fathomed the depths of Hertzberg’s duplicity. He did not know of his
having prompted Russia to suggest to Frederick William a secret bargain
at the expense of Poland; but on 6th March he stated that Danzig and
Thorn still held the first place in that statesman’s thoughts, despite
the express veto of his master. The Prussian Minister sought to justify
his behaviour by assuring Jackson that, in case of a war with Russia,
Leopold would step in and dictate his terms to Prussia as a revenge for
her treatment of him at Reichenbach. Accordingly, Hertzberg refused to
take comfort from Jackson’s remark that the splendid army of Prussia
(numbering 208,000 effectives) would be a match for the exhausted and
badly led forces of the two Empires, distracted as they would be by the
efforts of the Ottomans in the south. He also affected great concern
lest England should play him false by sending only a small fleet into
the Baltic. But Jackson saw, rightly enough, that the two phantoms,
a triumphant Austria and a skeleton British fleet, were conjured up
merely as an excuse for doubling back to the forbidden fruit--Danzig
and Thorn. Hertzberg finally suggested the advisability of toning down
the allied demands in order to mollify the Czarina.[995] Thus the first
suggestion to this effect came, not from Pitt or Auckland, but from the
man who had first advised the use of coercive measures against Russia.
Is it surprising, then, that up to 20th March 1791 Pitt declined to
take any vigorous steps against Catharine? The whole trend of events
prescribed caution and delay until the policy of Prussia showed signs
of consistency and firmness. But now the whole situation was suddenly
to change owing to causes which must be set forth in the following
chapter.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE TRIUMPH OF CATHARINE II
A pretty piece of work Mr. Pitt has made of this Russian war.
I think all the foxhounds will have a fine chase at him next
session.--LADY MALMESBURY TO SIR GILBERT ELLIOT, _24th August 1791_.
The success of Pitt in playing the part of Petruchio to Catharine
depended mainly on the steadiness of the Prussian and British
Governments, the honest neutrality of Leopold, the goodwill of
Gustavus, and the conviction of the Czarina that she was hopelessly
outmatched. We have already seen that the actions of the Austrian and
Swedish sovereigns were ambiguous. It remains to consider the conduct
of the Prussian monarch. On 11th March 1791 Frederick William wrote the
following autograph letter to Count Redern, his Minister in London:
[_Translation._]
Having a sure belief that Austria desires to draw closer to me and
my Allies, and that the Emperor has declared to the Empress of
Russia that he cannot assist her in a war that might result from
her refusal to accept the _status quo_, I wish England to consider
whether the best course of action would not be that of inducing
Russia by means of superior forces, both naval and military, to
follow the example of the Emperor. But, in case England cannot
resolve on so vigorous a course of action, the cession of Oczakoff
would be its natural outcome. It seems to me incontestable that
Russia by the possession of that place gains over Turkey a
superiority which may be very prejudicial to the interests even of
England. As the decisive moment is drawing near, I await a definite
declaration on this subject.
Here was a distinct challenge to our good faith as an ally of Prussia.
The Duke of Leeds received it on 19th or 20th March. Jackson’s covering
despatch supplied a curious commentary on the royal missive. He had
found out that Hertzberg’s plan of aggrandisement at the expense of
Poland was much more widely favoured at Berlin than he believed to
be possible. General Möllendorf feared a war with Russia in view of
the threatening attitude of Austria. Count Schulenberg thought the
position very difficult, but hoped that the presence of a “large”
British fleet in the Baltic might overawe Catharine and end the
dispute. Even Bischoffswerder, who had returned from his mission to
Vienna in the most buoyant spirits, expressed concern at the irresolute
mood of Frederick William; but he promised to report progress after
an interview which he was to have with him at a private dinner on
that day. Late in the evening the favourite declared that he had
convinced the monarch of the falseness of Hertzberg’s information
about Austria. In fact, the dinner and Bischoffswerder’s conversation
brought Frederick William to see the need of bold measures against
Russia; and he drew up forthwith that inspiriting challenge to England.
Bischoffswerder also assured our envoy that the anti-British intrigues
were the work of Anglophobes like Prince Henry of Prussia, or of those
who wished to maintain the influence of the reigning favourite, the
Countess Dönhoff, and keep the King immersed in his pleasures.[996]
A more damning explanation of the King’s action cannot be conceived;
and we learn with some surprise that the royal appeal carried the
day at the British Cabinet’s meetings of 21st and 22nd March, when
Ministers had before them the declaration of the Dutch admiral as
to the comparative uselessness of Oczakoff. The final resolve was
formed on 25th March, when the ultimatum to Russia was drawn up and
sent to the King for his approval.[997] Evidently it was the arrival
of Frederick William’s letter that clinched the matter. On the 27th
the Foreign Office sent off despatches to Berlin and St. Petersburg,
warning Jackson and Whitworth of the definite demand of the Allies,
that Catharine must restore to the Turks all her conquests exclusive of
the Crimea. The Allies hoped to induce Gustavus by the joint offer of a
sum of £200,000, or even £300,000, to grant the use of his ports to the
British fleet destined for the Baltic.[998]
The British ultimatum to Russia took the form of a “representation,”
the original of which is in Pitt’s handwriting. It pointed out that,
the _status quo_ having been adopted as the basis of the treaties
concluded between Austria and the Porte and Russia and Sweden, the
Allies had hoped that the Empress of Russia would accept the same
reasonable terms for her peace with the Sultan. But, as this was not
the case, the two Courts now desired to point out that any further
accession of territory to Russia was far from necessary to her, and
must seriously weaken the Turkish dominions. They therefore invited
the Empress to declare her readiness to offer reasonable terms to
the Sultan. The failure to give a favourable answer within ten days
would be regarded as a refusal.[999] Pitt also sought to infuse energy
into the Dutch Government. On the same day he directed Auckland, our
ambassador at The Hague, to request the equipment of a Dutch squadron
with a view to a cruise to the Baltic along with the British fleet,
it being certain that Catharine would give way before so great a
superiority of force.[1000]
It seemed, then, that Pitt and his colleagues had nailed their colours
to the mast; and their behaviour in Parliament betokened no lack of
resolve. On the day following (28th March) Pitt presented the King’s
message as to the need of further naval armaments. Fox, “with more than
usual solemnity,” demanded that Parliament should know the reasons for
the present request; but Pitt declined to promise any more information
than that contained in the brief official statement. Fox at once
censured this refusal as “a very new, violent and extraordinary step
indeed.” Pitt here showed a want of tact. A more sympathetic nature
would have felt the pulse of the House and discerned feverish symptoms.
Already members had been alarmed by the outbreak of war against Tippoo
Sahib; and though Ministers had convicted that potentate of aggressions
against our ally, the Rajah of Travancore, yet the House evinced more
than its usual jealousy respecting foreign entanglements, and resented
Pitt’s demand for warlike preparations. In refusing to explain the
grounds for his present action the Prime Minister behaved as a correct
diplomatist, but an indifferent parliamentarian.
On 29th March the Whig leaders in the Lords showed their former
fondness for the Russian alliance in a series of startling assertions.
Earl Fitzwilliam denied that the retention of Oczakoff, or even
Akerman, would in the slightest degree injure British interests. Lord
Porchester reprobated the ambitious conduct of the Prime Minister,
which almost led him to hope that France might recover her strength,
so as to check his career. The country, he added, was in the deepest
distress,[1001] and would be ruined by the hostilities now imminent.
The Earl of Carlisle declared that Russia was naturally our friend, and
that we ought to have formed alliances that were useful, not such as
would drag us into a criminal war. The naval armament against Spain had
served merely to “pillage the public and make a show between Portsmouth
and the Isle of Wight.” Lord Stormont then treated the House to a
disquisition on Turkish history to prove that the Porte had always been
the tool of France against the two Empires; and it was her game we now
were asked to play. For the rest, it would be “extremely disagreeable”
to send a fleet into the Baltic if Sweden, deserted by us, showed
herself unfriendly. The Duke of Richmond damned the proposal with
faint praise, and he was guardedly followed by the Lord Chancellor,
Thurlow. Nevertheless, Ministers held their own by ninety-seven votes
to thirty-four.
On the same day Pitt brought the matter before the Commons in a
somewhat cold and ineffective manner. He showed that the interests of
Europe demanded the restoration of the old boundaries in the East;
and that the weakening of Turkey would undermine the defensive system
which we had formed with Prussia. From the meagre report of his speech
it would appear that he did not refer to the importance of upholding
Poland or of hindering the approach of Russia to the Mediterranean.
Consequently all the life and glow of the debate was on the side of
the Opposition. Coke of Norfolk, in a characteristically acrid speech,
declared that he believed neither in the abilities nor the integrity
of the Prime Minister, who now, as in the case of the Spanish dispute,
bade them throw away the nation’s money without showing a single
reason why. Lambton followed in the same vein, asserting that a war
with Russia would yield no prize in galleons and ingots, but merely in
bear-skins. At what point, he asked, had Russia injured our interests
or insulted our honour? Doubtless Ministers had promised the King of
Prussia to go to war with the Czarina. If so, they should state it
clearly. Other members then demanded more information before they
supported the administration. For the defence, Steele spoke weakly,
urging that the House must trust the executive.
Fox, on the contrary, declared that Pitt had “enveloped himself in
mystery and importance,” and that his speech was “finely confused but
very alarming.” The Minister had not shown how the balance of power
was endangered by the Czarina’s policy. It would be time enough to go
to war when she attacked Prussia, or sought to drive the Turks out
of Europe--a scheme which the orator held up to ridicule. He then
protested against our attacking Russia “for the recovery of a single
town [_sic_],” and proceeded to indict Ministers because “they first
stirred up the Turks to their own destruction to war upon Russia: they
next raised the King of Sweden against the same Power, and afterwards
they lost the benefit of his arms by shamefully abandoning him.”
Finally they had disarmed, after settling the dispute with Spain,
and thus put the nation to the expense of this new armament. It is
difficult to think that Fox was so ill informed as to believe these
charges, the falseness of which has been proved in Chapters XXII and
XXIII. In fact, these indictments merely showed him to be the trustful
receptacle of the anti-British slanders started by foreign Chanceries.
Nevertheless, being urged with his wonted power, they struck home; for
it is ever the bent of a popular Assembly to ascribe the worst motives
for actions which it dislikes.
Pitt replied with admirable temper. He showed that the recent advance
of Russia southwards brought about a situation wholly different from
that which existed when Fox was in power; he declared that Russia had
several times rejected our proffered friendship, and that our alliances
with Prussia and Holland were most advantageous. Prussia, however,
would be seriously weakened if the Muscovites triumphed completely
over the Sultan, and would in that case be unable to cover the Dutch
Netherlands or maintain the independence of Poland. He then showed
how closely this latter topic touched us; for, if we upheld Poland
and cultivated trade with her, she would send us the naval stores for
the supply of which we at present depended on Russia. Commercial and
political motives, therefore, alike bade us set bounds to the boundless
ambitions of Russia.
The effect of his statesmanlike speech (the first in which the Eastern
Question in its new phase received adequate treatment) was lessened
by a vehement harangue from Burke, who was angry with Ministers for
diverting attention from French affairs. At that time he and his son
were striving to prepare the way for an armed intervention of the
monarchs in the interests of Louis XVI; and he therefore upbraided
the Cabinet for supporting “a horde of barbarous Asiatics” against
the Czarina, a declared champion of royalty.[1002] “All that is holy
in religion,” he said, “all that is moral and humane, demands an
abhorrence of everything which tends to extend the power of that cruel
and wasteful Empire.” “Any Christian Power is to be preferred to these
destructive savages.”... “Why are we to be alarmed at the Russians’
capture of a town? The Empire of Turkey is not dismembered by that. We
are in possession of Gibraltar, and yet Spain is not dismembered.” This
appeal to sentiment and this fine disregard of the facts of geography
(for the district in question is about the size of Scotland) told
with much effect; and it was with some difficulty that the Government
mustered 228 votes as against 135 for the Opposition.[1003]
The next debates, of 12th and 15th April, brought up Grey, Whitbread,
and Sheridan in their most combative moods. The last taunted Ministers
with being led at the heel of Prussia, whose only desire was to seize
Danzig and Thorn, and to have the upper hand at Warsaw. While not
calling the tune, we were to pay the piper. He (Sheridan) was sick of
the parrot cry, “Confidence! Confidence!” Ministers did not deserve
it. Their conduct in Holland in 1787 had been a blow to popular
liberty. And now the son of Chatham was intriguing in all the Courts of
Europe, and figuring as “the posture-master of the Balance of Power.”
Undismayed by this brilliant invective, Dundas once more appealed for
a continuance of the confidence which Ministers had merited by their
conduct; and the House accorded it by 253 votes to 173. On 15th April
the figures were 254 to 162.[1004]
It is clear, then, that Pitt kept his party well together, despite
the fact that his hands were tied by official reserve, while the
Opposition ramped at large in the unalloyed bliss of ignorance. Storer
might choose to tell Lord Auckland that “the country throughout have
told Mr. Pitt that they will not go to war.”[1005] But, apart from an
influential deputation from Manchester, there was no decided protest.
Seven weeks later Pitt admitted to Ewart that it would have been
difficult to keep his party together in the event of war, and if he had
“to state, as would then be indispensable, the precise ground on which
it arose.”[1006] But the news which arrived up to 27th March clearly
warranted the hope that Russia would give way. Then, however, the
diplomatic situation underwent a curious change.
* * * * *
On the 27th, then, that is, on the very day on which the Cabinet sent
off the decisive despatches referred to above, most disconcerting news
from Lord Auckland reached the Foreign Office. It was to this effect:
With respect to the good disposition of the Count of Vienna, which
is made the groundwork of His Prussian Majesty’s Instruction of
the 11th inst. to M. de Redern, I think it material to mention to
Your Grace that, in a subsequent letter of the 12th, _in cypher_,
which is gone by this day’s mail to M. de Redern (and which I
have happened to see), His Prussian Majesty states in terms of
the strongest uneasiness that the Emperor’s conduct becomes more
suspicious and that he evidently intends to defeat the whole
Convention of Reichenbach; that he has given up his own opinion to
that of Messrs. de Kaunitz and Cobenzl and, particularly, that he
is collecting large magazines and preparations in the neighbourhood
of Cologne, which M. de Redern is instructed to mention to Your
Grace as a subject of just uneasiness.[1007]
This sudden transition from a warlike resolve to timorous prudence in
part resulted from the Prussian monarch’s habit of listening to two
sets of advisers. Hertzberg whispered peaceful advice into one ear,
while the other took in the bellicose counsels of Bischoffswerder; and
the royal mind sent forth to London both sets of impressions. Other
proofs were soon at hand betokening a reaction towards pleasure and
inertia. Hertzberg, so Jackson reported, sought to enforce the cession
of Danzig and Thorn as a _sine quâ non_ of Prussia’s acting conjointly
with England--a step which obviously aimed at hindering such action.
Still more important was the news that came from Copenhagen. On 27th
March there reached the Foreign Office a despatch from Francis Drake,
our envoy at Copenhagen, who was destined one day to win unenviable
notoriety as the dupe of Napoleon’s secret police, and to figure in
French caricatures as a ruffled mallard flying off with bottles of
invisible ink. At present he merely forwarded a pacific proposal of
Count Bernstorff. In the hope of averting strifes in which Denmark
must inevitably suffer, that Minister had begged the Czarina to accept
the terms of the Allies if they were modified in her favour. When
Catharine smiled on the proposal, Bernstorff assured Drake of his
desire to reconcile the Courts of St. Petersburg and London without
compromising the dignity of George III. He declared that Catharine
had eagerly welcomed the prospect of a peaceful arrangement, and
hoped that the Allies would appreciate the force of her reasons for
rejecting the strict _status quo ante_, seeing that she had been
unjustly attacked by the Turks, and had won a brilliant triumph. While
restoring to them a large part of her conquests, she was determined
to retain “a single fortress and a desert region in order to gain a
safer frontier.” She therefore hoped that the Allies would show their
moderation by substituting a limited _status quo_ for their present
demand. Bernstorff added the suggestion that she should have all the
land up to the Dniester, on condition that the walls of Oczakoff were
razed for all time, and that no military colonies should be founded in
the ceded territory, which also should remain waste. He further hinted
that Russia might be induced to grant England a favourable commercial
treaty.[1008]
This last was added as a bait especially tempting to Pitt, who had
been much annoyed by the failure of his efforts in that direction in
1787, and now found the Dutch obdurate to some parts of his proposed
commercial treaty with them. Is it too much to assume that, if the news
which arrived on 27th March concerning the shifting of Prussian policy
and the reasonableness of the Czarina had reached him two or three days
earlier, he would have led the Cabinet to a far different decision?
The speeches of Ministers in Parliament were now marked by coolness
and caution, characteristics which came out even more strongly on 12th
and 15th April.
The searchings of heart in the Cabinet on the anxious days 30th
March–10th April are laid bare in the memoranda of the Duke of Leeds.
The Duke of Richmond and Grenville were opposed to the use of coercion
against Russia. Pitt, Leeds, Thurlow, Camden, and Chatham at first
resolutely maintained their position. At the second meeting of the
Cabinet, on 31st March, Stafford joined Grenville and Richmond. Pitt
also heard of the defection of the Duke of Grafton and his sons. Camden
seemed shaken by the news before them; and Thurlow attained a prudent
neutrality by diplomatic slumber. Pitt himself was now impressed with
the need of circumspection; and, on the ground of the proposals from
Denmark, advised the sending of a special messenger to Berlin, to
request Jackson not to forward the ultimatum to Russia. Leeds objected
to the Danish proposal being assigned as the reason for delay, and
declared that if the despatch were sent in that form, Grenville must
sign it, for he could not.[1009] Pitt then agreed to tone down the
despatch into a request for a few days’ delay. This was his first
decided disagreement with Leeds. He sought to end it by friendly
conversation, but in vain; for the Duke believed the honour of the
Cabinet to be tarnished by so unworthy a surrender.
Pitt took a more sanguine view of the situation, as appears in some
hitherto unpublished letters that passed between him and Ewart. That
over-wrought envoy had departed for Buxton in the belief that he had
persuaded the Cabinet of the certainty of Catharine acquiescing in the
demands of the Triple Alliance. What must have been his chagrin, then,
to receive a letter from Pitt, of 6th April, begging him to return
to town at once. “Events have taken a turn here,” wrote Pitt, “which
seem to leave little or no chance of pushing our Plan to its original
extent, and that the best thing we shall have to --(?) it is some
modification, which perhaps, however, may be so managed as to provide
more fully than could have been expected for the general object.”[1010]
This sounds the hopeful note which was rarely missing from Pitt’s
utterances. Evidently he wished that Ewart should return to Berlin
to make the best of the situation. Ewart had an interview with him,
on or about 10th April, which he described in a letter of 14th April
to Jackson, his _locum tenens_ at Berlin. He found Pitt as deeply
impressed as ever with the importance of the political and commercial
objects at issue, which were
well worthy of every exertion. “But,” continued Pitt, “all my
efforts to make a majority of the House of Commons understand the
subject have been fruitless; and I know for certain that, tho’
they may support me at present, I should not be able to carry the
vote of credit. In short, Sir, you have seen that they can be
embarked in a war from motives of passion, but they cannot be made
to comprehend a case in which the most valuable interests of the
country are at stake. What, then, remains to be done? Certainly,
to risk my own situation, which my feelings and inclination would
induce me to do without any hesitation; but there are unfortunately
circumstances in the present state of this country which make it
certain that confusion and the worst of consequences might be
expected, and it would be abandoning the King.”
After stating several facts in confirmation [Ewart says], and
repeating, even with the tears in his eyes, that it was the
greatest mortification he had ever experienced, he said he was
determined not to knock under but to keep up a good countenance:
that the armaments should therefore continue to be made with
vigour, and the fleet to be made ready for sailing; and that in the
meantime he hoped means might be found to manage matters so as not
to have the appearance of giving up the point, but modifying it so
as to prevent any serious bad consequences from ensuing, tho’ he
repeated that he was well aware that the difference between any
such plan would always be very great and extremely mortifying.[1011]
This revelation of Pitt’s feelings and intentions is of the highest
interest. Nowhere else do we hear of wounded pride bringing tears to
his eyes; and nowhere do we find a clearer statement of his desire
to resign, were it not that such a course would abandon the King and
the country to a factious Opposition. He therefore resolved on a
compromise, the weakness of which he clearly saw, because it would
satisfy Parliament and his opponents in the Cabinet without too much
offending Prussia or unduly exalting the horn of the Czarina. Ewart
decided to return to Berlin to help on his chief, to whom he expressed
unfaltering devotion. It is further noteworthy that Pitt at this time
desired to send the fleet to the Baltic; and we may reasonably infer
that the subsequent reversal of that salutary resolve was the work of
Grenville.
One other detail in Ewart’s letter claims attention. Why did Pitt
assign so great weight to the opposition in Parliament? Had he received
private remonstrances? Rumour says that Dundas and others warned him to
desist from his scheme. But, as we have seen, his majority held well
together. On 12th April he beat Fox by eighty votes, and on the 15th by
ninety-two. How is it possible to reconcile this increase with wavering
or lukewarmness? I think it probable that Pitt chose now and at a later
date to ascribe his change of front to parliamentary opposition (on
which he could descant), while it really resulted from difficulties
in the Cabinet, on which he had to keep silence. Further, he may have
hoped that if Ewart, the soul of the forward policy, consented to
return to Berlin, the Duke of Leeds would find it consonant with his
own dignity to retain office.
If so, he was disappointed. Before the Cabinet meeting of 10th April
he had convinced himself that the pacific overtures of Catharine sent
through Bernstorff were genuine and sincere. He also pointed out to
the Duke that the violent language of the Opposition would certainly
encourage the Empress to reject the absolute _status quo_. The
inference was irresistible, that England and Prussia must be content
with securing rather less for Turkey. Pitt decided in favour of this
course, and on 15th and 16th April, drew up the drafts of despatches to
this effect, in the hope that Leeds would sign them. The Duke, however,
declined to do so, and, by the King’s leave, Grenville appended his
signature.
This implied a ministerial change; and on 21st April Leeds returned
the seals to the King after the Drawing Room at St. James’s Palace.
Thus disappeared from the forefront of history a personality whose
sprightliness and charm earned him a high place among the wits and
amateur playwrights of that age, and whose jealousy for the honour
of England at this crisis won the regard even of those who differed
from him. He was far from being a great Foreign Minister. At every
crisis Pitt took the reins into his own hands, and at other times
the business of the Foreign Office went on somewhat loosely, Keith
complaining at Vienna that in the year 1788 he received only one reply
to fifty-three despatches sent from that capital.[1012] The Duke’s
tenure of office was marked by two of the greatest triumphs ever won
by peaceful means, namely, over France in 1787 and Spain in 1790;
but these, as we have seen, were essentially the work of Pitt. There
could be but one successor to Leeds. Grenville, though a far from
attractive personality, possessed qualities of shrewdness, good sense,
and untiring assiduity. He was strong where Leeds was weak, namely,
in system, thoroughness, and equability; but he was weak where Leeds
was strong, namely, in managing men. George III certainly approved
of the accession of Grenville to power, and sent to him the seals
on the same day. After some delay, arising from Pitt’s desire that
Cornwallis should succeed Grenville at the Home Office, Dundas took
that appointment.[1013]
On 20th April, then, Ewart was instructed to return to Berlin for
the purpose of explaining to Frederick William that the difficulties
arising from the trend of public opinion and the opportunity afforded
by the Danish proposals induced the British Government to seek for
a peaceful compromise with Russia. Pitt also urged the desirability
of Austria joining the Triple Alliance. As to the new Russo-Turkish
boundary, it should be fixed if possible East of the Dniester, namely,
at Lake Telegul, the lands eastward up to the River Bug being also left
a desert.[1014]
Ewart arrived at Potsdam on 29th April (a remarkably quick journey),
and found Frederick William in a gracious mood. The King agreed to
Pitt’s new proposals, and highly approved of the overtures to Austria.
While expressing mortification at the change of front towards Russia,
he assured Ewart of his belief in the good intentions of the British
Ministry. It is easy to see that Frederick William felt some relief at
the prospect of avoiding a war, of which nearly all his counsellors
expressed disapproval. Hertzberg on 24th April assured Lucchesini
that a war with Russia would probably be the tomb of the Prussian
monarchy.[1015] There was, indeed, every need for caution, owing to the
doubtful attitude of Austria. Lord Elgin followed the Emperor Leopold
to Florence for the purpose of urging him to join the Triple Alliance;
but, while receiving the overture with Tuscan graciousness, he in
effect waived it aside. In vain did our envoy follow the Emperor from
city to city for some weeks, and urge him to join the Allies. Leopold,
with his usual penetration, saw that the situation favoured the two
Empires, provided that they held together; and Pitt’s offer appeared
to him merely an ingenious means of separating them. Further, Kaunitz
detected the rift in the Anglo-Prussian concert, and the hatred of
England which pervaded the letters of Marie Antoinette to the Emperor
may also have strengthened his resolve to dally with Pitt’s proposals,
even while he took the most effective means of thwarting them. The
Polish Revolution of 3rd May 1791, soon to be described, also led
Leopold to draw closer to Russia. Thus, despite affable converse with
Elgin in the towns of Lombardy, he instructed his envoys at Sistova to
raise their demands and assume an arrogant tone. The Turks received
this rebuff with oriental composure, and, having the support of Keith
and Lucchesini, resisted this flagrant attempt of Austria to shuffle
out of the Reichenbach compact. Accordingly the early days of June 1791
witnessed a break in the negotiations and a rapid increase of warlike
preparations on the Danube--a turn of affairs highly favourable to
Catharine.[1016]
The indignation of Pitt and Grenville at the double-dealing of Leopold
finds expression in a note of the latter to Auckland (6th July): “If
the Emperor does break faith with us at last, he does it in a manner
so directly and personally disgraceful to himself, that it is hard
to suppose he can make up his mind to hear all that he must hear in
such a case.”[1017] In these words we see the cause of the distrust of
the Emperor which clogged all attempts at an Anglo-Austrian compact
directed against French democracy. Events, therefore, told heavily
against Pitt’s efforts to bring about an honourable compromise with
Russia. Nothing, however, is further from the truth than to represent
his offers to Catharine as a humiliating surrender. The instructions
to Fawkener, the special envoy to St. Petersburg, were as follows:
Either the whole of the Oczakoff territory as far west as the River
Dniester should be left neutral and uninhabited; or it should become
Russian on condition of lying waste; or the Russian boundary should be
drawn east of the Dniester, no fortress being constructed in the ceded
territory.[1018] It is worth noting that the Turkish envoy at Berlin
thought these terms satisfactory. Fawkener was to agree to the third
and least desirable alternative only in case Austria proved obdurate.
But in this respect he was allowed a certain latitude, provided that
Turkey retained adequate means of defence on that side. In order to
avoid any appearance of menace, the British fleet was not to enter
the Baltic or the Black Sea, a resolve much resented at Berlin and
Warsaw.[1019]
Frederick William received Fawkener most cordially at Sans Souci on
11th May. He showed some concern at the Manchester petition to Pitt,
as it would stiffen the tone of the Czarina; he urged the sending of
a British squadron to the Black Sea to ward off the threatened attack
on Constantinople, and stated his preference for the third of the
alternatives named by Grenville. Fawkener therefore felt bound to place
it first in his proposals to the Czarina: and it is noteworthy that
Prussian diplomacy once again favoured a concession to Catharine larger
than Pitt was disposed to grant. Inward satisfaction at the course of
events was, as usual, accompanied by many sneers at the weakness of
British policy.[1020] Gustavus of Sweden adopted a similar tone. He
assured Liston of his readiness to receive the British fleet and to arm
against Russia, provided that the Allies would grant him the needful
subsidies. Liston, knowing his shiftiness, received these offers with
polite incredulity. Certainly they had no effect at Whitehall.
Pitt’s change of front ruined his influence in the North;[1021] and in
diplomacy prestige counts for so much that Catharine had virtually
won her case by the end of May. Fawkener arrived at St. Petersburg
on 24th May, and soon found himself involved in a series of gorgeous
fêtes which proclaimed the wealth and power of the Empress and her
entire indifference to all that England might do. For the irksome
details of business he was referred to the Ministers and Prince
Potemkin. The latter boasted in his lordly way of his resolve to seize
Constantinople, wage eternal war on the miscreant Turks, and finally
conquer Egypt. After a delay of three weeks the Empress received
Fawkener graciously at a ball; she assured him of her admiration of
Burke’s “Reflections” on the French Revolution, and expressed her
horror of that event as well as her regret at the sympathy of Fox with
it. She petted her grandson, Alexander, and ostentatiously avoided
all reference to the subject of Fawkener’s mission, except that, when
a dog chanced opportunely to bark, she said, “Dogs that bark do not
always bite.” So matters dragged on, it being the aim of Catharine to
gain another success on the Danube, to win over Leopold definitely to
her side (as Fawkener found to be the case by 21st June), and to sow
discord among Britons.[1022]
In this last she achieved a startling success. On 17th June there
arrived at St. Petersburg Mr. (afterwards Sir) Robert Adair, who later
on was to figure as a diplomatist under the Ministry of Fox and that
of All the Talents. We may accept his solemn declaration, in a letter
written in the year 1842, that Fox had no hand in sending him on this
so-called “mission”;[1023] but we are able to correct Adair’s version
in several respects, from documents in the “Pitt Papers,” which Bishop
Tomline, when challenged by Adair, thought fit to withhold.[1024]
Adair asserted in 1842 that his object in going to Russia was not to
oppose Pitt’s policy of recovering Oczakoff, because that Minister had
already renounced it in obedience to the mandate of Parliament. This,
as we have seen, is incorrect; for when Adair left England, in May
1791, warlike preparations were still going on.[1025] He admits that
Fox said to him before starting, “Well: if you are determined to go,
send us all the news”; and that Fox provided him with a cipher so that
that news might elude the prying eyes of British diplomatists. It may
be, as Adair says, that he and he alone was accountable for this odd
attempt to direct the foreign policy of his country. But it is highly
probable that Vorontzoff (Woronzow), the Russian ambassador in London,
abetted the scheme. On 2nd May Whitworth wrote that Vorontzoff’s
despatches had given great satisfaction at the Russian capital. “He
assures his Court that Russia has many friends and partisans in
England, and affirms pretty positively that His Majesty’s Ministry will
have no small difficulty in carrying through their measures contrary
to the interest of the country.”[1026] Further, the account of Adair’s
“mission,” given by William Lindsay, Whitworth’s secretary, states that
Adair came with strong letters of recommendation from Vorontzoff, while
the Duchess of Devonshire commended him to Whitworth. He travelled
_viâ_ Vienna, where he stayed with the Russian ambassador. At St.
Petersburg he at first received countenance from the British embassy,
owing to the high recommendations which he brought with him, and he was
presented at Court by Whitworth himself!
Thus Adair found his path everywhere strewn with flowers. Catharine
smiled on him and plied him with important questions, ironically asking
him whether the British fleet had set sail. Fawkener, on the other
hand, she treated with marked coldness. The British embassy, however,
had its revenge; for Lindsay opened the letters, which Adair trustfully
asked him to take to London, and apparently was able to decipher the
ciphered parts, which gave hints to Fox for an attack on Pitt. But
Adair was more than a purveyor of hints for the Whig orators. It is
clear that he stiffened the resistance of the Russian Government. “He
shows,” so Whitworth wrote privately to Grenville, on 21st July, “the
most virulent opposition to His Majesty’s measures, and takes great
pains to counteract the negotiation.”[1027] In official documents
Whitworth and Fawkener depict him as a vain, meddlesome, ignorant
person, concerned with stockjobbing no less than with diplomacy. But
it is certain that his presence at St. Petersburg, and the biassed
information which he supplied, greatly harmed the cause of the Allies;
and Pitt, after seeing copies of Adair’s letters, was justified in
hinting that his action had prejudiced the success of Britain’s efforts
at St. Petersburg. As for Fox, Catharine showed her regard for him by
placing his bust between those of Demosthenes and Cicero in her palace;
and Adair, on his departure, received from the hands of Potemkin a ring
containing her miniature.[1028]
Such is the story of this singular “mission.” Even before its details
were fully known at Whitehall, Ministers debated whether they should
not take action against Adair. On 29th July Grenville wrote to
Auckland, _à propos_ also of a recent letter of Fox to Barnave: “Is not
the idea of Ministers from Opposition to the different Courts of Europe
a new one in this country? I never heard of it before, and should think
that, if it can be proved, I mean legally proved, it would go very near
to an impeachable misdemeanour.”[1029] Ministers, however, decided to
treat Adair’s “mission” with the silence of contempt. Probably their
judgement was correct; for the _finesse_ of Vorontzoff and Catharine,
if fully revealed to the world, would have covered the Opposition with
obloquy, but the Cabinet with ridicule; and in politics the latter
alternative is more to be feared. Apart, therefore, from one scornfully
vague reference by Pitt to the damage done to the nation’s interests by
a partisan intrigue at St. Petersburg, little was heard of the affair.
The reader who wades through the dreary debates on the Russian Question
early in 1792 will probably conclude that Adair’s tour belongs to the
annals, not of diplomacy, but of electioneering.[1030] Fox, Grey,
Sheridan, and Whitbread proved to their own satisfaction, from Russian
sources of information, that Pitt, besides wasting the public money on
futile preparations for war, had been outwitted and publicly flouted
by the Czarina. They did not prove that the occasion called for no
effort to curb her ambition, or that Pitt was not justified in taking
up the challenge which their factious conduct had emboldened her to
fling down. In one sense it is unfortunate that the Foxites did make
further diplomatic excursions; for the result might have been the
addition of interesting gargoyles to the edifice of the party system
in the form of Opposition embassies, worked by fallen Ministers,
disappointed place-hunters, and discharged clerks.
Meanwhile other events were working against Pitt. The successes of the
Russian arms had been crowned by the capture of Anapa, near the River
Kuban, and their triumph seemed assured both in Asia and Europe. The
Russian Black Sea fleet was preparing to deal a blow at Constantinople;
and, for a time, as we have seen, the Turks were distracted by the
prospect of the renewal of war with Austria.
Yet here again, by one of those sudden turns of fortune which have
so often saved the Ottoman Empire, the designs of the Viennese Court
were cut short. At Padua, during his Italian tour, the Emperor Leopold
heard the news of the capture of the King and Queen of France by the
rabble of Varennes. This ignominious ending of his schemes for a
counter-revolution in France stirred the sluggish blood of the Emperor.
On 6th July he wrote to his brother Maximilian that it was high time to
save Marie Antoinette and stifle the French plague. A forward policy
in the West implied moderation in the East, and even the Prussophobe
Chancellor, Kaunitz, saw the need of a definite peace with the Sultan.
Accordingly, Austria waived her demands for parts of Wallachia and
Servia, and made peace with the Porte at Sistova on 4th August, on
condition of receiving Old Orsova.[1031] Thus the Varennes incident,
which involved the royalist cause in ruin, brought salvation to the
Moslems.
The desire of Leopold to crush the French Revolution was to have
far-reaching consequences, which will concern us later. Here we may
remark that the woes of Marie Antoinette and the _volte-face_ of the
Emperor produced a marked effect at St. Petersburg. Hitherto, all had
been bluster and defiance. So late as 15th July Fawkener reported that
the Empress had lately seemed inclined to conquer and keep all that
she could; but the news from France impelled the Vice-Chancellor,
Ostermann, to declare that all animosities should now be laid aside and
“that every nation in Europe should unite [against France] whenever any
proper plan could be agreed on.”[1032] Thus, here again, the failure
of the royalist attempt in France helped to avert the utter breakdown
of the Anglo-Prussian case. Even so, the Czarina won the day at nearly
every point. Little by little the Allies gave up all the safeguards
on which Pitt had at first insisted; and on 26th July their envoys
consented to the acquisition by Russia of all the Turkish lands east
of the Dniester, provided that the Czarina agreed not to hinder the
navigation of that river. On the whole, the Porte sustained no very
serious loss, considering the collapse of its defence, the slight
interest felt on its behalf both at London and Berlin, and the marked
dislike of Catharine for England and Prussia. She hated Pitt, but she
despised Frederick William. How then could she, in the midst of her
military triumphs, give way to the demands of the Triple Alliance,
whose inner weakness she had probed?
Nevertheless, the intervention of the Allies was not the failure
that has often been represented. It checked the soaring ambitions of
Potemkin. The Roumans, Bulgars, and Greeks had to thank the Allies for
delivering them from this selfish adventurer. Their day of liberation
was deferred, but it came ultimately in far better guise than as a gift
from Catharine and her favourite. Strange to say, he fell a victim to
fever, and expired by the roadside in Moldavia as he was proceeding to
the front; and this event, which wrung the heart of Catharine, had no
small share in facilitating the signature of the Russo-Turkish treaty
(on the terms required by the Allies) at Jassy early in the following
year.
Other influences were leading Catharine towards peace. In the spring
of the year 1791 Poland entered on a new lease of life. That the Poles
should alter their constitution without her permission was a grievous
affront, for which she inveighed against them as rebels. Thenceforth
Warsaw, rather than Constantinople, took the first place in her
thoughts. Apart from this, the prospects of the Poles were radiant
with promise; and the student who peruses the despatches of Hailes,
British envoy at Warsaw, cannot but picture the results that might
have occurred had the Poles received adequate support from Prussia and
England against the Muscovites. The confederated Diet at Warsaw then
showed a reforming zeal equal to that of the French National Assembly.
In the middle of April it struck off the shackles from the burghers and
made them citizens. Early in May, when the political horizon darkened,
fear cowed even the Russophiles, while a storm of patriotic fervour
swayed the Diet, and burst through the two barriers which hemmed in the
national life. There was no hubbub in this memorable sitting. No swords
flashed forth, as had happened on many a petty pretext. Emotion held
the Assembly spellbound, while the majority swept away those curses
of the land, serfdom and the elective kingship. Thereupon one of the
leading obstructives aroused general astonishment by proposing that
members should swear to uphold the new order of things. King Stanislaus
evinced his patriotic zeal by calling on the Bishop of Cracow to
administer the oath, which deputies and visitors alike recorded with
shouts of joy. The exulting throng of nationalists and their recent
converts then sallied forth and took the oath once more at the foot
of the high altar of the Cathedral; and the sullen dissidence of some
thirty of Russia’s henchmen served but to emphasize the overwhelming
triumph of intelligence and patriotism.[1033]
Such was the peaceful Revolution of 3rd May 1791 at Warsaw. It sent
a thrill of exultation through France, and moved Burke to a splendid
panegyric, which he crowned with the startling statement that the
events at Warsaw were probably the purest good ever conferred upon
mankind.[1034] Even Grenville’s cold and insular nature warmed and
dilated at the news; and he bade Hailes express the interest of Great
Britain in the new constitution, especially as it would benefit the
cause of the Allies.[1035]
But the ill fortune which dogged the steps of the Poles willed that in
this time of their revival the Alliance, from which alone they could
hope for safety, should go to pieces. The refusal of England to send a
fleet either to the Baltic or the Black Sea depressed the influence of
England at Berlin. “Oh! how my blood boils, my dear Sir,” wrote Ewart
to Keith on 18th June. “Our influence was all powerful so long as it
was maintained with the necessary vigour; and the moment we flinched,
all the Powers, as if by common consent, turned the tables upon
us.”[1036] This proved to be the case. The web of Ewart’s diplomacy,
the toil of four years, which connected England with Prussia, Sweden,
Poland, and Turkey, was unravelled in as many weeks. The general trend
of events helped on the work of dissolution; and among the sinister
influences at Berlin, jealousy of the reviving power of Poland played
no small part. Hertzberg, whose fortunes were now on the decline,
sought to postpone his fall (it came early in July) by exciting
animosity against the Courts of London and Warsaw. To his reckless
charge against Pitt, of seeking to ruin Prussia by a war against the
Muscovites, he now added a jeremiad against the Polish reformers of
Warsaw--“The Poles have just dealt the _coup de grace_ to the Prussian
monarchy by making their kingdom hereditary and adopting a constitution
better than that of England.”[1037] Dislike of its Allies was now
the prevalent feeling at the Prussian Court, and by the end of June
Frederick William decided to have an interview with Leopold for the
purpose of coming to a friendly understanding.[1038]
This resolve, fraught with evil for Poland, was clinched by the news
of the capture of the King and Queen of France at Varennes. Concern
at their ignominious position now began to influence the Central and
Eastern Powers. The wrath of the Czarina fell upon French democrats;
for in the nature of this extraordinary woman sentiment and passion
always ran an even race with foresight and reason. In her present
mood the French Revolution and all its abettors were anathema. The
results were curious. The bust of Voltaire was deposed from its place
of honour and huddled away amidst lumber. Within a short space the
bust of Fox, now that he had served her purpose, shared the same fate.
More important, perhaps, if less striking to the imagination, is
the fact that she now formed a close alliance with Sweden. Early in
October Gustavus III ended his long balancings by espousing the side
of Russia, with a view to eventual action against France.[1039] The
decline or collapse of the Anglo-Prussian Alliance followed as a matter
of course so soon as Frederick decided to clasp the hand of Leopold.
It is curious to find Pitt and Grenville, even at the end of August
1791, seeking to include Austria in the Triple Alliance, when statesmen
at Berlin and Vienna were scoffing at England, and were adopting
an offensive policy at variance with the pacific aims cherished at
Whitehall. Kaunitz and Bischoffswerder looked about for a scape-goat,
and found him in Joseph Ewart. Auckland had also been making a dead set
at this able ambassador; and some hitch in the negotiations attending
the marriage of the Duke of York with the eldest daughter of the King
of Prussia served to increase his troubles at this time. But the
following hopeful letter which Pitt wrote to him on 2nd September must
have salved his mental wounds:
... Many events have certainly concurred to disappoint the
accomplishment of very important objects, and to produce in some
respects an unfavourable change both in Prussia and elsewhere.
But the general state of Europe, taking in the whole, affords so
favourable a prospect to this country that we have great reason
to be contented. Any temporary fluctuation in the disposition
at Berlin is therefore, at the moment, of less consequence. The
connection between Prussia and Austria, whatever right we have
to complain of the steps which have led to it, cannot, I think,
produce any permanent mischief to our system; and, at least, I
am convinced that the best chance of preventing it is to mark
no suspicion on our part to preserve as much good humour and
cordiality as possible. For the rest, in the singular and uncertain
state of Europe, our chief business must be to watch events and
keep ourselves quiet. I have been sincerely concerned not to have
more favourable accounts of your health....
The prospects, so far as concerned the freedom of Poland and the peace
of the West, were worse than Pitt anticipated. Ewart foresaw the course
of events more correctly. A little later he obtained the recall for
which he had some time been pressing; but he had the mortification of
seeing Morton Eden, the brother of his rival, Lord Auckland, installed
in his place. He retired to Bath for treatment by his brother, a
medical man; but an internal disease of long standing developed very
suddenly on 25th January 1792, and ended his life two days later
amidst delirium. The details, as set forth in the family papers, show
that the delirium of his last hours was the outcome of acute internal
troubles, which resembled appendicitis. They serve also to refute
the wild rumours that Ewart went raving mad as a result of political
disappointments, or that he was poisoned by some Russian agent.[1040]
The last letter which Pitt wrote to this brilliant but most unfortunate
diplomatist shows a chivalrous desire to screen him from needless
anxiety:
Downing Street, _Jan. 20, 1792_.[1041]
Your letter having come at a time of very particular engagement,
it was impossible for me to answer it sooner. Your recollection
of what pass’d between the Duke of York and yourself is certainly
different from the manner in which I am told that H.R.H.
understands it; but no difficulty whatever will arise from this
circumstance in settling the business; nor do I see any reason
for your entertaining any apprehension of its producing any
consequences disagreeable to yourself. I am very sorry that you
should already have felt so much on the subject. The train in
which the business now is will, I am in hopes, relieve you from
any further anxiety or trouble respecting it, and makes it wholly
unnecessary to dwell further upon it.
Worse than private misfortunes was the blow dealt to the Polish
cause. The rebuff encountered by the Allies at St. Petersburg deeply
depressed the reformers of Warsaw. On the return of Fawkener through
the Polish capital, King Stanislaus expressed grave concern at the
abandonment of all the safeguards for Turkey and Poland on which Pitt
had at first insisted. The cession to Russia of all the land up to
the Dniester seemed to him to presage ruin to the Poles--“Nor did my
pointing out [added Hailes] the attention which had been paid to their
interests by the preservation of the liberty of the Dniester produce
any advantageous effect.”[1042] In truth, Stanislaus knew Catharine
well enough to see in her triumph the doom of his kingdom.[1043] Just
as the ascendancy which she acquired over Turkey by the Treaty of
Kainardji led naturally, perhaps inevitably, to the First Partition of
Poland, so now the principle of the Balance of Power impelled Austria
and Prussia to look about for lands that would compensate them for the
expansion of Russia. Those lands could be found most easily in Poland,
less easily in France. So it came about that the principle which Pitt
invoked for the greater security of the smaller States, became in the
hands of Catharine and her powerful neighbours a pretext for schemes of
aggrandisement and pillage.
Thus fell to pieces the “federative system,” whereby Pitt hoped to
group the weaker States around England and Prussia. The scheme was due
in the first instance to Ewart. Pitt adopted it when he believed the
time to be ripe; but he postponed action too long. Had he pushed his
plans forward in the autumn of 1790, as soon as the dispute with Spain
was settled, and maintained the naval armaments at their full strength,
he would probably have gained a peaceful triumph over Catharine. In
that case the accession of Poland, Sweden, and Turkey to the Triple
Alliance would naturally have followed. There would then have been
no invasion of France by Austria and Prussia; still less would there
have been any spoliation of Poland. The practical manner in which the
Poles reformed their commonwealth opened up vast possibilities for the
east of Europe; and the crushing of those hopes under the heel of a
remorseless militarism is probably the severest loss which the national
principle has sustained in modern times.
Nevertheless, though Pitt showed a lack of nerve at the crisis, yet, in
view of the duplicity of Prussia, the doubtful attitude of Leopold and
Gustavus, the marvellous resourcefulness of Catharine, and the factious
opposition of the Whigs, he cannot be blamed. At times, new and subtle
influences warp the efforts of statesmen. This was so in the year 1791.
Pitt was striving to build on the basis of the Balance of Power. But
that well-trodden ground now began to heave under the impact of forces
mightier than those wielded by monarchs and chancellors. Democracy
sent out its thrills from Paris as a centre, and the gaze of statesmen
was turned from the East to the West. Thenceforth the instinct of
self-preservation or of greed marshalled the continental chanceries
against the two reforming States. The “Zeitgeist” breathed against the
plans of Pitt, and they were not. In their place there came others of
a far different kind, inspired by hopes of territorial gains in Poland
and the overthrow of liberty in France.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Baines, “Hist. of Cotton Manufacture,” 226, 232–4. See Mr. G. P.
Gooch’s “Politics and Culture,” for other coincidences.
[2] The first trustworthy statistics of population were obtained in the
census of 1801; but those given above are probably not very wide of the
mark. The estimates are those of Rickman, quoted by Porter, “Progress
of the Nation,” 13. The estimate of the “Statistical Journal” (xliii,
462), quoted by Dr. Cunningham, “Eng. Industry and Commerce,” 699, is
7,953,000 for the year 1780.
[3] See Walter’s “Origin of Commerce,” iv, 401, for a full statement of
this juggling with the nation’s finance.
[4] “Diary of a Journey to England (1761–62),” by Count F. von
Kielmansegge, 237.
[5] “The Coltness Collections,” 116, quoted by J. H. Jesse; “Memoirs of
the Reign of George III,” i, 29.
[6] “Mems. of Queen Charlotte,” by J. Watkins, 1819, pt. i, ch. x. The
Duchess of Devonshire had flaunted a head-plume of an ell and three
inches.
[7] See an excellent study, “Personal and Party Government
(1760–1766),” by Mr. D. A. Winstanley, 1910.
[8] “Corresp. of George III with Lord North,” ii, 323; Wraxall, i, 347.
[9] “F. O.,” Prussia, 15, Carmarthen to Ewart, 6th January 1789.
[10] For the influence exerted by George III on elections see Porritt,
“The Unreformed House of Commons,” i, 409–15.
[11] Pitt MSS., 195, pt. ii.
[12] B. M. Add. MSS., 28062. Pitt’s answer is not among these papers.
But Dr. Jackson did not gain the bishopric.
[13] Lecky, v, 26.
[14] Montesquieu, “Esprit des Lois,” bk. viii, ch. v.
[15] See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, “The Parish and the County,” bk. i,
ch. iv; bk. ii, ch. ii; Boutmy, “The Eng. Constitution” (Eng. edit.),
pt. iii, sect. 3.
[16] Howell, State Trials, xxiii, 231.
[17] Delavoye, “Life of T. Graham,” 87.
[18] “Letters from Lady Jane Coke to her friend, Mrs. Eyre, at Derby
(1747–58).”
[19] C. P. Moritz, “Travels in England in 1782”; W. Wales, “Inquiry
into the ... Population of England” (1781), estimated the number of
houses in London at 100,000, and the population at 650,000.
[20] See, too, Wroth’s “London Pleasure Gardens of the Eighteenth
Century.”
[21] See ch. xx of this volume for details; also T. Clarkson’s “Hist.
of the Abolition of the Slave Trade,” especially chs. xvii, xviii; and
Prof. Ramsay Muir’s “Hist. of Liverpool,” ch. xii.
[22] “Hamlet,” i, sc. 4.
[23] “Wealth of Nations,” bk. iv, ch. iii, pt. 2.
[24] H. Twiss, “Life of Lord Eldon,” vol. i, ch. ii.
[25] H. Walpole, “Letters,” viii, 395.
[26] “Mems. of Queen Charlotte,” 203.
[27] See the new letter of Hugh Elliot to Pitt from Brighthelmstone,
17th Oct. 1785, quoted in ch. xvii, as to the danger of the Prince
losing his life if he did not amend his ways.
[28] “Mems. of Queen Charlotte,” 187.
[29] “Travels in England in 1782,” by C. P. Moritz (Eng. trans., 1895),
53.
[30] Rousseau, “Social Contract,” bk. iii, ch. xv.
[31] Dr. Cunningham, “Eng. Industry and Commerce,” pt. ii, 546, 698.
[32] Quoted by Baines, “History of the Cotton Manufacture,” 334.
[33] W. Wales, _op. cit._, 5.
[34] “Origin of Power-loom Weaving,” by W. Radcliffe, 59 _et seq._
[35] In Pitt MSS., 221, is a petition signed by many persons connected
with the navy in favour of granting a pension to Mr. Cort, who had made
“malleable iron with raw pit-coal, and manufactured the same by means
of grooved rollers, by a process of his own invention.” The petitioners
state that though the invention had brought no benefit to Cort, but
rather the reverse, yet it had proved to be of national importance.
[36] W. Wales, _op. cit._, 44 _et seq._, enumerates several cases where
the rural population declined, but he attributed that fact not to the
enclosures (for he states that the enclosures of wastes, which were
more numerous than those of the open fields, increased employment),
but rather to the refusal of landlords to build cottages, though they
charged higher rents than before. For the question of enclosures,
however, see Dr. Gilbert Slater’s recent work on the subject (Constable
and Co., 1907).
[37] See Dr. von Ruville’s work, “William Pitt, Earl of Chatham” (Eng.
ed., 3 vols. 1907), for a full account of these forbears.
[38] Ruville, i, 343–6.
[39] _Ibid._, 345. Pitt finally bought about 100 acres, and further
strained his resources by extensive building at Hayes.
[40] “Pitt, some Chapters of his Life and Times,” by Lord Ashbourne,
161–6.
[41] “The Life of William Wilberforce,” by his Sons, i, 304.
[42] Pitt MSS., 11 and 13.
[43] Stanhope, ii, 125.
[44] “Correspondence of the Earl of Chatham,” iii, 27.
[45] Notes by Bishop Tomline in the Pretyman MSS., Orwell Park.
[46] Lord Fitzmaurice, “Life of Shelburne,” i, 72. See also two
articles on the early life of the elder Pitt in the “Edinburgh Review”
for 1910.
[47] “Chatham Corresp.,” iii, 65.
[48] “Chatham Corresp.,” iv, 538.
[49] Pitt MSS., 11.
[50] “Chatham Corresp.,” iv, 363.
[51] Pitt MSS., 101. The disuse of past participles was a
characteristic of that age. To write “rode” for “ridden” after the
auxiliary verb was no more noticeable a defect than to walk unsteadily
after dinner. One other early letter of Pitt’s bears date 1772 at Lyme
Regis, and refers to some fun which he and his brothers and sisters
had had on a cutter yacht. Another letter undated, but in Pitt’s round
schoolboy hand, to a gentleman of Somerset, refers to sporting matters
such as the lack of hares and the inability of his brother to catch
those which he does start (Pitt MSS., 102).
[52] From Mr. A. M. Broadley’s MSS.
[53] By the kindness of the Countess Stanhope I was allowed to peruse
this most interesting MS., which is preserved, along with many other
Pitt treasures, at Chevening.
[54] Pellew, “Sidmouth,” i, 28.
[55] Ashbourne, _op. cit._, 7–8.
[56] “Diary of Thomas Moore,” vol. v.
[57] Pitt MSS., 11.
[58] _Ibid._
[59] One remembers here the terrifying remark of Lord Acton that the
mass of documents which the modern historian must consult inevitably
tells against style.
[60] See an interesting fragment, “Bishop Tomline’s Estimate of Pitt,”
by the Earl of Rosebery (London, 1903), also in the “Monthly Review”
for August 1903.
[61] Dr. Pretyman was chaplain to George III, and later on Bishop of
Lincoln and Dean of St. Paul’s.
[62] Pitt MSS., 196. The notes and diagrams refer to the movement of
bodies considered dynamically: there are also some problems in algebra.
More numerous are the notes on English History, especially on the
parliamentary crises of the years 1603–27, where, unfortunately, they
break off. I have also found notes on Plutarch, and translations of the
speech of Germanicus in Tacitus (“Annals,” Bk. I), and of parts of the
Second Philippic.
[63] His books went in large measure to Bishop Pretyman (Tomline), and
many of them are in the library of Orwell Park.
[64] “Chatham Corresp.,” iv, 289.
[65] Chevening MSS.
[66] Pretyman MSS., quoted by Lord Ashbourne, _op. cit._, 31, note.
[67] “Private Papers of W. Wilberforce,” 65.
[68] “Chatham Corresp.” iv, 376, 377.
[69] Macaulay, “Miscellaneous Writings” (Essay on William Pitt).
[70] Macaulay, “Miscellaneous Writings” (Essay on William Pitt), iv,
510.
[71] “Corresp. of George III with Lord North,” ii, 154 (17th March
1778).
[72] “Corresp. of George III with Lord North,” ii, 184.
[73] Pitt MSS., 12.
[74] Ashbourne, _op. cit._, 161, 162.
[75] See Porritt, “The Unreformed House of Commons,” i, ch. ix, on the
exclusion of poor men from Parliament.
[76] Letter of 3rd July 1779. Stanhope, i, 31.
[77] Chevening MSS.
[78] Pitt MSS., 182.
[79] “The Black Book of Lincoln’s Inn,” iv, Preface.
[80] “Life of Burke,” by R. Bissett (1800), ii, 55–66.
[81] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 67–72.
[82] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 83.
[83] “Black Book of Lincoln’s Inn,” iv, Preface; “Bland Burges Papers,”
58.
[84] “Bland Burges Papers,” 60, 61.
[85] “Life of William Pitt,” by Henry Cleland (1807).
[86] As a rule, Lowther exacted strict obedience from his nominees. In
1788 he compelled them to vote against Pitt on the Regency Question.
[87] Hansard, cliii, 1056, 1057.
[88] Porritt, i, 315–7.
[89] Burke, “Thoughts on the present Discontents” (1770).
[90] For details of bribery see May, “Constitutional History,” i,
313–27; Porritt, i, 414–20.
[91] “Life of Romilly,” i, 141.
[92] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 37, 38.
[93] Selwyn, p. 140.
[94] “Reminiscences of Charles Butler,” i, 172.
[95] Wraxall, “Memoirs,” ii, 62; G. Rose, “Diaries,” i, 28.
[96] Lecky, “Hist. of England in the XVIIIth Cent.,” iv, 228–34, does
not absolve Shelburne of the charge of duplicity in the matter of the
negotiations for peace; but Sir G. C. Lewis, “Administrations of Great
Britain,” 31–48, minimizes the importance of the point at issue.
[97] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 118–21.
[98] “Private Papers of W. Wilberforce,” 79.
[99] Cartwright, “Take your Choice” (1776). In 1780 Cartwright founded
“The Society for promoting Constitutional Information,” the first of
the modern clubs that was purely political.
[100] “The Speeches of William Pitt” (4 vols., 1806), i, 1–7.
[101] “George Selwyn: his Letters and his Life,” p. 132 (Storer to Lord
Carlisle, Feb. 28, 1781). He adds that Woodfall reported the debates
“almost always faithfully.” I therefore see no reason for refraining,
as Earl Stanhope did, from citing many passages of his speeches, on the
ground that they were very imperfectly reported.
[102] _Ibid._, p. 143.
[103] These images are curiously like those used by Lord Shelburne on
25th January 1781. See Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 120.
[104] Both letters are among the Chevening MSS.
[105] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 17.
[106] _Ibid._, v, 292.
[107] Ashbourne, p. 159.
[108] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 68.
[109] Lord Waldegrave’s “Memoirs,” p. 63.
[110] Pitt MSS., 103.
[111] Nicholl, “Recollections of George III,” i, 389.
[112] Porritt, i, 409–15.
[113] See May’s “Const. History,” i, 315 _et seq._ for the increase of
the Secret Service Fund under George III.
[114] Malmesbury Diaries, iii, 8.
[115] Wraxall, ii, 434–5 (3rd edit.).
[116] “Letters of George III to Lord North,” ii, 336.
[117] “Life of Romilly,” i, 135.
[118] Stanhope, i, 67.
[119] May, “Const. History,” i, 458.
[120] Rockingham, “Memoirs,” ii, 452–3.
[121] Speech of 7th February 1782 (“Parl. Hist.,” xxii, p. 987).
[122] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 136.
[123] “Dropmore P.,” i, 163; Lecky, iv _ad fin._
[124] Hood, Rodney’s second in command, asserted that if Rodney had
fought and pursued vigorously he would have taken not five but twenty
French ships of the line. See “Rodney’s Letters and Despatches,” ed. by
D. Hannay for the Navy Records Society, p. 103.
[125] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 1.
[126] “Life of Romilly,” i, 162. Romilly, who was present, quotes
a sentence of the speech, which did not appear in the official
report: “This House is not the representative of the people of Great
Britain; it is the representative of nominal boroughs, of ruined and
exterminated towns, of noble families, of wealthy individuals, of
foreign potentates.”
[127] “Speeches of Lord Erskine” (edit. of 1880), p. 293; “The Papers
of Christopher Wyvil,” i, 424–5; State Trials, xxii, 492–4.
[128] See Mahon, “Hist. of England,” vii, 17; Porritt, i, 217.
[129] “Buckingham Papers,” i, 50.
[130] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 163.
[131] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 175; “Life of Romilly,” i, 173. Fox had
announced to the Cabinet his intention of resigning a few days before
Rockingham’s death. See the “Memorials of Fox,” i, 435 _et seq._
[132] Sir G. C. Lewis, “Administrations of Great Britain,” pp. 31–48.
[133] Lecky, iv, 239. The original Cabinet numbered five Rockingham
Whigs and five Shelburne Whigs.
[134] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” vol. iii, chs. iv-vi.
[135] “Buckingham Papers,” i, 76.
[136] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 305; Stanhope, “Pitt,” i, 86.
[137] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 265.
[138] Keppel resigned on the question of the terms of peace; the Duke
of Richmond disapproved them; Grafton was lukewarm. See their speeches,
17th February 1783 (“Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 392–6). W. W. Grenville
refused to move the resolution in the Commons in favour of the peace,
as Pitt urged him to do (“Dropmore P.,” i, 194).
[139] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 33.
[140] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 37, 38; “Auckland Journals,” i, 40–5.
Lord John Townshend, Adam, Eden, Lord Loughborough, and George North
helped to bring about the Coalition. Burke favoured the plan, also
Sheridan, though later on he vehemently declared the contrary (_ibid._,
pp. 21–4).
[141] Mr. Le B. Hammond, “Life of Fox,” pp. 57, 58.
[142] “My friendships are eternal, my hatreds can be appeased.”
[143] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 541.
[144] Fox’s friends, Mr. Powys and Sir Cecil Wray, had reprobated his
present action.
[145] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 543–50. I may here note that after the
resignation of Shelburne, Pitt framed a Bill for regulating in friendly
terms commerce with the United States. It was sharply criticized and
much altered in committee; but his Bill as well as the words quoted
above prove the depth of his conviction as to the need of winning back
if possible the goodwill of those young communities.
[146] Horace, “Odes,” bk. iii, 29. From modesty he omitted the words
“et mea Virtute me involvo.” (“If she [Fortune] abides, I commend her.
If her fleet wings quiver for flight, I resign her gifts--and hail
honest, dowerless poverty as mine.”)
[147] Wraxall, iii, 15.
[148] Chevening MSS. Yet on 25th February, Dundas wrote of the plan as
“my project” (Stanhope, i, 105).
[149] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 369–70; Stanhope, i, 104–9;
“Memorials of Fox,” ii, 40–2. The King’s letter to Shelburne refutes
Horace Walpole’s statement that the King made the offer very drily and
ungraciously: also that Pitt’s vanity was at first “staggered” by the
offer.
[150] “Buckingham P.,” i, 170.
[151] “Buckingham P.,” i, 194.
[152] Pitt MSS., 103.
[153] Stanhope, i, App. III.
[154] Wraxall, iii, 36.
[155] Sichel, “Sheridan,” i, 133.
[156] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 28.
[157] Wraxall, iii, 89, 143–5.
[158] “Dropmore P.,” i, 197–212. Mr. Sichel (“Sheridan,” ii, ch. ii),
following the earlier biographer, Thomas Moore, proves that Sheridan
sought to dissuade Fox from the coalition with North. This is doubtless
true. But determined opposition should have led him to refuse office.
[159] “Buckingham P.,” i, 189, 219.
[160] Horace Walpole’s Letters (8th May 1783). He thought Pitt’s
motion “most dangerous. We know pretty well what good or evil the
present state of the House of Commons can do. What an enlargement might
achieve no man can tell.” Later on he notes that Pitt was very little
supported, but shone marvellously in debate.
[161] Mr. Sichel (“Sheridan,” ii, 36) admits the strong personal
element in Sheridan’s opposition to Pitt.
[162] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 926, 945, 1, 114.
[163] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 113. Jesse, “Memoirs of George III,”
iii, 435, states that the Shelburne Ministry had named £100,000 as the
allowance for the Prince. I find no proof of this.
[164] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 113, 119.
[165] “Buckingham P.,” i, 303–5.
[166] “Dropmore P.,” i, 216; also Earl Stanhope’s “Miscellanies,” ii,
23–6, who rightly places the date as 20th July.
[167] “Buckingham P.,” i, 304; “Rutland P.,” iii, 70; Stanhope,
“Misc.,” ii, 32–5.
[168] _Ibid._, i, 218; “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 131–9.
[169] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 1143.
[170] “Dropmore P.,” i, 219, 220; Stanhope, “Misc.,” ii, 35.
[171] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 38.
[172] Lady Blennerhassett, “Life of Talleyrand,” i, 46. It is strange
that the “Talleyrand Memoirs” do not mention the meeting.
[173] G. Rose, “Diaries,” i, 32.
[174] Wraxall, iii, 122.
[175] “Early Life of Samuel Rogers,” 134.
[176] D’Haussonville, “The Salon of Mme. Necker,” ii, 50 (Eng. ed.).
[177] “Private Papers of W. Wilberforce,” 58. Strange to say, Horace
Walpole does not mention the affair in his letters.
[178] Horace Walpole (24th Feb. 1783).
[179] Milton, “A Free Commonwealth.”
[180] See, too, “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 98. Probably the second Bill
contained more of the suggestions of Burke.
[181] Wraxall, iii, 146, 155.
[182] Paper dated 4th Dec. 1783, in Pitt MSS., 354.
[183] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 1187–1208.
[184] _Ibid._, 1209–11.
[185] I cannot agree with Lecky’s statement (iv, 293) that Pitt’s
charges were extravagant. Seven partisan commissioners, jobbing away
vast patronage, would have been a canker in the State, whether they
acted for their party or the Crown.
[186] Pitt MSS., 102. Letter of 25th Nov. 1783.
[187] Wraxall, iii, 161.
[188] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiii, 1312–86.
[189] Wraxall, iii, 150.
[190] “Buckingham P.,” i, 289.
[191] _Ibid._, 285.
[192] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 196–225.
[193] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 224.
[194] Tomline (i, 233) gives the date as 21st December. The date is
doubtful, in view of the two perfectly friendly letters of Pitt to his
uncle on 23rd December, quoted by Stanhope (“Miscellanies,” ii, 36,
37). Wilberforce places the Earl’s resignation on 22nd December. I
incline to place it late on the 23rd.
[195] “Dropmore P.,” i, 163, 526–9. The Earl did not gain his desire,
and deeply resented the refusal of George III to make him a duke.
[196] Quoted in full in “Buckingham P.,” i, 291–3.
[197] “Dropmore P.,” i, 239, 240.
[198] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 48.
[199] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 406–13. Pitt soothed the feelings
of the Earl by persuading the King to create him Marquis of Lansdowne.
(_Ibid._, 419–25).
[200] Grafton MSS. in the Chevening Library.
[201] Wraxall, iii, 252.
[202] The letter of George III to Pitt, quoted in “Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies,” rebuts the statement of the editor of “The Cornwallis
Correspondence” (i, 162, _n._) that there is no trace of any offer of
an office to Cornwallis. The letters of the Earl at that time show
that he declined office because he believed Pitt’s administration must
speedily fall, whereupon “the virtuous Coalition” would return in
triumph.
[203] “Mems. of the Whig Party,” ii, 5–7.
[204] The Duke of Richmond did not join the Cabinet until 13th January.
See Lord Carmarthen’s Mem. (“Leeds Mem.,” 94).
[205] “Life and Letters of Sir G. Elliot,” i, 91.
[206] “Rutland P.,” iii, 73.
[207] Lord Carmarthen stated that in the Cabinet meeting of 13th
January Pitt talked of giving up the struggle, but this is against all
other contemporary evidence (“Leeds Mems.,” 94). These notes on the
Cabinet meetings show how long were the discussions there respecting a
dissolution, and Pitt’s anxiety to defer it to a favourable moment.
[208] Pitt MSS., 353. I cannot accept Mr. Sichel’s statement
(“Sheridan,” ii, 45), that Dundas prescribed Pitt’s India Bill, and
Burke helped in it. Dundas doubtless helped in its compilation, but
Pitt must have conferred directly with the Company and found out how
far it was inclined to meet his views.
[209] Wraxall, iii, 85.
[210] Stanhope, i, App., p. viii.
[211] “Ann. Reg.” (1784–5), 271; “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 238–41.
[212] Hearn, “The Government of England,” 140–4, 147.
[213] “Corresp. between Pitt and the Duke of Rutland,” 9. Cornwallis
(“Corresp.,” i, 171) also prophesied after that vote that if Ministers
acted wisely, they might hold office for many years.
[214] “Leeds Mems.,” 99.
[215] “Fox’s Martyrs: a new Book of the Sufferings of the Faithful”
(London, 3rd edit., 1784).
[216] Letter to Wilberforce, 6th April 1784.
[217] I have found in the Pitt MSS. (No. 315) only two references
to Pitt’s election for Cambridge. One is a letter of that year from
“F. B.” giving numerous hints how this or that M.A. should be “got at”
so as to secure his vote, and ending: “Go on and prosper, thou godlike
young man, worthy of your immortal father.” The other is a note, not
dated, signed J. T[urner?]:
“DEAR PRETYMAN,
“Our canvas goes on very successfully, but we are yet very desirous
of your being here to-morrow night if possible, since Mr. Pitt
cannot come himself. His appearance on Thursday did immense
service.... We depend on seeing you to-morrow; next to Mr. Pitt’s
appearance yours will certainly be of the utmost importance.”
[218] Wraxall, iii, 338.
[219] For the daily figures see “Ann. Reg.” (1784), 34.
[220] “Hist. of Westminster Election,” 483.
[221] From the letter of George III to Pitt of 1st May it seems that
the High Bailiff had previously decided to grant a scrutiny, if asked
for, owing to the many doubtful votes that had been polled.
[222] “Dropmore P.,” i, 177.
[223] “Memorials of Fox,” ii, 244–6.
[224] “Malmesbury Diaries,” iv, 22.
[225] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1006.
[226] Necker, “De l’Administration des Finances de la France,” 3 vols.
(1784).
[227] “Observations on Reversionary Payments,” by R. Price, i, 206.
When all the expenses of the war were added, by the year 1786, the
National Debt amounted to £245,466,855. See Parl. Paper, No. 443, Sept.
1858.
[228] R. Price, “State of the Public Debts and Finances in January
1783,” 5, 8, 19.
[229] Pitt reckoned a State lottery as yielding a profit of £140,000;
but obviously he disliked this means of raising money (“Parl. Hist.,”
xxv, 1307).
[230] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1021.
[231] _Ibid._, 1022–4.
[232] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1015.
[233] A. Young, “Farmer’s Letters,” 197.
[234] “Wealth of Nations,” bk. i, ch. xi, pt. 3; “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv,
1012.
[235] “Wealth of Nations,” bk. v, ch. ii, § 4.
[236] Dowell, “Hist. of Taxation,” ii, 183.
[237] I owe this interesting fact to the Rev. Dr. Cunningham.
[238] R. Price, _op. cit._, 18, 19 (note).
[239] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1009.
[240] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1354.
[241] “Wealth of Nations,” bk. v, ch. ii, § 1.
[242] Cunningham, 548.
[243] Dowell, ii, 187, 188.
[244] In Pitt MSS., 353, I have found a memoir of the East India
Company containing this sentence: “Much will he deserve of his country
who can devise a mode of anything like equal taxation by any single
tax.”
[245] “Corresp. of W. Wilberforce,” i, 9.
[246] Chevening MSS.
[247] R. Price, “Treatise on Reversionary Annuities” (1772).
[248] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 419–30.
[249] Consols which touched 54¼ in January 1785 rose to 69¾-73½ in
December of that year.
[250] “Memoir and Works of R. Price,” by W. Morgan (1816), i, 120–5; “A
Review of Dr. Price’s Writings on Finance,” by W. Morgan (1792).
[251] Pitt MSS., 169.
[252] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 419–30, 1303.
[253] Lecky, v, 51.
[254] Pitt MSS., 169.
[255] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 1294–1312, 1367, 1368, 1416–30.
[256] These formed the chief charges urged against the Sinking Fund by
R. Hamilton, “An Inquiry concerning ... the Management of the National
Debt” (1813).
[257] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 1430–32.
[258] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 17–36. Earl Stanhope’s measure will be
described by Miss Ghita Stanhope in her monograph on the Earl.
[259] J. R. McCulloch, “Taxation and the Funding System,” 3rd edit.,
1883, 477–81.
[260] Hamilton, _op. cit._ McCulloch admits only half that amount. In
the Pitt MSS. (No. 275) is an account of the stocks purchased for the
Sinking Fund up to 5th January 1796. They amounted to £18,001,655 and
Annuities equal to £89,675. See, too, Pitt’s Memoranda on the Sinking
Fund in “Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies.”
[261] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 998.
[262] _Ibid._, 1383.
[263] From Mr. Broadley’s MSS.
[264] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1396.
[265] “Corresp. of Wyvill with Pitt,” pt. i, 1796, 13.
[266] “Corresp. of Pitt with Wyvill,” pt. ii, 1797, 1–7.
[267] In the “Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies,” I include a
Memorandum--“Notes on Reform of Parliament”--from the Pretyman MSS.
It is undated; but the notes form undoubtedly the rough draft of the
speech outlined above, except that there is no mention of the buying
out proposals at the end. May we infer that this was an afterthought,
due to Dundas?
[268] “Rutland P.,” iii, 202.
[269] “Corresp. of Pitt with the Duke of Rutland,” 84.
[270] “Corresp. of Wilberforce,” i, 4; “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 77;
“Corresp. of Wyvill with Pitt,” pt. i, 15 n.
[271] Stanhope, i, xv; Wraxall, iii, 116.
[272] Lecky, v, 62, 63; Jephson, “The Platform,” i, 166.
[273] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 191.
[274] I agree with Dr. W. Hunt (“Political Hist. of England,” x, 287)
in his interpretation of the King’s letter quoted by Stanhope, i, App.,
xv.
[275] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 113.
[276] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808.
[277] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 1–5, 178–86; “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 114.
[278] “Rutland P.,” iii, 202.
[279] “Rutland P.,” iii, 198, 203; Letters of 11th and 23rd April 1785.
[280] “Private Papers of W. Wilberforce,” 72.
[281] “Corresp. of Pitt with the Duke of Rutland,” 150, 151.
[282] _Ibid_., 174, 175.
[283] Pitt MSS., 111. Printed in the “Barham Papers” (ii, 219), edited
by Sir John Laughton for the Navy Records Society.
[284] “Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin,” iii, 380–2 (Navy
Records Society).
[285] Wraxall, iv, 268–70. For some details on the inquiries at
Portsmouth and Plymouth see the “Cornwallis Corresp.,” i, 195–8.
[286] Porter, “Hist. of the Royal Engineers,” ii, 209–11. The Duke of
Richmond was, however, able to fortify some points at Portsmouth before
the war of 1793 with France. See “Professional Papers of the Corps of
Royal Engineers,” xii (1886), 83, 86. Fort Monckton and smaller forts
on Stokes Bay were built.
[287] H. Twiss, “Life of Lord Eldon,” i, ch. iv.
[288] Wraxall, iv, 436.
[289] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 780–832. On 8th May 1789, a similar motion
by Beaufoy was defeated by 122 votes to 102 (_Ibid._, xxviii, 1–41).
[290] “Parl. Hist.,” xxiv, 1086–99.
[291] Pitt MSS., 353.
[292] Mill, “Hist. of British India,” iv, 559 (4th edit.).
[293] Lord Acton, “Letters to Mary Gladstone,” 45.
[294] “Cornwallis Correspondence,” i, 180, 191.
[295] _Ibid._, 220, 221.
[296] Wraxall, iv, 142–4.
[297] Malleson, “Life of Warren Hastings” (1894), 456.
[298] Malleson, “Life of Warren Hastings” (1894), 455.
[299] Wraxall, iv, 250; “Diary of Mme. d’Arblay,” iv, 60 (edit. 1854).
[300] Malleson, _op. cit._, 449.
[301] Wraxall, iv, 260.
[302] _Ibid._, 261; “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 1094–5.
[303] _E.g._, Malleson, _op. cit._, 450.
[304] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 1256.
[305] The debate of 26th April seems to show that Burke was acquainted
with the substance of those papers.
[306] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 1384–94.
[307] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 37–90.
[308] “Zamindar” means no more than landowner. Hastings had confirmed
Cheyt Singh in his powers. Sir Alfred Lyall and Mr. G. W. Hastings in
their works on Warren Hastings lay stress on the fact that Cheyt Singh
was a _parvenu_, not one of the old hereditary princes of India. I
fail to see that this has any bearing on the justice or injustice of
Hastings’ treatment of him.
[309] “Auckland Journals,” i, 127.
[310] “Auckland Correspondence,” i, 127; Wraxall, iv, 336.
[311] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 115.
[312] “Lives of the Lord Chancellors,” ix, 175 (4th edit.). The words
quoted above furnish no ground for the assertion of Sir H. Lyall in his
“Warren Hastings” that Pitt heard news of Thurlow’s boast just before
the debate of 13th June. Campbell’s words are quite vague, and are
entitled to little credence.
[313] Stanhope, i, App., xix.
[314] For new letters of George III see “Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies.”
[315] Wraxall, iv, 342.
[316] “Bland Burges P.,” 89, 90.
[317] “Life of Wilberforce,” v, 340, 341.
[318] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 69, 70. A similar remark may be
applied to Mr. Gladstone’s replies, which often disgusted simple men.
[319] Pitt MSS., 169.
[320] This opinion is repeated by Mr. G. W. Hastings, “A Vindication of
Warren Hastings,” ch. vi.
[321] For a hostile account of Pitt’s conduct here, see the “Bland
Burges P.,” 81–9.
[322] “Hist. of the Trial of Warren Hastings,” pt. v, 308, 309. His net
fortune on 31st January 1786 was given as £65,313, exclusive of £12,000
made over to Mrs. Hastings.
[323] It may belong to the spring of 1787, when, as we learn from the
“Corresp. of Wilberforce,” i, 40, Dundas introduced Adam Smith to Pitt
and Wilberforce; but the latter does not record the anecdote.
[324] Of the 118 Parliamentary boroughs as many as 87 (including
Belfast!) were “close,” that is, were controlled by Government or by a
local magnate or the Corporation. See a list in “Castlereagh P.,” iv,
428–30; also Porritt, “Unreformed House of Commons,” ii, pt. vi.
[325] Lecky, iv, 429, 440, 450.
[326] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 74, 96, 107, 119; “Rutland P.,” iii, 193.
[327] Pitt MSS., 324.
[328] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 17, 19.
[329] Ashbourne, 84, 85.
[330] Ashbourne, 85–91.
[331] Grenville, writing in November 1798, said that he considered the
faulty procedure adopted in 1785 largely contributed to the failure.
(“Buckingham P.,” ii, 412.)
[332] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 43.
[333] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 55–75.
[334] _Ibid._, 73.
[335] Ashbourne, 104 (Letter of Pitt to Orde, 1st February 1785). Irish
exports to Great Britain for 1779 were £2,256,659, her imports thence
only £1,644,770 (Pitt MSS., 322).
[336] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 311–14. Lecky, vi, 390, 395, and his “Leaders
of Public Opinion in Ireland,” 114.
[337] “Rutland P.” (Hist. MSS. Comm.), iii, 162–68.
[338] Pitt MSS., 320.
[339] “Rutland P.,” iii, 191; “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 314; Ashbourne, 105,
108.
[340] Chevening MSS.
[341] “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 311–28.
[342] “Dropmore P.,” i, 247, 248
[343] Pitt MSS., 321.
[344] This is refuted by the official wording of that Resolution as
passed at Dublin, in “Parl. Hist.,” xxv, 312.
[345] Pitt MSS., 321.
[346] Fifty-six petitions had been sent in against Lord North’s
proposals in 1778. Daniel Pulteney wrote on 22nd March: “The
selfishness, ignorance, and credulity of many more commercial towns has
been too successfully practised on by Opposition.” He says Nottingham
was worked on by “Portland’s emissaries.” The day before he expressed
regret at Pitt’s obstinacy over the “cursed” Westminster scrutiny
(“Rutland P.,” iii, 192, 193).
[347] Ashbourne, 121.
[348] “Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council” (1st March
1785). (J. Stockdale,) 4. Pitt stated in his letter of 6th January 1785
to Rutland, that Ireland bought far less from Great Britain than she
sold to her.
[349] _Ibid._, 8–30.
[350] _Ibid._, 31–42.
[351] _Ibid._, 43–49.
[352] “Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council,” 50–55.
[353] _Ibid._, 68.
[354] _Ibid._, 78, 79.
[355] “The Proposed System of Trade with Ireland explained” (1785).
[356] Letter of 6th April to Duke of Rutland in “Rutland P.,” iii, 197.
[357] T. Moore, “Life of Sheridan,” i, 424.
[358] Wraxall, iv, 127–38.
[359] Lord Morley (“Burke,” 125) allows that Burke was wrong in
following Fox’s factious opposition, and that he “allowed his political
integrity to be bewildered.”
[360] The actual authors of these amusing poems were Tickell, General
Fitzpatrick, Lord John Townsend, Richardson, George Ellis, and Burke’s
friend and literary executor, Dr. Lawrence, who contributed the prose
parts. (T. Moore, “Sheridan,” i, 421.)
[361] “The Rolliad,” 90, 370.
[362] “Dropmore P.,” i, 255. See ch. xii of this work for a new letter
of Wilberforce to Pitt on the crisis.
[363] “Auckland Journals,” i, 79.
[364] Chevening MSS. Pitt continued to reside at the house on the
north side of Putney Heath, next to Lord Ashburton’s, until October or
November 1785, when he removed to Holwood Hill, Kent.
[365] “Dropmore P.,” i, 254; “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 125–33.
[366] Ashbourne, 146.
[367] Wraxall, iii, 217.
[368] Wilberforce gave up Lauriston House in 1786. A little later
Dundas and Grenville came to reside at Wimbledon, on the east and west
sides of the Green. Grenville’s is now called Eagle House. Dundas’s
stood on the site of “Canizzaro.”
[369] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 111.
[370] “Rutland P.,” iii, 177.
[371] _Ibid._, 178; Wraxall, iv, 72–9, 98.
[372] Wraxall, iv, 98.
[373] Bruce, “Life of Sir W. Napier,” i, 28; quoted by Lecky, v, 16.
[374] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 69.
[375] Wraxall, ii, 234, 235.
[376] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 65; “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 78.
[377] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 66, 67.
[378] “Life and Letters of the Earl of Minto,” ii, 5.
[379] B.M. Add. MSS., 28061. This postscript to Harris’s letter of 18th
July 1786 to Carmarthen is omitted from “The Malmesbury Diaries”; so,
too are most personal touches, often of great interest.
[380] “Auckland Journals,” i, 117.
[381] Omond, G. W. T., “The Lord Advocates of Scotland,” ch. xiv.
[382] Porritt, “Unreformed House of Commons,” ii, 8.
[383] Wraxall, ii, 123.
[384] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 179, 233, 350, 351; also iii, 212, for
the decline of Dundas’s influence on Pitt. Omond, “Lord Advocates of
Scotland,” vol. ii, ch. xiv.
[385] Lord Macaulay told this to Earl Stanhope (author of the “Life of
Pitt”) at the British Museum in December 1846 (Note of Earl Stanhope in
the Chevening MSS.).
[386] “Malmesbury Diaries,” iii, 292, 516, 590–2; “Dropmore P.,” iii,
167.
[387] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 78.
[388] Pitt MSS., 189.
[389] Wraxall, iv, 151.
[390] Pellew, “Life of Lord Sidmouth,” i, 4.
[391] Pellew, “Life of Lord Sidmouth,” i, 38.
[392] Wraxall, iii, _ad fin._
[393] I distrust the charges of corrupt dealing brought against Rose
respecting the next election at Westminster.
[394] “Diaries of George Rose,” i, 32–37.
[395] “Corresp. of Wilberforce,” i, 9.
[396] “Corresp. of Wilberforce,” i, 21–4.
[397] The gross income was £4,100: see Mr. E. W. Hamilton’s estimate of
Pitt’s income (the total being £10,532) in App. C of Lord Rosebery’s
“Pitt.”
[398] Pretyman MSS.
[399] G. Croly, “Mems. of George IV,” i, 105, 106.
[400] _Ibid._, 107.
[401] Chevening MSS.
[402] B.M. Add. MSS., 35684. In May 1790, Pitt drafted a letter to the
members of the Senate of the University of Cambridge, asking for the
support to his intended candidature for the office of High Steward,
then vacant owing to the death of Lord Hardwicke. He expressed the hope
that the crisis in public affairs would be deemed a sufficient excuse
for not making the application in person. He was elected. The draft of
the letter is in the Library of Pembroke College, Cambridge.
[403] “Private Papers of Wilberforce,” 13, 14.
[404] “Life of Wilberforce,” i, 113.
[405] _Ibid._, ii, 10–13.
[406] “Antony and Cleopatra,” v, sc. 2.
[407] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 24–26, 49, 55. The character and career
of Sir James Harris (the future Earl of Malmesbury) will concern us
later. Herr F. K. Wittichen, “Preussen und England in der Europäischen
Politik--1785–1788,” _ad init._, condemns the resentment of Frederick
the Great as a mistake, fatal to the interests both of Prussia and
England.
[408] “Malmesbury Diaries,” i, 374, 402, 532. He thought her hasty, and
swayed by passion or caprice; but events proved that she did not lack
foresight or firmness.
[409] Mahan, “Influence of Sea Power,” i, 11.
[410] Martens, iii, 327.
[411] “Leeds Memoranda” (edited by Mr. Oscar Browning), 101.
[412] B.M. Add. MSS., 27914. This letter and other documents of
interest will appear in my volume “Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies.”
[413] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060. “Lord C.” may be Lord Clarendon, who had
previously given advice to Lord Carmarthen.
[414] _Ibid._
[415] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060. It is endorsed, in Pitt’s hand: “Oct. 12,
1784, Mem^m for Instructions to Mr. Fitzherbert.” Carmarthen’s draft
is almost certainly that which is printed by Mr. Oscar Browning in
the “Leeds Memoranda,” p. 103 _n._; but the evidence here given shows
that that draft cannot be Pitt’s, as Mr. Browning at that time (1884)
naturally inferred.
[416] This is well set forth in the despatches of Lord Dalrymple,
British Ambassador at Berlin, to Carmarthen. The latter wrote to Harris
on 24th February 1786, that Vorontzoff would try to persuade Catharine
II to restore the “good system,” and to induce Joseph II to help in the
work; but nothing came of it (B.M. Add. MSS., 28061).
[417] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 104. Memorandum of 2nd February 1785.
[418] Even after the disasters of 1813 Napoleon wrote: “Holland is a
French country and will remain so for ever” (“Lettres inédites,” 6th
November 1813).
[419] See Colenbrander, “De Patriottentijd,” i, 415, for the Prince’s
difficulty in forming (February 1784) a permanent force of 8,000
sailors subject to the Council of War and not to the provincial
Estates; also “A View of the Policy ... of the United Provinces”
(Dublin, 1787). As Grenville wrote to Pitt from The Hague on 31st July
1787, that the Dutch understood their Constitution very imperfectly
(“Dropmore P.,” iii, 410), I may be pardoned for not seeking to unravel
it here.
[420] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 92–4, 222–4.
[421] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060, Letter of 23rd August 1785. These
“private” letters are often more interesting and important than those
printed in the “Malmesbury Diaries,” which form but a small portion of
the whole.
[422] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060.
[423] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060.
[424] _Ibid._
[425] See the conversation of Joseph II with Sir R. M. Keith at Vienna
in December 1785, on French designs on Egypt, as given in chap. xxi,
_ad init._
[426] Salomon, “Pitt,” 309, 310; also Martens, iv, 133–9, for the
treaty closing this dispute.
[427] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060.
[428] “Malmesbury Mems.,” ii, 113–21.
[429] “Leeds Mem.” 111–13.
[430] Wittichen, _op. cit._, 8, 25 _et seq._, and 173, 174; “Malmesbury
Mems.,” 131.
[431] _Ibid._, 118.
[432] Tomline, ii, 108; “Leeds Mem.,” 116.
[433] Colenbrander, iii, 16, quoted by Wittichen, 173.
[434] Joseph Ewart had been secretary to Sir John Stepney, then
was Secretary of the Berlin Embassy in 1785–7. In 1788–91 he was
ambassador. For Anglo-Prussian relations and Ewart’s work, see Dr.
Luckwaldt’s excellent monograph, “Die englisch-preussische Allianz von
1788,” 51 _et seq._ (Leipzig, 1902). By the kindness of General Sir
Spencer Ewart, I was able to transcribe several of the letters of his
forefather, Joseph Ewart. Some of them are published in an article in
the “Edinburgh Review” for July 1909.
[435] Luckwaldt, 52, 53.
[436] “Cornwallis Corresp.,” i, 202–11.
[437] “Malmesbury Diaries,” i, 157.
[438] I disagree with Herr Salomon (“Pitt”) on this point. It seems to
me that Pitt’s policy was essentially tentative, and remained so up to
the year 1788.
[439] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060. George III showed more sagacity than his
Ministers, witness the phrase in his letter of 7th August to Pitt: “An
experience of twenty years has taught me not to expect any return for
the great assistance she [Catharine] has received from this country.”
[440] As late as 5th February 1786 he wrote to Harris: “We are on more
friendly terms with Russia than for a long time” (B.M. Add. MSS.,
28061).
[441] I have published this Memorandum along with other documents
bearing on the years 1785–7 in the “Eng. Hist. Rev.” for 1909.
[442] Garden, “Traités,” v, 60–72.
[443] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 175.
[444] On 7th March 1786 Harris reported to Carmarthen joint actions
of the Dutch and French in the East, and that eight Dutch warships
were to sail thither with troops on board. (B.M. Add. MSS., 28061.)
The possession of the Cape of Good Hope by the Dutch rendered our
communications with India precarious.
[445] “Dropmore P.,” i, 258.
[446] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 111.
[447] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 172.
[448] The Grand-Duke of Tuscany was a Hapsburg prince.
[449] Pitt MSS., 332.
[450] Dr. Cunningham, “Eng. Industry and Commerce” (pt. ii, 546).
[451] B.M. Add. MSS., 28063. Eden to Carmarthen, 10th January 1788.
[452] “F. O.,” France, 18.
[453] _Ibid._
[454] “Wealth of Nations,” bk. iv, ch. iii.
[455] “Politique de tous les Cabinets de l’Europe ...,” ii, 402–3. It
contains some “Mémoires” of Vergennes.
[456] Fitzmaurice, “Shelburne,” iii, 260.
[457] “Précis du Traité de Commerce de 1786,” by Count His de Butenval
(Paris, 1869), 25.
[458] “Wealth of Nations,” bk iv, ch. iii.
[459] Butenval, 23.
[460] B.M. Add. MSS., 28060.
[461] “F. O.,” France, 14, Dorset to Carmarthen, 31st March 1785. See,
too, L. Pingaud Choiseul-Gouffier, “La France en Orient sous Louis XVI”
(Paris, 1887).
[462] Pitt MSS., 337.
[463] _Ibid._, 333. Hailes to Fraser, 26th January 1786.
[464] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 112.
[465] “Malmesbury Diaries,” ii, 157.
[466] “F. O.,” France, 16.
[467] _Ibid._ The British Parliament in 1716 abrogated these clauses in
favour of earlier and less liberal arrangements. Louis XIV consented to
this.
[468] “F. O.,” France, 16. Hailes to Carmarthen, 4th August 1785.
[469] _Ibid._, Hailes to Carmarthen, 1st December 1785. The Chambers of
Commerce at Paris, Versailles, and Montpellier protested against the
_arrêts_. See Butenval, _op. cit._, 36.
[470] Pitt MSS., 110. Eden to Pitt, 12th October 1785. See, too,
“Carlisle Papers,” 644.
[471] B.M. Add. MSS., 34420.
[472] Butenval, 39
[473] Carmarthen to Eden, 9th December 1785 (B.M. Add. MSS., 34420).
[474] Pitt MSS., 333.
[475] Pitt to Eden, 4th December 1785, in “Auckland Journals,” i, 87.
[476] Vergennes to Carmarthen, 14th December 1785, in Pitt MSS., 333.
[477] B.M. Add. MSS., 34420. Letter of John Lees, 1st April 1785.
[478] “Auckland Journals,” i, 89; Wraxall, iv, 229.
[479] J. Flammermont, “Correspondances des Agents diplomatiques
étrangers avant la Révolution,” 508.
[480] “Auckland Journals,” i, 106.
[481] Pitt MSS., 110. I quote fully only from those letters which have
not been published.
[482] “Auckland Journals,” i, 112.
[483] B.M. Add. MSS., 28061. Letter of 19th May 1786.
[484] _Ibid._ Letter of 12th December 1786.
[485] _Ibid._
[486] Pitt MSS., 333.
[487] This letter of 6th June has no date of the year, and it has been
bound up in vol. 28064 of the Add. MSS. in the British Museum for the
year 1789 of the Auckland MSS. Internal evidence shows that the year
should be 1786.
[488] Their memorial, dated 22nd February 1786, is from the London
silk trade (B.M. Add. MSS., 34420). It states that “no alteration
or modification whatsoever, short of the present prohibition of all
foreign wrought silks, can ensure the silk trade to this country.”
[489] Pitt MSS., 110.
[490] “Pitt-Rutland Corresp.,” 158; “Beaufort Papers” (Hist. MSS.
Commission), 353.
[491] Pitt MSS., 110. Eden to Pitt, 23rd August.
[492] _Ibid._ Pitt to Eden, 12th September.
[493] “F. O.,” France, 20. For further details see my article in the
“Eng. Hist. Rev.” for October 1908.
[494] “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 233–54; “Auckland Corresp.,” i, 495–515;
Martens, “Traités,” iv, 155–80.
[495] Pitt MSS., 169.
[496] “F. O.,” France, 18.
[497] “Auckland Journals,” i, 392, 6th October 1786.
[498] “Dropmore P.,” i, 274.
[499] “Auckland Journals,” i, 404.
[500] “Auckland Journals,” i, 404; “Parl. Hist.,” xxvi, 342–78.
[501] _Ibid._, 392, 394.
[502] _Ibid._, 397, 398, 402, 424, 595. Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond in his
able work, “Charles James Fox” (1903), defends his hero on the ground
that monarchical France was the enemy of England.
[503] Pitt MSS., 110. Eden to Pitt, 13th April 1786.
[504] “F. O.,” France, 18.
[505] “F. O.,” France, 18. Hailes to Carmarthen, 25th October 1786. The
Duke of Dorset thought very little of Hailes, but Hailes’s despatches
show far more knowledge of France than the Duke’s.
[506] Flammermont, _op. cit._, 125.
[507] See summaries of both in Butenval, _op. cit._, chs. xv, xvi.
[508] Arthur Young’s “Travels in France” (Bohn edit., 1889), 8, 9, 69,
107, 284.
[509] Levasseur, “Hist. des Classes ouvrières,” ii, 776.
[510] This is the judgement of R. Stourm, “Les Finances de l’Ancien
Régime et de la Révolution,” 59.
[511] “Cambridge Mod. Hist.,” viii, 74.
[512] “Auckland Journals,” i, 127. Pitt to Eden, 10th June 1786.