WHILE the Twelfth Congress at Washington from November, 1811, until
July, 1812, struggled with the declaration which was to spread war
westward to the Mississippi River, Napoleon at Paris prepared the
numberless details of the coming campaign that was to ravage Europe
eastward as far as Moscow; and in this fury for destruction, no part
remained for argument or diplomacy. Yet Joel Barlow, full of hope that
he should succeed in solving the problem which had thus far baffled his
Government, reached Paris, Sept. 19, 1811, and began a new experience,
ended a year later at Zarnovitch in Poland by a tragedy in keeping with
the military campaign to which Barlow was in a fashion attached.
Joel Barlow felt himself at home in Paris. In 1788, at the age of
thirty-four, he had first come abroad, and during seventeen exciting
years had been rather French than American. In 1792 the National
Convention conferred on him the privileges of French citizenship,--an
honor then shared only by Washington and Hamilton among Americans.
He felt himself to be best understood and appreciated by Frenchmen.
His return to France in 1812 was, he said, attended by a reception
much more cordial and friendly than that which he had received in
America, in 1805, on his return to his native country after seventeen
years of absence. He settled with delight into his old society, even
into his old house in the Rue Vaugirard, and relished the pleasure
of recovering, with the highest dignity of office, the atmosphere of
refinement which he always keenly enjoyed. Yet when these associations
lost their freshness, and he turned to his diplomatic task, he found
that few lots in life were harder than that of the man who bound
himself to the destinies of Napoleon.
On the success of Barlow’s mission the fate of President Madison might
depend. As long as France maintained her attitude of hostility to the
United States, war against England would be regarded by a majority of
the Northern people with distrust and dislike. On that point Madison
was justly timid. The opposition of New England and New York must be
quieted, and in order to quiet it Madison must prove France to be
honest in respecting American rights; he must show that the decrees
had been really repealed as he had so often and still so obstinately
asserted, and that the vast confiscations of American property under
the authority of those decrees would receive indemnity. The public had
commonly supposed France to be comparatively a slight aggressor; but
to the general surprise, when Congress, before the declaration of war
against England, called for a return of captures under the belligerent
edicts, Monroe’s report showed that the seizures by France and by the
countries under her influence in pursuance of the decrees were not
less numerous than those made by England under the Orders in Council.
The precise values were never known. The confiscations ordered by
Napoleon in Spain, Naples, Holland, Denmark, Hamburg, and on the Baltic
outnumbered those made in his empire; but all these taken together
probably exceeded the actual condemnations in British prize-courts.
This result, hardly expected by the American government, added to its
embarrassment, but was only a part of its grievances against Napoleon.
Not only had France since 1807 surpassed England in her outrages on
American property, but while England encouraged American commerce
with her own possessions, Napoleon systematically prohibited American
commerce with his empire. He forbade American vessels to import sugar
or other colonial produce except by special license; he imposed a duty
of sixty cents a pound on Georgia cotton worth twenty or twenty-five
cents; he refused to take tobacco except in small quantities as a part
of the government monopoly; and he obliged every American ship to carry
for its return cargo two thirds in silks and the other third in wines,
liquors, and such other articles of French produce as he might direct.
The official returns made to Congress showed that in 1811 the United
States exported domestic produce to the amount of $45,294,000, of which
France and Italy took only $1,164,275.
Barlow’s instructions required him to reform these evils, but they
especially insisted upon indemnity for seizures under the decrees.
Haste was required; for Congress could not be expected to adopt
extreme measures against England until France should have made such
concessions as would warrant the American government in drawing a
distinction between the two belligerents. Barlow arrived in Paris
September 19, only to learn that on the same day the Emperor set out
for Antwerp and Amsterdam. The Duc de Bassano received him kindly,
assured him of the Emperor’s order to begin upon business at once, and
listened courteously to the American complaints and demands. Then he
too departed for Holland, whence he returned only November 9, when at
Washington Congress had been already a week in session.
Nothing showed this delay to be intentional; but Napoleon never allowed
delay when he meant to act, and in the present instance he was not
inclined to act. Although the Duc de Bassano made no reply to Barlow,
he found time at Amsterdam to write instructions to Serurier.[194] In
these he declared that all American vessels captured since November,
1810, had been released, except those coming by way of England, which
were not yet condemned, but only sequestered.
“The French government would like to know, before making a
decision, how England would act toward American ships bound for
France. If I return once more on the motives for this delay,
it is only for your personal instruction and without making
it a subject of an official declaration on your part. On this
question you should speak as for yourself; appear ignorant what
are the true motives for still detaining some American ships
which have had communication with England; restrict yourself
to receiving the representations sent you, and to declaring
that you will render an account of them; in short, give no
explanation that would imply that the Decrees of Berlin and
Milan are not entirely revoked.”
While the Emperor was thus secretly determined to enforce his decrees,
he was equally determined to pay no indemnities. Against sacrifices of
money Napoleon always made unconquerable resistance.
In due time Barlow had his audience of reception, and made to the
Emperor a speech, not without flattery. He ventured to mention his
commercial objects, in the hope of calling out an answer that would
suit his purpose. Napoleon’s reply proved for the hundredth time the
danger of risking such experiments:--
“As to the commerce between the two Powers, I desire to
favor it. I am great enough to be just. But on your part you
must defend your dignity against my enemies and those of the
Continent. Have a flag, and I will do for you all that you can
desire.”
In reporting the interview to Monroe, Barlow added that the ambiguity
of the Emperor’s reply made it unfit for publication.[195] Ambiguity
was not the quality that a more sensitive man would have ascribed to a
rebuff so sharp; but whatever the President may have thought, he took
Barlow’s advice. The interview was never made known to Congress.
During the month of November Napoleon busied himself in commercial
questions only in order to show liberality to England at the expense
of America. He extended his system of licenses to the exchange of
French wines for sugar in large quantities, and even to the importation
of coffee, indigo, tea, wool, dyewoods, and other articles, all to
be obtained from England by license.[196] He discovered that his
exchanges would benefit France more than England in the proportion of
three to one. “It is therefore the perfected system that has produced
this result, which had not been expected for several years. Evidently
the system thus established is a permanent system, which can be
made perpetual.”[197] The motive for this discovery might be traced
throughout all his economical experiments. He needed money.
Never had Napoleon’s ministers a harder task to give his acts a color
of consistency. During the months of November and December Barlow
held many interviews with Bassano, and made earnest efforts to obtain
some written pledge in favor of American interests, but without
success. December 19 he wrote that he was almost discouraged by the
unexpected and unreasonable delay.[198] Napoleon made no more seizures,
and released such American vessels as were held for violation of
the decrees; but he conceded nothing in principle, and was far from
abandoning his fiscal system against the United States. In order to
meet Barlow’s complaints, Bassano gathered together every token of
evidence that the decrees were not in force; but while he was asking
the American minister how these facts could be doubted, a French
squadron, Jan. 8, 1812, sailed from Nantes with orders to destroy all
neutral ships bound to or from an enemy’s port. For several months
American commerce was ravaged by these ships under the Emperor’s order,
in pursuance of his decrees. January 19 Napoleon issued another order
of the gravest character. His quarrel with Bernadotte the new king of
Sweden had reached a rupture, and he carried out his threat of seizing
the Swedish provinces south of the Baltic; but his orders to Marshal
Davoust were almost as hostile to the United States as to Sweden:[199]
“As soon as you shall be sure of seizing a great quantity of colonial
merchandise in Swedish Pomerania, you will take possession of that
province; and you will cause to be seized both at Stralsund and Anklam,
in short at all points in Pomerania, whatever colonial merchandise may
be found.” January 28 he wrote again:[200] “I wait with impatience your
report on the colonial merchandise you shall have found in Pomerania.”
He made no exceptions in favor of American property, for his need of
money was greater than ever.
While Bassano amused Joel Barlow with conversations that resulted in
nothing, he drew up a report to the Emperor, to be laid before the
conservative Senate, dealing wholly with the question of neutrals.
Circumstances made the appearance of this report peculiarly mortifying
to Barlow. Jonathan Russell, who had been sent to act as American
_chargé_ at London, wrote to Barlow asking for additional proofs
to satisfy Lord Castlereagh that the decrees were repealed. Barlow
replied, March 2, by a letter to Russell, recounting seven cases of
ships which had been admitted to French ports contrary to the decrees,
while in no case had the decrees been enforced.[201] “It is difficult
to conceive,” he added, “probably impossible to procure, and certainly
insulting to require, a mass of evidence more positive than this or
more conclusive to every unprejudiced mind.” Hardly had he written this
letter when news arrived that French frigates were burning American
vessels on the ocean for infringing the decrees. March 12 he wrote to
Bassano a letter of strong protest against these depredations, and
a demand for redress. His letter received no answer. Had this been
all, gross as the outrage was, nothing need have become public; but
on the heels of this scandal came another more flagrant. March 16 the
“Moniteur” published Bassano’s official report to the Emperor, which
had the character of an Imperial message to the conservative Senate.
This document began by defining neutral rights as claimed by France;
and while one of these claims required that the flag should cover
all goods except arms and other munitions of war, another declared
that no blockade was real except of a port “invested, besieged, in
the presumption of being taken;” and until these principles should be
restored to force by England, “the Decrees of Berlin and Milan must
be enforced toward Powers that let their flags be denationalized; the
ports of the Continent are not to be opened to denationalized flags or
to English merchandise.” Barlow could imagine no way of reconciling
this language with Bassano’s assertions that the decrees were
withdrawn, and he enclosed the report to Monroe in a letter speculating
upon the reason of this contradiction:[202]--
“You will notice that the minister in his report says nothing
particular of the United States, and nothing more precise than
heretofore on the revocation of the decrees.... I am afraid he
is forbidden to designate the United States as out of the gripe
of those decrees, because the Emperor did not like the bill we
have seen before Congress for admitting English goods contracted
for before the Non-importation Law went into operation.”
Barlow could not but maintain that the decrees were repealed; yet the
British government could hardly be required to hold the same opinion.
Taking Bassano’s report as proof that the United States would no longer
maintain the repeal, the Prince Regent issued, April 21, 1812, a formal
declaration, that in case those decrees should at any future time by
an authentic act publicly promulgated be expressly and unconditionally
repealed, then the Orders in Council should be wholly and absolutely
revoked. This step brought matters to a crisis. As soon as the Prince
Regent’s declaration reached Paris, May 1, 1812, Barlow wrote to the
French government a letter declaring that, between Bassano’s report and
the Prince Regent’s declaration, proof that the decrees were repealed
had become absolutely necessary for the United States, and he followed
up his notes by a conversation in which he pressed on the French
minister the danger of further trifling.[203]
Then came the climax of Imperial diplomacy. Neither Talleyrand nor
Champagny had shown repugnance to falsehood; whatever end they wished,
they used naturally and without hesitation the most convenient means.
Yet free as they were from scruples, one might doubt whether Talleyrand
or Champagny would have done what Bassano did; for when the American
minister impatiently demanded some authentic evidence that the decrees
were repealed, Bassano complained that such a demand should be made
when the American government possessed the repealing decree itself.
Barlow was struck dumb with astonishment when the French minister then
passed to him a decree signed by Napoleon at St. Cloud, April 28, 1811,
declaring his previous decrees non-existent for American vessels after
Nov. 1, 1810.[204]
That the American minister should have lost self-possession in the
face of an act so surprising and so unexpected was natural, for
Talleyrand himself could hardly have controlled his features on seeing
this document, which for an entire year had been sought by the whole
world in vain, and which suddenly appeared as a paper so well known
as to need only an allusion. In his embarrassment Barlow asked the
vacant question whether this decree had been published, as though his
surprise could be no greater had the document been printed in the
“Moniteur” and the “National Intelligencer,” or been sent to Congress
with the President’s Annual Message. Bassano replied that it had not
been published, but had been communicated at the time to Jonathan
Russell and sent to Serurier with orders to communicate it to the
Secretary of State. These assertions increased the American minister’s
embarrassment, for they implied a reflection on the American
government which he could not resent without in his turn implying that
Napoleon had invented the story so gravely told. Barlow said no more,
but asked for a copy of the repealing decree, which was sent to him May
10.
If evidence were necessary to show that no such decree was issued April
28, 1811, Napoleon’s correspondence proves that the Emperor did not
consider the subject until April 29, and his note to the Council dated
that day is proof that no such decree had then been adopted.[205] Yet
such a decree might naturally have been afterward ante-dated without
objection. Had the Emperor signed it within the year 1811 he might
have set what date upon it he liked, and need have made no mystery of
the delay. The interest of Bassano’s conduct lay not so much in his
producing an ante-dated paper as in his averring that the paper was
not ante-dated, but had been communicated to the American government
at the time. The flagrancy of the falsehood relieved it from the usual
reproach of an attempt to deceive; but if it did not embarrass Bassano
in the telling, it embarrassed President Madison beyond calculation in
admitting.
Still more characteristic than the calmness with which Bassano made
these announcements to the American minister at Paris, was the
circumstantial gravity with which he repeated them to his own minister
at Washington. Writing the same day, May 10, 1812, he enclosed a copy
of the decree, explaining his reasons for doing so:[206]--
“I have learned from Mr. Barlow that he is not acquainted with
the Decree of April 28, 1811, ... and I have addressed a copy to
him. You yourself, sir, have never acknowledged its reception;
you have never mentioned it in any of your despatches; you
have never dwelt upon it in any of your interviews with the
American Secretary of State. This silence makes me fear that the
communication made of it to you under date of May 2, 1811, did
not reach you, and I think it proper to enclose herewith a new
copy.”
He explained at some length why he had ignored this decree in his
report to the conservative Senate:
“It had become useless to recall in this report a measure in
respect to which no one could longer raise a doubt; it would
have been even improper to specify the Americans by name; it
would have entailed other citations; it would have required too
much prominence to be given to the true motives of the Senatus
Consultum which was to be proposed. The Emperor had reason to
complain of the numerous infractions made by Russia in the
Continental system, in spite of her engagement to co-operate
with and maintain it. Therefore against Russia were directed the
provisions of that report; but although various circumstances
rendered war inevitable, it was still necessary to avoid naming
her while preparing forces against her.”
Bold and often rash a diplomatist as Napoleon was, he still felt that
at the moment of going to war with Russia he could not entirely
disregard the wishes of the United States. In appearance he gave way,
and sacrificed the system so long and so tenaciously defended; but in
yielding, he chose means that involved the United States government in
common responsibility for his previous acts.
Even had the Emperor’s deception stopped there, it would have offered
the most interesting example in American experience of one peculiarity
of his genius; but this was not all. He seemed to grudge the success
which Barlow had wrung from him. One is tempted to think that this
victory cost Barlow his life. The decree he had gained was flung at him
like a missile. Bassano’s letter was dated May 10; the Emperor already,
the day before, had left Paris to take command of his Grand Army on the
Russian frontier, and as yet the negotiation had not advanced a step.
Meanwhile Barlow took a course of his own. Monroe and Madison cared
little for a commercial treaty, but insisted upon indemnities. Barlow,
finding that indemnity was for the present out of the question, showed
great earnestness to make a commercial treaty, and admitted suggestions
altogether displeasing to his Government. Thus June arrived, producing
no change in the attitude of France other than the new decree, which
was as grave an offence to the President’s dignity as though it had
been couched in terms of the lie direct.
Deceived and deserted, Madison was driven without an ally into a war
that required the strongest alliances. Mortified at the figure he had
been made to present, he wrote to Barlow that the shameful conduct
of the French government would be an everlasting reproach to it, and
that if peace were made with England, “the full tide of indignation
with which the public mind here is boiling” would be directed against
France. His anger was the more bitter because of his personal outrage.
The repealing Decree of April, 1811, spared no kind of humiliation,
for it proved, even to himself, his error in asserting that Napoleon
imposed no condition precedent on the original promise to withdraw his
decrees.[207] On that point the Federalists were shown to be right, and
Madison could offer no defence against their charge that he had made
himself a tool of Napoleon.
When Bassano left Paris to follow Napoleon into Russia he intrusted
the negotiation with Barlow to the Duc Dalberg, by birth a German,
who was in the Imperial service. While Dalberg listened to Barlow and
wrote long reports to Bassano, Napoleon, entering Russia June 23, five
days after Congress declared war against Great Britain, advanced to
Wilna in Poland, where he remained until July 17, and then with five
hundred thousand men plunged into the heart of Russia, leaving Bassano
at Wilna with general charge of matters of state. These events made
Barlow conscious that his negotiation was hopeless. His communications
with Dalberg must be sent from Paris to Wilna, and thence to Napoleon
on the road to Moscow, with the certainty of receiving no attention
during the active campaign; while even if Napoleon had been able
to give them ample attention, he would soon have taken offence at
the increasing ill-temper of their tone, and would have been more
likely to show anger than to grant favors. Under new instructions
from Monroe, which were almost a reprimand, Barlow said less and less
about a commercial treaty, and pressed harder for indemnities. Under
instructions from Bassano, dated August 10,[208] Dalberg was obliged to
avoid the discussion of indemnities and to talk only about commerce.
Barlow insisted upon explanations in regard to seventeen American
vessels recently burned at sea under the Decrees of Berlin and Milan;
but no explanation could be obtained from Bassano. When the news
arrived that Congress had declared war against England, Bassano, August
10, renewed his instructions to Dalberg without essential change:[209]--
“As for the commercial advantages that his Majesty may be
disposed to grant the Americans, particularly since the last
measures their Government has taken, communicate to the Minister
of Commerce the different demands of Mr. Barlow; consult with
him to what points and in what proportion these advantages might
be granted, and communicate the result of these interviews to me
before concluding anything in that respect with Mr. Barlow. You
are to encourage his hopes and his confidence in the benevolent
views of his Majesty toward the United States; explain, on the
score of his Majesty’s distance and the importance of his actual
occupations, the kind of languor of the negotiation which has
been begun, and the failure to decide some of the questions
proposed by that minister; and you can point him to the American
declaration of war against England as a motive the more for
removing from their proposed arrangements with France whatever
would tend to complicate them and too long delay their adoption.”
These instructions showed no change in the Imperial policy even in
consequence of the war declared by the United States against England.
The Decrees of Berlin and Milan were no more repealed by the Decree
of 1811, so unexpectedly produced by Bassano, than they had been by
Champagny’s famous letter of August 5, 1810; no order was ever given
to any official of the empire that carried the revocation into effect.
While Bassano protested to Barlow against implications of the Emperor’s
good faith, Bassano’s colleagues equally protested to Barlow that they
had no authority to exempt American ships from the operation of the
decrees. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, gave orders to his cruisers
to destroy all vessels infringing the decrees, and not even an apology
could be wrung from him for the act. If Barlow lost patience at this
conduct, the Duc Dalberg, with German simple-mindedness, felt even more
acutely the odium of his part, and sent to Bassano remonstrances as
strong as those he received from Barlow. August 11, only one day after
Bassano wrote from Wilna the instruction just quoted, Dalberg wrote
from Paris in language such as had been of late seldom used in the
Emperor’s service:[210]--
“If we wish to inspire any confidence in the American
government, of what use is an isolated proof of revocation if
a little while afterward another proof overthrows it, and if
Mr. Barlow, by his means of information at the Department of
Commerce, at that of the Marine, at the Council of Prizes,
learns that they are ignorant of it; that nothing is changed
in that legislation, and that it may at any instant be again
enforced? Under such circumstances, I pray you, Monsieur le
Duc, to consider what is the good of all the fine phrases
and fair words that I may use to Mr. Barlow when he is every
moment receiving news that our privateers in the Baltic and
on the coast permit themselves the most reckless (_les plus
fortes_) violations against the property of Americans. In
such circumstances the art of diplomacy becomes insufficient, a
sorry game (_triste métier_) of which no one is long the
dupe.”
Dalberg seemed to suspect that Bassano himself knew little of the true
situation:--
“Your Excellency is perhaps not informed of the complaints made
by Americans to Mr. Barlow. If you believe that, while nothing
is settled in regard to American navigation, the Americans
enjoy the favor of navigating freely, of being well treated in
our ports, and of being exposed to no annoyance, you deceive
yourself. What with the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, whose
revocation is not yet known to the authorities; what with our
forms of custom-house examinations; what with the multiplied
obstacles to all commercial movement,--this is impossible.”
Plain as such language was, it could have no effect; for Bassano could
do nothing without Napoleon’s approval, and Napoleon was already beyond
reach. September 7 he fought the battle of Borodino; September 15 he
entered Moscow.
During all these months Barlow received by every packet despatches
more and more decided from Monroe, letters more and more threatening
from Madison. He told Dalberg in substance that these orders left
no choice except between indemnities and war. Dalberg reported his
language faithfully to Bassano; and Bassano, struggling with the
increasing difficulties of his position, invented a new expedient for
gaining time. While Napoleon remained at Moscow, unable to advance
and unwilling to retreat, Bassano wrote, October 11, from Wilna a
letter to Barlow saying that the Emperor, regretting the delay which
attended negotiation conducted at so great a distance, had put an end
to the Duc Dalberg’s authority and requested Barlow to come in person
to Wilna. The request itself was an outrage, for its motive could not
be mistaken. For an entire year Barlow had seen the French government
elude every demand he made, and he could not fail to understand that
the journey to Wilna caused indefinite further delay, when a letter
of ten lines to Dalberg might remove every obstacle; but however
futile the invitation might be, refusal would have excused the French
government’s inaction. Throughout life Barlow exulted in activity; a
famous traveller, no fatigue or exposure checked his restlessness,
and although approaching his sixtieth year he feared no journey. He
accepted Bassano’s invitation, and October 25 wrote that he should
set out the following day for Wilna. A week earlier, Napoleon quitted
Moscow, and began his retreat to Poland.
Ten days brought Barlow to Berlin, and already Napoleon’s army was
in full flight and in danger of destruction, although the winter had
hardly begun. November 11 Barlow reached Königsberg and plunged into
the wastes of Poland. Everywhere on the road he saw the devastation
of war, and when he reached Wilna, November 18, he found only
confusion. Every one knew that Napoleon was defeated, but no one yet
knew the tragedy that had reduced his army of half a million men
to a desperate remnant numbering some fifty thousand. While Barlow
waited for Napoleon’s arrival, Napoleon struggled through one obstacle
after another until the fatal passage of the Beresina, November 27,
which dissolved his army and caused him to abandon it. December 5, at
midnight, he started for Paris, having sent a courier in advance to
warn the Duc de Bassano, who lost no time in dismissing his guests from
Wilna, where they were no longer safe. Barlow quitted Wilna for Paris
the day before Napoleon left his army; but Napoleon soon passed him on
the road. The weather was very cold, the thermometer thirteen degrees
below zero of Fahrenheit; but Barlow travelled night and day, and after
passing through Warsaw, reached a small village called Zarnovitch near
Cracow. There he was obliged to stop. Fatigue and exposure caused an
acute inflammation of the lungs, which ended his life Dec. 24, 1812. A
week earlier Napoleon had reached Paris.
Barlow’s death passed almost unnoticed in the general catastrophe of
which it was so small a part. Not until March, 1813, was it known
in America; and the news had the less effect because circumstances
were greatly changed. Madison’s earnestness in demanding satisfaction
from France expressed not so much his own feelings as fear of his
domestic opponents. The triumph of Russia and England strengthened the
domestic opposition beyond hope of harmony, and left the President in a
desperate strait. No treaty, either with or without indemnities, could
longer benefit greatly the Administration, while Napoleon’s overthrow
threatened to carry down Madison himself in the general ruin. In his
own words,[211]--
“Had the French emperor not been broken down, as he was to a
degree at variance with all probability and which no human
sagacity could anticipate, can it be doubted that Great Britain
would have been constrained by her own situation and the
demands of her allies to listen to our reasonable terms of
reconciliation? The moment chosen for war would therefore have
been well chosen, if chosen with a reference to the French
expedition against Russia; and although not so chosen, the
coincidence between the war and the expedition promised at the
time to be as favorable as it was fortuitous.”
Thus the year 1812 closed American relations with France in
disappointment and mortification. Whatever hopes Madison might still
cherish, he could not repeat the happy diplomacy of 1778 or of 1803.
From France he could gain nothing. He had challenged a danger more
serious than he ever imagined; for he stood alone in the world in the
face of victorious England.