CHAPTER XI

THE IRISH PROBLEM

(1785)

We have the satisfaction of having proposed a system which will

not be discredited even by its failure, and we must wait times and

seasons for carrying it into effect.--PITT TO THE DUKE OF RUTLAND,

17th August 1785.

There is a story, uncertain as to date and origin, which picturesquely

describes Pitt’s indebtedness to the author of “The Wealth of

Nations.”[323] Adam Smith had been invited to meet the young

Prime Minister at dinner; but some mischance delayed his arrival.

Nevertheless, the guests patiently waited for him, and on his entrance

Pitt exclaimed, “Nay, we will stand until you are seated; for we are

all your scholars.” The compliment came with none the less graciousness

because the father of Political Economy had in his work incautiously

defined a statesman as “that insidious and crafty animal.” Pitt was

now to give a new connotation to the word. Almost alone among the

politicians of the eighteenth century, he had set himself to gain a

store of knowledge which would enable him to cope with the increasingly

complex problems of his craft; and thus, in an age when a university

degree, the grand tour, and London club-life were held to be a

sufficient preparation for a political career, he came forth like a

Minerva fully armed at all points.

Among the practical questions to which the Scottish thinker turned

the attention of his age, none was more important than those dealing

with the relations between England and her American colonies, the

desirability of an unfettered trade with France, and the need of a

close union with Ireland. The first of these questions had been

disposed of by war, and the second will engage our attention in a later

chapter. On the Irish question Adam Smith strongly advocated union

with Great Britain as conferring on the smaller island the boons which

had breathed new life into Scotland, namely, freedom of trade and

deliverance from an oppressive dominant caste.

These contentions must have secured the approval of Pitt; for the

outlines of his policy both towards Ireland and France bear a striking

resemblance to those sketched in “The Wealth of Nations,” with

this important difference, that after the gain of independence by

the Irish Legislature in 1782 the union of the two Parliaments was

clearly impossible for the present. We therefore find Pitt turning his

attention to the two topics which then chiefly agitated public opinion

in Ireland, viz., the reform of Parliament and the fiscal relations to

Great Britain. In order to understand Pitt’s handling of these problems

it is necessary briefly to review the course of Anglo-Irish affairs.

The story of the dealings of England with the sister isle in the years

1688–1778 is one that it is painful to contemplate. The efforts to

dragoon the Catholic Irish out of their creed, or to grind them into

the lowest stratum of society, produced a race hatred of which we

are still reaping the dire harvest. The Celt broods over the past;

and his memory clings round the days when Papists were excluded

from Parliament, from the possession of freehold estates, from the

professions and from juries; when they might not act as guardians

or possess a horse worth more than £5; and when their Protestant

neighbours on tendering £5 could take any horse that pleased them.

All this and far more may be read in the pages of Lecky. As for the

ruffianly enactments of the Irish penal code, many of them were so

monstrous as to bring their own cure. In the latter half of the

eighteenth century even the arrogant Protestant squirearchy of Ireland

found it impossible or undesirable to enforce them.

The growth of principles of toleration and enlightenment which marked

the years 1760–80 had some effect even on the nominees of Protestant

landlords and borough-mongers who formed the bulk of the Irish

Parliament. It is a curious fact that even the narrowest and most

bigoted of governing castes cannot wholly resist the tendencies of

the times; and the Dublin Parliament, representing only a part even

of the Protestant minority of Irishmen, was no more able to keep

out new ideas than the members of the pocket boroughs of Britain

could withstand the Reform movement of 1830–32. The infiltration

of novel principles into the Irish Legislature was slower and more

partial, inasmuch as that body misrepresented even more ludicrously

the opinions of the mass of Irishmen.[324] It had long been swayed by

a clique of politicians who were termed “Undertakers,” because they

undertook its manipulation, ostensibly in the interests of the British

Government, but really in their own. The traditions of the past and

the determination of the members of the Protestant Established Church

to keep the Government in their own hands, formed a massive barrier

against change. Yet the dissolving touch of the Time-Spirit and the

shocks of war were at work upon that barrier; and when the war with

the American colonies and France strained the resources of Great

Britain and Ireland past endurance, it showed signs of giving way on

two questions, the one religious, the other fiscal. In the year 1778,

Catholics who took the oath of allegiance were allowed to become in

effect owners of land, that is, they might hold land on lease for

999 years. Further, the odious temptations formerly held out to sons

of Catholics to abjure their creed were also abrogated. That year

therefore seemed to be the beginning of an epoch of toleration, which

it was the ardent desire of Pitt to crown with an act of justice too

long delayed.

At present, however, we are concerned mainly with his attempt to reform

the fiscal relations between the two islands. Until the year 1778

Irishmen were still in the state of economic vassalage to England which

the Parliaments of William III had forcibly imposed. In some respects,

especially in regard to the woollen industry, they were now worse

off than in that time of humiliation. The enactment of 1699, which

absolutely forbade the export of her woollen goods, hopelessly crippled

an otherwise promising industry. Nor was this all. Her staple product,

wool, might not be sent to foreign lands lest their manufacturers

might benefit, and become rivals to ours. That fear was not wholly

groundless in the case of France; for French weavers found that Irish

wool supplied the qualities lacking in their own wool. The result was

the rise of an extensive smuggling trade in that article from Ireland

to France, which the Government utterly failed to stop.

The outbreak of war with the American colonies, as I have said,

brought all these questions to an acute phase; and in 1776 the British

Government so far relaxed the prohibitions on export as to allow Irish

woollens to be exported for the clothing of the Irish troops serving

away from their own country. At the same time Irish fishermen were

admitted to a share in the Newfoundland and other fisheries from which

they had been excluded.

Nothing, however, was done for the most important of Irish

manufactures. The linen industry had not been severely hampered by the

British Government. While prohibiting the export of fine linens, and

of sail-cloth, in the supposed interests of British manufacturers,

the British Government granted bounties on the coarse linens exported

from Ireland; and up to the year 1771 that industry had greatly

prospered. Thereafter it underwent a serious decline. So alarming

was the shrinkage of trade and the rise of Ireland’s debt, that in

1778 Lord North’s Ministry was fain to propose the abolition of many

of the fiscal disabilities which sapped her strength. She was to be

allowed to send her products to the British colonies and to receive

theirs directly in return; but, in order to allay the fears of British

manufacturers, the old restrictions on the Irish woollen trade remained

in force. Nothing, however, could allay those fears. At once loud

complaints were raised from Aberdeen to Plymouth, so that North gave

up nearly all his proposals; and Ireland gained little or nothing from

his well meant efforts, except that ships built in Ireland thenceforth

counted as British-built, and could receive bounties granted for the

fisheries.[325]

Where reason and statesmanship had failed, force was to succeed. The

utter inability of the British Government to defend Ireland against

threatened French invasions furnished the pretext for the formation

of powerful Volunteer corps, consisting solely of Protestants, and

therefore especially strong in Ulster. The Presbyterians of that

province, smarting under the civic disabilities imposed by the old

Test Act, and under an equally archaic system of commerce, demanded

redress of these grievances, in the latter of which the more lethargic

Romanists gave them increasing support. Religious antipathies were

forgotten in the face of Ireland’s urgent needs. The governing coterie

at Dublin Castle failed either to check the movement or to revive the

old schisms. It seemed that the intolerable burdens of the British

fiscal system were about to mould the jarring elements of Irish society

into the unity that marks a nation.

Though they failed to reach that far-off goal, they for the present

won a noteworthy success. By combining to refrain from the purchase of

British goods they dealt a severe blow at the system thrust upon them.

Nor did they abstain from threats of force. The Volunteers paraded the

streets of Dublin with cannon bearing the motto, “Free Trade--or this.”

In face of an overwhelming opposition, the Lord-Lieutenant, the Earl of

Carlisle, advised the British Government to give way; and at the close

of the year 1779, and early in 1780, a series of enactments was passed

at Westminster withdrawing the prohibitions on the export of woollen

goods and glass from Ireland. Commerce with the British colonies was

now also provisionally thrown open to Irish merchants, and they were

admitted to a share in the Levant trade.

At the same time the cause of religious toleration gained an equally

signal triumph. The strength of the Ulster Volunteers and the abatement

of religious bigotry brought the Irish Parliament to pass a measure for

relieving the Protestant Dissenters of that land from the sacramental

test which had been looked on as one of the bulwarks of the Established

Church; and in the spring of 1780 the British Parliament gave its

grudging assent to that boon for Ireland which for nearly half a

century longer it persisted in withholding from Nonconformists in

England and Wales. As was stated in Chapter V of this work, the Irish

Volunteers in the year 1782 gained another most important concession,

namely, the recognition of the legislative independence of the Irish

Parliament. Fortunately the British Government on this occasion acted

with grace and dignity. The Rockingham Ministry advocated the change,

which passed both Houses with but a single adverse vote, that of Lord

Loughborough. The disagreeable fact, that this last boon, like the

others, was extorted by force, was thus tactfully glozed over; and

when the suspicions of the good faith of England aroused in Ireland by

that restless demagogue, Flood, were laid to rest by the Renunciation

Act of the year 1783, the relations of the two islands became almost

cordial.

Causes of friction, however, remained. The royal veto might, and

probably would, still tell against the Irish Legislature, even though

the veto of the British Parliament and of the Privy Council had lapsed.

The influence of the Lord Lieutenant and of his Chief Secretary on

the Irish Ministers was also great; and his influence was distinctly

British. Dublin Castle could also generally determine the votes of a

majority in both Houses of Parliament. Further, it was quite possible

that on commercial questions the Irish Parliament would differ sharply

from that of Westminster. This seemed so in the early months of Pitt’s

Ministry. The beginning of the year 1784 found Ireland depressed by

a very inclement winter; and the cry was raised that her Parliament

should “protect” her industries, especially that of wool, from English

competition. The exertions of the new Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of

Rutland, aided perhaps by the reluctance of the more moderate members

to enter on a commercial war with England, sufficed to defeat these

proposals; but the Irish House of Commons, in May 1784, unanimously

passed an address to the King, emphasizing the need of “a wise

and well-digested plan for a liberal arrangement of a commercial

intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland.” This was the friendly

challenge which Pitt determined to take up. From the outset he made the

Irish commercial question peculiarly his own. More than once in his

correspondence with the Duke of Rutland he describes it as the nearest

to his heart.[326]

No problem could have been more tangled. Ireland was still in a very

restless state. Despite the warnings of that uncrowned King of Ireland,

Grattan, the Volunteers began to enroll Catholics and to threaten

the coercion of the Dublin Parliament. But, as the Duke of Rutland

wrote to Pitt, Parliament “does not bear the smallest resemblance to

representation”; and a petition from a great meeting held at Belfast in

July 1784 declared that “the [Irish] House of Commons has degenerated

into a fixed body so little connected with the people that it ceases

to be a guardian of their property, and hath become the representative

of an overbearing aristocracy.” The petitioners asserted that the

delegates of the Volunteers were a representative body, and urged

the King to dissolve the Irish House of Commons.[327] This demand

was widely echoed. The Volunteers, having already through their

delegates exerted on Parliament a pressure which was semi-national,

refused either to let politics alone, or to disband. Ultimately their

recklessness and the efforts of Grattan undermined their influence,

and they gradually dwindled away; but, for the present, they seemed

able to extort all their demands, prominent among which was that for

the “protection” of Irish industries and products. In his first long

communication to Pitt, the Duke of Rutland dwelt on the urgent need of

investigating Irish claims, though he frankly declared that he could

not understand the commercial question. Open-handed to ostentation, and

devoted to the pleasures of the table, this affable young aristocrat

occasionally showed signs of political foresight, as when he ventured

to predict “that without _an union_ Ireland will not be connected with

Great Britain in twenty years longer.”[328]

Far abler and more painstaking was his chief secretary, Orde, on whom

was to fall the burden of work connected with the proposed Reform. The

letters which passed between him and Pitt in the summer of 1784 show

the care taken by both of them to master the facts of the situation.

Orde (the future Lord Bolton) warned Pitt that a resolute effort would

soon be made to effect the entire separation of the two Kingdoms, and

urged him to “act towards Ireland with the utmost liberality consistent

with your own safety: it must in the long run be the wisest policy.”

Above all he insisted, as the duke had also done, on the need of a firm

decision, which even the malcontents must regard as final.[329]

Pitt on his side sought to procure the fullest information on all

points. In regard to the Reform of the Irish Parliament he deprecated

any extreme measure such as the admission of the Roman Catholics then

appeared to be; but he advocated the extension of political rights

to Protestant Dissenters; for, as he forcibly put it, “we may keep

the Parliament, but lose the people.” As for the fiscal question he

required first of all a satisfactory knowledge of the facts, so that

some general principles of action could be agreed on; and he urged that

the financial relations of the Kingdoms should be regulated according

as the prosperity of Ireland increased with her enlarged commercial

opportunities. Justice required that Ireland should then take her

share of the imperial burdens, which at present rested almost entirely

with Great Britain. Finally they must seek some means calculated to

bestow on Ireland that permanent tranquillity which the late commercial

concessions had failed to secure.[330]

In this letter, dated 19th September 1784, we see not only an outline

of the scheme which took definite form in the Irish Propositions,

or Resolutions, of the session of 1785, but also an instructive

example of Pitt’s methods of procedure. He began by collecting all

the ascertainable facts, including the causes of previous failures,

and, by sifting these data, he sought to arrive at general principles

which would illuminate the whole question. In a word, his method was

inductive. It begun with facts and ended with principles. Unlike the

French legislators of 1789–93, who first enunciated principles and then

sought to square the facts of life to them, he started with a solid

basis and reared on it a structure from whose summit the toiler might

take a wide survey. The Revolutionists built symmetrically and grandly,

but without foundations.

In order thoroughly to master details, Pitt summoned from Ireland not

only Orde but also Foster, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Beresford,

Chief Commissioner of the Revenue. Both were able and masterful men,

the former the doughtiest opponent, the latter the staunchest champion,

of Pitt’s Act of Union. Beresford did much to beautify Dublin, and his

name lives on in Beresford Place. With these experienced officials Pitt

had many conferences at Downing Street, or at the house on the north

side of Putney Heath, which he rented for the latter part of 1784.

They confirmed Orde’s advice as to the wisdom of granting to Ireland

complete liberty and equality in matters of trade, but warned him as to

the difficulty of drawing from Ireland any contribution to the imperial

funds. Here it should be remembered that Ireland supported 15,000

regular troops, 3,000 of whom were at the disposal of the British

Executive in Ireland, while the others could be moved from Ireland with

the consent of her Parliament.

Converse with Foster must also have strengthened Pitt’s resolve to

press on the Reform of the Irish Parliament; for he now warned the

Duke of Rutland, who stoutly opposed Reform, not to confuse peaceable

efforts in that direction with subversive or treasonable schemes; and

in a notable phrase of his letter of 4th December, he declared that

Parliamentary Reform must sooner or later be carried in both countries.

As regards procedure, he thought it best to postpone a change in the

Irish franchise until a similar measure came forward at Westminster;

for this, if successful, would impart to the movement in Ireland an

irresistible force. In the meantime it would be well to take up the

commercial problem.

Pitt’s sanguine temperament here led him into a tactical mistake. The

Irish Resolutions were destined to arouse in Great Britain a storm of

opposition which swept away the hopes of the Reform Associations; and

the collapse of their efforts told unfavourably on the Irish political

movement. Probably also he erred in bringing forward his proposals

first in Dublin--a matter on which Fox readily aroused resentment at

Westminster. Yet, where the issues were so tangled, it is difficult to

say whether success could have crowned Pitt’s efforts had they been put

forth in a different order.[331] From his letter of 7th October 1784 to

the Lord Lieutenant we see that he looked on the Reform of the Irish

Parliament as simpler, but yet “perhaps more difficult and hazardous,”

than the commercial questions then at stake.

Here again he calculated wrongly. Ireland’s demand for equality of

trading advantages with Great Britain was certain to meet with vehement

opposition from our manufacturers, as the events of the year 1778

convincingly showed. His mistake is the more remarkable as he proposed

“to give Ireland an almost unlimited communication of commercial

advantage, if we can receive in return some security that her strength

and riches will be our benefit, and that she will contribute from time

to time in their increasing proportions to the common exigencies of the

Empire.”[332] How buoyant was Pitt’s nature to cherish the hope that

British merchants would concede commercial equality to Ireland, or that

the factions at Dublin would take up the burdens of Empire!

No letter of Pitt’s rings with more enthusiasm, though an undertone

of anxiety can be detected, than the very long one of 6th-7th

January 1785. Writing until far past midnight he explained to the

Lord-Lieutenant in great detail the aim which he had in view, namely,

the sweeping aside of all local prejudices, so that England and Ireland

might become “one country in effect, though for local concerns under

distinct Legislatures.” The pupil of Adam Smith had caught a clear

glimpse of the truth that States which throw down their customs’

barriers become effectually parts of the same body. But he now saw that

British manufacturers would probably resist so sweeping a change; and

he pointed out to Rutland that the admission of Ireland to commercial

equality, even in the case of the export trade from British Colonies,

to which, he said, she had no claim of right, involved a solemn duty

to respond to imperial duties. He then pointed out that Ireland would

have more than mere equality; for Great Britain was burdened by taxes

which were the outcome of those duties; and Irish shippers, with their

lighter burdens, might find it possible to export the produce of those

colonies to Great Britain to the detriment of British shippers. In

many ways he sought to disprove the claims or excuses put forward by

Irish patriots why they should receive much and give little in return.

He showed the impossibility of conceding so much unless Ireland would

irrevocably pledge herself to contribute, according to her ability, to

the expenses of the Empire.[333]

The despatches sent by the Home Secretary, Lord Sydney, to the Lord

Lieutenant, and the letters of Pitt to Orde, contained precise

instructions on this last point. Pitt first desired that Ireland’s

contribution should go towards the navy.[334] Then for a time he

harboured the notion that it should go towards his proposed Sinking

Fund, because that money would not pass beyond England, and would

return in the form of a trade the balance of which was known to be in

favour of Ireland.[335] But the Cabinet adopted the earlier proposal,

with the proviso that the contribution towards the naval expenses of

the Empire should be made in such a way as the Irish Parliament might

direct. The letter of George III to Pitt, of 28th January 1785, shows

that the King insisted on a contribution from Ireland as essential.

The ten Propositions, or Resolutions, embodying the aims of Pitt, were

brought before the Irish Parliament on 7th February 1785. They embodied

the information gleaned from Beresford, Foster, and Orde; and a report

recently drawn up by a special committee of the British Privy Council

also furnished useful information. Modified in some particulars, and,

with the addition of a Proposition soon to be noticed, they passed the

Dublin Parliament with little difficulty. In their modified form they

may be summarized as follows. Foreign and colonial products were to

pass between Great Britain and Ireland, in either direction, without

any increase of duty. The goods and products of the sister islands were

also to be imported either free or at identical rates; or again, where

the duties were not equal, they were to be reduced to the lower of the

two tariffs hitherto in operation. All prohibitions on inter-insular

trade were to lapse without renewal, unless it should seem expedient

in the case of corn, meal, malt, flour, and biscuits. The British

Government required that, when the “hereditary revenue” exceeded a

certain sum, Ireland should pay over the surplus as a contribution

to the naval expenses of the Empire. As the “hereditary revenue”

consisted mainly of custom and excise duties, its increase (which was

generally steady) afforded the best index of the prosperity of Ireland.

Moreover that branch of the revenue had hitherto been under the general

direction of the Crown; and Pitt’s proposal to transfer its surplus

to the control of the Irish Parliament was both statesmanlike and

conciliatory.[336]

Nevertheless, the letters of the Duke of Rutland to Pitt revealed the

conviction even of the best friends of Government that the Propositions

would fail if they were coupled with any demand for a money payment.

The time, said the Duke, was very critical. They were seeking to

organize a legal militia force in place of the self-constituted

Volunteers; Grattan and Daly had spoken splendidly for the change;

but the demand for a subsidy would jeopardize everything, even the

connection with Great Britain.[337] A secret report which he sent to

Pitt showed that of the members of the large towns of Ireland, only

Londonderry was well disposed to the Resolutions. In the case of

Waterford (“well governed, under Lord Tyrone’s influence”) the freemen

opposed them while the two members supported them. Belfast, a close

borough, opposed them. In all, he reckoned forty-five members hostile,

twelve friendly, and the others absent or not accounted for. A list

followed of the “expectations” of members as regards judgeships,

pensions and sinecures.[338]

As Rutland and Orde had foreseen, the assailants of the measure

fastened on the question of the contribution. How could a country,

whose annual expenditure at present exceeded income by £150,000, and

whose absentee landlords drained her of a million a year, pay a large

sum to the richer island? Did not Ireland contribute largely in men

and money to the army? And was not a great part of her administration

controlled by a Monarch and a Ministry in whose succession and

appointment she had no voice? Such were the invectives of that most

acrid and restless of demagogues, Flood. Far more statesmanlike was the

conduct of Grattan. Equalling, nay excelling, Flood in his oratorical

powers, he held them under the control of a masculine reason. As

his energy and tact had gained for his land the boon of legislative

independence, so now he sought to cement friendly relations with

Great Britain, and therefore gave a general assent to the commercial

proposals. The Irish Ministers also pointed out that Great Britain

opened a far larger market than Ireland did; that the industries of the

larger island, being handicapped by war taxes and high wages, could be

exploited by Irishmen, whose national burdens were comparatively light,

and that the colonial trade was now to be opened up in its entirety and

for ever, not on terms that were revocable at the option of the British

Government, as was the case in 1780.

All these arguments were of no avail to carry the proposal respecting

Ireland’s contribution to the navy. Though Pitt had carefully framed

it so that Ireland would pay nothing until she was in a prosperous

state, he failed to meet the rooted objections of the Dublin Parliament

to money going out of the country. Grattan focused the opposition by

demanding that Ireland should pay nothing until her Government had put

an end to the long series of deficits. In private conversations with

him Orde failed to weaken this decision, in which nearly all Irishmen

concurred. A Resolution to that effect was therefore added. It was

further arranged that when the annual hereditary revenue, which then

stood at £652,000, should exceed £656,000 in time of peace, the surplus

should go towards the support of the imperial navy in such a way as the

Irish Parliament should direct. Additional taxes were then voted which

were estimated to yield £140,000 a year.

No beginning could have been less auspicious. The arrangement was far

less satisfactory than the worst of the alternative plans to which Pitt

expressed the hope that Orde would never resort. The contribution,

on the present terms, could be evaded by any juggling Chancellor of

the Exchequer who should contrive a series of small and profitable

deficits. Consequently Orde, who came to London to persuade Pitt of

the need of the change, found him inexorable. Pitt was resolved “not

to proceed until the condition should be taken away from the last

Resolution.”[339] This also appears in a part of his letter to the

Marquis of Buckingham:

[_Secret._]

Sunday, February 20, 1785.[340]

... I am able to tell you confidentially that we shall certainly

_suspend_ the final approbation of the commercial system, and

declare the impossibility of completing it till more satisfaction

and explicit provision is made in Ireland respecting the object of

contribution.

Yours ever,

W. PITT.

In opening his case at Westminster on 22nd February, Pitt had to

contend with the discouragement caused by this rebuff, and with a fit

of hoarseness, which he informed Grenville he had been trying to sleep

off without much success. Nevertheless his speech was allowed to be

a fine effort. He besought members fairly to consider his proposals,

which aimed at settling the relations of the two islands on a liberal

and permanent basis. Glancing scornfully at the tactics of the

Opposition and the campaign of malice and misrepresentation started

by the “Gazetteer” and taken up by various trading bodies, he claimed

that there should be fair play, at least until he had stated his case

fully. It was complex, and his proposals might need modification in

details. The old system of cruel and abominable restraint imposed on

Irish trade had vanished. They now had to complete a new system,

and community of benefits was the only principle on which they could

proceed. They proposed entirely and for ever to open to Ireland the

trade of our colonies except that of India, which was a monopoly of the

East India Company. There was no solid ground for the fear that so poor

a country as Ireland would become the emporium of colonial goods, and

would re-export them to our shores. Equally unlikely was the suggestion

that Ireland would undersell us in manufactures; for British energy had

secured for our goods a fairly large market in Ireland even against her

import duties. He then referred guardedly to the subject of Ireland’s

contribution to the imperial navy. Finally, while deprecating any

immediate decision, he declared that what England lost by the bargain

she would more than recoup from the growing friendliness and prosperity

of the sister island. He therefore proposed a general motion for the

permanent and irrevocable admission of Ireland to all the advantages

of British commerce when she irrevocably pledged herself to pay a sum

towards the defence of commerce.[341]

The Opposition, exasperated by Pitt’s ungenerous treatment of Fox

concerning the Westminster election, at once opened a furious fire of

criticisms. Fox, who held the old Whig views in favour of a “national

commerce,” that is, protection, urged that Ireland would probably

smuggle into Great Britain the produce of foreign colonies, and would

become the “grand arbitress of all the commercial interests of the

Empire.” The Resolutions ought, he claimed, first to have been moved

at Westminster, in which he was probably right. If they were passed,

he said, Great Britain would never have anything more to concede to

Ireland. The Navigation Acts, the source of England’s prosperity, would

be a dead letter. As for Ireland’s contribution to the navy, he would

“trust everything to her generosity, but not much to her prudence.”

Eden, formerly Irish Secretary, then dwelt on the danger of allowing a

lightly taxed country to compete with a heavily burdened country. The

debt of Great Britain was a hundredfold that of Ireland; and, while a

Briton paid on an average fifty shillings a year in taxes, an Irishman

paid only eight shillings. The plan now proposed would be a revolution

in British trade. These words are remarkable in view of Eden’s

desertion of North and his assistance to Pitt in carrying through a

still greater “revolution,” the commercial treaty with France of 1786.

The speeches of Fox and Eden did some good; their attack on Pitt’s

measure convinced Irishmen that it must have many excellences. The Earl

of Mornington (afterwards the Marquis Wellesley) declared that Ireland

would warmly support Pitt. Beresford also stated that the Irish members

now only wanted an excuse for siding with him; but England must beware

of pressing Ireland too hard in this bargain. A rebuff would seriously

jeopardize the cause of order.[342]

No sense of prudence or responsibility restrained the action of the

British Opposition and their mercantile allies. A campaign had already

begun. It bore signs of careful organization. The signal was given by

the “Gazetteer” of 16th February, which pointed out that the Navigation

Acts, the source of Britain’s prosperity, would be virtually annulled

by Pitt’s proposals. On the next day it showed that Irish competition,

based on low wages, must ruin our industries. On 18th February a

meeting of silk manufacturers protested against the Resolutions. On

the 24th the planters and merchants of the West Indies followed suit.

On that day the “Gazetteer” stated that, if Pitt’s measure became law,

the Exchange would be transferred from Cornhill to Cork; later on it

declared that Arkwright and Dempster would set up their factories in

Ireland. On 3rd March the “Morning Chronicle,” the organ of the middle

classes, joined in the hue and cry, declaring that even as it was the

balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland was in favour of

the latter, and that the larger island must be drained of money by the

smaller if the old restrictions were not maintained.

Meetings of protest were now in full swing. Delegates of the West

India merchants had an interview with Pitt and declared his answer to

be unsatisfactory. The merchants themselves refused, by fifty-nine to

forty, to petition against his proposals, but the minority published

and circulated their opinions. The manufacturing towns, except those

of the woollen districts, petitioned strongly against the Resolutions.

Manchester, Lancaster, and Dudley each sent two petitions to that

effect; while three apiece emanated from Glasgow, Paisley, and Bristol.

So the game of misrepresentation went on. A petition from Lancashire

contained 80,000 signatures; and a document purporting to come from

13,243 weavers of Glasgow and Rutherglen, shows that artisans were as

much alarmed as the merchants. The weavers stated their conviction

that if the Resolutions became law, they would be undersold by the

Irish in the home market and reduced to beggary.[343] This solidarity

of interest is noteworthy. In those days the “manufacturer” was

actually, as well as in name, the weaver; and tens of thousands of

households, where the hand-loom kept the wolf from the door through

the winter, saw pale Ruin stalking behind the figure of thrifty,

resourceful, energetic Paddy. The agitation therefore spread through

all classes with a unanimity that would scarcely be possible now,

when the term “manufacturer” has come to mean a capitalist who owns a

factory where nothing is done by hand. Then the solidarity of interest

between merchants and weavers was obvious. In imagination both classes

saw their industries wafted by a cruel east wind to a land whose

inhabitants they disliked and despised.

Some of the petitions were based on false information. That of the

Glasgow cotton workers complained that the fourth Resolution, as

it left the Irish Parliament, would place a heavy duty on British

cottons.[344] But Pitt had throughout insisted that there must be

an equalizing of duties on both sides of the Irish Sea, the lower

level being always taken. In truth, all reasoning was in vain. The

protectionist spirit was proof against all arguments. Thus, the

committee of the merchants and manufacturers of Sheffield declared

that their industry could not be carried on without grave injury if

the present duty on bar iron imported into Great Britain, namely, 56

shillings per ton, were reduced to the level then obtaining in Ireland,

that is, 10 shillings a ton.

Still keener was the opposition in Bristol. The protectionist feeling

had lost none of the bitterness which mainly caused the unseating of

Burke in the election of 1774. The sugar refiners of that town now

declared that they had spent more than £150,000 in buildings and plant,

all of which would go for naught, if the Irish Parliament, “under the

privilege of importing raw and refined sugars through that country to

this [should] lay a heavy duty on loaf and lump sugar and a small duty

on bastard and ground sugars and molasses”; for the Irish merchants

would then “effectually prevent our exporting the former to that

kingdom and also to foreign markets, and enable them to send the latter

into Great Britain at a less price than it can be manufactured here

under the burthen of the high duties, the high price of labour, and

heavy taxes, which would inevitably tend to the ruin of that valuable

branch of trade in this kingdom.”[345] The Bristol sugar-refiners can

scarcely have read Pitt’s proposals, which implied equal duties on

all articles at British and Irish ports; and the Irish Parliament had

agreed to this. The notion that Irish sugar-refiners, by complex duties

of their own devising, would soon beat their British rivals out of

foreign markets and ruin them in the home market, is a sign of the mad

folly of the time. Against stupidity such as this even the gods fight

in vain.

By no arguments could the hubbub be appeased. Pamphlets, especially

one by Lord Sheffield, denounced the doom awaiting England should

Pitt’s Resolutions pass. In a short time sixty-four petitions poured

in against them;[346] and the manufacturers of Great Britain, under

the chairmanship of Wedgwood, formed a “Great Chamber” in order to

stave off the catastrophe. Yet Pitt’s energies and spirits seemed to

rise with the rising opposition. In order to emphasize the importance

of commerce, he had recently appointed a Committee of Council for

Commerce, which promised to answer the purposes which that ornamental

body, the Board of Trade (abolished in 1782), had signally failed to

fulfil. The new Council was charged to examine manufacturers and others

as to the relations of Anglo-Irish commerce and the probable effect

of the Resolutions. Similar investigations were made at the bar of

the House of Commons. Pitt cherished high hopes from these inquiries.

“The more the subject is discussed,” he wrote to Orde on 4th April,

“the more our cause will be benefited in the end.... I do not myself

entertain a doubt of complete success.” To the Duke of Rutland he

wrote on the 16th: “Though we may lose a little in popularity for the

time, we shall ultimately gain--at least the country will, which is

enough.”[347]

The report of the committee is very curious, as showing the difficulty

of obtaining trustworthy statistics even on the weightiest topics. The

Irish accounts showed a far larger export of goods to Great Britain

than of imports from Great Britain; while, on the contrary, the British

Custom House returns gave the balance of trade as largely against

Ireland. The committee could discover no means of accounting for this

extraordinary discrepancy.[348] Thus, while protectionists on both

sides of the Irish Sea were croaking over the decline of their trade

and the growth of that of their rival, the official returns showed that

(as they would have phrased it) the balance of trade was so largely in

their favour as to warrant the hope of the speedy exhaustion of that

rival.

In matters which were within the ken of the financiers of that age, the

report was reassuring. The woollen manufacturers of Norwich declared

that, though the wages of Irish spinners were less by one-half than

those of English spinners, Irish competition was not to be feared under

the conditions now proposed. Everett, a London merchant, maintained

that the British manufacturers, owing to their skill, taste, and

ingenuity, would always have a superiority over those of Ireland,

provided that British sheep and wool were not exported thither. Nine

woollen manufacturers of Yorkshire were decidedly of this opinion. The

chief clothier of Devizes expected harm from Irish competition only

in the cheaper stuffs.[349] For the cotton industry the evidence was

less encouraging, the witnesses from Manchester claiming that Irish

thread could be spun 20 per cent. cheaper than British thread, and

that an import duty of 10½ per cent. was needed to protect the home

market.[350] Representative silk merchants of London and Scotland had

little apprehension for the future, until the Irish workers developed

skill and taste.[351] As for the iron trade, the evidence of eight

iron-masters who were examined refuted the reasoning of the Sheffield

petition. Provided that Ireland did not pay a smaller duty than Great

Britain on imports of bar iron, they asserted that they could hold

their own against her small and struggling iron industry.[352]

In face of the alarmist statements of Wedgwood in public, his evidence

before the committee is of some interest. When asked whether he feared

Irish competition in pottery if the duties in both kingdoms were

equalized, he replied that “there might be danger of a competition in

time, in their own and every foreign market.[353] I should think we

were safer if earthenware was allowed to be imported free of all duties

into both countries.” This was the man who headed the protectionist

“Great Chamber of Manufacturers.” Wedgwood’s chief manager admitted

that he had only the day before heard that any pottery at all was made

in Ireland. Is it surprising that Pitt sharply criticized Wedgwood’s

tactics?

Other strange features of this report are, first, that the outcry in

England against any relaxation of duties was greatest in the case of

the very articles, calicoes and sugar, in which the Irish Parliament

had recently imposed higher duties; secondly, that whereas much of the

evidence told in favour of inter-insular Free Trade, the committee

decided in favour of a system of moderate duties to be agreed on by the

two Governments.[354] Some such conclusion was perhaps inevitable in

view of the popular clamour; but the committee made no suggestion how

the two Parliaments, now drifting into fiscal hostility, were to come

to terms.

If the evidence contained in the report had been duly weighed, the

scare among British traders must have passed away; but official reports

are of little avail to thwart the efforts of panic-mongers. In vain did

George Rose, in an unsigned pamphlet, point the moral of the case, and

appeal to the common sense of his countrymen.[355] The Opposition had

the ear of the public, and the fate of the Resolutions in their present

form was evidently sealed. Probably Pulteney was right in stating that

the report came out too late to influence public opinion, and that Pitt

had unaccountably underrated the force of the prejudices contending

against him. Now, when the vote on the Westminster Scrutiny alarmed

him, he became perhaps unduly cautious.[356] This may be the true

explanation of his disposition to compromise. In his letter of 21st

May, to the Duke of Rutland, he dwelt on the difficulties arising from

the unscrupulous tactics of the enemy and the very marked independence

of a large number of his supporters, so that “we are hardly sure from

day to day what impression they may receive.”

This avowal is of some interest. It shows how critical was Pitt’s

position in the spring of 1785. As has been seen in a former chapter,

he had strained the allegiance of his motley following by taking up

too many thorny questions at once. The composite elements--Foxite,

Northite, and Chathamite--had not yet been fused into unity by the

power of his genius and the threatening pressure of France. Only by

the most careful leading could he keep his supporters together, and

save the country from the turmoil which a Fox-North Ministry must have

caused. There was the danger; and we may be sure that Pitt clung to

office, not merely from love of power (though he did love power), but

because, in the proud words of Chatham, he knew that he could guide his

country aright, and that no one else could.

Viewing the question of the independence of members of Parliament in

a more general way, we may hazard the conjecture that in the days of

pocket boroughs and small electorates members probably acted more

independently than in the present time, when their action is apt to

be the resultant of two external forces, pressure from constituents

and pressure from the party “whip.” However we may explain the fact,

it is certain that Pitt, despite his huge majority, failed to carry

three important proposals in 1785–6; and in the case of the Irish

Propositions he hesitated and lost the day.

* * * * *

In the second week of May, 1785, the Prime Minister bent before the

storm, and on the 12th presented his modified measure in the form of

twenty Propositions. The chief changes were those tending to safeguard

our West India planters and merchants against the secret importation

of the products of the French or Spanish colonies into this country on

Irish ships. He maintained the monopoly of the East India Company in

all the seas and lands between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of

Magellan, but allowed the Company’s ships to export goods from Ireland

to the East Indies. Further, he proposed that the Navigation Laws,

whether present or future, and the enactments respecting colonial

commerce, should be equally binding on both kingdoms. Respecting the

reduction of duties in either country, it was suggested that they

should not fall below 10½ per cent.; also that no new duties should be

imposed except such as would “balance duties on internal consumption.”

He also added a Proposition concerning the copyright of books.

Respecting Ireland’s contribution to the navy, Pitt annulled the Irish

proposal asserting the prior need of balancing income and expenditure,

and required that the proposed financial arrangement should be

perpetual.

In his speeches of 12th May and succeeding days he showed that most of

the petitions against his plan were founded on error, and he refuted

the hackneyed assertion that, because Ireland was lightly taxed and

wages were low, she would therefore undersell Britons in their own

markets. Considering her extreme poverty, he said, her burdens were in

effect as great as those of England; her backwardness in industry would

long cripple her; moreover, for skilled labour she had to pay as dearly

as British employers. He claimed that a liberal scheme of commercial

union would benefit both islands, just as the Union with Scotland

had immensely furthered the prosperity of Great Britain despite the

prophecies of ruin with which it was at the time received.

His opponents now changed their tactics. Seeing that the Propositions

had been altered largely in deference to their fears, they could

scarcely meet them with a direct attack. They therefore sought to

procure their rejection, if not at Westminster, then at Dublin.

Congratulating themselves on having caused the abandonment of the first

proposals, as fraught with ruin to Great Britain, they sought to set

Ireland in a flame against the amended measure. It is true that Fox

deprecated the concession of the proposed advantages to Ireland, on

the ground that they would subject our workers to the caprices of the

Dublin Parliament. But he reserved his denunciations for the proposals

which treated Ireland as a subsidiary State, in the matter of the

Navigation Acts. Above all, he declared, he would trust Ireland where

the Prime Minister distrusted her, namely, in the contribution to the

navy. Put that to her as a debt of honour, said he, and she would

discharge it. Compel her, and she would either refuse from injured

pride or concede it grudgingly, while perhaps equally withdrawing her

support from the army. “I will not,” he exclaimed, “barter English

commerce for Irish slavery: that is not the price I would pay, nor is

this the thing I would purchase.” Finally he declared that the House

could not understand these matters so well as the traders and workers

of Great Britain, who had overwhelmingly declared against the measure.

Fox did well to disclaim any positive opinions on these subjects; for

he took no interest in them, and is known never to have read Adam

Smith’s work, which he scoffed at as a collection of entertaining

theories.[357] We can now understand his conduct in declaiming against

the new safeguards for British industry, which he himself had demanded;

and if we may judge from Wraxall, the most telling parts of his

speech were the personal touches in which he reprobated Pitt’s lofty

dictatorial manner, and his novel connection with the “King’s friend,”

Jenkinson. Formerly War Secretary under Lord North,[358] he had

recently been appointed by Pitt head of the new “Committee of Council

for the Superintendence of Commerce.” Burke, who must have approved

Pitt’s proposals (except the contribution from Ireland, against which

he hotly inveighed), made capital out of the new “Coalition,” calling

Jenkinson Pitt’s pedestal, and wittily declaring that he envied not the

statue its pedestal or the pedestal its statue.[359] Other members,

including Fox and Pitt, skilfully played with the simile, and thus

beguiled the hours of these otherwise exhausting debates, which, we may

note, caused Wilberforce to faint in the midst of his efforts to defend

his chief.

The most brilliant, though not the least mischievous, speech of these

debates was that of Richard Brinsley Sheridan. It is needless to dilate

on the Celtic charm and vivacity of this great _littérateur_. Descended

from an old Irish family, which gave to Swift one of his dearest

friends, and to Dublin one of its leading actors and authors, he was

born in 1751, doomed to sparkle. Educated at Harrow, and called to the

Bar, he soon attracted attention by his speeches and still more by his

plays. His “Rivals” and “School for Scandal” attested the versatility

of his wit and the cynical geniality of his nature. In 1780 he made

what was perhaps the chief mistake of his life in entering Parliament

as member for Stafford; for his character was too volatile his satire

too caustic, to ensure success except as a _frondeur_. Friendship

with Fox condemned him almost entirely to this _rôle_ and exaggerated

the recklessness of his utterances. He was the Charles O’Malley of

politics. When, therefore, that engaging political satire, “The

Rolliad,” appeared, in castigation of Rolle, the somewhat roisterous

member for Devonshire, everyone attributed the poems to Sheridan; and

his strenuous denial found little credence.[360]

One of the “Probationary Odes” amusingly hit off the alliance of

Jenkinson with Pitt and the increase in the number of the Irish

Propositions:

Lo! hand in hand advance th’ enamour’d pair

This Chatham’s son and that the drudge of Bute.

Proud of their mutual love

Like Nisus and Euryalus they move

To Glory’s steepest heights together tend,

Each careless for himself, each anxious for his friend.

CHORUS

Hail! most prudent Politicians!

Hail! correct Arithmeticians!

Hail! vast exhaustless source of Irish Propositions!

Elsewhere in dolorous strains the Muse

Sees fair Ierne rise from England’s flame,

And build on British ruin Irish fame.[361]

In these witticisms we have the high-water mark of the achievements

of the Opposition. Sheridan inveighed against the exaction of a

contribution from Ireland towards the navy, and the re-imposition of

the Navigation Laws (certainly the weakest part of Pitt’s case) as

implying a legislative inferiority from which she had escaped in 1782.

He scoffed at the commercial boons as a mean and worthless bribe,

and the whole scheme as “a fraud, cheat and robbery,” fatal to the

confidence of the Irish in the good faith of Britain. The playwright

further exclaimed that it would be a misfortune if the Irish Parliament

dared to pass the Resolutions, and that, as it was not by Parliament

that the independence of Ireland had been obtained, so it was not

by Parliament that it should be given up. This was tantamount to an

invitation to the Irish Volunteers to renew their coercion of the

Dublin Parliament; and it was now clear that Fox and his friends, in

despair of defeating the proposals at Westminster, were seeking to

wreck them at Dublin, if need be, at the cost of civil broils.

In this they succeeded. By substantial majorities Ministers carried

the Irish Propositions at the end of May; and the Lords passed them

on 18th July. But long before this the storm-centre had moved across

St. George’s Channel. Throughout the length and breadth of Ireland an

outcry was raised against the state of ignominious dependence in which

Ireland would be placed by the contribution now imposed on her for ever

in return for greatly diminished advantages. Fox’s telling phrase about

the bartering of Irish liberty against British commerce was on every

lip. The results were at once obvious. Though Pitt, with his usually

sanguine forecast, had expressed the belief that the Dublin Parliament

would be more manageable than that of Westminster, it set at naught

all the Viceregal blandishments. Some of its members even taunted

Pitt with acting treacherously towards Ireland throughout. Grattan,

while refraining from this taunt, opposed the new scheme, especially

clause iv and the perpetual contribution, in a speech which the Lord

Lieutenant described to Pitt as “seditious and inflammatory to a degree

scarcely credible.” Flood excelled himself in recklessness; and in that

body of usually subservient placemen, leave to bring in the Bill was

granted only by a majority of nineteen (12th August).

* * * * *

In face of this storm-signal the Irish Government decided to furl

their sails and come to anchor. The measure was deferred to another

session; and of course was never heard of again. Considering the “very

great clamour”[362] in the country, this was inevitable; and Dublin

manifested its joy by a spontaneous and general illumination. Woodfall,

an opponent of Pitt’s policy, admitted to Eden that neither the

populace nor the members could explain the cause of their recent fury

or their present joy.[363] The excitement soon abated; and it must be

allowed that the popular party in Ireland did not adopt the hostile

measures against British trade which might have been expected after the

breakdown of these enlightened proposals. Lord Westmorland, during his

viceroyalty five years later, admitted that complete harmony existed in

the commercial relations of the two kingdoms.

This may have salved the wound which the events of 1785 dealt to

Pitt. Up to the very end he had hoped for success in what had been

the dearest object of his life. After hearing of the ominous vote of

12th August in Dublin, he wrote to the Marquis of Buckingham in the

following manly terms:

Putney Heath, Aug. 17, 1785.[364]

MY DEAR LORD,

I have many thanks to return you for your letter. Grenville will

probably send you the account we received to-day from Ireland,

after a long period of suspense. The motion for bringing in a

Bill has been carried only by 127 against 108; and such a victory

undoubtedly partakes, for the present at least, of the nature of

a defeat. A motion was announced for Monday last, declaratory

against the 4th Resolution. The event of this motion seemed to be

thought uncertain. The probable issue of all this seems to be that

the settlement is put at some distance, but I still believe the

principles of it too sound, not to find their way at last.

To the Duke of Rutland he also wrote in the same lofty spirit, using

the words quoted at the head of this chapter, and adding that, when

experience had brought more wisdom, “we shall see all our views

realised in both countries and for the advantage of both.”

Faith and courage such as this are never lost upon colleagues and

subordinates, especially when they can rely on loyal support from their

chief. Both to the Duke and to Orde Pitt now tendered his thanks for

their tact and resolution in face of overwhelming difficulties, and

thus manifested that kindliness and magnanimity which wins heartfelt

devotion. For, as usually happens after defeat, envious surmises

were rife. Some spiteful influence (probably that of the Marquis of

Buckingham),[365] had sought to poison Pitt’s mind against Orde

as the chief cause of the failure in Dublin. As for Beresford, he

believed that some of Pitt’s colleagues had turned traitors. Lesser men

might pry into corners to find petty causes for that heart-breaking

collapse; but no such suspicions mar the dignity of Pitt’s voluminous

correspondence, a perusal of which enables the reader to understand

why Orde once exclaimed: “I am so sensible of the manly and noble part

which Mr. Pitt has acted, that I will die by inches in the cause of his

support.”[366]

The real reason of failure, as Pitt clearly saw, was the determination

of powerful factions in both kingdoms to wreck his proposals by

representing each concession made to the sister-island as an injury or

an insult, or both. At all times it is easier to fan to a flame the

fears and jealousies of nations than to allay them; and in that age the

susceptibilities both of Britons and Irishmen were highly inflammable.

Twelve decades, marked by reforming efforts and closer intercourse,

have softened the feelings then so easily aroused; and as we look back

over efforts of conciliation, not yet crowned with complete success, we

see no figure nobler and more pathetic than that of the statesman who

struggled hard to bring together those hitherto alien peoples by the

ties of interest and friendship; we see also few figures more sinister

than those of his political opponents at Westminster who set themselves

doggedly to the task of thwarting his efforts by means of slander and

misrepresentation.

William Pitt and national revival · 第 11 / 25 章