THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
This treaty produced an effect throughout the whole of Europe by
its mere existence, without military preparations or force of
arms.--VON SYBEL.
Pitt has already astonished all Europe by the alacrity of the late
armament, and his name as a War Minister is now as high as that
of his father ever was.--THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO THE DUKE OF
RUTLAND, 17th October 1787.
The events described in the last chapter had brought England and
Prussia to a crisis at which, despite their strong mutual suspicion,
common action was imperiously needed in order to save the Dutch
Netherlands from French domination. As we have seen, no British
statesman had ever acquiesced in the supremacy of France in that
country; and it is clear from the British archives that Pitt now took
a keen interest in thwarting her designs. The draft of the official
answer to Eden’s despatch of 4th August 1787 is entirely in Pitt’s
writing, and it was sent without alteration or addition by the Foreign
Minister, Lord Carmarthen--an unusual circumstance, which shows the
masterful grip of the chief over matters of high import. In this
despatch, of 10th August, he welcomed the assurance of Montmorin
that warlike preparations would be stopped until further notice.
Great Britain would, however, renew them after due notice if France
assembled a force at Givet, on the Belgian border. He then referred
pointedly to rumours that French transports had sailed for Amsterdam--a
measure which would prejudice “the great work of conciliation which
it is so much the object of the two Courts to forward and promote.”
French ships were also reported as laying in stores of food in
British ports, a proceeding which would have been stopped but for the
friendly assurances now received. He then referred to the invitation
of the loyal provinces of Friesland and Zealand, that Great Britain
would mediate on their behalf, and hinted that this might be done.
The despatch closed with the following dignified remonstrance on the
subject of the outrages of the Free Corps in Holland:
I am here also under the painful necessity of adding that the
conduct held in the Province of Holland, apparently instigated
by those who have all along appeared the instruments of France,
seems to increase, instead of diminishing in violence. I enclose a
copy of an address presented by the Free Corps of that Province,
which it is intended that you should show to M. de M[ontmorin]. It
cannot escape that Minister how little such a step is calculated to
promote an accommodation or a suspension of hostilities, which his
language so strongly recommends.[551]
Meanwhile Pitt had sent his cousin, William Wyndham Grenville, to
collect information at The Hague. As we saw in Chapter XII, the
attainments of that young statesman, then Paymaster of the Forces, were
eminently sound. His hard and practical nature stood in contrast to the
sensitive and imaginative Harris, about whom George III trenchantly
wrote to Pitt, that he was so easily discouraged that it was well he
held no military command. Probably Pitt held the same opinion about
Harris, whose forward policy he had long held in check. That there was
some widespread distrust of him is clear from the observation of the
Duke of Dorset, that “he was playing the devil at The Hague.”[552] In
any case, it was well to have independent advice, and the selection of
so young a man as Grenville is a tribute to his prudence and ability.
He reached The Hague on 30th July, and during his stay of about
three weeks succeeded in clearing up many points preliminary to the
mediation. The letters which passed between him and Pitt bespeak a
resolve on both sides to settle matters peaceably if possible. The
following sentence in Pitt’s letter of 1st August is noteworthy: “It
is very material that our friends should not lose the superiority of
force within the Republic, while we are labouring to protect it from
interference from without.” Six days later he wrote that the prospect
was still favourable, but that, if French troops were to assemble
at Givet, it might be needful to resume naval preparations, so as to
reassure Prussia.[553] Equally hopeful in tone is his letter of 2nd
August to Earl Cornwallis, Governor-General of India. After pointing
out that Great Britain could not allow France to become mistress of the
Dutch Netherlands, and thereby add enormously to her naval strength
and her power of aggression in India, he expressed the hope that the
mediation of the three Powers would take place; but, failing an apology
from the Estates of Holland, the King of Prussia would order his
troops into that province, and take steps for “maintaining the just
rights of the Stadholder and the constitution and independence of the
Republic.” If war broke out, Cornwallis was at once to strike at the
Dutch settlement of Trincomalee, in Ceylon; while a force from England
would be sent to reduce the Cape of Good Hope--the first sign in Pitt’s
letters of the importance which he attached to that post.[554]
Despite suspicious signs to the contrary, the French Cabinet at that
time probably wished for a peaceful mediation; but the Courts of London
and Versailles differed sharply as to the way of action. Pitt and
Carmarthen held that reparation to the King of Prussia for the insult
to his sister was a purely personal affair, distinct from the political
issues. France now denied this; she belittled the affront to the
Princess, and induced the Estates of Holland to frame an apology which
was in the main a justification of their conduct. If Montmorin had
pressed that body to make an adequate apology, it would certainly have
been forthcoming. The stiff-neckedness of the Estates of Holland was
due to their expectation of armed support from France if matters came
to the sword; and the action of the Marquis de Vérac, the French envoy,
justified their confidence.
In truth, French policy wore different aspects at Paris and at The
Hague. Montmorin assumed an air of injured innocence when Eden
transmitted to him Pitt’s remonstrances. On 15th August he indignantly
denied the truth of the rumours about French transports sailing to
Holland and of the food supplies drawn from England. He also complained
of the harshness of Pitt’s reference to the assembling of troops at
Givet, an action which was a natural retort to the muster of Prussians
at their fortress of Wesel on the Rhine; and he merely laughed at
the address of the Free Corps.[555] A week later Eden reported that
Montmorin was anxious to settle the Dutch troubles peacefully and
speedily, and would therefore recall the over-zealous Vérac from The
Hague. Pitt, however, refused to allow that Prussia was exceeding her
just rights in claiming satisfaction for the insult. The fit way of
ending the matter, he argued, would be for the Estates of Holland to
apologize frankly and fully, whereupon the three Powers must insist on
the dispersal and disarming of the Free Corps as a needful preliminary
to the joint mediation.[556] On 28th August Eden heard that the French
Government would not form the camp at Givet, it being understood that
the Prussian monarch would limit his claims to the gaining of personal
satisfaction, which France promised to procure from the Estates of
Holland. This welcome news led Pitt to express the hope that an
agreement would at once be framed for stopping the excesses of the
Free Corps. Thus, so far as our dealings with Montmorin ran, there
seemed, even at the end of August 1787, the likelihood of a peaceful
settlement. A signal proof of Pitt’s hopefulness is afforded by his
letter of 28th August to Cornwallis at Calcutta. In this he speaks of
the need of settling the personal question between the King of Prussia
and the Estates of Holland as preliminary to the general settlement of
the dispute. Even of that he cherished hopes, but he deemed caution and
preparation so eminently necessary as to order the despatch of another
regiment to Bombay.[557]
In truth, the central knot of the whole tangle was at The Hague. In
order to understand the position there we must remember that the
States-General, representing the Union, had not called on France for
aid, in case of hostilities. Thanks to the skill and private influence
of Harris, a majority of that body still upheld the claims of the
Stadholder, deprecated any appeal to the Court of Versailles, and
sought to procure from the Estates of Holland an apology to the King
of Prussia. The Estates, however, stoutly refused to give anything
more than a complacent explanation of the incident. The spirit which
animated that assembly appears in the comment of one of the leading
Patriots on the Prussian ultimatum: “A sovereign body can never
apologize to the wife of its first servant.”[558] The Memoirs of
Count de Portes, a Swiss officer who espoused the cause of the Dutch
Patriots and helped to raise a regiment for them, show the cause of
their confidence. He wrote on 14th September: “Though the Prussians are
at our gates, they seem to me still at the sport of politics, and I
can scarcely believe that they will put themselves between our waters
and _our French_. At the worst we will open our sluices and drown
ourselves.”[559]
There was the strength of the Patriots. In a legal sense their case
was weak; but their audacious energy even now promised to snatch
victory from the inert Orange party. The Free Corps in the months of
July and August became more numerous and insolent than ever, and it
was a notorious fact that hundreds of French officers and soldiers had
passed into their ranks.[560] Thus strengthened, they marched about the
country, taking some places by force, and in several cases deposing the
Regents, or chief magistrates appointed by the Stadholder. On all sides
they despoiled the property of opponents, and carried confusion to the
gates of The Hague. On 1st August Harris thus summed up his hopes and
wishes to Carmarthen: “If I am de-Witted, don’t let me be outwitted,
but revenge me.”[561] Count Bentinck also wrote: “the majority of
Holland have made themselves masters of our lives and property; ...
they are masters of the purse, and of the sword, and of the Courts
of Justice.”[562] That arch-intriguer, Vérac, on 31st August, the
very day of his recall, assured the Patriots that France would never
desert them. This boast was consonant with the whole policy of France
respecting the Free Corps. She had rejected the Prussian proposal for
their suppression, which accompanied the plan of a Franco-Prussian
mediation. On 29th August Montmorin stated to Eden that it was
impossible to disarm the Free Corps, and on 11th September when stiff
remonstrances came from London on this subject, he airily declared
that France could no more control those troops than the waves of the
sea.[563]
Is it surprising that the Pitt Ministry came to the conclusion that
the real aim of the French Government was to amuse England and Prussia
with fair words, until its partisans gained a complete mastery in the
United Provinces and forced the States-General to send to Paris a
formal demand for help, with which the Court of Versailles could not
but comply? Whether Montmorin was playing a double game, or whether
his hand was forced by other members of his Cabinet, is far from
clear.[564] Certainly the contrast between his fair professions and
French intrigues in Holland inspired increasing distrust, and served to
bring about the _dénouement_ which shattered the prestige of the French
monarchy.
It was long before the crisis came. Only by slow degrees did Pitt,
Carmarthen, and Harris shake off distrust of Prussia. The length
of time attending the transit of despatches between London and
Berlin (eleven days on the average even in summer) clogged the
negotiations. At Paris the Prussian envoy, Görtz, intrigued against the
Anglo-Prussian understanding, and represented Eden as minimizing the
insult to the Princess of Orange. At once Pitt sent to Eden a courteous
but firm request for an explanation of his words, which had caused a
sensation at Berlin. Of course Eden was able to explain them entirely
to Pitt’s satisfaction.[565] But it is clear that the mutual dislike at
London and Berlin could have been ended only by the fears aroused by
the action of France.
In order to remove the distrust prevalent at Berlin, Pitt and
Carmarthen sent to that Court full copies of their correspondence with
France, which convinced Frederick William of their good faith and the
duplicity of Versailles.[566] He saw that France was dragging on the
affair so that the approach of autumn might hinder the effective action
of his troops. Suspicion of this helped to bring England and Prussia to
accord. But the tidings which spurred on Pitt and Carmarthen to more
decisive action came from The Hague. On 20th August Harris reported
that a body of Free Corps was approaching that town, that he was
preparing to leave it in haste, and had sent all important papers away.
On hearing this news and perhaps that brought back by Grenville on 23rd
August, the Cabinet resolved to send General Fawcett to Cassel to hire
5,000 Hessians for the help of the loyal Dutch provinces, and others
for the British service--that detestable expedient which parsimony made
inevitable at every alarm of war. Harris was also empowered to order up
a British ship lying at Harwich, laden with gunpowder and stores for
the help of the Stadholder’s forces.[567] On the same day Carmarthen
instructed Ewart to warn the Prussian Court that, though we had agreed
with France to suspend warlike preparations, yet we were ready to send
out at least as large a fleet as France could possibly equip.[568]
Ewart, in his reply of 4th September, stated that but for this
encouraging news Frederick William might once more have wavered, owing
to the insidious intrigues of the French party, and the discouraging
reports which came from the Duke of Brunswick. The nerves of that
veteran were unstrung by visions of the spectral camp at Givet, and
he mourned over the unpreparedness of his own force at Wesel, which,
he declared, could not march before 7th September.[569] These tidings
had once more depressed the royal thermometer at Berlin; but the news
from London came just in time to send the mercury up again. On 3rd
September, then, Frederick William drew up an ultimatum to the Estates
of Holland, and bade Hertzberg come to a close understanding with
England. On 7th September he resolved to recall Thulemeyer, and urged
the British Government to declare what forces it would set in motion if
France attacked the Prussian army in Holland.[570]
* * * * *
Late on that day there arrived at Berlin news which ended the last
hesitations of Frederick William. The Porte, long fretting under
the yoke imposed by the Treaty of Kainardji, and irritated by the
proceedings of the Czarina, had declared war on Russia. This came
almost as a bolt from the blue. No one had believed the Sultan capable
of so much energy as to attack the Muscovites; and rumours spread
at Vienna and Petersburg that this was due to British gold. The
insinuation was probably false. As will appear in Chapter XXI, the
Turks had been goaded into war, and relied on help from Sweden, perhaps
also from Prussia. Undoubtedly their action greatly embarrassed Joseph
II, who was bound by compacts with Russia, the enemy of Turkey, and
with France, her friend. Late on 7th September Finckenstein pointed
this out to Ewart, and added that Prussia and England ought at once
to frame an agreement, and intervene effectively without fear of
France.[571] This time the decision was final. Ewart reported that
the news of Turkey’s challenge to Russia caused all the more joy at
Berlin as the party of Marie Antoinette had gained an ascendancy at
Versailles, which implied the strengthening of the Franco-Austrian
alliance and a proportionate loosening of the ties linking Joseph II
to Russia.[572] The reasoning was not sound; for it was probable that
France, acting in close concert with the two Empires, would partition
Turkey with a view to the seizure of Egypt and other commanding posts
in the East.
Nevertheless, Prussia looked on the war in the East as giving her a
free hand in the West; and on 7th September she decided to act in
the Netherlands. Four days later a French envoy, Groschlag, arrived
in Berlin with offers, partly enticing, partly threatening, which
might once more have drawn the wavering impulses of the King towards
Paris.[573] But now, after many months of uphill fight, all the omens
favoured the Anglo-Prussian cause.
On 13th September, before the refusal of the Prussian ultimatum by the
Estates of Holland had been received, the Duke of Brunswick crossed the
Dutch frontier. In Guelderland and parts of Utrecht the Prussians were
hailed as deliverers; even the city of Utrecht opened its gates, owing
to the cowardice of the Rhinegrave of Salm, who soon abandoned the
cause for which he had blustered so long. Nowhere did the Free Corps
make any firm stand. Even in Holland their excesses had turned public
opinion strongly against them. It is said that the weather prevented
the opening of the sluices; but the half-heartedness of the defence,
and the eagerness of the Orange party for deliverance, probably explain
the _débâcle_. When the Dutch have been united and determined, their
defence of their land has always been stubborn. Now it was not even
creditable; and this fact may be cited as damning to the Patriots’
claim that they stood for the nation. On 20th September the Prince of
Orange made his entry into The Hague amidst boundless enthusiasm. Sir
James Harris also received a striking ovation, which rewarded him for
the long months of struggle.
Now, while the Patriots were in consternation at their overthrow, our
envoy clinched his triumph by persuading the Estates of Holland to
reverse their previous acts against the Stadholder’s authority, and to
rescind a resolution which they had passed on 9th September appealing
for armed aid from France. The cancelling of this appeal on 21st
September was a matter of great importance, as it deprived France of a
pretext for armed intervention. The receipt of this news at Versailles
helped to cool the warlike ardour of the French Court.
There the temper of the Ministry had fluctuated alarmingly. The recall
of Vérac seemed to assure a peaceful settlement. But on 4th September
Montmorin sent to Eden a despatch which ran directly counter to the
British and Prussian proposals. It stated that the Dutch towns,
where the Free Corps had forcibly changed the magistrates, “_ont
déjà consommé la réforme; ... c’est une affaire terminée_.” As for
the Prince of Orange, he would do well to abdicate in favour of his
son.[574] Pitt of course indignantly rejected both proposals; and his
temper is seen in the phrase of his letter of 14th September to Eden,
that if France was determined to keep her predominance in the United
Provinces, she must fight for it.[575]
An acute crisis now set in. While Carmarthen warned Montmorin that
England would not remain a quiet spectator of French intervention, that
Minister on 16th September issued a Declaration that France could not
refuse the appeal for help which had come from the Estates of Holland.
He charged England with having plotted the whole affair with Prussia,
and asserted that, inconvenient though the time was now that the fate
of the Turkish Empire stood at hazard, France must in honour draw the
sword.[576]
This Declaration drew from Pitt an equally stiff retort. In a circular
despatch intended for all our ambassadors, which he himself drew
up, he declared that England could not admit the right of France,
owing to its treaty with the Dutch Republic, “to support a party in
one of the Provinces in a measure expressly disavowed by a majority
of the States-General; and His Majesty has repeatedly declared the
impossibility of his being indifferent to any armed interference of
France in the affairs of the Republic, which, if unopposed, must
necessarily tend to consequences dangerous to the constitutional
independence of those Provinces, and affecting in many respects the
interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty has therefore
found himself under the necessity of taking measures for equipping
a considerable naval armament and for augmenting his land forces.”
Nevertheless he still desired “an amicable settlement of the points
in dispute.”[577] As many as forty sail of the line were immediately
prepared for sea; and here we may notice that Pitt’s care for the navy
ensured a preponderance which virtually decided the dispute.
In order to see whether war might be averted, George III suggested,
on 16th September, that someone should be sent to Paris who could
deal with the French Ministers better than Eden did. Pitt therefore
decided, on 19th September, to despatch Grenville, charging him
distinctly to declare that Great Britain approved the action of the
King of Prussia, and would resist an armed intervention by France; also
that the settlement in the United Provinces must be such as to restore
to the Stadholder his constitutional powers, and prevent the ascendency
of the party hostile to Britain. A secondary aim of Grenville’s mission
was the forming of a friendly understanding with France for the
cessation of warlike preparations on both sides of the Channel--a proof
of Pitt’s watchful care over the exchequer.[578]
Montmorin received Grenville coldly on 28th September at Versailles;
but his reserve was merely a cloak to hide his discomfiture. Nine
days before he had assured Eden, in the confidence which followed on
a private dinner, that “if the Estates of Holland should prove so
defenceless, or so intimidated as to give way to whatever might be
forced under the present attack, he would advise His Most Christian
Majesty not to engage in war.” If matters went more favourably he
would advise him to draw the sword; but, as for his own feelings,
he was weary of the Dutch Question, and only sought the means for
getting rid of it creditably, so that France might turn her attention
to another quarter, obviously the East.[579] Grenville, after hearing
all this from Eden, and receiving the good news from The Hague, of
course put the right interpretation on Montmorin’s _non possumus_, and
sought to facilitate his stately retreat. He was at once waved back.
Montmorin would make no promise as to her course of action so long as
the Prussians were in Holland. Even on the question of disarmament
by the two Powers--a matter of the utmost moment to France--he would
make no pledge, though Grenville strongly urged him to do so. Two more
interviews passed with the same frigid negations; and on 3rd October
Grenville returned to London, harbouring a shrewd suspicion that the
actions of the Court of Versailles would on this occasion tally with
Montmorin’s words.
Such proved to be the case. France did nothing, to the unbounded
disgust of her partisans in Holland. Amsterdam shut its gates and
endured a short siege from the Prussians in the belief that help
must come from Paris. Our diplomatic agent, W. A. Miles, writing
from Liège on 1st October, reported that the burgomasters of Utrecht
and Gorcum had passed through that city on their way to Paris in the
conviction that “France would never leave them in the lurch, and that
her troops would certainly march to the relief of Amsterdam.”[580]
Their consternation must have been great on reaching Givet to find that
there was no camp there.[581] The truth then flashed upon them that the
French agents had relied on bluster and the Free Corps. Disappointment
at the inaction of the French Court probably hastened the surrender
of Amsterdam, which opened its gates on 10th October. The capture by
the Prussians of many French soldiers, who declared that they were
acting for that Government, revealed the sinister conduct of some,
at least, of the French Ministers, and of Vérac.[582] A letter of
Grenville to Eden on 26th October 1787 shows the surprise and disgust
of our Ministers at this flagrant bad faith. He says he is “mortified”
at finding that Ségur, Minister for War, had sent signed orders for
parties of French artillerymen to march north to the frontier, and
put themselves under the command of an adventurer named Esterhazy.
“His (Ségur’s) orders again expressly direct the march into Holland in
disguise, and point out the places where the men are to be equipped
with _habits de paysan_ for this purpose.”[583]
The surrender of Amsterdam gave the last blow to the war party at
Versailles. Up to 14th October Pitt felt the utmost concern, as appears
in his letter of that date to Eden; but the reply of that envoy three
days later showed that Ségur and his colleagues now bowed to the
inevitable. Their peaceful mood was doubtless confirmed by the evasive
and discouraging answer sent by Austria to the appeal for help.[584]
The Emperor had a large force in Belgium, but none too large to hold
down that people. Moreover, the prospect of war with Turkey imposed
caution at Vienna.
The chief danger now was that France would join Russia and Austria
in the dismemberment of Turkey. Fear of such a step haunted Pitt, who
always surveyed the Dutch Question from the standpoint of India. Thus
we find him on 8th October charging Eden to watch most carefully the
attitude of France to the events in the East. The replies of that envoy
were, as usual, reassuring. France, according to Eden, only desired
peace, and the scheme of seizing Egypt was “wholly wild.”[585] Pitt
therefore decided to press forward, and to persuade France to give
an unequivocal assurance of her pacific intentions, as a prelude to
disarmament on both sides. His letter of 14th October to Eden on this
topic shows a grip of essentials, together with a surprising _finesse_.
While anxious to induce France to disarm at the earliest possible
moment, he advised Eden to humour Alvensleben, the special Prussian
envoy at Paris, and to convince him that we were giving Prussia firm
support and were not disposed to patch up a premature settlement.[586]
Evidently Pitt’s interest in diplomacy, though belated, was keen.
After long correspondence with Berlin, and much demurring at
Versailles, a Declaration and Counter-Declaration were drafted and
signed by the British envoys and Montmorin on 27th October. The French
document averred that, as it had never been the intention of the King
of France to intervene in Dutch affairs, he now retained no hostile
views in any quarter respecting them, and therefore consented to
disarm.[587] This public denial of what had notoriously been the aim of
his Government, and this promise to renounce all ideas of revenge on
Prussia, sent a thrill of astonishment through the diplomatic world.
Never had France so openly abandoned her partisans or so publicly
proclaimed her impotence. If Pitt (as French historians have asserted)
had persistently sought to humiliate the Court of Versailles, he could
not have succeeded more completely. But this Counter-Declaration was
merely the climax of a diplomatic game which had taken a threatening
turn only since the beginning of September. The fact is that the French
Ministers, and still more their agents in Holland, had precipitated
the crisis by the actions of the Free Corps at the very time which
proved to be most unfavourable for them. By their conduct they courted
failure; but it was the outbreak of war in the East which made that
failure complete and crushing.
On the other hand, the conduct of the friends of the House of Orange,
after long delays and blunders, was singularly astute when the crisis
came. The conduct of the Princess deserves the highest praise. The
diplomacy of Harris and Ewart was a marvel of skill. As for Eden, he
had little more to do than to obey orders, though he sometimes toned
down the harsh phrases of Pitt and Carmarthen.[588] The action of the
Prussians was trenchant, but it could not have been so but for their
confidence in the promised support of the Sea Power. Pitt’s fostering
care of the national resources, and his rehabilitation of the navy had
made it virtually impossible for the semi-bankrupt French State to
enter single-handed on a war with Great Britain and Prussia. This was
the determining factor in the problem; and every statesman at Paris,
London, and Berlin knew it.
But something more than sound finance is needed in a complex and
critical situation. There the qualities of foresight, tact, and
determination are of priceless worth; and on all sides it was admitted
that Pitt displayed them to a high degree. The restraint which kept
Harris strictly within bounds until the fit moment arrived is not more
remarkable than the boldness which reaped all possible advantages
from the daring _coup_ of the Princess of Orange. Eden wrote on 1st
November, that he had _shuddered_ at the courage of Pitt in braving the
chances of a war with France.[589] But the young statesman knew how far
he could go with safety; he discerned the essential fact that France
could not fight, and that Montmorin adopted his negative attitude in
order to hide that important secret. If Montmorin chose to justify her
disarmament by assertions which were equally false and humiliating,
that was a matter for him, not for the statesmen of Great Britain.
Pitt’s conduct of this, his first great diplomatic campaign, shines
all the more brightly by contrast with the vacillations of Frederick
William and the stupendous blunders of the French Government. Adverting
briefly to these last, we may note that France had little ground for
interference so long as a majority of the States-General deprecated
such action; and, thanks to Harris, that majority, except for a few
days, held firm. The French Government therefore founded its hopes
on the majority in the Province of Holland, and on the high-handed
proceedings of the Free Corps, which it secretly abetted. Montmorin
repulsed two overtures from Berlin because of the insistence of Prussia
that those corps should be suppressed. This action it was, more perhaps
than the resentment of Frederick William at the insult to his sister,
which helped to bring Prussia and Great Britain into line. France also
finally denied the right of Frederick William to gain reparation for
that insult, though she at first recognized the justice of his claim.
Further, when he sent forward his troops, she made ready for war, and
then adopted the attitude of sullen resentment, which rendered a joint
mediation by the three Powers impossible. This conduct in its turn
implied the lapse of the Franco-Dutch treaty of 1785, and the triumph
of British and Prussian influence in the United Provinces. Frenchmen
also saw in this event another proof of the uselessness of the Austrian
alliance on which Marie Antoinette had staked her popularity; and
the _débâcle_ in Holland was a deadly blow at the influence of that
unfortunate Queen. Finally France admitted her defeat in terms at which
friends and foes alike scoffed. Not without reason, then, did Napoleon
afterwards assert that the French Revolution was due to three causes,
the Battle of Rossbach, the Diamond Necklace scandal, and the ousting
of French influence from the United Provinces in 1787. The judgement is
curiously superficial in that it passes over the fiscal and agrarian
evils which potently conduced to the great upheaval; but it reflected
the opinion of that generation, which looked on deficits, dearths, and
bread-riots as dispensations of Providence, of trifling import when
compared with the decay in prestige of an ancient monarchy. Something
may be said for this view of things in the case of France. For years
that monarchy had lived on prestige. The surrender of October 1787 now
proclaimed to the world its decrepitude.
* * * * *
With the events attending the restoration of the Stadholder’s power
and the constitution of the year 1747 we are not here concerned. Pitt
had rightly refused to interfere until the efforts of the Patriots to
establish French influence had become a positive danger to England.
His interest in those troubles was largely grounded on naval and
colonial considerations. If the United Provinces became an annexe of
France, their fleet, their valuable colonies, and their once prosperous
East India Company, would be cast into the balance against us. Now
that this danger was past, he sought to remove all chance of its
recurrence by suggesting the formation of a treaty of alliance with the
Republic. On 5th October the first proposal to this effect was framed
at Whitehall on condition that the two States should assist one another
in case of attack, and guarantee the possession of their territories;
but from the outset the Foreign Office set its face sternly against any
concession such as “Free Ships, Free Goods,” on which the Dutch were
likely to insist.
There was, however, another stumbling stone in the way. The Dutch
felt keenly the surrender of Negapatam to Great Britain, and they
urged that, as that sacrifice had been forced on them in 1784 for the
greater security of our settlements in the Carnatic, its retrocession
was a natural consequence and a pledge of the friendship now happily
restored. The Pitt Ministry, however, viewed the matter in the
cold light of self-interest, and rejected the demand, in spite of
the reiterated assurances of the Prince of Orange, the new Grand
Pensionary, Van der Spiegel, and other friends of England, that they
could not otherwise accept the proffered treaty. Even Harris finally
confessed his inability to bend their will, and he advised Pitt and
Carmarthen not to imperil the alliance on this single detail. Prussia,
he said, had given way at some points in her negotiations with the
Dutch; and it was impolitic for us to be too stiff.[590]
Pitt, however, would not give way. Probably he considered that the
Stadholder’s party, now in power, needed our support more than we
needed his; or he may have grounded his decision on the need of
preventing the rise of any Power other than that of England in South
India, where Tippoo Sahib was always a danger. He refused to do more
than offer to negotiate on this question within the space of six
months after the signature of the treaty. The negotiation was never
even begun; and thus the treaty signed at The Hague on 15th April
1788 was always viewed with disfavour by the Dutch. The guarantee of
the restored Stadholderate by Great Britain, and the promise of each
State to assist in the defence of the possessions of the other, were
in themselves quite satisfactory; but the compact lacked the solidity
which comes only from entire confidence and goodwill.[591]
The formation of an alliance with Prussia in the same year also came
about in a manner more brilliant than sound. Of course, in all such
affairs each Power tries to bring the other over to its own standpoint;
and much tugging must needs take place between a military and a naval
State. Frederick William and his chief statesman, Hertzberg, had just
achieved the first success of their careers, and largely owing to the
firmness of Pitt. Assured of their supremacy in Germany and Holland,
they now sought to guard against the dangers threatening them from the
East. The news which came in the month of November 1787, that Austria
would join Russia in her war with Turkey, caused the gravest concern
at Berlin, and therefore enhanced the value of a British alliance. The
growing weakness of France and the power of Pitt to handle a crisis
firmly therefore put a new face on Prussian policy. Instead of waiting
on Paris, the Berlin Cabinet looked more and more expectantly towards
London.
Already Frederick William had signified his desire for a union with
the Dutch “in order to pave the way to a Triple Alliance between
England, Prussia, and Holland as soon as it may be possible to
accomplish it.”[592] But the Pitt Ministry, distrustful of an alliance
with Prussia unless Russia also came in, treated this overture very
coyly. From a letter which the first Earl Camden wrote to Pitt on
18th October, we gather that the Earl was far more inclined to such
an alliance than Pitt had shown himself to be at a recent meeting of
the Cabinet. Camden favoured the plan as tending to consolidate our
influence in Holland--a matter of the utmost moment. “We have escaped
miraculously,” he writes, “from the most perilous situation we ever
experienced, and shall be mad if we slip the opportunity of rooting
out the French interest in that country for ever ... and that will
be compleatly effected by a Prussian alliance.” It would also free
Prussia from slavish dependence upon France. As for the fear that it
would drive France to a close compact with Russia and Austria, the Earl
treated that danger as remote.[593]
Carmarthen, and probably Pitt also, looked on the danger as real
enough to give them pause. Not till 2nd December did Carmarthen return
any specific answer; and then he expressed the doubt whether it was
desirable to form a Triple Alliance then, as there were rumours of
a projected union between these three Powers, which might become a
reality if England, Prussia, and Holland coalesced.[594] If that
hostile league were formed, it would then be desirable to come to
terms, and even to include Denmark, Sweden, and the lesser German
States. It is curious that he did not name Poland; but here we find the
first definite sign of that league of the smaller States with Prussia
and Great Britain which afterwards played so important a part in Pitt’s
foreign policy.
The caution of Pitt was justified. In a few days’ time Sweden came
knocking at our door, asking for admittance along with Denmark. The
adventurous character of Gustavus III will appear in the sequel. Here
we may note that Carmarthen politely waved aside this offer of alliance
from a suspicion that he was planning a blow at Russia.[595] The blow
did not fall until the middle of July 1788; but then the sudden summons
of the Swedish King to the Empress Catharine to hand back part of
Russian Finland, and to accept his mediation in the Russo-Turkish War,
showed the meaning of his proposal at Christmas 1787.
Only by slow degrees did the eastern horizon clear. But when France
showed her resentment at the participation of Austria in the Turkish
War, the spectre of a hostile Triple Alliance was laid; and then, but
not till then, Pitt showed more favour to the Prussian proposals. Yet
here again there was need of caution. The Eastern Question touched
Prussia far more closely than England. If Joseph II gained his heart’s
desire--Moldavia and Wallachia--and Catharine extended her boundary to
the River Dniester, the greatness and even the safety of Prussia and of
Poland would be hopelessly compromised.[596] Accordingly Prussia sought
by all means short of drawing the sword to help the Turks in their
unequal struggle. She cantoned large forces near the Austrian border,
hinted that she would be glad to offer her mediation for the purpose
of securing a reasonable peace, and sent an official disguised as a
merchant by way of Venice to Constantinople in order to encourage the
Sultan to a vigorous prosecution of the war.[597] Hertzberg also urged
the formation of a league between Prussia, England, and the smaller
States with a view to the guarantee of the Turkish possessions in
Europe.[598]
To this proposal the British Government gave no encouragement. So
far as appears from the despatches of this year, the fate of Turkey
was not a matter of much concern to Pitt and Carmarthen. Indeed, not
until 2nd April did they vouchsafe an answer to the Prussian proposal
of alliance; and then they based their acceptance on the need of
safeguarding the situation in Holland. Other States, it was added,
might be invited to join the Triple Alliance in order effectively to
counterbalance the jealous efforts to which it might give rise; but
Great Britain declined to bind herself to any guarantee of the Sultan’s
dominions. If he were in sore straits, Great Britain would support
Prussia in gaining reasonable terms for him, but she would not favour
any active intervention on his behalf. Still less would she support the
notion (outlined by Hertzberg) that Prussia should acquire an indemnity
for any gains that Austria might make in the present war.[599] The
keynote of British policy was firmly struck in this sentence: “The
great object which we have in view is the continuance of peace, as far
as that is not inconsistent with our essential interests. It is with
that view that the alliance of Holland has been thought so material,
as rendering any attack upon us less probable. With the same view we
are desirous of cultivating the closest connections with the Court of
Berlin.”[600] That is to say, the proposed Triple Alliance was to be a
purely defensive league for the safeguarding of the three States and
their colonies.
At Berlin, however, now that Catharine had finally waved aside the
friendly offers of British and Prussian mediation, the Eastern crisis
eclipsed all other topics. By degrees Hertzberg laid his plans for the
aggrandizement of Prussia, whatever might befall the Turks.[601] As
will appear more fully in a later chapter, he expected that Joseph II
would gain the whole, or large parts, of Moldavia and Wallachia. The
armed mediation of Prussia was to lessen these acquisitions; and as a
set-off to them Austria must cede Galicia to the Poles; while their
gratitude for the recovery of that great province, torn from them in
1772, was to show itself in the cession to Prussia of the important
fortresses and districts, Danzig and Thorn, so necessary for the
rounding off of her ragged borders on the East. Such was the scheme
which took shape in Hertzberg’s fertile brain, and dominated Prussian
policy down to the summer of the year 1791.
The watchful Ewart forwarded to Whitehall details of this gigantic
“deal” (if we may use the Americanism); and as the scheme came to light
it aroused deep distrust at Whitehall. At once the Prussian proposal
wore a new aspect; and the draft of a treaty drawn up in this sense in
the middle of April left little hope of a settlement between the two
Powers. In reply to its proposals Pitt and Carmarthen pointed out the
vagueness of the Prussian suggestions respecting Turkey, but hinted
that an opportunity might come for befriending the Sultan if he were
too hard pressed. Further, while promising to help Prussia if she were
attacked, they again demanded the like succour from her if any of our
colonies were assailed. They also desired to bring into the league
Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal. For the present, however, they sought to
limit the Anglo-Prussian understanding to the Dutch guarantee, though
a closer compact was to be discussed during the visit of the Prussian
monarch to his sister at Loo.[602]
This last suggestion was for Ewart himself. The others he was to pass
on to Hertzberg. That Minister chafed at this further rebuff to his
plans, which now comprised the offer of the armed mediation of Prussia,
England, and Holland to Catharine and Joseph. The fondness of Frederick
William for France once more appeared; and the French party at Berlin
venomously raised its head. England, they avowed, would gain everything
from this one-sided compact; for her colonies were to be found in every
sea. Why should the troops of the great Frederick be set in motion to
help the islanders every time that one of their colonial governors lost
his temper? Finally the King declared that he would not send his troops
beyond the bounds of Germany and Holland.[603]
There seemed little chance of an agreement between the two Courts,
until Frederick William set out for his visit to the Prince and
Princess of Orange at Loo, and let fall the remark that he hoped to see
Sir James Harris there. Already that envoy had asked permission to come
to London; and, with the zeal of a convert to the Prussian alliance,
he convinced Ministers of its desirability, even if they gave way on
certain points. The Instructions drawn up for him on 6th June set forth
the need of an Anglo-Prussian alliance in order “to contribute to
the general tranquillity.” He was also to sound the Prussian monarch
as to the inclusion of other Powers, especially Sweden and Denmark;
but discussions on this matter were not to stand in the way of the
signature of the treaty.[604] George III, now a firm supporter of peace
principles, favoured the scheme, as appears from his letter of the same
date to the Princess of Orange. He there stated that he approved of
an alliance with Prussia, though there might not be time to gain the
adhesion of other States; and he expressed the hope that this compact
would lead Austria and France to desire the continuance of peace, and
thereby conduce to the termination of war in the East.[605]
Fortified by these opinions of the King and Cabinet, Harris prepared to
play the game boldly. His handsome person, grand air, and consciousness
of former victories gave him an advantage in the discussions with
Frederick William, who, thanks to the tact of the Princess, laid aside
his earlier prepossessions against the “dictator,” and entered into his
views. In order to keep the impressionable monarch free from disturbing
influences, Harris paid the sum of 200 ducats to a chamberlain if he
would ensure the exclusion of a noted partisan of France, Colonel
Stein, from the royal chamber during a critical stage in the healing
process. The climax came during a ball on 12–13th June. After midnight
the King sought out Harris, invited him to walk in the garden, admitted
the force of his arguments in favour of an immediate signature of the
proposed treaty, and allowed him to speak to his Minister, Alvensleben.
While fireworks blazed and courtiers danced, the two Ministers drew
up a provisional treaty, to which the King assented on the following
morning, 13th June 1788.
The news of the signature of the Provisional Treaty of Loo was received
at Berlin with an outburst of rage, when it appeared that nearly all
the aims and safeguards striven for by Ministers and Francophiles had
disappeared. Further negotiations ensued at Berlin; but they brought
no material change to the Loo compact. The treaty signed at Berlin by
Hertzberg and Ewart on 13th August 1788 was defensive in character.
Each State promised to help the other, in case of attack, by a force of
20,000 men; but Great Britain was not to use such a force of Prussians
outside Europe or even at Gibraltar. That contingent might be increased
if need arose; or it might be replaced by a money equivalent. As was
stipulated at Loo, the two Powers pledged themselves to uphold the
integrity of the United Provinces and of their present constitution,
and to defend that State by all possible means, in case of attack,
the Dutch also affording armed help to either ally, if it were
attacked. Two secret articles were added to the Berlin Treaty, the one
stipulating that no military aid should be given to the party attacked
unless the latter had on foot at least 44,000 men; the second provided
that a British fleet should assist Prussia if the latter applied for
it.[606]
Thus was formed an imposing league. The splendid army of Prussia,
backed by the fleets and resources of Great Britain and the Dutch
Republic, constituted a force which during three years was to maintain
peace and assure the future of the smaller States. If we remember the
state of woeful isolation of England up to the summer of 1787, the
contrast in her position a year later is startling. It came about owing
to the caution of Pitt in a time when precipitate action would have
marred everything. His wise delay in the early stages of the Dutch
crisis, and his diplomatic coyness in the bargaining with Prussia are
alike admirable.[607] The British envoys, Ewart and Harris (Keith at
Vienna deserves also to be named) were men of unusual capacity and
courage; but then as now success depended mainly on the chief; and it
has been shown that the guiding hand at Whitehall was that of Pitt.
His diplomatic triumphs recorded in this chapter were to have a marked
influence on the future of Europe. It is not generally known how acute
was the danger arising from the schemes of Catharine II and Joseph
II. In popular imagination the premonitory rumblings of the French
Revolution rivet the attention of the world to the exclusion of all
else; but a perusal of the letters of statesmen shows that nine-tenths
of their time were given to thwarting the plans of the imperial
revolutionists. In truth French democracy could not have gained its
rapid and easy triumphs had not the monarchies of Central and Eastern
Europe shaken the old order of things to its base, so that even the
intelligent conservatism of Pitt failed to uphold the historic fabric
from the attacks that came from the East and the West. Well was it for
Great Britain that her diplomatic position was fully assured by the
autumn of the year 1788. For at that time lunacy beset her monarch,
paralyzed her executive government, and threatened to place her
fortunes at the mercy of a dissolute prince.