ALTHOUGH no one doubted that the year 1812 was to witness a new
convulsion of society, if signs of panic occurred they were less marked
in crowded countries where vast interests were at stake, than in
remote regions which might have been thought as safe from Napoleon’s
wars as from those of Genghis Khan. As in the year 1754 a petty fight
between two French and English scouting parties on the banks of the
Youghiogheny River, far in the American wilderness, began a war that
changed the balance of the world, so in 1811 an encounter in the Indian
country, on the banks of the Wabash, began a fresh convulsion which
ended only with the fall of Napoleon. The battle of Tippecanoe was a
premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.
Governor William Henry Harrison, of the Indiana Territory, often said
he could tell by the conduct of his Indians, as by a thermometer,
the chances of war and peace for the United States as estimated in
the Cabinet at London. The remark was curious, but not surprising.
Uneasiness would naturally be greatest where least control and most
irritation existed. Such a region was the Northwestern Territory. Even
the spot where violence would break out might be predicted as somewhere
on the waterline of the Maumee and the Wabash, between Detroit at one
extremity and Vincennes at the other. If a guess had been ventured that
the most probable point would be found on that line, about half way
between Lake Erie and the Ohio River, the map would have shown that
Tippecanoe Creek, where it flowed into the Wabash, corresponded with
the rough suggestion.
The Indiana Territory was created in 1800; and the former delegate of
the whole Northwestern Territory, William Henry Harrison, was then
appointed governor of the new division. Until the year 1809, Illinois
formed part of the Indiana Territory; but its single settlement at
Kaskaskia was remote. The Indiana settlement consisted mainly of two
tracts,--one on the Ohio, opposite Louisville in Kentucky, at the
falls, consisting of about one hundred and fifty thousand acres, called
Clark’s Grant; the other, at Vincennes on the Wabash, where the French
had held a post, without a definite grant of lands, under an old
Indian treaty, and where the Americans took whatever rights the French
enjoyed. One hundred miles of wilderness separated these two tracts. In
1800, their population numbered about twenty-five hundred persons; in
1810, nearly twenty-five thousand.
Northward and westward, from the bounds of these districts the Indian
country stretched to the Lakes and the Mississippi, unbroken except
by military posts at Fort Wayne and Fort Dearborn, or Chicago, and a
considerable settlement of white people in the neighborhood of the
fortress at Detroit. Some five thousand Indian warriors held this vast
region, and were abundantly able to expel every white man from Indiana
if their organization had been as strong as their numbers. The whites
were equally eager to expel the Indians, and showed the wish openly.
Governor Harrison was the highest authority on matters connected with
the northwestern Indians. During eight years of Harrison’s government
Jefferson guided the Indian policy; and as long as Jefferson insisted
on the philanthropic principles which were his pride, Harrison, whose
genius lay in ready adaptation, took his tone from the President, and
wrote in a different spirit from that which he would have taken had he
represented an aggressive chief. His account of Indian affairs offered
an illustration of the law accepted by all historians in theory,
but adopted by none in practice; which former ages called “fate,”
and metaphysicians called “necessity,” but which modern science has
refined into the “survival of the fittest.” No acid ever worked more
mechanically on a vegetable fibre than the white man acted on the
Indian. As the line of American settlements approached, the nearest
Indian tribes withered away.
Harrison reported conscientiously the incurable evils which attended
the contact of the two hostile forms of society. The first, but not
the most serious, was that the white man, though not allowed to settle
beyond the Indian border, could not be prevented from trespassing far
and wide on Indian territory in search of game. The practice of hunting
on Indian lands, in violation of law and existing treaties, had grown
into a monstrous abuse. The Kentucky settlers crossed the Ohio River
every autumn to kill deer, bear, and buffalo for their skins, which
they had no more right to take than they had to cross the Alleghanies,
and shoot or trap the cows and sheep in the farm-yards of Bucks County.
Many parts of the Northwestern Territory which as late as 1795 abounded
in game, ten years afterward contained not game enough to support the
small Indian parties passing through them, and had become worthless for
Indian purposes except as a barrier to further encroachment.[58]
The tribes that owned these lands were forced either to remove
elsewhere, or to sell their old hunting-grounds to the government for
supplies or for an annuity. The tribes that sold, remaining near the
settlements to enjoy their annuity, were more to be pitied than those
that removed, which were destined to destruction by war. Harrison
reported that contact with white settlements never failed to ruin them.
“I can tell at once,” he wrote in 1801,[59] “upon looking at an Indian
whom I may chance to meet, whether he belongs to a neighboring or to a
more distant tribe. The latter is generally well-clothed, healthy, and
vigorous; the former half-naked, filthy, and enfeebled by intoxication,
and many of them without arms excepting a knife, which they carry for
the most villanous purposes.” Harrison estimated the number of Indian
warriors then in the whole valley of the Wabash as not exceeding six
hundred; the sale of whiskey was unlawful, yet they were supposed to
consume six thousand gallons of whiskey a year, and their drunkenness
so often ended in murder that among three of the tribes scarcely a
chief survived.
“I have had much difficulty,” wrote Harrison in the same letter
from Vincennes, “with the small tribes in this immediate
neighborhood; namely the Piankeshaws, the Weas, and the Eel
River Miamis. These three tribes form a body of the most
depraved wretches on earth. They are daily in this town in
considerable numbers, and are frequently intoxicated to the
number of thirty or forty at once, when they commit the greatest
disorders, drawing their knives and stabbing every one they meet
with; breaking open the houses of the citizens, killing their
cattle and hogs, and breaking down their fences. But in all
their frolics they generally suffer the most themselves. They
kill each other without mercy. Some years ago as many as four
were found dead in a morning; and although those murders were
actually committed in the streets of the town, yet no attempt to
punish them has ever been made.”
The Piankeshaws were reduced to twenty-five or thirty warriors; the
Weas and Eel River Indians were mere remnants. The more powerful tribes
at a distance saw with growing alarm the steady destruction of the
border warriors; and the intelligent Indians everywhere forbade the
introduction of whiskey, and tried to create a central authority to
control the degraded tribes.
A third evil was much noticed by Harrison. By treaty, if an Indian
killed a white man the tribe was bound to surrender the murderer for
trial by American law; while if a white man killed an Indian, the
murderer was also to be tried by a white jury. The Indians surrendered
their murderers, and white juries at Vincennes hung them without
scruple; but no jury in the territory ever convicted a white man of
murdering an Indian. Harrison complained to the President of the wanton
and atrocious murders committed by white men on Indians, and the
impossibility of punishing them in a society where witnesses would not
appear, criminals broke jail, and juries refused to convict. Throughout
the territory the people avowed the opinion that a white man ought not
in justice to suffer for killing an Indian;[60] and many of them, like
the uncle of Abraham Lincoln,[61] thought it a virtuous act to shoot an
Indian at sight. Harrison could combat this code of popular law only by
proclamations offering rewards for the arrest of murderers, who were
never punished when arrested. In 1801 the Delawares alone complained
of six unatoned murders committed on their tribe since the Treaty of
Greenville, and every year increased the score.
“All these injuries,” reported Harrison in 1801, “the Indians
have hitherto borne with astonishing patience; but though they
discover no disposition to make war on the United States at
present, I am confident that most of the tribes would eagerly
seize any favorable opportunity for that purpose; and should the
United States be at war with any of the European nations who are
known to the Indians, there would probably be a combination of
more than nine tenths of the Northern tribes against us, unless
some means are used to conciliate them.”
So warmly were the French remembered by the Indians, that if Napoleon
had carried out his Louisiana scheme of 1802 he could have counted on
the active support of nearly every Indian tribe on the Mississippi and
the Lakes; from Pensacola to Detroit his orders would have been obeyed.
Toward England the Indians felt no such sentimental attachment; but
interest took the place of sentiment. Their natural line of trade was
with the Lakes, and their relations with the British trading-post at
Malden, opposite Detroit, became more and more close with every new
quarrel between Washington and London.
President Jefferson earnestly urged the Indians to become industrious
cultivators of the soil; but even for that reform one condition was
indispensable. The Indians must be protected from contact with the
whites; and during the change in their mode of life, they must not
be drugged, murdered, or defrauded. Trespasses on Indian land and
purchases of tribal territory must for a time cease, until the Indian
tribes should all be induced to adopt a new system. Even then the
reform would be difficult, for Indian warriors thought death less
irksome than daily labor; and men who did not fear death were not
easily driven to toil.
There President Jefferson’s philanthropy stopped. His greed for land
equalled that of any settler on the border, and his humanity to the
Indian suffered the suspicion of having among its motives the purpose
of gaining the Indian lands for the whites. Jefferson’s policy in
practice offered a reward for Indian extinction, since he not only
claimed the territory of every extinct tribe on the doctrine of
paramount sovereignty, but deliberately ordered[62] his Indian agents
to tempt the tribal chiefs into debt in order to oblige them to sell
the tribal lands, which did not belong to them, but to their tribes:--
“To promote this disposition to exchange lands which they have
to spare and we want, for necessaries which we have to spare and
they want, we shall push our trading-houses, and be glad to see
the good and influential individuals among them in debt; because
we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals
can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of
lands.”
No one would have felt more astonishment than Jefferson had some friend
told him that this policy, which he believed to be virtuous, was a
conspiracy to induce trustees to betray their trusts; and that in
morals it was as improper as though it were not virtuously intended.
Shocked as he would have been at such a method of obtaining the
neighboring estate of any Virginia family, he not only suggested but
vigorously carried out the system toward the Indians.
In 1804 and 1805, Governor Harrison made treaties with the Miamis,
Eel Rivers, Weas, Piankeshaws, and Delawares,--chiefly the tribes he
called “a body of the most depraved wretches upon earth,”--by which he
obtained the strip of country, fifty miles wide, between the Ohio and
the White rivers, thus carrying the boundary back toward the Wabash.
The treaty excited deep feeling among the better Indians throughout
the territory, who held long debates on their means of preventing its
execution.
Among the settlers in Indiana, an internal dispute mingled with the
dangers of Indian relations. For this misfortune Harrison himself
was partially to blame. A Virginian by birth, naturally inclined
toward Southern influences, he shared the feelings of the Kentucky
and Virginia slave-owners who wanted the right of bringing their
slaves with them into the Territory, contrary to the Ordinance of
1787. The men who stood nearest the governor were earnest and active
in the effort to repeal or evade the prohibition of slavery, and
they received from Harrison all the support he could give them. With
his approval, successive appeals were made to Congress. Perhaps the
weightiest act of John Randolph’s career as leader of the Republican
majority in the House was to report, March 2, 1803, that the extension
of slavery into Indiana was “highly dangerous and inexpedient,”
and that the people of Indiana “would at no distant day find ample
remuneration for a temporary privation of labor and immigration” in the
beneficence of a free society. Cæsar Rodney, of Delaware, in March,
1804, made a report to a contrary effect, recommending a suspension for
ten years of the anti-slavery clause in the Ordinance; but the House
did not act upon it.
The advocates of a slave system, with Harrison’s co-operation, then
decided that the Territory should pass into the second grade, which
under the Ordinance of 1787 could be done when the population should
number five thousand male whites of full age. The change was effected
in the winter of 1804–1805, by means open to grave objection.[63]
Thenceforward Harrison shared his power with a Legislative Council and
a House of Representatives; while the legislature chose a territorial
delegate to Congress. The first territorial legislature, in 1805, which
was wholly under Harrison’s influence, passed an Act, subsequently
revised and approved Sept. 17, 1807, permitting owners of slaves to
bring them into the Territory and keep them there for a number of
days, during which time the slave might be emancipated on condition of
binding himself to service for a term of years to which the law set no
limit.[64]
The overpowering influence and energy of the governor and his
Southern friends gave them during these years undisputed control.
Yet the anti-slavery sentiment was so strong as to make the governor
uncomfortable, and almost to endanger his personal safety; until at
last, in 1808, the issue was fairly brought before the people in the
elections. Both in that and in the following year the opponents of
slavery outvoted and defeated the governor’s party. Feelings became
exceedingly bitter, and the Territory was distracted by feuds which
had no small influence on matters of administration, and on the Indian
troubles most of all. Between the difficulties of introducing negroes
and expelling Indians, Harrison found that his popularity had been
lessened, if not lost.[65] He could not fail to see that a military
exploit was perhaps his only hope of recovering it; and for such an
exploit he had excuses enough.
The treaties of 1804–1805, which threatened the Indians with immediate
loss of their hunting-grounds in the Wabash valley, caused a
fermentation peculiarly alarming because altogether new. Early in 1806
Harrison learned that a Shawanee Indian, claiming to be a prophet, had
gathered a number of warriors about him at Greenville, in Ohio, and
was preaching doctrines that threatened trouble. Harrison attributed
the mischief to the Prophet; but he learned in time that the Prophet’s
brother Tecumseh--or more properly Tecumthe--gave the movement its
chief strength.
Indians and whites soon recognized Tecumthe as a phenomenon. His father
was a Shawanee warrior, in no way distinguished; his mother, a Creek or
Cherokee Indian, captured and adopted by the Shawanee,--and of these
parents three children at one birth were born about the year 1780, a
few miles from Springfield, Ohio. The third brother lived and died
obscure; Tecumthe and the Prophet became famous, although they were
not chiefs of their tribe, and had no authority of office or birth.
Such of the chiefs as were in the pay or under the power of the United
States government were jealous of their influence, and had every reason
for wishing to suppress the leaders of a movement avowedly designed to
overthrow the system of tribal independence. From the first, Tecumthe
aimed at limiting the authority of the tribes and their chiefs in order
to build up an Indian confederacy, embracing not the chiefs but the
warriors of all the tribes, who should act as an Indian Congress and
assume joint ownership of Indian lands.
This scheme was hostile to the plans though not to the professions of
President Jefferson. Its object was to prevent the piecemeal sale
of Indian lands by petty tribal chiefs, under pressure of government
agents. No one could honestly deny that the object was lawful and even
regular; for in the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, which was the only
decisive authority or precedent, the United States had admitted and
acted on the principle for which Tecumthe contended,--of accepting
its cessions of land, not from single tribes, but from the whole body
of northwestern Indians, without entering on the subject of local
ownership.[66] Governor Harrison and President Jefferson were of course
aware of the precedent, and decided to disregard it[67] in order to act
on the rule better suited to their purposes; but their decision was in
no way binding on Tecumthe or the tribes who were parties to the treaty
of Greenville.
During the year 1807 Tecumthe’s influence was increased by the
“Chesapeake” excitement, which caused the Governor-general of Canada
to intrigue among the Indians for aid in case of war. Probably their
increase of influence led the Prophet and his brother, in May or June,
1808, to establish themselves on Tippecanoe Creek, the central point of
Indian strategy and politics. Vincennes lay one hundred and fifty miles
below, barely four-and-twenty hours down the stream of the Wabash;
Fort Dearborn, or Chicago, was a hundred miles to the northwest;
Fort Wayne the same distance to the northeast; and excepting a short
portage, the Tippecanoe Indians could paddle their canoes to Malden
and Detroit in one direction, or to any part of the waters of the Ohio
and Mississippi in the other. At the mouth of Tippecanoe Creek the
reformers laid out a village that realized Jefferson’s wish, for the
Indians there drank no whiskey, and avowed themselves to be tillers of
the soil. Their professions seemed honest. In August, 1808, the Prophet
came to Vincennes and passed two weeks with Governor Harrison, who was
surprised to find that no temptation could overcome the temperance of
the Prophet’s followers. The speech then made in the public talk with
the governor remains the only record of the Prophet’s words, and of the
character he wished to pretend, if not to adopt.
“I told all the redskins,” he said to Harrison, “that the way
they were in was not good, and that they ought to abandon it;
that we ought to consider ourselves as one man, but we ought to
live agreeable to our several customs,--the red people after
their mode, and the white people after theirs; particularly that
they should not drink whiskey; that it was not made for them,
but the white people, who alone know how to use it; and that it
is the cause of all the mischiefs which the Indians suffer....
Determine to listen to nothing that is had; do not take up
the tomahawk, should it be offered by the British or by the
Long-knives; do not meddle with anything that does not belong
to you, but mind your own business, and cultivate the ground,
that your women and your children may have enough to live on. I
now inform you that it is our intention to live in peace with
our father and his children forever.”
Whatever want of confidence Harrison felt in these professions of
peace, he recorded his great surprise at finding the temperance to
be real; and every one who visited the settlement at Tippecanoe bore
witness to the tillage, which seemed to guarantee a peaceful intent;
for if war had been in Tecumthe’s mind, he would not have placed town,
crops, and stock within easy reach of destruction.
Nothing could be more embarrassing to Jefferson than to see the Indians
follow his advice; for however well-disposed he might be, he could not
want the Indians to become civilized, educated, or competent to protect
themselves,--yet he was powerless to protect them. The Prophet asked
that the sale of liquor should be stopped; but the President could no
more prevent white settlers from selling liquor to the Indians than
he could prevent the Wabash from flowing. The tribes asked that white
men who murdered Indians should be punished; but the President could
no more execute such malefactors than he could execute the smugglers
who defied his embargo. The Indians had rights recognized by law, by
treaty, and by custom, on which their existence depended; but these
rights required force to maintain them, and on the Wabash President
Jefferson had less police power than the Prophet himself controlled.
Wide separation could alone protect the Indians from the whites, and
Tecumthe’s scheme depended for its only chance of success on holding
the white settlements at a distance. The Prophet said nothing to
Harrison on that point, but his silence covered no secret. So notorious
was the Indian hostility to land-cessions, that when Governor Hull of
Michigan Territory, in November, 1807, negotiated another such cession
at Detroit,[68] the Indian agent at Fort Wayne not only doubted its
policy, but insinuated that it might have been dictated by the British
in order to irritate the Indians; and he reported that the Northern
Indians talked of punishing with death the chiefs who signed it.[69]
Aware of the danger, Harrison decided to challenge it. The people of
his Territory wanted the lands of the Wabash, even at the risk of
war. The settlement at Tippecanoe was supposed to contain no more
than eighty or a hundred warriors, with four or five times that
number within a radius of fifty miles. No immediate outbreak was to
be feared; and Harrison, “conceiving that a favorable opportunity
then offered”[70] for carrying the boundary from the White River to
the Wabash, asked authority to make a new purchase. Secretary Eustis,
July 15, 1809, wrote him a cautious letter,[71] giving the required
permission, but insisting that, “to prevent any future dissatisfaction,
the chiefs of all the nations who had or pretended right to these
lands” were to be present as consenting parties to the treaty. On this
authority Harrison once more summoned together “the most depraved
wretches upon earth,”--Miamis, Eel Rivers, Delawares, Pottawatomies,
and Kickapoos,--and obtained from them, Sept. 30, 1809, several
enormous cessions of territory which cut into the heart of the Indian
country for nearly a hundred miles up both banks of the Wabash valley.
These transfers included about three million acres.
Harrison knew that this transaction would carry despair to the heart of
every Indian in his Territory. The Wabash valley alone still contained
game. Deprived of their last resource, these Indians must fall back to
perish in the country of the Chippewas and Sioux, their enemies.[72]
Already impoverished by the decrees of Napoleon, the Orders in Council,
and the embargo, which combined to render their peltry valueless,
so that they could scarcely buy the powder and shot to kill their
game,[73] the Indians had thenceforward no choice but to depend on
British assistance. Harrison’s treaty immediately strengthened the
influence of Tecumthe and the Prophet. The Wyandots, or Hurons,
regarded by all the Indian tribes in the Territory as first in dignity
and influence, joined Tecumthe’s league, and united in a declaration
that the late cessions were void, and would not be recognized by the
tribes. The winter of 1809–1810 passed quietly; but toward May, 1810,
alarming reports reached Vincennes of gatherings at the Prophet’s
town, and of violence to be expected. When the salt, which was part of
the usual annuity, reached Tippecanoe, Tecumthe refused to accept it,
and drove the boatmen away. He charged the American government with
deceiving the Indians; and he insisted, as the foundation of future
peace, that the cessions of 1809 should be annulled, and no future
cession should be good unless made by all the tribes.
Harrison knew that his treaties of 1809 opened an aggressive policy,
which must naturally end in an Indian war. Some of the best citizens
in the Territory thought that the blame for the consequences ought
not to rest on the Indians.[74] Since the election of Madison to the
Presidency in November, 1808, war with England had been so imminent,
and its effect on the Indians so marked, that Harrison could not help
seeing the opportunity of a military career, and he had given much
study to military matters.[75] His plans, if they accorded with his
acts, included an Indian war, in which he should take the initiative.
His treaties of 1809 left him no choice, for after making such a war
inevitable, his only safety lay in crushing the Indians before the
British could openly aid them. Unfortunately, neither Madison nor
Eustis understood his purpose, or would have liked it. They approved
his land-purchases, which no Administration and no citizen would have
dared reject; but they were very unwilling to be drawn into an Indian
war, however natural might be such a consequence of the purchases.
So it happened that as early as the summer of 1810 war was imminent
in the Wabash and Maumee valleys, and perhaps only British influence
delayed it. British interests imperatively required that Tecumthe’s
confederacy should be made strong, and should not be wrecked
prematurely in an unequal war. From Malden, opposite Detroit, the
British traders loaded the American Indians with gifts and weapons;
urged Tecumthe to widen his confederacy, to unite all the tribes, but
not to begin war till he received the signal from Canada. All this was
duly reported at Washington.[76] On the other hand, Harrison sent for
Tecumthe; and August 12, 1810, the Indian chief came for a conference
to Vincennes. Indians and whites, in considerable numbers, armed and
alert, fearing treachery on both sides, witnessed the interview.
Tecumthe took, as his right, the position he felt himself to occupy
as the most powerful American then living,--who, a warrior himself,
with five thousand warriors behind him, held in one hand an alliance
with Great Britain, in the other an alliance with the Indians of the
southwest. Representatives of the Wyandots, Kickapoos, Pottawatomies,
Ottawas, and Winnebagoes announced the adhesion of their tribes to
the Shawanee Confederacy and the election of Tecumthe as their chief.
In this character he avowed to Harrison, in the broadest and boldest
language, the scope of his policy:[77]--
“Brother, since the peace was made in 1795 you have killed some
of the Shawanee, Winnebagoes, Delawares, and Miamis, and you
have taken our land from us; and I do not see how we can remain
at peace with you if you continue to do so.... You try to force
the red people to do some injury; it is you that are pushing
them on to do mischief. You endeavor to make distinctions; you
wish to prevent the Indians from doing as we wish them,--from
uniting and considering their land as the common property of
the whole. You take tribes aside and advise them not to come
into this measure.... The reason, I tell you, is this: You want,
by your distinctions of Indian tribes, in allotting to each a
particular tract of land, to make them to war with each other.
You never see an Indian come and endeavor to make the white
people do so. You are continually driving the red people; and at
last you will drive them into the great lake, where they cannot
either stand or work.
Since my residence at Tippecanoe we have endeavored to level all
distinctions, to destroy village chiefs by whom all mischief is
done: it is they who sell our lands to the Americans. Our object
is to let all our affairs be transacted by warriors. This land
that was sold, and the goods that were given for it, was only
done by a few. The treaty was afterward brought here, and the
Weas were induced to give their consent because of their small
numbers.... In future we are prepared to punish those chiefs who
may come forward to propose to sell their land. If you continue
to purchase of them, it will produce war among the different
tribes, and at last I do not know what will be the consequence
to the white people.”
Earnestly denying the intention of making war, Tecumthe still declared
that any attempt on Harrison’s part to enter into possession of the
land lately ceded would be resisted by force. In the vehemence of
discussion he used language in regard to the United States which caused
great excitement, and broke up the meeting for that day; but he lost no
time in correcting the mistake. After the conference closed, he had a
private interview with Harrison, and repeated his official ultimatum.
He should only with great reluctance make war on the United States,
against whom he had no other complaint than their land-purchases; he
was extremely anxious to be their friend, and if the governor would
prevail upon the President to give up the lands lately purchased,
and agree never to make another treaty without the consent of all
the tribes, Tecumthe pledged himself to be a faithful ally to the
United States, and to assist them in all their wars with the English;
otherwise he would be obliged to enter into an English alliance.
Harrison told him that no such condition had the least chance of
finding favor with the Government. “Well,” rejoined Tecumthe, as though
he had expected the answer, “as the great chief is to decide the
matter, I hope the Great Spirit will put sense enough into his head to
induce him to direct you to give up this land. It is true, he is so far
off he will not be injured by the war; he may sit still in his town and
drink his wine, while you and I will have to fight it out.”
Therewith Tecumthe and Harrison parted, each to carry on his
preparations for the conflict. The Secretary of War wrote to Harrison
in November instructing him to defer the military occupation of the new
purchase on the Wabash, but giving no orders as to the policy intended
to be taken by the Government. Wanting peace, he threw on Harrison the
responsibility for war.[78]
“It has indeed occurred to me,” wrote the secretary, “that the
surest means of securing good behavior from this conspicuous
personage [Tecumthe] and his brother, would be to make them
prisoners; but at this time more particularly, it is desirable
that peace with all the Indian tribes should be preserved; and
I am instructed by the President to express to your Excellency
his expectation and confidence that in all your arrangements
this may be considered (as I am confident it ever has been) a
primary object with you.”