TSU-SHIMA
1905
When the war of 1894-5 between China and Japan was brought to a close by
the Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April, 1895), the Japanese were in possession
of Korea and Southern Manchuria, Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula,
Wei-hai-wei and the Pescadores Islands, and a joint naval and military
expedition was ready to seize Formosa.
By the second article China ceded to Japan the fortress and dockyard of
Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. As soon as the terms of the treaty
were published, Russia, which was the northern neighbour of China along the
borders of Manchuria and Mongolia, and the neighbour of Japan by the
possession of Vladivostock and Saghalien, protested against the cession of
Port Arthur and its territory to the victors, arguing that the permanent
occupation of Port Arthur by a foreign Power would be a standing menace to
the Government at Pekin, and would put an end to the independence of China.
Germany and France joined in the Russian protest, and the three Powers
began to move their ships eastward. Their combined squadrons would have
been more than a match for Admiral Ito's cruisers. England had a powerful
squadron in the Eastern seas, but observed a strict neutrality in the
diplomatic strife.
If England had joined her, Japan would undoubtedly have fought rather than
yield up the fruit of her hard-won victories. But the Mikado's Ministers
realized that single-handed they could not face a Triple Alliance of
aggressive European Powers. The treaty was revised, the cession of Port
Arthur and its territory being struck out of it. They were to be restored
to China.
But the statesmen of Japan, while they yielded the point, recognized in
Russia their future rival for the empire of the East, and resolved to begin
at once preparing for a struggle in years to come which would give them
back more than they were now forced to abandon. They set to work to create
a powerful navy, and at the same time added steadily to the fighting
strength of their army, which for a while found useful war training in the
subjugation of the hill tribes of Formosa. The millions of the war
indemnity and loans negotiated abroad were expended on a great scheme of
armaments. A fleet of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft was built in
foreign shipyards, and the personnel of the navy was increased to provide
officers and crews. The Japanese Government went on for years patiently
preparing, regardless of conduct on the part of Russia that might have
tempted a less self-possessed Power to premature action.
The Russian Government had hardly forced Japan to abandon so large a part
of her conquests when it took advantage of the weakness of China to obtain
from the Pekin Government the right to make a railway through Manchuria to
the treaty port of Niu-chwang, and to place garrisons along the new line
for its protection, and further the right to garrison Port Arthur, use it
as a naval station, and occupy the adjacent territory. When the first
rumours of the Russo-Chinese Treaty reached Europe they were treated with
incredulity. It was said that it was impossible that Russia could cynically
claim a position which she had just declared was incompatible with the
independence of China, and which she had argued the nations of Europe could
not permit to Japan or any other Power. But presently the treaty was
published, and acted upon, Russia making Port Arthur her chief naval
station in the East, announcing a project for a great commercial port at
Talienwan Bay, and, further, occupying the treaty port of Niu-chwang. There
was a brief period of tension, during which there was a talk of various
Powers resisting this barefaced aggression, but European statesmen thought
that an easier course was open to them. Instead of resisting the aggressor,
they embarked in a policy of aggression themselves, on the plea of securing
compensations and guarantees. The weakness of China made her the ready
victim of this policy.
Foreign aggression from so many quarters called forth a patriotic movement
in China, which in 1900 culminated in the "Boxer" revolt. For a while Japan
and the European Powers, including Russia, became allies, to save their
embassies and repress the rising about Pekin. In the campaign the Japanese
forces proved themselves the most efficient of all, and their chiefs
returned home with an absolute confidence that they could successfully meet
European soldiers in the field.
Japan had made the most unsparing use of its rights in Korea, acquired by
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, all but absolutely annexing the country. After
the Boxer revolt Admiral Alexieff, who was governor of the Russian
possessions in the Far East, embarked on a dangerous policy of provocation
towards Japan. He had an ill-informed contempt for the hardy islanders. He
underrated their power of resistance, and felt sure that the mere fact that
the Russian fleet outnumbered theirs would secure the command of the sea
for Russia, and have a decisive effect in the event of a conflict. He
believed that the sooner it came the better.
The Russian fleet in the East was steadily reinforced, unit by unit. The
Japanese people began to see in these proceedings, and in the work done at
Port Arthur, a threat of early hostilities, and there was a general call on
the Government to anticipate the blow, when relations became strained
between the two countries in 1903. The Tokio Government was anxious not to
precipitate the war, for the organization of the army required some months
for completion, but the feeling in the navy, army, and civil population
forced its hand. After a brief delay of negotiations, during which both
parties worked with feverish energy to secure additional armaments,
diplomatic relations were broken off at the beginning of February, 1904,
and then, without waiting for any formal declaration of war, the Japanese
torpedo flotilla swooped down on the Russian fleet lying in the roads
outside the narrow entrance of Port Arthur, found them utterly unprepared
to meet this sudden attack, and crippled several of the ships. A second
blow was the destruction of the first-class armoured cruiser "Variag," the
Russian guardship at Chemulpo, by a Japanese squadron.
Most of the best ships in the Russian navy were in the East at the outbreak
of the war. Alexieff had, however, made the initial mistake of dividing the
force at his disposal. Away north at Vladivostock was a squadron of three
large armoured cruisers, the "Gromoboi," "Rossia," and "Rurik," and the
protected cruiser "Bogatyr." The "Variag" was isolated at Chemulpo, the
port of Seoul, doing duty that might have been left to a gunboat. At Port
Arthur, under Admiral Stark, there was a strong fleet, including seven
battleships, the "Petropavlosk," "Poltava," "Peresviet," "Pobieda,"
"Retsivan," "Sebastopol," and "Tsarevitch," the cruisers "Askold,"
"Boyarin," "Bayan," "Pallada," "Diana," and "Novik," and a flotilla of
torpedo craft and the mine-laying steamer "Yenessei." In the torpedo attack
on the evening of 8 February the "Retsivan," "Tsarevitch," and "Pallada"
were badly damaged. The "Variag" was destroyed next day, and a few days
later the "Yenessei" accidentally blew herself up while laying mines. This
series of disasters seemed for a while to have almost destroyed the
_morale_ of the fleet. Stark set to work to repair his damaged ships, made
no attempt to meet the Japanese at sea, or interfere with the transport of
their armies to the mainland of Asia, and, subordinating his fleet to the
defence of Port Arthur, even landed guns and men to strengthen the landward
works. The Japanese blockaded the port, insulted it with long-range
bombardments, and tried to block the narrow entrance by sinking old
steamers across it.
In March the arrival of the best officer in the Russian Navy, Admiral
Makharoff, for a while inspired new energy into the Port Arthur fleet. The
repairs of the injured ships were completed, and on 13 April the admiral
steamed out to challenge Togo and the main Japanese fleet to battle.
Notwithstanding precautions taken against the known danger of floating
mines, the fleet entered a tract of water where several were afloat, and
the flagship "Petropavlosk" was destroyed with fearful suddenness by the
explosion of one of them. There was great loss of life, but the most
serious blow to Russia was the death of the admiral.
After the fleet returned to the harbour there came another period of
irresolute inactivity. It was not till August, when several ships had been
injured at their anchors by the bombardment from the land batteries of the
Japanese attack, and it was evident that the port would soon be a dangerous
place for the ships, that Admiral Witjeft proceeded to sea, announcing that
he was going to Vladivostock, the cruiser squadron from that port having
been warned to come out and reinforce him on his way.
The sea-fight, known as the battle of the Tenth of August, took place a few
miles to seaward of the port. Witjeft led the fleet in his flagship the
"Tsarevitch," followed by the battleships "Retsivan," "Sebastopol,"
"Pobieda," "Poltava," and "Peresviet" (carrying the flag of the second in
command, Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky), and the cruiser division made up
of the "Askold" (carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein),
"Pallada," "Diana," and "Novik," besides eight destroyers. The cruiser
"Bayan" had been so damaged that she was left in port. Witjeft had a marked
superiority in battleships. Togo had had six new first-rate ships of the
class under his command at the outset of the war, but on 15 May he had lost
two of them, one-third of his battleship fleet, by a disaster like that of
the "Petropavlosk." On that May morning, while cruising off Port Arthur, he
ran into a field of drift mines, and in a few minutes the battleships
"Hatsuse" and "Yashima," and the cruiser "Yoshino," were destroyed. The
Japanese managed till the end of the war to conceal the fact that the
"Yashima" had been lost, and the Russians up to the battle of Tsu-shima
believed Togo had five of his big battleships intact. In the battle of 10
August he put in his main fighting-line the two powerful armoured cruisers
"Nisshin" and "Kasuga," purchased from the Argentine Government on the eve
of the war.
The battle began with long-range firing at 1 p.m., and continued till after
seven in the evening. It was decided by the superior gunnery of the
Japanese, and the damage done by their high explosive shells. The
"Tsarevitch," badly cut up and set on fire, was driven out of the line.
Witjeft was killed by a shell. His last word was to reiterate his order to
push for Vladivostock. As darkness came on Ukhtomsky lost heart, and led
the fleet back to Port Arthur. If he had held on he might have got through
the Japanese fleet, for their ammunition was almost exhausted when the
firing ceased. Reitzenstein, with the cruisers, tried to execute Witjeft's
last order. The "Pallada," however, left him and followed the battleships.
The rest of the cruiser squadron and the destroyers that accompanied it
were forced to part company, and only the "Novik" got through to the
northwards. The "Diana" fled southwards to the French port of Saigon; the
"Askold," with a destroyer, reached Shanghai. The battered "Tsarevitch,"
with three destroyers, took refuge at Kiao-chau. All these ships were
disarmed by the French, German, and Chinese authorities, and detained till
the end of the war, when they were restored to the Russian Government.
The "Novik" failed to get into Vladivostock, but reached a Russian port in
Saghalien, where a few days later she was tracked down and destroyed by
Japanese cruisers. The Vladivostock squadron had come out to meet the
unfortunate Witjeft. The "Boyarin" was left behind, damaged by accidentally
grounding, so the squadron was made up of the three big armoured cruisers
"Gromoboi," "Rossia," and "Rurik." They were approaching the straits of
Tsu-shima, and were as far south as Fusan, when they were discovered and
attacked by Admiral Kamimura's cruiser squadron, on 14 August. Once more
good gunnery against poor shooting decided the fight. The "Rurik" was sunk,
and the "Gromoboi" and "Rossia" returned to Vladivostock, bearing marks of
very hard hitting--riddled funnels, and sides hastily patched with plates
of iron, told of the straight shooting of the Japanese cruisers. In both
the action with the Port Arthur battleship fleet and the Vladivostock
cruiser squadron the losses of the Japanese had been very slight.
On paper the Russians had had a distinct superiority over the Japanese in
sea-power at the outset, so far as it can be measured by balancing off
battleships, cruisers, and minor craft in parallel columns. In the months
before the war there was ample material for the enterprising journalist to
work up a navy scare at Tokio. But once more it was shown that not the
number of ships but the temper and training of the men are the true measure
of power on the sea. From the first Togo had asserted his superiority, and
by asserting secured it. After the naval engagements of 10 and 14 August
the Russian Navy in the Far East accepted a position of helpless inaction.
Ukhtomsky kept what was left of the fine fleet, that had been originally
assembled at Port Arthur, anchored in the land-locked harbour till the
ships were sunk by fire of the besieging batteries.
While the Far Eastern fleet was still in being, and Port Arthur was holding
out, the Russian Government had announced its intention of sending a
second fleet from Europe to the seat of war. It had two fleets in European
waters, those of the Black Sea and the Baltic. The Black Sea fleet was not
available. International treaties barred its exit from the Dardanelles.
Only the Baltic dockyards could supply the new armada.
As soon as the news of the first torpedo attack on Port Arthur arrived, in
February, 1904, there was talk of the new fleet for the East, and
unofficially the end of June was spoken of as the time when it would be
ready to sail. From the first it was obvious that this was an over-sanguine
estimate, unless the fleet was to be made up entirely of old and weak
ships. The best units that could be made available, and without some at
least of which the fleet could hardly be sent out, were five powerful
battleships that were being completed in the Neva yards and at Cronstadt.
Two had been launched in 1901, two in 1902, and the fifth in 1903, but even
on the 1901 ships there was a large amount of work to be done. Naval
experts declared that the fleet would not be ready for a year, and that
even then the difficulty of coaling would make its voyage to the other side
of the world in war time a hopeless task for the admiral in command.
By hard work the fleet was made ready for sea by the middle of September.
The coaling difficulty was overcome by taking colliers with the fleet,
contracting with a German firm to send large coal-laden steamers to various
points on the route selected, and straining to the utmost the benevolent
neutrality of France, and using her colonial ports as halting places on the
way. There was some difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number of
engineer officers, and of stokers who could manage the novel tubular
boilers of the new battleships, and the fleet was undoubtedly handicapped
by the inexperience of its engine-room and stokehold staff.
Admiral Rojdestvensky, the officer chosen for the supreme command, had an
excellent record. He was fifty-six years of age, and had served in the
navy since 1865. In the Russo-Turkish War he had distinguished himself by
brilliant attacks on Turkish ships of war with a small torpedo gunboat, the
"Vesta." He had been naval attache in London, and had filled important
technical and official positions at St. Petersburg, being for a while chief
of the general Naval Staff. Finally he had personal knowledge of the
Eastern seas and of the Japanese navy, for he had commanded the Russian
squadron in the Far East during the war between China and Japan.
On 14 August--just after the news of the disastrous sortie of the Port
Arthur fleet had reached Europe, and on the very day that Kamimura defeated
the Vladivostock squadron and sank the "Rurik"--Admiral Rojdestvensky
hoisted his flag on board his flagship, the "Knias Suvaroff," at Cronstadt.
But there was still much work to be done, and recent mishaps to some of the
ships' machinery to be made good, so the fleet did not sail till 25 August.
Even then it was only for a few days' training cruise in the Baltic.
On the 30th the fleet was back again at Cronstadt. Engineers and mechanics
worked night and day, setting right defects in the ships, and on 11
September there was another start, this time for the port of Libau.
The fleet consisted of seven battleships, two armoured cruisers, and some
protected cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. It was to be joined at
Libau by a miscellaneous collection of craft--some small cruisers and a
number of merchantmen to be used as auxiliary cruisers, store, hospital,
and repair ships.
Of the five new battleships in the Neva yards four had been got ready for
sea. These were the "Borodino," "Orel," "Imperator Alexander III," and
"Knias Suvaroff." They were powerful ships of 13,000 to 13,500 tons
displacement, with engines of nominal 16,000 horse-power, and their
official speed, which they never realized, was eighteen knots. Their
heaviest armour was nine inches, and they carried two pair of 12-inch guns
fore and aft in armoured turrets, with an auxiliary armament of twelve
6-inch quick-firers besides lighter guns. The three other battleships, the
"Ossliabya," "Navarin," and "Sissoi Veliki" were older ships. The newest of
them, the "Ossliabya," launched in 1898, was on her way to the East when
the war broke out, and had turned back. She was of 12,600 tons
displacement, and claimed a speed of eighteen knots. She carried four
10-inch and eleven 6-inch guns. The other two ships were rated as having
sixteen knots speed, but probably could not much exceed twelve. Their
displacement and principal armament were:--
_Navarin_, 10,000 tons, four 12-inch guns, eight 6-inch Q.F.
_Sissoi Veliki_, 8880 tons, four 12-inch guns, six 6-inch Q.F.
The two armoured cruisers were old ships:--
_Admiral Nakhimoff_, 8500 tons, eight 8-inch, ten 6-inch guns.
_Dimitri Donskoi_, 7796 tons, six 6-inch, ten 4.7 inch guns.
Two of the protected cruisers, the "Aurora" and "Oleg," were ships of about
7000 tons, carrying for their main armament the former eight and the latter
twelve 6-inch guns. The other cruisers were four smaller ships, but some of
them were comparatively new vessels with good speed--useful as scouts.
Well manned with competent engineers and trained gunners the fleet would
have been formidable enough, notwithstanding its weaker units. But here
again it was the men that counted.
In the first week of October the fleet was taken to Revel. The Tsar arrived
there on the 9th and inspected it next day. On the 11th it sailed. But it
stopped again at Libau, until October 15, when at last it started for the
East.
There had been wild rumours that the Japanese had sent emissaries to
Europe, obtained some light craft, and fitted them as improvised
torpedo-boats for the purpose of attacking the fleet on its voyage through
the narrow waters that form the exit from the Baltic or during the crossing
of the North Sea. The Russian police attached such importance to these
canards that Rojdestvensky was warned to take precaution against attack
until he was out on the open ocean. He passed the Danish straits with his
ships partly cleared for action, fired on a Swedish merchantman and a
German fishing-boat, and, avoiding the usual course from the Skaw to the
Channel, ran by the Dogger Bank, and in a panic of false alarm opened fire
on the steam trawling fleet, sinking a boat and killing and wounding
several men. The result was an outburst of indignation in England, a
partial mobilization of the British fleet, and some days of extreme
tension, when it seemed likely that England would be drawn into the war,
with the probability that France would then, under the terms of her
alliance with Russia, have also to enter into the conflict. An agreement
was arranged under which there was to be an international inquiry into the
Dogger Bank incident, and Russia promised to make full reparation.
Meanwhile the Baltic fleet had run down Channel and across the Bay of
Biscay, and southwards to Tangier, where it was concentrated on 3 November,
watched by Lord Charles Beresford and the Channel Fleet, for the period of
sharp tension was not over. At Tangier Rojdestvensky divided his force. He
went southward along the African coast with the first division, and sent
the second division under Admiral Foelkersham into the Mediterranean to go
eastwards by the Suez Canal route. A third division had been formed at
Libau to reinforce the fleet. It was composed of the armoured cruisers
"Izumrud" and "Oleg," three auxiliary cruisers (armed liners of the
volunteer fleet), the "Terek," "Rion," and "Dnieper," a flotilla of
destroyers, and a number of storeships. It sailed from Libau on 7 November.
Rojdestvensky put into various African ports, mostly in the French
colonies, and coaled his ships from his colliers. He was at Dakar, in West
Africa, on 13 November; at Gaboon on the 26th; in Great Fish Bay on 6
December; and at Angra Pequena on the 11th. He passed Cape Town on 19
December. Rounding the Cape, he steered for Madagascar, and on 1 January,
1905, he anchored in the Bay of Ste. Marie, near Tamatave.
On that same New Year's Day General Stoessel sent a flag of truce out to
General Nogi, to inform him that he was anxious to arrange the immediate
surrender of Port Arthur. The capitulation was signed next day. Thus at the
very moment that Rojdestvensky and the main fighting force of the Baltic
fleet established itself in the Indian Ocean, its nearest possible base in
the Eastern seas passed into Japanese hands, and the problem the Russian
admiral had to solve became more difficult.
Foelkersham, with the second division, rejoined Rojdestvensky's division in
the waters of Madagascar.
From Ste. Marie the fleet moved to the roadstead of Nossi-Be, at the north
end of Madagascar, where it was joined in February by the reinforcements
for Libau. Rojdestvensky had now under his command an armada of some forty
ships of all kinds, including storeships and colliers. Now that Port Arthur
had fallen he seemed in no hurry to proceed eastwards.
There had been an agitation in Russia for a further reinforcement of the
fleet, and though the addition of a few more old and weak ships could add
no real strength to Rojdestvensky's armada, the Government yielded to the
clamour, and on February 15 dispatched from Libau a fourth division, under
the command of Admiral Nebogatoff. The flagship was an armoured
turret-ship, the "Imperator Nikolai I," of 9700 tons, dating from 1889, and
classed in the Navy List as a battleship; with her went three small
armoured "coast-defence battleships," the "General Admiral Apraxin," the
"Admiral Ushakoff," and the "Admiral Senyavin," all of about 4000 tons, and
the cruiser "Vladimir Monomach," of a little over 5500 tons. Rojdestvensky
seemed inclined to wait at Nossi-Be for Nebogatoff's arrival, but the
Japanese addressed strong protests to Paris against Madagascar being made
a base of operations for a huge expedition against them; the French
Government sent pressing remonstrances to their friends at St. Petersburg,
and the admiral was ordered by cable to move on.
Sailing from Nossi-Be on 25 March, Rojdestvensky steered first for the
Chagos Archipelago, and then for the Straits of Malacca. In the afternoon
of 8 April the fleet passed Singapore, keeping well out to sea. The ships
were burning soft coal, and an enormous cloud of black smoke trailed from
the forest of funnels. Steamers ran out from the port to see the splendid
sight of the great crowd of ships moving four abreast into the China Sea.
Before the fleet sailed many critics of naval matters had prophesied that
as Russia had no coaling stations the coaling difficulty would make it
impossible for Rojdestvensky ever to carry his fleet so far. The successful
entry into the Eastern seas was therefore regarded as something of an
exploit. It was a revelation of the far-reaching power that would belong to
better-equipped fleets in future wars.
While the Baltic fleet was on its way the Japanese Government,
patriotically supported by the Press and the people, kept a strict silence
on all naval matters. There were wild conjectures that under this veil of
secrecy Togo had moved southwards, that he would fall on his enemy during
the voyage across the Indian Ocean, or wait for him in the China Sea. But
the Japanese admiral had no reason for embarking in such adventures. He
knew that if he kept his fleet near the shores of Japan his enemy must come
sooner or later within effective striking distance.
Rojdestvensky might attempt a raid on the coasts of Japan, or make a dash
for Niu-chwang to seize that port, now the nearest base of supply of the
Japanese field army. Far-seeing precautions were taken against this
eventuality by accumulating enormous stores of supplies in the immediate
rear of the army. But it was far more likely that the Russian admiral would
try to reach Vladivostock, either with or without a battle. To do so he
would have ultimately to pass through one of three channels into the Sea of
Japan. He must choose between the Korean or Tsu-shima straits between Japan
and Korea, or the Tsugaru channel between Nippon and Yozo, or the La
Perouse Straits (known to the Japanese as the Soya channel) still further
north. Whatever course he chose, the best position for the Japanese fleet
was near the Tsu-shima straits, with the arsenal and dockyard of
Shimonoseki close by on the Japanese shore. This the Russians themselves
foresaw would be the most likely position for Togo to select.
He made Masampho Bay on the Korean side of the straits, and inside them
(the "Douglas Bay" of our Admiralty Charts), the station for his fleet.
Freed from all harassing blockading and cruising work, he devoted the
period between the retirement and destruction of the Port Arthur fleet in
the late summer of 1904, and the approach of the Russians in May, 1905, to
repairing his ships very thoroughly, substituting new guns for those they
had mounted at the beginning of the war, which had had their rifling worn
down. Continual target practice and manoeuvre exercises kept every ship and
every man up to the mark. Charts of the sea around Japan were ruled off
into small numbered squares, so as to facilitate the reporting of the
enemy's position and movements from the moment he would be first sighted.
An elaborate system of scouting by light cruisers was organized; signal
stations were established on islands and headlands, and wireless
installations erected at central and outlying points. If Rojdestvensky made
for the Tsu-shima channels, Togo was there to meet him. If he went for
either of the more northern straits, the Japanese admiral counted on having
news of his movements in sufficient time to enable him to steam at full
speed by a shorter route, and still interpose between the Baltic armada and
Vladivostock.
After passing Singapore, on 25 March, there was another delay before the
final advance of the Russian fleet. Rojdestvensky was anxious to give time
to Nebogatoff to join him. This last reinforcement was coming by the
Mediterranean route. The Russian commander-in-chief again strained French
neutrality to the utmost. In April and May he passed week after week in the
ports of French Cochin China, first at Kamranh and then at Van Fong or
Honkohe. Here, early in May, he was at last joined by Nebogatoff's
squadron.
Again Japan protested against the use of French harbours by her enemy. The
diplomatic tension became acute, and at one moment it seemed as if the
Russian admiral were anxious to produce complications that would force
France into the war. But at last, to the general relief, on 14 May he
sailed from Honkohe Bay. He passed through the Bashi Strait between Formosa
and the Philippines, and then steered for Shanghai. Here, on 25 May, the
fighting portion of the fleet lay out at sea, while a crowd of auxiliary
steamers, colliers, store-ships, and armed merchantmen were sent into the
Wusung River, the mouth of the Yang-tse, and anchored there.
Their appearance without the fleet to which they belonged led to many
conjectures. The Japanese at once grasped its real meaning. To quote the
message cabled by the Tokio correspondent of "The Times":--
"They read it as a plain intimation that Rojdestvensky intended
to put his fate to the test at Tsu-shima, since, had it been his
purpose to make for Tsugaru or Soya, he must have retained the
services of these auxiliary ships during several days longer. It
is apparent, indeed, that the Russian admiral here made his
first cardinal mistake; he should have kept his non-combatant
vessels out of sight as long as possible. Their absence from the
arena would have been a mysterious element, whereas their
apparition, especially as a segregated squadron in the Yang-tse
River, furnished an unerring clue to expert observers."
With the fleet the admiral retained only the hospital and repairing ships
and those laden with naval stores for the Vladivostock dockyard. On the
evening of the 25th the fleet stood out to sea heading for Tsu-shima. The
weather was bad, with a probability that it would be worse. There was a
rising wind and sea with cold rain that made a blinding haze, but the
Russian staff officers were rather pleased than depressed at such
unpleasant conditions. Thick weather would baffle the Japanese scouts and
lookout stations, and rough seas would keep their torpedo flotillas at
anchor.
Out ahead were the fast cruisers of the scouting division, the "Svietlana,"
"Almaz," and "Ural." After these came the main body of the fleet in line
ahead in two columns, the heavy armour-clads on the starboard (right side),
the rest of the armoured ships and four cruisers in the port line. Abreast
of the leading ships each flank was guarded by a cruiser and two torpedo
destroyers. After the fighting lines and between their foaming wakes
steamed four store-ships and two repairing ships. Last of all were the two
steamers fitted as hospital ships. The arrangement is best shown by a rough
diagram:--
_Svietlana_.
(Cruisers.)
_Almaz_. _Ural_.
PORT LINE. STARBOARD LINE.
(Cruiser.) (Cruiser.)
_Jemschug_. _Imperator Nikolai_. _Knias Suvaroff_. _Izumrud_.
2 torpedo _Admiral Senyavin_. _Imperator Alexander_. 2 torpedo
destroyers. _Admiral Apraxin_. _Borodino_. destroyers.
_Admiral Ushakoff_. _Orel_.
{_Oleg_. _Ossliabya_.
Cruisers. {_Aurora_. _Sissoi Veliki_.
{_Dimitri Donskoi_. _Navarin_.
{_Alexander Monomach_. _Admiral Nakhimoff_.
5 torpedo destroyers.
_Anadir_. }
_Irtish_. } Store-ships.
_Korea_. }
_Kamschatka_. }
_Svir_. } Repairing ships and tugs.
_Russ_. }
_Orel_. _Kostroma_.
|_______________________|
Hospital ships.
In this order the great fleet steamed slowly through the rain and darkness.
On board the great battleships there was much grumbling at "Nebogatoff's
old tubs," though they themselves could not do much better, for poor coal,
inefficient stoking, and weed-grown bottom-plates handicapped even the
newest of them. The next day, 26 May, was the eve of the greatest naval
battle in all history. "The clouds began to break and the sun shone
fitfully," says Captain Semenoff,[23] "but although a fairly fresh
south-westerly wind had sprung up, a thick mist still lay upon the water."
Rojdestvensky meant to pass the perilous straits in daylight, and he
calculated that by noon next day the fleet would be in the narrows of
Tsu-shima.
[23] Semenoff had served with the Port Arthur fleet on board one
of the cruisers which were disarmed in a neutral port after the
battle of August 10th, 1904. He then returned to Europe, was
attached to the staff of the Baltic fleet, and went out to the
East on board the flagship. His remarkable narrative, "The
Battle of Tsu-shima," is a vivid detailed account of the
"Suvaroff's" fortunes during the fight. He died in 1910.
Behind that portal of the Sea of Japan Togo was waiting confidently for his
enemy, who, he knew, must now be near at hand. Never before had two such
powerful fleets met in battle, and the fate of the East hung upon the
result of their encounter.
That result must depend mainly upon the heavy armoured ships. In these and
in the number of guns of the largest calibre, the Russians had an advantage
so far as mere figures went, as the following tables show:--
ARMOURED SHIPS
Class. Japan. Russia.
Battleships 4 8
Coast-defence armour-clad -- 3
Armoured cruisers 8 3
-- --
Total 12 14
HEAVY GUNS
Quick-firers.
Guns. 12-inch. 10-inch. 9-inch. 8-inch. |---------------|
6-inch. 4.7-inch.
Japan 16 1 -- 30 160 --
Russia 26 15 4 8 102 30[24]
[24] These tables are from Sir George Sydenham Clarke's preface
to Captain Lindsay's translation of Semenoff's "Tsu-shima,"
p. 11.
The annexed tables (pp. 315, 316) give some details of Russian and Japanese
armoured ships.
With regard to the armour it must be kept in mind for purposes of
comparison that the armoured belts of the newer ships, nine inches at the
thickest part, were of Harveyized or Krupp steel, and could resist
penetration better than the thicker belts of the older ships. It will be
noticed that the Japanese carried fewer of the heavier types of guns, but
had more 6-inch quick-firers than the Russians. This is a point to bear in
mind in following the story of the battle. It was the steady rain of
100-pounder shells from the quick-firers that paralysed the fighting power
of the Russian ships.
Far more important than the mere number of guns was the fact that the
Japanese shot straighter and had a more effective projectile. There was
such a marked difference between the effect of the Japanese shells at
Tsu-shima and in the naval battle of 10 August, 1904, that Captain
Semenoff, who was present at both battles, thought that in the interval the
Japanese must have adopted a more powerful kind of high explosive for their
bursting charges. This was not the case. Throughout the war the Japanese
used for their bursting charges the famous Chimose powder. But perhaps
between 10 August, 1904, and the following May they had improved their
fuses, so as to detonate the charge more certainly and thoroughly.
The first five battleships on the Russian list were up-to-date modern
vessels. The "Navarin" was fairly fit to lie in line with them. The rest
were, to use a familiar expression, "a scratch lot," coast-defence ships of
small speed and old craft quite out of date. The decks of the larger ships
were encumbered with an extra supply of coal, and this must have seriously
diminished their margin of stability, with, as we shall see, disastrous
results.
Admiral Togo could oppose to them only four modern battleships. But his two
heavy cruisers, the "Nisshin" and "Kasuga" (the ships bought from Argentina
on the eve of the war), might almost have been classed as smaller
battleships, and certainly would have been given that rank a few years
earlier. His fine fleet of armoured cruisers were at least a match for the
Russian coast-defence ships and the older battleships.
RUSSIA
----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------
Class. | | | | | |
| Ships. | | | | |
| |Displacement. Tons. | |
| | |Thickest Armour. Inches.
| | | |Principal Armament. Guns.
| | | | |Men.|
| | | | | | Remarks.
----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------
{|_Knias Suvaroff_ |} | | | |Flagship of Admiral
{| |} | | | |Rojdestvensky.
{|_Imperator |} | | | | These four
{| Alexander III_ |}13,516| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 740| ships were
B {|_Borodino_ |} | |{12 6-inch }| | all completed
a {|_Orel_ |} | | | | in 1904.
t {| | | | | |
t {|_Ossliabya_ | 12,674| 9 |{ 4 10-inch }| 732|Flagship of Rear-
l {| | | |{11 6-inch }| |Admiral Foelkersham.
e {| | | | | |Completed 1901.
s {| | | | | |
h {|_Sissoi Veliki_ | 8,880|15.7|{ 4 12-inch }| 550|Completed 1894.
i {| | | |{ 6 6-inch }| |
p {| | | | | |
s {|_Navarin_ | 10,206|16 |{ 4 12-inch }| 550| " 1895.
{| | | |{ 8 6-inch }| |
{| | | | | |
{|_Imperator | 9,672|14 |{ 4 9-inch }| 604| " 1892.
{| Nikolai I_ | | |{ 8 6-inch }| |Flagship of Rear-
{| | | | | |Admiral Nebogatoff.
| | | | | |
C d A c | | | | | |
o e r l {|_General Admiral | 4,162|10 |{ 3 10-inch }| 400|Completed 1898.
a f m a {| Apraxin_ | | |{ 4 6-inch }| |
s e o d {| | | | | |
t n u s {|_Admiral Senyavin_ |} 4,684|10 |{ 4 9-inch }| 400| " 1895.
- c r {|_Admiral Ushakoff_ |} | |{ 4 6-inch }| |
e - | | | | | |
| | | | | |
A C {|_Admiral Nakhimoff_ | 8,524|10 |{ 8 8-inch }| 567|Completed 1888.
r r {| | | |{10 6-inch }| |Reconstructed 1895.
m u {| | | | | |
o i {|_Dimitri Donskoi_ | 6,200| 7 |{ 6 6-inch }| 510|Completed 1885.
u s {| | | |{10 4.7-inch}| |Reconstructed 1896.
r e {| | | | | |
e r {|_Vladimir Monomach_ | 5,593|10 |{ 5 8-inch }| 550|Completed 1885.
d s {| | | |{12 6-inch }| |Rearmed 1898.
----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------
JAPAN
------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------------
Class.| | | | | |
| Ships.[25] | | | | |
| |Displacement. Tons. | |
| | |Thickest Armour. Inches.
| | | |Principal Armaments. Guns.
| | | | |Men.|
| | | | | | Remarks.
------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------------
B s {|_Mikasa_ | 15,200| 9 |{ 4 12-inch } |795|Completed 1902. Flagship
a h {| | | |{14 6-inch }| |of Admiral Togo.
t i {| | | | | |
t p {|_Skikishima_ |}14,850| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 810|Completed 1899.
l s {|_Asahi_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |
e {| | | | | |
- {|_Fuji_ |12,320 | 14 |{ 4 12-inch }| 600| " 1897.
{| | | |{10 6-inch }| |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
{|_Nisshin_ |} 7,294| 6 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1904. _Nisshin_
{|_Kasuga_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |was flagship
{| | | | | |of Vice-Admiral Misu.
{| | | | | |
A C {|_Idzumo_ |} 9,750| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901.
r r {|_Iwate_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |_Idzumo_--flagship of
m u {| | | | | |Vice-Admiral Kamimura.
o i {| | | | | |
u s {|_Adzumo_ | 9,436| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901.
r e {| | | |{12 6-inch }| |
e r {| | | | | |
d s {|_Asama_ |} 9,700| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1899.
{|_Tokiwa_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |
{| | | | | |
{|_Yakumo_ | 9,850| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 498| " 1901.
{| | | |{12 6-inch }| |
------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------------
[25] The old turret-ship _Chin-yen_--captured from the Chinese
(formerly the _Chen-yuen_) (4 12-inch and 4 6-inch guns)--was
with the fleet, but is not included in a list of effective
armour-clads.
Besides his armoured ships, Admiral Rojdestvensky had a squadron of six
protected cruisers under Rear-Admiral Enquist, whose flag flew in the
"Oleg," a vessel of 6750 tons launched in 1903, and completed next year.
She had for her principal armament twelve six-inch quick-firers. The other
cruisers were the "Aurora," of a little over 6000 tons, the "Svietlana," of
nearly 4000, the "Jemschug," and "Izumrud," of 3000 tons (these two armed
with 47 quick-firing guns), and the "Almaz," of 3285, a "scout" of good
speed, carrying nothing heavier than 12-pounders. There was one auxiliary
cruiser, the "Ural,"[26] a flotilla of nine destroyers, four transports,
two repairing ships, and two hospital steamers.
[26] A German Atlantic liner purchased at the beginning of the
war--formerly known as the "Koenigin Maria Theresa"--"roomy and
luxurious, but as a warship useless," says the Naval Constructor
Politovsky, Chief Engineer of the Baltic Fleet.
Awaiting the battle in sight of his own shores, Togo had concentrated as
auxiliary squadrons to his armoured fleet a considerable number of
protected cruisers and a whole swarm of torpedo craft. At this stage of her
naval development, and on the eve of a life-and-death struggle, Japan had
no idea of "scrapping" even the older ships. Anything that could carry a
few good guns, and brave men to fight them, might be useful, so even the
old Chinese ironclad which had carried Ting's flag at the Yalu battle, a
ship dating from 1882, was under steam in one of the auxiliary squadrons,
with four new 12-inch guns in her barbettes.
There were three of these auxiliary squadrons, commanded by Rear-Admiral
Dewa, Rear-Admiral Uriu, and Rear-Admiral Kataoka, the last having as a
subordinate commander Rear-Admiral Togo, a relative of the
commander-in-chief. Dewa's flag flew in the "Kasagi," a fine cruiser of
nearly 5000 tons, built in America, and he had with him her sister ships,
the "Chitose" and "Taka-sago." Uriu's flag flew in the "Naniwa," Togo's
ship when he was a captain in the Chinese war. Several of the fine cruisers
which Ito had then led to victory were present, many of them remodelled,
and all provided with new guns. Then there were a number of small protected
cruisers, built in Japanese dockyards since the Chinese war, the heralds of
the later time when the Japanese navy would all be home-built. Battleships,
armoured cruisers, and protected cruisers were all swifter than the Russian
ships. The fleet as a whole could manoeuvre at fully fifty per cent greater
speed than the enemy, and this meant that it could choose its own position
in battle.
The five torpedo squadrons included two or three torpedo-gunboats,
twenty-one fine destroyers, and some eighty torpedo-boats. Togo's plans had
the simplicity which is a necessity in the rough game of war, where
elaborate schemes are likely to go wrong. Some of the swift protected
cruisers were scouting south of the straits. The fleet was anchored in a
body in Masampho Bay, and in wireless communication with its scouts. The
armoured fleet was to make the main attack on the head of the Russian
advance. The protected cruiser squadrons were to sweep round the enemy's
flanks, fall upon his rear, and destroy his transports and auxiliaries. The
torpedo flotilla was to be ready to dash in and complete the defeat of the
enemy when his fleet was crippled by the fight with the heavy ships.
Most of the officers and men of the Russian fleet had the dogged courage
that could carry them through even a hopeless fight, but they looked
forward to the immediate future with forebodings of disaster. Even among
the officers on board the great "Suvaroff" there was a feeling that the
most that could be hoped for was that a few ships would struggle through
to Vladivostock, if there was a battle, and that the best thing that could
happen would be for the thick weather and rough seas to enable them to
avoid anything like a close fight with the Japanese.
During the last day before the fight Rojdestvensky, who did not want to
hurry forward, but was timing his advance so as to pass the straits in the
middle of the next day, spent some time in manoeuvres. Captain Semenoff's
notes on the proceedings convey a useful lesson.
"Once again" (he says), "and for the last time, we were forcibly
reminded of the old truism that a 'fleet' is created by long
practice at sea in time of peace (cruising, not remaining in
port), and that a collection of ships of various types hastily
collected, which have only learned to sail together on the way
to the theatre of operations, is no fleet, but a chance
concourse of vessels."[27]
[27] "Tsu-shima," p. 10.
Wireless telegraphy had come into use since the last naval war, and a fleet
could now try to overhear the aerial messages of an enemy. In the Russian
fleet the order had been given that no wireless messages were to be sent.
In other words, the operators were to keep silence, and listen by watching
their apparatus. In the morning of the 26th they thought they detected
messages passing. In the evening these were more frequent--"short messages
of a word or two" was the interpretation that the experts in the signal
cabins put upon the unintelligible flickerings of the indicator, and they
suggested that they were mere negative code-signals from the Japanese
scouts to their main fleet, repeating an indication that they were on the
alert, and had seen nothing. This was mere guesswork, however, and
Politovsky's diary of the voyage[28] shows that near the Cape, at
Madagascar, and out in the midst of the Indian Ocean, Rojdestvensky's
wireless operators had thought that they detected Japanese aerial
signalling, simply because the receivers gave indications they could not
understand. Possibly these were merely the effect of electric storms on the
apparatus.
[28] "From Libau to Tsu-shima." By the late Eugene S.
Politovsky. Translated by Major F. R. Godvey, R.M.L.I. 1906.
Once or twice, on 26 May, they thought they could read fragments of
sentences, such as--"Last night--nothing--eleven lights--not in line." The
short messages in the evening came at fixed times. This showed that
prearranged signalling was really going on. It gave the impression that
perhaps the fleet was being watched by unseen enemies.
As the sun went down the ships closed up, and half the officers were
detailed for duty at the guns during the hours of darkness. The rest lay
down fully dressed, ready to turn out at a moment's notice. Many slept on
the decks. No lights were shown. Semenoff's description of that night of
anxious expectation is worth quoting. He was on board the flagship, the
"Suvaroff":--
"The night came on dark. The mist seemed to grow denser, and
through it but few stars could be seen. On the dark deck there
prevailed a strained stillness, broken at times only by the
sighs of the sleepers, the steps of an officer, or by an order
given in an undertone. Near the guns the motionless figures of
their crews seemed like dead, but all were wide awake, gazing
keenly into the darkness. Was not that the dark shadow of a
torpedo-boat? They listened attentively. Surely the throb of her
engines and the noise of steam would betray an invisible foe.
Stepping carefully, so as not to disturb the sleepers, I went
round the bridges and decks, and then proceeded to the
engine-room. For a moment the bright light blinded me. Here life
and movement were visible on all sides. Men were nimbly running
up and down the ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and a
buzzing of voices. Orders were being transmitted loudly, but on
looking more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same
peculiar frame of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be
observed."[29]
[29] "Tsu-shima," pp. 27, 28.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA
SKETCH MAP TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF THE WATERS IN WHICH THE FIRST
PART OF THE FIGHT TOOK PLACE. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE KOREAN
(OR TSU-SHIMA) STRAITS ARE MAPPED IN BLACK, & AN OUTLINE MAP OF
THE NORTH SEA BETWEEN THE EASTERN COUNTIES OF ENGLAND & THE
OPPOSITE COAST OF THE CONTINENT IS SKETCHED OVER THE MAP IN RED
ON THE SAME SCALE]
At daybreak the Japanese scouts were in touch. As the day came in grey
light over the misty broken sea, one of their scouts, the auxiliary cruiser
"Siano Maru" (an armed passenger liner), sweeping round through the haze,
almost collided with the hospital ships, and then dashed off and
disappeared in the twilight. In former wars she would have had to run back
to the fleet with her news. Now from her wireless apparatus the information
was sent through the air to the receivers of the "Mikasa" in Masampho Bay,
and in a few minutes Togo knew that "the enemy's fleet was in square No.
203 of the chart, apparently steering for the eastern passage," i.e. the
strait between Tsu-shima Island and Japan.
In the straits and outside Masampho Bay a heavy sea was running, and though
the wind blew strongly from the south-west, the weather was still hazy at
sunrise, with patches of fog here and there. The main body of the Japanese
fleet began to get up anchors and slip from its moorings.[30]
[30] English people have so seldom occasion or opportunity of
consulting large-scale maps of Japan, that there is an
impression that the battle of Tsu-shima was fought in narrow
waters, where there was no chance of the Russians eluding Togo
and little room for manoeuvring. The strait in which the battle
took place is really about as wide as the North Sea between
Harwich and the Hook of Holland. (See accompanying sketch map.)
At dawn Rojdestvensky had called in the "Almaz," leaving the "Jemschug" and
"Izumrud" steaming in advance of his two divisions. The six auxiliary ships
had closed up, so that the leading ship, the transport "Anadir," was
abreast of the centre of the two lines. The "Almaz," "Svietlana," and
"Ural," steamed at the rear of this central line of transports, to protect
them in that direction. The two hospital ships, flying the Red Cross flag
and trusting to it for safety, were well astern. About 6 a.m. the huge
"Ural" came running up between the lines, and semaphored to the flagship
that four ships in line ahead were passing across the rear of the fleet,
but could not be clearly made out in the mist.
They could only be some of Togo's cruisers "shepherding" the fleet. Just
before seven a fine cruiser was seen some five miles away on the starboard
beam of the "Suvaroff." She closed up to three miles, and was soon
identified as the "Idzumo." The big turret-guns were swung round to bear on
her, but the Japanese cruiser, having seen what she wanted, increased her
distance, but could be seen still keeping the fleet in sight. Togo's report
notes that at 7 a.m. the "Idzumo" sent by wireless the second definite
report of the enemy, stating that he was twenty-five miles north-west of
Ukushima, steering north-east. This would make the Russian position about
thirty miles south of the Tsu-shima Islands, heading for the channel to the
east of them. An hour later, about 8 a.m., some Japanese ships showed
themselves the other side of the fleet. Semenoff notes how:--
"The 'Chin-yen,' 'Matsushima,' 'Itsukushima,' and 'Hashidate,'
appeared out of the mist, steaming on an almost parallel course.
Ahead of them was a small, light cruiser, apparently the
'Akitsushu,' which hurriedly drew off to the north as soon as we
were able to see her well (and equally she us), and the whole
squadron began slowly to increase their distance and gradually
to disappear from sight."
This was Vice-Admiral Takeomi's division, composed of three of the cruisers
that had fought at the Yalu battle, eleven years before, and the
"Chin-yen," which had fought against them as the "Ting-yuen." The ship that
ran out ahead was the only quick or modern ship in the squadron, the small
Clyde-built armoured cruiser "Chiyoda." If Rojdestvensky had had any speedy
cruisers available, he might have severely punished this slow squadron of
old ships. Takeomi showed he knew his enemy by thus boldly approaching in
the mist.
The Russians now realized that they had watchful enemies all round them,
and rightly conjectured that they would find the enemy's heavy ships in
the straits ready for battle.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. GENERAL MAP]
At 10 a.m. another cruiser squadron appeared on the port beam. This was
Dewa's division, made up of the American-built sister ships "Kasagi" and
"Chitose," of nearly 5000 tons, and two smaller protected cruisers, the
"Niitaka" and "Otowa," lately turned out by Japanese yards. They seemed to
invite attack. At a signal from the admiral, the eight armour-clads of the
starboard line steamed ahead of the port line, turned together to port, and
then, turning again, formed line ahead, leading the whole fleet. At the
same time the transports moved out to Starboard, guarded by the "Vladimir
Monomach" (detached from the port division), the "Svietlana," "Almaz," and
"Ural."
Dewa's cruisers held a parallel course with the Russian battleships for
more than an hour, still apparently unsupported. The range was about five
miles. At 11.20 the Russians opened fire on them. Semenoff says that it was
the result of a mistake. "The 'Orel' fired an accidental shot (which she
immediately reported by semaphore). Unable, with smokeless powder, to tell
by which of the leading ships it had been fired, the fleet took it as a
signal from the 'Suvaroff' and opened fire. Of the whole fleet the fire of
the 3rd Squadron was the heaviest."
This squadron was made up of Nebogatoff's "old tubs." Their heavy fire was
probably the result of undisciplined excitement. The Japanese fired a few
shots in reply, but no harm was done on either side. Rojdestvensky, who had
kept the guns of his flagship silent, signalled "Ammunition not to be
wasted," and the firing ceased in five minutes, just as the Japanese turned
slowly and increased their distance.
Orders were now signalled for the men of the Russian fleet to have their
dinners, and the officers lunched in turn. The harmless skirmish encouraged
some of the Russian crews with the idea that they had been in action and
were none the worse, and had driven the Japanese away. At noon the fleet
was due south of Tsu-shima, which towered like a mountain out of the sea a
few miles ahead. The signal was hoisted, "Change course N.23 deg.E. for
Vladivostock." It was the anniversary of the Tsar's coronation. Round the
wardroom tables in his doomed fleet the officers stood up and drank with
enthusiasm to the Emperor, the Empress, and "victory for Russia!"
The cheering had hardly died down when the bugles sounded the alarm. Every
one hurried to his post. The enemy's cruisers had again shown themselves,
this time accompanied by a flotilla of destroyers, that came rolling
through the rough sea with the waves foaming over their bows. On a signal
from the admiral the four leading battleships turned to starboard and stood
towards the enemy, then re-formed line ahead on a course parallel to the
rest of the fleet, and slightly in advance of it. The Japanese on the
threat of attack had turned also and went off at high speed to the
northwards.
At 1.20 p.m. the admiral signalled to the four next ships of the fleet to
join the line of battleships, forming astern of them. The Russian armada
was now well into the wide eastern strait of Tsu-shima, and far ahead
through the mist a crowd of ships could be dimly seen. The crisis was near
at hand.
On receiving the first wireless message from the "Shinano Maru" at
daybreak, Togo had weighed anchor and come out of Masampho Bay, with his
main fleet steering east, so as to pass just to the north of Tsu-shima. He
had with him his twelve armoured ships, and Rear-Admiral Uriu's division of
protected cruisers ("Naniwa," "Takachico," "Tsushima," and "Akashi"), and a
strong flotilla of destroyers. The smaller torpedo-boats, more than sixty
in number, had been already sent to shelter in Miura Bay in the island of
Tsu-shima, on account of the heavy seas.
During the morning Togo received a succession of wireless messages from his
cruisers, and every mile of the enemy's progress, every change in his
formation was quickly signalled to him. Shortly after noon he was able to
note that the Russians were entering the straits, steaming at about 12
knots on a north-easterly course; that they were formed in two columns in
line ahead, the starboard column being the stronger, and that they had
their transports astern between the columns. He decided to attack them on
the weaker side at 2 p.m., when he calculated that they would be near
Okinoshima, a small island in the middle of the eastern strait, about
half-way between Tsu-shima and the south-western headlands of Nippon.
At half-past one he was joined by Dewa's division of cruisers, and a few
minutes later the divisions of Kataoka and the younger Togo rejoined. They
had till now hung on the flanks of the Russian advance. At a quarter to two
the enemy's fleet came in sight away to the south-westward of Okinoshima.
Flags fluttered up to the signal yards of the "Mikasa," and the fleet read
with enthusiasm Togo's inspiring message:--
"_The rise or fall of the Empire depends upon to-day's battle.
Let every man do his utmost._"
He had been about ten miles north of Okinoshima at noon (by which time he
had steamed some 90 miles from Douglas Bay since 5 a.m.), thence he turned
back slowly, going west and a little south, till he sighted the Russians.
He crossed their line of advance diagonally at about 9500 yards distance.
His light cruiser divisions had received orders to steam southwards and
attack the Russian rear, and were already well on their way.
The heavy Japanese ships, circling on the left front of the enemy's
advance, put on speed, and were evidently intending to recross the bows of
the battleship division, bringing a converging fire to bear on the leading
ships--the manoeuvre known as "crossing the T." As the "Mikasa" led the
Japanese line on its turning movement Rojdestvensky swung round to
starboard and opened fire at 8500 yards. Togo waited till the distance had
shortened to 6500, and then the guns of the "Mikasa" flashed out. At that
moment only three other of his ships had made the turn. They also opened
fire, and ship after ship as she came round into line joined in the
cannonade. The Russians turned more slowly, and it was some time before the
whole of their line was in action. Meanwhile a storm of fire had burst upon
the leading ships of Rojdestvensky's lines, the "Suvaroff" and the
"Ossliabya" at the head of the starboard and port divisions being each made
a target by several of the enemy.
The Japanese gunners were firing with a rapidity that surprised even those
who had been in the action of 10 August, and with much more terrible
effect. In Captain Semenoff's narrative of the fate of the "Suvaroff" we
have a remarkably detailed description of the execution done by the
Japanese shells in this first stage of the battle. The opening shots went
high. They flew over the "Suvaroff," some of the big 12-inch projectiles
turning over and over longitudinally in their flight. But at once Semenoff
remarked that the enemy were using a more sensitive fuse than on 10 August.
Every shell as it touched the water exploded in a geyser of smoke and
spray. As the Japanese corrected the range shells began to explode on board
or immediately over the deck, and again there was proof of the improved
fusing. The slightest obstacle--the guy of a funnel, the lift of a boat
derrick--was enough to burst the shell.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA
DIAGRAMS OF MOVEMENTS DURING THE FIGHTING OF MAY 27TH]
The first fair hit was on the side, abreast of the forward funnel. It sent
up a "gigantic column of smoke, water, and flame." Then several men were
killed and wounded near the fore-bridge, and then there was a crash beside
one of the quick-firers, and, the shell bursting as it penetrated the deck,
set the ship on fire. In the battle of 10 August the flagship "Tsarevitch,"
which had borne the brunt of the Japanese fire, had been hit just nineteen
times, but now that the "Mikasa" and her consorts had got the range hit
followed hit on the leading Russian ships. "It seemed impossible," says
Semenoff, "even to count the number of projectiles striking us. I had not
only never witnessed such a fire before, but I had never imagined anything
like it. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after
another.... The steel plates and superstructure on the upper deck were torn
to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were
crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their
mountings. Such havoc would never be caused by the simple impact of a
shell, still less by that of its splinters. It could only be caused by the
force of the explosion.... In addition to this there was the unusually high
temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over
everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Of
course, the steel did not burn, but the paint on it did. Such almost
incombustible materials as hammocks and rows of boxes, drenched with water,
flared up in a moment. At times it was almost impossible to see anything
with glasses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering,
heated air. No! It was different to the 10th of August!"
In this storm of fire there was heavy loss of life. A shell-burst killed
and wounded most of the signallers as they stood together at their station.
An explosion against the opening of the conning-tower killed two officers
beside Rojdestvensky, and slightly wounded the admiral. The fight had not
lasted more than twenty minutes, and the "Suvaroff," the "Alexander," and
"Borodino," the three leading Russian ships, were all wrapped in black
smoke from the fires lighted on board of them by the Chimose shells.
How was the Japanese line faring? I talked over his battle experiences with
a Japanese officer not long after the day of Tsu-shima. He told me his
impression was that at first the Russians shot fairly well, causing some
loss of life at the more exposed stations on board the leading Japanese
ships. "But," he added, "after the first twenty minutes they seemed
suddenly to go all to pieces, and their shooting became wild and almost
harmless." No wonder that under such a tornado of explosions, death and
destruction, and with their ships ablaze, and range-finding and
fire-controlling stations wrecked, the gunnery of the Russians broke down.
One of the pithy sayings of the American Admiral Farragut was: "The best
protection against the enemy's fire is the steady fire of your own guns."
Tsu-shima gave startling proof of it.
Semenoff hoped that the Japanese were also suffering from the stress of
battle. From the fore-bridge of the "Suvaroff" he scanned their line with
his glasses. In the sea-fights of other wars both fleets were wrapped in a
dense fog of powder smoke, but now with the new powder there was no smoke
except that of bursting shells and burning material. So he could
distinguish everything plainly.
"The enemy had finished turning. His twelve ships were in
perfect order at close intervals, steaming parallel to us, but
gradually forging ahead. No disorder was noticeable. It seemed
to me that with my Zeiss glasses (the distance was a little more
than two miles) I could distinguish the mantlets of hammocks on
the bridges and the groups of men. But with us? I looked round.
What havoc! Burning bridges, smouldering debris on the decks,
piles of dead bodies. Signalling and judging distance stations,
gun-directing positions, all were destroyed. And astern of us
the 'Alexander' and the 'Borodino' were also wrapped in smoke."
Men were killed in the turrets by shell splinters flying through the narrow
gun openings. The fire hose was repeatedly cut to ribbons, and the men
fighting the fire killed. The injuries caused by near explosions were
terrible. Men were literally blown to atoms, or limbs were torn off. Eleven
wooden boats piled up on the spar-deck were a mass of roaring flame. Gun
after gun was disabled. And all the while a glance at the Japanese fleet
showed them steaming and firing as if at peace manoeuvres, without even
one of their numerous flagstaffs and signal yards shot away. The battle had
not lasted an hour, and it was already evident that it could have only one
ending.
In the smoke and confusion Semenoff could only see what was happening in
the front of the line, but the other ships were exposed to a heavy fire,
and had less resisting power. The "Ossliabya," the fifth of the
battleships, and Foelkersham's flagship during the voyage,[31] was the first
to succumb. The firing had hardly begun when a 12-inch projectile
penetrated her forward above the water-line. In fine weather the effect
would not have been very serious, but the heavy sea flooded her two bow
compartments. Then another shell started an armour plate on the water-line
amidships, flooded the bunkers on the port side, and gave her a heavy list
in that direction. Unsuccessful attempts were made to right her by opening
valves and admitting water on the other side. Then a shell burst in the
fore-turret and put all the crews of the two guns out of action. She was
now settling down by the head and heeling over more and more to port.
Suddenly the sea reached her lower gun-ports and poured into her. Then,
like the unfortunate "Victoria," she "turned turtle," and sank. It was at
2.25 that she disappeared thus suddenly, the first battleship ever sunk by
gun-fire. Three of the destroyers picked up some of the crew who had jumped
overboard.
[31] Admiral Foelkersham had a paralytic stroke while at Honkohe
Bay, and died at sea two days before the battle.
As she sank, the three other ships of her division ("Sissoi," "Navarin,"
and "Nakhimoff"), under the stress of the Japanese fire, sheered for a
while out of the line with their upper works ablaze in several places. The
four stately battleships at the head of the line had then to face the
concentrated attack of the enemy. The "Orel" was suffering like her
consorts. Though her armour was nowhere penetrated, the shells burst their
way into her unarmoured superstructure, and reduced everything on her upper
decks to tangled wreckage. Five minutes after the "Ossliabya" sank a shell
wrecked the after-turret of the "Suvaroff," tearing the after-bridge to
pieces with the flying fragments. Her steering gear was temporarily
disabled, and she drifted from her station at the head of the line. One by
one in quick succession the heavy steel masts and two huge funnels crashed
down. The upper deck was impassable from end to end. In the midst of the
confused wreckage handfuls of brave men fought the fires with buckets as
they broke out now here now there. Most of the guns were silent. "She no
longer looked like a ship," says a Japanese account.
When the "Suvaroff" swerved out of the line at a few minutes before three
o'clock her steering gear had been disabled, and probably for a few minutes
before the crisis she had not been answering her helm. The course of the
fleet, while she led it during the fight with the Japanese armoured fleet,
had been due east, but, as she lost her direction, it turned slightly to
the south. When she drifted away from the line the "Imperator
Alexander III" became the leading ship. Captain Buchvostoff, who commanded
her, led the fleet in a circle round the disabled "Suvaroff," first running
southwards, increasing the distance from the enemy, and then sweeping round
as if trying to break through to the northward. Togo followed on a parallel
course until the Russian fleet seemed to be going due south, then he
signalled an order, and, as accurately as if they were performing a
practice evolution at manoeuvres, his twelve ships turned simultaneously
through half a circle, thus reversing the direction and changing the order
of the fleet so that the last ship in the line became the leader. As the
Russians swept round to the north Togo was thus ready to cross their bows,
and the "Alexander" received the concentrated fire of several ships.
She turned eastwards, followed by her consorts in a straggling line, and
then drifted out of her place at the head of it, leaking badly, and with
her upper works ablaze. On a smoother sea the "Tsarevitch" had been hit
once below the armour belt on 10 August.
[Illustration: THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP 'OREL'
_Taken after the battle of Tsu-Shima, showing effects of
Japanese shell fire_]
The "Borodino" now had the dangerous post at the head of the line. It
steamed eastwards for nearly an hour, followed by Togo on a parallel
course, the Japanese fire only slackening when fog and smoke obscured its
targets, and the fire of the Russians dwindling minute by minute, as gun
position after position became untenable or guns were disabled and
dismounted.
Long before this the divisions of protected cruisers under Admiral Dewa and
his colleagues had worked round to the southward of the Russians. Dewa and
Uriu, with their swift ships, were in action by a quarter to three. The
slower ships of Takeomi and the younger Togo's squadrons, united under the
command of Rear-Admiral Kataoka, came into the fight a little later. In the
heavy sea that was running the light cruisers afforded a less steady
platform for the guns than the big armoured ships, and their fire was not
so terribly destructive. But it was effective enough, and that of the
Russian rear ships was hopelessly bad. The Japanese cruisers drove the
transports and their escort, in a huddled crowd, north-eastwards towards
the main Russian fleet. The great wall sides of the German liner, now the
auxiliary cruiser "Ural," were riddled, and the giant began to settle down
in the water. The cruiser "Svietlana," hit badly in the forepart, was
dangerously down by the head. The transports "Kamschatka" and "Irtish" were
both set on fire, and the latter was also pierced along the water-line. She
sank at four o'clock. The "Oleg" and "Aurora" were both badly damaged. But
the Japanese unarmoured cruisers did not escape scathless. Dewa's fine
cruiser, the "Kasagi," was badly hit below the waterline, and was in such
danger of sinking that he handed the command of his squadron over to Uriu
and, escorted by the "Chitose," steamed out of the fight, steering for the
Japanese coast. Togo's old ship, the famous "Naniwa Kan," was also hit
below the water-line, and had to cease firing and devote all the energy of
the crew to saving the ship.
At five o'clock the Russian fleet, battleships, cruisers, and transports,
were huddled together in a confused crowd, attacked from the eastward by
Togo and Kamimura with the heavy squadrons, while from the south the line
of light cruisers under Uriu and Kataoka poured a cross-fire into them.
Away to the westward lay the disabled and burning "Suvaroff" with the
Russian naval flag, the blue cross of St. Andrew on a white ground, still
flying from a flagstaff in the smoke. The admiral had been twice wounded,
the second blow slightly fracturing his skull, and making it difficult for
him to speak. Her captain, Ignazius, had been simply blown to pieces by a
Japanese shell while, after being already twice wounded, he was directing a
desperate effort to master the conflagration on board. The decks were
strewn with dead, the mess-deck full of helpless wounded men. Most of the
guns were out of action, but a 6-inch quick-firer and a few lighter guns
were kept in action, and drove off the first attempt of the Japanese
destroyers to dash in and sink her. Still there was no thought of
surrender. The few survivors of her crew fought with dogged Russian courage
to the last. A torpedo destroyer, the "Buiny," taking terrible risks, came
up to her, hung on for a few moments to her shattered side, and succeeded
in getting off the wounded admiral and a few officers and men.
Rojdestvensky sent a last message to Nebogatoff, telling him to take over
the command and try to get through with some part of the fleet to
Vladivostock.
About half-past five some of the Russian ships struggled out of the press,
led by the burning "Borodino," with the "Orel" next to her. In the
straggling line battleships and cruisers, armoured and unarmoured, were
mingled together. The "Alexander" had succeeded in stopping some of her
leaks and had rejoined the line. She was near the end of it. The "Ural,"
deserted by her crew, was drifting, till one of Togo's battleships sank her
with a few shots.
The Russians were now steering northwards, and for the moment there was no
large ship in front of them. The Japanese could have easily headed them
off, but Togo now regarded them as a huntsman regards a herd of deer that
he is driving before him. The Japanese squadron steamed after them at
reduced speed, just keeping at convenient range, the heavy ships on their
right, the light squadrons behind them. At first the armoured ships
concentrated their fire on the "Alexander." Shells were bursting all over
her, and throwing up geysers of water about her bows. Then the merciless
fire was turned on the "Borodino." A few minutes after seven the
"Alexander" was seen to capsize and disappear. A quarter of an hour later
there was an explosion on board of the "Borodino." Next moment a patch of
foam on the waves showed where she had been. About the same time a division
of torpedo-boats came upon the unfortunate "Suvaroff," torpedoed her, and
saved some of the crew, who were found floating on the water after she
sank.
As the sun went down, and the twilight darkened into night, the firing died
away. What was left of the Russian fleet was steaming slowly into the Sea
of Japan, some of the ships isolated, others holding together in improvised
divisions, all bearing terrible marks of the fight, some of them still on
fire, others leaking badly.
Togo had been hit during the fight, but it was only a slight bruise. The
losses of his fleet had been trifling. Of the armoured ships the only one
that had been badly hit was the "Asama." She was struck by three shells aft
near the water-line, her rudder was disabled, and she was leaking badly.
She left the fighting-line for a while, but was able temporarily to repair
damages, and rejoined later in the day.
At sunset Togo ordered his squadrons to steam north-eastward during the
night, and unite at sunrise at a point south of Matsu-shima or Ullondo
Island. They were to keep away from the Russian ships in the darkness. The
victorious admiral was about to let loose his torpedo flotillas, to
complete the destruction of the flying enemy, and meant that his torpedo
officers should have no anxiety about hitting friends in the dark.
He had with the main fleet twenty-one destroyers organized in five
squadrons. In the bays of Tsu-shima nearly eighty torpedo-boats had been
sheltering all day. The destroyers had been directed to pursue and attack
the beaten enemy during the night. No orders had been given to the
torpedo-boats. The sea was going down, but it was still rough, and Togo had
doubts about risking the smaller craft. But without orders, sixteen groups
of four boats each, sixty-four in all, got up steam and sallied out into
the darkness.
It was an awful night for the Russians. After dark they had extinguished
the fires lighted by the enemy's shells, and in some cases got collision
mats over the leaks. The dead were committed to the sea, the wounded
collected and cared for. For more than an hour they were allowed to hold
their course uninterrupted, and the lights of the Japanese fleet were
disappearing far astern. After all, Vladivostock might be reached. But just
after eight o'clock the throb of engines, the hurtling beat of propellers,
came sounding through the night from all sides. On the sea black, low
objects were rushing along with foaming phosphorescent wakes trailing
behind them. Bugles ran out the alarm; crews rushed to quarters;
searchlights blazed out, and the small quick-firers that were still
serviceable mingled their sharp ringing reports with the crackle of
machine-gun fire. The sea seemed to be swarming with torpedo craft. They
appeared and disappeared in the beams of the searchlights, and the surface
of the water was marked with the long white ripples raised by the rush of
discharged torpedoes. Loud explosions, now here now there, told that some
of them had found their target, though in the confusion and the rough sea
there were more misses than hits. The "Sissoi Veliki," which had been on
fire in the action, and pierced below the waterline, had a new and more
serious leak torn open in her stern, the rudder was damaged and two
propeller blades torn off. But she floated till next day. Several ships
received minor injuries, but kept afloat with one or more compartments
flooded. But the effect of the attack was to disperse the fugitive Russians
in all directions.
When it began Nebogatoff was at the head of a line of ships in the old
battleship "Imperator Nikolai I." In the confusion only three of the line
kept up with him, the much-battered "Orel" and the "Admiral Apraxin" and
"Admiral Senyavin." The "Orel" had no searchlight left intact. The
"Nikolai" and the two others did not switch on their searchlights, and kept
all other lights shaded. The remarkable result was that as they moved
northwards through the darkness they were never attacked, though more than
once between 8 p.m. and midnight they saw the enemy's torpedo craft rushing
past them. The ships with searchlights drew all the attacks.
Admiral Enquist, with his flag in the "Oleg," and followed by the "Aurora"
and "Jemschug," had run in amongst the remains of the transport flotilla at
the first alarm, narrowly escaping collision with them. Then he turned
south, in the hope of shaking the enemy off, but came upon another flotilla
arriving from that direction. He had some narrow escapes. The look-outs of
the "Oleg" counted seventeen torpedoes that just missed the ship. Having
got away, he tried more than once to turn back to the northward, but each
time he ran in among hostile torpedo-boats, and saw that beyond them were
ships with searchlights working and guns in action, so he steered again
south. At last he gave up the attempt and headed for the Tsu-shima Straits.
He got safely through them, because the main Japanese fleet was miles away,
steaming steadily north, with tired men sleeping by the guns. Next day he
was in the open sea with no enemy in sight, and set his course for
Shanghai.
At midnight the defeated Russians thought they had at last shaken off the
pursuit of the sea-wolves. But at 2 a.m. the attacks began again. The
"Navarin" and the "Admiral Nakhimoff," among the rearmost ships, were
attacked by Commander Suzuki's squadron of destroyers. The "Navarin" was
sunk after being hit by two torpedoes. The "Nakhimoff" was severely
damaged. About the same time the "Vladimir Monomach" and the "Dimitri
Donskoi" were torpedoed, but managed to keep afloat. The attacking force
had a good many casualties. Torpedo-boats Nos. 35 and 65 were sunk by the
Russian fire. Their crews were rescued by their consorts. Four destroyers
(the "Harusami," "Akatsuki," "Izazuchi," and "Yugiri") and two
torpedo-boats (Nos. 31 and 68) were so seriously damaged by hostile fire,
or by collision in the darkness, that they were put out of action. As the
dawn began to whiten the eastern sky the torpedo flotillas drew off.
At sunrise the Russian fleet was scattered far over the Sea of Japan. Some
of the ships for a while steamed alone with neither consort nor enemy in
sight within the circle of the horizon. But new dangers came with the day.
Togo's fleet was at hand, flinging out a wide net of which the meshes were
squadrons and detached cruisers to sweep the sea northwards, and gather up
the remnants of the defeated enemy. The weather was clearing up, and it was
a fine, bright day--just the day for the work the Japanese had to do.
Steaming steadily through the night, Togo, with the main body of the
Japanese fleet, had passed to eastward of the scattered Russians, and was
about twenty miles south of Ullondo. The distances covered in this battle
of Tsu-shima were beyond any that had ever been known in naval war. The
running fight during the night had passed over more than 150 miles of sea.
At 5.20 a.m. the admiral on board the "Mikasa" received a wireless message
from Kataoka's cruisers, reporting that they were sixty miles away to the
southward of him, and that they could see several columns of black smoke
on the horizon to the eastward. Shortly after Kataoka sent another wireless
message--"Four of the enemy's battleships and two cruisers are in sight,
steering north-west." Togo at once signalled to his own ships to head off
this detachment of the enemy, and sent wireless orders to Kataoka and Uriu
to close in on their rear. It was probably the main fighting division left
to the Russians, and would soon be surrounded by an overwhelming Japanese
force.
The ships sighted by the cruisers were those that Admiral Nebogatoff had
led through the night, and was trying to take to Vladivostock. He had with
him the battleships "Nikolai I" and "Orel," the coast-defence armour-clads
"Admiral Apraxin" and "Admiral Senyavin," and the cruisers "Izumrud" and
"Svietlana." This last ship was leaking badly and down by the bows. She
could not keep up with the others, and at daylight fell far astern and lost
sight of them. At 7 a.m. Uriu's division in chase of Nebogatoff came up
with her, and the cruisers "Niitaka" and "Otowa" were detached to capture
her. The Russian captain, Schein, had held a council with his officers. He
had only a hundred shells left in the magazines, and the "Svietlana" was
being kept afloat by her steam pumps. Under the regulations he could have
honourably surrendered to a superior force, but it was unanimously resolved
to fight to the last shot, and then sink with colours flying. The fight
lasted an hour. There were heavy losses. The Japanese fire riddled the
ship, and first the starboard, then the port engine was disabled. As the
hundredth shot rang out from the "Svietlana's" guns, Captain Schein stopped
the pumps and opened the sea-cocks, and the ship settled down rapidly in
the water. The Japanese cruisers went off to join the fleet as the
"Svietlana" disappeared, but an armed Japanese liner, the "America Maru,"
stood by and picked up about a hundred men.
At 10.30 a.m. Nebogatoff was completely surrounded eighteen miles south of
the island of Takeshima. The "Izumrud" had used her superior speed to get
away to the south-west. The four battered ships that remained with him saw
more than twenty enemies appear from all points of the compass, including
Togo's battleships and heavy armoured cruisers, all as fit for work as when
the first fighting began. They opened fire at long range with their heavy
guns.
The situation was desperate. Nebogatoff consulted his officers, and all
those on board the "Nikolai" agreed that he must surrender. In a memorandum
he subsequently wrote he pointed out that, though some ammunition was left,
the Japanese were using their superior speed to keep a distance at which he
could not reply effectively to their overwhelming fire; neither the shore
nor other ships were within reach; most of the boats had been shattered,
the rest could not be lowered; even the life-belts had been burned or used
to improvise defences in the ships; continued resistance or the act of
sinking the ships would only mean the useless sacrifice of some 2000 men.
After the ships had been only a short time in action, during which time
they received further severe damage, he hauled down his colours. Togo
allowed the Russian officers to retain their swords, as a proof of his
opinion that they had acted as befitted brave and honourable men.
While the brief action with Nebogatoff's squadron was in progress, the
third of the Russian coast-defence battleships, the "Admiral Ushakoff,"
hove in sight. She turned off to the westward pursued by the armoured
cruisers "Iwate" and "Yakumo." They soon overhauled her, and signalled a
summons to surrender, adding that Nebogatoff had already done so. The
"Ushakoff" replied with her 9-inch guns. The cruisers sank her in an hour,
and then rescued some three-fourths of her crew of 400 men.
The "Sissoi Veliki," badly injured in the action of the day before, and
torpedoed during the night, was in a sinking condition when the sun rose on
28 May. No ships were in sight, all the boats had been destroyed, and while
the pumps were still kept going the crew was set to work to construct
rafts. While this was being done with very scanty materials, the "Vladimir
Monomach" hove in sight, accompanied by the destroyer "Iromki." In reply to
a signal for help, the "Monomach" answered that she could do nothing, as
she was herself expecting to sink soon. The "Iromki" offered to take a few
men, but the captain of the "Sissoi" generously refused to deprive the
"Monomach" of her help. The two ships then steamed away. An hour later the
"Sissoi" was just settling down in the water, when three Japanese armed
merchant steamers appeared and took off her crew. At half-past ten the
"Sissoi" heeled over to starboard and sank.
Soon after she lost sight of the "Sissoi," the "Monomach" came upon the
armoured cruiser "Admiral Nakhimoff," which also signalled that she was in
a sinking condition. Presently there was smoke on the horizon, and then the
armed steamer "Sadu Maru" and the Japanese destroyer "Shiranui" appeared.
In such conditions the enemy proved a friend. The crews of the two
unfortunate ships were transferred to the "Sadu," which stood by till,
about ten o'clock, both the "Nakhimoff" and the "Monomach" went to the
bottom.
The "Navarin" was comparatively little injured in the battle, but was
torpedoed during the night. Leaking badly, she struggled northward at a
slow rate till two in the afternoon of the 28th, when she was found and
attacked by a Japanese destroyer flotilla. She still made a fight with her
lighter guns, and was hit by two torpedoes. The crew were all at their
battle stations when she began suddenly to sink. The order, "All hands on
deck," came too late, and very few lives were saved.
The armoured cruiser "Dimitri Donskoi," last survivor of Rojdestvensky's
fourteen battleships and armoured cruisers, escaped the torpedo attacks in
the night, and eluded pursuit all through the morning of the 28th. At 4
p.m., when she was near the island of Ullondo, she sighted some Japanese
ships in the distance, Uriu's cruiser division and some destroyers. They
closed slowly on her, and it was not till six o'clock that she was attacked
by the cruisers "Niitaka" and "Otowa," and three destroyers. The "Donskoi"
made a gallant fight for two hours, beating off the torpedo-boats, losing
sixty killed and twice as many wounded, and finally disengaging herself in
the darkness about eight o'clock. The water-line armour was intact, but one
boiler was penetrated and ammunition was nearly exhausted. In the night,
the captain, who was himself slightly wounded, decided to land his men on
Ullondo Island and sink the ship. All the boats had been shattered and the
cutter that was left had to be hastily repaired before it could be lowered.
With the one boat the disembarkation went on slowly during the night. At
dawn the enemy's torpedo-boats were sighted. The rest of the crew jumped
overboard and swam ashore, leaving a few men with the second-in-command on
the ship. They ran the "Donskoi" out into a hundred fathoms of water,
opened the sea-cocks, embarked in their one boat, and saw their ship go
down as they pulled ashore. The Japanese sent a couple of steamers to take
the crew off the island.
The torpedo destroyer that conveyed the wounded Admiral Rojdestvensky,
Captain Semenoff, and a few other officers and men away from the fight was
found and captured by a Japanese flotilla during the afternoon of the 28th.
The cruiser "Izumrud," one of the few fast ships the Russians had with
them, escaped the torpedo attacks in the night. In the morning she was
chased by several of the enemy's cruisers. She kept up a good speed, and
one by one they abandoned the chase, the "Chitose" being the last to give
it up. By 2 p.m. all pursuit was left behind, and she reduced speed. In the
battle and the chase she had burned so much coal that she had not enough
left to make for Vladivostock, so she steered for Vladimir Bay, in the
Russian Coast Province of Siberia, north of Korea. She was off the
entrance of the Bay at midnight with only ten tons of coal left in her
bunkers. Unfortunately, in trying to go in in the dark on the flood-tide
she drove hard on a reef. Next day unsuccessful efforts were made to get
his ship off and in the afternoon, as her captain expected the enemy's
ships might arrive to secure the "Izumrud" and refloat her, he landed his
crew on Russian ground, destroyed his guns one by one with blasting
charges, and then blew up the ship.
The destroyer "Groki" was chased and captured by the Japanese destroyer
"Shiranui" and a torpedo-boat, and after a sharp fight close to Tsu-shima
Island surrendered at 11.30 a.m. She was so injured that she sank within an
hour of her capture. Admiral Enquist, with the three protected cruisers
"Oleg," "Aurora," and "Jemschug," had, after turning south for the last
time during the night of torpedo attacks, got through the Tsu-shima Straits
in the darkness. Next day no enemy was in sight, and he steered for
Shanghai under easy steam, repairing damages on the way. He intended to lie
off the port, bring a couple of colliers out of the Woosung River, fill his
bunkers at sea, and try to reach Vladivostock by the Pacific and the La
Perouse Straits. On the morning of the 29th he was overtaken by the
repairing ship and tug "Svir," and from her learned the full extent of the
disaster. Fearing that if he approached Shanghai he would be driven into
the port and blockaded by the enemy, he changed his course for Manila,
where he arrived on 3 June. The "Svir," after communicating with him, had
gone on to the Woosung River. She was joined on her way there by the
transport "Anadir," which had got successfully south through the Tsu-shima
Straits. The transport "Korea," which had escaped in the same way, and had
a cargo of coal, did not go to Woosung, but crossed the Indian Ocean and
appeared unexpectedly in the French port of Diego Suarez in Madagascar. Of
the nine torpedo destroyers with the Russian fleet seven were hunted down
and sunk or taken by the Japanese.
The only ships of all the Russian armada that finally reached Vladivostock
were the two destroyers "Brawy" and "Gresny," and the small swift cruiser
"Almaz." She had been with Enquist's cruiser division in the first hours of
the night after the battle. During the torpedo attacks she had become
separated from her consorts. Escaping from the destroyers, she headed at
full speed first towards the coast of Japan, then northward. At sunrise on
the 28th she was well on her way and many miles north-east of Togo's fleet.
Next day she reached Vladivostock with 160 tons of coal still on board.
A hundred years after Trafalgar Togo had won a victory as complete and as
decisive. The Russian power had been swept from the Eastern Seas, and the
grey-haired admiral who had secured this triumph for his native
land--"Father Togo," as the Japanese affectionately call him--had lived
through the whole evolution of the Imperial Navy, had shared in its first
successes, and for years had been training it for the great struggle that
was to decide who was to be master in the seas of the Far East.
The war was followed by an immediate expansion of the Japanese Navy.
Numbers of captured Russian ships were repaired, re-armed, and placed in
the Navy List under Japanese names. No longer dependent on foreign
builders, the Japanese yards were kept busy turning out yet a new navy of
every class, from the battleship to the torpedo-boat. The laying down of
the gigantic "Aki" and "Satsuma," battleships of over 20,000 tons, opened a
new period in naval construction, and nations began to count their
sea-power by the number of "Dreadnoughts" afloat or on the slips.
The great maritime powers are now engaged in a race of construction, and
the next naval war will see forces in action far surpassing even the
armadas that met at Tsu-shima. And maritime war, hitherto confined to the
surface of the sea, will have strange auxiliaries in the submarine stealing
beneath it, and the airship and aeroplane scouting in the upper air. But
still, whatever new appliances, whatever means of mutual destruction
science supplies, the lesson taught by the story of all naval war will
remain true. Victory will depend not on elaborate mechanical structures and
appliances, but on the men, and will be the reward of long training, iron
discipline, calm, enduring courage, and the leadership that can inspire
confidence, command self-sacrificing obedience, divine an enemy's plans,
and decide swiftly and resolutely on the way in which they are to be
frustrated.
INDEX
A
Actium, 25, etc.;
topography of, 30;
the battle of, 32, etc.
AEschylus, 2, 21
Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius, 27
Alava, Spanish rear-admiral at Trafalgar, 192;
surrenders to Collingwood, 199
Albemarle. _See_ Monk, Duke of
Albini, Italian admiral, second in command at Lissa, 242, etc.
Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral, 85, 86, 88, 93, 103
Alexandria, bombardment of, 253, 254
Allen, Sir Thomas, English admiral in Second Dutch War, 152, etc.
Antony, Mark, 25;
flight from Actium, 35;
death, 38
Antwerp, the great fire-ship of, 130
Aristides, 15;
at Salamis, 21
Armada of 1588, 105, etc.;
organisation and statistics, 111
Armour-clads, early: Erik Jarl's "Iron Beard," 49;
the "Finis Belli" (1585), 209;
floating batteries, 211
Armour-clads, first modern sea-going: the "Gloire" (French), 211;
the "Warrior" (British), 213
Artemisia of Halicarnassus, 11, 15;
at Salamis, 21;
at the council after the battle, 22
Athens, beginnings of its sea-power, 4;
occupied by the Persians, 7
Augustus, 25;
founder of the Roman Empire, 38;
naval policy, 39
B
Bahuchet, French admiral, 61
Baltic Fleet organised by Russia for the Far East, 304;
voyage of, 306;
Dogger Bank incident, 307;
passes Malacca, 309
Barbarigo, Agostino, Venetian admiral, 80, 92;
killed at Lepanto, 103
Barbavera, Genoese admiral at Sluys, 61;
his escape after the battle, 65
Bertendona, admiral of the Levant squadron of the Armada, 112
Bingham, Queen Elizabeth's Governor of Connaught, 138, etc.
Blackwood, captain of Nelson's look-out frigate "Euryalus," 181, 186,
188, 191
Blake, 143, 144
Bragadino, Venetian commandant of Famagusta, 73;
tortured and put to death by the Turks, 74
Bragadino, Ambrogio and Antonio, Venetian captains at Lepanto, 92
British Navy: in Middle Ages, _see_ chap. IV., Sluys, 55;
in Tudor period, _see_ chap. VI., the Armada, 105;
in Stuart period, _see_ chap. VII., the battle off the Gunfleet, 142;
in the eighteenth century, _see_ chap. VIII., the Battle of the Saints'
Passage, 158;
in Nelson's time, _see_ chap. IX., Trafalgar, 173
Brunel, 208
Buchanan, commodore, C.S.N., captain of the "Merrimac," 219, etc.
Byron, captain, under Rodney, 163
C
Caesar, Julius, 25
Calais, importance to England, 55
Calder, Sir Robert, action off Finisterre, 177
Cardona, Juan de, Spanish admiral, 80
Cervantes, Miguel de (author of "Don Quixote"), at Lepanto, 82;
wounded, 99
Cervera, Spanish admiral, 280;
voyage to Cuba, 282, etc.;
goes out of Santiago to battle, 287;
taken prisoner, 293
Charlemagne and the Norsemen, 41
Chatham, Dutch raid on, 156, 157
Churucca, Commodore, at Trafalgar, 200, 201
Cinque Ports, 57, 58
Cisneros, Spanish rear-admiral at Trafalgar, 197, 198
Cleopatra, 25;
flight from Actium, 35;
death, 38
Clerk of Eldin, his naval theories, 168
Collingwood, 179, 180, 183;
breaks through French line at Trafalgar, 192;
takes command of fleet after Nelson's death, 204
Colonna, Marco Antonio, Papal admiral, 71, 76;
at Lepanto, 99
Cromwell, 143
Cyprus, Turkish invasion of, under Selim II, 70;
fall of Nicosia, 71;
siege of Famagusta, 71, 73
D
Damme, naval victory at, 56
Darius, 4
Decres, Admiral, Minister of Marine under Napoleon I, 178, 180
Dewa, Admiral, 323, 331
Dewey, Admiral, 280
Doria, Giovanni Andrea, Genoese admiral, 80;
at Lepanto, 99, etc.
Douglas, Sir Charles, share in Rodney's victory, 167-9
Dover with Calais made England mistress of the Channel, 56;
De Burgh's naval victory off, 57
Drake, Francis, 107, 109, 116, 119, 124, 132
Drake, Samuel, rear-admiral under Rodney, 164
Dumanoir, admiral of French van squadron at Trafalgar, his blunders, 194;
subsequent loss of his ships, 203
E
Edward I, use of navy in Scottish wars, 56
Edward III, 55;
the French War, 59;
at Sluys, 64
Egypt, early navigators of, 2
Enquist, Russian admiral, 335, etc.
Ericsson, John, designer of the "Monitor," 213;
_See_ "Monitor"
Erik Jarl, 46;
his ship the "Iron Beard," a primitive armour-clad, 49;
in the fight at Svold, 51, etc.
Euboea, battles of Greeks and Persians off, 11, etc.
Eulate, captain of the "Vizcaya" at Santiago, 294, 295
Eurybiades, 11, 22
Evans, Captain Robley, U.S.N., 294, 295
Evertszoon, Dutch admiral, 148, etc.
F
Famagusta. _See_ Cyprus
Farragut, Admiral, sayings of, 231, 238
Fenner, 116
Fitzwilliam, Elizabeth's Lord Deputy in Ireland, 138, etc.
Fremantle, captain of the "Neptune" at Trafalgar, 197, 198
Frobisher, 117, 128, 132
Fulton and early steamships, 206
G
Galley-slaves, 87
Ganteaume, French admiral, 174
Giustiniani, Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, 81, 103
Grasse, Comte de, Rodney's battle with, 158, etc.
Gravelines, the Armada battle off, 131, etc.
Gravina, Spanish admiral, 176, 181, 187
Guichen, de, 160
H
Hanneken, Major von, German officer in Chinese service, 261
Hardy, captain of the "Victory," 195, 196
Harold Haarfager, 42
Hawkins, 107, 116, 119, 127, 128, 132
Hobart Pasha, 253
Holland, rise of naval power, 142;
first war with England, 143;
second war, 144
Hood, 164, etc.
Howard of Effingham, 116, 124, etc.
Howard, Lord Thomas, 127
Howe, 173
I
Infernet, captain of the "Intrepide" at Trafalgar, 202, 203
Ireland and the Armada, 137
Ito, Count, Japanese admiral at the Yalu, 259, etc.
J
Japan, rise of naval power, 254;
policy after Chinese War, 297;
war with Russia, 300
Josephine, the Empress, 161
Juan of Austria, Don, admiral of the Christian League, 76, 78;
at Lepanto, 91, etc.
K
Kamimura, Admiral, defeats the Vladivostock squadron, 303;
at Tsu-shima, 332
Kara Khodja, his scouting expeditions, 85
Kempenfeldt, Admiral, 161
Kiriet, French admiral, 61
L
Leotychides, 23
Lepanto, 67, etc.
Lepidus, 25
Leyva, general of the troops embarked in the Armada, 114, 120, 123,
127, 135;
shipwrecked and drowned, 140
Lissa, battle of (1866), 231, etc.
Longsword, William, his victory at Damme, 56
Lucas, captain of the "Redoutable," 193, 195
M
Macaulay and the Armada, 105, 120
McGiffen, Commander, American officer in Chinese service, 261, 265,
272, 273
Magon, French admiral at Trafalgar, 199
Mahomet II takes Constantinople, 67
Makharoff, Admiral, death of, 301
Manila, battle of, 180
Marathon, 4
Mark Antony. _See_ Antony
Maurice of Nassau, 134
Maximilian, Archduke and Austrian admiral (afterwards Emperor of Mexico),
235
Medina, Lopez de, wrecked on Fair Isle, 137, 138
Medina-Sidonia, Guzman, Duke of, commander-in-chief of the Armada, 109,
115, etc.;
return to Spain, 140
"Merrimac," improvised Confederate armour-clad, 214, etc.;
attack on the wooden ships at Hampton Roads, 215;
sinks the "Cumberland," 218;
fight with the "Monitor," 224, etc.;
"Merrimac" destroyed later, 230
Missiessy, French admiral, 174
Mohacs, battle of, 68
Moncada, admiral of the galleasses in the Armada, 131
"Monitor," design and construction, 221, etc.;
voyage to Hampton Roads, 223;
fight with "Merrimac," 224, etc.;
lost at sea later on, 230
Monk, Duke of Albemarle, 146, etc.
Mycale, destruction of Persian fleet at, 24
Mylae, naval battle of, 27
N
Napier, Sir Charles, first to take steamships into action, 207
Napoleon I, naval projects, 174, etc., 178, 179;
refuses Fulton's inventions, 206
Napoleon III and the introduction of armoured ships, 210, 211;
Ericsson's offer to, 213
Nebogatoff sent with squadron of old ships to reinforce Baltic Fleet, 308;
at Tsu-shima, 323;
surrenders, 337, 338
Nelson, alleged Danish descent, 41;
the Trafalgar campaign, 173, etc.;
plans for the battle, 182, 189, 190;
opening of the battle, 192;
wounded, 195, 196;
his death, 203
Nicholls, English gunner in Chinese service, killed at Yalu, 271
Nicopolis, 29, 38
Norsemen, 41, etc.
North Sea battles in Dutch War, 143, etc.
O
Octavian. _See_ Augustus
Olaf, Saint, 54
Olaf Tryggveson, his career, 42;
becomes King of Norway, 44;
his famous ships, 45;
in the fight at Svold, 47, etc.;
death in battle, 53
Opdam, Dutch admiral, 145
Orde, Sir John, and blockade of Cadiz, 176
Ottomans. _See_ Turks
P
Parma, Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 114, 128, 129, 130
Pepys, Samuel, 146, 153
Persano, Italian admiral in command at Lissa, 237, etc.
Pertev Pasha, Turkish seraskier at Lepanto, 86, 88, 95
Petz, Commodore, Austrian second in command at Lissa, 241, etc.
Philip II of Spain, 105
Philip of Valois, King of France, 59, 66
Piracy in early days, 3;
of Turks and Algerines in the Mediterranean, 68
Pius V, efforts to form a league against the Turks, 70, 72, 75
Plataea, battle of, 23
Port Arthur, naval operations around, 300, etc.;
surrender of, 308
Purvis, English engineer killed at the Yalu, 270
R
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 122
Recalde, Martinez de, admiral of the Biscay squadron of the Armada, 114,
123, 127, 135, 140
Reitzenstein, admiral of the Vladivostock squadron, 302, 303
Rodney, 159, etc.
Rojdestvensky, admiral in command of the Baltic Fleet, 304, etc.;
taken prisoner, 340
Rupert, Prince, as an admiral, 146, etc.
Ruyter, de, 146, etc.
S
Saints' Passage, battle of, 158, etc.
Salamis, refuge of the Athenians, 6;
Greek fleets concentrate at, 13;
the battle, 16, etc.
Sampson, U.S. admiral, 278, etc.
Santa Cruz, Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of, 80, 108
Santiago, blockade of, 285;
battle outside, 287, etc.
Schley, U.S. admiral, 278, etc.
Sebastopol, attack on sea-front, 209, 211
Selim II, 70
Semenoff, Captain, personal narrative of Tsu-shima, 313, 319, 320, 322,
327, 328;
taken prisoner, 340
Seymour, Lord Henry, 118, 126, 129, 132
Shafter, General, operations against Santiago, 286, etc.
Sigvald Jarl, 47
Sluys, 55, etc.
Steam applied to warships, 206, etc.
Steevens, John and Robert, inventors, 210
Strachan, Sir Richard, takes Dumanoir's squadron, 203
Suleiman the Magnificent, 70
Svold Island, battle of, 40, etc.
T
Takeomi, Admiral, 322, 331
Tegethoff, Austrian commander at Lissa, 235, etc.
Terschelling, sack of, 156
Themistocles, 4, 13, 14, 22
Ting, Chinese admiral at the Yalu, 259, etc.
Togo, captain of the "Naniwa" in the Chinese War, 260;
admiral commanding in chief in war with Russia, 301, etc.;
preparations for Baltic Fleet, 310, etc.;
his battle signal, 325;
slightly wounded, 333
Torpedoes, 252, 253
Trafalgar, 173, etc.
Troy, 4
Tsu-shima, battle of, 321, etc.
Turks, growth of their power, 67
U
Ulugh Ali, renegade Turkish admiral, 77, 84, 85;
counter-attack at Lepanto, 101;
his escape, 102
United States: the navy and the Civil War, 213, etc.;
the navy after the war, 277;
the new navy, 278;
situation at outbreak of war with Spain, 278, 279
Uriu, Admiral, 331
Urs de Margina, defender of fortress of Lissa, 237
V
Valdes, Diego Flores de, admiral of the Castilian squadron of the Armada,
114
Valdes, Pedro de, admiral of the Andalusian squadron, 114, 123
Van Tromp, 148, etc.
Veniero, Sebastian, Venetian admiral, 76;
at Lepanto, 97
Vikings. _See_ Norsemen
Viking ships, 43
Villeneuve, French admiral commanding at Trafalgar, 174, etc.;
wounded and taken prisoner, 197
W
Winter, Sir W., 118, 129, 132
Wireless telegraphy, 319
Witjeft, Russian admiral, killed in battle on the 10th of August, 302
Worden (afterwards Admiral), commander of the "Monitor," 223, etc.;
wounded in fight with "Merrimac," 227
X
Xantippus, 23
Xerxes, 4;
his great expedition, 5, etc.;
watches the battle of Salamis, 16;
return to Asia, 21, 22
Y
Yalu, naval battle of the, 255, etc.
York, Duke of (afterwards James II), 145, 158
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