THE BATTLE OF THE YALU
1894
One result of the victory won by Tegethoff at Lissa was that an exaggerated
importance was for many years to come attached to the ram as a weapon of
attack. In every navy in the world ships were built with bows specially
designed for ramming. The sinking of the "Re d'Italia" had made such an
impression on the public mind, that it was in vain for a minority among
naval critics to urge that the ram was being overrated, and to point out
that even at Lissa for one successful attempt to sink an enemy by running
her down there had been an untold number of failures. It was very gradually
that the majority was brought to realize that a ship under full control
could generally avoid a ramming attack, and that it could only be employed
under exceptional circumstances, and against an already disabled enemy.
Then the progress of invention and armaments introduced features into naval
warfare that made it extremely difficult and dangerous for a large ship to
come to such close quarters as an attempt to ram implies. First the
introduction of the Whitehead torpedo as part of the auxiliary armament of
battleships and cruisers gave the ship attacked a means of sinking the
aggressor as she approached, and the increase in the power of guns led
naval tacticians to accept as a principle that fleet actions must be fought
at ranges which were regarded as too distant for any effective action in
earlier days.
But for nearly thirty years after Lissa there were no fleet actions.
Ships, armour, guns, were all improved, and the great naval Powers built on
a larger and larger scale. Steel took the place of iron as the material for
shipbuilding and armour. Naval gunnery became a precise science. Torpedoes
were introduced, and with them such new types of ships as the swift torpedo
boat and the "destroyer." But there was very little fighting on the sea,
though in the same period there were colossal conflicts on land.
Hundreds of armour-clads were built that became obsolete, and were turned
over to the shipbreaker, without ever having fired a shot in action.
Theories of tactics for fleet actions were worked out on paper, and tested
to some extent at naval manoeuvres, but the supreme test of battle was
wanting. In the Franco-German War of 1870 the French navy had such a
decided superiority that the few German warships of the day were kept in
their harbours protected by batteries and sunken mines. The only naval
action of the war was an indecisive duel between two gunboats. In the
second stage of the war the officers and men of the French navy fought as
soldiers in the defence of France. Guns were taken from the ships to be
mounted on land fortifications. Admirals commanded divisions, formed
largely of naval officers and bluejackets.
Again in the war of 1878 between Russia and Turkey the Russians had only a
few light craft in the Black Sea, and the Turkish fleet under Hobart Pasha,
weak as it was, held the undisputed command of these waters, and had only
to fear some isolated torpedo attacks. In South American civil wars and
international conflicts there were duels between individual ships, and some
dashing enterprises by torpedo boats, but nothing that could be described
as a fleet action between ironclads. The only time a British armoured fleet
was in action was against the batteries of Alexandria on the occasion of
the bombardment in July, 1882. The forts, badly armed and constructed, and
inefficiently defended, were silenced, but a careful examination of them
convinced experts that if they had been held by a better-trained garrison,
the victory would not have been such an easy matter. This and subsequent
experiences have led to the general acceptance of the view that it will be
seldom advisable to risk such valuable fighting machines as first-class
battleships and armoured cruisers in close action against well-constructed
and powerfully armed shore defences.
It was not till the summer of 1894 that at last there was another pitched
battle between fleets that included a large proportion of armoured vessels.
That action off the mouth of the Yalu River will be always remembered as
the event that heralded the coming of a new naval power.
A long rivalry between China and Japan for the control of Korea had
resulted in an outbreak of war between the two empires of the Far East. For
an island state like Japan the command of the sea was a necessary condition
for successful operations on the mainland of Asia, and for some years she
had been building up a powerful fleet, the ships being constructed in
foreign yards, as the Japanese yards were not yet in a position to turn out
large warships.
In the memory of living men the Japanese fleets had been made up of
primitive-looking war-junks. After failures to build ships in Japan on the
European model, the Government had in the middle of the nineteenth century
purchased some small steamships abroad, but it was not till 1876 that the
first Japanese armour-clad, the "Fuso," was constructed in England from
designs by the late Sir Edward Reed. Naval progress was at first very slow,
but solid foundations were laid. Young naval officers were attached to the
British and other navies for professional training, and on their return to
Japan became the educators of their fellow-countrymen in naval matters. A
serious obstacle to the acquisition of a numerous and powerful fleet was
the financial question. Japan is not a rich country. At first, therefore,
the Japanese did not venture to order battleships, but contented
themselves with protected cruisers. They thought that these would be
sufficient for the impending conflict with China, which possessed only a
fleet of weak, protected cruisers of various types and a couple of small
coast defence ironclads, that might be counted as inferior battleships.
When war broke out between China and Japan in 1894, the fleet of the latter
consisted of older ships of miscellaneous types, and a number of new
protected cruisers, some of them armed with quick-firing guns, a type of
weapon only lately introduced into the world's navies. Of these modern
cruisers most had been built and armed in French yards, but the best and
swiftest ship was a fine cruiser delivered not long before from Armstrong's
yard at Elswick.
The following lists give some details of the Japanese and Chinese fleets,
only the ships engaged at the Yalu battle being included. But these ships
represented almost the entire strength of the two rival navies, and no
really effective ship was absent on either side, while to make up the two
squadrons ships were sent to sea that in a European navy would have been
considered obsolete and left in harbour (see pages 256-7).
A comparison of these two lists brings out some interesting points. The
advantage in gun power was clearly on the side of the Japanese. Of the
heavier class of guns they had seventy to fifty-five, and there were no
weapons in the Chinese squadron equal to the long 12 1/2-inch rifled
breech-loaders of French make, carried by four of the Japanese cruisers.
But there was a further gain in gun power for the Japanese in the
possession of 128 quick-firers, some of them of fairly heavy calibre. The
quick-firing gun was then a new weapon. It is really a quick loader, a gun
fitted with a breech action that can be opened and closed by a rapid
movement, and so mounted that the recoil is taken up by mechanism in the
carriage which at once automatically runs the gun back into firing
position, while the process of loading is further accelerated (for the
smaller calibre guns) by making up the ammunition like that of a rifle,
with projectile and charge in a big brass-cased cartridge, so that the gun
can be loaded up by one movement, and the cartridge contains its own means
of ignition, and is fired by pulling off a trigger. The lighter
quick-firers are further mounted on pivots, so that they can be easily
moved through an arc of a circle by one man, who keeps his eyes on a moving
target and his finger on the trigger ready to fire. The storm of shells
that poured from the Japanese quick-firers was even more terrible for the
Chinese than the slower fire of the heavy guns, and of these new
quick-firing guns the Chinese only had three on the little "Kwang-ping."
JAPANESE FLEET
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
|Tonnage.
| |Heavy Guns.
| | |Quick-firers.
| | | |Machine Guns.
Ships. | | | | | Notes.
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
N {_Yoshino_ | 4150 | -- | 44 | -- |Swiftest ship in either fleet:
e { | | | | | speed 23 knots; 2-inch
w c{ | | | | | steel protective deck. Built
r{ | | | | | by Armstrong.
p u{ | | | | {|2-inch steel protective deck.
r i{_Matsushima_ |} {| 12 | 16 | 6 {| Barbette forward covered
o s{_Ikitsushima_|}4277{| 12 | 16 | 6 {| with 12-inch armour, and
t e{_Hashidate_ |} {| 12 | 16 | 15 {| armed with a long Canet
e r{ | | | | {| 12 1/2-inch gun.
c s{
t {_Takachico_ |}3650{| 8 | -- | 12 {|3-inch steel protective deck.
e {_Naniwa Kan_ |} {| 8 | -- | 12 {| Speed 18 knots.
d {_Akitsushima_| 3150 | 1 | 12 | 10 |2 1/2-inch steel protective deck.
| | | | | One long 12 1/2-inch Canet gun.
_Chiyoda_ | 2450 | -- | 24 | 13 |Small partly armoured cruiser;
| | | | | 4 1/2-inch armoured belt over
| | | | | two-thirds of length; 1-inch
| | | | | steel protective deck.
_Fuso_ | 3718 | 6 | -- | 8 |4 1/2-in. armour belt }
| | | | | amidships. } Old
_Hiyei_ | 2200 | 9 | -- | -- {|7-in. armour belt. } ironclads
| | | | {|9-in. armour on } launched
| | | | {| battery. } 1877-8.
_Akagi_ | 615 | 2 | -- | 2 |Gunboat.
_Saikio Maru_| 600 | -- | (?) | -- |Armed merchant steamer carrying
| | | | | only a few small quick-firers.
| |----|-----|-----|
| | 70 | 128 | 84 |
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
CHINESE FLEET
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
|Tonnage.
| |Heavy Guns.
| | |Quick-firers.
| | | |Machine Guns.
Ships. | | | | | Notes.
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
A {_Chen-yuen_ |}7430{| 6 | -- | 12 {|Coast-defence battleships, 14-inch
r {_Ting-yuen_ |} {| 6 | -- | 12 {| armour belt. Four 12-inch guns
m { | | | | {| on each ship, mounted in pairs
o { | | | | {| in turrets with 12-inch armour.
u { | | | | |
r {_Lai-yuen_ |}2850{| 4 | -- | 8 {|Armoured cruisers, 9 1/2-inch
e {_King-yuen_ |} {| 4 | -- | 8 {| armour belt. 8-inch armour on
d { | | | | {| barbettes forward.
{_Ping-yuen_ | 2850 | 3 | -- | 8 |Armoured cruiser, 8-inch armour
| | | | | belt; 5 inches on barbette.
U | | | | |
n {_Tsi-yuen_ | 2355 | 3 | -- | 10 |
a {_Ching-yuen_ |}2300{| 5 | -- | 16 {|Quickest ships in the fleet:
r {_Chi-yuen_ |} {| 5 | -- | 16 {| speed 18 knots.
m { | | | | |
o {_Yang-wei_ |}1350{| 6 | -- | 7 |
u {_Chao-yung_ |} {| 6 | -- | 7 |
r {_Kwang-chia_ | 1300 | 7 | -- | 8 |
e {_Kwang-ping_ | 1030 | -- | 3 | 8 |
d { | | | | |
| | | | |
4 torpedo-boats | | | | |
and 3 small | | | | |
gunboats. | | | | |
| |----|-----|-----|
| | 55 | 3 | 120 |
-----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------
The Chinese fleet had more armour protection. The two coast-defence
battleships were heavily armoured, and there were three other less
completely protected ironclads, although seven other ships had no armour
whatever. In the Japanese fleet the only armoured vessels were the two old
ironclads, belonging to an obsolete type, and the armour-belted "Chiyoda."
The real fighting force of the fleet was made up of the seven new protected
cruisers. Some of these had armour on the barbettes in which their long
bow-guns were mounted, but their "protection" consisted in a deck plated
with steel covering the "vitals" of the ship, boilers, engines, and
magazines, all placed as low as possible in the hull. There was some
further protection afforded by the coal-bunkers placed along the water-line
amidships. The theory of the protected cruiser was that everything below
the water-line was safeguarded by this armoured deck, and as the over-water
portion of the ship was further divided by bulk-heads into numerous
water-tight compartments, the danger of the ship being sunk was remote. The
protected cruiser is no longer regarded as having a place in the main
fighting-line. But the Japanese cruisers gave such good results in the Yalu
battle that for a while an exaggerated value was attached to it.
But in one point, and the most important of all, the Japanese had an
overwhelming advantage. The Chinese officers and men were mostly brave
enough, but almost entirely unskilled. The only really efficient officers
and engineers they had were a few Englishmen and Americans and two Germans.
The Japanese, from Admiral Count Ito, who commanded, down to the youngest
of the bluejackets, were not only brave with the inherited recklessness of
death and suffering, which is characteristic of their race, but were also
highly trained in every branch of their profession, first-rate sailors,
excellent gunners. And the fleet had for years been exercised in
manoeuvres, so that the ships could work together as an organized whole.
The spirit which animated it was that of "No surrender--Victory at any
cost." It is a standing order of the Japanese navy that if a ship should
strike her colours, the first duty of her consorts is not to try to
recapture her, but to endeavour to sink her and her crew.
The Mandarin Ting, who commanded the Chinese fleet, was more of a soldier
than a sailor, but he had some sea experience, and was a thoroughly brave
man. As soon as war was declared he was anxious to go in search of his
enemy. He urged upon the Pekin Government that the first step to be taken
was to use the Chinese fleet to attack the Japanese transports, which were
conveying troops to Korea. This would, of course, lead to a battle with the
enemy's fleet, but Ting was quite confident that he would defeat the
Japanese if he met them. In giving this advice the Chinese admiral was
reasoning on correct principles, even if his confidence in his own fighting
power was not justified by facts. To keep the fleet idle at Port Arthur or
Wei-hai-wei would be to concede the command of the sea to Japan, without an
effort to dispute it.
But the mandarins at Pekin would not accept their admiral's view. In the
first place they were alarmed at the fact that in a minor naval engagement
off the Korean coast, at the very outset of the conflict, the weak Chinese
force in action had fared very badly. The quarrel in Korea had begun
without a regular declaration of war. On the coast there were the Chinese
cruiser, "Tsi-yuen," and a small gunboat, the "Kwang-yi." On 24 July the
two ships had gone to sea to look for, and give their escort to, some
transports that were expected with reinforcements from China. In the grey
of the morning on the 25th they fell in with, and were attacked by, three
of the swift protected cruisers of the Japanese fleet, the "Yoshino,"
"Akitsushima," and "Naniwa Kan." The fight was soon over. The gunboat was
sunk, and the little cruiser was attacked at close quarters by the "Naniwa
Kan," whose shells riddled her weak conning-tower, killing all within it.
The "Tsing Yuen" fled, pursued by the "Naniwa," whose commander, by the
way, was Captain Togo, famous afterwards as the victorious admiral of the
Russo-Japanese War. The "Tsing Yuen" made good her escape, only because the
chase brought the "Naniwa Kan" on the track of the transport "Kowshing,"
and Togo stopped to dispose of her by sending her to the bottom.
This incident made the Pekin Government nervous about the fighting
qualities of their ships. And then they were afraid that if Ting went to
sea with all his ships, the Japanese fleet would elude him, and appear with
an expeditionary force at the mouth of the Pei-ho, capture the Taku forts,
and land an army to march on Pekin. They therefore ordered Admiral Ting to
collect his fleet at Port Arthur, and watch the sea-approach to the
capital.
The Japanese were therefore able to land their troops in Korea without
interruption, and soon overran the peninsula. When they were advancing to
capture Ping-yang, the Chinese began to concentrate a second army to defend
the crossing of the Yalu River, the entrance into Southern Manchuria. It
was now evident even to the Pekin mandarins that the Japanese plans did not
at this stage of the war include a raid on the Pei-ho and the Chinese
capital, so Admiral Ting was at last allowed to go to sea, in order to
protect the movement of transports along the western shores of the Korean
Bay to the mouth of the Yalu.
On 14 September five large steamers crowded with troops left Taku under the
convoy of six Chinese cruisers and four torpedo boats, bound for the mouth
of the Yalu River. Next day, as they passed Talienwan Bay, near Port
Arthur, they were joined by Ting with the rest of the fleet. On the second
day they safely reached their destination, and the troops were disembarked.
And early on the 17th Ting again put to sea with his fleet to return to
Port Arthur.
He had expected to have to fight the Japanese on his outward voyage, and he
knew that there was a still greater chance of meeting them on his way back
down the bay. He had a few white officers with him. On board his flagship,
the armour-clad "Ting-yuen" was a German artillery officer, Major von
Hanneken. On the other battleship was Commander McGiffen, formerly of the
United States navy, nominally second in command to the Chinese captain of
the "Chen-yuen," but practically acting as her commander. On some of the
other ships there were a few British-born engineer or gunnery officers, and
some of the latter had been petty officers in the English navy. By the
advice of these non-Chinese officers Ting had done something to remedy the
defects of his fleet.
A good deal of woodwork had been cut away and thrown overboard, though far
too much of it still remained, and on several ships there was a dangerous
quantity of carved ornamental wood on the upper works, much of it all the
more inflammable because it was gilded and lacquered in bright colours
which it was the practice to clean with oiled rags. The thin steel roofs of
barbettes, and the shields of many of the guns, had been removed, as the
"Tsi-yuen's" experiences in the fight with the "Naniwa Kan" had shown that
such light steel did not keep out the shells of the Japanese quick-firers,
but served only to ensure their bursting with deadly effect. Sometimes a
gun-shield had burst a shell, which if there had been no such attempt at
protection would perhaps have passed harmlessly over the heads of the
gunners. Round the barbettes of the ships sacks of coal were stacked as an
emergency method of strengthening these defences. Of coal the fleet had an
abundance, but it was woefully short of ammunition, and much of what was on
board was old and defective. If Ting had had more professional knowledge
and training, he would have been more anxious as to the probable result of
a battle.
Where were Admiral Ito and the Japanese fleet? Early in August he had
crossed the Yellow Sea with his cruiser squadron, and shown himself before
Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. He drew the fire of the seaward forts at long
range, and replied with a few shots, but he made no attack. He was engaged
only in a reconnaissance, and was quite satisfied when he ascertained that
the Chinese ships were remaining in harbour. He then returned to the Korean
side of the Yellow Sea, and till nearly the middle of September was
employed in escorting the convoys of transports from Japan, and protecting
the disembarkation of the reinforcements they were bringing to Korea.
On Friday, 14 September--the same day on which the Chinese convoy with the
reinforcements for Manchuria left Taku--Ito had completed his work in
connection with the transport of Japanese troops, having landed the last
detachments at Chinampo in the estuary of the Ta-tung River. Higher up the
river General Nodzu's army was attacking the Chinese walled town of
Ping-yang. Ito sent his gunboats up the Ta-tung to co-operate with Nodzu,
and leaving his torpedo boats at the river mouth, went to sea with his
fleet. He steered for the mouth of the Yalu River, intending to reconnoitre
the Chinese positions there, and obtain information as to the reported
concentration of troops near the river mouth, but under the belief that the
enemy's fleet was still at Port Arthur, Admiral Ting was just as ignorant
of his enemy's position and movements. Early on the morning of Monday, 17
September, he had expended some ammunition in practice at floating targets
off the mouth of the Yalu. The fleet had then anchored, and the men were
given a rest while the cooks got dinner ready. This was about 11 a.m. A
little later there was unexpected news, that interrupted the cooking. The
look-outs at the mastheads of the anchored fleet reported that the smoke of
many steamers was rising above the horizon far away to the south-westward.
It was a bright sunny day, with a perfectly smooth sea, clear air, and a
blue sky, and the look-out men could easily make out that the smoke rising
above the skyline came from a long line of funnels. Admiral Ting had no
doubt it was the Japanese fleet, and he gave orders to weigh anchor and
clear for action.
Early that morning Admiral Ito had heard from coasting craft that the
Chinese fleet was at sea, and one trader retailed to him a rumour that the
fleet was anchored behind Hai-Yang island, where there was a sheltered
roadstead. But on reaching Hai-Yang he found only a few fishing-boats lying
behind the island. He continued his voyage towards the Yalu, now
anticipating a meeting with Ting, unless the Chinese admiral had already
run down the other coast of the bay, and so passed him at a distance during
the previous night.
Ito's fleet was steaming in line ahead, and was organized in two squadrons.
The van squadron was led by his second in command, Admiral Tsuboi, who had
hoisted his flag on the fast cruiser "Yoshino." After her in succession
came the cruisers "Takachico," "Akitsushima," and "Naniwa Kan." Then there
was a considerable interval between the van squadron and the leading ship
of the main squadron, the cruiser "Matsushima," flying Count Ito's flag.
Next to her came the armoured cruiser "Chiyoda"; then the "Matsushima's"
two sister ships, the cruisers "Ikitsushima" and "Hashidate." The four
ships of the van squadron and the four leading ships of the main squadron
represented the chief strength of Ito's fleet, his eight modern cruisers.
After them came the two old ironclads "Hiyei" and "Fuso," the gunboat
"Akagi," and the small armed merchant steamer "Saikio Maru." The long line
of warships steaming swiftly through the sunlight must have looked more
like a fleet arrayed for some festive occasion than squadrons prepared for
imminent battle, for every ship was painted a brilliant white, with the
gilded device of the chrysanthemum forming a broad golden shield on her
bows, and the red-and-white sun flag of Japan flew from every masthead.
At half-past eleven, half an hour after the Chinese had perceived the
approach of the Japanese fleet, the "Yoshino," which was leading the
advancing line of the van squadron, signalled that there was a dense mass
of black smoke on the horizon inshore. This was the smoke produced by
Ting's furnaces, as his ships hurriedly stoked their fires to get full
pressure on the boilers. Then the Chinese fleet was seen coming out and
forming in line of battle.
Admiral Ting formed his ships in line abreast, that is side by side with
every bow towards the enemy. In the centre were the two little battleships,
with the armoured cruisers, "Lai-yuen" and "King-yuen," to right and left
of them. On each flank of these four heavy ships there was a group of three
unarmoured cruisers--the "Ching-yuen," "Chao-yung," and "Yang-wei"--on the
right; and the "Chi-yuen," "Kwang-chia," and "Tsi-yuen," on the left. These
were the ten ships on which he relied to bear the brunt of the fighting.
Away to the left flank and rear of the line, and nearer the shore, was the
small, armour-clad "Ping-yuen," the corvette "Kwang-ping," and four torpedo
boats. The Chinese fleet was under easy steam. The ships were painted a
dull black, but had a large amount of gilding and colour on their bows,
upper works, and deck-houses, and they were all dressed with flags. The
decks had been strewn with sand, to prevent accidents by men slipping,
and flooded with water from the fire hose to minimize the danger of fire.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU 1. THE JAPANESE ATTACK]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU 2. END OF THE FIGHT]
The fleets were now rapidly closing. McGiffen, the American officer of the
"Chen-yuen," was impressed with the "holiday aspect" of the scene. "The
twenty-two ships," he wrote in an account of the battle, "trim and fresh in
their paint and their bright new bunting, and gay with fluttering signal
flags, presented such a holiday aspect, that one found a difficulty in
realizing that they were not there simply for a friendly meeting."
When the range of the leading Japanese ship--the "Yoshino"--was just 5400
metres, or something less than 3 1/2 miles, the Chinese admiral fired one
of his heavy barbette guns at her from the "Ting-yuen." The shot fell
short, throwing up a great fountain of foaming water. The guns of the other
Chinese ships roared out, and the line was wrapped in smoke, but the
gunners had not the range in most cases, and their shooting was everywhere
bad. Untouched by the hostile fire, the Japanese fleet came silently on.
At first the Japanese line had been heading directly for the Chinese
centre. It now altered its course, ship after ship, the "Yoshino" leading
the line so that it would pass obliquely across the right front of the
enemy, and beyond the extreme right of his line, the wing of Ting's fleet
that was furthest from the shore. At a range of about two miles, the
"Yoshino" began replying to the Chinese fire with her bow guns and her
starboard battery, and the other ships opened as they reached the same
range. Thanks to McGiffen's narrative, we know what was the impression made
on the few skilled observers in the Chinese fleet. The advancing line of
hostile cruisers was wrapped in a dense cloud of smoke, out of which rose
their tall masts. Through the smoke came a continual flicker of the long
red flashes of the Japanese quick-firers. To men used to the old guns the
rapidity of the fire was something startling. But the Japanese had just
missed getting the range. The showers of shells were falling ahead of the
Chinese ships. The sea in front of their bows was a mass of spurting
columns and fountains of foam, and some of these geysers of sea-water shot
up so close ahead that they splashed over the Chinese ships, and numbers of
men on their forward-decks were drenched to the skin.
But as the range shortened the rain of shells began to find its target, and
fell crashing and exploding on the hulls and upper-works of the Chinese
line. It had now lost something of its first formation. The centre had
surged forward, the wings had hung back, and it had become slightly convex.
Ito in his report stated that Admiral Ting had adopted a crescent
formation, but this was only the result of his ships not keeping station
correctly. His order had been to fight in "line abreast." Presently the
line became so irregular that some of the Chinese ships were masking each
other's fire. The slow fire of the Chinese guns, ill directed as it was,
did little damage to the Japanese cruisers. But the Chinese ships were
already suffering from the shower of shells. The Japanese found themselves
faced with an unexpected difficulty of detail. In the older type of guns
the silk cartridge-case was burned when the shot was fired. But with the
quick-firers the solid drawn brass case of the cartridge, a thing like a
big metal can, is jerked out by an extractor as the breech-block is swung
back after firing, and these brass cases began to accumulate in heaps at
the gun positions. Extra men were sent to the batteries to throw them
overboard.
The "Yoshino" was now on the extreme flank of Ting's right, about a mile
away from the "Yang-wei." Count Ito signalled from the "Matsushima" for the
van squadron to circle round the enemy's fleet by changing its course to
starboard. This would bring the weaker ships of the hostile squadron under
a cross-fire from the van squadron, sweeping round astern of them, and the
main squadron crossing their bows obliquely. At the same time the ships on
the Chinese left had most of their guns masked by their consorts, and could
only fire at relatively long range with their bow guns at the rearward
ships of the Japanese main squadron. Ting was out-generalled, and was
paying the penalty of a bad formation. His weak right wing was in imminent
danger of being crushed by superior numbers and weight of fire.
The two ironclads in the Chinese centre had been made the target of the
heaviest guns in Ito's fleet. Theoretically these guns should have been
able to pierce even the heavily armoured plating of the barbettes, but no
projectile penetrated the armour of the two ships, though shot after shot
came thundering against them. Their unarmoured parts were pierced again and
again, the shells bursting as they entered, and lighting several fires that
were extinguished with difficulty.
But the unarmoured ships on the Chinese right were suffering terribly under
the cross-fire of the enemy's van and main squadrons. The two outer ships
on this flank were the "Chao Yung" and the "Yang-wei." Each of these ships
had a barbette armed with a 10-inch gun fore and aft. Amidships was a
raised structure carrying machine guns on its roof, and having on each side
of it a passage, off which opened a range of wooden cabins, oil-painted and
varnished. Under the rain of bursting shells these masses of dry,
inflammable woodwork were soon ablaze; the fire spreading rapidly made it
impossible to bring up ammunition for the guns, and the two cruisers
drifted helplessly out of the line, each wrapped in clouds of black smoke,
through which long tongues of red flame shot up into the air.
On the other flank practically no damage had been done by the few shots
fired by the Japanese in this direction. But here there was a miserable
display of cowardice on the part of the Chinese. The ship on the extreme
left was the "Tsi-yuen," which still bore the marks of her encounter with
the "Naniwa Kan," in the first days of the war. The experiences of that
adventure had evidently got on the nerves of Captain Fong, who commanded
her. As the Japanese line swung round the other flank, he suddenly left his
station and steamed at full speed away from his admiral, crossing astern of
the Japanese, at what he thought a safe distance, and heading for Port
Arthur. The rearmost Japanese cruiser, the "Chiyoda," sent a shell after
him, that dismounted one of his guns, and added wings to his flight. The
"Kwang-chia," the next ship in the Chinese line, followed his bad example,
and leaving the battle raging behind them, the two cruisers soon
disappeared over the south-western horizon. Fong, with the "Tsi-yuen,"
reached Port Arthur. He said he had been in the thick of the fight, and
only left it when the day was lost. But the evidence of his own crew was
against him. He was promptly tried by court-martial and beheaded. The other
ship, the "Kwang-chia," never reached Port Arthur. She was wrecked during
the night after the battle, with much loss of life, on a reef outside
Talienwan Bay.
There were some other instances of half-heartedness or worse among the
Chinese as the fight developed, but on the whole they fought bravely, and
many showed the most self-sacrificing courage.
While the large Japanese cruisers of the two squadrons kept perfect station
and distance, and enveloped the Chinese right wing with as much precision
as if they had been carrying out a fleet exercise in peace manoeuvres, the
older ships in their line, less speedy and handy, had dropped astern, and
were under fire from Ting's two ironclads in the centre. The "Fuso" was at
one time so close to them that one of the ironclads made an attempt to ram
her, but the Japanese ship evaded it, and running along the broken front of
the enemy, rejoined the main cruiser squadron. The other of the old
Japanese ironclads, the "Hiyei," boldly steamed between the Chinese
battleships, amid a storm of fire. Two torpedoes were discharged at her,
but both missed, and she joined the van squadron in the Chinese rear. The
little "Akagi" was for a while the target of many of the Chinese guns, and
one of her masts went over the side. Ito had signalled to her, and to the
armed merchantman, "Saikio Maru," that they might keep out of the fight,
but Japanese courage would not allow of this. The "Saikio Maru" had a
narrow escape. As the two burning cruisers drifted away from the Chinese
right, making for the Yalu, the "Saikio" pursued them, firing her light
guns. Two Chinese gunboats opened upon her and four torpedo boats steamed
out to attack her. But she turned her fire on them, and some of the
Japanese cruisers helped her by accurate shooting at long range. The
Chinese flotilla, which had expected an easy prey, turned back, and
gunboats and torpedo boats disappeared in the Yalu estuary.
But in the brief encounter the "Saikio Maru" had received a good deal of
damage from the light guns of the hostile flotilla. Her funnel was riddled,
and several steam-pipes cut through. She retired from the engagement. With
her went the "Hiyei," which had been seriously damaged in her dash through
the Chinese centre. The "Akagi" also withdrew to clear her decks, which
were encumbered with wreckage. The fall of her mast had killed her captain,
Sakamoto, and her two lieutenants were badly wounded.
So far Ting had lost four of his unarmoured cruisers, and Ito had sent out
of the fight three of his ships, the old ironclad "Hiyei," the gunboat
"Akagi," and the armed steamer "Saikio Maru." But none of these were
fighting units of serious value. His two squadrons of protected cruisers
were intact, and it was on these he counted for victory.
The second phase of the battle was a prolonged cannonade at a range of from
one to two miles. Thanks to the superior speed of the Japanese fleet, Ito
could choose position and distance, and the training of his officers and
men enabled him to concentrate his fire now on one part, now on another,
of the straggling Chinese line. His ships poured out a steady shower of
shells, whose heavy bursting charges not only scattered hurtling fragments
of steel among the Chinese crews, but also had a tendency to light a hot
fire wherever they exploded. The Chinese had a very poor supply of inferior
ammunition, most of it armour-piercing projectiles, that were practically
solid shot. Their fire was slow and ill-directed, and even when it found
its target the damage done was seldom serious.
Two more Chinese ships were soon disposed of. The cruiser "Chi-yuen" had
been pluckily fought by her Chinese captain, Tang, and her English
engineer, Purvis. She had received several shots between wind and water,
and was leaking badly. Tang knew she could not be long kept afloat, and he
made a desperate resolution to attempt to ram a Japanese ship before he
went down. As the enemy's van squadron, headed by the "Yoshino," came
sweeping to closer range with the Chinese left the "Chi-yuen" made a dash
for the leading cruiser. Even if she had not been half-sinking already, the
Chinese ship had neither the speed nor handiness to ram the swiftest ship
in the enemy's line. As the "Chi-yuen" came on, the guns of the van
squadron were concentrated on her. She was enveloped in a fierce storm of
bursting shells, and suddenly her bows plunged in the sea, her twin screws
whizzed for a moment in the air, and then all that was left to show where
she had sunk was floating wreckage and drowning men. Purvis went down with
his ship. Tang was seen swimming on an oar for a few minutes, with a big
dog--a pet of his--paddling near him. Then the dog put its paws on his
shoulders, and he was forced under and drowned.
Another Chinese cruiser, the "Lai-yuen," which lay in the line to the right
of the two armour-clads, was now seen to be burning fiercely. On board this
ship the Chinese engine-room staff showed devoted courage. While the fire
spread through the upper works, so that after the fight many of the iron
deck beams were bare and twisted out of shape, not one of the brave men
below quitted his post. Stokers, engineers, mechanics worked almost naked,
in heat like that of a furnace. Some died, all were in the doctor's hands
after the fight, but they kept the engines going, obeyed orders, and
brought the half-burnt ship out of action.
More than half of the Chinese fleet had now been destroyed or beaten off,
without any loss to the main fighting force of the Japanese. Disregarding
the Chinese cruisers, which were now badly cut up and firing harmlessly at
long range, Ito concentrated his attack on the two armour-clads. Though
each ship was hit more than four hundred times, their armour was never
pierced. Yet the Japanese had some guns that theoretically should have
penetrated it. Battle results are, however, often very different from
experimental work on the testing range.
Early in the fight a Japanese shell had cut down the foremast of the
Chinese flagship, sending overboard and drowning seven men who manned the
top--carrying away also the signal yards, so that no orders could for some
time be conveyed to the fleet. But for more than an hour Admiral Ting was
in no condition to give orders. Almost at the outset he had carelessly
taken a position that brought him within the danger arc of the blast from
his own big barbette guns. He was stunned, and for a while it was thought
that he was dead. The ship was fought by two European officers, Herr
Albrecht, a German, and Mr. Nicholls, who had formerly been a petty officer
in the British navy. Albrecht distinguished himself by more than once going
to terribly exposed positions, and personally handling the hose with which
he extinguished the fires lighted by the Japanese shells. Nicholls directed
the barbette guns with a cool courage worthy of the service in which he had
been trained, until he was killed by a bursting shell.
Two other white men, the German soldier, Captain von Hanneken, and the
American commander, McGiffen, took a prominent part in the fighting on
board the other armour-clad, the "Chen-yuen." Both had more than one narrow
escape. Von Hanneken was stunned for a while by an explosion, and slightly
wounded while at the barbette guns. When the lacquered woodwork of the bow
burst into flame and smoke, and none of the Chinese would go forward to
extinguish it, McGiffen, who was in command of the ship, dragged the
fire-hose to the danger point. Just as he had drowned the fire he was
wounded in two places and stunned by a bursting shell. He had told the men
in the barbette not to reopen fire till he rejoined them, but, to his
horror, as he recovered from the shock he saw the guns swing round and
point directly over the bow. He escaped being blown to pieces by dropping
through an open hatchway. Altogether during the fight the "Chen-yuen" was
on fire eight times.
Most of the Chinese crew fought pluckily, but there were some skulkers.
McGiffen tells how once, when there was something wrong with the revolving
gear of the barbette guns, and he went down into a recess under the
barbette to clear it, he saw a group of frightened men huddled in the
semi-darkness, and heard the voice of a Chinese officer saying: "You can't
hide down here. There are too many of us already." But he tells also of the
courage of others. The captain of one of the guns was killed as he prepared
to fire, the man's head being shattered by a shell, and his brains
scattered over the gun. Another man dragged the corpse away, took the
lanyard, looked along the sights, and fired without a moment's hesitation.
Tsao-kai, the gunnery lieutenant, was badly wounded and taken below. He had
brought his brother, a mere boy, on board for a holiday, and had him beside
him in the barbette. The boy remained there to the end, helping to pass up
ammunition, and apparently regarding the fight as an interesting game,
though he was the only unwounded individual in the barbette when the
battle ended.
McGiffen asserts that when the fight began the "Chen-yuen" had in her
magazine, besides a quantity of armour-piercing (almost solid) shot, only
three really effective shells for the 12-inch guns. Two of these were fired
early in the day. In the afternoon, in handling the ammunition, a third was
discovered. It was fired at the "Matsushima," Ito's flagship, and did
terrible execution. Ito, in his report, says that the incident occurred at
3.26 p.m., and that the shell came from the "Ting-yuen," but this appears
to have been a mistake. The shell dismounted a 5-inch gun, seriously
damaged two more, and exploded a quantity of quick-firing ammunition that
was lying ready near the guns. According to the Japanese official report,
forty-six men were killed or badly wounded. Unofficial narratives make the
loss even greater. One officer was simply blown to pieces. The flame of the
explosion set the ship on fire, and she was for a while in imminent danger
of destruction.
"The crew," writes Mr. H. W. Wilson, "with unabated gallantry and courage,
divided their attention between the fire and the enemy. The bandsmen went
to the guns, and, though the position of the ship was critical, and her
loss appalling, there was no panic. The fire was on the lower deck, just
above the magazine. In charge of the magazine were a gunner's mate and a
seaman. The shell had apparently dented the plating over the powder, and
the red glow through the crevices showed the danger. But these brave men
did not abandon their post. Stripping off their clothes, they crammed them
into the cracks, and saved the 'Matsushima'; though nearly a third of the
men above the waterline had been put out of action, the remnant got the
fire under."
While the fire was still burning the "Matsushima" steamed out of the fight,
and Ito transferred his flag to the cruiser "Hashidate." This was really
the second narrow escape the "Matsushima" had experienced during the
battle. Early in the fight a 10-inch shell had passed through her side,
killed four men in her torpedo-room, narrowly missed a loaded torpedo,
smashed up an oil-tank, and then broke into pieces. Examination of the
fragments showed there was no trace of a fuse, and a plug of cement filled
the place where the bursting charge should have been. It was really a bad
specimen of a solid shot. If it had been a live shell, it might well have
destroyed the "Matsushima." It was thanks to the wretched ammunition
supplied by swindling contractors to the mandarins that the Japanese were
able to fight the battle with such trifling loss.
After the transfer of Ito's flag to the "Hashidate" the battle became a
cannonade at an increasing range. The Chinese ammunition was running low,
and Ito, after having had his quick-firers in action for hours, had also
his magazines nearly empty. The heavy fire of the afternoon had failed to
destroy the two little "battleships" that represented the only remaining
effective units of the Chinese fleet. Ito had accomplished enough in the
destruction of the Chinese cruisers, and he had no intention of giving
their torpedo boats a chance, by spending the night near the mouth of the
Yalu River. At half-past five he broke off the engagement.
Shortness of ammunition supply and exhaustion of officers and men were
probably his real reasons, for the explanation he gave in his official
report is not very convincing. "About 5.30 p.m.," he writes, "seeing that
the 'Chen-yuen' and the 'Ting-yuen' had been joined by other ships, and
that my van squadron was separated by a great distance from my main force,
and considering that sunset was approaching, I discontinued the action, and
recalled my main squadron by signal. As the enemy's vessels proceeded on a
southerly course, I assumed that they were making for Wei-hai-wei; and
having reassembled the fleet, I proceeded upon what I supposed to be a
parallel course to that of the enemy, with the intention of renewing the
engagement in the morning, for I judged that a night action might be
disadvantageous, owing to the possibility of the ships becoming separated
in the darkness, and to the fact that the enemy had torpedo boats in
company. However, I lost sight of the Chinese, and at daylight there were
no signs of the enemy."
There really were no ships of any importance available to join the Chinese
ironclads, so one is puzzled to imagine what Ito saw. It was only when the
firing died away that Admiral Ting sent orders to the "Kwang-ping," the
transports, gunboats, and torpedo craft to come out. Only the "Kwang-ping"
and the torpedo boats obeyed. As the sun went down he formed line ahead,
and steered for Port Arthur. First came the two ironclads; then the
"Lai-yuen," with her upper works still on fire in places; then the
"Ching-yuen," "Ping-yuen," "Kwang-ping," and the torpedo boats. Far astern
the abandoned "Chao-yung" blazed like a bonfire in the twilight. Ting
honestly believed he had beaten off the Japanese fleet, and on his arrival
at Port Arthur reported a victory. But though Japanese opinion was not
quite satisfied, Ito had so damaged the Chinese fleet that henceforth he
held command of the sea. He had won his success with comparatively small
loss. Of all the units of his fleet his flagship, the "Matsushima," had
suffered most. She had two officers killed and three wounded, and 33 men
killed and 71 wounded, a total of 109, and about a third of the losses in
the entire fleet. The "Hiyei" came next in the casualty list, with 56
killed and wounded. The losses of the other ships were trifling. The
"Ikitsushima" had 31 killed and wounded; the "Akagi," 28; the
"Akitsushima," 15; the "Fuso," 14; and the "Yoshino" and "Saikio," each 11.
The "Takachico" had an officer and two men wounded; the "Naniwa Kan"
(Captain Togo's ship) one man wounded. The "Chiyoda," which lay next to the
"Matsushima," in the main squadron, had not one single casualty. The
official return of losses gave these totals:--
Killed. Wounded. Totals.
Officers 10 16 26
Men 80 188 268
-- --- ---
90 204 294
There are no available returns of the Chinese loss. It was certainly much
heavier, perhaps a thousand men. But, thanks to their armour, the two
"battleships" suffered comparatively little loss, notwithstanding the
terrible fire to which they were exposed for hours. The "Ting-yuen" had 14
killed and 20 wounded, the "Chen-yuen" 7 killed and 15 wounded. The two
ships afterwards took part in the defence of Wei-hai-wei, where one was
torpedoed and the other captured by the Japanese.
When the first reports of the Yalu battle reached Europe there was much
exaggerated talk about the value of the protected cruiser. It was even said
by amateur "naval experts" that this type and not the battleship would be
the warship of the future. It is almost needless to say that the battle
conveyed no such lesson. If anything, it rather proved the enormous
resisting power of the armoured ship. If Ting, instead of his two
antiquated coast-defence armour-clads, had had a couple of up-to-date
battleships manned with trained crews, he would certainly have disposed of
a good many of the Japanese cruisers. The Japanese quite realized this, and
proceeded to build a heavily armoured fleet.
The most valuable lesson of the battle was the warning of the danger of
fires lighted by exploding shells. This had an immediate influence on ship
construction, and on the methods adopted by all navies in clearing for
action.
But the most important point of all was that the conduct of the Japanese
officers and men in the battle, and in the subsequent naval operations in
the siege of Wei-hai-wei, made the world realize that a new naval power had
arisen in the Far East.