WHEN news of this decisive step became public, the British minister
hastened to Monroe for explanations.[156] Monroe “deprecated its
being considered as a war measure. He even seemed to affect to
consider it as an impartial measure toward the two belligerents, and
as thereby complying with one of our demands; namely, putting them
on an equality.... He used an expression which I had some difficulty
in comprehending,--that it was the wish of the Government to keep
their policy in their own hands.” In truth Monroe seemed, to the
last, inclined to leave open a door by which the anger of America
might, in case of reconciliation with England, be diverted against
France. Madison had no such delusion. Foster went to the President,
and repeated to him Monroe’s remark that the embargo was not a war
measure.[157] “Oh, no!” said Madison, “embargo is not war;” but he
added that in his opinion the United States would be amply justified in
war, whatever might be its expediency, for Great Britain was actually
waging war on them, and within a month had captured eighteen ships of
the estimated value of fifteen hundred thousand dollars. He said he
should be glad still to receive any propositions England might have to
make, and that Congress would be in session at the period fixed for
terminating the embargo. Neither Madison nor Monroe could properly say
more to the British minister, for they could not undertake to forestall
the action of Congress; but the rumor that France might be included
in the declaration of war as in the embargo, made the French minister
uneasy, and he too asked explanation. To him the secretary talked more
plainly.[158]
“Mr. Monroe answered me,” wrote Serurier April 9, “that the
embargo had been adopted in view of stopping the losses of
commerce, and of preparing for the imminent war with England; he
protested to me his perfect conviction that war was inevitable
if the news expected from France answered to the hopes they
had formed. He gave me his word of honor that in the secret
deliberations of Congress no measure had been taken against
France. He admitted that in fact the affair of the frigates had
produced a very deep impression on that body; that it had, even
in Republican eyes, seemed manifest proof that the Imperial
Decrees were not repealed, and that this unfortunate accident
had shaken (_ébranlé_) the whole base of the Administration
system; that the Executive, by inclination as much as by system,
had always wished to believe in this repeal, without which
it was impossible to make issue (_engager la querelle_)
with England; that its interest in this respect was perfectly
in accord with that of France, but that he had found it wholly
impossible to justify the inconceivable conduct of the commander
of the frigates.... Mr. Monroe insisted here on his former
declarations, that if the Administration was abandoned by France
it would infallibly succumb, or would be obliged to propose war
against both Powers, which would be against its interests as
much as against its inclination.”
The Embargo Message surprised no one. The Committee of Foreign
Relations made no secret of its decision. Calhoun warned Josiah Quincy
and other representatives of commercial cities; and on the afternoon
of March 31 these members sent an express, giving notice to their
constituents that the embargo would be proposed on the following day.
Every ship-owner on the seaboard and every merchant in the great cities
hurried ships and merchandise to sea, showing that they feared war
less than they feared embargo, at the moment when Congress, April 1,
went into secret session to discuss the measure intended to protect
ship-owners and merchants by keeping their property at home. Porter
introduced the bill laying an embargo for sixty days;[159] Grundy
declared it to be intended as a measure leading directly to war; Henry
Clay made a vehement speech approving the measure on that ground. On
the other side Randolph declared war to be impossible; the President
dared not be guilty of treason so gross and unparalleled as that of
plunging an unprepared nation into such a conflict. Randolph even read
memoranda of Monroe’s remarks to the Committee of Foreign Relations:
“The embargo would leave the policy as respected France, and indeed
of both countries, in our hands;” and from this he tried to convince
the House that the embargo was not honestly intended as a war measure.
The debate ran till evening, when by a vote of sixty-six to forty the
previous question was ordered. Without listening to the minority the
House then hurried the bill through all its stages, and at nine o’clock
passed it by a vote of seventy to forty-one.
The majority numbered less than half the members. In 1807 the House
imposed the embargo by a vote of eighty-two to forty-four, yet the
country failed to support it. The experience of 1807 boded ill for that
of 1812. In the Senate the outlook was worse. The motion to extend
the embargo from sixty to ninety days was adopted without opposition,
changing the character of the bill at a single stroke from a strong war
measure into a weak measure of negotiation; but even in this weaker
form it received only twenty votes against thirteen in opposition. The
President could not depend on a bare majority in the Senate. The New
England Democrats shrank from the embargo even more than from war.
Giles and Samuel Smith stood in open opposition. The Clintons had
become candidates of every discontented faction in the country. Had
the vote in the Senate been counted by States, only six would have
been thrown for the embargo, and of these only Pennsylvania from the
North. In face of such distraction, war with England seemed worse than
a gambler’s risk.
Madison, watching with that apparent neutrality which irritated both
his friends and his enemies, reported to Jefferson the progress of
events.[160] He was not pleased with the Senate’s treatment of his
recommendations, or with “that invariable opposition, open with some
and covert with others, which has perplexed and impeded the whole
course of our public measures.” He explained the motives of senators in
extending the embargo from sixty to ninety days. Some wished to make
it a peace measure, some to postpone war, some to allow time for the
return of their constituents’ ships; some intended it as a ruse against
the enemy. For his own part he had regarded a short embargo as a
rational and provident measure, which would be relished by the greater
part of the nation; but he looked upon it as a step to immediate war,
and he waited only for the Senate to make the declaration.
The President asked too much. Congress seemed exhausted by the efforts
it had made, and the country showed signs of greater exhaustion before
having made any efforts at all. The complaints against France, against
the non-importation, against the embargo, and against the proposed war
were bitter and general. April 6 Massachusetts held the usual State
election. Gerry was again the Republican candidate for governor, and
the Federalists had little hope of defeating him; but the Republican
Administration had proved so unpopular, the famous Gerrymander by
which the State had been divided into districts in party interests
had so irritated the conservative feeling, that the new embargo and
the expected war were hardly needed to throw the State again into
opposition. Not even the revelations of John Henry restored the
balance. More than one hundred and four thousand votes were cast, and a
majority of about twelve hundred appeared on the Federalist side. Caleb
Strong became governor once more at a moment when the change paralyzed
national authority in New England; and meanwhile throughout the country
the enlistments for the new army produced barely one thousand men.
The month of April passed without legislation that could strengthen
Government, except an Act, approved April 10, authorizing the President
to call out one hundred thousand militia for six months’ service.
Congress showed so strong a wish to adjourn that the Administration
was obliged to exert its whole influence to prevent the House from
imitating the Senate, which by a vote of sixteen to fifteen adopted a
Resolution for a recess until June 8. Secretary Gallatin ventured to
bring no tax bills before Congress; Lowndes and Cheves made a vigorous
effort to suspend the Non-importation Act; and a general belief
prevailed that the Government wished to admit English goods in order to
evade, by increase of customs-revenue, the necessity of taxation.
Serurier, much discomposed by these signs of vacillation, busied
himself in the matter, declaring to his friends in Congress that he
should look on any suspension of the Non-importation Act as a formal
infraction of the compact with France. When he pressed Monroe with
remonstrances,[161] Monroe told him, April 22, that the President
and Cabinet had positively and unanimously declared to the Committee
of Foreign Relations against the suspension, because it would seem
to indicate indecision and inconsequence in their foreign policy;
that this remonstrance had caused the plan to be given up, but that
the Administration might still be obliged to consent to a short
adjournment, so great was the wish of members to look after their
private affairs. In fact, Congress showed no other wish than to escape,
and leave the President to struggle with his difficulties alone.
If the war party hesitated in its allegiance to Madison, its doubts
regarded his abilities rather than his zeal. Whatever might be
Madison’s genius, no one supposed it to be that of administration.
His health was delicate; he looked worn and feeble; for many years
he had shown none of the energy of youth; he was likely to succumb
under the burden of war; and, worst of all, he showed no consciousness
of needing support. The party was unanimous in believing Secretary
Eustis unequal to his post, but Madison made no sign of removing him.
So general was the impression of Eustis’s incapacity that when, April
24, the President sent to Congress a message asking for two Assistant
Secretaries of War to aid in conducting the Department, the request
was commonly regarded as an evasion of the public demand for a new
Secretary of War, and as such was unfavorably received. In the House,
where the subject was openly discussed, Randolph defended Eustis in the
style of which he was master: “I will say this much of the Secretary
of War,--that I do verily believe, and I have grounds to believe it
to be the opinion of a majority of this House, that he is at least as
competent to the exercise of his duties as his colleague who presides
over the Marine.” The Senate, wishing perhaps to force the President
into reconstructing his Cabinet, laid aside the bill creating two
Assistant Secretaries of War; and with this action, May 6, ended the
last chance of efficiency in that Department.
While Eustis ransacked the country for generals, colonels, and the
whole staff of officers, as well as the clothing, arms, and blankets
for an army of twenty-five thousand men who could not be found,
Gallatin labored to provide means for meeting the first year’s
expenses. Having no longer the Bank to help him, he dealt separately
with the State Banks through whose agency private subscriptions were
to be received. The subscriptions were to be opened on the first and
second days of May. The Republican newspapers, led by the “National
Intelligencer,”[162] expressed the hope and the expectation that
twice the amount of the loan would be instantly subscribed. Their
disappointment was very great. Federalist New England refused to
subscribe at all; and as the Federalists controlled most of the
capital in the country, the effect of their abstention was alarming.
In all New England not one million dollars were obtained. New York and
Philadelphia took each about one and a half million. Baltimore and
Washington took about as much more. The whole Southern country, from
the Potomac to Charleston, subscribed seven hundred thousand dollars.
Of the entire loan, amounting to eleven million dollars, a little more
than six millions were taken; and considering the terms, the result was
not surprising. At a time when the old six-per-cent loans, with ten or
twelve years to run, stood barely at par, any new six-per-cent loan to
a large amount, with a vast war in prospect, could hardly be taken at
the same rate.
The Federalists, delighted with this failure, said, with some show
of reason, that if the Southern States wanted the war they ought to
supply the means, and had no right to expect that men who thought the
war unjust and unnecessary should speculate to make money from it.
Gallatin put a good face on his failure, and proposed soon to reopen
subscriptions; but the disappointment was real.
“Whatever the result may be,” wrote Serurier to his
Government,[163] “they had counted on more national energy on
the opening of a first loan for a war so just. This cooling
of the national pulse, the resistance which the Northern
States seem once more willing to offer the Administration, the
defection it meets every day in Congress,--all this, joined
to its irritation at our measures which make its own system
unpopular, adds to its embarrassment and hesitation.”
Gallatin made no complaints, but he knew only too well what lay before
him. No resource remained except treasury notes bearing interest.
Neither Gallatin, nor any other party leader, cared to suggest
legal-tender notes, which were supposed to be not only an admission of
national bankruptcy at the start, but also forbidden by the spirit of
the Constitution; yet the government could hardly fail to experience
the same form of bankruptcy in a less convenient shape. After the
destruction of the United States Bank, a banking mania seized the
public. Everywhere new banks were organized or planned, until the
legislature of New York, no longer contented with small corporations
controlling capital of one or two hundred thousand dollars, prepared to
incorporate the old Bank of the United States under a new form, with
a capital of six millions. Governor Tompkins stopped the project by
proroguing the legislature; but his message gave the astonishing reason
that the legislature was in danger of yielding to bribery.[164] The
majority protested against the charge, and denounced it as a breach of
privilege; but whether it was well or ill founded, the influence of the
banking mania on State legislatures could not fail to be corrupting.
The evil, inherent in the origin of the new banks, was aggravated by
their management. Competition and want of experience or of supervision,
inevitably led to over-issue, inflation of credit, suspension of specie
payments, and paper-money of the worst character. Between a debased
currency of private corporations and a debased currency of government
paper, the former was the most expensive and the least convenient; yet
it was the only support on which the Treasury could depend.
Early in May a double election took place, which gave more cause of
alarm. New York chose a Federalist Assembly, and Massachusetts chose
a General Court more strongly Federalist than any one had ventured to
expect. In the face of such a revolution in two of the greatest and
richest States in the Union, President, Cabinet, and legislators had
reason to hesitate; they had even reason to fear that the existence
of the Union might hang on their decision. They knew the Executive
Department to be incompetent for war; they had before their eyes
the spectacle of an incompetent Congress; and they saw the people
declaring, as emphatically as their democratic forms of government
permitted, their unwillingness to undertake the burden. Even bold men
might pause before a situation so desperate.
Thus the month of May passed, full of discouragement. Congress did not
adjourn, but the members went home on leave, with the understanding
that no further action should be taken until June. At home they found
chaos. Under the coercion of embargo, commerce ceased. Men would do
little but talk politics, and very few professed themselves satisfied
with the condition into which their affairs had been brought. The press
cried for war or for peace, according to its fancy; but although each
of the old parties could readily prove the other’s course to be absurd,
unpatriotic, and ruinous, the war men, who were in truth a new party,
powerless to restore order by legitimate methods, shut their ears to
the outcry, and waited until actual war should enforce a discipline
never to be imposed in peace.
The experiment of thrusting the country into war to inflame it, as
crude ore might be thrown into a furnace, was avowed by the party
leaders, from President Madison downward, and was in truth the only
excuse for a course otherwise resembling an attempt at suicide. Many
nations have gone to war in pure gayety of heart; but perhaps the
United States were first to force themselves into a war they dreaded,
in the hope that the war itself might create the spirit they lacked.
One of the liveliest and most instructive discussions of the session,
May 6, threw light upon the scheme by which the youthful nation was
to reverse the process of Medea, and pass through the caldron of war
in confidence of gaining the vigor of age. Mr. Bleecker of New York,
in offering petitions for the repeal of the embargo, argued that the
embargo could not be honestly intended. “Where are your armies; your
navy? Have you money? No, sir! Rely upon it, there will be, there
can be, no war--active, offensive war--within sixty days.” War would
be little short of treason; would bring shame, disgrace, defeat;
and meanwhile the embargo alienated the people of States which must
necessarily bear much of the burden. These arguments were supported by
John Randolph.
“I am myself,” he said, “in a situation similar to what would
have been that of one of the unfortunate people of Caracas, if
preadvised of the danger which overhung his country. I know
that we are on the brink of some dreadful scourge, some great
desolation, some awful visitation from that Power whom, I am
afraid, we have as yet in our national capacity taken no pains
to conciliate.... Go to war without money, without men, without
a navy! Go to war when we have not the courage, while your
lips utter war, to lay war taxes! when your whole courage is
exhibited in passing Resolutions! The people will not believe
it!”
Richard M. Johnson undertook first to meet these criticisms. Johnson
possessed courage and abilities, but he had not, more than other
Kentuckians of his day, the caution convenient in the face of
opponents. He met by threats the opposition he would not answer. “It
was a Tory opposition, in the cities and seaports; and an opposition
which would not be quite so bold and powerful in a time of war; and
he trusted in that Heaven to which the gentleman from Virginia had
appealed, that sixty days would not elapse before all the traitorous
combinations and opposition to the laws and the acts of the general
government would in a great measure cease, or change, and moderate
their tone.” Calhoun, who followed Johnson, expressed the same idea in
less offensive form, and added opinions of his own which showed the
mental condition in which the young war leaders exulted: “So far from
being unprepared, sir, I believe that in four weeks from the time that
a declaration of war is heard on our frontiers the whole of Upper and a
part of Lower Canada will be in our possession.”
Grundy, following in the debate, used neither threats like Johnson,
nor prophecies like Calhoun; but his argument was not more convincing.
“It is only while the public mind is held in suspense,” he said; “it
is only while there is doubt as to what will be the result of our
deliberations,--it is only while we linger in this Hall that any
manifestations of uneasiness will show themselves. Whenever war is
declared, the people will put forth their strength to support their
rights.” He went so far as to add that when war should be once begun,
the distinction between Federalists and Republicans would cease.
Finally, Wright of Maryland, whose words fortunately carried little
weight, concluded the debate by saying that if signs of treason and
civil war should discover themselves in any part of the American
empire, he had no doubt the evil would soon be radically cured by hemp
and confiscation; and his own exertions should not be spared to employ
the remedy.
The President himself had no other plan than to “throw forward the flag
of the country, sure that the people would press onward and defend
it.”[165] The example he had himself given to the people in 1798
tended to cast doubt on the correctness of his judgment,[166] but his
candidacy for the Presidency also shook confidence in his good faith.
So deep was the conviction of his dislike for the policy he supported
as to lead the British minister, May 3, to inform his Government that
the jealousies between the younger and older members of Congress
threatened an open schism, in which the President was supposed likely
to be involved.[167]
“The reason why there has been no nomination made in caucus yet,
by the Democratic members, of Mr. Madison as candidate for the
Presidency is, as I am assured in confidence, because the war
party have suspected him not to have been serious in his late
hostile measures, and wish previously to ascertain his real
sentiments. I have been endeavoring to put the Federalists upon
insinuating that they will support him, if he will agree to give
up the advocates for war.”
This intrigue was stopped by the positive refusal of the eastern
Federalists to support Madison on any terms,--they preferred coalition
with DeWitt Clinton and the Republican malcontents; but the time had
come when some nomination must be made, and when it arrived, all
serious thought of an open Republican schism at Washington vanished.
The usual Congressional caucus was called May 18, and was attended
by eighty-three members and senators, who unanimously renominated
Madison. Seventeen senators, just one half the Senate, and sixty-six
members, almost one half the House, joined in the nomination; but only
three New York members took part, and neither Giles nor Samuel Smith
was present,--they had ceased to act with the Republican party. Only
a few weeks before, Vice-President Clinton had died in office, and
whatever respect the Administration may have felt for his great name
and Revolutionary services, the party was relieved at the prospect of
placing in the chair of the Senate some man upon whom it could better
depend. The caucus named John Langdon of New Hampshire; and when he
declined, Elbridge Gerry, the defeated Governor of Massachusetts, was
selected as candidate for the Vice-presidency.
So little cordiality was felt for President Madison by his party that
only the want of a strong rival reconciled a majority to the choice;
but although Clay, Crawford, and Calhoun accepted the necessity, the
State of New York flatly rebelled. At Albany, when the news arrived
that the Washington caucus had named Madison for the Presidency, the
Republican members of the State legislature called for May 29 a caucus
of their own. Their whole number was ninety-five; of these, all but
four attended, and eighty-seven voted that it was expedient to name
a candidate for the Presidency. Ninety members then voted to support
DeWitt Clinton against Madison, and Clinton formally accepted the
nomination. This unusual unanimity among the New York Republicans
raised the movement somewhat above the level of ordinary New York
politics, and pointed to a growing jealousy of Virginia, which
threatened to end in revival of the old alliance between New York
and New England. Even in quiet times this prospect would have been
alarming; in face of war, it threatened to be fatal.
During the entire month of May Congress passed, with only one
exception, no Act for war purposes. While the absent members attended
to their private affairs, Government waited for the last despatches
from abroad. The sloop-of-war “Hornet,” after long delay, arrived at
New York, May 19, and three days afterward the despatches reached
Washington. Once more, but for the last time, the town roused itself to
learn what hope of peace they contained.
As far as concerned Great Britain, the news would at any previous time
have checked hostile action, for it showed that the British government
had taken alarm, and that for the first time a real change of policy
was possible; but this news came from unofficial sources, and could
not be laid before Congress. Officially, the British government still
stoutly maintained that it could not yield. Lord Wellesley had given
place to Lord Castlereagh. In a very long despatch,[168] dated April
10, the new Foreign Minister pleaded earnestly that England could not
submit herself to the mercy of France. The argument of Lord Castlereagh
rested on an official report made by the Duc de Bassano to the Emperor,
March 10, in which Napoleon reasserted his rules regarding neutrals
in language quite as strong as that of his decrees, and reasserted
the validity of those decrees, without exception, in regard to every
neutral that did not recognize their provisions. Certainly, no proof
could be imagined competent to show the continued existence of the
decrees if Bassano’s report failed to do so; and Castlereagh, with some
reason, relied on this evidence to convince not so much the American
government as the American people that a deception had been practised,
and that England could not act as America required without submitting
to Napoleon’s principles as well as to his arms.
Embarrassing as this despatch was to President Madison, it was not all,
or the worst; but Serurier himself described the other annoyance in
terms as lively as his feelings:[169]--
“The ‘Hornet’ has at last arrived. On the rumor of this news,
the avenues of the State Department were thronged by a crowd
of members of both Houses of Congress, as well as by strangers
and citizens, impatient to know what this long-expected vessel
had brought. Soon it was learned that the ‘Hornet’ had brought
nothing favorable, and that Mr. Barlow had as yet concluded
nothing with your Excellency. On this news, the furious
declamations of the Federalists, of the commercial interests,
and of the numerous friends of England were redoubled; the
Republicans, deceived in their hopes, joined in the outcry,
and for three days nothing was heard but a general cry for war
against France and England at once.... I met Mr. Monroe at
the Speaker’s house; he came to me with an air of affliction
and discouragement; addressed me with his old reproach that
decidedly we abandoned the Administration, and that he did not
know henceforward how they could extricate themselves from the
difficult position into which their confidence in our friendship
had drawn them.”
Serurier had no reason for uneasiness on his own account. The President
and his party could not go backward in their path; yet no enemy
could have devised a worse issue than that on which the President
had placed the intended war with England. Every Act of Congress and
every official expression of Madison’s policy had been founded
on the withdrawal of the French Decrees as they affected American
commerce. This withdrawal could no longer be maintained, and Madison
merely shook confidence in his own good faith by asserting it; yet
he could do nothing else. “It is understood,” he wrote to Jefferson
at this crisis,[170] “that the Berlin and Milan Decrees are not in
force against the United States, and no contravention of them can be
established against her. On the contrary, positive cases rebut the
allegation.” Yet he said that “the business has become more than ever
puzzling;” he was withheld only by political and military expediency
from favoring war with France. He wrote to Joel Barlow,[171] after full
knowledge of Napoleon’s conduct, that “in the event of a pacification
with Great Britain the full tide of indignation with which the public
mind here is boiling will be directed against France, if not obviated
by a due reparation of her wrongs; war will be called for by the nation
almost _unâ voce_.”
A position so inconsistent with itself could not be understood by the
people. Every one knew that if the decrees were not avowedly enforced
in France against the United States, they were relaxed only because
Madison had submitted to their previous enforcement, and had, in
Napoleon’s opinion, recognized their legality. The Republican press,
which supported Madison most energetically, made no concealment of its
active sympathies with Napoleon, even in Spain. What wonder if large
numbers of good citizens who believed Napoleon to be anti-Christ should
be disposed to resist, even to the verge of treason, the attempt to use
their lives and fortunes in a service they regarded with horror!