CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The move from the line to Ste. Catherine Camp was the beginning of

a series of movements, some leisurely, some hasty, which eventually

brought the battalion into position to take its part in the Battle

of Bapaume and the second Battle of Cambrai. The breaking of the

famous "Hindenburg Line," on which the enemy had lavished such skill

and pains, and on which it was evident he placed such firm reliance,

finally altered the method of warfare from the concentrated attack on

an organized trench system to the battle of movement in unfortified

areas.

But before briefly describing the systems of the Hindenburg Line,

and the general trend of the battle, the preceding movements of our

battalion must be sketched.

On the evening of August 18th we moved back from Ste. Catherine Camp

to the village of Anzin, two or three miles north-west of Arras,

with instructions to move again very early next morning. This we

certainly did, as we rose about 2 a.m., and had finished breakfast

by 3 a.m. About 6 a.m. we moved down to the railway line between

Anzin and St. Aubin--Artillery Point was the name of the spot--and

entrained. A pleasant journey in open trucks on the light railway,

which twisted and turned amid green woods and cornfields smiling in

the lovely summer weather, brought us to Monchy Breton, about twenty

miles west-north-west of Arras and some five miles north-east of St.

Pol. Here we detrained and marched on about three miles to Magnicourt,

another delightful little French village, which had escaped the

destroying hand of war and nestled peacefully amid pleasant rural

surroundings. Instead of the ordinary hutted camp that had formed

our home at Anzin, we were billeted in comfortable farmhouses. We

remained here for two days, doing a little quiet training; while some

of the more privileged attended, on August 21st, a Tank lecture and

demonstration at Monchy Breton. After settling down comfortably for the

night, we were suddenly roused up again and told to be ready to move

forthwith.

At 2.15 a.m. we were again on the march, and after passing through

Chelers and Tinques, arrived about 3.45 a.m. at Penin, some nine miles

due south of our starting-point. After breakfast all ranks turned into

bed for a good sleep, "Reveillé" being at noon. It was a gorgeous day,

but terribly hot, and the effect of the morning's sleep, coupled with

the heat, made everyone feel very lethargic. At 9.25 the same night we

set off once more, this time due south, passing Givenchy, Lignereuil,

Grand Rullecourt, and Sus St. Leger, and reaching Ivergny at 2.45 a.m.

on August 23rd. The march had been somewhat complicated by our having

to cut across a Canadian Division moving west-north-west. We expected

to renew our nocturnal rambles that night, but we were left in peace

for twenty-four hours, resuming our march at 2.15 p.m. on August 24th

in a north-easterly direction through Sombrin to Barly, some ten miles

away, which we reached at 6.45 p.m.

At Barly we remained two days, making final preparations for the

offensive. Seven officers and sixty men were detailed for the "nucleus

party," and Major C. W. Wilson was appointed to command the Brigade

"nucleus." At 11.30 p.m. we left Barly for Ficheux area, arriving at

Le Chat Maigre at 2.45 a.m. on August 27th. Here we made a halt, and

lay down to rest in the open fields. The march had been made in a fine,

clear night and under ideal conditions, and the bivouac was really

delightful.

The proximity of active hostilities was evidenced by (among other

things) a number of tanks, both large and small, which waddled up the

road near us. But the conditions were very different from those at

Passchendaele the previous year. There you saw only an interminable

stretch of mud and water, with never a living thing to vary the

monotony of the scene except soaked and muddy soldiers. Here, on the

contrary, we had fine rolling country, dry and firm, which even a spell

of wet weather did not convert into a muddy swamp. Ripe corn stood

ready for the cutting, birds sang, and save for the distant rumble of

the guns all was peaceful and still. The villages, it is true, were

razed to the ground and often half overgrown with grass and weeds--sad

reminders of the first Battle of Cambrai; the ground was scarred and

pocked with shell-holes, and the ravages of war were only too obvious

in many other ways. Yet even in the war zone itself the open, rolling

country was always pleasant to the eye, and the ground dry and firm

except during actual rain.

At 11 p.m. we moved off to another field a few miles away at Mercatel,

arriving soon after midnight. What might be described as our "circular

tour of France" was now drawing to a close. These night marches, with

all the comic incidents connected with night bivouacs, the confusion

of settling down or setting off in the profound darkness, which the

restless bombing 'planes made imperative, were soon to be but pleasing

memories. One march more was to bring us to the Hindenburg Line.

At 11.30 a.m. we moved off, and in due course arrived at St. Martin,

just in front of the redoubtable Line, and the Commanding Officer

proceeded to the place forthwith. Meanwhile the men settled down

in shell-holes amid the ruins, while Battalion Headquarters was

established deep down in a dug-out under the remains of the church.

Walking wounded and German prisoners were much in evidence. After a

short delay the battalion moved in for the night into the Hindenburg

front line, with all its mass of trenches, wire, and dug-outs--a truly

magnificent work, but looking somewhat forlorn now that the tide of war

had rolled eastward.

At 7 p.m. on August 29th we moved a little farther along the line,

which here bent back in an easterly direction. This brought us to a

point nearly due east of Fontaine Lez Croisilles, which was some 2,500

yards away and in close vicinity to the other two Brigades of our

Division, which were already in action.

At 10 a.m. the battalion was ordered to take up its position as Brigade

Reserve, the 2/7th and 8th Battalions K.L.R having moved up to form a

defensive flank during the attack of the Canadian Division on Upton

Wood, which was about a mile and a half west of Fontaine.

The companies took up ground positions on the south-west and south-east

of Fontaine respectively.

At 6.30 a.m. on August 30th the Brigade took over the front line from

the 170th Brigade, of our Division, and the battalion concentrated west

of Fontaine. We had now come into the fringe of the battle zone, and

had three men killed and four wounded. We remained in this area till

the next day, August 31st, when we received orders at 9.30 p.m. that we

were to attack on September 1st at 6.5 p.m.

Before describing the attack it should be stated that it was the final

stage of the Battle of Bapaume, which had opened on August 21st on the

whole front of the Third Army and the left wing of the Fourth Army. It

finally resulted in the capture of 3,400 prisoners and 270 guns, and

the advance of the line Roye (on the Amiens--Noyon road) to Arleux,

ten miles north-west of Arras, up to a line which ran west of Nesle,

Peronne, and Bullecourt. In other words, the enemy had been driven

right across the old Somme battlefield, and the northern portion of the

Hindenburg Line had been pierced. The action in which the battalion,

in conjunction with other troops, took part was intended to complete

the success which the previous day's fighting had won, and prepare the

way for the next great assault. The following extract from the _Morning

Post_ dated September 3rd, 1918, is worth quoting at this point.

* * * * *

"THE LANCASHIRES' ACHIEVEMENT.

"The breaking of this line was an intricate operation, and a detailed

account of its accomplishment would be too technical for the average

reader. It is sufficient to say that the Drocourt Line is a series

of parallel trenches in two groups, known as the front and support

systems, running northward out of the Hindenburg system near Quéant,

and in front of the villages of Cagnicourt, Dury, and Etaing to the

River Scarpe. Against the greater part of the line--that is, from

Etaing on the Scarpe down to Cagnicourt--the English troops and

Canadians had only simple front and support trenches to cross. On

the right, however, the great triangle of closely woven ditches and

tunnels was a much harder obstacle, and our progress in this region

has been much slower in the preliminary stages of the advance. You

know the trouble caused by Bullecourt and Hendecourt, even more by

Riencourt, all of them lying fast in the meshes of the joined defensive

systems--Hindenburg and Drocourt--a solid mass of earthworks over three

miles deep, riddled with secret refuges and machine-gun emplacements.

"Before the main attack could be made it was essential that we held

Hendecourt and Riencourt. That was effected yesterday evening by

Lancashire troops. Bullecourt had already been prized loose from the

Hindenburg Line by Londoners after several sanguinary efforts and

severe counter-attacks. Riencourt had withstood all blows by reason of

its commanding position, a group of village walls on a slight crest

encircled by trench protected by outlying redoubts. The Lancashires

facing it knew its worth. Hendecourt, besides Riencourt, was hardly

less difficult a nut to crack. They had been fighting without rest in

their conquered portion of the maze. Two days running they delivered

attacks at noon, followed by one at four o'clock the next morning. The

same night--the night of Sunday--they went out to storm these citadels

of the Hun that the victory of to-day might be complete. They found

both village ruins full of Germans and machine guns. It was the usual

mixed experience, surrender in the open and resistance in the cellars.

Some of the Germans ran away, others rallied under their officers.

[Illustration: MŒUVRES, INCHY, AND CANAL DU NORD

Oblique Aeroplane Photograph.]

"Riencourt and Hendecourt contained many German bodies when they were

left quiet, deserted by the forward surge of the battle front, the

survivors of grim hand-to-hand encounters with the Lancashire men and

their bayonets. All night long the 'mopping up' continued. Hardly had

the secret places been declared clear when the Lancashires had to

attack again and take up their share of the greater advance at dawn.

The Canadians and their brother Britishers on their left know the

debt they owe these stout lads of the North, whose unflagging efforts

enabled them to attack with easy minds, knowing their flank would be

secure.

"Riencourt captured, the striking troops were within easy reach of the

Drocourt Line. At Riencourt itself the distance was not over half a

mile. Higher up the Canadians on both sides of the Cambrai road were

closer at some places. Their front was nearly straight. Before them

were unobstructed fields, little scarred by shell, with dull red banks

of tangled wire stretched taut in front of the white band of trenches,

the ground behind rising gently with the tips of broken roofs and the

Church towers of the villages laid against the rain-swept sky of grey.

* * * * *

"It is now necessary to return to the Lancashire men who were on the

Canadian right. They had to attack and pass through the triangle I

have described, east of Riencourt. Some of them followed behind the

Canadians, then slipped south-east into the trenches and mopped them

up. By last accounts they were working satisfactorily down the line of

the triangle, and clearing out nests of machine guns. The drive through

to Buissy was a phase of the attack following this operation of the

Lancashire men.

"This despatch is necessarily very incomplete, for the battle is still

going on and news comes back slowly. Fresh German divisions are no

doubt coming up. The Canadians on Mont Dury at eight o'clock could see

masses of grey moving westwards at several places; and although some

of the German artillery had begun to drop back, the bombardment was

still very heavy. The intermixture of enemy troops is extraordinary.

In one narrow Canadian sector prisoners have been taken from seven

different divisions. Lancashires on the right have taken them from six

divisions. There are Saxons, fresh 1st Guards Reserve, battered 2nd

Guards Reserve, bits of the 30th from Bapaume, and the 12th Reserve

from Bullecourt; 7th Cavalry Division, fighting dismounted, and badly

at that, and apparently other relics of the fighting of the past three

weeks served up with fresh dressing, in the shape of a few rested

divisions from 'the back of beyond.' It is a most disorderly order of

battle. Something appears to have cracked besides the Drocourt Line."

* * * * *

To return to actual details. At 4.40 a.m. on September 1st the 2/7th

and 8th K.L.R. attacked and captured Hendecourt, and advanced to a line

running from Terrier Alley (about 1,000 yards due west of Riencourt) up

Greyhound Trench to Hendecourt Chateau, about 1,000 yards due north of

Riencourt.

The 2/6th K.L.R., in conjunction with two companies of 2/7th K.L.R.

on our left and the 52nd Division on our right, were now to attack in

the evening and capture Riencourt Lez Cagnicourt, and consolidate a

line 500 yards east of the village. The formation was two companies

in front--"C" Company (Captain Williams) on the right and "B" Company

(Captain Robinson) on the left; "D" Company (Lieutenant Noon) was in

support, with "A" Company (Lieutenant Sage) in reserve.

After spending the night of August 31st-September 1st in an area just

west of Fontaine, the battalion moved forward by Crux Trench at 3.15

p.m. in the order "B," "C," "D," "A." The trench at this point was

extremely shallow, and there can be little doubt that the movement of

the battalion was observed.

[Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF RIENCOURT

2/6th The King's (Liverpool Regiment)

_To face Page 210._]

The forming-up positions were as follows: The front line companies

moved on a line running along the lower part of Terrier Alley, and

thence in a northerly direction across to Greyhound Avenue, on the

southern edge of Hendecourt, which positions had been captured by the

2/7th K.L.R. in the morning. "D" Company were some 300 yards in rear in

Morden Trench; "A" Company were some 1,200 yards farther back.

The orders were that the Hendecourt--Bullecourt road was not to be

crossed till 5.15 p.m. Just at this moment as the companies were

moving to cross this road an aeroplane came over, flying very low, and

immediately afterwards the enemy artillery opened out on Crux Trench

and the road with 5·9's and gas shells, causing many casualties to both

"B" and "C" Companies, including many N.C.Os. The aeroplane also fired

several belts of ammunition at the men as they lined up.

In spite of this bombardment, the companies moved steadily to their

appointed positions, and were ready at 6 p.m., and great credit is due

for this to their platoon commanders. Just before zero (6.5 p.m.) the

barrage of the right Division (52nd) opened, which caused the enemy to

drop a protective barrage on our front also. Luckily, this fell about

100 yards in rear of our companies, and no harm was done. At 6.5 p.m.

our artillery opened on the barrage line for three minutes, during

which period the two leading companies (with two platoons in front and

two in support) advanced through the 8th K.L.R. and moved forward with

sections in "worms" up to the barrage. This at zero plus three minutes

moved forward at the rate of 200 yards in eight minutes, settling down

finally for ninety minutes on the German side of our objective, Emu

Alley and Wolf Trench, the far side of Riencourt.

The moment the barrage lifted the enemy opened on our forming-up line,

shortening from time to time, but so well did our men keep up to our

own barrage that the enemy's was always behind us.

The first opposition was encountered by the right platoon of "C"

Company, who were held up by heavy machine-gun fire. The supporting

platoon at once commenced an enveloping movement, which apparently

disheartened the foe, as the post retired into a dug-out, out of which

they were bombed, and the survivors made prisoners. "B" Company then

advanced again with three platoons in front, though as progress was

made sections darted off to deal with individual posts. "C" Company

encountered little opposition till they approached the west edge of

the village, when our own barrage, unfortunately, came back 200 yards,

causing considerable casualties. A third platoon was accordingly

sent forward to reinforce, and just at this moment heavy machine-gun

fire was opened from the sunken road. No. 6 Section promptly dashed

forward and successfully dealt with this nest of machine guns, when the

company proceeded to deploy and move through the village, "B" Company

continuing the line from the southern part of the village to the

Brigade boundary.

The enemy now concentrated his artillery fire on the village, and both

companies sustained somewhat serious casualties. Moreover, some of the

enemy had gone to ground, and, reappearing after the leading wave had

passed through, came up and opened fire on them from behind. A section

was consequently detached to put a stop to this, and successfully drove

the enemy back into the arms of "D" Company, who were "mopping up,"

twenty-one Germans being taken prisoners.

During the passage of the village 2nd-Lieutenant Anderson (No. 5

Platoon) became a casualty, and Sergeant Adlington took over command;

while in "C" Company 2nd-Lieutenants Upward and Paterson were both

wounded. Corporal Stevenson, finding both his platoon officer and

sergeant out of action, assumed command of his platoon and led them

successfully to their final objective in a masterly fashion.

After passing through the village, where numerous prisoners had been

taken, the companies advanced steadily over difficult country to their

final objectives. These were reached by "B" and "C" Companies at 7.10

p.m. and 7.15 p.m. respectively.

Shortly before this 2nd-Lieutenant T. L. Williams (No. 11 Platoon)

was most unfortunately killed by a shell, and his place was taken by

Sergeant Warren, who took the men over to their objective, which he

consolidated with marked ability.

The enemy still held out with one very determined machine-gun party at

Wolf Alley, and the advance was slightly checked. Rifleman Dury, with

the utmost coolness, scored a direct hit on the gun at point-blank

range with a rifle grenade, and the whole gun team were taken prisoners.

At 7.25 p.m. the contact aeroplane passed over as prearranged, and

the flares were lit. By 9 p.m. both companies had completed the

consolidation of their objectives, and on the right were in touch with

the Scots Fusiliers. The left company, however, had not succeeded in

getting touch with the 2/7th K.L.R., so Captain Robinson and Corporal

Lee set out at 9.45 p.m. to try and find the right post of the left

battalion. Soon after starting they ran into a party of the enemy,

consisting of one officer and twenty-one men, which was apparently

working round our left flank. The enemy proceeded to get his machine

gun into action, but the officer and N.C.O. who were attending to it

were promptly shot dead by Robinson and Lee, while five men of the

party were killed as they tried to take cover, whereupon the remainder

at once surrendered. For this fine performance and his general conduct

throughout the operations, of which too much cannot be said, Captain

Robinson received a bar to his Military Cross, while Corporal Lee was

awarded the Military Medal.

The left battalion was located about 10 p.m., but being 500 yards away

two sections were moved up from "D" Company to fill the gap, the rest

of that company forming supporting posts. They had done their "mopping

up" well, and took fifty prisoners in Riencourt itself.

Such is a brief and bald account of the taking of Riencourt, a feat of

which the battalion may well be proud. The barrage that fell on them

as they were moving forward to their assembly positions might well

have disorganized the attack. As it was, the N.C.Os. and riflemen rose

to the occasion as their seniors became casualties, and carried on

admirably. Some names have already been mentioned, but some additions

must be made. Rifleman Lewis, after his Company Sergeant-Major and

the other N.C.O. at Company Headquarters were knocked out, took

charge of the Headquarters personnel and kept up communication with

all concerned. Rifleman Prior on liaison patrol tackled a German

party of eight men with such determination that two were killed and

the rest captured. Sergeant Haigh proved a skilful and bold platoon

commander; Rifleman Dodd an equally dashing section commander. Riflemen

Hatton, Fairclough, and Atkin ran backwards and forwards unceasingly

throughout the action, keeping up communication; while Rifleman

Mount, as stretcher-bearer, was untiring in his efforts, and entirely

regardless of danger. He organized enemy stretcher parties, and many

of the battalion wounded undoubtedly owe their lives to his energy and

resource.

The resistance offered varied. Generally speaking, from covered

positions it was determined. One or two groups certainly gave in rather

too readily. One party in particular of the 66th (Würtemberg) Regiment,

sixteen strong, issued from a dug-out, pushing in front of them the

usual Red Cross man. This fellow came along holding his medicine chest

at arm's length, with an expression on his face of "I am touching wood"

which was really comical.

The total prisoners captured by us that day amounted to 170, with 13

machine guns and a trench mortar. As against this, we had 1 officer

killed and 3 wounded, 19 men killed and 95 wounded.

The following criticism of a German Sergeant-Major, made to the

Divisional Intelligence Officer, may be quoted here in the form in

which it was passed on to us.

"57TH DIVISION P. OF W. CAGE,

"2-9-1918.

"A.D.C. FOR G.O.C. 57TH DIVISION.

"In the course of a conversation with a Sergeant-Major of the 7th

Cavalry Division, this N.C.O. expressed warm admiration for the British

as soldiers, and particularly for the way in which the attack was

carried out when he was captured. He said he had not seen a finer

attack, and knew how an attack should be carried out, because he had

formerly belonged to a 'Sturm' Battalion.

"He said that the infantry were into the trenches the moment the

barrage 'lifted,' and this was confirmed by an artillery Observation

Officer, who also mentioned that the attack had been very smartly

carried out.

"The N.C.O., when asked what badges the attacking troops wore, said

they were green diamonds.

(Sgd.) "S. A. SPALL, _Lieutenant_,

"_Intelligence Officer,_

"_57th Division_.

"_September 2nd, 1918._"

* * * * *

Hearty congratulations on our success were received both from the

Commander-in-Chief and from our more immediate Commanders.

In this action, in addition to the rewards already mentioned, Captain

Williams and Lieutenant Harris were awarded the Military Cross, and

twelve men the Military Medal.

The next morning the Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line opened

with a general attack by the Third Army; and before nightfall we were

three miles behind the front line, the 172nd Brigade of our Division

and the 63rd Division having passed through us. We had a magnificent

view of the battle, and the sight of our artillery galloping up and

opening fire was a most welcome reminder of the new type of warfare

which was now taking the place of the old. After one peaceful day we

were ordered, on September 3rd, to concentrate in the vicinity of

Hendecourt, where the rear headquarters, transport, and "nucleus party"

joined us.

Here we remained quietly, cleaning up and training, till September 6th,

the only excitement being a high velocity gun which shelled us on that

day, wounding two men.

This day we received orders to move into the line in the vicinity of

Inchy the next day (September 7th), in order to relieve the 190th

Brigade, of the 63rd Division. Accordingly, at 10 a.m. our advance

party set off to the trenches, followed in the evening by the rest of

the battalion.

The Royal Fusiliers, from whom we took over, were in support, and the

relief was complete at 2 a.m. on September 9th. The rear headquarters

and transport meantime moved to Quéant. Nothing of any moment happened

this day in the line. We were issued with a defence scheme, from which

we learnt that the Guards Division were on our right and the 2nd

Canadian Division on our left; while we were to be responsible for the

main line of resistance, a section of the Hindenburg Support Line about

1,200 yards in extent running round the south-west outskirts of Inchy.

"A," "D," and "C" Companies were in front, and "B" in support. The

other two battalions were responsible for the temporary main line of

resistance, east of Inchy.

[Illustration: THE ROAD TO CAMBRAI.

2/6th The King's (Liverpool Regiment)

_To face Page 216._]

Later on during the day these orders were altered, but only in the

matter of exact frontages. At "stand-to" on September 10th "D"

Company dropped in for some attention, 2nd-Lieutenant Green, who had

but recently joined, being wounded, along with one or two others.

Otherwise little happened. On September 11th the 2/7th and 8th K.L.R.

attempted, at 6.15 p.m., to establish posts on the Canal du Nord.

This great canal stands roughly north and south about 1,000 yards

east of Inchy and about 500 yards east of Mœuvres, the latter place

being just over a mile south-south-east of Inchy. The ground had been

excavated to a great depth, and very large banks constructed, but the

canal had never been finished and contained no water (_see_ photo.).

It was, notwithstanding, a formidable obstacle, being 20 feet deep in

places, though the embankment had been pierced in places for roads and

tram-lines. Opposite Mœuvres the canal banks were in some places quite

low.

The attempt of the other two battalions to establish posts proved

unsuccessful, and at 10.15 p.m. our "C" Company was pushed forward to

replace "A" Company of the 8th K.L.R. in the Hindenburg Line.

At 12.55 a.m. on September 12th orders were received for our Battalion

Headquarters to join Headquarters of the 8th K.L.R.; and we were warned

that as many as three companies might be required to form a defensive

flank north-east of Mœuvres. At 3.30 a.m. "A" Company was ordered

forward for this purpose, with instructions to form platoon posts in

Cemetery Trench, just north of Mœuvres, and to gain touch with the

170th Brigade on the right. It was now nearly daylight, and the company

experienced the greatest difficulty in gaining its position, as there

was no cover, and touch was not obtained with the 170th Brigade. At 6

p.m. the enemy counter-attacked on the Inchy--Mœuvres line, and "A"

Company, finding itself being outflanked, after hard fighting was

obliged to withdraw. In the course of this movement Lieutenant Sage,

the Company Commander and a very gallant officer, and seven men were

killed, and twenty-one men wounded.

That night the battalion was relieved by the 2/4th South Lancashire

Regiment and one company of the Munster Fusiliers. This was completed

at 5.30 a.m. on September 13th. Our new dispositions were two companies

in the Buissy Switch and two in the Hindenburg Support north-east of

Pronville. After remaining here for two days we learnt, on September

15th, that we were to be relieved by the 52nd Division and go back

for a short rest. Taking everything into consideration, we had had a

pretty strenuous time since we left Anzin on our preliminary marches,

and after our first arrival in the battle area had had our share of

fighting and shelling. There was, of course, no cover from the weather

except in trenches. Villages had for the most part long since ceased to

exist, and were but grass-grown mounds with notice boards to indicate

what places they had once been. Our casualties had been fairly heavy,

and the reduction in officers and N.C.Os., of course, threw extra work

on the remainder, whose opportunities for sleep and rest, small as they

were likely to be in any case, were thus further curtailed. A few days'

rest and all would be well again, so we greeted the news that we were

going back for a while with no little pleasure.

The relief by the 7th Cameronians commenced at 1.30 p.m. on September

16th with Battalion Headquarters, "A" and "D" Companies. This was

finished by 4.30 p.m. "C" and "B" Companies could not be relieved

till after dark, but had finished by 11.30 p.m. There was very little

hostile activity during the relief, only two men being wounded, and the

companies made their way back to Croisilles for the night in their own

time.

Next day, September 17th, we moved to Boyelles, and entrained there at

4 p.m. for Saulty. Here we detrained and marched to Barly, arriving

there at 7.10 p.m. Our rest at Barly will live long in the memory of

the battalion. We had enjoyed periods out of the line before, but never

was any place so acceptable as Barly. Everyone arrived full of that

comfortable feeling which only hard work well done can produce. All

were pleasantly tired, but quite ready to make the most of the golden

hours so long as they should last. Even the senior officers of the

battalion became light-hearted and youthful. Were not the Commanding

Officer and the Padre seen hurrying up the main street with pockets

and arms filled with bottles of "bubbly," and in no way disconcerted

on reaching the Mess to find that a supply had already been obtained?

Our stay lasted till September 25th, and during that time we rested

and trained, cleared up and repaired, and generally made ready for the

resumption of the offensive.

The second instalment of "Cheerio," published by the "Whizzbang

Press," and edited by Rifleman Wheway, of "B" Company, duly made its

appearance, and was acclaimed as a great journalistic success. The

"Cheerios" Concert Party made its début here, and produced a really

first-class entertainment in the Cinema on September 22nd. As to the

doings of these artistes more will be said hereafter.

A number of officers joined us at Barly--2nd-Lieutenant Alty, D.C.M.,

and 2nd-Lieutenant Shirt on the 18th, 2nd-Lieutenant Hardy on the

21st, 2nd-Lieutenant D. R. Williams on the 22nd, and Lieutenant

Kissan on September 23rd. As against this, more than one officer was

now suffering from dysentery brought on by shell gas, and Lieutenant

Penrice, Captain Robinson, and 2nd-Lieutenant Lever had to be evacuated.

Captain Robinson in particular was a great loss. His command of men

was truly remarkable. Forceful and brave in the extreme, he had at

Riencourt the opportunity to show the stuff he was made of, and proved

himself a fine officer. Lieutenant Kissan took over command of "B"

Company.

On September 25th we learnt that our rest was over and that work was

before us once more. At 8.40 a.m. on September 26th we entrained at

Saulty and proceeded to Vaux Vraucourt, which was reached at 3 p.m. A

march took us thence to our concentration area near Quéant, which we

reached at 5 p.m. At 2.50 a.m. on September 27th the battalion moved

forward from the concentration area to the first assembly position,

which was in the Hindenburg front line about 500 yards south-west

of Pronville. This was reached at 4.30 a.m. At zero (5.20 a.m.) the

battalion moved forward to the second assembly position, which was

about 600 yards west of Mœuvres, arriving there at 12.30 p.m.

The battalion now opened up into artillery formation and advanced

across the Canal du Nord, through an arm of the Hindenburg Support

Line, and on to some high ground about a mile east of Mœuvres. Here we

settled down and waited for the attack to develop.

* * * * *

The scheme of operations was on a large scale. The 52nd and 63rd

Divisions were to capture the first objective (Red Line), which ran

north and south just beyond the main system of the Hindenburg Support

Line; and then the second objective (Brown Line), which ran through

Anneux Chapel round Anneux to east of Graincourt. After this, the

171st and 172nd Brigades of the 57th Division were to pass through and

capture the third objective (Blue Line), which ran round the east side

of Fontaine, west of La Folie and east of Cantaing. The 170th Brigade

were then to seize the crossings of the Canal de L'Escaut if not

already taken, and carry the attack farther. The Canadians on the left

and the Guards on the right were continuing the line of attack north

and south with the same relative objectives. The 6th Dragoon Guards

and Corps cyclists were in reserve; and orders were issued to make

a swift advance possible if the conditions should prove favourable.

In consequence of these movements, the accumulation of troops behind

the front line was very considerable. The country was similar to what

had been covered in the previous attacks, though perhaps some of the

rolling slopes were bolder and the sunken roads deeper.

* * * * *

Everywhere you looked were groups of men dotted about, and the enemy

proceeded to shell vigorously, as the force opposite his front was

only too conspicuous. At about 1.30 p.m. a message was received from

the 8th K.L.R. that the Sugar Factory beyond the Red Line on the

Cambrai--Bapaume road had not been captured, and that in consequence

the attack of the 57th Division could not take place.

There was nothing, therefore, to do but for the battalion to dig in,

which they proceeded to do under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire,

a none too pleasant task.

At 4.30 p.m. news was received that the 63rd Division had captured the

Sugar Factory; and at 5.30 p.m. General Longbourne, our Brigadier,

arrived at Battalion Headquarters. It now appeared that the attacking

divisions had made progress towards their second objective, and that it

was our turn to continue the operation.

Our instructions were to capture Cantaing Trench and Support. This

was a double line of trenches which ran in a south-south-easterly

direction from the south side of Bourlon Wood round the south-east side

of Anneux down to Cantaing. To reach this line we were to move down to

our objective from the north, using the section of Cantaing Trench and

Support that ran along the west and south sides of Bourlon Wood, and

obtaining cover from the wood itself.

It was decided to attack on a two company front--"D" on the right, "C"

on the left, with "B" in support and "A" in reserve. "C" Company was

responsible for the clearance of Cantaing Trench. Zero was 6.20 p.m.,

at which hour a twenty minutes' barrage was to begin. The companies

moved over at 6 p.m., but the barrage never came off. However, at

about 9.30 p.m. word was received from Captain Fell that, as neither

Cantaing Trench nor Support was half dug or continuous, he thought it

inadvisable to continue before daylight. This was approved.

At 4.30 a.m. on September 28th Captain Patteson, the Brigade Major,

arrived with fresh orders. The battalion were now to capture a trench

just west of Fontaine and round the southern edge of that place to the

east end of Cantaing, the attack to commence at 6.20 a.m.

The formation for the attack was the same as had already been detailed,

except that "B" and "A" Companies were given objectives on the left of

the attack.

Companies moved off at 6.15 a.m. and at 9.30 a.m. Captain Fell and

Captain Williams reported that they had gained their objectives and

were moving through Fontaine--where a Divisional Headquarters, complete

with maps and papers, was occupied--to take up positions on the east

side.

While proceeding to attack Anneux, Lieutenant James, commanding "A"

Company, was severely wounded. Notwithstanding, he carried on for

eighteen hours, and was only evacuated at length by the direct orders

of the Commanding Officer. For his gallantry on this occasion he was

awarded the Military Cross.

Platoon posts were established by the three companies, "B," "C" and

"D," east of Fontaine, "A" Company being on the western outskirts of

the village. The casualties were 2nd-Lieutenant Shirt and ten men

wounded. The same morning the 170th Infantry Brigade passed through us

to capture the Marcoing Line, which runs north and south about 1,400

yards east of Fontaine, but, having failed to do so, were withdrawn

through us early in the morning of September 29th. At 7.30 a.m.

on September 29th information was received that the Canadians had

captured the Marcoing Line as far south as the trenches just north

of the railway embankment which cuts the Cambrai--Bapaume road. Two

patrols from "D" and "B" companies were despatched in consequence at

9.30 a.m. to "mop up" the balance of this line north of the Canal De

l'Escaut. "D" Company's patrol reached the sunken road which runs from

the north end of La Folie Wood towards Cambrai, but were there held

up by machine-gun fire. 2nd-Lieutenant Waln and "B" Company's patrol

worked along the north side of the railway embankment, which runs from

about 100 yards north of Fontaine due east, till they got in touch with

the southernmost post of the Canadians in the Marcoing Line. Turning

south, he proceeded to clear the Marcoing Line, fighting his way with

the utmost coolness and gallantry. At the very outset several of his

men were knocked out by artillery and machine-gun fire, but he worked

his way doggedly along. Being presently reinforced by another platoon,

he completed the clearing of this section of the line, joining hands

finally with "D" Company's patrol at the southern end of this section

of the line. He finished his task at 6.30 p.m., and brought in one

machine gun and sixteen prisoners. For this very gallant performance,

which was highly complimented by the Canadians, 2nd-Lieutenant Waln

was recommended for the Military Cross, but was awarded a Divisional

Commander's Card of Congratulations only. Lance-Corporal Chambers was

awarded the Military Medal in the same connection.

At 3 p.m. news was received that the enemy was falling back, and an

attack on Proville Trench, on the east side of the Canal De l'Escaut,

was ordered. The same formation was prescribed as before, and the

advance began at 6.30 p.m. About 7.10 p.m. Captain Fell reported that

his company ("D") were across the Canal de l'Escaut, little opposition

being encountered. Shortly afterwards "C" and "B" Companies reported

to the same effect. "A" Company were remaining in reserve on our side

of the canal and La Folie Wood. But at this point our difficulties

began. "C" Company, as darkness fell, found themselves floundering in

a swamp, and could make no headway. "D" Company's left platoon reached

Proville Trench, but came under heavy machine-gun fire and were forced

back to the lock. The rest of that company were similarly checked by

the fusilade, and the company established itself in the vicinity of the

lock, about 400 yards west of Proville. Reference was made to Battalion

Headquarters, and instructions were issued to wait for the dawn to

renew the attack.

At 10 p.m. Battalion Headquarters moved up into La Folie Wood and

occupied some huts close to the canal, where they were shelled

continuously throughout the night with the utmost vigour. At 12.20

a.m. "A" Company was sent over the canal, and a further attack by the

leading companies was attempted. However, the enemy machine guns,

which had a perfect field of fire, were too much for the attackers,

and caused severe casualties. All that could be done was done,

Sergeant Bibby in particular distinguishing himself on this occasion,

but it became evident that a mere frontal attack was useless. It was

accordingly decided that "D" Company should renew the frontal attack

while "A" Company supported by "C" Company was to work round the sunken

road which ran from our right towards Proville. However, before this

order could take effect we were informed that the 2/7th K.L.R. would

take over and carry out this attack, which they did successfully, our

battalion being concentrated west of the canal by 4 p.m.

At 6 p.m. the 2/5th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment relieved us,

and the battalion withdrew to bivouac in an open field just west of

Fontaine and on the south side of the Cambrai--Bapaume road. This

completed an awkward period of desultory but difficult fighting.

We took twenty-one prisoners, with one machine gun and one trench

mortar, but had two officers killed and two wounded, while among

the men there were fifty-nine casualties. The officers killed were

2nd-Lieutenant Purdie, a most popular and gallant Scotsman who had

been with us for a long while, and had seen active service during the

greater part of the war; and 2nd-Lieutenant Alty, D.C.M., who had only

joined us at Barly, but whose worth we knew, as he won his D.C.M. when

serving at Houplines in the ranks of the 2/7th K.L.R. Of the officers

wounded, Lieutenant James has been already mentioned; the other was

2nd-Lieutenant Shirt, who, like Alty, had joined us at Barly, and we

regretted his swift departure to "Blighty." Among the men the loss of

Company Sergeant-Major Woodward, of "C" Company, who was wounded during

the concentration in front of the Canal du Nord, was the most serious.

He was one of the very old members of the battalion who had risen

steadily to warrant rank. He was badly wounded and his subsequent death

in hospital was universally deplored. Company Quartermaster-Sergeant G.

Lane was promoted to fill the vacancy that had occurred.

[Illustration: Official Photograph by permission of The Imperial War

Museum.]

For the whole of September, during a good part of which the battalion

had been engaged in active operations, our casualties had totalled

as follows:--Four officers killed and 10 wounded; 47 men killed and

188 wounded; 13 men missing. Our "effective strength" was 34 officers

and 708 men, as against 42 officers and 919 men on September 1st.

Our "trench strength" was, as always, considerably lower than our

"effective strength," as the latter included everyone detached, whether

on duty or leave, who was not counted in the war establishment of

another unit. Moreover, the Transport, rear headquarters, and the 33⅓

per cent. forming the "nucleus party" have to be further deducted to

show the number of "rifles" available for fighting purposes.

The battalion remained in its present position till October 4th.

Our habitation consisted of the remnants of old enemy trenches and

shell-holes in an open field. To the west of this, at a distance of

some 200 yards from the nearest "bivvies," was a line of six 6-inch

howitzers, which was continued by six 60-pounders. These two batteries

were almost continuously in action, and were frequently engaged in

firing salvos for barrages, and the effects of their presence had to

be experienced to be properly appreciated. Except for these--and it is

a very big exception--we were quiet enough. On October 1st some shells

fell among our most eastern "bivvies" and wounded three men. Apart from

this we were not troubled; but the hum of aeroplanes filled the air

all night, while the detonations from bombs were sufficiently close to

remind one of the unpleasant possibility of our turn coming next.

The weather was fine and mild, but beyond cleaning up and repairing the

damage of war very little training was attempted, except some useful

demonstrations of the best method of coping with hostile machine guns.

On October 1st 2nd-Lieutenant Simpson and a draft of sixty men arrived,

which was a welcome reinforcement. The Adjutant had also returned from

the United Kingdom and resumed his duties, Captain Bowring departing

shortly after to England for a well-earned leave.

Rear headquarters and the transport remained in the field on the north

side of the Cambrai--Bapaume road close up to the south-west edge of

Bourlon Wood, where they had moved on the evening of September 29th.

Bourlon Wood showed little signs outwardly of the hurricane fire to

which it had been treated both in 1917 and again recently. It covers

a large area, but is chiefly composed of small bushy trees with but

few of the large and stately boles which show the effect of shell

fire so markedly. Inside the wood the scent of gas was still fairly

strong; while derelict tanks and endless fragments of foreign and

British equipment served to show what hard fighting had taken place

in its green glades. Forward of Fontaine the country to our immediate

front was far less bold in its hills and valleys than the ground that

we had traversed. It still consisted of rolling downs, but the slopes

were gradual and less pronounced; and whole areas, especially in the

vicinity of the canal, were dead flat right up to Cambrai itself,

of which one could obtain a good view from the high ground on which

Bourlon Wood itself stands. Columns of smoke could be seen rising from

the town, and not infrequent explosions showed that the enemy was

preparing for his departure.

An unpleasant incident had occurred with a "booby trap" at Riencourt,

which caused the death of a rifleman and hurled Quartermaster Smith to

a considerable distance. Consequently, when the fire by the Battalion

Headquarters tent suddenly blew up, lodging a considerable quantity of

hot potato in the eyes of the cook, we were somewhat alarmed. It turned

out, however, to be only a small bomb detonator that the heat had

exploded.

While we were in bivouac here word came that the Commanding Officer had

been awarded the D.S.O. Although he modestly referred to it as being

a recognition of the merit of the battalion, all ranks felt that it

was richly deserved. His unofficial exploits in rallying and taking

forward stragglers from other units had been noted with approval by the

men, and throughout the operations he had been conspicuous by his total

disregard of personal safety.

On October 4th we moved up from reserve into support with two companies

("A" and "B") in the Marcoing Line and "C" and "D" Company in support.

Battalion Headquarters were to have occupied the Chateau Pill-box at

the corner of La Folie Wood, but this was already in occupation, and

eventually they were accommodated for the night in a deep dug-out in

the sunken road some two or three hundred yards farther back and next

door to Brigade Headquarters.

Next morning (October 5th), most unfortunately, Brigadier-General

Longbourne was wounded while patrolling in front of the advanced posts.

Though his wounds were not at first thought serious, they proved worse

than had been suspected, and we saw him no more. He was a fine leader

of men, a most gallant gentleman, and as popular with the men as with

the officers. No one could wish for a better Brigadier.

The Commanding Officer assumed command of the Brigade, and Major C. W.

Wilson of the battalion.

The same morning Battalion Headquarters moved up to the Chateau

Pill-box. This was a small concrete erection, of no strength, and

the inside was literally covered with flies. Besides this there were

various wooden "bivvies" and slit trenches for the men, into which all

soon settled. A large number of demolition charges littered the ground

in wooden cases about the size of a box that would contain a dozen

bottles of beer. These charges seemed to have an unholy attraction

for some people. A pioneer was found hacking the casing off one for

firewood; the cooks made a screen round their fire with others; while

a signaller was found carrying one into the pill-box to put his candle

on. They may have been safe enough, but you can never tell.

It was certainly a most unpleasant corner that we were in. There were

8-inch howitzers just behind us which fired at frequent intervals,

while the enemy kept us pretty occupied with shells. We had several

wounded, two cooks in one instance, bending over their fire, being

simultaneously disabled by a "whizz-bang," and the breakfast

spoilt. All night long revised orders as to defensive positions to

be maintained along the canal bank kept coming in, which kept the

companies always on the move.

* * * * *

At 6.45 p.m. on October 6th we relieved the 8th K.L.R. in the front

line--"D," "A," "B" Companies in front and from the right, and "C"

Company in support. The line ran from a point in the Marcoing Line

about 300 yards north-north-east of Proville across the Canal de

l'Escaut, and right across an old German aerodrome almost to the

Cambrai--Bapaume road, where the Canadians carried on the line. "D"

Company were south of the canal, "B" and "A" Companies north of it.

Posts were for the most part in old houses and cellars. "A" Company

had an enormous covered concrete rifle range (_see_ aeroplane photo)

on their front. Their posts were at one end, and Company Headquarters

at the other--a most convenient arrangement, affording protection from

weather or hostilities for the Company Commander when visiting his

posts.

* * * * *

During this night rear headquarters and transport lines by Bourlon

Wood, to which the Padre and Lieutenant Hazell had been sent sick, and

Captain Bowring for a rest prior to going on leave, were visited by an

aeroplane and heavily bombed. The destruction caused by these terrific

explosions was very considerable. One man was killed and seven wounded;

while among the transport itself, which received the brunt of the

bombing, eighteen animals were either blown to pieces or so maimed that

they had to be shot. It was a horrible business digging out the wounded

men and putting the mutilated and screaming animals out of their pain,

and in the morning the place looked like a shambles.

October 7th passed off quietly with only intermittent shelling; but

next day there was a general attack by the Third Army on limited

objectives, which was connected with the turning of Cambrai from the

flanks, though but mild retaliation occurred on our front.

It was now expected that the enemy might fall back at any moment.

Active patrolling for the night of October 7th-8th was arranged by

the battalion scouts working in relief. As had been anticipated, no

enemy were located in the area bounded by the Cambrai--Bapaume road,

the Cambrai embankment, and the canal; but up to 4 a.m. machine guns

were still firing across the open country from the south bank of the

canal. By this time the general attack of the Canadians, which had

commenced at 1.30 a.m., had carried them up to the canal bridgeheads

without serious opposition. Accordingly all companies in the front

line were instructed to push forward small patrols, to be followed by

strong fighting patrols, to keep abreast with the Canadians. At 7.30

a.m. a general advance was ordered, and, after consultation with the

8th K.L.R., who had relieved the 2/7th K.L.R. on our right, we made

the following moves: "D" Company worked along the south of the canal

up to the railway embankment in front of Cambrai; "B" Company worked

along south of the Cambrai--Bapaume road, crossed the canal in front of

Cambrai by a footbridge; "A" followed "B" Company, to form the left of

our front line, which was now the railway embankment; while "D" Company

occupied "B" Company's old position as support.

By twelve o'clock our new line was established with three companies on

the line of the railway embankment running along the western outskirts

of the town, and piquets placed over all entrances to Cambrai.

Battalion Headquarters had moved from the canal bank up to the rifle

range.

At 2 p.m., the pursuit having swept through and past Cambrai, we were

concentrated for the night with "A" and "B" Companies in the rifle

range, "C," "D," and Headquarters in houses some few hundred yards

nearer the town itself. Our casualties from shell and machine-gun fire

for three days were three killed and twenty-eight wounded.

The capture of Cambrai was the end of our share in the battles of

Bapaume and Cambrai. The month of September and the early days of

October saw the final initiation of the battalion, and, in fact, of the

whole Division, into the mysteries of a great offensive. Looking back,

we have reason to feel that we acquitted ourselves with credit. The

following letter from General Sir Julian Byng, commanding Third Army,

to our Divisional Commander, is reproduced here by special permission:--

"I cannot allow the 57th Division to leave the Third Army without

expressing my sincerest appreciation of its services during the Battle

of Cambrai.

"The success that has crowned its efforts has been brought about by

careful preparation by the Staff, by skilful tactical handling by all

leaders, and by determined resolve of all ranks to beat the enemy.

"The Third Army's record of ground gained, of prisoners and guns

captured, is a fine one, and I owe my deepest thanks to all ranks of

the 57th Division for their fine share in the achievement."

The History of the 2/6th (Rifle) Battalion, "the King's" (Liverpool Regiment) 1914-1919 · 第 8 / 13 章