THE diplomatic insolvency inherited from Merry, Rose, Erskine, and
Jackson became more complete with every year that passed; and even
while Foster was on the ocean, a new incident occurred, which if it did
not prove a catastrophe to be inevitable, showed at least how small was
his chance of averting it.
On the renewal of trade between America and France, the British navy
renewed its blockade of New York. If nothing more had happened, the
recurrence of this vexation would alone have gone far to destroy the
hopes of diplomacy; but this was not all.
The “Melampus” reappeared, having for a companion the “Guerriere,”
commanded by Captain Dacres, and supposed to be one of the best British
frigates of her class. Early in May, when Foster sailed from England,
these cruisers, lying off Sandy Hook, began to capture American vessels
bound for France, and to impress American sailors at will. No sooner
did these complaints reach Washington than Secretary Hamilton, May
6,[30] ordered Commodore John Rodgers, whose flag-ship, the 44-gun
frigate “President,” was lying at Annapolis, to sail at once to
protect American commerce from unlawful interference by British and
French cruisers. Rodgers sailed from Annapolis May 10, and May 14
passed the capes. The scene of the “Chesapeake’s” unredressed outrage
lay some fifteen or twenty miles to the southward, and the officers and
crew of the “President” had reason to think themselves expected to lose
no fair opportunity of taking into their own hands the redress which
the British government denied. For the past year Rodgers had carried
orders “to vindicate the injured honor of our navy and revive the
drooping spirits of the nation; ... to maintain and support at any risk
and cost the honor” of his flag; and these orders were founded chiefly
on “the inhuman and dastardly attack on our frigate ‘Chesapeake,’--an
outrage which prostrated the flag of our country, and has imposed on
the American people cause of ceaseless mourning.”[31]
Rodgers was bound for New York, but on the morning of May 16 was still
about thirty miles from Cape Charles and eighteen miles from the coast,
when toward noon he saw a ship to the eastward standing toward him
under a press of canvas. As the vessel came near, he could make her out
from the shape of her upper sails to be a man-of-war; he knew of no
man-of-war except the “Guerriere” on the coast; the new-comer appeared
from the quarter where that frigate would be looked for, and Rodgers
reasoned that in all probability she was the “Guerriere.” He decided
to approach her, with the object of ascertaining whether a man named
Diggio, said to have been impressed a few days before by Captain Dacres
from an American brig, was on board. The spirit of this inquiry was
new.
Until quarter before two o’clock in the afternoon the ships stood
toward each other. The stranger showed no colors, but made signals,
until finding them unanswered, she changed her course and stood to the
southward. Rodgers then made sail in chase, his colors and pennant
flying. At half-past three, the stranger’s hull began to be visible
from the “President’s” deck, but as the wind failed the American
frigate gained less rapidly. In latitude 37° the sun, May 16, sets
at seven o’clock, and dusk comes quickly on. At quarter-past seven
the unknown ship again changed her course, and lay to, presenting
her broadside to the “President,” and showing colors, which in the
gathering twilight were not clearly seen. The ship had the look of a
frigate.
At quarter before eight, Rodgers ordered his acting commandant to bring
the “President” to windward of the supposed frigate within speaking
distance,--a manœuvre which naturally caused the stranger uneasiness,
so that she wore three times to prevent the “President” from getting
under her stern. At half-past eight, according to the American
account,--at quarter-past eight, according to the British story,--the
“President” rounded to, within pistol-shot. On both ships every gun in
the broadside was run out and trained on the opposite vessel, and out
of every port a dozen eyes were strained to catch sight, through the
dusk, of what passed in the stranger.
By the dim light Rodgers saw the supposed “Guerriere,” her
main-top-sail to the mast, waiting with apparent confidence the next
act of the audacious American frigate which had chased a British
man-of-war all day, and had at last run up close to windward,--a
manœuvre which British frigates were disposed to resent. To this
point the reports showed no great disagreement; but in regard to what
followed, one story was told by Rodgers and all his ship’s company,
while a wholly different story was told by the British captain and his
officers.
Rodgers reported that while rounding to, he hailed the unknown vessel
through his trumpet, calling out: “What ship is that?” The question,
“What ship is that?” was immediately echoed back. Rodgers had time
to tell his acting captain that the “President” was forging too fast
ahead, before he hailed again: “What ship is that, I say?” Instantly
a flash was seen from the dark where the stranger’s hull lay, and a
double report told that the ball had struck the “President,” lodging
in the mainmast. Taken by surprise, Rodgers turned to his commandant
of marines and asked, “What the devil was that?” but before he gave an
order his third lieutenant, Alexander James Dallas, who was watching
at the first port forward of the gangway and saw the flash, leaped to
one of the guns in his division and discharged it. The “Chesapeake’s”
disaster had done away with the old-fashioned logger-heads and matches;
the “President’s” guns were fitted with locks, and were discharged in
an instant. Immediately afterward three guns were fired by the enemy,
and the report of muskets was heard. Then Rodgers gave the order to
fire, and the “President” opened with a whole broadside, followed
by another. In about five minutes the enemy seemed to be silenced,
and Rodgers gave the order to cease firing; but some three minutes
afterward the stranger opened again, and the “President” resumed fire
until she desisted. From the “President’s” deck enough could be seen
of the enemy’s behavior to prove that whoever she might be, she was
not the “Guerriere;” and Rodgers then made the remark that either she
had received some unfortunate shot at the outset, or she was a vessel
of force very inferior to what he had taken her for,--although she was
still supposed to be nothing less than a 36-gun frigate. Disabled she
certainly was, for she lay ungovernable, with her bow directly under
the “President’s” broadside.
Rodgers hailed once more, and understood the stranger to answer that
she was a British ship-of-war in great distress. At nine o’clock at
night the “President” began to repair damages, and beat about within
reach, on different tacks, with lights displayed, until daybreak, when
she ran down to the British vessel, and sent a boat on board. Then at
last Rodgers learned, certainly to his great disappointment, that he
had been fighting a single-decked vessel of less than half his force.
His mistake was not so surprising as it seemed. The British cruiser
might easily at a distance, or in the dark, be taken for a frigate. Her
great length; her poop, top-gallants, forecastle; her deep bulwarks;
the manner of stowing her hammocks; and room on each side to mount
three more guns than she actually carried,--were decisive to any one
who could not see that she carried but one tier of guns.[32]
Captain Bingham of the “Little Belt,” a British corvette, rated at
twenty guns, gave a very different account of the affair. He had been
ordered from Bermuda to carry despatches to the “Guerriere;” had run
north toward New York without finding her; and on his return southward,
at eleven o’clock on the morning of May 16, had seen a strange sail, to
which he gave chase. At two o’clock in the afternoon, concluding that
she was an American frigate, he abandoned the chase, and resumed his
course. The rest of his story is to be told in his own words:[33]--
“Hoisted the colors, and made all sail south, ... the stranger
edging away, but not making any more sail. At 3.30 he made sail
in chase.... At 6.30, finding he gained so considerably on us
as not to be able to elude him during the night, being within
gunshot, and clearly discerning the stars in his broad pennant,
I imagined the most prudent method was to bring to, and hoist
the colors, that no mistake might arise, and that he might see
what we were. The ship was therefore brought to, her colors
hoisted, her guns double-shotted, and every preparation made in
case of a surprise. By his manner of steering down, he evidently
wished to lay his ship in a position for raking, which I
frustrated by wearing three times. At about 8.15 he came within
hail. I hailed and asked what ship it was. He again repeated my
words and fired a broadside, which I instantly returned. The
action then became general, and continued so for three quarters
of an hour, when he ceased firing, and appeared to be on fire
about the main hatchway. He then filled, ... hailed, and asked
what ship this was. He fired no more guns, but stood from us,
giving no reason for his most extraordinary conduct.”
Bingham’s report was afterward supported by the evidence of his two
lieutenants, his boatswain, purser, and surgeon, at the official
inquiry made May 29, at Halifax.[34] Rodgers’s report was sustained
by the searching inquiry made by the American government to ascertain
the truth of Bingham’s assertions.[35] The American investigation was
naturally much more thorough in consequence of Bingham’s charges, so
that not only every officer, but also every seaman of the “President’s”
company gave evidence under oath. All agreed in swearing to the facts
as they have been related in the American story.
About a month after the action, two sailors claiming to be deserters
from the “President” arrived at Halifax and made affidavits,[36] which
gave a third account quite different from the other two. One of these
men, an Englishman, swore that he had been stationed in the second
division, on the gun-deck of the “President;” that a gun in that
division went off, as he thought, by accident, four or five men leaning
on it; that he had turned to acquaint Lieutenant Belden, who commanded
that division, of the fact, but before he could do this, though the
lieutenant was only three guns from him, the whole broadside of the
“President” was discharged. This story was the least probable of the
three. The evidence of a deserter, under every motive to ingratiate
himself with his future officers, would be suspicious, even if he were
proved to have been in the “President’s” crew, which was not the case;
but it became valueless when the rolls showed no Lieutenant Belden on
board the “President,” but that the second division on the gun-deck was
commanded by Lieut. A. J. Dallas,--and Lieutenant Dallas swore that he
himself fired the first gun from the “President,” without orders, in
answer to the “Little Belt’s” discharge. The evidence of every other
officer and man at the guns supported his assertion.
When the contradictory reports of Rodgers and Bingham were published,
a controversy arose between the newspapers which sympathized with the
different captains. Rodgers was vehemently attacked by the English
and Federalist press; Bingham was as hotly scouted by the American
newspapers friendly to Madison. The dispute was never settled. Perhaps
this was the only instance where the honor of the services was so
deeply involved on both sides as to make the controversy important; for
if Rodgers, all his officers, and his whole crew behaved as Bingham
alleged, and perjured themselves afterward to conceal it, they were not
the men they were supposed to be; and if Bingham swore falsely, he went
far to establish the worst American charges against the character of
the British navy.
For this reason some little effort to form an opinion on the subject
deserves to be made, even at the risk of diffuseness. The elaborate
investigation by the United States government settled the weight of
testimony in favor of Rodgers. Other evidence raised doubts of the
accuracy of Bingham’s report.
This report was dated May 21, five days after the battle, in “lat. 36°
53´ N.; long. 71° 49´ W. Cape Charles bearing W. 48 miles,”--which,
according to the senior lieutenant’s evidence, May 29, was about
the spot of the action, from fifty to fifty-four miles east of Cape
Charles. Yet a glance at the map showed that these bearings marked
a point more than two hundred miles east of Cape Charles. This
carelessness could not be set to the account of a misprint.
The date proved only inaccuracy; other parts of Bingham’s report showed
a willingness to confuse the facts. He claimed to have hoisted his
colors at two o’clock in the afternoon, after making out the American
commodore’s pennant and resuming a southerly course. Rodgers averred
that the “Little Belt” obstinately refused to show colors till darkness
concealed them; and Bingham’s report itself admitted that at 6.30 he
decided to hoist his colors, “that no mistake might arise.” During the
five hours’ chase his colors were not flying. His assertion, too, that
at 6.30 the American frigate was within gunshot, and that the “Little
Belt” was brought to because she could not escape, agreed ill with
his next admission, that the “President” consumed nearly two hours in
getting within hailing distance.
The most evident error was at the close of the British story. Bingham
declared that the general action lasted three quarters of an hour,
and that then the enemy ceased firing; appeared to be on fire about
the main hatchway, and “stood from us,” firing no more guns. The two
lieutenants, boatswain, and purser of the “Little Belt” swore that
the action lasted “about an hour;” the surgeon said “about forty-five
minutes.” Every American officer declared under oath that the entire
action, including the cessation of firing for three minutes, did not
exceed a quarter of an hour, or eighteen minutes at most. On this
point the American story was certainly correct. Indeed, two years
later, after the “Constitution” had silenced the “Guerriere” in
thirty-five minutes, and the “United States” had, in a rough sea and
at comparatively long range, left the “Macedonian” a wreck in less
than two hours of action, no officer in the British service would
have sacrificed his reputation for veracity by suggesting that a
British corvette of eighteen guns could have lain nearly an hour
within pistol-shot, in calm weather, under the hot fire of an American
“line-of-battle ship in disguise.” The idea of forcing her to “stand
from us” would have seemed then mere gasconade. Some fifteen months
afterward, the British sloop-of-war “Alert,” of twenty guns, imitated
the “Little Belt” by attacking Commodore Porter’s 32-gun frigate
“Essex,” and in eight minutes struck her colors in a sinking condition.
If the “President” had been no heavier than the “Essex,” she should
still have silenced the “Little Belt” in a quarter of an hour.
The “Little Belt” escaped destruction, but she suffered severely.
Bingham reported: “I was obliged to desist from firing, as, the ship
falling off, no gun would bear, and had no after-sail to help her to;
all the rigging and sails cut to pieces; not a brace nor a bowline
left.... I have to lament the loss of thirty-two men killed and
wounded, among whom is the master. His Majesty’s ship is much damaged
in masts, rigging, and hull; ... many shot through between wind and
water, and many shots still remain inside, and upper works all shot
away; starboard pump also.” He did not know his good fortune. Two
years afterward he would have been well content to escape from the
“President” on any terms, even though the “Little Belt” had been twice
the size she was. The “President’s” loss consisted of one boy wounded,
and some slight damage to the rigging.
Bingham’s report was accepted by the British government and navy with
blind confidence, and caused no small part of the miscalculation which
ended in disasters to British pride. “No one act of the little navy of
the United States,” said the British historian five years afterward,
“had been at all calculated to gain the respect of the British. First
was seen the ‘Chesapeake’ allowing herself to be beaten with impunity
by a British ship only nominally superior to her. Then the huge frigate
‘President’ attacks and fights for nearly three quarters of an hour the
British sloop ‘Little Belt.’”[37] So self-confident was the British
navy that Bingham was believed to have fought the “President” with
credit and success; while, on the American side, Rodgers and his ship’s
company believed that the British captain deliberately delayed the
meeting until dark, with the view of taking advantage of the night to
punish what he thought the insolence of the chase.
Whatever opinion might be formed as to the conduct of the two captains,
the vehemence of feeling on each side was only to be compared with the
“Chesapeake” affair; but in this instance the grievance belonged to
the British navy, and Dacres and the “Guerriere” felt the full passion
and duty of revenge. The news met Foster on his arrival at Norfolk,
a few weeks afterward, and took away his only hope of a cordial
reception. His instructions intended him to conciliate good-will by
settling the “Chesapeake” outrage, while they obliged him to take a
tone of refusal or remonstrance on every other subject; but he found,
on arriving, that the Americans cared nothing for reparation of the
“Chesapeake” outrage, since Commodore Rodgers had set off against it
an outrage of his own, and had killed four men for every one killed
by Captain Humphries. Instead of giving redress, Foster found himself
obliged to claim it.
July 2 Foster was formally received by the President; and the same day,
as though he had no other hope but to take the offensive, he began his
official correspondence by a letter on the seizure of West Florida,
closing with a formal notice that if the United States persevered in
their course, his orders required him to present the solemn protest of
his Government “against an attempt so contrary to every principle of
public justice, faith, and national honor.”
The language was strong; but unfortunately for Foster’s influence,
the world at the moment showed so little regard for justice, faith,
or honor, that the United States had no reason to be singular in
Quixotism; and although in logic the _tu quoque_ was an argument
hardly deserving notice, in politics it was only less decisive than
cannon. The policy of Foster’s remonstrance was doubtful in another
respect. In proportion as men exposed themselves to reprimands,
they resented the reprimand itself. Madison and Monroe had each his
sensitive point. Madison resented the suggestion that Napoleon’s
decrees were still in force, regarding the matter as involving his
veracity. Monroe equally resented the assertion that West Florida
belonged to Spain, for his character as a man of sense, if not of
truth, was involved in the assertion that he had himself bought West
Florida in his Louisiana purchase. Yet the mildness of his reply to
Foster’s severe protest proved his earnest wish to conciliate England.
In a note[38] of July 8 he justified the seizure of West Florida by the
arguments already used, and offered what he called a “frank and candid
explanation” to satisfy the British government. In private he talked
with more freedom, and--if Foster could be believed--showed himself in
a character more lively if not more moral than any the American people
would have recognized as his. July 5 Foster wrote to Wellesley:[39]--
“It was with real pain, my Lord, that I was forced to listen
to arguments of the most profligate nature, such as that other
nations were not so scrupulous; that the United States showed
sufficient forbearance in not assisting the insurgents of South
America and looking to their own interests in the present
situation of that country.”
Foster was obliged to ignore the meaning of this pointed retort;
while his inquiries how far the American government meant to carry
its seizures of Spanish territory drew from Monroe no answer but a
laugh. The Secretary of State seemed a transformed man. Not only did he
show no dread of interference from England in Florida, but he took an
equally indifferent air on every other matter except one. He said not a
word about impressments; he betrayed no wish to trouble himself about
the “Chesapeake” affair; he made no haste in apologizing for the attack
on the “Little Belt;” but the Orders in Council--these, and nothing
else--formed the issue on which a change of policy was to depend.
Precisely on the Orders in Council Foster could offer no hope of
concession or compromise. So far from withdrawing the orders, he was
instructed to require that the United States should withdraw the
Non-intercourse Act, under threat of retaliation; and he carried out
his instructions to the letter. After protesting, July 2, against the
seizure of West Florida, he wrote, July 3, a long protest against the
non-importation.[40] His demand savored of Canning’s and Jackson’s
diplomacy; but his arguments in its support were better calculated for
effect, and his cry for justice claimed no little sympathy among men
who shared in the opinion of Europe that France was the true object of
attack, and that Napoleon’s overthrow, not the overthrow of England,
was the necessary condition of restoring public order. Foster’s
protest against including Fox’s blockade among the admittedly illegal
Orders in Council, brought the argument to a delicate issue of law and
fact.
“In point of date,” he said, “the blockade of May, 1806,
preceded the Berlin Decree; but it was a just and legal
blockade, according to the established law of nations, because
it was intended to be maintained, and was actually maintained,
by an adequate force appointed to guard the whole coast
described in the notification, and consequently to enforce the
blockade.”
In effect this argument conceded Madison’s principle; for the
further difference between blockading a coast and blockading by
name the several ports on a coast, was hardly worth a war; and the
question whether an estuary, like the British Channel, the Baltic
Sea, or Chesapeake Bay, could be best blockaded by a cruising or by
a stationary squadron, or by both, called rather for naval than for
legal opinion. Foster repudiated the principle of paper-blockades; and
after showing that Fox’s blockade was defended only as far as it was
meant to be legal, he made the further concession of admitting that
since it had been merged in the Orders in Council, it existed only as
a part of the orders; so that if the orders were repealed, England
must either make Fox’s blockade effective, or abandon it. By this
expedient, the issue was narrowed to the Orders in Council retaliatory
on Bonaparte’s decrees, and intended to last only as long as those
decrees lasted. Foster appealed to Napoleon’s public and official
language to prove that those decrees were still in force, and therefore
that the United States government could not, without making itself a
party to Napoleon’s acts and principles, demand a withdrawal of the
British Orders. If the orders were not to be withdrawn because they
were illegal, they ought not to be withdrawn on the false excuse that
Napoleon had withdrawn his decrees. Against such a demand England might
reasonably protest:--
“Great Britain has a right to complain that ... not only
has America suffered her trade to be moulded into the means
of annoyance to Great Britain under the provisions of the
French Decrees, but construing those decrees as extinct,
upon a deceitful declaration of the French Cabinet, she has
enforced her Non-importation Act against England. Under these
circumstances I am instructed by my Government to urge to that
of the United States the injustice of thus enforcing that Act
against his Majesty’s dominions; and I cannot but hope that a
spirit of justice will induce the United States government to
reconsider the line of conduct they have pursued, and at least
to re-establish their former state of strict neutrality.”
President Madison had put himself, little by little, in a position
where he had reason to fear the popular effect of such appeals; but
awkward as Madison’s position was, that of Monroe was many degrees
worse. He had accepted office in April as the representative of
Republicans who believed that Napoleon’s decrees were not repealed,
and the objects of his ambition seemed to depend on reversing
Madison’s course. In July he found himself in painful straits. Obliged
to maintain that Napoleon’s decrees were repealed, he was reduced to
sacrifice his own official agent in the effort. Foster reported, as a
matter of surprise to himself, remarks of Monroe still more surprising
to history.
“I have urged,” reported Foster, July 7,[41] “with every
argument I could think of, the injustice of the Non-importation
Act which was passed in the last session of Congress, while
there were doubts entertained even here as to the repeal of
the Berlin and Milan Decrees; but to my surprise I find it
now maintained that there existed no doubt on the subject
at the time of passing the Act, and Mr. Russell is censured
by his Government for publicly averring that the ship ‘New
Orleans Packet’ was seized under their operation,--not that
it is denied, however, that she was seized under them by our
construction. Mr. Monroe, indeed, though he qualified his blame
of Mr. Russell by praising his zeal, yet allowed to me that much
of their present embarrassment was owing to his statement.”
“It would be fatiguing to your Lordship,” continued Foster,
“were I to describe the various shadows of argument to which the
American minister had recourse in order to prove his statement
of the decrees having been repealed in as far as America had a
right to expect.”
These shadows of argument, however elaborately described, could be
reduced to the compass of a few lines; for they all resulted in a
doctrine which became thenceforward a dogma. Napoleon’s decrees, so
viewed, had two characters,--an international, and a municipal. The
international character alone could give the right of international
retaliation; and the Emperor, since November 1, had ceased to enforce
his edicts in this character. The municipal character, whether enforced
or not, in no way concerned England.
Such was, indeed, Napoleon’s object in substituting customs regulations
for the rules of his decrees in his own ports. After that change, he
applied the decrees themselves to every other part of Europe, but made
an apparent exception for American commerce with France, which was
forced to conform to his objects by municipal licenses and prohibitory
duties. Monroe took the ground that since November 2 the decrees
stood repealed, and the “New Orleans Packet” had been seized under
a “municipal operation” with which England had nothing to do. The
argument, though perhaps casuistic, seemed to offer a sufficient excuse
for England, in case she should wish to abandon her own system as she
saw danger approaching; but it brought Monroe, who used it profusely,
into daily mortification, and caused the President, who invented
and believed it, a world of annoyance,--for Napoleon, as Monroe had
personal reason to remember, never failed to sacrifice his allies, and
was certain to fail in supporting a theory so infirm as this.
For the moment, Monroe made no written reply to Foster’s letter of July
3; he was tormented by the crisis of his career, and Foster ceased
to be important from the moment he could do nothing toward a repeal
of the orders. With the usual misfortune of British diplomatists,
Foster became aggressive as he lost ground, and pushed the secretary
vigorously into Napoleon’s arms. July 14 Foster wrote again, in a
threatening tone, that measures of retaliation for the Act of March
2 were already before his Government, and if America persisted in
her injurious course of conduct, the most unfriendly situation would
result. While this threat was all that England offered for Monroe’s
friendship, news arrived on the same day that Napoleon, May 4, had
opened his ports to American commerce. Not till then did Monroe give
way, and turn his back upon England and his old political friends. The
course taken by Foster left no apparent choice; and for that reason
chiefly Monroe, probably with many misgivings, abandoned the theory
of foreign affairs which had for five years led him into so many
mortifications at home and abroad.
July 23 Monroe sent his answer[42] to the British minister’s
argument. In substance this note, though long, contained nothing
new; but in effect it was an ultimatum which left England to choose
between concession and war. As an ultimatum, it was weakened by the
speciousness of its long argument to prove that the French Decrees
were repealed. The weakness of the ground required double boldness
of assertion, and Monroe accepted the whole task. He showed further
willingness to accept an issue on any point England might select.
Foster’s remonstrance in regard to the “Little Belt” called from
Monroe a tart reference to the affair of the “Chesapeake,” and a
refusal to order an inquiry, as a matter of right, into the conduct of
Commodore Rodgers. He showed equally little disposition to press for
a settlement of the “Chesapeake” affair. Foster had been barely two
weeks at Washington when he summed up the result of his efforts in a
few words,[43] which told the situation, as Monroe then understood it,
a year before war was declared:--
“On the whole, their view in this business [of the ‘Little
Belt’] is to settle this, with every other difference, in the
most amicable manner, provided his Majesty’s Orders in Council
are revoked; otherwise, to make use of it, together with all
other topics of irritation, for the purpose of fomenting a
spirit of hatred toward England, and thereby strengthening their
party. Your Lordship cannot expect to hear of any change till
Congress meet.”