offer you peace, liberty, and
security,--your choice lies between these and war, slavery, or
destruction. Choose then; but choose wisely.”...
This proclamation, dated July 12, was spread throughout the province
with no small effect, although it contained an apparently unauthorized
threat, that “no white man found fighting by the side of an Indian
will be taken prisoner; instant death will be his lot.” The people of
the western province were strongly American, and soon to the number
of three hundred and sixty-seven, including deserters from the Malden
garrison, sought protection in the American lines.[241] July 19 Hull
described the situation in very hopeful terms:[242]--
“The army is encamped directly opposite to Detroit. The camp
is entrenched. I am mounting the 24-pounders and making every
preparation for the siege of Malden. The British force, which
in numbers was superior to the American, including militia and
Indians, is daily diminishing. Fifty or sixty (of the militia)
have deserted daily since the American standard was displayed,
and taken protection. They are now reduced to less than one
hundred. In a day or two I expect the whole will desert. The
Indian force is diminishing in the same proportion. I have now
a large council of ten or twelve nations sitting at Brownstown,
and I have no doubt but the result will be that they will remain
neutral. The brig ‘Adams’ was launched on the 4th of July. I
have removed her to Detroit under cover of the cannon, and shall
have her finished and armed as soon as possible. We shall then
have the command of the upper lakes.”
To these statements Hull added a warning, which carried at least equal
weight:--
“If you have not a force at Niagara, the whole force of the
province will be directed against this army.... It is all
important that Niagara should be invested. All our success will
depend upon it.”
While Hull reached this position, July 19, he had a right to presume
that the Secretary of War and Major-General Dearborn were straining
every nerve to support him; but in order to understand Hull’s
situation, readers must know what Dearborn and Eustis were doing.
Dearborn’s movements, compared day by day with those of Hull, show
that after both officers left Washington in April to take command of
their forces, Hull reached Cincinnati May 10, while Dearborn reached
Albany May 3, and wrote, May 8, to Eustis that he had fixed on a
site to be purchased for a military station. “I shall remain here
until the erection of buildings is commenced.... The recruiting seems
going on very well where it has been commenced. There are nearly
three hundred recruits in this State.”[243] If Dearborn was satisfied
with three hundred men as the result of six weeks’ recruiting in New
York State in immediate prospect of a desperate war, he was likely
to take his own duties easily; and in fact, after establishing his
headquarters at Albany for a campaign against Montreal, he wrote, May
21, to the Secretary announcing his departure for Boston: “As the
quartermaster-general arrived here this day I hope to be relieved from
my duties in that line, and shall set out for Pittsfield, Springfield,
and Boston; and shall return here as soon as possible after making the
necessary arrangements at those places.”
Dearborn reached Boston May 26, the day after Hull took command at
Dayton. May 29 he wrote again to Eustis: “I have been here three
days.... There are about three hundred recruits in and near this
town.... Shall return to Albany within a few days.” Dearborn found
business accumulate on his hands. The task of arranging the coast
defences absorbed his mind. He forgot the passage of time, and while
still struggling with questions of gunboats, garrisons, field-pieces,
and enlistments he was surprised, June 22, by receiving the declaration
of war. Actual war threw still more labor and anxiety upon him. The
State of Massachusetts behaved as ill as possible. “Nothing but their
fears,” he wrote,[244] “will prevent their going all lengths.” More
used to politics than to war, Dearborn for the time took no thought of
military movements.
Madison and Eustis seemed at first satisfied with this mode of
conducting the campaign. June 24 Eustis ordered Hull to invade West
Canada, and extend his conquests as far as practicable. Not until June
26 did he write to Dearborn,[245]--
“Having made the necessary arrangements for the defence of the
sea-coast, it is the wish of the President that you should
repair to Albany and prepare the force to be collected at that
place for actual service. It is understood that being possessed
of a full view of the intentions of Government, and being also
acquainted with the disposition of the force under your command,
you will take your own time and give the necessary orders to the
officers on the sea-coast. It is altogether uncertain at what
time General Hull may deem it expedient to commence offensive
operations. The preparations it is presumed will be made to move
in a direction for Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. On your
arrival at Albany you will be able to form an opinion of the
time required to prepare the troops for action.”
Such orders as those of June 24 to Hull, and of June 26 to Dearborn,
passed beyond bounds of ordinary incapacity, and approached the line
of culpable neglect. Hull was to move when he liked, and Dearborn was
to take his own time at Boston before beginning to organize his army.
Yet the letter to Dearborn was less surprising than Dearborn’s reply.
The major-general in charge of operations against Montreal, Kingston,
and Niagara should have been able to warn his civil superior of the
risks incurred in allowing Hull to make an unsupported movement from
an isolated base such as he knew Detroit to be; but no thought of Hull
found place in Dearborn’s mind. July 1 he wrote:[246]--
“There has been nothing yet done in New England that indicates
an actual state of war, but every means that can be devised
by the Tories is in operation to depress the spirits of the
country. Hence the necessity of every exertion on the part
of the Government for carrying into effect the necessary
measures for defence or offence. We ought to have gunboats
in every harbor on the coast. Many places will have no other
protection, and all require their aid. I shall have doubts as
to the propriety of my leaving this place until I receive your
particular directions after you shall have received my letter.”
Dearborn complained with reason of the difficulties that surrounded
him. Had Congress acted promptly, a large body of volunteers would have
been already engaged, general officers would have been appointed and
ready for service, whereas no general officer except himself was yet
at any post north of New York city. Every day he received from every
quarter complaints of want of men, clothing, and supplies; but his
remaining at Boston to watch the conduct of the State government was
so little likely to overcome these difficulties that at last it made
an unfavorable impression on the Secretary, who wrote, July 9, a more
decided order from Washington:[247]--
“The period has arrived when your services are required at
Albany, and I am instructed by the President to direct, that,
having made arrangements for placing the works on the sea-coast
in the best state of defence your means will permit, ... you
will then order all the recruits not otherwise disposed of to
march immediately to Albany, or some station on Lake Champlain,
to be organized for the invasion of Canada.”
With this official letter Eustis sent a private letter[248] of the same
date, explaining the reason for his order:--
“If ... we divide, distribute, and render inefficient the force
authorized by law, we play the game of the enemy within and
without. District among the field-officers the seaboard!... Go
to Albany or the Lake! The troops shall come to you as fast as
the season will admit, and the blow must be struck. Congress
must not meet without a victory to announce to them.”
Dearborn at Boston replied to these orders, July 13,[249] a few hours
after Hull’s army, six hundred miles away, crossed the Detroit River
into Canada and challenged the whole British force on the lakes.
“For some time past I have been in a very unpleasant situation,
being at a loss to determine whether or not I ought to leave the
sea-coast. As soon as war was declared [June 18] I was desirous
of repairing to Albany, but was prevented by your letters of
May 20 and June 12, and since that time by the extraordinary
management of some of the governors in this quarter. On the
receipt of your letter of June 26 I concluded to set out in
three or four days for Albany, but the remarks in your letter of
the 1st inst. prevented me. But having waited for more explicit
directions until I begin to fear that I may be censured for not
moving, and having taken such measures as circumstances would
permit for the defence of the sea-coast, I have concluded to
leave this place for Albany before the end of the present week
unless I receive orders to remain.”
A general-in-chief unable to decide at the beginning of a campaign in
what part of his department his services were most needed was sure to
be taught the required lesson by the enemy. Even after these warnings
Dearborn made no haste. Another week passed before he announced, July
21, his intended departure for Albany the next day, but without an
army. “Such is the opposition in this State as to render it doubtful
whether much will be done to effect in raising any kind of troops.” The
two months he passed in Boston were thrown away; the enlistments were
so few as to promise nothing, and the governor of Massachusetts barely
condescended to acknowledge without obeying his request for militia to
defend the coast.
July 26, one week after Hull had written that all his success depended
on the movements at Niagara, Dearborn reached Albany and found there
some twelve hundred men not yet organized or equipped. He found also
a letter, dated July 20, from the Secretary of War, showing that the
Government had begun to feel the danger of its position.[250] “I have
been in daily expectation of hearing from General Hull, who probably
arrived in Detroit on the 8th inst.” In fact Hull arrived in Detroit
July 5, and crossed into Canada July 12; but when the secretary wrote,
July 20, he had not yet heard of either event. “You will make such
arrangements with Governor Tompkins,” continued Eustis, “as will
place the militia detached by him for Niagara and other posts on the
lakes under your control; and there should be a communication, and if
practicable a co-operation, throughout the whole frontier.”
The secretary as early as June 24 authorized Hull to invade Canada
West, and his delay in waiting till July 20 before sending similar
orders to the general commanding the force at Niagara was surprising;
but if Eustis’s letter seemed singular, Dearborn’s answer passed
belief. For the first time General Dearborn then asked a question in
regard to his own campaign,--a question so extraordinary that every
critic found it an enigma: “Who is to have command of the operations in
Upper Canada? I take it for granted that my command does not extend to
that distant quarter.”[251]
July 26, when Hull had been already a fortnight on British soil, a
week after he wrote that his success depended on co-operation from
Niagara, the only force at Niagara consisted of a few New York militia,
not co-operating with Hull or under the control of any United States
officer, while the major-general of the Department took it for granted
that Niagara was not included in his command. The Government therefore
expected General Hull, with a force which it knew did not at the
outset exceed two thousand effectives, to march two hundred miles,
constructing a road as he went; to garrison Detroit; to guard at least
sixty miles of road under the enemy’s guns; to face a force in the
field equal to his own, and another savage force of unknown numbers in
his rear; to sweep the Canadian peninsula of British troops; to capture
the fortress at Malden and the British fleet on Lake Erie,--and to
do all this without the aid of a man or a boat between Sandusky and
Quebec.