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State of the Union Address
James Polk
December 7, 1847
Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:
The annual meeting of Congress is always an interesting event. The
representatives of the States and of the people come fresh from their
constituents to take counsel together for the common good.
After an existence of near three-fourths of a century as a free and
independent Republic, the problem no longer remains to be solved whether
man is capable of self-government. The success of our admirable system is a
conclusive refutation of the theories of those in other countries who
maintain that a "favored few" are born to rule and that the mass of mankind
must be governed by force. Subject to no arbitrary or hereditary authority,
the people are the only sovereigns recognized by our Constitution.
Numerous emigrants, of every lineage and language, attracted by the civil
and religious freedom we enjoy and by our happy condition, annually crowd
to our shores, and transfer their heart, not less than their allegiance, to
the country whose dominion belongs alone to the people. No country has been
so much favored, or should acknowledge with deeper reverence the
manifestations of the divine protection. An all wise Creator directed and
guarded us in our infant struggle for freedom and has constantly watched
over our surprising progress until we have become one of the great nations
of the earth.
It is in a country thus favored, and under a Government in which the
executive and legislative branches hold their authority for limited periods
alike from the people, and where all are responsible to their respective
constituencies, that it is again my duty to communicate with Congress upon
the state of the Union and the present condition of public affairs.
During the past year the most gratifying proofs are presented that our
country has been blessed with a widespread and universal prosperity. There
has been no period since the Government was founded when all the industrial
pursuits of our people have been more successful or when labor in all
branches of business has received a fairer or better reward. From our
abundance we have been enabled to perform the pleasing duty of furnishing
food for the starving millions of less favored countries.
In the enjoyment of the bounties of Providence at home such as have rarely
fallen to the lot of any people, it is cause of congratulation that our
intercourse with all the powers of the earth except Mexico continues to be
of an amicable character.
It has ever been our cherished policy to cultivate peace and good will with
all nations, and this policy has been steadily pursued by me. No change has
taken place in our relations with Mexico since the adjournment of the last
Congress. The war in which the United States were forced to engage with the
Government of that country still continues.
I deem it unnecessary, after the full exposition of them contained in my
message of the 11th of May, 1846, and in my annual message at the
commencement of the session of Congress in December last, to reiterate the
serious causes of complaint which we had against Mexico before she
commenced hostilities.
It is sufficient on the present occasion to say that the wanton violation
of the rights of person and property of our citizens committed by Mexico,
her repeated acts of bad faith through a long series of years, and her
disregard of solemn treaties stipulating for indemnity to our injured
citizens not only constituted ample cause of war on our part, but were of
such an aggravated character as would have justified us before the whole
world in resorting to this extreme remedy. With an anxious desire to avoid
a rupture between the two countries, we forbore for years to assert our
clear rights by force, and continued to seek redress for the wrongs we had
suffered by amicable negotiation in the hope that Mexico might yield to
pacific counsels and the demands of justice. In this hope we were
disappointed. Our minister of peace sent to Mexico was insultingly
rejected. The Mexican Government refused even to hear the terms of
adjustment which he was authorized to propose, and finally, under wholly
unjustifiable pretexts, involved the two countries in war by invading the
territory of the State of Texas, striking the first blow, and shedding the
blood of our citizens on our own soil.
Though the United States were the aggrieved nation, Mexico commenced the
war, and we were compelled in self-defense to repel the invader and to
vindicate the national honor and interests by prosecuting it with vigor
until we could obtain a just and honorable peace. On learning that
hostilities had been commenced by Mexico I promptly communicated that fact,
accompanied with a succinct statement of our other causes of complaint
against Mexico, to Congress, and that body, by the act of the 13th of May,
1846, declared that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico a state of war
exists between that Government and the United States." This act declaring
"the war to exist by the act of the Republic of Mexico," and making
provision for its prosecution "to a speedy and successful termination," was
passed with great unanimity by Congress, there being but two negative votes
in the Senate and but fourteen in the House of Representatives.
The existence of the war having thus been declared by Congress, it became
my duty under the Constitution and the laws to conduct and prosecute it.
This duty has been performed, and though at every stage of its progress I
have manifested a willingness to terminate it by a just peace, Mexico has
refused to accede to any terms which could be accepted by the United States
consistently with the national honor and interest.
The rapid and brilliant successes of our arms and the vast extent of the
enemy's territory which had been overrun and conquered before the close of
the last session of Congress were fully known to that body. Since that time
the war has been prosecuted with increased energy, and, I am gratified to
state, with a success which commands universal admiration.. History
presents no parallel of so many glorious victories achieved by any nation
within so short a period. Our Army, regulars and volunteers, have covered
themselves with imperishable honors. Whenever and wherever our forces have
encountered the enemy, though he was in vastly superior numbers and often
intrenched in fortified positions of his own selection and of great
strength, he has been defeated. Too much praise can not be bestowed upon
our officers and men, regulars and volunteers, for their gallantry,
discipline, indomitable courage, and perseverance, all seeking the post of
danger and vying with each other in deeds of noble daring.
While every patriot's heart must exult and a just national pride animate
every bosom in beholding the high proofs of courage, consummate military
skill, steady discipline, and humanity to the vanquished enemy exhibited by
our gallant Army, the nation is called to mourn over the loss of many brave
officers and soldiers, who have fallen in defense of their country's honor
and interests. The brave dead met their melancholy fate in a foreign land,
nobly discharging their duty, and with their country's flag waving
triumphantly in the face of the foe. Their patriotic deeds are justly
appreciated, and will long be remembered by their grateful countrymen. The
parental care of the Government they loved and served should be extended to
their surviving families.
Shortly after the adjournment of the last session of Congress the
gratifying intelligence was received of the signal victory of Buena Vista,
and of the fall of the city of Vera Cruz, and with it the strong castle of
San Juan de Ulloa, by which it was defended. Believing that after these and
other successes so honorable to our arms and so disastrous to Mexico the
period was propitious to afford her another opportunity, if she thought
proper to embrace it, to enter into negotiations for peace, a commissioner
was appointed to proceed to the headquarters of our Army with full powers
to enter upon negotiations and to conclude a just and honorable treaty of
peace. He was not directed to make any new overtures of peace, but was the
bearer of a dispatch from the Secretary of State of the United States to
the minister of foreign affairs of Mexico, in reply to one received from
the latter of the 22d of February, 1847, in which the Mexican Government
was informed of his appointment and of his presence at the headquarters of
our Army, and that he was invested with full powers to conclude a
definitive treaty of peace whenever the Mexican Government might signify a
desire to do so. While I was unwilling to subject the United States to
another indignant refusal, I was yet resolved that the evils of the war
should not be protracted a day longer than might be rendered absolutely
necessary by the Mexican Government.
Care was taken to give no instructions to the commissioner which could in
any way interfere with our military operations or relax our energies in the
prosecution of the war. He possessed no authority in any manner to control
these operations. He was authorized to exhibit his instructions to the
general in command of the Army, and in the event of a treaty being
concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico he was directed to give him
notice of that fact. On the happening of such contingency, and on receiving
notice thereof, the general in command was instructed by the Secretary of
War to suspend further active military operations until further orders.
These instructions were given with a view to intermit hostilities until the
treaty thus ratified by Mexico could be transmitted to Washington and
receive the action of the Government of the United States. The commissioner
was also directed on reaching the Army to deliver to the general in command
the dispatch which he bore from the Secretary of State to the minister of
foreign affairs of Mexico, and on receiving it the general was instructed
by the Secretary of War to cause it to be transmitted to the commander of
the Mexican forces, with a quest that it might be communicated to his
Government. The commissioner did not reach the headquarters of the Army
until after another brilliant victory had crowned our arms at Cerro Gordo.
The dispatch which he bore from the Secretary of War to the general in
command of the Army was received by that officer, then at Jalapa, on the
7th of May, 1847, together with the dispatch from the Secretary of State to
the minister of foreign affairs of Mexico, having been transmitted to him
from Vera Cruz. The commissioner arrived at the headquarters of the Army a
few days afterwards. His presence with the Army and his diplomatic
character were made known to the Mexican Government from Puebla on the 12th
of June, 1847, by the transmission of the dispatch from the Secretary of
State to the minister of foreign affairs of Mexico.
Many weeks elapsed after its receipt, and no overtures were made nor was
any desire expressed by the Mexican Government to enter into negotiations
for peace.
Our Army pursued its march upon the capital, and as it approached it was
met by formidable resistance. Our forces first encountered the enemy, and
achieved signal victories in the severely contested battles of Contreras
and Churubusco. It was not until after these actions had resulted in
decisive victories and the capital of the enemy was within our power that
the Mexican Government manifested any disposition to enter into
negotiations for peace, and even then, as events have proved, there is too
much reason to believe they were insincere, and that in agreeing to go
through the forms of negotiation the object was to gain time to strengthen
the defenses of their capital and to prepare for fresh resistance.
The general in command of the Army deemed it expedient to suspend
hostilities temporarily by entering into an armistice with a view to the
opening of negotiations. Commissioners were appointed on the part of Mexico
to meet the commissioner on the part of the United States. The result of
the conferences which took place between these functionaries of the two
Governments was a failure to conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioner
of the United States took with him the project of a treaty already
prepared, by the terms of which the indemnity required by the United States
was a cession of territory.
It is well known that the only indemnity which it is in the power of Mexico
to make in satisfaction of the just and long-deferred claims of our
citizens against her and the only means by which she can reimburse the
United States for the expenses of the war is a cession to the United States
of a portion of her territory. Mexico has no money to pay, and no other
means of making the required indemnity. If we refuse this, we can obtain
nothing else. To reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cession of
territory would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war,
bearing all its expenses, without a purpose or definite object.
A state of war abrogates treaties previously existing between the
belligerents and a treaty of peace puts an end to all claims for indemnity
for tortious acts committed under the authority of one government against
the citizens or subjects of another unless they are provided for in its
stipulations. A treaty of peace which would terminate the existing war
without providing for indemnity would enable Mexico, the acknowledged
debtor and herself the aggressor in the war, to relieve herself from her
just liabilities. By such a treaty our citizens who hold just demands
against her would have no remedy either against Mexico or their own
Government. Our duty to these citizens must forever prevent such a peace,
and no treaty which does not provide ample means of discharging these
demands can receive my sanction.
A treaty of peace should settle all existing differences between the two
countries. If an adequate cession of territory should be made by such a
treaty, the United States should release Mexico from all her liabilities
and assume their payment to our own citizens. If instead of this the United
States were to consent to a treaty by which Mexico should again engage to
pay the heavy amount of indebtedness which a just indemnity to our
Government and our citizens would impose on her, it is notorious that she
does not possess the means to meet such an undertaking. From such a treaty
no result could be anticipated but the same irritating disappointments
which have heretofore attended the violations of similar treaty
stipulations on the part of Mexico. Such a treaty would be but a temporary
cessation of hostilities, without the restoration of the friendship and
good understanding which should characterize the future intercourse between
the two countries.
That Congress contemplated the acquisition of territorial indemnity when
that body made provision for the prosecution of the war is obvious.
Congress could not have meant when, in May, 1846, they appropriated
$10,000,000 and authorized the President to employ the militia and naval
and military forces of the United States and to accept the services of
50,000 volunteers to enable him to prosecute the war, and when, at their
last session, and after our Army had invaded Mexico, they made additional
appropriations and authorized the raising of additional troops for the same
purpose, that no indemnity was to be obtained from Mexico at the conclusion
of the war; and yet it was certain that if no Mexican territory was
acquired no indemnity could be obtained. It is further manifest that
Congress contemplated territorial indemnity from the fact that at their
last session an act was passed, upon the Executive recommendation,
appropriating $3,000,000 with that express object. This appropriation was
made "to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, and
boundaries with the Republic of Mexico, to be used by him in the event that
said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of the two Governments
and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of the same or
any part thereof." The object of asking this appropriation was distinctly
stated in the several messages on the subject which I communicated to
Congress. Similar appropriations made in 1803 and 1806, which were referred
to, were intended to be applied in part consideration for the cession of
Louisiana and the Floridas. In like manner it was anticipated that in
settling the terms of a treaty of "limits and boundaries" with Mexico a
cession of territory estimated to be of greater value than the amount of
our demands against her might be obtained, and that the prompt payment of
this sum in part consideration for the territory ceded, on the conclusion
of a treaty and its ratification on her part, might be an inducement with
her to make such a cession of territory as would be satisfactory to the
United States; and although the failure to conclude such a treaty has
rendered it unnecessary to use any part of the $3,000,000 appropriated by
that act, and the entire sum remains in the Treasury, it is still
applicable to that object should the contingency occur making such
application proper.
The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and if
sanctioned would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong and
that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was unjust
and should be abandoned--an admission unfounded in fact and degrading to
the national character.
The terms of the treaty proposed by the United States were not only just to
Mexico, but, considering the character and amount of our claims, the
unjustifiable and unprovoked commencement of hostilities by her, the
expenses of the war to which we have been subjected, and the success which
had attended our arms, were deemed to be of a most liberal character.
The commissioner of the United States was authorized to agree to the
establishment of the Rio Grande as the boundary from its entrance into the
Gulf to its intersection with the southern boundary of New Mexico, in north
latitude about 32 degree, and to obtain a cession to the United States of
the Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias and the privilege of the
right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The boundary of the Rio
Grande and the cession to the United States of New Mexico and Upper
California constituted an ultimatum which our commissioner was under no
circumstances to yield.
That it might be manifest, not only to Mexico, but to all other nations,
that the United States were not disposed to take advantage of a feeble
power by insisting upon wrestling from her all the other Provinces,
including many of her principal towns and cities, which we had conquered
and held in our military occupation but were willing to conclude a treaty
in a spirit of liberality, our commissioner was authorized to stipulate for
the restoration to Mexico of all our other conquests.
As the territory to be acquired by the boundary proposed might be estimated
to be of greater value than a fair equivalent for our just demands, our
commissioner was authorized to stipulate for the payment of such additional
pecuniary consideration as was deemed reasonable.
The terms of a treaty proposed by the Mexican commissioners were wholly
inadmissible. They negotiated as if Mexico were the victorious, and not the
vanquished, party. They must have known that their ultimatum could never be
accepted. It required the United States to dismember Texas by surrendering
to Mexico that part of the territory of that State lying between the Nueces
and the Rio Grande, included within her limits by her laws when she was an
independent republic, and when she was annexed to the United States and
admitted by Congress as one of the States of our Union. It contained no
provision for the payment by Mexico of the just claims of our citizens. It
required indemnity to Mexican citizens for injuries they may have sustained
by our troops in the prosecution of the war. It demanded the right for
Mexico to levy and collect the Mexican tariff of duties on goods imported
into her ports while in our military occupation during the war, and the
owners of which had paid to officers of the United States the military
contributions which had been levied upon them; and it offered to cede to
the United States, for a pecuniary consideration, that part of Upper
California lying north of latitude 37°. Such were the unreasonable
terms proposed by the Mexican commissioners.
The cession to the United States by Mexico of the Provinces of New Mexico
and the Californias, as proposed by the commissioner of the United States,
it was believed would be more in accordance with the convenience and
interests of both nations than any other cession of territory which it was
probable Mexico could be induced to make.
It is manifest to all who have observed the actual condition of the Mexican
Government for some years past and at present that if these Provinces
should be retained by her she could not long continue to hold and govern
them. Mexico is too feeble a power to govern these Provinces, lying as they
do at a distance of more than 1,000 miles from her capital, and if
attempted to be retained by her they would constitute but for a short time
even nominally a part of her dominions. This would be especially the case
with Upper California.
The sagacity of powerful European nations has long since directed their
attention to the commercial importance of that Province, and there can be
little doubt that the moment the United States shall relinquish their
present occupation of it and their claim to it as indemnity an effort would
be made by some foreign power to possess it, either by conquest or by
purchase. If no foreign government should acquire it in either of these
modes, an independent revolutionary government would probably be
established by the inhabitants and such foreigners as may remain in or
remove to the country as soon as it shall be known that the United States
have abandoned it. Such a government would be too feeble long to maintain
its separate independent existence, and would finally become annexed to or
be a dependent colony of some more powerful state. Should any foreign
government attempt to possess it as a colony, or otherwise to incorporate
it with itself, the principle avowed by President Monroe in 1824, and
reaffirmed in my first annual message, that no foreign power shall with our
consent be permitted to plant or establish any new colony or dominion on
any part of the North American continent must be maintained. In maintaining
this principle and in resisting its invasion by any foreign power we might
be involved in other wars more expensive and more difficult than that in
which we are now engaged. The Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias
are contiguous to the territories of the United States, and if brought
under the government of our laws their resources--mineral, agricultural,
manufacturing, and commercial--would soon be developed.
Upper California is bounded on the north by our Oregon possessions, and if
held by the United States would soon be settled by a hardy, enterprising,
and intelligent portion of our population. The Bay of San Francisco and
other harbors along the Californian coast would afford shelter for our
Navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in
the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short period become the marts of an
extensive and profitable commerce with China and other countries of the
East.
These advantages, in which the whole commercial world would participate,
would at once be secured to the United States by the cession of this
territory; while it is certain that as long as it remains a part of the
Mexican dominions they can be enjoyed neither by Mexico herself nor by any
other nation.
New Mexico is a frontier Province, and has never been of any considerable
value to Mexico. From its locality it is naturally connected with our
Western settlements. The territorial limits of the State of Texas, too, as
defined by her laws before her admission into our Union, embrace all that
portion of New Mexico lying east of the Rio Grande, while Mexico still
claims to hold this territory as a part of her dominions. The adjustment of
this question of boundary is important.
There is another consideration which induced the belief that the Mexican
Government might even desire to place this Province under the protection of
the Government of the United States. Numerous bands of fierce and warlike
savages wander over it and upon its borders. Mexico has been and must
continue to be too feeble to restrain them from committing depredations,
robberies, and murders, not only upon the inhabitants of New Mexico itself,
but upon those of the other northern States of Mexico. It would be a
blessing to all these northern States to have their citizens protected
against them by the power of the United States. At this moment many
Mexicans, principally females and children, are in captivity among them. If
New Mexico were held and governed by the United States, we could
effectually prevent these tribes from committing such outrages, and compel
them to release these captives and restore them to their families and
friends.
In proposing to acquire New Mexico and the Californias, it was known that
but an inconsiderable portion of the Mexican people would be transferred
with them, the country embraced within these Provinces being chiefly an
uninhabited region.
These were the leading considerations which induced me to authorize the
terms of peace which were proposed to Mexico. They were rejected, and,
negotiations being at an end, hostilities were renewed. An assault was made
by our gallant Army upon the strongly fortified places near the gates of
the City of Mexico and upon the city itself, and after several days of
severe conflict the Mexican forces, vastly superior in number to our own,
were driven from the city, and it was occupied by our troops.
Immediately after information was received of the unfavorable result of the
negotiations, believing that his continued presence with the Army could be
productive of no good, I determined to recall our commissioner. A dispatch
to this effect was transmitted to him on the 6th of October last. The
Mexican Government will be informed of his recall, and that in the existing
state of things I shall not deem it proper to make any further overtures of
peace, but shall be at all times ready to receive and consider any
proposals which may be made by Mexico.
Since the liberal proposition of the United States was authorized to be
made, in April last, large expenditures have been incurred and the precious
blood of many of our patriotic fellow-citizens has been shed in the
prosecution of the war. This consideration and the obstinate perseverance
of Mexico in protracting the war must influence the terms of peace which it
may be deemed proper hereafter to accept. Our arms having been everywhere
victorious, having subjected to our military occupation a large portion of
the enemy's country, including his capital, and negotiations for peace
having failed, the important questions arise, in what manner the war ought
to be prosecuted and what should be our future policy. I can not doubt that
we should secure and render available the conquests which we have already
made, and that with this view we should hold and occupy by our naval and
military forces all the ports, towns, cities, and Provinces now in our
occupation or which may hereafter fall into our possession; that we should
press forward our military operations and levy such military contributions
on the enemy as may, as far as practicable, defray the future expenses of
the war.
Had the Government of Mexico acceded to the equitable and liberal terms
proposed, that mode of adjustment would have been preferred, Mexico having
declined to do this and failed to offer any other terms which could be
accepted by the United States, the national honor, no less than the public
interests, requires that the war should be prosecuted with increased energy
and power until a just and satisfactory peace can be obtained. In the
meantime, as Mexico refuses all indemnity, we should adopt measures to
indemnify ourselves by appropriating permanently a portion of her
territory. Early after the commencement of the war New Mexico and the
Californias were taken possession of by our forces. Our military and naval
commanders were ordered to conquer and hold them, subject to be disposed of
by a treaty of peace.
These Provinces are now in our undisputed occupation, and have been so for
many months, all resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased within
their limits. I am satisfied that they should never be surrendered to
Mexico. Should Congress concur with me in this opinion, and that they
should be retained by the United States as indemnity, I can perceive no
good reason why the civil jurisdiction and laws of the United States should
not at once be extended over them. To wait for a treaty of peace such as we
are willing to make, by which our relations toward them would not be
changed, can not be good policy; whilst our own interest and that of the
people inhabiting them require that a stable, responsible, and free
government under our authority should as soon as possible be established
over them. Should Congress, therefore, determine to hold these Provinces
permanently, and that they shall hereafter be considered as constituent
parts of our country, the early establishment of Territorial governments
over them will be important for the more perfect protection of persons and
property; and I recommend that such Territorial governments be established.
It will promote peace and tranquillity among the inhabitants, by allaying
all apprehension that they may still entertain of being again subjected to
the jurisdiction of Mexico. I invite the early and favorable consideration
of Congress to this important subject.
Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are other Mexican Provinces
which have been reduced to our possession by conquest. These other Mexican
Provinces are now governed by our military and naval commanders under the
general authority which is conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war.
They should continue to be held, as a means of coercing Mexico to accede to
just terms of peace. Civil as well as military officers are required to
conduct such a government. Adequate compensation, to be drawn from
contributions levied on the enemy, should be fixed by law for such officers
as may be thus employed. What further provision may become necessary and
what final disposition it may be proper to make of them must depend on the
future progress of the war and the course which Mexico may think proper
hereafter to pursue.
With the views I entertain I can not favor the policy which has been
suggested, either to withdraw our Army altogether or to retire to a
designated line and simply hold and defend it. To withdraw our Army
altogether from the conquests they have made by deeds of unparalleled
bravery, and at the expense of so much blood and treasure, in a just war on
our part, and one which, by the act of the enemy, we could not honorably
have avoided, would be to degrade the nation in its own estimation and in
that of the world. To retire to a line and simply hold and defend it would
not terminate the war. On the contrary, it would encourage Mexico to
persevere and tend to protract it indefinitely. It is not to be expected
that Mexico, after refusing to establish such a line as a permanent
boundary when our victorious Army are in possession of her capital and in
the heart of her country, would permit us to hold it without resistance.
That she would continue the war, and in the most harassing and annoying
forms, there can be no doubt. A border warfare of the most savage
character, extending over a long line, would be unceasingly waged. It would
require a large army to be kept constantly in the field, stationed at posts
and garrisons along such a line, to protect and defend it. The enemy,
relieved from the pressure of our arms on his coasts and in the populous
parts of the interior, would direct his attention to this line, and,
selecting an isolated post for attack, would concentrate his forces upon
it. This would be a condition of affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their
favorite system of guerrilla warfare, would probably prefer to any other.
Were we to assume a defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages
of such a state of war would be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no
contributions upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of
the war, but must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant
uncertainty at what point on the line or at what time he might make an
assault. He may assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the interior
on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make a sudden
assault upon some one of our posts so distant from any other as to prevent
the possibility of timely succor or reenforcements, and in this way our
gallant Army would be exposed to the danger of being cut off in detail; or
if by their unequaled bravery and prowess everywhere exhibited during this
war they should repulse the enemy, their numbers stationed at any one post
may be too small to pursue him. If the enemy be repulsed in one attack, he
would have nothing to do but to retreat to his own side of the line, and,
being in no fear of a pursuing army, may reenforce himself at leisure for
another attack on the same or some other post. He may, too, cross the line
between our posts, make rapid incursions into the country which we hold,
murder the inhabitants, commit depredations on them, and then retreat to
the interior before a sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him.
Such would probably be the harassing character of a mere defensive war on
our part. If our forces when attacked, or threatened with attack, be
permitted to cross the line, drive back the enemy, and conquer him, this
would be again to invade the enemy's country after having lost all the
advantages of the conquests we have already made by having voluntarily
abandoned them. To hold such a line successfully and in security it is far
from being certain that it would not require as large an army as would be
necessary to hold all the conquests we have already made and to continue
the prosecution of the war in the heart of the enemy's country. It is also
far from being certain that the expenses of the war would be diminished by
such a policy. I am persuaded that the best means of vindicating the
national honor and interest and of bringing the war to an honorable close
will be to prosecute it with increased energy and power in the vital parts
of the enemy's country.