RETRENCHMENT
In the arithmetic of the customs, two and two, instead of making
four, make sometimes only one.--DEAN SWIFT.
When the sixteenth Parliament of Great Britain met on 18th May 1784
the arrears of legislation and accumulation of debt were as serious
as at any time in our history; for, owing to fierce party strifes and
the distractions of war, very few remedial measures had been passed
in recent years. The “Economic Reform” passed by Lord Rockingham’s
Government is the only oasis in an otherwise arid waste, strewn with
the wrecks of partisan warfare. The condition of affairs was therefore
becoming most serious; and a collapse could be averted only by the
utmost skill and care. The three per cent. government stocks told a
tale of waning confidence. Even after the peace they steadily declined,
from an average of 65 in January 1783 to 56 at the close of that year.
They were as low as 53⅞ in part of January 1784; and it is a striking
tribute to the confidence which Pitt inspired that, on the results of
the elections of the spring of 1784 being known, they rose to more
than 58. That first essential to a revival of national credit, a firm
Government, was now assured, and patriots looked anxiously for the
measures whereby the young Minister might stave off disaster.
The King’s Speech laid stress on two topics, finance and the East India
Company. Within the limits of a short session Pitt could not possibly
hope to pass other large measures; and he urged Alderman Sawbridge
not to persevere with his annual motion in favour of Parliamentary
Reform, promising to bring it forward himself in the session of 1785.
When the Alderman pressed the matter to a division, he was defeated by
a majority of seventy-four--a result damaging to the cause which he
sought to serve.[225]
The way being thus left clear for the two great questions that would
admit of no delay, Pitt sought to lay the ghost of national bankruptcy.
The imminence of the danger can scarcely be realized. In that decade
we link together the thought of bankruptcy with that of France; but
if those years closed with the Revolution in France and prosperity
in England, the result may be ascribed very largely to the wasteful
financial system pursued at Versailles and to the wise husbanding of
Britain’s resources by Pitt. According to the French statesman, Necker,
the National Debts of the two countries were almost exactly equal.[226]
The pamphlet literature of the years 1783–84 reveals a state of things
wellnigh as serious in England as that which brought about the crash
in France. One of the closest students of finance, Dr. Price, in a
pamphlet of the early part of 1783, stated that the Fox-North Ministry
openly avowed its inability to pay off any of the public debts; and he
asserted that such helpless conduct must carry us fast to the brink of
disaster. Another writer urged that, in order to abolish the National
Debt, tithes must be swept away, the revenues of the Church reformed,
and all citizens must submit to the payment of one-sixth part of their
incomes. The National Debt, which amounted to £215,717,709 in January
1783, was denounced in language whose extravagance would cause a mild
surprise to a generation that placidly bears a burden nearly four times
as great; but, to a kingdom which with the utmost difficulty raised
£25,000,000 in revenue, this burden seemed overwhelming. Dr. Price
summed up a widespread conviction in his statement that the growth of
debt brought about increased subservience to the Crown, prosperity to
stock-jobbers, and depression to all honest traders.[227]
The war which ended in 1783 had been carried on in a singularly
wasteful manner. Price computed that the increase to the National Debt
owing to the war had been £115,654,000 up to January 1783, when all the
accounts had not yet come in; he also reckoned that the last four years
of that struggle had cost £80,016,000 as against £60,835,000 for the
last four years of the Seven Years’ War. This increase resulted largely
from the reckless way in which North had issued loans, so that bankers
and subscribers, and, it is said, the Ministers themselves, reaped
large profits, while the nation suffered. According to Price, loans
which cost the nation £85,857,691, actually brought to the exchequer
only £57,500,000.[228] This resulted partly from corrupt practices,
but also from North’s endeavour to keep down the rate of interest to
three or four per cent.; the outcome being that, in the impaired state
of public credit of the year 1781 he had to allot £150 of stock in the
three per cents and £25 in the four per cents for every £100 actually
borrowed. Thus, the raising of a sum of £12,000,000 on these terms
actually cost the nation £21,000,000; and interest had to be paid on
£9,000,000 which never came into the exchequer. Obviously he would have
done better to raise £100 for £100 stock, even had he given 6 or 7 per
cent. interest; for the experience of the past showed that in time of
peace and prosperity the rate of interest could be reduced without much
difficulty. Nevertheless, the advisers of the Crown always preferred to
keep to a low rate of interest, even at the cost of tempting lenders by
allotting £175 of Government stock for every £100 of cash.
Such was the state of affairs when Pitt introduced his Budget (30th
June 1784). It will be convenient to set forth and explain his
proposals singly and in connection with the facts which he had to
face. The first was the appallingly large deficit, constantly swollen
by the coming in of bills for war expenses. The champion of peace and
retrenchment had to confess that, despite all his efforts to balance
income and expenditure, he must raise a loan of £6,000,000. Obviously,
as Consols still stood as low as 58, he could borrow only on exorbitant
terms; but it is regrettable that he now fell back on North’s plan
of borrowing at a low rate of interest and of burdening the funds
with a vast amount of fictitious debt. He proposed to allot to every
subscriber of £100 no less an amount of stock than £100 of three per
cents, £50 of four per cents, and 5_s._ 6_d._ of long annuities,
besides three fifths of a lottery ticket in a lottery of 36,000
tickets.[229] He computed that the terms and chances now offered were
actually worth £103 14_s._ 4½_d._, and that lenders would therefore be
tempted to lend.[230] This was so. But, for the reasons stated above,
the burdens bequeathed to posterity were crushing, though less than
those entailed by North’s loan of 1781.
As regards Pitt’s personal dealings with financiers, his conduct shone
radiantly clear when contrasted with those of Lord North. It had been
the custom for that guardian of the public purse to arrange the price
of the loan with a few favoured supporters in the City, and then allot
scrip on scandalously low terms to his friends in Parliament, who
could thereafter sell at a handsome profit. Pitt now threw open to
public competition all tenders for his loan; and the proposals sent in
were formally opened at the Bank in a way which precluded jobbery and
safeguarded the nation’s interests.
Scarcely less serious was the problem of the huge floating, or
unfunded, debt, that is, that portion of the National Debt for which
no provision whatever had been made by Parliament. In the main it
consisted of unpaid bills, which had been increased by about one
quarter or even one third of their original amount. It now stood at
about £14,000,000. Pitt ardently desired to fund the whole of it, but
he found that so great an effort would cause too much disturbance
in the money market. He therefore proposed to fund at present only
£6,600,000, forming it into stock bearing 5 per cent. interest and
issued at 93. He defended this high rate of interest on the ground that
such a stock could in the future be redeemed on more favourable terms
than a three per cent. stock which might be worth a comparatively small
sum when capitalized. The argument was surely just as applicable to the
former loan of £6,000,000.[231]
* * * * *
It still remains to notice the worst ills that beset the fiscal and
commercial life of our land. Indeed, we shall not understand the
daring nature of Pitt’s experiment of the year 1784 unless we take
a comprehensive view of the losses, both material and moral, which
resulted from the extraordinary prevalence of smuggling. Never had
contraband trade been so active as of late. How should it be otherwise,
when the customs dues were tangled and burdensome; when the Navigation
Laws, especially respecting the coasting trade in Scotland, were so
annoyingly complex that the papers which a vessel needed for crossing
the Firth of Forth involved nearly as much expense and delay as if she
were bound for Canada.[232] In such a state of things illicit trade was
ever gaining recruits from the ranks of honest merchants and seamen.
For monopoly, too, depressed their calling and exalted that of the
smuggler. By far the most important article subject to monopoly was
tea. That expensive luxury of the days of Queen Anne, a “dish of tea,”
was now fast becoming a comfort of the many. Indeed, Arthur Young
found that the use of tea had spread into the homes of cottagers; and
he classed as extravagant those villages which owed their refreshment
to China, and commended the frugality of those which adhered to
home-brewed ale.[233] The increased use of Bohea was certainly not
due to the East India Company or to the State; for the former sold
the “drug” at the high prices warranted by its monopoly of trade with
China; and on the arrival of the precious chests at our shores, an _ad
valorem_ duty of 119 per cent. had to be met. The increase of habits
which Arthur Young deprecated and temperance reformers now applaud
was due to smugglers. We learn from Adam Smith that Dutch, French,
and Swedish merchants imported tea largely;[234] and from their ports
enterprising skippers conveyed it to our shores, there to be eagerly
welcomed by a populace which found the cheating of Government far
more attractive and gainful than agriculture. The annals of the time
show how deeply the coast population was infected. The large barns
which the tourist admires in many an East Anglian coast village, more
often held contraband than corn. Thomas Hardy has shown how the dull
life of a Wessex village kindled at the news of a successful “run
in,” and how all classes helped to defeat the “King’s men.” The poet
Crabbe, with his keen eye for the stern realities of life in his parish
of Aldborough, tells of his grief at finding there, not the simple
home-loving life of an old English village,
But a bold, artful, surly savage race.
Their sport was not cricket or wrestling on the village green, but
smuggling.
Beneath yon cliff they stand
To show the freighted pinnace where to land,
To load the ready steed with guilty haste,
To fly with terror o’er the pathless waste,
Or, when detected in their straggling course,
To foil their foes by cunning or by force,
Or yielding part (which equal knaves demand)
To gain a lawless passport through the land.
These are the words of a moralist. To the easy-going many the smuggler
was merely a plucky fellow who cheated the common foe of all, the
Government, and helped poor folks to get spirits, tea, and tobacco at
cheap prices. As for showing any reluctance to buy smuggled goods, this
seemed “a pedantic piece of hypocrisy.”[235] It must also be admitted
that Government had sinned against light; for the great reduction of
the tea duty by Pelham in 1745 had almost put an end to smuggling in
that article; but unfortunately his successors, when confronted with
the results of war, re-imposed the old duties and thereby gave new life
to the smuggler’s calling.[236]
The excess of an evil sometimes works its cure. It was the stupidity
of the fiscal regulations in France which helped to turn the attention
of her most original thinkers to the subject of national finance;
whence it came about that Political Economy had its first beginnings in
the land where waste and want were rampant. So, too, it was reserved
for the son of a Kirkcaldy customs officer to note early in life the
follies of our system; and, when further enlightened by contact with
men and affairs, especially with the French _Economistes_, he was
able to give to the world that illuminating survey of a subject where
tradition and prejudice had previously reigned supreme. Finally, it was
in the very darkest hour of Britain’s commercial and financial annals
that remedial measures were set on foot by the young statesman who had
laid to heart the teachings of the “Wealth of Nations.”
It is not easy to say whether Pitt owed more to Adam Smith or to Earl
Shelburne. Probably the influence of the Scottish thinker on the young
statesman at this time has been exaggerated; for it seems certain that
the later editions of the “Wealth of Nations” were modified so as to
bring them into line with some of Pitt’s enactments.[237] Further,
Pitt made no public acknowledgement of his debt to Adam Smith until
his Budget speech of 1792, when he expressed the belief that the
philosopher, then deceased, had given to the world the best solution to
all commercial and economic questions. It may be, then, that Pitt in
1784 owed less to Adam Smith than to his first chief, Shelburne, and
to other men of affairs, including his own brother-in-law, that able
though eccentric nobleman, Lord Mahon. Shelburne was the depository of
the enlightened aims of that age; and, as Price pointed out, he and
Pitt in the year 1782 were about to make reforms in the public service
which would have saved the revenue some half a million a year.[238]
Now, with a freer hand, he took up the task which the Coalition of
Fox and North had interrupted; and in a measure which supplemented
his Budget, he proposed to cut the ground from under the smuggler
by reducing the duty on tea from an average of 119 per cent. to 12½
per cent. on the cheaper varieties, though on the finer kinds of tea
(Suchong, Singlo, and Hyson) he imposed a higher scale of duties.[239]
Even so, he expected that the produce of the tea duty would sink at
first from £800,000 to £169,000, though he must have hoped soon to
recoup a large part of this sum. As there was a large deficit on the
past year, it was necessary to devise a tax which would help to make up
the temporary loss with no risk of leakage.
Such a source of revenue Pitt found in an increase of the window-tax.
Every house with seven windows was now to pay, not four shillings, but
seven shillings a year. On a house with eight windows eight shillings
were paid, and so on, except that houses with more than ten windows
paid half-a-crown per window. He reckoned the increase from this source
at about £700,000. Whatever objections might be urged against the tax
on the score of health, it certainly fell mainly on the middle and
wealthy classes; for as many as 300,000 of the poorest houses went
duty free. The impost may therefore be considered as a first rough
attempt at taxation according to income. The change was beneficial in
another way. The old customs duty on tea violated the canon of taxation
laid down by Adam Smith--that a tax should take from the pockets of
the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into
the treasury of the State. The 119 per cent. duty seemed to challenge
evasion, and the attempt to enforce it probably cost the country more
than the tax yielded. The window tax belonged to the class of excise
duties the expenses of which amounted only to about 5½ per cent. of the
total yield; and the new impost could not possibly be evaded except by
the heroic remedy of blocking up windows.
Thus, both in regard to economic doctrine and common sense (the
former is but the latter systematized) Pitt’s experiment ushered in
a new era in British finance and therefore in British commerce. The
City of London welcomed the change, which promised to lead to the
employment of twenty more clipper ships for the China tea-trade and to
the destruction of the contraband tea-trade to these shores carried
on hitherto by the French and Dutch East India Companies. Indeed, no
sooner did this Commutation Bill (as it was called) gain general assent
than the Dutch Company offered to sell to us its cargoes of tea at a
loss of 40 per cent. on prime cost and expenses. This fact alone ought
to have stilled all opposition to the measure; but Fox continued to
oppose it with a vehemence worthy of a better cause; he was ultimately
beaten by 143 votes to 40 (10th August 1784).[240]
We may note here that by further regulations of the year 1784 and by
what was called the “Manifest Act” of 1786, frauds on the revenue were
made far more difficult. Thus to Pitt belongs the credit of having done
more than any minister (for he succeeded where Walpole largely failed)
to stop a material loss and a grave moral evil.
It would be incorrect to claim that Pitt was the first to light on the
idea of substituting lower and effective duties for the exorbitant
and ineffective duty on tea. William Eden (the future Lord Auckland)
declared that very many persons had advocated some such change, and
he attributed to Lord John Cavendish the formation of the revenue
committee, the results of whose inquiries were now utilized by the
Prime Minister. Pitt, on the other hand, gave the credit of the measure
to his relative, Lord Mahon. The mention of that nobleman reminds us
of an incident which enlivened the debate. While sawing the air in
order to emphasize his hearty approval of the death blow now dealt to
smuggling, he gave Pitt a smart knock on the head, to the unbounded
amusement of the House.
The details of the Budget itself do not imply a very firm belief in
the principles of what is called Free Trade. As has been shown, the
difficulties in Pitt’s way were enormous. The new loan, the funding
operation, and the interest on the unfunded debt altogether entailed an
added charge of £910,000 a year. This sum he proposed to raise by means
that may be termed old-fashioned. Looking round the domain of industry,
he singled out for taxation the few articles that were duty-free or
were only lightly burdened. Men’s hats were now to pay a toll of two
shillings a-piece (felt hats only sixpence), and thus bring £150,000
to the nation’s purse; female finery (ribbons and gauzes) was mulcted
to the extent of £120,000. He also estimated that a duty of three
shillings on every chaldron of coals (not only in London as heretofore,
but throughout Great Britain) would bring in about £150,000; but he
proposed to free from its operations all manufacturers who met with
sharp foreign competition. Further, he imposed a tax on all horses
used for riding or for pleasure, which he estimated at £100,000; and
he eked out the remainder of the sum by duties on printed linens and
calicoes, candles, hackney coaches, bricks and tiles, paper, licences
for shooting, and licences for traders in excisable goods.
Most of these proposals were received with resignation, but several
members urgently protested against the impost on coals as likely to be
ruinous to industry, and ultimately Pitt withdrew it. This, however,
led him to impose a tax on race-horses (especially winners), to raise
the licence for shooting from one guinea to two guineas, to increase
the postage for letters, and to curtail the privileges of franking
letters by Members of Parliament. This had been disgracefully abused.
Every member of both Houses had the right both of sending and of
receiving letters free. As if this were not sufficient, in days when a
shilling was an ordinary charge for the receiver of a letter, several
members were known to sell envelopes which they had franked; and a
large firm is said to have paid a member £300 a year for franking their
correspondence. Pitt struck at these abuses by requiring that franked
letters must bear the name of the member, the date, and the post town
from which the letter was to be sent. By this and other restrictions
a leakage which had amounted to nearly £200,000 a year was stopped,
at least in part. The notion that every Member of Parliament ought
to enjoy privileges which were withheld from the many was so deeply
rooted that the abuses of “franking” persisted up to the time of the
complete abolition of the privilege in 1840, when penny postage became
the law of the land. Thus in January 1802 we find a distinguished
diplomatist, Sir George Jackson, commiserating his sister on the
scarcity of noblemen in Bath, which implied “a dearth of _frank-men_ to
fly to.”
The effort to curb the abuses of that hateful class privilege forms
the best feature of Pitt’s Budget of 1784. In other respects it is
not remarkable. The new imposts have none of the merits attending his
Commutation Act for the repression of smuggling. What is surprising is
that he did not try the experiment of increasing the House Duty, an
impost which fell mainly upon the rich, was easy to collect, and could
be made very remunerative.[241] It was actually tried by North in 1778,
apparently because it had borne good results in Holland.[242] Thus, the
machinery was at hand, and only needed to be more strenuously worked.
I have failed to find in the Pitt Papers the reason why the statesman
did not try this expedient; still less why he imposed the niggling and
irritating little taxes named above. He estimated the yield of the
duties on bricks, paper, and hackney coaches at no more than £50,000,
£18,000, and £12,000 respectively. Further, the tax on candles, though
only of one halfpenny the pound, was certainly burdensome to the poor.
On the whole, it is not surprising that a rhymester thus set forth the
condition of John Bull:
One would think there’s not room one new impost to put
From the crown of the head to the sole of the foot.
Like Job, thus John Bull his condition deplores,
Very patient, indeed, and all covered with sores.
Other persons of a quasi-scientific turn sought comfort in the
reflection that taxation ought, like the air, to press on the
individual at all points in order not to be felt.
In truth, Pitt’s financial genius matured slowly. Possibly he thought
the situation too serious to admit of doubtful experiments. Certainly
he went step by step, as is seen by reference to his next Budget. Its
most significant feature was the endeavour to simplify the collection
of taxes. Hitherto there had been much overlapping and consequent waste
of effort, owing to the existence of three Boards or Committees. The
Excise Department managed the taxes on carriages, wagons, carts, and
male-servants; the new taxes on horses and race-horses were under the
Commissioners of Stamps; while separate Commissioners administered the
imposts on houses and windows. In place of this complex, expensive,
and inefficient machinery, Pitt instituted a single “Board for Taxes,”
which supervised affairs more cheaply and left few loopholes for
evasion. The imposts named above were thenceforth termed “the assessed
taxes.”[243] In that year he also imposed taxes on female servants,
shops, and attorneys. Here again his fiscal policy distinctly belonged
to the old order of things, when men, despairing of finding any
widespread and very lucrative tax, grumblingly submitted to duties
on every article of consumption and every important action of life.
The days of a few simple and highly productive taxes had not fully
dawned.[244] The sequel will show that, only under the intolerable
pressure of the long war with France, did Pitt work his way to the
Income Tax; and the terms in which he replied to the Lord Provost of
Glasgow, who in March 1798 recommended that impost, show that, while
always favouring it on theoretical grounds, he doubted the possibility
of collecting it systematically.
In 1785 we are still in the age of youthful hopes and experiments.
We find Pitt writing to Wilberforce on the last day of September:
“The produce of our revenues is glorious, and I am half mad with a
project which will give our supplies the effect almost of magic in
the reduction of debt.”[245] Equally hopeful is his letter to Lord
Buckingham on 8th November, in which he speaks of the rise of stocks
being fully justified by the splendid surplus of “£800,000 per annum at
least. The little that is wanting to make good the complete million may
be had with ease.”[246] Both references are to the plan of a Sinking
Fund which was to work wonders with the National Debt, blotting it out
in two or three generations by the alchemy of compound interest.
* * * * *
The plan of a Sinking Fund was not wholly his, although it came to
bear Pitt’s name. Walpole, early in his career, had started a scheme
whereby a certain sum was annually set apart for forming a fund which
would accumulate by compound interest and finally be available for the
extinction of the National Debt. This plan came to grief, because in
1732 Walpole began to draw on his own fund rather than increase the
Land Tax and annoy country gentlemen. This, we may note, is one of
the perils of a Sinking Fund that, guard it as its founder may, some
thriftless Chancellor of the Exchequer will insist on filching from it.
That was the fate of Walpole’s fund. The scheme, however, survived,
and received a new impulse in 1772, when Dr. Price, a Nonconformist
minister, called public attention to it by a pamphlet on the National
Debt. In this he proved by irrefutable arithmetic that a Sinking Fund,
if honestly worked, must ultimately wipe out the largest debt that can
be conceived. For, as he hopefully pointed out, a single seed, if its
produce could be entirely set apart for sowing, would in course of time
multiply so vastly as to fill all the lands where it could grow. This
is true; but the simile implies singular powers of self-control in the
sowers, especially if they are beset by hunger before that glorious
climax is attained. Descending to the more practical domain of the
money market, Price proved that a sum of £200,000, set apart annually,
together with its compound interest, would in eighty-six years be worth
£258,000,000. Whether the nation were at peace or at war, said Dr.
Price, the stipulated sum must be set aside, even if it were borrowed
at a high rate of interest; for the nation borrowed at simple interest
in order to gain the advantages of compound interest. While admitting
the folly of such conduct for a private individual, he maintained with
equal _naïveté_ that a State must benefit by it, even if there were no
surplus of revenue and if money were dear.[247]
Such was the scheme which fired Pitt with hope; but it is very
questionable whether he accepted all its details. Certainly he did not
act precipitately. On 11th April 1785 he felt the pulse of the House
of Commons by stating his confident hope of having a surplus of one
million available for the present plan, and his determination next
year to found “a real Sinking Fund” on a basis which would absolutely
preclude pilfering in the future. It is also noteworthy that he
resolved to raise that million by taxation, not by borrowing. This
is a fact which has been ignored by Hamilton, McCulloch, Lecky, and
other critics of Pitt’s experiment; but the debate just referred to and
those soon to be considered place it beyond possibility of denial. Mr.
Dempster urged him to begin at once, even if he had to borrow, seeing
that France had started a Sinking Fund which “would enable her in a few
years to get rid of the greatest part of her National Debt.” But the
Prime Minister declined to be hurried, especially if he had to borrow
at a high rate of interest.[248] Clearly, then, Pitt did not share the
extravagant hopes of Price.
His relations to Price cannot be wholly cleared up. Early in January
1786 he wrote to him in the following terms:
The situation of the revenue certainly makes this the time to
establish an effectual Sinking Fund. The general idea of converting
the 3 per cents with a fund bearing a higher rate of interest,
with a view to facilitate redemption, you have on many occasions
suggested, and particularly in the papers you were so good as to
send me last year. The rise of the stocks has made a material
change since that period, and I am inclined to think something
like the plan I now send you may be more adapted to the present
circumstances.[249] There may be, I believe, some inaccuracies in
the calculations, but not such as to be very material. Before I
form any decisive opinion, I wish to learn your sentiments upon it,
and shall think myself obliged to you for any improvement you can
suggest if you think the principle a right one, or for any other
proposal which from your knowledge of the subject you may think
preferable.
With his reply Price sent the three alternative plans which the curious
may peruse in his “Memoir and Works.” Unfortunately the ten volumes
consecrated to his fame by his nephew, William Morgan, are instinct
with so bitter a prejudice against Pitt as to be worthless on all
questions affecting him. Morgan does not print Pitt’s proposal, but
brushes it aside as puerile, and gives the impression that Price did
so; he gives no account of the interview which Pitt had with Price in
the middle of January, but asserts that the Minister threw aside his
own proposals, adopted the third and least efficient of Price’s plans,
mangled it in the process, and never acknowledged his debt to his
benefactor.[250] The first of these charges can be refuted by Price’s
reply to Pitt’s letter given above. He pronounced the Prime Minister’s
proposals “very just,” but pointed out some defects, especially the
proviso which placed the Sinking Fund at the disposal of Parliament
when the interest on it amounted to £4,000,000, as he expected it would
by the year 1812.[251] Morgan’s unfairness is further revealed by his
statement that Pitt did not choose to increase the taxes in 1786 so as
to provide the million surplus which ought to have been forthcoming.
Whereas the fact is that in the Budget of 1785 the Minister imposed
taxes for that very purpose; and when these proved scarcely sufficient,
he imposed others on 29th March 1786.[252]
False and acrid charges such as these do not surprise us in the
partisan biographies of that age. What is surprising is that McCulloch
and Lecky should have endorsed some of Morgan’s statements, especially
respecting Pitt’s omission of his acknowledgements to Price.[253] On
this I must observe, firstly, that it is not proven that Pitt owed
to Price everything that was good in his Sinking Fund, and spoiled
the plan by his own alterations of it; for the omission of Pitt’s
proposal by Morgan leaves us without means of comparing the original
proposals of the two men; secondly, that the official reports of the
three debates of the spring of 1786 on this subject are so meagre as to
furnish no decisive evidence on what was, after all, a minor detail.
Further, it is probable that Price’s influence on Pitt’s proposal was
less than has been supposed. In the Pitt Papers is a letter of Pulteney
to Pitt dated 18th April 1786, in which he urges him carefully to
reconsider Price’s third plan before finally adopting it. He states
that Sir John Sinclair, Sir Edward Ferguson, Mr. Beaufoy, and Mr.
Dempster had yesterday met Dr. Price at Bath House in order to discuss
the merits of Price’s plan, and also one by Mr. Gale. The discussion
left Pulteney with the conviction that Gale’s plan was “infinitely
preferable to any of the three produced by Dr. Price,” and he begged
Pitt to add it to his Bill as an alternative.[254] I have not found
a copy of Gale’s plan or any evidence as to its adoption in part by
Pitt; but the statesman certainly repudiated the notion of borrowing
in order to pay off debt, on which Price had laid stress. And yet by
a strange irony of fate, this expedient, to which the statesman had
temporary recourse only under the strain of war, is that which has been
pronounced by nearly all critics the characteristic part of his scheme.
The chief features of Pitt’s proposals were his efforts to raise the
whole of the annual million from revenue, and to safeguard this fund
from the depredations of wasteful financiers in the future.[255] He
therefore placed it under the control of six responsible persons, among
whom were the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank
of England. The disposal by Parliament of the fund when the yearly
income arising from it should amount to four millions, may be termed a
concession of the financier to the parliamentary spirit.
The scheme met merely with indirect criticism, the debates turning
on general policy, or on the question whether there was a surplus of
a million, or any surplus at all. These were the issues to which the
eager partisanship of Fox and Sheridan sought to divert the attention
of the House. Let them beware, exclaimed Fox, of tying up a sum of a
million a year, when they might want all their available resources for
a war. As for Sheridan, he sought to ridicule the experiment, not on
financial grounds, but because it was the height of folly to add to the
present enormous burdens when “we had but one foe, and that the whole
world.”
There seems to have been in these debates no reference to Dr. Price’s
schemes, though they then enjoyed considerable notoriety. Mention was
made of the writings of Baron Maseres on the efficacy of Compound
Interest; but the Opposition confined itself almost entirely to
complaints about the taxes, and gloomy prophecies about the advent of
another war. Surely some member of that angry and disappointed group
would have accused Pitt of filching his scheme wholesale from that of
Price, if the charge had been possible. We can imagine that Sheridan,
instead of croaking over the impending coalition of Europe against
England, would in that case have declaimed against Pitt as the thief
of the magic wand of the real Prospero of finance. Would not Fox also
have brought his sound and sturdy sense to the congenial task of
exposing the fallacies of Price and the imposture of Pitt? The darling
of Brooks’s Club, who well knew the perils of borrowing in order to
pay off old debts, would have fastened on the folly of borrowing at
high rates in order to gain the advantage of Compound Interest. We
can picture him asking how a plan, which was admittedly foolish for
an individual, could be profitable for a nation, and where the taxes
could be raised that would make good the interest on the sums set apart
every year for the wonder-working fund. Surely the Opposition was not
so ignorant of finance and of Price’s proposals as not to detect the
weakness of the Prime Minister’s plan, had it been modelled solely on
them.[256]
The debates in which the Commons dealt with this great and complex
subject seem to have been fruitful only in personalities. At the final
stage of the Bill, however, Fox moved an amendment with the aim of
lightening the burdens on the nation in time of war. He proposed that,
whenever a new loan should be raised, the Minister should be pledged to
raise moneys sufficient to pay the interest on the loan, and also to
make good to the Sinking Fund what might be taken from it. He stated as
a concrete example that, if a new loan of £6,000,000 were required in
time of war, and if £1,000,000 were in the hands of the Commissioners
of the National Debt, that sum should be transferred to the account of
the loan; for this, he claimed, would save the public the expense of
raising that million through bankers and the Stock Exchange, and the
Sinking Fund would not be injured if the million temporarily borrowed
from it were made good by taxation. His speech contained one statement
of personal interest, namely, that he had shown his proposal to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who approved of it. This, then, was one
of the few occasions on which Pitt conferred with Fox. He now accepted
Fox’s amendment, because (to take the supposed case), apart from the
saving of commission on the million, Government would be able to raise
the five millions on better terms than the six millions. Pitt also
expressed the hope that the addition of the amendment to his Bill would
do away with all temptation to a Minister to rob the Sinking Fund.[257]
This last argument cut both ways. As Earl Stanhope (formerly Lord
Mahon) pointed out to the Lords, when he introduced a rival scheme a
few days later, it would be absurd to lessen the temptation to commit
an offence which he (Pitt) had declared to be thenceforth impossible.
In fact, the permission to transfer the yearly million to another fund
rather tended to strengthen the argument for alienation in any other
case where expediency might be urged. Stanhope’s plan for rendering the
Sinking Fund permanent is too complex to be discussed here; the debates
on it were closed by the royal assent being given to Pitt’s measure on
26th May.[258]
If we examine carefully the many criticisms that have been levelled
against Pitt’s Sinking Fund, they apply only to his handling of the
fund during the Great War with France. Every sciolist in finance can
now see the folly of borrowing money at a high rate of interest in
order to provide the fund with its quarterly supply.[259] It is clearly
a case of feeding a dog on his own tail. But such a proceeding, though
lauded by Price, was quite contrary to Pitt’s original intention, which
was the thoroughly sound one of paying off debt by a steady application
of the annual surplus. He departed from this only under stress of
circumstances which he looked on as exceptional and temporary.
Strange to say, even the officials of the Treasury seem to have
overlooked the fact that the nation was thereby increasing its debt
in a cumbrous attempt to lessen it. In 1799, when the pinch caused by
the withdrawal of a million a year was severely felt, George Rose,
the Secretary of the Treasury, praised the Sinking Fund as an example
of integrity and economy which must in the highest degree promote the
prosperity of the nation. And Lord Henry Petty, who succeeded Pitt as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated in his first Budget Speech in March
1806 that “it was owing to the institution of the Sinking Fund that the
country was not charged with a much larger amount of debt. It was an
advantage gained by nothing.” This extraordinary statement, coming from
a political opponent, shows how that generation was mesmerized by the
potency of Compound Interest.
Yet, delusive as the scheme came to be, it conferred two benefits on
Great Britain. Firstly, it tended to the reduction of the National Debt
during the time of peace. Nearly eleven millions were written off in
the years 1784–1792;[260] and the country felt no inconvenience until
the million had to be borrowed at ruinous rates. But, far more than
this, faith in the Sinking Fund buoyed up British credit at a time
when confidence was the first essential of the public safety. In the
dark days of 1797 and 1805 Britons were nerved by the spirit of their
leader, who never quailed even in face of mutiny, disaster, and the
near approach of bankruptcy. There are times when unjustifiable trust
is better than the most searching scrutiny. Finally, it is the barest
justice to the memory of Pitt to remember that his whole financial
policy in the early part of the Great War rested on the assumption that
France would soon be overborne; and, as we shall see, that assumption
was justified by the experience of the past and by every outward sign
in her present life. It was the incalculable element in the French
Revolution, from the _levée en masse_ of 1793 down to Austerlitz in
1805, which baffled Pitt and metamorphosed his Sinking Fund into a load
of lead.