"'Our mess had the volume of _Harper's Magazine_, found at

Salisbury, and we each could have it an hour or more daily.

A few games of checkers or cribbage, played sitting on the

floor, tailor-fashion, were always in order. All who were

accustomed to smoking would manage to secure a supply of

tobacco at least sufficient for one smoke per day, and, if

they could not obtain it in any other way, would sell half

their scanty ration, and perhaps get enough to last a week.

It was a good place to learn how to economize. I have known

some to refuse a light from the pipe, for fear of losing a

grain of the precious weed. Evenings we would be in

darkness, and as we could not move about without frequent

collisions, would gather in little groups and talk of home,

friends, and the good time coming, when we would have one

good, square meal; arrange the bill of fare, comprising all

the delicacies that heart could wish, or a morbid mind

prompted by a starving stomach could conceive; lay plans for

escape and discuss the route to be followed; sing a few

hymns and the national airs, and wind up with 'We'll Hang

Jeff Davis on a Sour Apple Tree.'

"'There were with us two officers who, when we arrived at

Salisbury, had been in solitary confinement and whom the

rebels were holding as hostages for two guerillas whom Gen.

Burnside had condemned to be shot. When the removal of the

officers to Danville occurred, these two were released from

close confinement and sent on with us, and it was thought

they were no longer considered as hostages. They had planned

an escape and well nigh succeeded. They had dug a hole

through the brick wall, and passing into an adjoining

unoccupied building, cut through the floor, dug under the

stone foundation and were just coming through on the

outside, when some one in passing stepped on the thin crust

and fell in. Whether he or the men digging were the most

frightened it would be hard to tell. The next morning these

two who had worked so hard to regain their liberty were

taken out and probably placed in close confinement again.

"'After this attempt to escape, the rebel authorities made

an effort to rob us of everything, particularly

pocket-knives, watches, or any thing that could aid us to

escape. In this they were foiled. They made us all go to one

end of the room and placing a guard through the middle,

searched us one by one and passed us to the other side. If

one had a knife, watch or money, he had only to toss it over

to some one already searched, and when his turn came would

have nothing to show.

"'The guards would not allow us to stand by the windows, and

on one occasion, without warning, fired through a

second-story window and badly wounded an officer on the

third floor.

"'My shoes were nearly worn out when I was captured, and

soon became so worn that I could only keep _sole_ and _body_

together by cutting strings from the edge of the uppers and

lacing them together. These strings would wear but a little

while, and frequent cuttings had made the shoes very low.

"'Toward the last of January, Capt. Cook received

intelligence that a special exchange had been effected in

his case and he was to start at once for the North. Here was

an opportunity to communicate with our comrades and friends,

for up to this time we did not know whether any of our

letters had been received. Capt. Cook had a pair of good

stout brogans. These shoes he urged me to take in exchange

for my dilapidated ones. At first, I felt reluctant to do

so, but finally made the exchange and he left us with a

light heart, but his anticipations were not realized, for

instead of going directly North he was detained in Libby

Prison until just before the rest of us arrived, and when we

reached Annapolis he was still there awaiting his leave, and

had been obliged to wear my old shoes until two days

previous.

"'Rumors of a general exchange began to circulate, and a few

boxes of provisions and clothing, sent by Northern friends,

were delivered. Among the rest, was a well-filled box from

the officers of our regiment, and twelve hundred dollars

Confederate money (being the equivalent of sixty dollars

greenbacks) which they had kindly contributed. Could we have

received the box and money in November, instead of just

before our release, we could have subsisted quite

comfortably all winter. As it was, we lived sumptuously as

long as the contents of the box lasted, and when about a

week later we started for Richmond to be paroled, we had

drawn considerably upon the twelve hundred dollars.

"'February 17th, we left Danville for Richmond and were

again quartered in Libby. On the 19th, we signed the parole

papers.

"'The second morning after signing the rolls, one of the

clerks came in and said that for want of transportation,

only a hundred would be sent down the river that day, and

the rest would follow soon; that those whose names were

called would fall in on the lower floor, ready to start. As

he proceeded to call the roll there was a death-like

stillness, and each listened anxiously to hear his own name.

Of our mess only one name was called. As he stopped reading

and folded his rolls and turned to leave, I thought, what if

our army should commence active operations and put an end

to the exchange, and resolved to go with the party that day,

if possible. I had noticed that the clerk had not called the

names in their order nor checked them, and knew he could not

tell who had been called. I therefore hurried down to the

lower floor and fell in with the rest, thinking all the time

of the possibility of detection and the consequent solitary

confinement, and although my conscience was easy so far as

the papers I had signed were concerned--for I had only

agreed not to take up arms until duly exchanged--I did not

breath freely until I had disembarked from the boat and was

under the Stars and Stripes. Fortunately, the rest of the

party came down on the boat the next day.

"'One other incident and I am done: Sergt. Henry Jordan, of

Company C, was wounded and captured with the rest of us, but

on account of his wounds was unable to be sent South with

the other enlisted-men. After his recovery he was kept as a

servant about the office of Major Turner, the commandant of

the prison, and when, on the 2d of April, 1865, the rebels

evacuated Richmond and paroled the prisoners, he remained

until our forces came in and took possession of the city.

When, a few days later, Maj. Turner was captured by our

troops and confined in the same cell we had occupied, Sergt.

Jordan was detailed to carry him his rations, and although

he was not of a vindictive or revengeful disposition, I will

venture to say that the rations allowed Turner were not much

better than had been given the sergeant through the winter.

Had Turner been guarded by such men as Henry Jordan, or even

by the poorest soldiers of the regiment, he would not have

escaped within three days of his capture, as was the case.'"

Very few of the black soldiers were exchanged, though the confederate

government pretended to recognize them and treat them as they did the

whites. General Taylor's reply to General Grant, was the general policy

applied to them when convenient. In the latter days of the war, when--in

June, 1864, at Guntown, Miss.,--the confederate Gen. Forrest attacked

and routed the Union forces, under Sturgis, through the stupidity of the

latter, (alluded to more at length a few pages further on,) a number of

black soldiers were captured, Sturgis having had several Phalanx

regiments in his command. The confederates fought with desperation, and

with their usual "no quarter," because, as Forrest alleges, the Phalanx

regiments meant to retaliate for his previous massacre of the blacks at

Fort Pillow. Seeking to justify the inhuman treatment of his black

prisoners, he wrote as follows to General Washburn, commanding the

District of West Tennessee:

"It has been reported to me that all of your colored troops

stationed in Memphis took, on their knees, in the presence

of Major General Hurlburt and other officers of your army,

an oath to avenge Fort Pillow, and that they would show my

troops no quarter. Again I have it from indisputable

authority that the troops under Brigadier General Sturgis on

their recent march from Memphis, publicly, and in many

places, proclaimed that no quarter would be shown my men. As

they were moved into action on the 10th they were exhorted

by their officers to remember Fort Pillow. The prisoners we

have captured from that command, or a large majority of

them, have voluntarily stated that they expected us to

murder them, otherwise they would have surrendered in a body

rather than have taken to the bushes after being run down

and exhausted."

The massacre at Fort Pillow had a very different effect upon the black

soldiers than it was doubtless expected to have. Instead of weakening

their courage it stimulated them to a desire of retaliation; not in the

strict sense of that term, but to fight with a determination to subdue

and bring to possible punishment, the men guilty of such atrocious

conduct. Had General Sturgis been competent of commanding, Forrest would

have found himself and his command no match for the Phalanx at Guntown

and Brice's Cross Roads. Doubtless Forrest was startled by the reply of

General Washburn, who justly recognized the true impulse of the Phalanx.

He replied to Forrest, June 19, 1864, as follows:

"You say in your letter that it has been reported to you

that all the negro troops stationed in Memphis took an oath,

on their knees, in the presence of Major General Hurlburt

and other officers of our army, to avenge Fort Pillow and

that they would show your troops no quarter. I believe it is

true that the colored troops did take such an oath, but not

in the presence of General Hurlburt. From what I can learn

this act of theirs was not influenced by any white officer,

but was the result of their own sense of what was due to

themselves and their fellows who had been mercilessly

slaughtered."

The chief of Forrest's artillery writes in the Philadelphia _Times_, in

September, 1883:

"Col. Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the Fifty-fifth Colored

Infantry in this fight, tells me that no oath was taken by

his troops that ever he heard of, but the impression

prevailed that the black flag was raised, and on his side

was raised to all intents and purposes. He himself fully

expected to be killed if captured. Impressed with this

notion a double effect was produced. It made the Federals

afraid to surrender and greatly exasperated our men, and in

the break-up the affair became more like a hunt for wild

game than a battle between civilized men."

In his description of the battle at Brice's Cross Roads, he says:

"The entire Confederate force was brought into action at

once. We kept no reserves; every movement was quickly

planned and executed with the greatest celerity. A potent

factor which made the battle far bloodier than it would have

been, was it being reported, and with some degree of truth,

that the negroes had been sworn on their knees in line

before leaving Memphis to show 'no quarter to Forrest's

men,' and badges were worn upon which were inscribed,

'Remember Fort Pillow.' General Washburn, commanding the

district of West Tennessee, distinctly admits that the negro

troops with Sturgis had gone into this fight with the

declared intention to give no quarter to Forrest's men."

The fate of the black soldiers taken in these fights is unknown, which

is even worse than of those who are known to have been massacred.

The details of the massacre at Fort Pillow have been reserved for this

portion of the present chapter in order to state them more at length,

and in connection with important movements which soon after took place

against the same confederate force.

The most atrocious of all inhuman acts perpetrated upon a brave

soldiery, took place at Fort Pillow, Kentucky, on the 13th of April,

1864. No cause can be assigned for the shocking crime of wanton,

indiscriminate murder of some three hundred soldiers, other than that

they were "niggers," and "fighting with niggers."

On the 12th, General Forrest suddenly appeared before Fort Pillow with a

large force, and demanded its surrender. The fort was garrisoned by 557

men in command of Major L. F. Booth, consisting of the 13th Tennessee

Cavalry, Major Bradford, and the 6th Phalanx Battery of heavy artillery,

numbering 262 men, and six guns. At sunrise on the 13th, General

Forrest's forces advanced and attacked the fort. The garrison maintained

a steady brisk fire, and kept the enemy at bay from an outer line of

intrenchments. About 9 A. M. Major Booth was killed, and Major Bradford

taking command, drew the troops back into the Fort, situated on a high,

steep and partially timbered bluff on the Mississippi river, with a

ravine on either hand. A federal gunboat, the "New Era," assisted in the

defence, but the height of the bluff prevented her giving material

support to the garrison. In the afternoon both sides ceased firing, to

cool and clean their guns. During this time, Forrest, under a flag of

truce, summoned the federals to surrender within a half hour. Major

Bradford refused to comply with the demand. Meantime the confederates

taking advantage of the truce to secret themselves down in a ravine,

from whence they could rush upon the Fort at a given signal. No sooner

was Bradford's refusal to surrender received, than the confederates

rushed simultaneously into the Fort. In a moment almost the place was in

their possession. The garrison, throwing away their arms fled down the

steep banks, endeavoring to hide from the promised "no quarter," which

Forrest had embodied in his demand for surrender: "_If I have to storm

your works, you may expect no quarter._" The confederates followed,

"butchering black and white soldiers and non-combatants, men, women and

children. Disabled men were made to stand up and be shot; others were

burned within the tents wherein they had been nailed to the floor." This

carnival of murder continued until dark, and was even renewed the next

morning. Major Bradford was not murdered until he had been carried as a

prisoner several miles on the retreat.

It is best that the evidence in this matter, as given in previous pages

of this chapter, should be read. It is unimpeachable, though Forrest, S.

D. Lee and Chalmers have attempted to deny the infernal work. The last

named, under whose command these barbarous acts were committed, offered

on the floor of the United States Congress, fifteen years afterward, an

apologetic denial of what appears from the evidence of those who

escaped,--taken by the Congressional Committee,--and also contradictory

to the confederate General S. D. Lee's report, in which he fails to

convince himself even of the inaccuracy of the reports of brutality, as

made by the few who escaped being murdered. Lee says:

[Illustration: THE MASSACRE AT FORT PILLOW.--APRIL 12TH, 1864.]

"The garrison was summoned in the usual manner, and its

commanding officer assumed the responsibility of refusing to

surrender after having been informed by General Forrest of

his ability to take the Fort, and of his fears of what the

result would be in case the demand was not complied with.

The assault was made under a heavy fire, and with

considerable loss to the attacking party. Your colors were

never lowered, and your garrison never surrendered, but

retreated under cover of a gunboat, with arms in their hands

and constantly using them. This was true particularly of

your colored troops, who had been firmly convinced by your

teaching of the certainty of slaughter, in case of capture.

Even under these circumstances, many of your men, white and

black, were taken prisoners."

Continuing, he says:

"The case under consideration is almost an extreme one. You

had a servile race armed against us. I assert that our

officers with all the circumstances against them endeavored

to prevent the effusion of blood."

This is an admission that the massacre of the garrison actually

occurred, and because Phalanx troops were a part of the garrison. That

the black soldiers had been taught that no quarter would be shown them

if captured, or if they surrendered, is doubtless true. It is also too

true that the teaching was the _truth_. One has but to read the summons

for the surrender to be satisfied of the fact, and then recollect that

the President of the Confederate States, in declaring General Butler an

outlaw, also decreed that negroes captured with arms in their hands,

their officers as well, should be turned over to the State authorities

wherein they were captured, to be dealt with according to the laws of

that State and the Confederacy.

The sentiment of the chief confederate commander regarding the

employment of negroes in the Union army, notwithstanding the Confederate

Government was the first to arm and muster them into service, as shown

in previous and later chapters, is manifested by the following dispatch,

though at the time of writing it, that General had hundreds of blacks

under his command at Charleston building fortifications.

"CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 13th, 1862.

"HON. WM. P. MILES, RICHMOND, VA.

"Has the bill for the execution of abolition prisoners,

after January next, been passed? Do it, and England will be

stirred into action. It is high time to proclaim the black

flag after that period: let the execution be with the

garrote. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The confederate thirst for "nigger" blood seemed to have been no

stronger in Kentucky than in other Departments, but it does appear, for

some reason, that Kentucky and northern Mississippi were selected by the

confederate generals, Pillow and Forrest, as appropriate sections in

which to particularly vent their spite. The success of Forrest at Fort

Pillow rather strengthened General Beauford's inhumanity. He commanded a

portion of Pillow's forces which appeared before Columbus the day after

the Fort Pillow massacre, and in the following summons demanded its

surrender:

"_To the Commander of the United States Forces, Columbus,

Ky._:

"Fully capable of taking Columbus and its garrison, I desire

to avoid shedding blood. I therefore demand the

unconditional surrender of the forces under your command.

Should you surrender, the negroes in arms will be returned

to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by

force, _no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever_;

white troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

"I am, sir, yours,

A. BEAUFORD, Brig. Gen."

Colonel Lawrence, of the 34th New Jersey, declined to surrender, and

drove the enemy off, who next appeared in Paducah, but retired without

making an assault upon the garrison.

These occurrences, with the mysterious surrender of Union City to

Forrest, on the 16th of March, so incensed the commander of the

Department that a strong force was organized, and in command of General

S. D. Sturgis, started, on the 30th of April, in pursuit of Forrest and

his men, but did not succeed in overtaking him. A few weeks later,

General Sturgis, with a portion of his former force, combined with that

of General Smith's,--just returning from the Red River (Banks)

_fiasco_,--again went in pursuit of General Forrest. At Guntown, on the

10th of June, Sturgis' cavalry, under General Grierson, came up with the

enemy, charged upon them, and drove them back upon their infantry posted

near Brice's Cross Roads. General Grierson, needing support, sent back

for the infantry, which was several miles in his rear. The day was

intensely hot, and the roads, from constant rains, in very bad

condition. However, Sturgis marched the troops up at double-quick to the

position where General Grierson was holding the confederates in check.

The infantry had become so exhausted when they reached the scene of

action, that they were unable to fight as they otherwise would have

done. Sturgis, either ignorant of what was going on or incapacitated for

the work, heightened the disorder at the front by permitting his train

of over two hundred wagons to be pushed up close to the troops, thus

blocking their rear, and obstructing their manoeuvring; finally the

wagons were parked a short distance from the lines and in sight of the

foe. The troops exhausted by the rapid march, without proper formation

or commanders, had been brought up to the support of the cavalry, who

were hotly engaged with the enemy, whose desperation was increased at

the sight of the Phalanx regiments. General Beauford had joined Forrest,

augmenting his force 4,000. Sturgis' force numbered about 12,000, in

cavalry, artillery and infantry. Forrest was well provided with

artillery, which was up early and took a position in an open field

enfilading the Federal line, which fought with a determination worthy of

a better fate than that which befel it.

A confederate writer says:

"At early dawn on the 10th Lyon took the advance, with

Morton's artillery close behind, Rucker and Johnson

following. Meanwhile, Bell, as we have stated, at Rienzi,

eight miles further north, was ordered to move up at a trot.

The roads, soaked with water from recent continuous heavy

rains and so much cut up by the previous passage of cavalry

and trains, greatly retarded the progress of the artillery,

so that Rucker and Johnson soon passed us. On reaching old

Carrollville, five miles northeast of Brice's Cross Roads,

heavy firing could be heard just on ahead. Forrest, as was

his custom, had passed to the front of the entire column

with his escort.

"He had, however, ordered Lieutenant R. J. Black, a dashing

young officer, temporarily attached to his staff, to take a

detachment of men from the Seventh Tennessee Cavalry and

move forward and develop the enemy. Black soon reported that

he had met the advance of the Federal cavalry one and a half

miles from Brice's Cross Roads and there was skirmishing

with them. General Forrest ordered Lyon to press forward

with his brigade. A courier hastening back to the artillery

said: 'General Forrest says, 'Tell Captain Morton to fetch

up the artillery at a gallop.' Lyon in the meantime had

reached the enemy's outposts, dismounted his brigade and

thrown it into line and had warmly opposed a strong line of

infantry or dismounted cavalry, which, after stubborn

resistance, had been driven back to within half a mile of

Brice's Cross Roads."

The columns of the Federals could not do more than retreat, and if they

had been able to do this in any order, and recover from their

exhaustion, they would have been ready to drive the foe, but they were

hotly pursued by the confederates, who were continually receiving

re-enforcements. It was soon evident that the confederates intended to

gain the rear and capture the whole of the Union troops. The Federals,

therefore, began to retire leisurely.

Says the confederate account:

"General Forrest directed General Buford to open vigorously

when he heard Bell on the left, and, taking with him his

escort and Bell's Brigade, moved rapidly around

southeastward to the Guntown-Ripley road. He formed Wilson's

and Russel's Regiments on the right of the road, extending

to Rucker's left, and placed Newsom's Regiment on the left

of the road; Duffs Regiment, of Rucker's Brigade, was placed

on the left of Newsom; Captain H. A. Tyler, commanding

Company A, Twelfth Kentucky, was ordered by Lyon and

subsequently by Forrest to take his company, with Company C,

Seventh Kentucky, and keep mounted on the extreme left of

the line. The escort, under Captain Jackson, moved around

the extreme left of the line, and on striking the Baldwyn

and Pontotoc road about two miles south of the cross roads

had a sharp skirmish and pressed the enemy's cavalry back to

where Tishamingo creek crosses that road; here it was joined

by Captain Gartrell's Georgia company and a Kentucky

company. By mutual agreement Captain Jackson, of the escort,

was placed in command of the three companies and Lieutenant

George L. Cowan in command of the escort. Meanwhile General

Buford had ordered Barteau's Second Tennessee Cavalry to

move across the country and gain the Federal rear, and if

possible destroy their trains and then strike them in

flank."

The gallant conduct of the Federal cavalry inspired the other troops.

They made a stand, and for awhile advanced, driving the confederate line

before them on the right, doubling it up and gaining the rear.

The same writer says:

"It was at this critical moment an officer of Bell's staff

dashed up to General Forrest, very much excited, and said:

'General Forrest, the enemy flanked us and are now in our

rear. What shall be done?' Forrest, turning in his saddle,

very coolly replied: 'We'll whip these in our front and

then turn around, and wont we be in their rear? And then

we'll whip them fellows!' pointing in the direction of the

force said to be in his rear. Jackson and Tyler, charging on

the extreme left, drove back two colored regiments of

infantry upon their main line at the cross roads. In this

charge the gallant Captain Tyler was severely wounded.

"Meanwhile the Federals, with desperation, hurled a double

line of battle, with the four guns at Brice's house

concentrated upon Rucker and Bell, which for a moment seemed

to stagger and make them waver. In this terrible onslaught

the accomplished Adjutant, Lieutenant W. S. Pope, of the

Seventh Tennessee, was killed, and a third of his regiment

was killed and wounded. Soon another charge was sounded.

Lieutenant Tully Brown was ordered, with his section of

three-inch rifles, close on the front at the Porter house,

from which position he hurled a thousand pounds of cold iron

into their stubborn lines. A section of twelve-pounder

howitzers, under Lieutenant B. F. Haller, pressed still

further to the front and within a stone's throw almost of

the enemy's line. Mayson's section of three-inch rifles were

quickly placed in line with Haller's. Just then, General

Buford, riding up and seeing no support to the artillery,

called General Forrest's attention to the fact, when Forrest

remarked: 'Support, h--l; let it support itself; all the

d--n Yankees in the country can't take it."'

The lines were now closing upon each other, and the confederates began

to feel the effect of the Union fire. The dash of the Phalanx, charging

the enemy's flank, gave renewed courage to the troops, now pouring

deadly volleys into the confederate's faces, and their guns had gained a

position, from which they began to sweep the enemy's lines.

Says the same account:

"Now rose the regular incessant volleys of musketry and

artillery. The lines in many places were not over thirty

paces apart and pistols were freely used. The smoke of

battle almost hid the combatants. The underbrush and dense

black-jack thickets impeded the advance of the dismounted

cavalry as the awful musketry fire blazed and gushed in the

face of these gallant men. Every tree and brush was barked

or cut to the ground by this hail of deadly missiles. It was

here the accomplished and gallant William H. Porter, brother

of Major Thomas K. and Governor James D. Porter, fell

mortally wounded. This promising young officer had not

attained his manhood. He was a cadet in the regular

Confederate States army and had been ordered to report to

General Bell, who assigned him to duty as A. D. C. Captain

J. L. Bell, General Bell's Assistant Inspector-General, had

just been killed from his horse, and almost at the same

moment young Porter lost his own horse and just mounted

Captain Bell's when he received the fatal shot. Lieutenant

Isaac Bell, aide-de-camp of Bell's staff, was severely

wounded. The loss in officers right here was very heavy;

sixteen were killed and sixty-one wounded. Captain Ab Hust,

a mere boy, who commanded Bell's escort, rendered most

efficient service at this critical juncture, and Major Tom

Allison, the fighting Quartermaster of Bell's Brigade, was

constantly by the side of his fearless commander, and in

this terrible loss in staff officers his presence was most

opportune.

"Like a prairie on fire the battle raged and the volleying

thunder can be likened in my mind to nothing else than the

fire of Cleburne's Division at Chickamauga, on that terrible

Saturday at dusk. At length the enemy's lines wavered,

Haller and Mayson pressed their guns by hand to within a

short distance of Brice's house, firing as they advanced.

Bell, Lyon and Rucker now closed in on the cross roads and

the Federals gave way in disorder, abandoning three guns

near Brice's house. General Sturgis, in his official report

of the fight, says: 'We had four pieces of artillery at the

cross roads. * * * Finding our troops were being hotly

pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's

reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great

accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate

vicinity of our guns.' A shell from one of the Confederate

guns struck the table in Brice's porch, was used by General

Sturgis, stunning that officer."

The terrible struggle which now ensued was not surpassed, according to

an eye-witness, by the fighting of any troops. The Phalanx were

determined, if courage could do it, to whip the men who had so dastardly

massacred the garrison of Fort Pillow. This fact was known to Forrest,

Buford and their troops, who fought like men realizing that anything

short of victory was death, and well may they have thus thought, for

every charge the Phalanx made meant annihilation. They, too, accepted

the portentous fiat, victory or death.

Though more than twenty years have passed since this bloody fight, yet

the chief of the confederate artillery portrays the situation in these

words:

"Is was soon evident that another strong line had formed

behind the fence by the skirt of woods just westward of

Phillips' branch. General Forrest riding up, dismounted and

approached our guns, which were now plying shell and solid

shot. With his field glasses he took in the situation. The

enemy's shot were coming thick and fast; leaden balls were

seen to flatten as they would strike the axles and tires of

our gun carriages; trees were barked and the air was ladened

with the familiar but unpleasant sound of these death

messengers.

"Realizing General Forrest's exposure, we involuntarily

ventured the suggestion that, 'You had better get lower down

the hill, General.' Instantly we apologized, as we expected

the General to intimate that it was none of our business

where he went. He, however, stepped down the hill out of

danger and seating himself behind a tree, seemed for a few

moments in deep study, but soon the head of our cavalry

column arriving, he turned to me and said: 'Captain, as soon

as you hear me open on the right and flank of the enemy over

yonder,' pointing to the enemy's position, 'charge with your

artillery down that lane and cross the branch.' The genial

and gallant Captain Rice coming up at this time and hearing

the order, turned to me and said: 'By G--d! whoever heard of

artillery charging?' Captain Brice's Battery had been

stationed at Columbus, Miss., and other points on local

duty, and only a few months previous had been ordered and

assigned to our command. He accepted his initiation into the

ways and methods of horse artillery with much spirit and

good grace.

"Meanwhile, watching Forrest at the head of the cavalry

moving through the woods and across the field in the

direction of the enemy's right, I directed Lieutenants

Tully, Brown and H. H. Briggs, whose sections had been held

in the road below the Hadden house for an emergency, to be

ready to move into action at a moments notice. The enemy,

observing our cavalry passing to their right, began to break

and retire through the woods. Forrest, seeing this, dashed

upon them in column of fours. At the same moment Lieutenant

Brown pressed his section down the road, even in advance of

the skirmish line, and opened a terrific fire upon the

enemy, now breaking up and in full retreat. Lieutenant

Briggs also took an advanced position and got in a few

well-directed shots. Brown's section and a section of Rice's

Battery were pushed forward across Phillips' branch and up

the hill under a sharp fire, the former taking position on

the right of the road and the latter in the road just where

the road turns before reaching Dr. Agnew's house.

"Our skirmishers had driven the enemy's skirmishers upon

their main line, when we were about to make another

artillery charge, but distinctly hearing the Federal

officers giving orders to their men to stand steady and

yell, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' 'Charge! charge! charge!' ran

along their lines, and on they came. Our right was pressed

back on the 'negro avengers of Fort Pillow.' They moved

steadily upon our guns and for a moment their loss seemed

imminent. Our cannoneers, standing firm and taking in the

situation, drove double-shotted cannister into this

advancing line. The cavalry rallying on our guns sent death

volleys into their ranks, which staggered the enemy and

drove them back, but only to give place to a new line that

now moved down upon us with wild shouts and got almost

within hand-shaking distance of our guns.

"Lyon coming up opportunely at this moment formed his

brigade on our right, and springing forward with loud

cheers, hurled them back with so stormful an onset that

their entire line gave way in utter rout and confusion.

Lieutenant Brown's horse was shot under him. The gallant

young soldier, Henry King, of Rice's Battery, fell with his

rammer staff in hand, mortally wounded. His grave now marks

the spot where he fell. Several members of the artillery

were wounded and a great many battery horses were killed.

The reason for this desperate stand was soon discovered. The

road was filled with their wagons, ambulances and many

caissons, the dying and wounded. Cast-away arms,

accoutrements, baggage, dead animals and other evidences of

a routed army were conspicuous on every side. The sun had

set, but the weary and over-spent Confederates maintained

the pursuit for some five or six miles beyond and until it

became quite too dark to go further. A temporary halt was

ordered, when a section from each battery was directed to be

equipped with ammunition and the best horses from their

respective batteries and be ready to continue the pursuit at

daylight."

The rout was all the enemy could desire, the Federals fought with a

valor creditable to any troops, but were badly worsted, through the

incompetency of Sturgis. They were driven back to Ripley, in a most

disastrously confused state, leaving behind their trains, artillery,

dead and wounded. But for the gallantry of the Phalanx, the enemy would

have captured the entire force.

The same writer describes the rout:

"Johnson, pressing his brigade forward upon the enemy's

position at Brice's Quarter, with Lyon supporting the

artillery in the road below Brice's house, the position was

soon captured with many prisoners and three pieces of

artillery. Hallers and Mayson's sections were moved up at a

gallop and established on the hill at Brice's Quarter and

opened a destructive fire with double-shotted cannister upon

the enemy's fleeing columns and wagon trains. The bridge

over Tishamingo creek, still standing, was blocked up with

wagons, some of whose teams had been killed. Finding the

bridge thus obstructed the enemy rushed wildly into the

creek, and as they emerged from the water on the opposite

bank in an open field, our artillery played upon them for

half a mile, killing and disabling large numbers. Forrests

escort, under the dashing Lieutenant Cowan, having become

detached in the meantime, had pressed around to the west

side of the creek and south of the Ripley road, and here

made one of its characteristic charges across an open field

near the gin house, upon the enemy's wagon train, capturing

several wagons.

"Meanwhile Barteau was not idle. He had moved his regiment,

as we have stated, across to get in the enemy's rear, and in

his own language says: 'I took my regiment across the

country westward, to reach the Ripley road, on which the

enemy was moving, and being delayed somewhat in passing

through a swampy bottom, I did not reach that road, at

Lyon's gin, three miles from Brice's Cross Roads, until

probably 1 o'clock. I then learned that the last of the

Federal regiments, with all their train, had passed by rapid

march, and as there was now a lull in the engagement (for I

had been hearing sharp firing in front), I greatly feared

that Forrest was defeated and that the Federals were pushing

him back, so I moved rapidly down the road till I reached

the open field near the bridge.'

"This could not have been the Ripley Guntown road, as that

road was filled with Federal troops, wagons and artillery

from Dr. Agnew's house to the cross roads, a distance of two

miles. 'Having placed some sharpshooters, whose sole

attention was to be directed to the bridge,' he continues,

'I extended my line nearly half a mile, and began an attack

by scattering shots at the same time. Sounding my bugle from

various points along the line, almost immediately a

reconnoitering force of the enemy appeared at the bridge,

and being fired upon returned. This was followed, perhaps,

by a regiment, and then a whole brigade came down to the

creek. My men, taking good aim, fired upon them coolly and

steady. Soon I saw wagons, artillery, etc., pushing for the

bridge. These were shot at by my sharpshooters. I now began

to contract my line and collect my regiment, for the

Federals came pouring in immense numbers across the creek.

Your artillery was doing good work. Even the bullets from

the small arms of the Confederates reached my men. I

operated upon the flank of the enemy until after dark.'

"The wagons blockading the bridge were soon removed by being

thrown into the stream and a section from each battery was

worked across by hand, supported by the escort, and brought

to bear upon a negro brigade with fearful loss; the other

two sections were quickly to the front, ahead of any support

for the moment, and drove the enemy from the ridge back of

Holland's house across Dry creek. The cavalry in the

meantime had halted, reorganized and soon joined in the

pursuit. The road was narrow, with dense woods on each side,

so that it was impossible to use more than four pieces at a

time, but that number were kept close upon the heels of the

retreating enemy and a murderous fire prevented them from

forming to make a stand.

"The ridge extending southward from the Hadden house offered

a strong natural position for defensive operations. Upon

this ridge the Federals had established a line of battle,

but a few well directed shots from the artillery stationed

near the Holland house and a charge by our cavalry across

Dry creek readily put them to flight. A section of each

battery was ordered at a gallop to this ridge, which was

reached in time to open with a few rounds of double-shotted

cannister upon their demoralized ranks as they hastily

retreated through the open fields on either side of Phillips

branch. Our cannoneers were greatly blown and well nigh

exhausted from excessive heat and continuous labor at their

guns for full five hours. We noticed a number drink with

apparant relish the black powder water from the sponge

buckets."

The enemy followed the fleeing column, capturing and wounding many at

the town of Ripley. Next morning the Federals made a stand. Again the

Phalanx bore the brunt of the battle, and when finally the troops

stampeded, held the confederates in check until the white troops were

beyond capture. But this was all they could do, and this was indeed an

heroic act.

The confederate says:

"Long before daylight found us moving rapidly to overtake

the flying foe. We had changed positions. The cavalry now

being in advance, overtook the enemy at Stubb's farm; a

sharp skirmish ensued, when they broke, leaving the

remainder of their wagon train. Fourteen pieces of artillery

and some twenty-five ambulances, with a number of wounded,

were left in Little Hatchie bottom, further on. The

discomfited Federals were badly scattered throughout the

country. Forrest, therefore, threw out his regiment on

either side of the roads to sweep the vicinity. A number

were killed and many prisoners captured before reaching

Ripley, twenty-five miles from Brice's Cross Roads. At this

point two strong lines were formed across the road. After a

spirited onset the Federals broke, leaving one piece of

artillery, two caissons, two ambulances. Twenty-one killed

and seventy wounded were also left on the field. Colonel G.

M. McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois

Infantry, was among the killed; also Captain W. J. Tate,

Seventh Tennessee Cavalry. This was accomplished just as the

artillery reached the front.

"Lieutenant Frank Rodgers, of Rucker's staff, the night

previous, with a small, select detachment of men, assisted

by Captain Gooch, with the remnant of his company, hung

constantly upon the Federal rear, with a daring never

surpassed. Their series of attacks greatly harrassed and

annoyed the enemy, numbers of whom were killed and wounded.

The artillery followed to Salem, twenty-five miles distant

from Ripley."

The Phalanx regiments would not consent to be whipped, even with the

black flag flying in their front, and deserted by their white comrades.

A correspondent of the Cleveland _Leader_, in giving an account of this

"miserable affair," writes:

"About sunrise, June 11, the enemy advanced on the town of

Ripley, and threatened our right, intending to cut us off

from the Salem Road. Again the colored troops were the only

ones that could be brought into line; the Fifty-ninth being

on the right, and the Fifty-fifth on the left, holding the

streets. At this time, the men had not more than ten rounds

of ammunition, and the enemy were crowding closer and still

closer, when the Fifty-ninth were ordered to charge on them,

which they did in good style, while singing,

"'We'll rally round the flag, boys.'

"This charge drove the enemy back, so that both regiments

retreated to a pine grove about two hundred yards distant.

"By this time, all the white troops, except one squadron of

cavalry, that formed in the rear, were on the road to Salem

and, when this brigade came up, they, too, wheeled and left,

and in less than ten minutes this now little band of colored

troops found themselves flanked. They then divided

themselves into three squads, and charged the enemy's lines;

one squad taking the old Corinth Road, then a by-road, to

the left. After a few miles, they came to a road leading to

Grand Junction. After some skirmishing, they arrived, with

the loss of one killed and one wounded.

"Another and the largest squad covered the retreat of the

white troops, completely defending them by picking up the

ammunition thrown away by them, and with it repelling the

numerous assaults made by the rebel cavalry, until they

reached Collierville, a distance of sixty miles. When the

command reached Dan's Mills, the enemy attempted to cut it

off by a charge; but the colored boys in the rear formed,

and repelled the attack, allowing the whole command to pass

safely on, when they tore up the bridge. Passing on to an

open country, the officers halted, and re-organized the

brigade into an effective force. They then moved forward

until about four, P. M.; when some Indian flank skirmishers

discovered the enemy, who came up to the left, and in the

rear, and halted. Soon a portion advanced, when a company

faced about and fired, emptying three saddles. From this

time until dark, the skirmishing was constant.

"A corporal in Company C, Fifty-ninth, was ordered to

surrender. He let his would-be captor come close to him;

when he struck him with the butt of his gun.

"While the regiment was fighting in a ditch, and the order

came to retreat, the color-bearer threw out the flag,

designing to jump out and get it; but the rebels rushed for

it, and in the struggle one of the boys knocked down with

his gun the reb who had the flag, caught it, and ran.

"A rebel, with an oath, ordered one of our men to surrender.

He, thinking the reb's gun was loaded, dropped his gun; but,

on seeing the reb commence loading, our colored soldier

jumped for his gun, and with it struck his captor dead.

"Capt. H., being surrounded by about a dozen rebels, was

seen by one of his men, who called several of his

companions; they rushed forward and fired, killing several

of the enemy, and rescued their captain.

"A rebel came up to one, and said, 'Come my good fellow, go

with me and wait on me.' In an instant, the boy shot his

would-be master dead.

"Once when the men charged on the enemy, they rushed forth

with the cry, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' The rebs called back,

and said, 'Lee's men killed no prisoners.'

"One man in a charge threw his antagonist to the ground, and

pinned him fast; and, as he attempted to withdraw his

bayonet, it came off his gun, and, as he was very busy just

then, he left him transfixed to mother earth.

"One man killed a rebel by striking him with the butt of his

gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work,

he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better

gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his

gun badly cut his lip.

"When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one

man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he

shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could

bayonet the third, he turned the butt of his gun, and

knocked him down."

General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after

the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms.

He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of

which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports

furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped

they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 1._]

"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

COLLIERSVILLE, TENN., June 12, 1864.

"GENERAL:--I have the honor to report that we met the enemy

in position and in heavy force about 10 A. M. on the 10th

instant at Brice's Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road

and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe

battle ensued which lasted until about 4 P. M., when I

regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the

overwhelming numbers by which they were assailed at every

point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily

difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through

which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge.

The road was almost impassable by reason of the heavy rains

which had fallen for the previous ten days and the

consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the

artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to

confusion and disorder.

"In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two

colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side

of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well

and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was

only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops

were seized with a panic and became absolutely

uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of

great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in

checking up the flying column and placing it in line of

battle.

"This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes

only, when it again gave way and my whole army became

literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do

but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it

gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly

dark, the roads almost impassable and the hope of saving my

artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the

artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned

and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six

pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7 A.

M. next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we

re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The

retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our

ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and

pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the

retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7

o'clock this morning.

"My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and

some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of

the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly

scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I

am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear,

however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve

hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I

think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall

short of our own.

"This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the

result of a series of unfortunate circumstances over which

human ingenuity could have no control.

"The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a

desert country that the enemy had ample time to accumulate

an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in

an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals

that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery

from the mud.

"So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while

they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops

deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to

their work.

"This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our

operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon

as the official reports can be received from division

commanders.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your

obedient servant,

"S. D. STURGIS,

"_Brig.-Gen. Commanding._

"To Maj.-Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Commanding District W. Tenn."

An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the

55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:

"Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on

double-quick--a distance of about five miles--immediately

before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact

that this arm of our force went into the engagement very

seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and

fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped

in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous

assaults of your forces. When the engagement first began I

was at the rear of the Federal column, in command of the

train guard, and hence passed over the ground on the way to

the battle-field after the balance of the army had passed,

and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of

the infantry, as I passed large numbers entirely prostrated

by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle

and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement."

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 2._]

"MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

"Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the

operations of the expedition which marched from near La

Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This

expedition was organized and fitted out under the

supervision of the major general commanding the District of

West Tennessee and I assumed command of it on the morning of

the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in

pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters,

District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which

were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the

command in round numbers was about 8,000 men,' (which

included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st

Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2

pieces.)

"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of

181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train

of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as

follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of

Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be

there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible

towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force,

thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was

allowed me as to the details of the movement where

circumstances might arise which could not have been

anticipated in my instructions. Owing to some

misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the

point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some

forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was

some little delay occasioned in getting the column in

motion.

"The following incidents of the march are taken from the

journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C.

Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:

"'Wednesday, June 1st.--Expedition started from Memphis and

White's Station toward La Fayette.

"'Thursday, June 2nd.--The general and staff left Memphis on

the 5 o'clock A. M. train and established headquarters at

Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and assumed command. Cavalry

moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove

roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all

day and part of the night.

"'Friday, June 3rd.--Ordered the cavalry to move to within

three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18

miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the

day and the bad condition of the roads and bridges, the

train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did

not get into park until 11 o'clock P. M., the colored

brigade remaining with the train as a guard.

"'Saturday, June 4th.--Informed General Grierson that the

infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances

could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his

march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued

rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained

heavily until 1 o'clock P. M., making the roads almost

impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house,

two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of

infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem.

"'Sunday, June 5th.--Infantry and train started at half past

four o'clock A. M., and joined the cavalry, two miles east

of Salem. At 10 o'clock A. M., issued rations to the cavalry

and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in

camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of

the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville

roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men,

started at 6 P. M., with instructions to move via Ripley to

Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy

bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at

Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.

"'Monday, June 6th.--Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clock

A. M., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5 A.

M., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow,

marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at

intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the

Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville.

The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party

of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La

Grange and Ripley roads.

"'Tuesday, June 7th.--Upon information received from General

Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him

to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and

instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or

Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped

on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small

party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward

Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove

them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a

regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south.

Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very

bad.

"Wednesday, June 8th.--Received information at 4 o'clock A.

M. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River

and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements.

Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton

Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road.

Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return

of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clock P. M., having

swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.

"'Thursday, June 9th.--Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and

wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to

Stubbs', fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days'

rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.

"'Friday, June 10th.--Encountered the enemy at Brice's

Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from

Guntown.'

"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to

whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still

fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally

mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with

difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I

called together my division commanders and placed before

them my views of our condition. At this interview, one

brigade commander and two members of my staff were,

incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the

great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous

rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the

exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability

that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded

him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the

vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our

train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the

narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the

impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the

animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of

defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our

steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however,

(and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had

abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and

given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire

destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we

were again sent through the same country, it would be

ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting

the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General

Washburn had acquired, there _could be no considerable_

force in our front and all my own information led to the

same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly

meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have

been totally unable to present any facts to justify my

cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been

successfully carried forward. All I could have presented

would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would

naturally do under the circumstances and these would have

availed but little against the idea that the enemy was

scattered and had no considerable force in our front.

"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the

consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force

as compact as possible and ready for action at all times;

hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did

not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in

comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to

General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so

large an extent.

"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I

assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the

headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to

the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps;

keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a

moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate

or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved

us to move and act constantly as though in his presence.

That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment,

and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to

be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry

marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven,

thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of

the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a

half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as

follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance;

infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply

train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments

at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of

artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the

infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building

bridges, &c., &c.

"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry

column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp,

when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that

would require considerable time and labor to render

practicable. While halted here to await the head of the

column, I received a message from General Grierson that he

had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few

minutes more I received another message from him, saying the

enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That

he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position

was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to

leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the

infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and

with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward

Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of

the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main

purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode

forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far,

however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel

McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as

possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the

cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the

battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on

either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the

cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing

to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent

impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however,

that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one

section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's

artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell

bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.

"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until

the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel

Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and

occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance

of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved

and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that

Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without

authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to

us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall

back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his

line and strengthening his position. I was especially

anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding,

that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been

withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was

compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort,

consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This

handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess,

behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival

of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began

to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the

field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when

the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now

requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was

exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized

as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it

and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear

and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time

I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in

position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or

four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing

any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to

this point to see that my orders had been executed and also

to give directions for the management and protection of the

wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and

supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies

thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the

superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins,

of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train,

which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear,

arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near

where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned

round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on

the right of the line was now becoming very great and

General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his

cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message

from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement

on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being

made on the left. Another section of artillery was now

placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins,

but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of

the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which

had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way,

and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in

rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required

re-enforcements in the centre. _I now endeavored to get hold

of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train.

While traversing the short distance to where the head of

that brigade should be found, the main line began to give

way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and

confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing

him that I was unable to render him any additional

assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what

he had to hold his position until I could form a line to

protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply

train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position

in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find.

This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here

that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid

to Colonel McMillen_, who was soon after compelled to

withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in

rear. It was now 5 o'clock P. M. For seven hours, these

gallant officers and men had held their ground against

overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted

they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many

of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the

enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and

was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General

Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing

column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and

force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my

assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length

succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing

them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was

placed in command. About this time it was reported to me

that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but

little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for

the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few

minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and

disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken

and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also

gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise

any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with

troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud

became inextricable and added to the general confusion which

now prevailed. No power could now check or control the

panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by

Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and

who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in

rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly,

if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable

resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clock P. M., I

reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and

his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only

organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed

him to add to his own every possible force he could rally,

as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in

position until all should have passed. I also informed him

that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the

wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving

anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to

destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find

blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men.

In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were

lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery

spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were

brought away. By 7 o'clock A. M., of the 11th, we had

reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a

respectable appearance, and would have been able to

accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the

unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were

well nigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put

in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance,

followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the

rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion

so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all

cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the

command was in no condition to offer determined resistance,

whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a.

m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out

and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for

two days and two nights without rest and without eating.

About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis,

bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and

supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain

here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording

protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through

fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening,

that the commander at White's Station had information of a

large force of the enemy approaching that place from the

southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to

offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself

across my line of march, I informed the general commanding

the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to

continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p.

m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station

at daylight next morning. This report having already become

more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely

omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's

Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but

would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports

herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:

"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That

our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much

greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal

exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the

95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the

able commanders under him.

"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most

intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very

intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days

in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy

actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two

divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear

strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our

vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise

will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar

with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of

acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's

country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the

enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we,

as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war,

can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by

actually fighting for the information; and in that case the

knowledge often comes too late.

"While I will not prolong this already extended report by

recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of

many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will

respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division

and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing

my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by

that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of

the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth

and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a

part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during

one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night

following.

"To the officers of my staff,--Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th

Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D.

C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A.

D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.;

Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.;

Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills.

Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,--whose names appear in no other

report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and

zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and

often under trying and hazardous circumstances.

"I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS,

MAJ. W. H. MORGAN, A. A. G., _Brig.-Gen. Commanding._

Hdqrs. Dist. West Tenn., Memphis, Tenn.

"Amid these scenes we noted the arrival of 95 more men;

those who had belonged to a _raid_ sent from Memphis, Tenn.,

under command of General Sturgis, and were attacked and

badly defeated by the rebel General Forrest, at a place in

Mississippi. General Sturgis is said to have been

_intoxicated_ during the engagement, and that just as soon

as he saw things were likely to go against him, he turned

away with a portion of his cavalry, and _sought to save

himself from capture_.--'_Life and Death in Rebel

Prisons._'"

Notwithstanding the arrangements usually and speedily entered into by

two belligerent powers for the exchange of prisoners of war, it proved a

most difficult task for the Federal Government to consummate an

arrangement with the confederates, and much suffering was caused among

the prisoners in the hands of the latter while negotiations were in

progress. The agreement entered into by the commissioners, after a long

delay, did not anticipate there being any black soldiers to exchange;

nor would the confederate authorities thereafter allow the terms of the

cartel to apply to the blacks, because Jefferson Davis and the

confederate Congress regarded it as an outrage against humanity, and the

rules of civilized warfare to arm the negroes against their masters.

It was a year after the black soldiers had become a part of the Union

forces before even a _quasi_ acknowledgment of their rights as prisoners

was noted in Richmond. The grounds upon which the greatest difficulty

lingered was the refusal of the Federal government at first to accord

belligerent rights to the confederates but this difficulty was finally

overcome in July, 1862, and the exchange of prisoners proceeded with

until the confederate authorities refused to count the black soldiers

captured in the interpretation of the cartel. But the time arrived when

Grant assumed command of the armies, when it was no longer an open

question, for the confederate Congress began devising plans for arming

the slaves.

However, the inhuman treatment did not cease with "irresponsible

parties," whose conduct was doubtless approved by the rebel authorities,

Jefferson Davis having declared General Butler an outlaw, and committed

him and his officers and black soldiers to the mercy of a chivalry which

affected to regard them as mercenaries. With this spirit infused in the

confederate army, what else than barbarity could be expected?

[Illustration: PHALANX REGIMENT RECEIVING ITS FLAGS.

Presentation of colors to the 20th United States Colored Infantry, Col.

Bertram, in N. Y., March 5th, 1864.]

FOOTNOTES:

[28] Among the captured rebel flags now in the War Department,

Washington, D. C., are several Black Flags. No. 205 was captured near

North Mountain, Md., Aug. 1st, 1864. Another Captured from General

Pillow's men at Fort Donelson, is also among the rebel archives in that

Department. Several of them were destroyed by the troops capturing them,

as at Pascagoula, Miss., and near Grand Gulf on the Mississippi.

[29] General Brisbin, in his account of the expedition which, in the

Winter of 1864, left Bean Station, Tenn., under command of General

Stoneman, for the purpose of destroying the confederate Salt Works in

West Virginia, says the confederates after capturing some of the

soldiers of the Sixth Phalanx Cavalry Regiment, butchered them. His

statement is as follows:

"For the last two days a force of Confederate cavalry, under Witcher,

had been following our command picking up stragglers and worn-out horses

in our rear. Part of our troops were composed of negroes and these the

Confederates killed as fast as they caught them, laying the dead bodies

by the roadside with pieces of paper pinned to their clothing, on which

were written such warnings as the following: 'This is the way we treat

all nigger soldiers,' and, 'This is the fate of nigger soldiers who

fight against the South.' We did not know what had been going on in our

rear until we turned about to go back from Wytheville, when we found the

dead colored soldiers along the road as above described. General

Burbridge was very angry and wanted to shoot a Confederate prisoner for

every one of his colored soldiers he found murdered, and would

undoubtedly have done so had he not been restrained. As it was, the

whole corps was terribly excited by the atrocious murders committed by

Witcher's men, and if Witcher had been caught he would have been shot."

This gallant soldier,(?) twenty years after the close of the war, writes

about the incidents and happenings during the march of the army to

Saltville, and says:

"Before we reached Marion we encountered Breckenridge's advance and

charged it vigorously driving it back in confusion along the Marion and

Saltville road for several miles. In one of these charges (for there

were several of them and a sort of running fight for several miles) one

of Witcher's men was captured and brought in. He was reported to me and

I asked him what his name was and to what command he belonged. He gave

me his name and said 'Witcher's command.' Hardly were the words out of

his mouth before a negro soldier standing near raised his carbine and

aimed at the Confederate soldier's breast. I called out and sprang

forward, but was too late to catch the gun. The negro fired and the poor

soldier fell badly wounded. Instantly the negro was knocked down by our

white soldiers, disarmed and tied. I drew my revolver to blow his brains

out for his terrible crime, but the black man never flinched. All he

said was, pointing to the Confederate soldier, 'He killed my comrades; I

have killed him.' The negro was taken away and put among the prisoners.

The Provost Marshal had foolishly changed the white guard over the

prisoners and placed them under some colored troops. An officer came

galloping furiously to the front and said the negroes were shooting the

prisoners. General Burbridge told me to go back quickly and do whatever

I pleased in his name to restore order. It was a lively ride, as the

prisoners were more than four miles back, being forced along the road as

rapidly as possible toward Marion. All the prisoners, except a few

wounded men, were on foot, and of course they could not keep up with the

cavalry. I soon reached them and never shall I forget that sight while I

live. Men with sabres were driving the poor creatures along the road

like beasts. I halted the motley crew and scolded the officer for his

inhumanity. He said he had orders to keep the prisoners up with the

column and he was simply trying to obey his orders. As I was General

Burbridge's chief of staff and all orders were supposed to emanate from

my office, I thought I had better not continue the conversation. As it

was, I said such orders were at an end and I would myself take charge of

the prisoners."

[30] "When the successful attempt was made, by tunneling, to escape from

Libby Prison in 1862, many of the fugitives were honorably harbored by

this unfortunate class till a more quiet opportunity occurred for

leaving the city. This I have from one of the escaped officers."