L’ENTENTE CORDIALE
(1786)
Thy father’s fame with thine fair Truth shall blend.
His vigour saved from foreign foes the land,
Thy prudence makes each foreign foe a friend.
REV. W. MASON TO PITT, 1786.
The nation is but the family writ large; and, just as families after
a ruinous quarrel sometimes win their way back towards prudence and
friendliness, so too nations now and again feel the force of the
sociable instincts. Such a time was now at hand for Great Britain
and France. The eight years of the American War of Independence had
increased the debt of the Island Power by £115,000,000;[450] and so
wasteful had been the conduct of the war by France that in the years
1778–1783, she had exceeded the total of her already large peace
expenditure by £66,000,000.[451] Further, as that struggle brought to
her few results beyond the satisfaction of rending the British Empire
in twain, she was scarcely the better for it. In truth, while defeat
led patriotic Britons to tread the humble paths of retrenchment and
reform, the triumph of France allured her politicians into the stately
avenues ending in bankruptcy and Revolution.
During the period of war, philosophy, science, and industry had
been waging their peaceful campaigns; and now in the exhaustion or
quiescence which beset both peoples, the still small voice of reason
was heard. The responsiveness of thought in England and France is
one of the most remarkable facts in the eighteenth century. Though
political rivalry had five times over embroiled those peoples in deadly
strife, yet their thinkers had never ceased to feel the thrill of
sympathetic ideas, originated by “the natural enemy,” which proved
to be no less potent than the divulsive forces of statecraft. The
Marconigrams of thought pass through storms, whether atmospheric
or political; and it may be that finally the nations will become
sounding-boards responding more and more to progressive ideas, and less
and less to the passions of mankind.
Certainly the mental sympathy of England and France in that century was
strongly marked. As is well known, the philosophy of Locke supplied
Voltaire and Rousseau with most of the weapons of their intellectual
armoury. From the English constitution Montesquieu drew many of the
contentions which lend significance to his _Esprit des Lois_. The ideas
of naturalism and sensibility were wafted hither from the garner of
Rousseau. Philanthropy became a force in both lands about the same
time but in diverse ways. In France it was in the main anti-clerical,
springing from the indignant protests of Voltaire against atrocities
such as that inflicted by the Church on Calas. In this land it may
be traced to the Wesleyan revival, the motive which impelled Howard,
Clarkson, and Wilberforce being distinctly religious.
On a lower plane we notice the immense vogue of English fashions in
France, and of French _modes_ in England. _Grands seigneurs_ sought to
copy our field sports, swathed themselves in English _redingotes_, and
rose in the stirrups _à l’Anglaise_. The Duc de Chartres (the future
Philippe Egalité) set the rage for English ways and fabrics, so that
French industries seriously suffered. In 1785 the French Minister
complained to our envoy that French draperies could not be sold unless
they looked like English stuffs.[452] Britons returned the compliment.
They swarmed into France. We find our envoy complaining that English
families were settling in every French town, so that it might be well
to devise an absentee tax which would drive them homewards.[453]
But no influence helped on the new cosmopolitanism so much as the
spread of ideas of Free Trade. Here the honours lie with French
thinkers. It was by residence in France and contact with the
_Economistes_, Quesnay and Turgot, that Adam Smith was able to
formulate the ideas soon to be embodied in the “Wealth of Nations.”
Here we may note a curious paradox. The practical islanders supplied
their neighbours with political ideas which, when barbed by Voltaire
and Rousseau, did much to gall France into violent action. On the other
hand, the more nimble-witted people gave to its trading rival the
fiscal principles (neglected at home) which furthered the extension
of its commerce. Venomous use might be made of this contrast by that
fast diminishing band of Anglophobes who see in all British actions
perfidious attempts to ruin France; but it must be remembered that
everything depends on the men who introduce and apply the new ideas,
and that, whereas France was unfortunate in the men who promulgated and
worked the political principles learnt in England, the islanders on the
contrary had the wisest of counsellors. Contrast Voltaire, Rousseau,
and Robespierre with Adam Smith and Pitt, and the riddle is solved at
once.
Amidst the exhaustion of war, both nations were now ready to listen
to all that was most convincing in the arguments of the _Economistes_
and of Adam Smith. These exponents of the nascent science of Economics
rendered a memorable service to the cause of peace by urging nations,
like sensible traders, to rejoice in the prosperity of their
neighbours, not in their poverty. Propinquity, said they, should be an
incentive to free intercourse, not to hatred. Adam Smith pointed out
in his “Wealth of Nations” (1776) that France could offer us a market
eight times as populous as that of our North American colonies, and
twenty-four times as advantageous if the frequency of the returns were
reckoned. The British market, he said, would be equally profitable
to France. He laughed to scorn the notion that France would always
drain Great Britain of her specie, and showed that the worship of the
“balance of trade” was accountable for much folly and bloodshed.[454]
It is difficult to say whether these views had much hold on the
English people. If we may judge from the passions aroused by Pitt’s
Irish Resolutions, it was slight. On the other hand the absence of
any vehement opposition to the commercial treaty with France a year
later, shows either that public opinion here was moving forwards, or
that the Opposition felt it impossible to bring to bear on the absolute
government of Louis XVI those irritating arguments which had had so
potent an influence on the Irish people.
The influence of the _Economistes_ in France probably did not count
for very much. But they had shown their power during the brief but
beneficent ministry of Turgot; and even when Marie Antoinette procured
the dismissal of that able but austere Minister, one of his disciples
remained in office, and was now Minister of Foreign Affairs. This
was Vergennes. Few men at that time did more for the cause of human
brotherhood than this man, whom Carlyle described as “solid phlegmatic
... like some dull punctual clerk.” A man’s importance depends,
after all, not so much on external brilliance as on the worth of his
achievements; a statesman who largely decided the Franco-American
alliance, the terms of peace in 1783, and the resumption of friendly
relations with England, need not fear the verdict of history. In a
little known fragment written in April 1776, Vergennes thus outlines an
intelligent policy:
Wise and happy will that nation be which will be the first to adapt
its policy to the new circumstances of the age, and to consent
to see in its colonies nothing more than allied provinces and no
longer subject States of the mother-land. Wise and happy will that
nation be which is the first to be convinced that commercial policy
consists wholly in employing lands in the way most advantageous for
the owners, also the arms of the people in the most useful way,
that is, as self-interest will enjoin if there is no coercion;
and that all the rest is only illusion and vanity. When the total
separation of America [from Great Britain] has forced everybody
to recognize this truth and weaned the European nations from
commercial jealousy, it will remove one important cause of war, and
it is difficult not to desire an event which ought to bring this
boon to the human race.[455]
Two years later, when France drew the sword on behalf of the Americans,
Britons naturally scoffed at these philanthropic pretensions. The
conduct of her Court and nobles was certainly open to the charge of
hypocrisy, especially when Louis XVI issued the ordinance of 1781
restricting the higher commissions in his army to those nobles who
could show sixteen quarters of nobility. Singular, indeed, to battle
for democracy in the new world and yet draw tighter the bands of
privilege in France! Yet Vergennes, Necker, and other friends of reform
were not responsible for this regal folly; and they were doubtless
sincere in hoping that the downfall of England’s colonial system would
inaugurate a new era in the politics and commerce of the world.
A proof of the sincerity of Vergennes is to be found in the 18th
Article of the Treaty of Versailles (1783), which stipulated that,
immediately after the ratification of the treaty, commissioners should
be appointed to prepare new commercial arrangements between the two
nations “on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, which
arrangements are to be terminated and concluded within the space of two
years from the 1st of January 1784.” For this clause Lords Shelburne
and Grantham on the British side were chiefly responsible; and it is
certain that the former warmly approved it.[456] Pitt, as Chancellor of
the Exchequer in that Ministry, doubtless also welcomed the proposal;
but I have found no sign of his opinions on the subject. The credit for
this enlightened proposal may probably be assigned to Vergennes, seeing
that he dictated terms, while the British Cabinet accepted them. There
is a ring of sincerity in his words written on 1st February 1783 to de
Rayneval, then his diplomatic agent in London: “It is an old prejudice,
which I do not share, that there is a natural incompatibility between
these two peoples.... Every nation must strive for the utmost
prosperity; but this cannot be based on exclusiveness, otherwise it
would be a nullity. One does not get rich from very poor nations.”[457]
This seems to be an echo of Adam Smith’s dictum: “A nation that would
enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when
its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations.”[458]
Statesmen on this side of the Channel were slower than their rivals
in seeking to realize these enlightened aims. The fall of Shelburne’s
Ministry and the triumph of the Fox-North Coalition led to no important
change in the Treaty, which was signed at Versailles in September 1783;
but the commercial treaty was shelved for the present. With all his
enlightenment in matters political, Fox had a limited outlook in the
commercial sphere. He held the old Whig views, which for wellnigh a
century had been narrowly national and mercantilist. Further, he hotly
contested the claim put forward by the French Government to consider
all trading arrangements at an end, including those of the Treaty of
Utrecht, if no arrangement were formed before the end of the year
1785.[459]
Such was the state of things when Pitt and Carmarthen took office
at the close of the year 1783. The events described in the previous
chapter will have enabled the reader to understand the need of
great caution on the part of Pitt. Though the language of Vergennes
was redolent of human brotherhood, his actions were often shrewdly
diplomatic. In the United Provinces, as we have seen, his policy wore
a twofold aspect. While supporting the Patriots, he claimed to be
supporting the cause of democracy, but he also dealt a blow at British
influence. Though he maintained the Austrian alliance, he coquetted
with Prussia; and, while dallying with the Czarina in order to keep
out England, he made a profitable bargain with Russia’s enemy, Sweden,
respecting Gothenburg. Thus on all sides he advanced the cause of
enlightenment and the interests of France.
It is not surprising that this dextrous union of philosophy and
statecraft (which resembles that by which Napoleon utilized Rousseau’s
advocacy of natural boundaries) earned the hatred of nearly every
Briton. Carmarthen and Harris were deeply imbued with these feelings;
and it is certain that Pitt, while taking the outstretched hand of
Vergennes, half expected a dagger-thrust. We find Grenville writing
to Carmarthen on 25th February 1785 concerning a plan, which Pitt had
formed, for provisionally buying over a Mr. D. S. M. at Paris to send
confidential news, especially respecting the plans and movements of
the French in the East Indies. He was to receive 60 guineas a month
for news sent to Daniel Hailes, Secretary at the British Embassy,
and 250 guineas at the end of three months if his information gave
satisfaction.[460] Other items make if clear that Pitt viewed with
concern the activity of France in the East. The formation of a French
East India Company in March 1785 was a threatening sign;[461] and in
the summer came a report from Sir Robert Ainslie, British ambassador at
Constantinople, that France was intriguing to gain a foothold in Egypt
on the Red Sea. Part of his despatch of 23rd July 1785 is worth quoting:
... The Porte has varied in her general opposition to establishing
a trade through Egypt, by opening the navigation of the Red Sea to
the flag of Christian Powers. The present undertaking and the late
French mission to Cairo was in consequence of a plan devised by the
late French ambassador to ruin our East India Company by an illicit
trade under the protection of France, in which it was thought the
Company’s servants would join most heartily. It is clear that
France adopted this scheme, but I can pledge myself the Porte was
not consulted and that she will never protect a project by far
more dangerous to her own interests than even to ours. It seems
Count Priest hoped to elude the Ottoman bad humour by employing the
navigation of the flags of all Christian Powers indiscriminately
and to secure his trade by the protection of the Beys of Egypt, who
certainly have aimed at absolute independence ever since the time
of Ali Bey.[462]
The correspondence of Sir James Harris with Carmarthen shows that
our Ministry kept a watchful eye on any symptoms which portended a
union of the Dutch East India Company with that of France. Indeed,
as we shall see, the reasons which prompted the resolute action of
Pitt at the crisis of 1787 in Holland were largely based on naval and
colonial considerations. Matters in the East were in an uneasy state.
Once again, in January 1786, Hailes reported that the unsettled state
of Egypt was known to be attracting the notice of the French Foreign
Office, probably with a view to conquest.[463] The efforts which France
put forth in 1785–6 for the construction of a great naval fortress at
Cherbourg also claimed attention; and Britons were not calmed by the
philosophic reflections of some peace-loving Gauls that the completion
of that mighty harbour would render it impossible for England to make
war on France.
* * * * *
In view of the lowering political horizon, is it surprising that
Pitt was very cautious in responding to the proposals of the French
Cabinet for a friendly commercial treaty? It is incorrect to say, as
Harris did in a rather peevish outburst, that Pitt was too occupied
with Parliament to attend to foreign affairs.[464] We now know that
he paid much attention to them, though the pressing problems of
finance, India, Ireland, and Reform perforce held the first place in
his thoughts. But he must have desired to gain a clearer insight into a
very complex situation before he committed his country to a commercial
treaty with France.[465] To have done so prematurely might have
prevented the formation of that closer political union with Russia and
Austria which British statesmen long and vainly struggled to effect.
But another motive probably weighed even more with Pitt in favour
of delay. We have seen how fondly and tenaciously he clung to the
hope of a commercial union between Great Britain and Ireland through
the session of 1785. Surely it was of prime importance to complete
the fiscal system of the British Islands before he entered into
negotiations with a foreign Power. To have hurried on the French
commercial treaty before that with Ireland was concluded would have
been a grave tactical error. As a firm economic unit, Great Britain and
Ireland could hope for far better terms from France than as separate
entities; and this consideration almost certainly supplies the reason
for Pitt’s extreme anxiety to assure the industrial unity of these
islands before he began to bargain with France; while it may also
explain the desire of Vergennes to press on the negotiation before the
British Islands had acquired fiscal solidarity. In fine, everything
conspired to impose on Pitt a passive attitude. Vergennes, as the
victor, could propose terms; Pitt, representing the beaten Power, could
only await them. Such was the situation in 1784–5. An autocracy founded
on privilege seemed to be threatening our political existence, and yet
made commercial proposals which might have come from Adam Smith himself.
The British Government responded to them very slowly. In the spring
of 1784 it appointed George Craufurd to act as our commissioner at
Versailles for the drafting of a commercial arrangement, as was
required by the treaty of 1783; but he did not receive his instructions
until September. Rayneval, who had the full confidence of Vergennes,
was the French commissioner; and at their first interview he asked that
the principle of reciprocity should form the basis of the negotiations.
To this the British Court demurred, and the affair remained in suspense
for some months. On 3rd March 1785 Craufurd wrote to Carmarthen that
he was still waiting for replies to his notes of 30th September and
25th November, and that Vergennes had repeatedly expressed to the Duke
of Dorset, the British ambassador, his annoyance at the loss of time.
His resentment had recently taken a tangible form; he had issued an
ordinance (_arrêt_) imposing a tax of sixty per cent on all carriages
imported from the United Kingdom. This action led Carmarthen to break
his long silence on commercial matters and to protest against the
tax as tending to “prevent that spirit of conciliation or friendly
liberality so necessary at this time to produce any good effect for
those commercial arrangements now in contemplation.”[466] He also
hinted that Great Britain might with perfect justice retaliate.
Further, he repudiated the French claim, once again raised, that
all commercial arrangements would lapse by the end of 1785, and
maintained that the Treaty of Utrecht would afterwards equally be in
force. After further delays Rayneval demanded that there should be
absolute reciprocity in their commercial dealings, the basis of the
most favoured nation being adopted where it did not infringe existing
treaties. To this Carmarthen sent the following reply on 5th August:
Mutual benefits and reciprocal advantages are indisputably the
objects we are inclined to pursue in the adjustment of this
business; but to say at once that the two nations shall be
entitled to those privileges which are alone allowed to the most
favoured nations, by way of a basis to the negotiation and without
weighing the nature and consequence of such privileges is totally
impossible; and of this I think M. de Rayneval must be convinced
when he recollects that it was a stipulation of this sort contained
in the 8th and 9th articles of the Treaty of Commerce of Utrecht
in 1713 that prevented those articles from ever being carried into
effect.[467]
Considering that reciprocity and the most favoured nation treatment
had been urged by Rayneval at his first interview with Craufurd in
September 1784, it is difficult to see why Carmarthen felt flurried by
the present proposal.
Meanwhile Vergennes had struck another heavy blow. He issued an
_arrêt_ forbidding foreigners to share in the French trade to the
Barbary States, and on 10th July he prohibited the import of foreign
cottons, muslins, gauzes, and linens into France. At once there arose
a cry of distress and rage throughout Great Britain; and Carmarthen
sent an energetic remonstrance against this further proof of the
ill-humour of the French Government. Hailes at once informed him
that the two _arrêts_ had “been suspended with more forbearance than
could reasonably have been expected, considering the detriment French
manufactures have sustained, and the great advantage we have derived
from the balance of trade being so much and so long in our favour.
People in general think that this strong measure will hasten the
conclusion of an arrangement between us.”[468] Vergennes soon assured
Hailes of his desire for a friendly arrangement, but he added that
meanwhile the French Government had to look to its own needs and stop
the enormous influx of British goods, for which the French public
clamoured. Commerce and finance were then the chief care of the French
Government. On 25th August Hailes reported the pains secretly taken
by the French to attract skilled English workmen. On 22nd September
Craufurd stated that further disagreeable events would happen unless
some progress were made with the commercial treaty; Rayneval observed
that, if we objected to reciprocity and the most favoured nation basis,
it was for us to make a proposal. On 21st October Vergennes issued
another unfriendly _arrêt_ prohibiting the import of iron, steel, and
cutlery; but Hailes continued to assure Carmarthen that Vergennes and
Rayneval were anxious for a final settlement and that the _arrêts_ were
“meant to stimulate us to a conclusion of the commercial treaty as soon
as possible.”[469]
Pitt now began to bestir himself on this matter. In order to have at
Paris a commissioner abler, or more acceptable, than Craufurd seems to
have been, he made overtures to William Eden (the future Lord Auckland)
with a view to his acting as special commissioner in his place. In the
Auckland Papers at the British Museum there is an unpublished letter
of Pitt to Eden, dated Brighthelmstone, 16th October 1785, in answer
to one in which Eden had hinted that he would prefer the Speakership
of the House of Commons, as Cornwall “obviously suffered while in the
chair.”[470] Pitt’s reply is as follows:
It gives me great satisfaction to find that there remains no
obstacle to your acceptance of either of the situations mentioned
in my letter to Mr. Beresford, and that nothing seems left to
settle but the mode of carrying such an arrangement into effect. I
confess I am not aware of any means which could properly be taken
to induce the Speaker to retire at present; and therefore in the
interval I should very much wish to accelerate the execution of the
other idea.[471]
Pitt then refers to some difficulties which make it desirable to
defer the actual appointment until the session had begun. He suggests
conferences, especially as in a fortnight he would be nearer to Eden.
All this bespeaks a degree of nonchalance quite remarkable considering
the importance of the questions at stake. Everything tends to show
that Pitt felt far less interest in this negotiation than in that with
Ireland, to which he had very properly given the first place. The
effort to free trade between the two islands having now failed, there
was no reason for further postponing the discussions with France.
Such seems to me the reasonable way of explaining his procedure. The
contention of the French historian of this treaty, that Pitt was
opposed to the commercial arrangement with France, and was only forced
into it by the hostile _arrêts_, is untenable.[472] He maintains that
it was the last _arrêt_, that of 21st October, which brought Pitt to
his senses--“Mr. Pitt, who did not _then_ wish for war, surrendered.”
This phrase reveals the prejudice of the writer, who, publishing his
work at the time of Cobden’s negotiations with Napoleon III, obviously
set himself to prove that Free Trade was French both in the origin of
the idea and in the carrying out in practice by statesmen. Passing
over these claims, we should remember that Pitt had made his first
overtures to Eden in the first week in October, some ten days before
the appearance of the _arrêt_, which, in Butenval’s version, compelled
him to “surrender.”
Pitt acted with much circumspection. He urged Eden to collect
information on trade matters; but it seems that not until December did
the new Council of Trade set on foot any official inquiries.[473]
Perhaps the Irish negotiation, which was hurried on too fast, had
given him pause. Meanwhile, however, France had gained another success
by imposing her mediation on the Emperor Joseph II and the Dutch
Government and settling the disputes between them. As appeared in the
previous chapter, this treaty led to the conclusion of an alliance
(10th November 1785) both political and commercial, with the United
Provinces, which emphasized the isolation of England and secured the
Dutch markets for France. Thus the delay in meeting the advances of
Vergennes had been doubly prejudicial to British interests, and it must
be confessed that Pitt’s _début_ in European diplomacy was far from
brilliant.
If, however, we look into details, we find that Carmarthen hampered
the negotiations at the outset by refusing to accept the “most
favoured nation” basis of negotiation, and by throwing on France the
responsibility for not proposing some “practicable” scheme. On 14th
October 1785 he wrote to Hailes that Great Britain very much desired a
commercial treaty with France, and was waiting for “specific proposals”
from her; and again, on 4th November, that matters seemed hopeless,
owing to Rayneval’s obstinate adherence to his original scheme.[474]
This pedantic conduct was fast enclosing the whole affair in a
vicious circle. Meanwhile the sands of time were running out: and it
seemed that England would be left friendless and at the mercy of any
commercial arrangement which France chose to enforce after the close
of the year. It is strange that Pitt did not insist on the furtherance
of a matter which he judged to be “of great national importance.”[475]
But his only step for the present was to write a letter, signed by
Carmarthen, asking for an extension of time beyond the end of that
year. In reply Vergennes expressed the satisfaction of Louis XVI that
Great Britain was seriously desirous of framing a commercial treaty and
granted six months’ extension of time.[476] A year was finally granted.
Notwithstanding this further proof of Vergennes’ good will, the
negotiation began under conditions so unfavourable to Great Britain
as to call for a skilled negotiator; but the career of William Eden
warranted the hope that he would bear the burden of responsibility
triumphantly. Born in 1744, and educated at Eton and Christchurch,
he early showed marked abilities, which were sharpened by practice
at the Bar. He also devoted his attention to social and economic
questions; and when, in 1780, he became Chief Secretary for Ireland
under the Earl of Carlisle, he did much to promote the prosperity of
that land, especially by helping to found the Bank of Ireland. He
took keen interest in the treatment of prisoners, and proposed to
substitute hard labour for transportation. The reform of the penal
laws also engaged his attention. He had long been attached to Lord
North’s party, though his views were more progressive than theirs. By
his marriage with the sister of Sir Gilbert Elliot he came into touch
with the Whigs; and, though his petulant conduct in 1782 with regard
to the resignation of the lord-lieutenancy by Carlisle caused general
annoyance, he was largely instrumental in bringing about the Fox-North
Coalition. Consistency sat lightly upon Eden; and when, in 1785, he
hotly opposed Pitt’s Irish proposals, similar in effect to his own of
some years earlier, he was roundly abused by one of his friends for his
factiousness.[477] The same correspondent soon had cause to upbraid
him still further for his conduct in the autumn of 1785, when, leaving
the Opposition, he went over to the Government side in order to act as
special commissioner at Paris. The Duke of Portland coldly commended
him for placing country above party; but the many saw in the move
only enlightened self-interest and felt no confidence in him. Wraxall
expressed the prevalent opinion when he said that there “existed in
Eden’s physiognomy, even in his manner and deportment, something
which did not convey the impression of plain dealing or inspire
confidence.”[478]
Undoubtedly Eden was the ablest negotiator whom Pitt could have chosen
for a difficult commercial bargain; Wedgwood at once wrote to say that
he would have been his choice; and the remarks as to Pitt filching away
a prominent member of the Opposition are clearly prompted by spite.
After hearing much evidence on commercial matters at the Committee
of Council, Eden set out for Paris at the end of March 1786, and was
welcomed by Vergennes as a kindred soul. The Duke of Dorset was
somewhat offended at his coming, and held aloof. Fortunately he found
it desirable to take a long holiday in England, during which time the
affairs of the embassy were ably carried on by Eden and Hailes. A
popular song of the day referred to this in the lines:
For Dorset at cricket can play
And leave Billy Eden in France, sir.
Dorset’s services were, in fact, mainly social. He was liked by Marie
Antoinette; and his _thés dansants_ were frequented by the leading
nobles.[479]
On Eden, then, and Pitt (for Carmarthen felt no trust in the French)
lay the chief burden of the negotiations. It is clear that Pitt now
took a keen interest in the affair; and as Vergennes, Rayneval, and
Calonne (Minister of Finance) showed a marked desire to come to a fair
compromise, the matter was soon in good train. The chief difficulties
arose from the suspicions of Carmarthen and the desire of Jenkinson,
head of the Council of Trade, to drive a hard bargain with France.
Pitt could not be indifferent to the opinions of his colleagues; and
his experience of British manufacturers was such as to make him press
for the best possible terms. That he still felt some distrust of the
Court of Versailles is clear from his letter of 19th April 1786 to Eden
that their financial embarrassments were such as “to secure, at least
for a time, a sincere disposition to peace.”[480] By that time, too,
he must have received Eden’s letter of 13th April marked “Private and
confidential,” which referred in glowing terms to the prospects of the
negotiation:
It is a circumstance which I shall think a just subject of pride
to us both in the present age and of merit with posterity if the
result should be what at this moment seems probable.... France
shows a disposition to encourage our trade if we remove the
senseless and peevish distinctions which fill so many lines in our
Book of Rates; and a decided resolution to obstruct it as much as
possible if those distinctions are suffered to remain. In the same
time all the speculations and exertions of our trade with this
Kingdom are suspended, and the manufactures, the navigation and the
revenue are suffering. Besides, all the trading and manufacturing
parts of England are at this hour disposed to go much greater
lengths than are now suggested.... It is even highly possible that
this treaty may form a new epoch in history.[481]
Over against the enthusiasm of Eden we may set the distrust of
Carmarthen, as evinced in his statement to that envoy on 29th April,
that if France could ever be sincere, Eden would doubtless bring the
bargain to a successful issue.[482] Far less complimentary were his
references to Eden in private letters to Dorset and Harris. From
the former he inquired: “How is our paragon of perfection relished
in France?”[483] In a letter to Harris, who constantly maintained
that Eden was playing the game for Versailles, not for London,
Carmarthen referred to “the absurd and officious letter of our great
commercial negotiator.”[484] It is well to remember these jealousies;
for, as Harris was the bosom friend of Carmarthen, he succeeded in
persuading him that the whole negotiation with France was a trick of
our arch-enemy. The letter of Harris, which called forth Carmarthen’s
ironical reply, ended with the statement that France sought “to depress
us everywhere, to keep us in an isolated and unconnected state, till
such time as they think they can cripple us irrecoverably by an open
hostile attack.”[485] These suspicions must have been passed on to Pitt
after due sifting; and it speaks much for the evenness and serenity
of his mind that he persevered with the negotiation in spite of the
prejudices of his Foreign Minister. Naturally, also, he kept the affair
in his own hands.
In truth, Pitt occupied a position intermediate between that of
the incurably suspicious Carmarthen and of the pleased and rather
self-conscious Eden. When the latter very speedily arrived at a
preliminary agreement, or Projet, with Rayneval, and begged that it
should be adopted as speedily, and with as few alterations as possible,
Pitt subjected it to friendly but close scrutiny. His reply of 10th May
has been printed among the Auckland Journals; but his criticisms were
even more practical in a long letter of 26th May, which is among the
Pitt Papers. The following sentences are of special interest:
The Principles on which the Projet is founded are undoubtedly those
on which it is to be wished that this business may be finally
concluded, both as they tend to the mutual advantage of the two
Countries in their commercial intercourse, and as they include the
abolition of useless and injurious distinctions. But on the fullest
consideration it has not appeared to His Majesty’s servants that
it would be proper to advise the immediate conclusion of a treaty
on the footing of that Projet without some additions to it which
may tend to give a more certain and permanent effect to these
principles.... In addition to this, the Projet, as it now stands
affords no security that general prohibitions or prohibitory duties
may not at any time take place in either Country to the exclusion
of whatever may happen to be the chief articles of trade from the
other. It is true that the same motives which should guide both
parties in the present negotiation might for a long time prevent
their adopting a conduct so contrary to the spirit of the proposed
agreement. But it cannot be the wish of either Court to trust to
this security only. We ought by all the means in our power to
remove even the possibility of future jealousy on these subjects.
And it appears from the observations of the French Government on
the first sketch of this Projet that they felt the force of this
remark. There can therefore be no doubt of their readiness to
concur in anything which can give it a greater degree of stability
and certainty. And we shall probably arrive sooner at the great
object--a solid and comprehensive settlement of the commercial
intercourse between the two countries than by beginning with a
Preliminary Treaty, unexceptionable indeed in its principles, but
which would necessarily reserve some very important points for
separate discussion, and would in the meantime leave the whole
system incomplete and precarious.[486]
Pitt then pointed out to Eden that the discussion of a compact of
a temporary nature would tend to unsettle the minds of traders and
perhaps even to discredit the whole undertaking. Accordingly he
enclosed a Declaration, which comprised the substance of the French
Projet, but gave it a more permanent form and set limits to the duties
which might thereafter be levied. The letter shows that he had got
over his first suspicions and was now working for a more thorough and
permanent settlement than that sketched by Rayneval. The draft of the
British Declaration is in Pitt’s writing--a proof that he had taken
this matter largely into his own hands. The replies of Eden to him are
both long and frequent; but most of those preserved in the British
Museum are too faded to be legible. In that of 6th June he warned Pitt
that France was ready to settle matters on friendly terms, but, as
there were many intrigues against the treaty, Pitt should conclude it
promptly. More favourable terms might possibly be gained for British
cottons and steel; but it would be best not to press the Versailles
Cabinet too hard.[487]
Pitt, however, refused to hurry matters. Indeed, the only part of this
long effusion which he heeded, seems to have been that respecting steel
and cottons. He further distressed Eden by his action with regard
to silks. Under pressure from the London silk-workers, he found it
necessary to continue to exclude all foreign silk-goods,[488] which
caused Eden to remark on 17th June: “With what face I am to propose the
admission of English cottons and the exclusion of French silks I do not
well foresee.”[489]
Most of the official letters between Pitt and Eden will be found in
Lord Auckland’s Journals. We will therefore glance only at some of
their letters which have not been published. They show that Pitt sought
by all possible means to lessen the duties on British cottons and
hardware imported into France, and that he demurred to the abrogation
of the Methuen Treaty with Portugal (1703) which had accorded to
her wines exceptionally favourable treatment. Discussions on these
and other topics were retarded by the long debates at Westminster
concerning the Sinking Fund and Warren Hastings: so that on 13th July
Eden ironically informed Pitt that all his letters to him since 10th
June had miscarried. The close of the session (11th July) left Pitt
freer for diplomatic affairs; he threw himself into the bargaining with
much zest, and Eden more than once hinted that a great outcry would
arise in France if their Ministers gave way to our demands.
Nevertheless, Pitt struggled hard to obtain the best possible terms not
only for Great Britain but also for Ireland. Despite Eden’s repeated
appeals for urgency, he asked the Duke of Rutland, Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland, to induce the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Speaker,
and Beresford to come to London for the purpose of advising him on
several matters that concerned Ireland, especially as to the admission
or exclusion of French linens. This further delay wrung Eden’s heart,
and he wrote on 31st August: “Your political courage goes beyond mine,
for I suppose that you look without anxiety on this fortnight’s delay,
which we are giving. In truth, if it is given in politeness to Ireland,
it is a great compliment; for it is impossible to do more for Ireland
than we have done.”[490] He then made the noteworthy prophecy that, as
the treaty could not possibly adjust all the topics relating to the
trade of Britain and Ireland, it would lead up to a right settlement
between the two islands. Certainly Eden equalled Pitt in foresight,
however much he fell short of him in coolness, determination, and
bargaining power.
These qualities appear very forcibly in the Anglo-French negotiation.
It is probable that Pitt bargained too closely; but the reason is
apparent if one looks at the scores of petitions that reached him
from alarmed manufacturers. Lancashire was well to the front in its
demands for favourable terms; and we therefore find Pitt holding out
for only a 5 per cent. duty in France on British cottons. To this
Rayneval retorted by claiming at least 20 per cent.--“M. de Vergennes
was of opinion,” wrote Eden, “for 15 per cent., and M. de Calonne,
after much dispute, and by the aid of a paper in which I had urged
for 5 per cent., split the difference and carried it for 10 (but with
great doubts).”[491] Calonne, the cheerful and prodigal Controller
of Finances, now began to take a closer interest in the treaty; he
inveighed against Pitt for prohibiting French silks while expecting the
almost free entry of British cottons, and said that there were 60,000
workers at Lyons who would curse him for this treaty. This explains why
the French negotiators once again held out for 15 per cent., and, when
that was rejected by Pitt, finally fixed it at 12 per cent.
Pitt also struggled to gain easier terms for Irish linens in France,
and suggested that if this were conceded, the Dublin Parliament would
probably accept the Anglo-French treaty _in toto_.[492] On the subject
of hardware Pitt fought for the interests of Birmingham, as appears
in the draft of a long despatch to Eden, of 4th September, with many
corrections and additions in his writing. Very significant is the last
sentence, which is in his hand:
If you cannot obtain a reduction to 5 or 7½ per cent. on iron,
copper, or brass, you will endeavour to gain it on iron alone, that
being a point which H.M.’s servants have most earnestly at heart,
and in which the reasoning above stated seems conclusive in our
favour. This is a point to be pressed to the utmost, but if you
should find it _absolutely_ impossible to carry it, it should not
ultimately prevent your signing the treaty.[493]
The treaty, signed at Versailles on 26th September 1786, may be thus
summarized: It granted complete freedom of navigation and trading
rights between the two nations for their European dominions. The
subjects of either kingdom were thenceforth free to enter the lands
of the other without licence or passport, and free of any capitation
tax--a privilege most unusual in those days--and to enjoy perfect
religious liberty. In regard to the most important of French exports,
namely, wine, Great Britain agreed to place her neighbour on the
footing of the most favoured nation by lowering the duties to the level
of those imposed on Portuguese wines. The duties on French vinegar
and oil were also greatly reduced. The following articles nominally
concerned both nations, but in practice applied almost entirely to
British imports into France. Hardware, cutlery, and similar goods were
not to pay more than 10 per cent.; cottons, woollens, muslins, lawns,
cambrics, and most kinds of gauzes, not more than 12 per cent.; but
silks, or articles partly silken, were prohibited as formerly. Linens
were reciprocally to be charged at no higher rates than those levied
on Dutch linens imported into Ireland, that is, at “the most favoured
nation” rates. Sadlery, porcelain, pottery, and glass of all kinds,
were to pay no more than 12 per cent. The highest impost retained was
30 per cent., levied on beer, perhaps because the interchange of that
product was certain to be small. Countervailing duties might, however,
be placed on certain articles. In the concluding forty articles of
the treaty (one of the longest and most complex ever signed), the
contracting Powers sought to lay down principles or regulations for
the avoidance of disputes with respect to contraband and prohibited
goods, smuggling, privateering, the suppression of piracy, and other
subjects. They also left themselves free to revise the treaty at the
end of twelve years. It is noteworthy that each of the contracting
Powers affirmed the principle of seizing and confiscating the goods of
the other Power when found on an enemy’s merchantman, provided that
they were embarked after the declaration of war.[494]
The treaty disappointed the hopes of some enthusiasts, who hoped that
it might include some proviso for arbitration. Among these was William
Pulteney, who, on 14th September, wrote to Pitt in terms that deserve
to be remembered. After pointing out the futility of prohibitive
edicts, he continued:
It is to be considered whether this is not a good opportunity to
ingraft upon this treaty some arrangement that may effectually
tend to prevent future wars at least for a considerable time.
Why may not two nations adopt, what individuals often adopt
who have dealings that may lead to disputes, the measure of
agreeing beforehand that in case any differences shall happen
which they cannot settle amicably, the question shall be referred
to arbitration. The matter in dispute is seldom of much real
consequence, but the point of honour prevents either party from
yielding, but if it is decided by third parties, each may be
contented. The arbitrators should not be sovereign princes; but
might not each nation name three judges, either of their own courts
of law, or of any other country, out of whom the opposite nation
should choose one, and these two hear the question and either
determine it or name an umpire--the whole proceedings to be in
writing? This would occasion the matter to be better discussed than
is commonly done, and would give time for the parties to cool and
most probably reconcile them to the decision, whatever it might be.
It has frequently occurred to my mind that, if France and England
understood each other, the world might be kept in peace from one
end of the globe to the other. And why may they not understand
each other? I allow that France is the most intriguing nation upon
earth; that they are restless and faithless; but is it impossible
to show them that every object of their intrigue may be better
assured by good faith and a proper intelligence with us, and might
we not arrange everything together now so as completely to satisfy
both?...[495]
Pitt, we may note, had sought to take a first step towards the
limitation of armaments, by suggesting that the two Powers should
lessen their squadrons in the East Indies; but to this Vergennes, on
1st April 1786, refused his assent.[496] Seeing, too, that France
was pressing on the works at Cherbourg, and forming an East India
Company on a great scale, Pitt naturally restricted his aims to the
establishment of friendly commercial relations. The progress made in
this respect was immense. Powers recently at war had never before
signed a treaty containing provisions of so wide a scope, and so
intimate a character; and lovers of peace hailed it as inaugurating a
new era of goodwill. “People in general,” wrote the Duke of Dorset,
from London, to Mr. Eden, “are very much pleased with your treaty: the
principal merchants in the City don’t choose to give an opinion about
it; anything, if novel, is apt to stupify merchants.... I never saw
the King in such spirits: they rise in proportion to the stocks, which
are beyond the sanguine expectations of everybody.”[497] The rise in
Consols gave the verdict of the City in unmistakable terms, and it was
generally endorsed. On 20th November the Marquis of Buckingham wrote:
“My accounts are that all manufacturers are run wild in speculation.
Our wool has felt it already.”[498] A few cranks like Lord George
Gordon declaimed against Pitt for selling his country to the French,
but the majority of thinking men, even in the Chamber of Manufacturers,
thankfully accepted the treaty. A Glasgow manufacturer wrote to Eden
that Great Britain, having the best wool, the best iron, the best
clays for pottery, the best coal, and by far the best machinery in the
world, would soon beat the French in their own market.[499] This was
the general opinion. Those who held it said nothing, but set to work
to regain in France herself the market of which she had deprived us
in America. The state of Great Britain and of France in the year 1789
showed which were the more durable, the triumphs of war or of peace.
Nevertheless, there was some opposition in the House of Commons. Early
in the session of 1787, Fox brought forward the question of the treaty
and pressed for delay, so that the feeling of the country might be
ascertained. To this Pitt demurred, on the ground that members had
had ample time to consider the questions at issue, and that trade
would suffer from the continuance of the present uncertainty. The
arts which had undermined Pitt’s compact with Ireland were now once
more practised. Burke twitted the Prime Minister with looking on the
affairs of two great nations in a counting-house spirit; and the
Chamber of Manufacturers, in which opinions were divided, sought to
frighten members by a petition setting forth “the serious and awful
importance of the treaty ... comprehending a prodigious change in
the commercial system of this country.”[500] This stage thunder was
speedily divested of its terrors by Pitt pointing out that four months
had elapsed since the signing of the treaty, and yet the Chamber of
Manufacturers had remained silent until that day (12th February). After
showing that neither our old ally, Portugal, nor our manufacturers had
cause for alarm, Pitt raised the question to a high level in a passage
which furnished a dignified retort both to the gibe of Burke, and to
those who denounced trade with our traditional enemy: “To suppose,”
he said, “that any nation can be unalterably the enemy of another is
weak and childish. It has its foundation neither in the experience of
nations nor in the history of man. It is a libel on the constitution of
political societies, and supposes the existence of diabolical malice
in the original frame of man.” Then, coming once more to practical
considerations, he affirmed that, though the treaty was advantageous to
France, it would be more so to us.[501]
In reply, Fox made one of the worst speeches of his career. He asserted
twice over that France was the natural enemy of this land, owing to
her overweening pride and boundless ambition; and that by means of the
present treaty she sought to tie our hands and prevent us engaging in
any alliances with foreign powers. Portugal, he said, was now made a
sacrifice and peace-offering to France. The House refused to follow the
vagaries of the Whig leader by 258 votes to 118; and the provisions of
the treaty were passed in Committee by substantial majorities within
a fortnight. The treaty passed the Lords on 6th March by 74 votes to
24.[502] In due course the treaty was ratified, and the ports on both
sides of the Channel were opened to free commercial intercourse on 10th
May 1787.
Pitt undoubtedly erred in proclaiming his conviction that the treaty
was more advantageous to Great Britain than to France. He clinched
his triumph in Parliament, but he imperilled the treaty; and it is
noteworthy that he made that statement after Eden had warned him not
to do so.[503] It was a weakness of which he was rarely guilty. The
French negotiators had often pointed out that they were running a great
risk of inflicting much harm on their industries. This was sober truth.
Indeed, their general acquiescence in Pitt’s requests has always been
a puzzle; for the belief of Vergennes in Free Trade was not shared by
the other Ministers, except perhaps by Calonne; and it was certain that
the manufacturers of Rouen, Amiens, and Lille would cry out against the
sudden change from prohibition to a 12 per cent. duty on textiles.
Daniel Hailes set himself to solve the riddle for the satisfaction of
the ever distrustful Carmarthen, who, on 29th September 1786, wrote
to him privately: “our suspicions of the good faith and friendly
professions of France in political matters ought to be in exact
proportion to the facility she may have evinced upon matters purely
commercial.” He further suggested that her aim was perhaps to sever our
good relations with States with which we had political and commercial
ties.[504] Hailes, doubtless taking his cue from his chief, thereupon
sought to find out the motives which had influenced the French
Ministry, and summed up his conclusions in a long report. It gives an
interesting but somewhat jaundiced account of affairs in that very
critical year 1786--the year of the Diamond Necklace scandal and of the
decision to convoke the Chamber of Notables for the rectification of
abuses too deep-seated for Louis XVI to uproot. The report is too long
to quote here except in its most important passage; but we may glance
at its salient features. Hailes pointed out that France suffered nearly
as much as England from the late war, which left her with a National
Debt almost exactly equal to that of her rival; also that the hopes of
Frenchmen to gain the trade of the United States had been blighted. The
Court of Versailles had, moreover, not exercised “the wise management
of venality and the œconomy of corruption and favor” which would
have satisfied most of the privileged classes. Its partiality was as
notorious as its extravagance; and the failure of the old commercial
prohibitive system, as also of the recent prohibitive _arrêts_, was
probably due to the corruption prevalent in Court and official circles;
for, to quote Hailes’s words:
Every one having credit enough with the great, or the mistresses of
the great, to procure an exemption, would not have failed to apply
for it in favour of some dependent or other. It seems therefore
probable that the French Government felt its own inability to give
effect to its prohibitory laws against the importation of British
manufactures, and in that respect, at all events, they may be said
to have been gainers by the treaty.
But I think I can take upon me to assure your Lordship that there
exists another and no less principal cause of the eagerness of
France to conclude the commercial arrangement. I mean that of the
immediate relief of the _Trésor Royal_ by the increase of the
Revenue, an increase which, it may be presumed, will prove immense,
from the sudden influx of all sorts of British merchandise paying
the legal duties, as soon as the Treaty shall take effect. If this
opinion should prove to be well grounded (and from the attention
which I have paid to the late conduct of the Comptroller General
[Calonne] I am much inclined to think it is) it will be a strong
mark of the corruption of that Minister, who sacrifices to an
immediate and temporary resource the dearest interests of his
country.[505]
We need not lay much stress on the personal arguments here adduced;
for Hailes may have been unduly influenced by the partisans of Necker
or Breteuil, who were always at feud with Calonne. It is probable that
Vergennes and Calonne were swayed by a deeper motive, namely, the
desire to keep England quiet and friendly while they laid their schemes
with a view to the ascendency of France in the Dutch affairs soon to
be described, and thereafter to the combination of their efforts for
the overthrow of British power in the East. Such an aim is consonant
with the philosophic thoroughness of the character of Vergennes and
the ambition of his showy colleague. Whether Pitt suspected some such
design is uncertain; that Carmarthen did so can admit of no doubt.
Much, however, may be said for Hailes’s views. It is generally admitted
that the prodigal Calonne sacrificed very much in order to stand
well with the Queen’s party, and that his ardent desire was to put
a good face on things at the time of the Assembly of the Notables
early in 1787. There was every reason for his concern. The future of
France depended on the docility of the Notables. If they were so far
satisfied with the state of affairs as to pass the reforms desired
by the King and Vergennes, the crisis which led up to the Revolution
might have ended peacefully. Unjust taxation, constant deficits, and
national bankruptcy were among the chief causes of the Revolution. Of
course, Vergennes and Calonne could not foresee events; but they knew
that the future was gloomy in the extreme unless the Notables induced
the privileged classes to take up their fair share of the financial
burdens. If Ministers were able to point to increased customs returns,
the decline of smuggling, and the cementing of friendly relations with
England, the Notables and the nobles at large might prove amenable to
reason (for Anglomania was still the fashion); and all might yet go
well. In these considerations probably lies the key to the conduct
of the French Ministry in the later stages of the negotiation of
1786. With Vergennes the treaty was probably a matter of principle;
to Calonne it was a device adopted in the course of that daring game
of “neck or nothing,” on which he staked the destinies of France.
Though he was the chief sinner, Government and people alike behaved
with incredible levity. Alvensleben, reporting on the situation at
Versailles in November 1787, said: “Everything here is a matter of
ceremony, clothes, varnish, phrases, national boasting, tinsel,
intrigues; and everything is finally decided by forms.”[506]
This scathing report was written after France had lost her one able
statesman. Vergennes died shortly before the Notables assembled;
and they, having to deal with an irresolute King and a political
gamester, turned a deaf ear to counsels of Reform. Probably, too,
they were influenced by the outcry against the commercial treaty,
for it was general in all manufacturing centres, and did not pass
away, as was the case in Great Britain. The Rouen Chamber of Commerce
instituted an inquiry, the outcome of which was a report affirming
the marked superiority of British textile goods to those of France,
and the impossibility of competing with them on the basis of the 12
per cent. duty. An able writer, Dupont de Nemours, gave an effective
answer to the report; but, as generally happens in such cases, the
defence attracted less attention than the attack.[507] We must
further remember that merchants who lived under an oppressive system
of taxation had every possible reason for “crying poor.” Complaints
against the commercial treaty were hurled at Arthur Young in every
French manufacturing town which he visited in his tours of 1787 and
1788. Abbeville, Amiens, Lille, and Lyons declared against it in
varying tones of anger or despair; the wine districts alone were loud
in its praise.[508] Undoubtedly the French textile industries suffered
severely for a time. The taste for English goods continued to depress
home products, and that, too, despite the efforts of Marie Antoinette
to set the fashion for the latter. In 1788 as many as 5,442 looms were
idle in Lyons; but it is to be observed that this crisis was due either
to the continued smuggling of English silk goods, to the preference for
our fine cottons, or to the failure of the silk harvest in that year.
The last cause was probably the most important.[509] The woollen and
cotton trades alone could have been directly affected by the treaty. In
them the conditions were undoubtedly bad in the years 1787, 1788. At
Troyes 443 looms were not worked out of 2,600, and that proportion was
usual throughout the east and north of France.
M. Levasseur, however, who has carefully investigated the causes of
this crisis, attributes it largely to the utter prostration of public
credit in France, and the issue of a coinage of doubtful value. The bad
harvest of 1788, followed by a terribly cold winter, also intensified
the distress. He concludes that, even so, the commercial treaty might
ultimately have been advantageous to certain parts of the industrial
economy of France; but it was applied suddenly in a time of political
unsettlement and general distress.[510]
We must also remember that Calonne had for many months been squandering
the resources of France. In accordance with his motto: “In order to
establish public credit one must cultivate luxury,” he had raised
loan upon loan in time of peace, and it has been estimated that in
the forty-one months of his term of office (1783–87) he borrowed
650,000,000 francs (£26,000,000).[511] No fiscal experiment can have a
fair chance under such conditions; and it is therefore a violation of
the laws of evidence to assert that the Commercial Treaty of 1786 was
the chief cause of the French Revolution.
Summing up the facts concerning this most interesting treaty, we may
conclude that the honour of originating it undoubtedly belongs firstly
to Vergennes, secondly to Shelburne, and only in the third place to
Pitt. It is clear that the French statesman worked steadily for it
during the negotiations of 1783, and used all available means to bring
it about even while Pitt showed no responsive desire. As has been shown
above, the young Prime Minister had good reasons for not taking the
matter up seriously until the autumn of 1785. Indeed it would have
been a tactical mistake to press on the commercial compact with France
until he had put forth every effort to unite Ireland with Great Britain
by intimate trade relations. When those endeavours were frustrated
by ignorance and faction, he turned towards France, but slowly and
suspiciously. Not until the negotiation was far advanced did he show
much eagerness on the subject. But it is the mark of a great Minister
to keep a firm grasp upon colleagues and subordinates at all important
points; and Pitt saw the futility of Carmarthen’s prejudices no less
than the possible danger of Eden’s Gallophile enthusiasm.
The hostile actions of the French agents in Holland, to which we must
soon recur, made him cautious on matters purely political; and, while
pushing on the commercial treaty, which Carmarthen looked on as a trap,
he took care to subject the ardent fancies of Eden to cold douches
like the following: “Though in the commercial business I think there
are reasons for believing the French may be sincere, I cannot listen
without suspicion to their professions of political friendship.”[512]
As we shall see in the next chapters, Pitt generally treated with
wholesome scepticism the alarmist news sent by Harris from The Hague.
But the tidings from that quarter enabled Pitt to assess at their due
value the philanthropic professions of the _salons_ of Paris. Not that
he was indifferent to the golden hopes of that age. After the treaty
was signed he gave expression to his hopes in words pulsating with a
noble enthusiasm; but, while it was under discussion, he showed the
balance of mind and keenness in bargaining which characterize a great
statesman. We may also remark here that Pitt sought earnestly to bring
about a favourable commercial treaty with Spain and Russia, but failed.
The Czarina showed her hostility by granting to France a treaty on the
basis of the most favoured nation.[513]
Finally, we may hazard the conjecture that, if the finances of France
had received from the Court of Versailles and Calonne a tithe of the
fostering care which Pitt bestowed on those of Great Britain, both
countries would have profited equally from the free commercial and
social intercourse inaugurated by this memorable compact. As it was,
France slid fast down the slope that led to the chasm of Revolution;
and in the midst of that catastrophe Robespierre and his followers, who
represented the prejudices of the northern manufacturing towns, spread
abroad the spiteful falsehood that Pitt’s commercial policy had ever
been aimed at the financial ruin of the French nation.