See generally, SPIRITUALISM and PSYCHICAL RESEARCH. (A. L.)

APPARITOR, or APPARATOR (Latin for a servant of a public official, from

_apparere_, to attend in public), an attendant who executed the orders

of a Roman magistrate; hence a beadle in a university, a pursuivant or

herald; particularly, in English ecclesiastical courts, the official who

serves the processes of the court and causes defendants to appear by

summons.

APPEAL, in law. In the old English common law the term "appeal" was used

to describe a process peculiar to English criminal procedure. It was a

right of prosecution possessed as a personal privilege by a party

individually aggrieved by a felony, a privilege of which the crown could

not directly or indirectly deprive him, since he could use it alike when

the prisoner was tried and acquitted, and when he was convicted and

pardoned. It was chiefly known in practice as the privilege of the

nearest relation of a murdered person. When in 1729 (after Colonel

Oglethorpe's inquiry and report on the London prisons) Banbridge and

other gaolers were indicted for their treatment of prisoners, but were

acquitted for deficiency of evidence, appeals for murder were freely

brought by relatives of deceased prisoners. In the case of Slaughterford

(1708) the accused was charged with murdering a woman whom he had

seduced; the evidence was very imperfect, and he was acquitted on

indictment. But public indignation being aroused by the atrocities

alleged to have been perpetrated, an appeal was brought, and on

conviction he was hanged, as his execution was a privilege belonging to

the prosecutor, of which the crown could not deprive him by a pardon. In

1818 an appeal was ingeniously met by an offer of battle, since if the

appellee were an able-bodied man he had the choice between combat or a

jury (see WAGER). This neutralizing of one obsolete and barbarous

process by another called the attention of the legislature to the

subject, and appeal in criminal cases, along with trial by battle, was

abolished in 1819. The history of this appeal is fully dealt with in

Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law_, 1898.

In its usual modern sense the term appeal is applied to the proceeding

by which the decision of a court of justice is brought for review before

another tribunal of higher authority. In Roman jurisprudence it was used

in this and in other significations; it was sometimes equivalent to

prosecution, or the calling up of an accused person before a tribunal

where the accuser appealed to the protection of the magistrate against

injustice or oppression. The derivation from _appellare_ ("call")

suggests that its earliest meaning was an urgent outcry or prayer

against injustice. During the republic the magistrate was generally

supreme within his sphere, and those who felt themselves outraged by

injustice threw themselves on popular protection by _provocatio_,

instead of looking to redress from a higher official authority. Under

the empire different grades of jurisdiction were established, and the

ultimate remedy was an appeal to the emperor; thus Paul, when brought

before Festus, appealed unto Caesar. Such appeals were, however, not

heard by the emperor in person but by a supreme judge representing him.

In the _Corpus Juris_ the appeal to the emperor is called

indiscriminately _appellatio_ and _provocatio_. A considerable portion

of the 49th book of the _Pandects_ is devoted to appeals; but little of

the practical operation of the system is to be deduced from the

propositions there brought together.

During the middle ages full scope was afforded for appeals from the

lower to the higher authorities in the church. In matters

ecclesiastical, including those matrimonial, testamentary and other

departments, which the church ever tried to bring within the operation

of the canon law, there were various grades of appeal, ending with the

pope. The claims of the church to engross appeals in matters trenching

on the temporal rights of princes led to continual conflicts between

church and state, terminated in England at the reformation by the

suppression in 1534 of appeals to Rome, which had previously been

discouraged by legislation of Edward III. and Richard II.

In temporal, as distinct from spiritual matters, it became customary for

ambitious sovereigns to encourage appeals from the courts of the crown

vassals to themselves as represented by the supreme judges, and

Charlemagne usually enjoys the credit of having set the example of this

system of centralization by establishing _missi dominici_. It is not

improbable that his claim was suggested or justified by the practice of

the Roman empire, to the sovereignty whereof he claimed to be

successor.

_England._--When the royal authority in England grew strong as against

that of the tenants _in capite_, the king's courts in England were more

effectively organized, and their net swept wider so as to draw within

their cognizance matters previously adjudged in courts baron or courts

leet or in the county court, and they acquired authority to supervise

and review the decisions of the inferior and local courts, to control

and limit their claims to exercise jurisdiction, and to transfer causes

from the local to the royal courts. The machinery by which this process

was usually effected, under the common law, was not by what is now known

as appeal, but by the process of _certiorari_ or writs of error or

prohibition. Recourse was also had against the decisions of the royal

courts by appeal to the great council of the king, or to parliament as a

whole. The supremacy of the king's courts over all causes, as well

ecclesiastical as civil, has been completely established since the reign

of Henry VIII., and they have effectually asserted the power to regulate

and keep within their proper jurisdiction all other tribunals within the

realm. Since that date the organization of judicial tribunals has

gradually been changed and improved with the object (1) of creating a

judicial hierarchy independent of executive control; (2) of ensuring

that all decisions on questions of law shall be co-ordinated and

rendered systematic by correction of the errors and vagaries of

subordinate tribunals; and (3) of securing so far as possible uniformity

in the judicial interpretation and administration of the law, by

creating a supreme appellate tribunal to whose decisions all other

tribunals are bound to conform. It would be undesirable to detail at

length the history of appellate jurisdiction in England, involving as it

would the discussion in great detail of the history and procedure of

English law, and it may suffice to indicate the system of appeals as at

present organized, beginning with the lowest courts.

_Justices of the Peace._--The decisions of justices of the peace sitting

as courts of summary jurisdiction are subject to review on questions of

law only by the High Court of Justice. This review is in a sense

consultative, because it is usually effected by means of a case

voluntarily stated by the justices at the request of the aggrieved

party, in which are set forth the facts as determined by the justices,

the questions of law raised and their decision thereon, as to the

correctness whereof the opinion of the High Court is invited. The

procedure is equally open in criminal and civil matters brought before

the justices. But when the justices decline to state a case for the

opinion of the High Court, the latter, if review seems desirable, may

order the justices to state a case. And the High Court has also power to

control the action of justices by prohibiting them from acting in a case

beyond their jurisdiction, ordering them to exercise jurisdiction where

they have improperly declined (_mandamus_), or bringing up for review

and quashing orders or convictions which they have made in excess of

jurisdiction, or in cases in which interested or biassed justices have

adjudicated (_certiorari_). None of these regulative processes exactly

corresponds to what is popularly known as an appeal, but in effect if

not in form an appeal is thus given.

There is also another form of appeal, in the fullest sense of the term,

from the decision of justices sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction

to the justices of the same county sitting in general or quarter

sessions, or in the case of a borough to the recorder as judge of the

borough court of quarter sessions. This form of appeal is in every case

the creation of statute: and even in text-books it is hardly possible to

find a really complete list of the matters in respect of which such

appeal lies. But as regards criminal cases there is an approximately

general rule, given by S 19 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, viz.

that an appeal to quarter sessions lies from the conviction or order of

a court of summary jurisdiction directing imprisonment without the

option of a fine as a punishment for an offence, or for failing to do or

to abstain from doing any act required to be done or left undone other

than an order for the payment of money, or to find sureties or give

security or to enter into a recognizance, or a conviction made on a plea

of guilty or admission of the truth of the matter of complaint.

As a general rule, subject to particular statutory exceptions, appeals

of this kind are by way of rehearing, i.e. the actor or prosecutor must

before the appellate tribunal call his witnesses and prove his case just

as if no previous hearing had taken place before the court appealed from

(Pritchard, _Quarter Sessions Practice_, 2nd ed., 461). The only limit

is that the appellant must confine himself to the grounds of appeal

stated in the notice of appeal given by him.

_Justices in Quarter Sessions._--This tribunal has under the commission

of the peace and under statute power to refer questions of difficulty

arising before it for decision to the High Court. The old mode of

exercising this power was by sending on to assizes indictments raising

difficult questions which had been presented at quarter sessions. The

High Court has _ex officio_ power to transfer such indictments where the

nature of the case and the demands of justice call for such transfer.

The quarter sessions had also power under statute on trying an

indictment to refer to the court for crown cases reserved (Crown Cases

Act 1848), abolished by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, questions of law

which had arisen at the trial, and in all civil cases the quarter

sessions has power of its own volition and subject to no direct

compulsion to consult the High Court on legal questions of difficulty

which have arisen. Until 1894 this jurisdiction was regarded as

consultative only. It was and is exercised by stating the facts, of

which the court of quarter sessions is the sole judge, and indicating

the questions of law arising on the facts, and the view of quarter

sessions thereon, and inviting the opinion of the High Court. Under the

Judicature Act 1894 cases stated in this way are now treated as

"appeals" in the popular sense.

_Inferior Courts of purely Civil Jurisdiction._--An appeal also lies as

a general rule to the High Court from the judgment of a county court or

of any inferior tribunal having civil jurisdiction.

(a) County Courts. Any party to an action or matter in a county court

who is dissatisfied with the determination or direction of the judge in

law or equity, or upon the admission or rejection of any evidence, may

appeal against the decision in the following cases: (1) if the amount of

claim or counter-claim in the proceeding exceeds L20; or (2) in all

equity matters or cases in which an injunction has been given; or (3) in

actions to recover possession of land where questions of title are

involved (County Courts Act 1888, S 120). In the case of a claim below

L20 no appeal lies except by the leave of the county court. The old

practice of appeal by way of special case as in appeals from justices

has been abolished, and the present procedure is by notice of motion

(R.S.C. O. LIX. rr. 10-18).

These appeals are heard in the king's bench division, except in the case

of appeals from judgments of a county court sitting in the exercise of

admiralty jurisdiction, which are heard by two or more judges sitting in

the probate, divorce and admiralty division. The chancery division has

never sat to hear "appeals" from a county court exercising equity

jurisdiction; but at times, by _prohibition_ or _certiorari_, has, in

effect, reviewed or restrained excess of jurisdiction by county courts

in equity matters.

The decision of the High Court on county court appeals is final unless

an appeal to the court of appeal is brought by leave of that court or of

the High Court (Judicature Act 1894, S 1, sub. sect. 5; Judicature Act

1873, S 45).

(b) Other inferior courts of civil jurisdiction. Appeals from the local

courts of record which still survive in certain cities, towns and

districts are in a somewhat anomalous position. The general rule is

that, unless a statute regulates such appeal, it may be brought in the

king's bench division of the High Court on notice of motion in any case

in which, before the Judicature Acts, the court of king's bench could

have reviewed the decision of the inferior court by writ of error. The

history of this question is dealt with in _Darlow v. Shuttleworth_,

1902, 1 K.B. 721.

In the case of the mayor's court of London, under the local and general

statutes regulating that court, the appeal is usually to the king's

bench division, but where there is what is termed "error" on the face of

the proceedings of the mayor's court, the appeal lies direct to the

court of appeal as successor of the court of exchequer chamber. Appeals

from the Liverpool court of passage and from the chancery courts of the

duchies of Lancaster and Durham lie by statute direct to the court of

appeal.

_High Court of Justice._--Until the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of

1873 and 1875 came into operation, the superior courts in England were

imperfectly co-ordinated both as to jurisdiction and appeals. The effect

of these acts was to create a Supreme Court of Judicature divided into

two main branches, the High Court of Justice, which is an appellate

court with respect to the inferior courts already mentioned, and to

certain other special courts and persons; and the court of appeal, which

is mainly concerned with appeals from the High Court of Justice.

The High Court of Justice acts as an appellate court or court of

consultation with reference to courts of summary jurisdiction or quarter

sessions and to county courts and other inferior courts of civil

jurisdiction in the cases already indicated. The three divisions of the

court are somewhat differently placed with reference to appeals.

In the chancery division (made up, in 1908, of six single judge courts)

no appeals are heard except from subordinate officials (masters) of the

court, or an occasional interference by _certiorari_ or _prohibition_

with a county court.

In the probate, divorce and admiralty division, besides the supervision

which may be exercised by a single judge over the subordinate officers

of the court (registrars), divisional courts (of two judges) hear

appeals from decisions of the county court in admiralty causes, and

appeals from justices in cases between husband and wife under the

Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, as amended by the

Licensing Act 1902. In the first of these cases the appeal is on law

only as in the case of other county court appeals; in the second, the

procedure is by rehearing, or reconsideration of the facts as minuted in

the court appealed from, and of the law there applied to these facts.

The bulk of the appellate work of the High Court is conducted in the

king's bench division--which, as successor of the old court of king's

bench in the duties of _custos morum_ of the realm, still retains

supervisory power over all inferior courts in all cases in which that

supervision has not been transferred to the other divisions of the High

Court or to the court of appeal, or to the court of criminal appeal.

The king's bench division exercises appellate jurisdiction in the

following cases.

With respect to decisions of justices of the peace sitting at quarter

sessions, or as a court of summary jurisdiction, except in the case

above stated, the subject matter of appeal is for the most part of a

criminal or quasi-criminal character, the civil jurisdiction of justices

being comparatively limited. The appeal in such cases is as to matters

of law only, the justices' decision on facts not being subject to

review.

In the case of the courts above named, the appeal is brought by writ of

_certiorari_, where the jurisdiction of quarter sessions to give the

judgment challenged is denied _in toto_, or in some cases by writ of

_habeas corpus_, where the appellant is in custody under an order of the

court appealed from (Judicature Act 1894, S 2). The best example of this

is the right of a fugitive criminal committed for extradition to

challenge the legality of the decision of the committing magistrate by

writ of _habeas corpus_. Save in cases of want of jurisdiction or

refusal to exercise it, no appeal lies from quarter sessions except by

consent of the court appealed from, which states the facts as

ascertained by the inferior court, and invites the review of the

superior court upon the questions of law raised by the facts as found.

Decisions of justices sitting in the exercise of summary jurisdiction

are subject to review by a special case in which the justices state the

facts found by them and their decision on the points of law, and invite

the review of the appellate court on these grounds. Such cases for

appeal are usually stated by consent of the justices, but in the event

of their refusal the appellate court may order that a case shall be

stated.

Decisions of justices in the exercise of summary jurisdiction may also

be challenged by writ of _certiorari_ as having been wholly outside

their jurisdiction; and in such proceeding the appellate tribunal may

review the evidence taken below so far as to ascertain whether the

justices have by an erroneous finding of fact enabled themselves to

assume a jurisdiction which upon the true facts they did not possess.

Where the decision appealed from is in a criminal cause or matter the

decision of the High Court is final. Where it is in a civil matter a

further appeal also lies to the court of appeal by leave of the High

Court or of the court of appeal (Judicature Act 1873, S 45).

Appeals in criminal cases tried on indictment, criminal information or

coroner's inquisition, stand on a different footing from other appeals.

For many years the question of criminal appeal in general had been a

matter of great controversy. As early as 1844 a bill had been

unsuccessfully introduced for the purpose of establishing appeal in

criminal cases, and from that time up to 1906 nearly thirty bills were

brought forward with the same object, but none succeeded in passing. In

1892 the question was referred to the council of judges and favourably

reported upon by them. It may be remarked that England was practically

the only civilized country in which there was no appeal in criminal

cases. It is true there was an appeal on questions of law arising at the

trial. But the procedure was intricate and technical, being either (1)

by writ of error, issued by the consent of the attorney-general

(expressed by his _fiat_), to review errors of law appearing in the

record of the trial, or (2) by special case, stated by the judge

presiding at the trial, with respect to a question of law raised at the

trial. These appeals were heard by the king's bench division. Meanwhile

there had been a considerable development of public opinion in favour of

the establishment of criminal appeal, a development undoubtedly hastened

by the report of a committee of inquiry in the case of Adolf Beck

(1904), showing clearly that the home office was not a satisfactory

tribunal of final appeal. In 1906 the lord chancellor (Lord Loreburn)

introduced another criminal appeal bill, which passed the House of

Lords, but was dropped in the House of Commons after a first reading.

The next year the act (Criminal Appeal Act 1907), which was ultimately

carried, was introduced into the House of Commons. By this act a court

is established consisting of the lord chief justice and eight judges of

the king's bench division, the jurisdiction of the court for crown cases

reserved being transferred to the new court. The court to be duly

constituted must consist of not less than three judges and of an uneven

number of judges. The court may sit in two or more divisions if the lord

chief justice so directs. Its sittings are held in London unless special

directions are given by the lord chief justice that it shall sit at some

other place. The opinion of the majority of those hearing the case

determines any question before the court, and judgment is pronounced by

the president (who is the lord chief justice or senior member present),

unless in questions of law, when, if it is convenient that separate

judgments should be pronounced by the members of the court, they may be

so pronounced. The judgment of the court of criminal appeal is final,

except where the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public

importance, and a certificate must be obtained from the attorney-general

to that effect. The court of criminal appeal is a superior court of

record. An appeal may be made either against conviction or against

sentence. A person convicted on indictment may appeal either on a

question of law alone or of fact alone, or on a question of mixed law

and fact. On a point of law a prisoner has an unqualified right of

appeal, on a question of fact or of mixed law and fact there is a right

of appeal only if leave be obtained from the court of criminal appeal or

a certificate be granted by the judge who tried the prisoner that it is

a fit case for appeal. The court is given a wide discretion as to

whether a conviction may be sustained or set aside. The court may allow

the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set

aside because it is unreasonable, or because it cannot be supported

having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment should be set aside

on the ground of a wrong decision on any point of law, or that on any

ground there was a miscarriage of justice. Power is given to the court

to dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage

of justice has occurred, even though they are of opinion that the point

raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant. The

sentence passed at the trial may be quashed by the appeal court and such

other sentence (whether more or less severe) warranted in law by the

verdict substituted. Notice of appeal or notice of application for leave

to appeal must be given within ten days of the date of conviction; where

a conviction involves sentence of death or corporal punishment the

sentence must not be executed until after the expiration of ten days,

and, if notice of appeal is given, not until after the determination of

the appeal or the final dismissal of the application for leave to

appeal. The act gives the court power to order any witnesses who would

have been compellable witnesses at the trial to attend and be examined

before the court, and to receive the evidence, if tendered, of any

witness who is a competent but not compellable witness. If any question

arises on the appeal involving prolonged examination of documents or

accounts or any scientific or local investigation, which the court

thinks cannot be conveniently conducted before it, the matter may be

referred to a special commissioner appointed by the court, and the court

may act on the report of that commissioner if it thinks fit. An

appellant is given the right to be present on the hearing of his appeal,

if he desires it, except where the appeal is on some ground involving a

question of law alone, but rules of court may provide for his presence

in such a case, or the court may give him leave. The act requires

shorthand notes to be taken of the proceedings at the trial of any

person, who, if convicted, would have a right to appeal under the act.

Nothing in the act affects the prerogative of mercy, and the home

secretary may, if he thinks fit, at any time refer a case to the court

of criminal appeal.

_The Court of Appeal._--The court of appeal, constituted under the

Judicature Acts, is one of the two permanent divisions of the Supreme

Court of Judicature. As now constituted the court consists of _ex

officio_ members and five ordinary members, styled lords justices of

appeal. The _ex officio_ members are the lord chancellor, every person

who has held that office, the lord chief justice, the master of the

rolls, and the president of the probate, &c., division.

The ordinary business of the court is carried on by the lords justices

under the presidency of the master of the rolls, who in 1881 ceased to

be a judge of the High Court (Judicature Act 1881, S 2). The court

usually sits in two divisions of three judges, but on occasion a third

court can be formed, with the assistance of the other _ex officio_

judges, in the absence of the ordinary judges from illness or public

engagements, or to deal with arrears of business. The quorum for final

appeals is three, for interlocutory appeals two judges.

The court of appeal has succeeded to the appellate authority exercised

(1) in the case of equity and bankruptcy matters by the lord chancellor

and the lords justices of appeal in chancery (Judicature Act 1873, S

18); (2) in the case of common law matters, by the court of exchequer

chamber, as a court of error, and the superior courts of common law

sitting to review the decisions of single judges of these courts sitting

with or without a jury at first instance in civil actions; (3) in the

case of divorce or probate causes by the full court of divorce

(Judicature Act 1881, S 9); (4) in the case of admiralty causes by the

king in council or the judicial committee of the privy council; (5) in

the case of applications for new trials in jury actions by the king's

bench division (Judicature Act 1890, S 1).

The court never had jurisdiction to hear an appeal in any criminal cause

or matter, but was able to review by writ of error decisions of the

king's bench division in such cases, unless the court for crown cases

reserved had dealt with the question under the Crown Cases Act 1848.

This procedure has been abolished by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.

Instances of procedure by writ of error were rare. Those best worth

notice are the cases of the Tichborne claimant on his conviction of

perjury, and the case of C. Bradlaugh on the sufficiency of the

indictment against him for publishing the _Fruits of Philosophy_.

The appellate jurisdiction of the court as now exercised entitles the

court to hear and determine (1) appeals from every judgment or decree of

every division of the High Court in all civil cases in which such

judgment is not declared final by statute; (2) applications for a new

trial in civil cases tried in the king's bench division by judge and

jury which, until 1890, were dealt with by two or more judges in that

division; (3) appeals in matters of civil practice and procedure from

decisions of a single judge in chambers, which, until 1894, were dealt

with in a divisional court or by a judge in open court; (4) appeals from

the chancery courts of Durham (Palatine Court of Durham Act 1889) and

Lancaster (act of 1890, c. 23) and the Liverpool court of passage

(_Anderson v. Dean_, 1894, 2 Q.B. 222), and on error in a record of the

mayor's court of London (_Le Blanche_ v. _Heaton Telegram Co._, 1876, 1

Ex.D. 408); and from county courts under the Agricultural Holdings Acts

and Workmen's Compensation Acts; (5) appeals on questions of law from

decisions of the railway commissioners in England (Railway and Canal

Traffic Act 1888).

The court of appeal also exercises the lunacy jurisdiction of the lord

chancellor, but in regard to this the jurisdiction of the court is for

the most part original and not appellate.

The jurisdiction of the court of appeal is excluded or limited in the

following cases:--(1) judgments of the High Court--(a) where its

jurisdiction is consultative only; (b) where there is an appeal to the

High Court from an inferior court of civil jurisdiction; (c) where there

is an appeal to the High Court from any court of person, unless in cases

(b) and (c) leave be obtained of the court by which the order is made,

or of the court of appeal; (2) orders of the High Court in registration

and election cases except with the like leave; (3) orders made by

consent of parties, or as to costs only which by law are left to the

discretion of the court; (4) certain interlocutory orders mentioned in S

1 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Procedure) Act 1894, except by

leave of the judge appealed from or of the court of appeal (5) orders of

the admiralty division in cases of prize, the appeal from which lies to

His Majesty in Council; (6) where the decision of any court whose

jurisdiction was transferred to the High Court is declared by statute to

be final; (7) matters which from their nature were not appealable to any

court before the Judicature Acts, or in which the court of appeal has no

means of enforcing or executing its judgment. For example, it was held

in the House of Lords, in _Cox_ v. _Hakes_, 1890, 15 A.C. 506, that no

appeal lies from the order of a judge discharging a prisoner under a

writ of _habeas corpus_. "If," said Lord Herschell, "the contention of

the respondent is to prevail, the statute has effected a grave

constitutional change"; and later, "if" the High Court "has inherited

the combined powers of the courts whose functions were transferred to

it, but none of them had any jurisdiction or authority to review a

discharge by a competent court under a writ of _habeas corpus_, or to

enforce the arrest of one thus freed from custody ... it seems to me to

follow, that however wrong the court of appeal might think a discharge

to have been, it would have been powerless to order a rearrest, or at

least to enforce such an order."

The procedure of the court of appeal is regulated by the rules of the

Supreme Court. A distinction is drawn between appeals from a final

judgment or order (which, unless the parties consent to a smaller

quorum, must be heard by three judges) and an appeal from an

interlocutory order (which may be determined by two judges of the court

of appeal).

In the case of appeals from a final or interlocutory "judgment," or from

an order, including applications for a new trial, the appeal must be

brought within three months from the time when the judgment or order is

signed, entered or otherwise perfected, or in the case of refusal of an

application from the date of refusal. The appeal is by notice of motion,

which except in cases of application for a new trial, need not state

the grounds of appeal. Fourteen clear days' notice of the motion must be

given by the appellant to the other party, the respondent.

In the case of appeals from an interlocutory order, or from a final

order, or from an order made in any matter which is not an action, or

from an order made in chambers, the appeal must be brought within

fourteen days by motion, of which four clear days' notice must be given

by the appellant to all parties directly affected by the appeal.

Controversies have arisen as to the meaning of the term "interlocutory,"

which (in the absence of any authoritative definition) the court of

appeal settles as they arise. The test most generally accepted is that a

judgment or order is final if, as made, it finally disposes of the

rights of the parties in a manner equally conclusive between them. The

court may by special leave allow appeals of either class to be brought

after the time above limited. The respondent may by proper notice bring

a cross appeal against any portion of the judgment or order made below

with which he is dissatisfied. The court has power to order the

appellant to find security for the costs of an appeal, if special

circumstances, such as insolvency or poverty or foreign domicile or the

like, make the giving of security desirable. The court of appeal

"rehears" the case. Under ordinary circumstances it does not permit a

new case to be set up inconsistent with the case as presented below; and

it is content with the judges' notes, or a transcript of the evidence

given below, and with a note or transcript of the judgment appealed

from, but has power on special grounds to receive fresh evidence either

_viva voce_ or on affidavit. The court may call in for its assistance

assessors who are experts on the matters of fact or science involved in

the appeal, and usually does so in cases arising out of collisions at

sea.

The court of appeal may make any order which it deems just as to the

costs of the whole or any part of an appeal, except possibly in the case

of certain appeals in matters on the crown side of the High Court, as to

which some doubt still exists. In practice the costs follow the event,

unless the court in a particular case makes an order to the contrary.

A decision of the court of appeal is final in appeals from the High

Court in bankruptcy, unless leave be given to appeal to the House of

Lords (S 104, Bankruptcy Act 1883), and in divorce appeals, except where

the decision either is upon the grant or refusal of a decree for

dissolution or nullity of marriage, or for a declaration of legitimacy,

or is upon any question of law on which the court gives leave to appeal

(Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1881, S 9); but no further appeal to

the House of Lords lies, even with leave of the court of appeal, on

appeals from the High Court sitting as a court of appeal from county

courts in bankruptcy. With these exceptions there is now a right of

appeal from every order of the court of appeal to the House of Lords.

_The House of Lords._--The House of Lords has for centuries been the

court of last resort, and is still the final court of appeal from the

chief courts in the United Kingdom. The origin of the appellate

jurisdiction of the House of Lords was undoubtedly of that partly feudal

and partly popular character already alluded to, which made the suitor

seek from the high court of parliament the justice denied elsewhere in

the baronial courts or by the king's judges. The lords exercised the

mixed function of jurymen and judges, and, as in judgments on

impeachment, might be influenced by private or party considerations,

debating and dividing on the question before the House. A revolution was

silently accomplished, however, by which the function of reviewing the

decisions of the courts fell entirely to the lawyers raised to the

peerage, while the unprofessional lords only attended to give the

sanction of a quorum to the proceedings, and the House has always had

the right to invoke the assistance of the judges of the superior courts

to advise on the questions of law raised by an appeal. The letters and

memoirs, so late as Queen Anne's reign, show that party or personal

influence and persuasion were employed to procure votes on appeals, as

they have been in later times on railway or other local bills. The last

instance probably in which a strong division of opinion was manifested

among the unprofessional lords was the celebrated Douglas cause in 1769,

when the House was addressed by the dukes of Newcastle and Bedford, but

was led by the authoritative opinion of Lord Mansfield on the effect of

the evidence--an opinion which was treated rather as that of a political

partisan than of a judge. The case of Daniel O'Connell and others,

brought up on writ of error from the queen's bench in Ireland in 1844,

may be said to have finally established the precedent that the judgments

of the House of Lords were to be given solely by the law lords. On that

occasion there was a difference of opinion among the law lords

themselves. The judgment of the majority of the House was strongly

against the political feeling of the government and of the peers as a

body, while the law lords who carried the decision had been appointed by

previous governments opposed in politics to the existing cabinet. But

all these temptations to a party vote by the unprofessional members were

resisted.

By S 20 of the act of 1873, the appellate jurisdiction of the House of

Lords (so far as it affects England) was abolished, but this section was

repealed by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. Under that act and an

amending act of 1887, the appellate business of the House of Lords is

conducted solely by the law lords, though lay peers may still sit

(_Bradlaugh_ v. _Clarke_, 1882, 8 App. Cas. 354). No appeal may be heard

or determined except in the presence of not less than three of the

following persons:--(1) the lord chancellor; (2) the lords of appeal,

four of whom are appointed under the act from among persons who hold, or

have held, high judicial office, or, at the date of appointment, have

been in practice for not less than fifteen years as barristers in

England or Ireland, or as advocates in Scotland; (3) such peers of

parliament as hold, or have held, high judicial office. By "high

judicial office" is meant the office of lord chancellor of Great Britain

or Ireland, lord of appeal in ordinary, paid judge of the judicial

committee or member of that committee, or judge of one of the superior

courts of Great Britain or Ireland.

An appeal lies to the House of Lords (1) from any order or judgment of

the court of appeal in England except as above stated; (2) from a

judgment or order of any court in Scotland or Ireland from which error

or an appeal to the House of Lords lay by common law or statute

immediately before the 1st of November 1876. No appeals are heard from

the decision of courts in criminal cases. The House of Lords has an

indirect power by standing orders to admit appeals from Scotland or

Ireland which under former law or practice could not be admitted

(Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, S 12). The procedure on appeals is

regulated by standing orders of the House. The proceedings are commenced

by petition of appeal, which must be lodged with the clerk of the

parliaments within one year from the date of the last judgment it

appealed from. Security for costs (L200) must be given by bond or

lodgment of the money, unless dispensed with by the House on the ground

of poverty (act of 1893). Each party lodges a printed case signed and

certified by counsel, containing a resume of the matters to be discussed

and of the contentions for or against the allowance of the appeal. The

hearing is before three or more law lords, who may call in nautical

assessors in admiralty cases (acts of 1893 and 1894). It is not public

in the full sense of the term, as persons not concerned in the appeal

can attend only by consent of the House. The House pronounces the

judgment which in the opinion of the majority of the law lords should

have been pronounced below, and has jurisdiction in the case of all

appeals to give or refuse costs to the successful party. The costs of

the appeal if given are taxed by the officers of the House. The

jurisdiction as to costs does not directly arise under any statute (see

_West Ham Guardians_ v. _Bethnal Green Churchwardens_, 1896, A.C. 477).

_Appeals to the King in Council._--The decisions of ecclesiastical

courts when acting within the limits of their jurisdiction, and the

decisions of courts in the king's dominions outside the United Kingdom,

and of courts in foreign countries set up under the Foreign Jurisdiction

Acts, cannot be dealt with by the House of Lords or any of the ordinary

tribunals of any part of the United Kingdom. The power once claimed by

the court of king's bench in England to control the courts of Ireland

has lapsed, and its power to intervene in colonial cases is limited to

the grant of the writ of _habeas corpus_ to a possession in which no

court exists having power to issue that writ or one of like effect

(Habeas Corpus Act 1862). As regards all British possessions, the appeal

to the king in council is in its origin and nature like that of the

provincials unto Caesar, and flows from the royal prerogative to admit

appeals. With the growth of the British empire it has been found

necessary to create a comparatively constant and stable tribunal to

advise the king in the exercise of this prerogative. For this purpose

the judicial committee of the privy council was created in 1833. In

1851, and again in 1870, it was reorganized, and by acts of 1876, 1887

and 1898 it received its present form. The committee consists of the

president of the council, and of the following persons, if privy

councillors--the lord chancellor and ex-chancellors of Great Britain and

of Ireland, the four lords of appeal in ordinary, the lords justices of

appeal in England or retired lords justices of appeal in England, and

persons who hold or have held the office (a) of judge of the High Court

of Justice or the court of appeal in England or Ireland, or of the court

of session in Scotland; (b) any person who is or has been chief justice

or a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada or of a superior court of any

province of Canada, of any of the Australian states (except Fiji and

Papua), or of New Zealand or the Cape of Good Hope or Natal. The number

of persons of this class who may be members at once is limited to five

(1895, c. 44); (c) provision is also made for the payment of two privy

councillors who have been judges in India who attend the privy council.

Numerous as are the members of the committee, the quorum is three. One

or more of the lords of appeal in ordinary usually attend at every

hearing, but the composition of the committee is very fluctuating.

Appeals from the British dominions abroad lie in criminal as well as

civil matters. The right of appeal is regulated as to most possessions

by order in council, and in some cases is limited by imperial or

colonial statute. Appeals are on fact as well as on law, but the

committee rarely if ever disturbs the concurrent judgments on facts of

two colonial courts. In the case of admiralty appeals from colonial or

consular courts, naval assessors may be called in. The committee also

hears (with the aid of ecclesiastical assessors) appeals from

ecclesiastical courts. The judgment of the committee is in the form of a

report and advice to the king, which is read by one of the members

sitting, and no indication is given as to whether the members present

are unanimous. Effect is given to the advice by orders in council

dismissing or allowing the appeal, and giving direction as to the

payment of costs and as to the further proceedings to be taken in the

colonial courts.

The procedure of the committee is on the same lines as that on appeals

to the House of Lords; no well-arranged code of practice existed however

up to the end of 1908, and new rules were then being proposed on the

subject. The appeal is commenced by a petition of appeal, and by the

giving of security for costs. In colonial appeals printed cases are

lodged containing a summary of the contentions of the parties, and with

this a printed copy of the record of the proceedings and documents used

in the courts appealed from. The hearing is in the privy council chamber

and is not public. When an appeal is called on, the counsel and parties

are summoned into the chamber, and when the arguments are concluded they

are requested to retire. The appeals to the king in council from

colonial states having a federal constitution, like Canada and

Australia, stand in an exceptional position. The act creating the

Supreme Court of Canada purports to make the decision of that court

final. But it is still the practice to admit by special leave a

prerogative appeal from the court, and to entertain appeals from courts

of the provinces of Canada direct to the king in council, without

requiring them to go to the Supreme Court. The constitution of the

Australian Commonwealth contemplates (S 73) the possibility of

restricting appeals to the king in council from the supreme courts of

Australia, and sec. 74 forbids appeals to the king in council except by

leave of the High Court of Australia from decision of that court on any

question however arising as to the limits _inter se_ of the

constitutional powers of the commonwealth and those of any state or

states, or as to the limits _inter se_ of the constitutional powers of

any two or more states. The exact effect of these enactments and of

Australian legislation under S 73 is a matter of controversy.

_Scotland._--In Scotland the ordinary appellate tribunal for decisions

of inferior courts and of the lords ordinary is the court of session,

which for appellate purposes sits in two divisions. Appeals from

inferior tribunals in criminal cases go before the judges of the court

of session sitting in the High Court of Justiciary. The court of session

was in its original constitution a committee of parliament for the

performance of its judicial functions, and an appeal to parliament was

consequently anomalous. In the reign of Charles II., however, the courts

grew so intolerably corrupt that a determined effort was made to have

their judgments overturned, by an appeal which was strictly of the old

character of a cry for protection against flagrant injustice. It was

called a "protest for remeid of law," and was inserted as one of the

national claims in the Petition of Right at the revolution. The treaty

of union is silent as to appeals, though definitely excluding the right

of English courts to interfere with Scottish courts or cases. The House

of Lords has since the Union acted without challenge as the final

appellate tribunal for Scotland in civil causes; but has always declined

jurisdiction in Scottish criminal cases.

_Ireland._--The Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Acts have

remodelled the courts and appellate system of Ireland on the same lines

as those of England. The High Court of Justice in Ireland now consists

of two divisions only, the chancery division, which has little or no

appellate functions, and the king's bench division, which has for

Ireland substantially the same power of reviewing and correcting the

decisions of inferior courts as has the corresponding court in England.

To this there is one exception, that appeals from a county court in

Ireland may be heard on circuit by a single judge of assize. In Ireland

there is also a court of appeal, created in 1877, whose jurisdiction and

procedure follow the same lines as that of the English court of appeal.

_France._--The court of last resort in France for all cases, whether

civil or criminal (_en matiere criminelle, correctionnelle et de

police_), is the _cour de cassation_, which sits in Paris. It is a court

of error for the review of all judgments of tribunals of last resort

(except _juges de paix_ in certain cases), and for the transfer of

causes from one court to another when justice so demands, and to

determine conflicts of jurisdiction (Law 1 Dec. 1790). Ordinarily it is

confined to errors of law and procedure, but where evidence not

available below is brought before the court, it may send the case back

for retrial or give the appropriate final judgment, as in the case of

Dreyfus (1906). It also hears appeals from courts martial.

Next to the _cour de cassation_ are the courts of appeal, which have

jurisdiction to hear appeals (1) in civil matters from courts of first

instance, _juges de paix_, and where the amount in dispute exceeds L60

from commercial courts, _tribunaux de commerce_ (Civil Proc. Code, arts.

443-475); (2) in criminal matters from _tribunaux correctionnels_ (Com.

Proc. Code, arts. 202-235). The appeal is both on fact and on law, and

applies to interlocutory or preparatory as well as to final judgments.

_Spain._--In Spain the jurisdiction and procedure with reference to

appeals is on the same lines as in France. As regards civil matters it

is regulated by title 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appeal to the

supreme court is for the most part on questions of law (_por infraccion

de ley o de doctrina_); but the court has also power to review judgments

on materials not available at the first hearing (arts. 1796, 1801).

_British India._--In British India complete and systematic provision is

made for appeals both in civil and in criminal cases by the Procedure

Codes (Civil of 1882, with subsequent amendments, and Criminal of 1898),

and also to some extent by the charters of the high courts of Calcutta,

Bombay and Madras (see Ilbert, _Government of India_, Oxford, 1898, p.

137). In addition, the decisions of subordinate tribunals may be revised

by a superior tribunal _proprio motu_, or reviewed in a proper case by

the tribunal which has given them; and provision is made for the

consultation of a superior by an inferior tribunal in cases of legal

difficulty. The policy of admitting so many appeals has been criticized.

But with an enormous population which has no representative institutions

it has been deemed wise to provide ample means of correcting judicial

errors at the instance not only of the aggrieved person but also at the

instance of the supervising judicial authorities, as a means of ensuring

regularity and propriety in the conduct of judicial business by

subordinate judges in out-of-the-way districts.

_Civil Appeals._--(1) Except where otherwise expressly provided by the

Civil Procedure Code, or by any other law for the time being in force,

an appeal lies from the whole or part of any decree, whether made _ex

parte_ or _inter partes_, of a court exercising original jurisdiction

(Civil Procedure Code, S 540). By "decree" is meant the final expression

of an adjudication upon a right claimed or defence set up in a civil

court, when such adjudication, so far as regards the court expressing

it, decides the suit (S 2). The appeal is both on facts and on law. The

procedure on the appeal is prescribed by c. 41 of the Civil Procedure

Code, and the directions of the code deal even with the language of the

judgment on appeal and the matters to be stated therein. (2) Decrees

passed on an appeal to any court in India subordinate to a High Court

are as a general rule subject to appeal to the High Court on the grounds

(a) that they are contrary to a specified law, or usage having the force

of law; (b) that they have failed to determine some material issue of

law, or usage having the force of law; (c) of substantial error or

defect in procedure prescribed by the code or other law which might

possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon

the merits (S 584). The procedure on these appeals is regulated by c. 42

of the Civil Procedure Code. (3) Appeals from orders which do not fall

within the definition of decrees are allowed in the cases specified in S

588 of the code. The procedure with respect to these appeals is on the

same lines as that on appeals against decrees (S 590). Provision is made

(by c. 44) for allowing appeals _in forma pauperis_ after certain

preliminary inquiries. In the High Courts appeals lie from the decision

of one judge to two or more judges of the High Court, whose decision has

effect as a judgment of the full court. Appeals, in civil cases, from

the courts of India to the king in council are regulated by c. 45 of the

Civil Procedure Code. The appealable amount is for most cases Rs. 10,000

or a claim or question as to property of like amount.

Besides the provisions stated as to appeals, Indian courts have power in

certain contingencies to review their own decisions (S 623). An inferior

court may also refer cases of difficulty to the High Court on a

statement of the facts as found in the referring court and of the

opinion thereon of that Court (SS 617-620); and in cases in which no

appeal lies to the High Court, that court may call for the record of any

case in which the court below appears to have acted without jurisdiction

or failed to exercise its jurisdiction, or to have exercised its

jurisdiction illegally or with material illegality (S 622).

_Criminal Matters._--Criminal jurisdiction in India is exercised by

magistrates of the first, second and third class, by sessions courts,

and the high or chief courts of the presidencies or provinces (Criminal

Procedure Code of 1898). The higher judges in a district have the power

of revising those decisions which are not absolutely summary of the

judges of the classes below them in the same district; i.e. the sessions

judge can revise the decisions of a first-class magistrate, and the High

Court those of a sessions judge (S 435). Inferior tribunals can also

refer questions of law to the High Court (SS 432, 433); and where a

sentence of death is passed, or a sessions judge differs from the jury

(S 307), the matter must be referred to the High Court. On matters of

reference or revision the parties have no right to be heard.

Provision is also made for appeals by c. 31 of the Code. Appeals from

second- or third-class magistrates are dealt with by the district

(first-class) magistrate (S 407). Persons convicted on trial by

assistant sessions judges or first-class magistrates, except in cases

where the punishment is very small, have an appeal to the sessions judge

(SS 408, 413). A person convicted on trial by the sessions judge has an

appeal to the High Court (S 410), but where he has pleaded guilty the

only point on which appeal is open is the legality or extent of sentence

(S 412). Special provision is made as to appeals by persons born in

Europe (whether British subjects or not) and Americans (SS 408, 415, and

c. 33).

In criminal cases there is a right of appeal to the king in council in

certain cases provided for by the charters of the chartered high courts

(see Ilbert, _Government of India_, Oxford, 1898, p. 137).

An appeal also lies in certain cases from the courts of British officers

in feudatory states of India to a high court in India, and from the

courts of Aden and Zanzibar and British East Africa to the High Court of

Bombay. Appeals do not lie from the courts of native states to British

courts in India, though in some cases there is an appeal of a political

rather than judicial nature from the judicial tribunals of feudatory

states; e.g. in the case of Kathiawar (_Hemchand Derchand_ v. _Azam

Sakarlal_; 1906. L.R. A.C. 212).

_Canada._--In Canada each province has the regulation of its own courts

of justice. In Ontario the judiciary are organized, under the Provincial

Judicature Acts, in much the same manner as in England; and the review

of decisions of inferior courts (by appeal or other proceedings based on

English practice) is in the hands of the High Court of Justice, subject

to appeal to the provincial court of appeal. In Quebec the highest court

(king's bench), besides its original jurisdiction, has appellate

jurisdiction over the superior court (see Quebec Civil Procedure Code,

art. 1114 _et seq_.). The jurisdiction is exercised by writ of error or

by appeal, according to the nature of the decision appealed from. The

judges of the superior court have also, under art. 494, power to review

before three judges decisions of a judge of that court or of a circuit

court (arts. 494-504). Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba and British

Columbia have supreme courts with appellate authority over decisions of

single judges of the court and over inferior tribunals in the province.

Appeals lie from the highest courts of each province, in civil matters,

to the Supreme Court of Canada, or to the king in council in cases

falling within the orders in council applying to each province, but in

criminal matters to the king in council. From the Supreme Court of

Canada no appeal lies as of right to the king in council (Dominion Act

1875, 38 Vic. c. 11, S 47), and the royal prerogative of granting

special leave to appeal is sparingly exercised. The principles on which

the judicial committee acts in advising for or against the grant of

special leave in civil case& are stated in _Daily Telegraph Newspaper

Co._ v. _M'Laughlin_, 1904, L.R. A.C. 776. It is, however, as before,

quite common for appeals to be brought direct to the privy council from

the provincial courts without resort to the Dominion court (see Wheeler,

_Privy Council Law_, p. 955).

_Australia._--Each of the states of the Australian Commonwealth has its

own supreme court. The Commonwealth parliament constituted in 1903 a

High Court for Australia, which, besides its original federal

jurisdiction, is also a court of appeal from the supreme courts of the

constitutional states, or from any state court from which an appeal lay

to the king in council at the establishment of the Commonwealth. The

jurisdiction of the court is defined by the Judiciary Act of 1903, by

which it is created. The right of appeal is given both as to criminal

and civil matters.

_South Africa._--In Cape Colony and Natal the appellate courts are the

supreme courts, subject to further appeal in certain cases to the king

in council. The superior courts of Cape Colony are empowered to review

the proceedings of all inferior courts in the colony and its

dependencies in cases where no appeal lies. There was for a time an

appeal from the High Court of Orange River Colony to the supreme court

of the Transvaal, and from that court (whether acting for its own colony

or on appeal from the Orange Colony), an appeal to the king in council.

In other colonies the provisions as to appeal follow more or less

closely the lines of English law and procedure as to appeals, and in all

cases the ultimate appeal is to the king in council.

_United States._--In the American courts the term "appeal" covers (1) a

removal of a cause to a higher court for retrial on all the questions of

law or fact involved, or (2) taking up points of law only by proceedings

in error, for revision by a higher court. Decrees in admiralty,

bankruptcy and equity, in the federal courts, are the subjects of an

appeal; judgments in actions at law, of a writ of error. On an equity

appeal the evidence taken at the original hearing is reported at length

to the appellate court, and it has the right to review the conclusions

of fact reached by the court below and come to different ones. This,

however, is seldom done, the appeal being almost always decided on

points of law based upon the conclusions of fact reached in the original

hearing. In admiralty appeals the conclusions of fact reached by the

trial court are specially set forth, and are final.

"Appeal" in many of the states is the general term for reviewing any

judgment of an inferior court on assignments of error. It is also often

used to signify a mode of reviewing proceedings of municipal bodies,

affecting the interests of particular persons, e.g. in matters of

licences or assessments.

In criminal prosecutions an appeal, or writ of error on points of law,

is almost everywhere allowed by statute to the defendant, and often to

the state. (_United States_ v. _Sanges_, 144 United States Reports, 310;

_State_ v. _Lee_, 65 Connecticut Reports, 265.)

By the constitution of the United States the Supreme Court is vested

with "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such

exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make."

This provision is held not to create but only to authorize the creation

of the jurisdiction. In the words of Chancellor Kent, "If congress had

not provided any rule to regulate the proceedings in appeal, the court

could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction: and, if a rule be

provided, the court could not depart from it." In pursuance of this

principle, the Supreme Court decided in _Clarke_ v. _Bazadone_ that a

writ of error did not lie to that court from a court of the United

States territory north-west of the Ohio, because the act had not

authorized an appeal or writ of error from such a court (_Commentaries_,

i. 324). The appellate jurisdiction of the court is now regulated by

title 13 chap. ii. of the Revised Statutes of the United States (1873),

SS 690-710; and by the acts enumerated at p. 901 of the Revised

Statutes, United States, 1873 to 1891. Under these statutes the Supreme

Court may entertain appeals from the highest court of a state of the

Union, but only (1) where the state court has decided against the

validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, or of an authority

exercised under the United States; (2) where a state court has affirmed

the validity of a statute, or of an authority exercised which has been

challenged on the ground of repugnance to the constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States; (3) where the state court has decided

against the existence of a title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed

or set up under the constitution of, or under any statute, treaty,

commission or authority of the United States.

The appeal from state courts is by writ of error, i.e. on law only; and

applies as well in criminal as in civil cases. The Supreme Court will

not act unless the federal question was raised in the court below

(_Chicago U.S. Mail Co._ v. _McGuire_, 1904, 196, U.S. 128). The circuit

court of appeals, established in 1891, deals with appeals from the

district and circuit courts of the United States, except where other

provision is made, e.g. where the jurisdiction of the court appealed

from is in question; in prize causes and convictions of capital crimes

(U.S. Statutes, 1801, c. 54. S 5); in cases involving the construction

or application of the constitution; in cases arising in district or

circuit courts involving the constitutional questions already stated as

subject of appeal from state courts.

The review by the circuit court of appeals is effected by appeal or by

writ of error, and its decision is final, with certain exceptions but

with power to certify cases to the Supreme Court for instructions (1891,

c. 511, S 6).

The Supreme Court hears appeals from the circuit court of appeals within

the limits above stated, and appeals from the circuit and district

courts in cases in which an appeal does not lie to the circuit court of

appeals, and has power to issue a _certiorari_ to transfer a case from

the circuit court of Appeals. (W. F. C.)

APPEARANCE (from Lat. _apparere_, to appear), in law, the coming into

court of either of the parties to a suit; the formal act by which a

defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The

defendant in an action in the High Court of England enters his

appearance to the writ of summons by delivering, either at the central

office of the Supreme Court, or a district registry, a written

memorandum either giving his solicitor's name or stating that he defends

in person. He must also give notice to the plaintiff of his appearance,

which ought, according to the time limited by the writ, to be within

eight days after service; a defendant may, however, appear any time

before judgment. The _Rules of the Supreme Court_, orders xii. and

xiii., regulate the procedure with respect to the entering of an

appearance, the giving of notice, the limit of time, the setting aside

and the general effect of default of appearance. In county courts there

is no appearance other than the coming into court of the parties to the

suit. In criminal cases the accused appears in person. In civil cases

infants appear by their guardians _ad litem_; lunatics by their

committee; companies by a solicitor; friendly societies by the trustee

or other officer appointed to sue or be sued on behalf thereof.

APPENDICITIS, the modern medical term for inflammation of that part of

the intestine which is known as the "appendix." Though not a new

disease, there can be no doubt that it is far commoner than it used to

be, though the explanation of this increased frequency is not yet

forthcoming. Amongst the virulent micro-organisms associated with the

disease no one specific germ has hitherto been found. It may be remarked

that the theories that influenza, or the use of preserved foods, may be

connected with the disease as cause and effect, have supporters.

Sometimes the disease is due to the impaction of a pin, shot-corn,

tooth-brush bristle, or fish-bone in the appendix, which has set up

inflammation and ulceration. In many cases a patch of mortification with

perforation of the appendix is caused by the presence of a hard faecal

concretion, or "stercolith," which from its size, shape and appearance

has been mistaken by a casual observer for a date-stone or cherry-stone.

Apart from the fact of the more frequent occurrence of appendicitis, the

disease is now better understood and more promptly recognized. It was

formerly included under the term "perityphlitis"--that is, inflammation

connected with the caecum or _blind_ portion of the large intestine. But

in the vast majority of cases the inflammation begins in the appendix,

not in the intestine proper. It is apt to extend and set up a localized

peritonitis, which in the worst cases may become general.

Appendicitis is more often met with in the young than the old, and in

boys rather than girls; and in some families there is a strange

predisposition towards it. It is often started by a chill, or by

over-exertion, and sometimes the attack follows a blow or strain, or

some other direct injury, after which the virulent micro-organisms seize

on the mucous membrane and involve the appendix in acute inflammation.

The appendix is a narrow tube, about the size of a goose-quill, with an

average length of 3 in. It terminates in a blunt point, and from its

worm-like shape is called _vermiformis_. It is an appendage of the large

intestine, into which it opens, and is regarded as the degenerate relic,

surviving in man and other mammals, of an earlier form of intestine.

Foreign bodies passing down the intestinal canal may find their way into

the appendix and lodge there. Frequently the diseased appendix is found

blocked by hard faeces or undigested particles of food, such as nuts,

fibrous vegetable matter, and other imperfectly masticated substances;

inflammation may occur, however, without the presence of any impacted

material. The appendix may be twisted, bent, or otherwise strangulated,

or its orifice may be blocked, so that the tube is distended with mucus

which can find no outlet; or ulceration of tuberculous or malignant

origin may occur. Inflammation started in the appendix is liable to

spread to the peritoneum, and herein lies the gravity of the affection

and the indication for treatment. The symptoms vary from "indigestion,"

and slight pain and sickness, which pass off in a few short days, to an

exceedingly violent illness, which may cause death in a few hours. Pain

is usually first felt in the belly, low down on the right side or across

the region of the navel; sometimes, however, it is diffuse, and at other

times it is scarcely complained of. There is some fever, the temperature

rising to 101 deg. or 102 deg. F., with nausea, and very likely with

vomiting. The abdomen is tender to pressure, and the tenderness may be

referred to the spot mentioned above. Some swelling may also be made out

in that region. The attack may last for two, three or four days, and

then subside. There are, however, other cases less well defined, in

which the mischief pursues a latent course, producing little more than a

vague abdominal uneasiness, until it suddenly advances into a violent

stage. In some chronic cases the trouble continues, on and off, for

months or even for years.

[Illustration: Large Intestine showing Vermiform Appendix (v.a.) and

Caecum (c)]

On paper it is easy to arrange cases of appendicitis into three

classes--catarrhal, ulcerative and mortifying--but in actual practice

this is neither desirable nor possible. Such classification is based

upon the symptoms, and in appendicitis symptoms may be actually

misleading. The three conditions to which the surgeon chiefly looks for

guidance are the aspect of the patient, the rate of his pulse and the

degree of fever as shown by the thermometer. But in certain cases of

appendicitis, though the surgeon knows intuitively, or, at least,

suspects, that the general condition is extremely serious, the patient

looks fairly well and says that he is not in pain, his pulse-rate being

but little quickened and his temperature being but slightly above

normal. Nevertheless, when the surgeon has opened the belly in the

appendix region, he finds the appendix swollen, perforated and

mortified, and lying in a stinking abscess, whilst inflammation has

already spread to the neighbouring coils of intestine. Unfortunately,

the surgeon can no more tell what he is going to find at his operation

in some of these cases than he can foretell the course which any

particular case is going to run.

We may most usefully give here the symptoms as they are likely to be

found in an ordinary case of appendicitis, and as they may be observed

by one who is not a member of the medical profession, in a way that may

prove helpful to him when circumstances have awakened his interest in

the disease.

The case taken shall be that of a boy at school, for, as already stated,

boys are more prone to the disease than girls. The boy has had, may be,

occasional attacks of "indigestion" which have duly passed away under

the influence of aperient medicines, and, being heated at play, he has

sat down upon the cold ground. Or he has got wet through or over-tired

during a long walk or ride. At any rate, his vital powers have been

suddenly lowered, and the micro-organisms teeming in his bowel have

seized upon the lining membrane of the appendix. He feels out of sorts,

and if he manages to eat a meal he very likely vomits it soon after, for

the whole nervous system of his abdomen is disturbed by the local

inflammation. The act of vomiting gives slight relief, however, and

probably he begins to complain of pains in his head as well as in his

abdomen, and possibly he has an attack of shivering--the result of

disturbance of his general nervous system. By this time he may be

attacked with intense pain in the part of his abdomen a little above the

middle of the right groin, and at that spot there may be a tenderness,

and a feeling of resistance may be made out by the gentle pressure of

the finger. In order to relax the pressure upon the tender area he

probably lies with his right thigh slightly bent. By this time he may

look ill, his face being slightly flushed, or pale and anxious. If the

clinical thermometer is placed under his tongue, the index may rise a

degree or two, perhaps several degrees, above normal, and his pulse may

be quickened to 90 or 100 beats a minute. Perhaps it is a good deal

quicker than this. Later, the skin of the lower part of the right side

of the abdomen may be flushed or reddened.

This clinical picture leaves no room for doubt. The boy has an attack of

acute septic inflammation of his appendix. Let it be that the symptoms

have come on quickly, and that the affection is not more than ten or

twelve hours old; no one can tell precisely what course the disease is

going to run. It may be that with rest in bed, constant fomentations,

and absolute starvation, the inflammation will subside; but it is just

as likely that in spite of this judicious treatment the symptoms will go

from bad to worse, and that a belated operation will fail to rescue the

boy from a general peritonitis which may end fatally. But at present, so

far as one can tell, the disease is still limited to the appendix. And

what, at this moment, is the best line of treatment? Some practitioners

would answer--"Let the acute attack settle down, and then, after a week

or ten days, when everything is quiet, remove the appendix, for

statistics show that when the operation is done in the quiet interval

the results are extremely favourable, whilst if it is done in the acute

stage the outlook is not so bright." This is quite right. But one cannot

be sure that the "quiet interval" will ever arrive. The case in question

may be one of those which rapidly go on from bad to worse, and

mortification and perforation of the appendix having taken place over

some hard faecal concretion, general peritonitis is inevitable, with

distension of the bowel and hopeless blood-poisoning. If it were certain

that the attack of appendicitis would subside and become quiescent, it

would be wise to wait. But it too often happens that the first attack

is, indeed, the last. Acute appendicitis is one thing; relapsing

appendicitis is another. The latter condition is very manageable.

Inasmuch, then, as it is impossible to know what direction the disease

will take, whether to quiescence or to disaster, it is for the greatest

good in the greatest number of cases that the inflamed appendix be

removed by operation whilst the disease is still limited to the

appendix. It is highly probable that if every available hospital surgeon

were asked if he had ever had cause to regret having advised early

operation in a case of appendicitis the answer would be "No"; on the

other hand, every surgeon would be able to recall cases in which delay

had been followed by disaster--which an early resort to operation would,

in all probability, have prevented.

If the disease is going to assume the severe form, all the symptoms, as

a rule, increase in severity. The facial expression becomes more

anxious, and the accumulation of gas in the paralysed intestine causes

an increase in the abdominal distension, so that the patient lies with

his knees drawn up. The vomiting continues. The pulse quickens to 120 or

140 a minute, and the temperature rises, perhaps to 104 deg. F. The

swelling and tenderness increase on the right side of the abdomen, and

if the abscess does not find escape externally it probably bursts into

the general peritoneal cavity, and the patient becomes bathed in profuse

sweat, the result of blood-poisoning. Death is likely to follow within

two days, the result of blood-poisoning and exhaustion.

_Catarrhal and Relapsing Appendicitis._--Some cases of appendicitis run

a mild course, giving rise to no worse symptoms, perhaps, than those of

"indigestion" and nausea, with a feeling of general discomfort in the

abdomen, and, probably, some local tenderness. The attack may be

preceded or accompanied by constipation. The administration of a mild

aperient or an enema, rest, starvation and fomentation will probably put

matters right again--at any rate for a time.

This form of the disease may be due to the presence of "bolted,"

unchewed or indigestible food in that part of the large intestine into

which the appendix opens. And these mild recurrent attacks may sometimes

be got rid of altogether by having the teeth put in order, and by

inducing the individual to choose his food with discretion, to chew it

carefully, to take his meals regularly and to eat slowly.

Obviously, these attacks are very different from those of the acute

septic form of the disease described above, though there is no telling

that one of them may not develop into the acute form. Some of the mild

attacks are due to a kink in the appendix, or to some other condition

which temporarily prevents the secretions of the appendix from finding

their way into the large intestine. Others of them are caused by a

passing catarrhal inflammation of the lining of the appendix and have a

distant resemblance to a recurring "sore throat."

After undergoing one or two of these mild attacks the patient would be

well advised to have his appendix removed when it has once more got into

the "quiet stage." Experience abundantly shows that the operation can

then be performed with but slight disturbance of the patient, and with

the smallest possible amount of risk. And until his vulnerable appendix

has been removed he is never safe.

In the _chronic_ form of the disease though the patient is never

desperately ill he is never quite well. He has pains and discomfort in

the abdomen, with slight tenderness and nausea, with "indigestion," as

he may call it. And as one can never tell when the smouldering

inflammation may break out into conflagration, he is well advised to

submit himself to operation without further delay. To carry about a

diseased appendix is to run the constant risk of being laid up at a time

most inconvenient, as when travelling or when staying in some place

where skilled assistance is far distant or absolutely unobtainable. But

having made up his mind that the appendix had better be removed, the

patient can choose time, place and surgeon, and, having undergone a

week's careful training for the ordeal, can safely count on being back

at work again in a month or six weeks' time.

As regards _treatment_, the greatest safety consists in the prompt

removal of the inflamed appendix, and statistics show that if the

operation can be done in the first or second day of even an acute

attack, the result is generally favourable--that is to say, if the

appendix can be removed whilst the disease is still shut up within its

tissues. But in some cases ulceration and perforation, or mortification,

may have taken place over a hard faecal concretion within the first

twenty-four or forty-eight hours, and, the septic germs having been let

loose, peritonitis may have already set in, and operation may be

followed by disappointment. Still, if the case had been left unoperated

on, no other result could have been expected. It was not to the

operation, but to the intensely acute disease that the calamity must be

attributed.

Nature is marvellously clever in some of these cases in shutting off the

area of the disease by glueing together the neighbouring coils of

intestine, the limited local peritonitis causing the tissues to build

themselves into a wall which securely shuts in the abscess cavity. But

in other cases she seems helpless, no barrier being formed for limiting

the area of disturbance. In such a case it is inevitable that

disappointment must result from the surgeon delaying operation in the

hope that delimitation might take place. And when at last he makes his

incision he sees that the disease has had so long a start that his own

chance of success is but a poor one. In a less severe attack, under the

influence of rest, starvation and fomentation, and in cases of chronic

and of relapsing disease, the surgeon may watch and wait and choose his

own time for operating. But when the symptoms are steadily increasing in

severity he should urge an immediate incision. When, as often happens,

the inflammation begins suddenly and severely, and, under the influence

of treatment, steadily quiets down, the surgeon does well to delay

operation. But in a fortnight or so, when everything has become once

more quiet, he will urge the removal of the appendix, for this one

attack is more than likely to be the forerunner of other attacks if the

diseased appendix is left.

The most serious cases are those in which the aspect, the pulse, and the

temperature of the patient fail to give warning of a very advanced state

of disease. Every surgeon of experience has met with cases in which,

though there is nothing pointing to the fact that the patient is on the

brink of a disaster, the operation has shown that the appendix is

mortified, and that it is surrounded with abundant foul matter. It is

then that he regrets not having operated a day or two earlier.

Consequently it is a good rule to operate in all doubtful cases. In

cases in which one happens to know that previous attacks have passed off

under palliative treatment, there is no need for immediate operation;

the quiet interval may be safely waited for. But in cases in which there

is "no history," and in which the surgeon has nothing to guide him, the

greatest safety is in prompt operation.

If an attack of acute appendicitis is allowed to take its course

unoperated on, abscess forms in the peritoneal cavity in the region of

the appendix, but if already inflammation has happily glued the

intestines together around that area, the pus is confined within

definite limits. But as the abscess increases in size the demand for its

evacuation becomes urgent. The pus, under the influence of a natural

law, seeks its escape by the path of least resistance; sometimes this is

into the intestine, and occasionally into the bladder. The most

satisfactory course which it can take is through the wall of the abdomen

and out above the right groin. As it is making its way in this direction

the skin over that part becomes red, swollen, hot and tender, and the

tissues between it and the skin become swollen and brawny. Rarely is

_fluctuation_ to be made out until the pus has worked its way close to

the surface. Later, ulceration takes place in the undermined skin, and

the stinking contents of the abscess escape, greatly to the relief of

the patient. But long before this could happen the surgeon should have

made an incision through the inflamed tissues in order to give nature

some greatly needed help. For in many cases she allows the pus blindly

to discover that the course of least resistance is not towards the

surface of the abdomen but through the inflammatory barrier formed by

the adherent coils of bowel, and so into the general peritoneal cavity.

This unfortunate issue may give temporary relief to the patient, so that

he says that he feels much better, and that his pain has nearly gone.

But though his temperature may fall, his pulse is apt to quicken--an

ominous coupling of symptoms; the paralysed bowels become further

distended, so that the lungs are pressed upon and breathing is

embarrassed; hiccough comes on; and whether operation is now resorted to

or not, a fatal end is highly probable. In other cases, the escaping pus

finds its way up towards the liver and forms an abscess below the base

of the lungs.

If operation is performed when appendicitis has run on to the formation

of abscess, and the diseased appendix presents itself, it should of

course be removed; but if it does not present itself the surgeon should

abstain from making a determined search for it, as in so doing he may

break down the barrier which nature has provided, and thus himself

become the means of spreading a septic peritonitis. Nor should he

attempt to make clean the foul abscess cavity. All that he should do is

to provide for efficient drainage. A large proportion of these cases do

extremely well with incision and drainage, and in the subsequent healing

of the cavity the wreckage of the appendix either undergoes

disintegration or is rendered harmless for further anxiety.

In some cases, however, the damaged appendix remains as a smouldering

ember, ready at any moment to cause further conflagration. This is made

manifest by lingering pains, and by tenderness and warnings after the

abscess has healed, and the patient will be well advised to have what is

left of the appendix removed by operation at a time of quiescence. The

operation, however, may turn out to be a very difficult one. Sometimes

the wound by which the abscess has been evacuated, by nature or by art,

refuses to heal completely, a little discharge of a faecal odour

continuing to escape. The small wound leads into a faecal fistula, and

a bent probe passed along it would probably find its way into the bowel.

The wound is likely to close of itself in due course; but if after many

weeks of disappointment it still continues to discharge, the surgeon may

advise an operation for its obliteration.

It occasionally happens that after operation the scar of the wound in

the abdominal wall yields under the pressure from within, and a bulging

of the intestines beneath the skin occurs. This is called a _ventral

hernia_, and if the patient cannot be made comfortable by wearing a

truss with a large flat pad, an operation may be deemed advisable.

If, in a case of appendicitis, for one reason or another operation is to

be delayed, what treatment should be resorted to? The patient should be

put to bed with his knees resting over a pillow, and a large fomentation

under oil silk should be laid over the lower part of the abdomen. No

food should be given beyond an occasional sip of hot water. Purgatives

should not be administered, as this would be to set in movement an

inflamed piece of bowel. If the case is not acute, a large enema of soap

and water with turpentine may be given, or, possibly, a dose of castor

oil by the mouth. As a rule, however, it is unwise to set the bowels in

vigorous action until the diseased appendix has been removed. No opium

should be given.

Acute intestinal obstruction, cancer of the intestine, inflammation of

the ovary, typhoid fever and renal and gallstone colic, are affections

which are apt to be mistaken for appendicitis. The first of these

resembles it most closely, and diagnosis is sometimes impossible without

resort to operation. And it is a fortunate thing that, when error of

diagnosis has been made, the operation which was designed for dealing

with an inflamed appendix may be directed with equal advantage to the

morbid condition which is found on opening the abdomen. In typhoid fever

the characteristic temperature, the general condition of the patient,

and the presence of delirium are differentiating signs of importance; in

renal and gallstone colic the situation and the more paroxysmal

character of the pain are usually distinctive. (E. O.*)

APPENDICULATA, a zoological name introduced by E. Ray Lankester (preface

to the English edition of C. Gegenbaur's _Comparative Anatomy_), and

employed by the same writer in the 9th edition of this encyclopaedia

(article "Zoology") to denote the eighth phylum, or major division, of

coelomate animals. The animals thus associated, the Rotifera, Chaetopoda

and Arthropoda, are composed of a larger or smaller number of hollow

rings, each ring possessing typically a pair of hollow lateral

appendages, moved by intrinsic muscles and penetrated by blood-spaces.

APPENDINI, FRANCESCO MARIA (1768-1837), Italian historian and

philologist, was born at Poirino, near Turin, on the 4th of November

1768. Educated at Rome, he took orders and was sent to Ragusa, where he

was appointed professor of rhetoric. When the French seized Ragusa,

Napoleon placed Appendini at the head of the Ragusan academy. After the

Austrian occupation he was appointed principal of a college at Zara,

where he died in 1837. Appendini's chief work was his _Notizie

Istorico-critiche sulle Antichita, Storia, e Letteratura dei Ragusci_

(1802-1803).

APPENZELL, one of the cantons of north-east Switzerland, entirely

surrounded by the canton of St Gall; both were formed out of the

dominions of the prince abbots of St Gall, whence the name Appenzell

(_abbatis cello_). It is an alpine region, particularly in its south

portion, where rises the Alpstein limestone range (culminating in the

Santis, 8216 ft.), though towards the north the surface is composed

rather of green hills, separating green hollows in which nestle neat

villages and small towns. It is mainly watered by two streams that

descend from the Santis, the Urnasch joining the Sitter (on which is the

capital, Appenzell), which later flows into the Thur. There are light

railways from Appenzell to St Gall either (12-1/2 m.) past Gais or

(20-1/2 m.) past Herisau, as well as lines from St Gall to Trogen (6 m.)

and from Rorschach to Heiden (4-1/4 m.). Since 1597 it has been divided,

for religious reasons, into two half-cantons, which are quite

independent of each other, and differ in many points.

The north and west portion or _Ausser Rhoden_ has a total area of 93.6

sq. m. (of which 90.6 are classed as "productive"; forests covering 22.5

sq. m. and glaciers .038 sq. m.), with a population (in 1900) of 55,281,

mainly German-speaking, and containing 49,797 Protestants as against

5418 Romanists. Its political capital is Trogen (q.v.), though the

largest town is Herisau (q.v.), while Teufen has 4595 inhabitants, and

Heiden (3745 inhabitants) in the north-east corner is the most

frequented of the many goats' whey cure resorts for which the entire

canton is famous (Urnasch and Gais are also in Ausser Rhoden). This

half-canton is divided into three administrative districts, comprising

twenty communes, and is mainly industrial, the manufacture of cotton

goods, muslins, and embroidery being very flourishing. It sends one

member (elected by the _Landsgemeinde_) to the federal _Standerath_ and

three to the federal _Nationalrath_ (elected by a direct popular vote).

The south or more mountainous portion of Appenzell forms the half-canton

of Appenzell, _Inner Rhoden_. It has a total area of 66.7 sq. m. (of

which 62.8 sq. m. are classed as "productive," forests covering 12.8 sq.

m. and glaciers .38 sq. m.), and a total population of 13,499,

practically all German-speaking, and all but 833 Romanists. Its

political capital is Appenzell (q.v.), which is also the largest

village, while Weissbad (near it) and Gonten are the best-known goats'

whey cure resorts. Embroidery and muslins are made in this half-canton,

though wholly at home by the work-people. But it is very largely

pastoral, containing 168 mountain pastures or "alps," maintaining each

summer 4000 cows, and of an estimated capital value of 2,682,955 francs

(the figures for Ausser Rhoden are respectively 100 alps, 2800 cows, and

1,749,900 francs). Inner Rhoden is extremely conservative, and has the

reputation of always rejecting any federal _Referendum_. For similar

reasons it has preserved many old customs and costumes, those of the

women being very elaborate and picturesque, while the herdsmen have

retained their festival attire of red waistcoats, embroidered braces and

canary-coloured shorts. It sends one member (named by the

_Landsgemeinde_) to the federal _Standerath_, and one also to the

federal _Nationalrath_, while it forms but a single administrative

district, though divided into six communes.

To the outer world the canton of Appenzell is best known by its

institution of _Landsgemeinden_, or primitive democratic assemblies held

in the open air, in which every male citizen (not being disqualified)

over twenty years of age must (under a money penalty) appear personally:

each half-canton has such an assembly of its own, that of Inner Rhoden

always meeting at Appenzell, and that of Ausser Rhoden in the odd years

at Hundwil (near Herisau) and in the even years at Trogen. This

institution is of immemorial antiquity, and the meetings in either case

are always held on the last Sunday in April. The _Landsgemeinde_ is the

supreme legislative authority, and elects both the executive (in Inner

Rhoden composed of nine members and called _Standeskommission_, and in

Ausser Rhoden of seven members and called _Regierungsrath_) and the

president or _Landammann_; in each half-canton there is also a sort of

standing committee (composed of the members of the executive and

representatives from the communes--in Inner Rhoden one member per 250 or

fraction over 125 of the population, and in Ausser Rhoden one member per

1000 of the inhabitants) which prepares business for the _Landsgemeinde_

and decides minor matters; in Inner Rhoden it is named the _Grossrath_

and in Ausser Rhoden the _Kantonsrath_. As various old-fashioned

ceremonies are observed at the meetings and the members each appear with

his girded sword, the sight of a meeting of the _Landsgemeinde_ is most

striking and interesting. The existing constitution of Inner Rhoden

dates mainly from 1872, and that of Ausser Rhoden from 1876.

By the middle of the 11th century the abbots of St Gall had established

their power in the land later called Appenzell, which, too, became

thoroughly teutonized, its early inhabitants having probably been

romanized Raetians. But as early as 1377, this portion of the abbots'

domains formed an alliance with the Swabian free imperial cities and

adopted a constitution of its own. The repeated attempts of the abbots

to put down this independence of their rule were defeated in the

battles of Vogelinsegg (1403), north-west of Trogen, and of the Stoss

(1405), the pass leading from Gais over to Altstatten in the Rhine

valley. In 1411 Appenzell was placed under the "protection" of the Swiss

Confederation, of which, in 1452, it became an "allied member," and in

1513 a full member. Religious differences broke up the land after the

Reformation into two portions, each called _Rhoden_, a term that in the

singular is said to mean a "clearing," and occurs in 1070, long before

the final separation. From 1798 to 1803 Appenzell, with the other

domains of the abbot of St Gall, was formed into the canton Santis of

the Helvetic Republic, but in 1803, on the creation of the new canton of

St Gall, shrank back within its former boundaries. The oldest codes of

the laws and customs of the land date from 1409 and 1585, the original

MS. of the latter (called the "Silver Book" from its silver clasps)

being still used in Inner Rhoden when, at the close of the annual

_Landsgemeinde_, the newly elected _Landammann_ first takes the oath of

office, and the assembled members then take that of obedience to him, in

either case with uplifted right hands.

See also _Appenzellische Jahrbucher_ (3 series from 1854, Trogen); G.

Baumberger, "_Juhu-Juuhu_"--_Appenzellerland und Appenzellerleut_

(Einsiedeln, 1903); J.G. Ebel, _Schilderung d. Gebirgsvolker d.

Schweiz_, vol. i. (Leipzig, 1798); W. Kobelt, _Die Alpwirthschaft im

Kant. App. Inner Rhoden_ (Soleure, 1899); I.B. Richman, _Appenzell_

(London, 1895); H. Ryffel, _Die schweiz. Landsgemeinden_ (Zurich,

1903); J.J. Tobler and A. Struby, _Die Alpwirthschaft im Kant. App.

Ausser Rhoden_ (Soleure, 1900); J.C. Zellweger, _Geschichte d. app.

Volkes_ (to 1597), 6 vols in 11 parts (Trogen, 1830-1838); J.C.

Zellweger, junior, _Der Kant. App._. (Trogen, 1867); A. Tobler, _Das

Volkslied im Appenzellerland_ (Basel, 1906); J.J. Blumer, _Staats- und

Rechtsgeschichte d. schweiz. Demokratien_ (3 vols. St Gall,

1850-1859). (W. A. B. C.)

APPENZELL, the political capital of the Inner Rhoden half of the Swiss

canton of Appenzell. It is built in a smiling green hollow on the left

bank of the Sitter stream, which is formed by the union of several

mountain torrents descending from the Santis. By light railways it is

12-1/2 m. from St Gall past Gais or 20-1/2 m. past Herisau. Its chief

streets are paved, but it is rather a large village than a town, though

in 1900 it had 4574 inhabitants, practically all German-speaking and

Romanists. It has a stately modern parish church (attached to a Gothic

choir), a small but very ancient chapel of the abbots of St Gall (whose

summer residence was this village), and two Capuchin convents (one for

men, founded in 1588, and one for women, founded in 1613). Among the

archives, kept in the sacristy of the church, are several banners

captured by the Appenzellers in former days, among them one taken in

1406 at Imst, near Lanedeck, with the inscription _Hundert Teufel_,

though popularly this number is multiplied a thousandfold. In the

principal square the _Landsgemeinde_ (or cantonal democratic assembly)

is held annually in the open air on the last Sunday in April. The

inhabitants are largely employed in the production of embroidery, though

also engaged in various pastoral occupations. About 2-1/2 m. by road

south-east of Appenzell is Weissbad, a well-known goat's whey cure

establishment, while 1-1/2 hours above it is the quaint little chapel of

Wildkirchli, built (1648) in a rock cavern, on the way to the Santis.

(W. A. B. C.)

APPERCEPTION (Lat. _ad_ and _percipere_, perceive), in psychology, a

term used to describe the presentation of an object on which attention

is fixed, in relation to the sum of consciousness previous to the

presentation and the mind as a whole. The word was first used by

Leibnitz, practically in the sense of the modern Attention (q.v.), by

which an object is apprehended as "not-self" and yet in relation to the

self. In Kantian terminology apperception is (1) _transcendental_--the

perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self

as subject, and (2) _empirical_,--the cognition of the self in its

concrete existence. In (1) apperception is almost equivalent to

self-consciousness; the existence of the ego may be more or less

prominent, but it is always involved. According to J.F. Herbart (q.v.)

apperception is that process by which an aggregate or "mass" of

presentations becomes systematized (_apperceptions-system_) by the

accretion of new elements, either sense-given or product of the inner

workings of the mind. He thus emphasizes in apperception the connexion

with the self as resulting from the sum of antecedent experience. Hence

in education the teacher should fully acquaint himself with the mental

development of the pupil, in order that he may make full use of what the

pupil already knows.

Apperception is thus a general term for all mental processes in which a

presentation is brought into connexion with an already existent and

systematized mental conception, and thereby is classified, explained or,

in a word, understood; e.g. a new scientific phenomenon is explained in

the light of phenomena already analysed and classified. The whole

intelligent life of man is, consciously or unconsciously, a process of

apperception, inasmuch as every act of attention involves the

appercipient process.

See Karl Lange, _Ueber Apperception_ (6th ed. revised, Leipzig, 1899;

trans. E.E. Brown, Boston, 1893); G.F. Stout, _Analytic Psychology_

(London, 1896), bk. ii. ch. viii., and in general text-books of

psychology; also PSYCHOLOGY.

APPERLEY, CHARLES JAMES (1777-1843), English sportsman and sporting

writer, better known as "Nimrod," the pseudonym under which he published

his works on the chase and the turf, was born at Plasgronow, near

Wrexham, in Denbighshire, in 1777. Between the years 1805 and 1820 he

devoted himself to fox-hunting. About 1821 he began to contribute to the

_Sporting Magazine_, under the pseudonym of "Nimrod," a series of racy

articles, which helped to double the circulation of the magazine in a

year or two. The proprietor, Mr Pittman, kept for "Nimrod" a stud of

hunters, and defrayed all expenses of his tours, besides giving him a

handsome salary. The death of Mr Pittman, however, led to a law-suit

with the proprietors of the magazine for money advanced, and Apperley,

to avoid imprisonment, had to take up his residence near Calais (1830),

where he supported himself by his writings. He died in London on the

19th of May 1843. The most important of his works are: _Remarks on the

Condition of Hunters, the Choice of Horses_, &c. (1831); _The Chase, the

Turf, and the Road_ (originally written for the _Quarterly Review_),

(1837); _Memoirs of the Life of the Late John Mytton_ (1837); _Nimrod's

Northern Tour_ (1838); _Nimrod Abroad_ (1842); _The Horse and the Hound_

(a reprint from the seventh edition of the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_)

(1842); _Hunting Reminiscences_ (1843).

APPERT, BENJAMIN NICOLAS MARIE (1797-1847), French philanthropist, was

born in Paris on the 10th of September 1797. While a young man he

introduced a system of mutual instruction into the regimental schools of

the department of the Nord. The success which it obtained induced him to

publish a _Manual_ setting forth his system. While engaged in teaching

prisoners at Montaigu, he fell under the suspicion of having connived at

the escape of two of them, and was thrown into the prison of La Force.

On his release he resolved to devote the rest of his life to bettering

the condition of those whose lot he had for a time shared, and he

travelled much over Europe for the purpose of studying the various

systems of prison discipline, and wrote several books on the subject.

After the revolution of 1830 he became secretary to Queen Marie Amelie,

and organized the measures taken for the relief of the needy. He was

decorated with the Legion of Honour in 1833.

His brother, FRANCOIS APPERT (d. 1840), was the inventor of the method

of preserving food by enclosing it in hermetically sealed tins; he left

a work entitled _Art de conserver les substances animales et

vegetables_.

APPIAN (Gr. [Greek: Appianos]), of Alexandria, Roman historian,

flourished during the reigns of Trajan, Hadrian and Antoninus Pius. He

tells us that, after having filled the chief offices in his native

place, he repaired to Rome, where he practised as an advocate. When

advanced in years, he obtained, by the good offices of his friend

Fronto, the dignity of imperial procurator--it is supposed in Egypt. His

work ([Greek: Rumaika]) in twenty-four books, written in Greek, is

rather a number of monographs than a connected history. It gives an

account of various peoples and countries from the earliest times down to

their incorporation into the Roman empire. Besides a preface, there are

extant eleven complete books and considerable fragments. In spite of its

unattractive style, the work is very valuable, especially for the period

of the civil wars.

Editio princeps, 1551; Schweighauser, 1785; Bekker, 1852; Mendelssohn,

1878-1905. English translations: by W. B., 1578 (black letter); J.

D[avies], 1679; H. White, 1899 (Bohn's Classical Library); bk. i. ed.

by J.L. Strachan-Davidson, 1902.

APPIANI, ANDREA (1754-1817), the best fresco painter of his age, was

born at Milan. He was made pensioned artist to the kingdom of Italy by

Napoleon, but lost his allowance after the events of 1814 and fell into

poverty. Correggio was his model, and his best pieces, which are in the

church of Santa Maria presso San Celso and the royal palace at Milan,

almost rival those of his great master. He also painted Napoleon and the

chief personages of his court. Among the most graceful of his

oil-paintings are his "Venus and Love," and "Rinaldo in the Garden of

Armida." He is known as "the elder," to distinguish him from his

great-nephew Andrea Appiani (1817-1865), an historical painter at Rome.

Other painters of the same name were Niccolo Appiani (fl. 1510) and

Francesco Appiani (1704-1792).

APPIA, VIA, a high-road leading from Rome to Campania and lower Italy,

constructed in 312 B.C. by the censor Appius Claudius Caecus. It

originally ran only as far as Capua, but was successively prolonged to

Beneventum, Venusia, Tarentum and Brundusium, though at what dates is

unknown. Probably it was extended as far as Beneventum not long after

the colonization of this town in 268 B.C., and it seems to have reached

Venusia before 190 B.C. Horace, in the journey to Brundusium described

in _Sat_. i. 5, followed the Via Appia as far as Beneventum, but not

beyond.

The original road was no doubt only gravelled (_glarea strata_); in 298

B.C. a footpath was laid _saxo quadrato_ from the Porta Capena, by which

it left Rome, to the temple of Mars, about 1 m. from the gate. Three

years later, however, the whole road was paved with _silex_ from the

temple to Bovillae, and in 191 B.C. the first mile from the gate to the

temple was similarly treated. The distance from Rome to Capua was 132 m.

For the first few miles the road is flanked by an uninterrupted series

of tombs and other buildings (see L. Canina, _Via Appia_, Rome, 1853).

As far as Terracina it ran in an almost entirely straight line, even

through the Alban Hills, where the gradients are steep. A remarkably

fine embankment belonging to it still exists at Aricia. At Forum Appii

it entered the Pomptine Marshes; that this portion (19 m. long, hence

called Decennovium) belonged to the original road was proved by the

discovery at Ad Medias (Mesa) of a milestone of about 250 B.C. (Ch.

Hulsen, in _Romische Mitteilungen_, 1889, 83; 1895, 301). A still older

road ran along the foot of the Volscian mountains past Cora, Norba and

Setia; this served as the post road until the end of the 18th century.

At the time of Strabo and Horace, however, it was the practice to travel

by canal from Forum Appii to Lucus Feroniae; to Nerva and Trajan were

due the paving of the road and the repair of the bridges along this

section. Theodoric in A.D. 486 ordered the execution of similar repairs,

the success of which is recorded in inscriptions, but in the middle ages

it was abandoned and impassable, and was only renewed by Pius VI. The

older road crossed the back of the promontory at the foot of which

Terracina stands; in imperial times, probably, the rock was cut away

perpendicularly for a height of 120 ft. to allow the road to pass.

Beyond Fundi it passed through the mountains to Formiae, the engineering

of the road being noteworthy; and thence by Minturnae and Sinuessa

(towns of the Aurunci which had been conquered in 314 B.C.)[1] to Capua.

The remains of the road in this first portion are particularly striking.

Between Capua and Beneventum, a distance of 32 m., the road passed near

the defile of Caudium (see CAUDINE FORKS). The modern highroad follows

the ancient line, and remains of the latter, with the exception of three

well-preserved bridges, which still serve for the modern highroad, are

conspicuous by their absence. The portion of the road from Rome to

Beneventum is described by Sir R. Colt Hoare, _Classical Tour through

Italy_, 57 seq. (London, 1819). He was accompanied on his journey, made

in 1789, by the artist Carlo Labruzzi, who executed a series of 226

drawings, the greater part of which have not been published; they are

described by T. Ashby in _Melanges de l'Ecole Francaise de Rome_ (1903),

p. 375 seq., and _Atti del Congresso Internazionale per le Scienze

Storiche_, vol. v. (Rome, 1904), p. 125 seq.

From Beneventum to Brundusium by the Via Appia, through Venusia and

Tarentum, was 202 m. A shorter route, but more fitted for mule traffic,

though Horace drove along part of it,[2] ran by Aequum Tuticum, Aecae,

Herdoniae, Canusium, Barium, and Gnatia (Strabo vi. 282); it was made

into a main road by Trajan, and took the name Via Traiana. The original

road, too, adopted in imperial times a more devious but easier route by

Aeclanum instead of by Trevicum. This was restored by Hadrian for the 15

m. between Beneventum and Aeclanum. Under Diocletian and Maximian a road

(the Via Herculia) was constructed from Aequum Tuticum to Pons Aufidi

near Venusia, where it crossed the Via Appia and went on into Lucania,

passing through Potentia and Grumentum, and joining the Via Popilia near

Nerulum. Though it must have lost much of its importance through the

construction of the Via Traiana, the last portion from Tarentum to

Brundusium was restored by Constantine about A.D. 315.

The Via Appia was the most famous of Roman roads; Statius, _Silvae_,

ii. 2. 12, calls it _longarum regina viarum_. It was administered

under the empire by a curator of praetorian rank, as were the other

important roads of Italy. A large number of milestones and other

inscriptions relating to its repair at various times are known. See

Ch. Hulsen in Pauly-Wissowa, _Realencyclopadie_, ii. 238 seq.

(Stuttgart, 1896). (T. As.)