TRAFALGAR
1805
The closing years of the eighteenth century and the opening years of the
nineteenth represent the most splendid period in the annals of the British
Navy. Howe destroyed the French fleet in the Atlantic on "the glorious
First of June, 1794," Nelson died in the midst of his greatest victory off
Cape Trafalgar on 21 October, 1805. Little more than eleven years separated
the two dates, and this brief period was crowded with triumphs for Britain
on the sea. The "First of June," St. Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile,
Copenhagen, and Trafalgar are the great names in the roll of victory; but
"the meteor flag of England" flew victorious in a hundred fights on all the
seas of the world.
Men who were officers young in the service on the day when Rodney broke at
once the formal traditions of a century and the battle-line of the Comte de
Grasse lived through and shared in the glories of this decade of victory. A
new spirit had come into the navy. An English admiral would no longer think
he had done his duty in merely bringing his well-ordered line into
cannon-shot of an enemy's array and exchanging broadsides with him at
half-cannon range. Nor was the occupation of a port or an island recognized
as an adequate result for a naval campaign. The enemy's fighting-fleet was
now the object aimed at. It was not merely to be brought to action, and
more or less damaged by distant cannonading. The ideal battle was the close
fight amid the enemy's broken line, and victory meant his destruction.
The spirit of the time was personified in its greatest sailor. Nelson's
battles were fought in grim earnest, taking risks boldly in order to secure
great results. Trafalgar--the last of his battles, and the last great
battle of the days of the sail--was also the final episode in the long
struggle of Republican and Imperial France to snatch from England even for
a while the command of the sea.
When Napoleon assembled the Grand Army at Boulogne, gave it the official
title of the "_Armee d'Angleterre_," and crowded every creek from Dunkirk
to Havre with flat-bottomed boats for its transport across the Channel, he
quite realized that the first condition of success for the scheme was that
a French fleet should be in possession of the Channel at the moment his
veterans embarked for their short voyage. He had twenty sail of the line,
under Admiral Ganteaume, at Brest; twelve under Villeneuve at Toulon; a
squadron of five at Rochefort under Admiral Missiessy; five more at Ferrol;
and in this last port and at Cadiz and Cartagena there were other ships
belonging to his Spanish allies. But every port was watched by English
battleships and cruisers. The vigilant blockade had been kept up for two
years, during which Nelson, who was watching Toulon, had hardly been an
hour absent from his flagship, the "Victory"; and Collingwood, in the
"Royal Sovereign," did not anchor once in twenty-two months of alternate
cruising and lying to.
Napoleon's mind was ceaselessly busy with plans for moving his fleets on
the sea as he moved army corps on land, so as to elude, mislead, and
out-manoeuvre the English squadrons, and suddenly bring a concentrated
French force of overwhelming strength into the narrow seas. The first move
in these plans was usually assigned to the Toulon fleet. According to one
project it was to give Nelson the slip, make for the Straits of Gibraltar,
combine with the Cadiz fleet in driving off or crushing the blockading
squadron before that port, sail north with the liberated vessels, fall on
the blockading ships before Rochefort and Brest, and then sweep the
Channel with the united squadrons. In other projects French fleets were to
run the blockades simultaneously or in succession, raid the West Indies,
draw off a part of the naval forces of England to the other side of the
Atlantic, and then come swooping back upon the Channel.
In the plan finally adopted the first move was to be the escape of the
Toulon fleet; the second, the threat against the West Indies. Its execution
was entrusted to Villeneuve, because Napoleon, ever since the escape of his
squadron from the disaster in Aboukir Bay, had regarded him as "a lucky
man," and luck and chance must play a great part in such a project.
Nelson did not keep up a close and continuous blockade of Toulon with his
fighting-fleet of battleships. He used Sardinia as his base of supplies,
and there were times when all the heavier ships were in Sardinian waters,
while his frigates watched Toulon. His previous experiences had led him to
believe that if the French Mediterranean fleet came out it would be for
another raid on Egypt, and this idea was confirmed by reports that
Villeneuve was embarking not only troops, but large quantities of saddlery
and muskets. The story of the saddles seemed to indicate an expedition to a
country where plenty of horses could be obtained to mount a body of
cavalry--horses, too, that when they were bought or requisitioned would not
have saddles that a European trooper was used to. Nelson did not want to
keep the French shut up in Toulon. He was anxious to catch them in the open
sea, and with his fleet on the coast of Sardinia and his frigates spread
out in a fan to the northwards he counted on bringing Villeneuve to action
if he attempted to reach the Levant.
In January, 1805, the frigates brought news that the French were out, and
Nelson at once disposed his fleet to intercept their expected voyage to
Egypt. He found no trace of them in the direction he expected, and he was
greatly relieved on returning from a hurried rush eastward to learn that
bad weather had driven Villeneuve back to his port. "These gentlemen," he
said, "are not accustomed to the Gulf of Lyons gales, but we have buffeted
them for twenty-one months without carrying away a spar."
On 30 March Villeneuve came out of Toulon again with eleven ships of the
line. This time, thanks to Nelson's fixed idea about Egypt, he got a good
start for the Atlantic. As soon as his frigates brought the news that the
French were out, Nelson strung out his ships from the south point of
Sardinia to Sicily and the African coast. He thus watched every possible
avenue to the Eastern Mediterranean, ready to concentrate and attack the
enemy as soon as he got touch of them anywhere. But not a French sail was
sighted.
Villeneuve had run down past the Balearic Islands to Cartagena, where
Admiral Salcedo was in command of a Spanish squadron. But the Spaniards
were not ready for sea, and Villeneuve was anxious to be west of the
Straits of Gibraltar as soon as possible, and could not wait for his
dilatory allies. On 8 April he passed through the Straits. Then he steered
for Cadiz, drove off Sir John Orde's blockading squadron of six sail, and
entered the harbour on the 9th.
At Cadiz there were Admiral Gravina's Spanish fleet and a French
battleship, the "Aigle." Again the Spaniards were mostly unready for sea,
but six of them and the "Aigle" joined Villeneuve when he sailed out into
the Atlantic steering for the West Indies, now at the head of eighteen
battleships and seven frigates.
Information was difficult to obtain and travelled slowly a hundred years
ago. It was not till 11 April that Nelson learned that Villeneuve had
passed through the Straits of Gibraltar eight days before. Then, while the
French were running down into the trade wind that was to carry them
westward, Nelson, still ignorant whether they were raiding the West Indies
or Ireland, but anxious in either case to be in the Atlantic as soon as
might be, had to work his way slowly towards the Straits against stormy
head winds, and then wait wearily at anchor on the Moorish coast for a
change of wind that would carry him into the ocean. He was suffering from
disappointment, depression, and ill-health. It was not till 7 May that he
passed the Straits. He had made up his mind that the French were probably
bound for the West Indies, and he followed them. They had a long start, but
he trusted to find them among the islands and make the West Indian seas
once more famous for a great British victory.
On 4 June he reached Barbadoes, and began his search, only to miss the
French, thanks to false information, and learn too late that they were
returning to Europe. Villeneuve had paid only a flying visit to the West
Indies, leaving Martinique on 5 June, the day after Nelson arrived at
Barbadoes, and steering first north, then eastwards across the Atlantic.
Nelson followed on 13 June, and reached Gibraltar without once sighting his
enemy.
He had, however, taken the precaution of dispatching a fast sailing brig to
England with the news that the French fleet was returning to Europe. This
ship, the "Curieux," actually got a glimpse of the enemy far off in mid
ocean, and outsailed him to such good purpose that the Admiralty was able
to order the squadrons blockading Brest and Rochefort to unite under the
command of Sir Robert Calder and try to intercept Villeneuve on his way
back. Though inferior in numbers to the allied fleet, Calder brought it to
action in thick, foggy weather on 22 July, some ninety miles off the
Spanish Cape Finisterre. The battle, fought in semi-darkness, was a
desultory, indecisive encounter, and though Calder cut off and took two
Spanish ships of the line, the feeling in England, when the news arrived,
was not one of satisfaction at his partial success, but of undeserved
indignation at his having failed to force the fighting and destroy the
enemy's fleet.
Villeneuve took his fleet into Vigo Bay. According to the plan of
campaign, now that he had shaken off Nelson's pursuit, he should have
sailed for the Channel, picking up the Brest and Rochefort squadrons on his
way. Napoleon, at Boulogne, was ceaselessly drilling the Grand Army in
rapid embarkation and disembarkation, and hoping each day for news of his
admiral's dash into the Channel. But Villeneuve, who knew Keith had a
squadron in the Channel, and had a vague dread of Nelson suddenly making
his appearance, had a better appreciation of the small chance of the scheme
giving any result than the imperious soldier-Emperor, who had come to
believe that what he ordered must succeed. From Vigo, Villeneuve wrote to
the Minister of Marine, Decres, that his fleet was hardly in condition for
any active enterprise. It had met with trying weather in the Atlantic. His
flagship, the "Bucentaure," had been struck and damaged by lightning. All
the ships needed a dockyard overhaul. There was sickness among the crews.
He had to land hundreds of men and send them to hospital. He wanted
recruits badly, and Vigo afforded only the scantiest resources for the
refitting of the ships. He was already thinking of going back to Cadiz. He
moved his fleet to Corunna, but there he found things in such a condition
that he reported that he could not even find hospital room for the sick.
From Napoleon came pressing orders to push on to the Channel at all risks.
On 11 August Villeneuve put to sea, picking up a combined French and
Spanish squadron from the neighbouring port of Ferrol. He meant to sail to
Brest, bring out the squadron there, and call up the ships at Rochefort by
sending on a frigate in advance with orders for that port. (The frigate was
captured on the way by a British cruiser.) He sent a dispatch overland to
Napoleon to say that at last he was coming.
In the Bay of Biscay, two days out from Corunna, he was told by a Danish
merchant-ship that there was a great fleet of British battleships close at
hand to the northward. The news was false. A few hours before the captain
of a British cruiser had stopped the Dane and purposely given him this
false information, in the hope that it would reach the French and mislead
them. Except a few scattered cruisers, there was nothing between Villeneuve
and the ports of Brest and Rochefort--nothing that could stop his projected
concentration. Nelson had waited a few days at Gibraltar, where the news of
Calder's fight had not arrived. He communicated with Collingwood, who was
watching Cadiz with six ships, and then, conjecturing that the object of
the French expedition might be Ireland, he sailed north and was off the
Irish coast on 12 August, the day after Villeneuve left Corunna. Finding no
trace of the enemy, he joined the squadron of Cornwallis off Ushant on 15
August, and then, broken in health and depressed at what seemed a huge
failure, he went back to England to spend some time with Lady Hamilton at
Merton.
Villeneuve had hardly heard of the imaginary fleet when the wind, which had
so far been fair, went round to the north. This decided the irresolute
admiral. To the dismay of his captains he suddenly altered his course and
ran before the wind southward to Cadiz, where he arrived on 22 August,
contenting himself with watching the retirement of Collingwood's six ships
and making no effort to envelop and cut them off with his enormously
superior force. Collingwood promptly resumed the blockade when the French
and Spanish anchored, and deluded Villeneuve into the belief that the
blockade was in touch with a supporting fleet by keeping one of his ships
well out in the offing, and frequently signalling through her to imaginary
consorts below the horizon.
On the very day that Villeneuve anchored at Cadiz, Napoleon sent off from
Boulogne this pressing dispatch to him at Brest:--
"Admiral, I trust you have arrived at Brest. Start at once. Do
not lose a moment. Come into the Channel with our united
squadrons, and England is ours. We are all ready. Everything is
embarked. Come here for twenty-four hours and all is ended, and
six centuries of shame and insult will be avenged."
When he heard that the admiral had lost heart and turned back he was
furious. But he had already formed plans for an alternative enterprise. The
English ministry had succeeded in forming a new coalition with Austria and
Russia as a means of keeping the Emperor occupied on the Continent. On 27
August Napoleon issued his orders for the march of the Grand Army to the
Danube, and on 1 September he started on the career of victory, the stages
of which were to be Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland.
To Villeneuve he sent, through Decres, bitter reproaches and new orders for
a naval campaign in the Mediterranean. Decres, writing to his old comrade,
transmitted the new plan of campaign and softened down the Emperor's angry
words. Villeneuve reported that he could not leave Cadiz for some time. He
was doing all that was possible to refit his fleet and find full crews for
the French and Spanish ships. For the latter men were provided by pressing
landsmen into the service. "It is pitiful," wrote a French officer, "to see
such fine ships manned with a handful of seamen and a crowd of beggars and
herdsmen." In the councils of war held at Cadiz there were fierce disputes
between the French and Spanish officers, the latter accusing their allies
of having abandoned to their fate the two ships lost in Calder's action.
The jealousy between the two nations rose so high that several French
sailors were stabbed at night in the streets.
The English Government knew nothing of the inefficient state and the
endless difficulties of the great fleet concentrated at Cadiz, and regarded
its presence there as a standing danger. Collingwood was reinforced, and it
was decided to send Nelson out to join him, take over the command, blockade
the enemy closely, and bring him to action if he ventured out.
Nelson sailed from Spithead on 15 September in his old flagship the
"Victory," accompanied by the "Euryalus," Captain Blackwood, one of the
swiftest and smartest frigates in the navy. Picking up the battleships
"Thunderer" and "Ajax" on the way, he joined the fleet off Cadiz on 28
September.
Villeneuve had written to Decres that none of the ships were in really good
order, and that the Spanish vessels were "quite incapable of meeting the
enemy." Only a portion of his fleet had had the slight training afforded by
the Atlantic voyage. The rest had lain for years in harbour, and many of
them had crews chiefly made up of recently enrolled landsmen. Many of the
captains held that if there was to be a fight it would be useless to
manoeuvre or to attempt an artillery duel, and that the only chance of
success lay in a hand-to-hand fight by boarding. But, then, to produce the
position for boarding meant being able to manoeuvre. Villeneuve was
supported by most of the superior officers of the fleet in the opinion that
he had better stay at Cadiz; but from Napoleon there came reiterated orders
for the fleet to enter the Mediterranean.
The last hesitation of the unfortunate admiral was ended by the news that
Admiral Rosilly was coming from Paris to supersede him. If he did not
attempt something, his career would end in disgrace. He held a final
council of war, gave his last instructions to his officers, and then wrote
to Decres that he would obey the Emperor's orders, though he foresaw that
they would probably lead to disaster.
Contrary winds from the westward delayed his sailing for some days after
this decision. Reefs and local currents made it difficult to work a large
fleet out of Cadiz without a fair wind. A smaller but better-trained fleet
than that of Villeneuve had once taken three days to get out, and a portion
of the fleet at sea and unsupported would be in deadly peril. On 17 October
the wind began to work round to the eastward. Next day it fell almost to a
calm, but it increased towards evening, and Villeneuve, after a conference
with his Spanish colleague, Admiral Gravina, signalled that the ships were
to weigh anchor at sunrise on the 19th.
Nelson had been watching Cadiz for three weeks, keeping his fleet well out
at sea, with his frigates close in to the port, and a chain of ships acting
as connecting links with them to pass on information by signalling with
flags by day and lanterns by night. The system of signalling had been
lately so improved that it was fairly rapid and reliable, and Nelson kept
his fleet out of sight, and requested that the names of ships sent to
reinforce him should not appear in the papers, as he hoped to delude
Villeneuve into a false idea that he had a very inferior force before
Cadiz. He feared that if the whole array of his fleet were visible from the
look-out stations of the port the allies would remain safe at anchor.
During this period of waiting he had had more than one conference with his
captains, and had read and explained to them a manuscript memorandum, dated
9 October, setting forth his plans for the expected battle. His plan of
battle excited an enthusiasm among them, to which more than one of them
afterwards bore testimony. They said that "the Nelson touch" was in it, and
it is generally taken for granted that they saw in it something like a
stroke of genius and a new departure in tactics. I hope it is not
presumption on my part to suggest that their enthusiasm was partly the
result of their seeing that their trusted leader was thoroughly himself
again and, to use a familiar phrase, meant business, and they had a further
motive for satisfaction in seeing how thoroughly he relied on them and how
ready he was to give them a free hand in carrying out his general ideas.
The "Nelson touch" memorandum of 9 October and the whole plan of the battle
have been, and still are, the subject of acute controversy, the various
phases of which it would be far too long to discuss. It is strange that
after the lapse of a hundred years and the publication of a vast mass of
detailed evidence--British, French, and Spanish--there are still wide
differences of opinion as to how the most famous naval battle in history
was actually fought out. There is even much uncertainty as to the order in
which the British ships came into action.
The memorandum shows that Nelson originally contemplated a formation in
three lines, an advanced division to windward, a main division under his
personal command, and a lee division under his second-in-command,
Collingwood. The final grouping of the ships in the battle was in two
divisions. In the following list of the British fleet the names of ships
are arranged in the same order in which they appear in Collingwood's
dispatch, written after the action:--
WINDWARD LINE.
Ships. Guns. Commanders.
_Victory_ 100 {Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson.
{Captain Hardy.
_Temeraire_ 98 " Harvey.
_Neptune_ 98 " Fremantle.
_Leviathan_ 74 " Bayntun.
_Conqueror_ 74 " Pellew.
_Britannia_ 100 {Rear-Admiral Lord Northesk.
{Captain Bullen.
_Agamemnon_ 64 " Sir E. Berry.
_Ajax_ 64 Lieutenant Pilfold.
_Orion_ 74 Captain Codrington.
_Minotaur_ 74 " Mansfield.
_Spartiate_ 74 " Sir F. Laforey.
_Africa_ 64 " Digby.
LEEWARD LINE.
Ships. Guns. Commanders.
_Royal Sovereign_ 100 {Vice-Admiral Collingwood.
{Captain Rotherham.
_Belleisle_ 74 " Hargood.
_Mars_ 74 " Duff.
_Tonnant_ 80 " Tyler.
_Bellerophon_ 74 " Cooke.
_Colossus_ 74 " Morris.
_Achille_ 74 " King.
_Dreadnought_ 98 " Conn.
_Polyphemus_ 64 " Redmill.
_Revenge_ 74 " Moorsom.
_Swiftsure_ 74 " Rutherford.
_Defiance_ 74 " Durham.
_Thunderer_ 74 Lieutenant Stockham.
_Defence_ 74 Captain Hope.
_Prince_ 98 " Grindall.
Besides one frigate of 38 guns, three of 36, and two brigs of 12
and 8 guns.
This was the fleet that lay off Cape Sta. Maria, some fifty miles from
Cadiz, on Saturday, 19 October, 1805, and received from the frigates
watching the port the message, passed on by connecting ships, that the
enemy was at last coming out.
Villeneuve, like Nelson, had originally divided his fleet into three
divisions. On the day of battle it fought in an order which was (as we
shall see) partly the result of chance, arrayed in a long double line. He
had deliberately mixed together in his array the French and Spanish units
of his fleet, to avoid the dangers that might arise from mutual jealousies
if they were drawn up in divisions apart. Instead of giving the list of his
fleet according to the _ordre de bataille_ drawn up in Cadiz harbour long
before the event, it will be more convenient to arrange the list as they
actually lay in line from van to rear on the day of battle.
The following, then, is the list of the allied Franco-Spanish fleet:
Ships. Guns. Commanders.
[*] _Neptuno_ 80
_Scipion_ 74 Captain Bellanger.
_Intrepide_ 74 Commodore Infernet.
_Formidable_ 80 {Rear-Admiral Dumanoir le Pelley.
{Captain Letellier.
[*] _Rayo_ 100 Commodore Macdonel.
_Duguay-Trouin_ 74 Captain Touffet.
_Mont Blanc_ 74 Commodore La Villegris.
[*] _San Francisco de Asis_ 74 Captain de Flores.
[*] _San Agustino_ 74 " Cagigal.
_Heros_ 74 " Poulain.
[*] _Santisima Trinidad_ 130 {Rear-Admiral Cisneros.
{Commodore de Uriarte.
_Bucentaure_ 80 {Vice-Admiral Villeneuve.
{Captain Magendie.
_Neptune_ 80 Commodore Maistral.
_Redoutable_ 74 Captain Lucas.
[*] _San Leandro_ 64 " Quevedo.
[*] _San Justo_ 74 " Gaston.
_Indomptable_ 80 Commodore Hubert.
[*] _Santa Ana_ 112 Vice-Admiral de Alava.
_Fougueux_ 74 Captain Baudouin.
[*] _Monarca_ 74 " Argumosa.
_Pluton_ 74 Commodore Cosmao Kerjulien.
[+]_Algeciras_ 74 {Rear-Admiral Magon.
{Captain Letourneur.
[*][+]_Bahama_ 74 Commodore Galiano.
[+]_Aigle_ 74 Captain Gourrege.
[+]_Swiftsure_[#] 74 " Villemadrin.
[+]_Argonaute_ 74 " Epron.
[*][+]_Montanez_ 74 " Alcedo.
[*][+]_Argonauta_ 80 " Pareja.
[+]_Berwick_ 74 Commodore Filhol-Camas.
[+]_San Juan Nepomuceno_ 74 " de Churucca.
[+]_Ildefonso_ 74 " de Vargas.
[+]_Achille_ 74 Captain Denieport.
[+]_Principe de Asturias_ 112 {Admiral Gravina.
{Rear-Admiral Escano.
Besides five 40-gun frigates and two corvettes, one of 18, the other of
16 guns.
[*] Names of Spanish ships are distinguished by being marked with an
asterisk.
[+] Ships of the "Squadron of Observation" originally intended to act
independently under Gravina.
[#] Formerly British.
So far as mere figures can show it, the relative strength of the opposing
fleets may be thus compared:--
Line of Battle. Lighter Ships.
|_______________| |___________________________________|
Brigs and
Ships. Guns. Frigates. Guns. corvettes. Guns.
British fleet 27 2148 4 146 2 20
Allied fleet 33 2626 5 200 2 30
But here once more--as so often happens in naval war--the mere reckoning up
of ships and guns does not give the true measure of fighting power. The
British fleet was immeasurably superior in real efficiency, and the French
and Spanish leaders knew this perfectly well.
The morning of 19 October was fine and clear with the wind from the shore.
So clear was the day that the lookout in the foretop of the "Euryalus"
could see the ripples on the beach. As the sun rose the enemy's ships were
seen to be setting their topsails, and one by one they unmoored and towed
down towards the harbour mouth. It was a long process working the ships
singly out of harbour. Blackwood, of the "Euryalus," stood close in, and
from early morning till near 2 p.m. was sending his messages to the distant
fleet.
Hoisted 7.20 a.m. transmitted to the "Victory" soon after 9
a.m.: "The enemy's ships are coming out."
11 a.m.: "Nineteen under sail. All the rest have top-yards
hoisted except Spanish rear-admiral and one line-of-battle
ship."
About 11.3: "Little wind in harbour. Two of the enemy are at
anchor."
Noon: "Notwithstanding little wind, enemy persevere to get
outward. The rest, except one line, ready, yards hoisted."
Just before 2 p.m.: "Enemy persevering to work outward. Seven of
line already without and two frigates."
When the fleet began to show in force outside, Blackwood drew off to a
distance of four miles from the shore and still watched them. He knew the
"Euryalus" could outsail the fastest of the enemy if they tried to attack
him. His business was to keep them under observation. He could see that for
want of wind they were forced to work out ship after ship by towing them
with rowing-boats. He knew they could not be all out till the Sunday
morning, and he knew also that Nelson had acknowledged his messages and was
beating up nearer and nearer to the port, though with the light winds he
could only make slow progress. Unless the enemy scuttled back into the
harbour a battle was inevitable.
On the Sunday morning (20 October) the wind freshened and enabled
Villeneuve to bring out the last of his ships. They were hardly out when
the wind changed and blew strong from the south-west, with squalls of rain.
The French admiral signalled the order to tack to the southward under
shortened sail. The fleet had been directed to sail in five parallel
divisions, each in line ahead, but for want of training in the crews the
ships lost station, and the formation was very irregular. At four in the
afternoon the wind changed again to the north-west, but it was very light
and the fleet moved slowly. To the westward all day the "Euryalus" and
"Sirius" frigates were seen watching Villeneuve's progress, and just as
darkness was closing in one of the French frigates signalled that there
were twenty sail coming in from the Atlantic.
If there had been more wind, Villeneuve might have crowded all sail for the
Straits, but he could only creep slowly along. Flashes and flares of light
to seaward showed him the British were exchanging night signals in the
darkness. He felt he was closely watched, and he was haunted by the memory
of the disastrous night battle in Aboukir Bay. Though the wind had gone
down the sea was rough, with a heavy swell rolling in from the westward,
the well-known sign of an Atlantic storm that might break on the Spanish
coast before many hours. The flickering signals of the British fleet seemed
to come nearer as the darkness of the moonless autumn night deepened, and
about nine a shadowy mass of sails was seen not far off. It was the
"Euryalus" that had closed in with every light shaded to have a near look
at the enemy.
There was an alarm that the British were about to attack, and Villeneuve
signalled to clear for action and form the prescribed double line of
battle. The sharp drumbeats from the French ships, the lighting up of open
ports, the burning of blue lights, showed Blackwood what was in progress.
It was nearly two hours before the lines were formed, and there was much
confusion, ships slipping into stations not assigned to them; and Gravina,
who had been directed to keep twelve of the best ships as an independent
reserve, or "squadron of observation," placing them in the line instead of
forming independently. Then the fleet went about, reversing its order.
Villeneuve had given up the idea of reaching the Straits without a battle,
and was anxious to have the port of Cadiz under his lee when the crisis
came.
Nelson's fleet, in two columns in line ahead, was drawing nearer and nearer
to his enemy. Between the two fleets the "Euryalus" flitted like a ghost,
observing and reporting every move of the allies, and sometimes coming
quite near them. When the enemy reversed their order of sailing,
Blackwood's ship was for a short time ahead of their double line, and saw
the allied fleet looking like "a lighted street some six miles long."
After midnight the alarm in the Franco-Spanish fleet had passed off, and
all the men who could be spared had turned in. At dawn on the Monday the
French frigate "Hermione" reported the enemy in sight to windward, and at
seven Villeneuve again gave the order to clear for action.
The sight of the allied fleet had called forth a great outburst of
exultation on board of Nelson's ships. "As the day dawned," wrote one of
his officers, "the horizon appeared covered with ships. The whole force of
the enemy was discovered standing to the southward, distant about nine
miles, between us and the coast near Trafalgar. I was awakened by the
cheers of the crew and by their rushing up the hatchways to get a glimpse
of the hostile fleet. The delight they manifested exceeded anything I ever
witnessed."
Opposing fleets separated by only nine miles of sea would in our day be
exchanging long-range fire after a very few minutes of rapid approach. It
was to be nearly six hours before Nelson and Villeneuve came within
fighting distance. The wind had become so slight that the British fleet was
often moving at a speed of barely more than a knot over the grey-green
ocean swells.
Still anxious to fight, with Cadiz as a refuge for disabled ships,
Villeneuve presently signalled to his fleet to go about. After they altered
their order of sailing and began to sail to the northward, moving very
slowly with the wind abeam (close-hauled on the port tack), the course of
the "Victory" was a little north of east, directed at first to a point
about two and a half miles ahead of the leading ship of the enemy. The
"Royal Sovereign," leading the leeward line on a parallel course, was about
a mile to the southward. As the allied fleet was moving so as presently to
cross the course of the British, the result would be that at the moment of
contact the line led by the "Victory" would come in a little ahead of the
enemy's centre, and the "Royal Sovereign" to the rearward of it. But the
courses of the two fleets did not intersect at right angles. Many of the
current plans of the battle, and, strange to say, the great model at the
Royal United Service Institution (though constructed while many Trafalgar
captains were still living), are misleading in representing the British
advance as a perpendicular attack in closely formed line ahead.
In the heavy swell and the light wind the allied fleet had succeeded in
forming only an irregular line when it went about. There were wide gaps,
some of them covered by ships lying in a second line; and the fleet was not
in a straight line from van to rear, but the van formed an obtuse angle
with the rearward ships, the flat apex towards Cadiz, so that some of
Nelson's officers thought the enemy had adopted a crescent-formed array. At
the moment of contact Collingwood's division was advancing on a course that
formed an acute angle of between forty and fifty degrees with the line and
course of the French rear. The result would be that the ships that followed
the "Royal Sovereign" were brought opposite ship after ship of the French
line and could fall upon them almost simultaneously by a slight alteration
of the course. But the French van line lay at a greater angle to the
windward attack, and here the British advance was much nearer the
perpendicular.
Nelson had in his memorandum forbidden any time being wasted in forming a
regular battle-line. The ships were to attack in the order and formation in
which they sailed. If the enemy was to leeward (as was the case now), the
leeward line, led by Collingwood, was to fall upon his rearward ships.
Meanwhile, the windward line, led by the "Victory," would cut through the
enemy just in advance of the centre, and take care that the attack on the
rear was not interfered with. Collingwood was given a free hand as to how
he did his work. Nelson reminded the captains that in the smoke and
confusion of battle set plans were likely to go to pieces, and signals to
be unseen, and he left a wide discretion to every one, noting that no
captain could do wrong if he laid his ship alongside of the nearest of the
enemy. The actual battle was very unlike the diagram in the memorandum,
which showed the British fleet steering a course parallel to the enemy up
to the actual attack, and some of the captains thought that in the
confusion of the fight Nelson and Collingwood had abandoned the plan. But
if its letter was not realized, its spirit was acted upon. Nelson had said
he intended to produce a melee, a close fight in which the better training
and the more rapid and steady fire of the British would tell. It was a
novelty that the two admirals each led a line into the fight. The
traditional position for a flagship was in the middle of the admiral's
division, with a frigate near her to assist in showing and passing signals
along the line. To the French officers it seemed a piece of daring rashness
for the flagships to lead the lines, exposing themselves as they closed to
the concentrated fire of several ships. "This method of engaging battle,"
wrote Gicquel des Touches, an officer of the "Intrepide," "was contrary to
ordinary prudence, for the British ships, reaching us one by one, and at a
very slow speed, seemed bound to be overpowered in detail by our superior
forces; but Nelson knew his own fleet--and ours." This was, indeed, the
secret of it all. He knew the distant fire of the enemy would be all but
harmless, and once broadside to broadside, he could depend on crushing his
opponents.
This was why he did not trouble about forming a closely arrayed
battle-line, but let his ships each make her best speed, disregarding the
mere keeping of station and distance, so that though we speak of two
lines, Collingwood's ships trailed out over miles of sea, and Nelson's
seemed to the French to come on in an irregular crowd, the "Victory" in the
leading place, having her two nearest consorts not far astern, but one on
each quarter, and at times nearly abreast. Every stitch of canvas was
spread, the narrow yards being lengthened out with the booms for the
studding-sails. Blackwood had been called on board the "Victory" for a
while during the advance. Nelson asked him to witness his will, and then
talked to him of the coming victory, saying he would not be satisfied with
less than twenty prizes. He was cheerful and talked freely, but all the
while he carefully watched the enemy's course and formation, and personally
directed the course of his own ship. He meant, as he had said before, to
keep the enemy uncertain to the last as to his attack, and as the distance
shortened he headed for a while for the enemy's van before turning for the
dash into his centre. Cheerful as he was, he did not expect to survive the
fight. He disregarded the request of his friends to give the dangerous post
at the head of the line to another ship, and though it was known that the
enemy had soldiers on board, and there would be a heavy musketry fire at
close quarters, he wore on his admiral's uniform a glittering array of
stars and orders.
To the advancing fleet the five miles of the enemy's line presented a
formidable spectacle. We have the impressions of one of the midshipmen of
the "Neptune" in a letter written after the battle, and he tells how--
"It was a beautiful sight when their line was completed, their
broadsides turned towards us, showing their iron teeth, and now
and then trying the range of a shot to ascertain the distance,
that they might, the moment we came within point-blank (about
600 yards), open their fire upon our van ships--no doubt with
the hope of dismasting some of our leading vessels before they
could close and break their line. Some of the enemy's ships were
painted like ourselves with double yellow streaks, some with a
broad single red or yellow streak, others all black, and the
noble Santissima Trinidad with four distinct lines of red, with
a white ribbon between them, made her seem to be a superb
man-of-war, which, indeed, she was."
The Spanish flagship was the largest ship afloat at the time, and she
towered high above her consorts. It was not the first time Nelson had seen
her in battle, for she was in the fleet that he and Jervis defeated twelve
years before off Cape St. Vincent.
As the fleets closed the famous signal, "_England expects that every man
will do his duty!_" flew from the "Victory." At half-past eleven the "Royal
Sovereign," leading the lee line, was within a thousand yards of the enemy,
making for a point a little to rearward of his centre, when the "Fougueux,"
the ship for which she was heading, fired a first trial shot. Other ships
opened fire in succession, and the centre began firing at the "Victory" and
her consorts. Not a shot in reply was fired by the British till they were
almost upon the allies. In the windward line the "Victory," already under
fire from eight ships of the allied van, began the battle by firing her
forward guns on the port side as she turned to attack the French admiral's
flagship, the 100-gun "Bucentaure."
Just as the "Victory" opened fire, at ten minutes to twelve, Collingwood,
in the "Royal Sovereign," had dashed into the allied line. He passed
between the French "Fougueux" and the "Santa Ana," the flagship of the
Spanish Rear-Admiral Alava, sending one broadside crashing into the stern
of the flagship, and with the other raking the bows of the Frenchman. "What
would not Nelson give to be here!" said Collingwood to his flag-captain.
The hearty comradeship of the two admirals is shown by the fact that at
that moment Nelson, pointing to the "Royal Sovereign's" masts towering out
of the dense smoke-cloud, exclaimed, "See how that noble fellow,
Collingwood, takes his ship into action!"
[Illustration: TRAFALGAR]
Swinging round on the inside of the "Santa Ana," Collingwood engaged her
muzzle to muzzle. For a few minutes of fierce fighting he was alone in the
midst of a ring of close fire, the "Fougueux" raking him astern, and two
Spanish and one French ship firing into his starboard side. The pressure on
him decreased as the other ships of his division, coming rapidly into
action, closed with ship after ship of the allied rear. Further relief was
afforded by Nelson's impetuous attack on the centre.
He was steering the "Victory" to pass astern of the "Bucentaure." Captain
Lucas, of the "Redoutable," the next in the line, saw this, and resolved to
protect his admiral. He closed up so that his bowsprit was almost over the
flagship's stern, and the "Bucentaure's" people called out to him not to
run into them. The "Victory" then passed astern of the "Redoutable," raking
her with a terribly destructive broadside, and then ranged up alongside of
her. Lucas had hoped to board the first ship he encountered. He grappled
the English flagship, and while the soldiers in the French tops kept up a
hot fire on the upper decks, the broadside guns were blazing muzzle to
muzzle below, and a crowd of boarders made gallant but unsuccessful
attempts to cross the gap between the two ships, the plucky Frenchmen being
everywhere beaten back. The "Redoutable's" way had been checked, and
through the gap between her and the "Bucentaure" came the "Neptune" to
engage the French flagship, while the famous "fighting 'Temeraire,'" which
had raced the "Victory" into action, passed astern of the "Redoutable" and
closed with the Spanish "San Justo." Ship after ship of both the British
divisions came up, though there were long gaps in the lines. The
"Belleisle," second of Collingwood's line, was three-quarters of a mile
astern of the "Royal Sovereign" when the first shots were fired. It was
nearly two hours before the rearmost English ships were engaged.
Meanwhile, the leading eight ships of the French van, commanded by Admiral
Dumanoir, in the "Formidable," after firing at the "Victory" and her
immediate consorts, as they came into action, had held on their course, and
were steadily drifting away from the battle. In vain Villeneuve signalled
to them to engage the enemy. Dumanoir, in a lame explanation that he
afterwards wrote, protested that he had no enemy within his reach, and that
with the light wind he found it impossible to work back, though he used
boats to tow his ships round. The effort appears to have been made only
when he had gone so far that he was a mere helpless spectator of the fight,
and his most severe condemnation lies in the fact that without his orders
two of his captains eventually made their way back into the melee and,
though it was too late to fight for victory, fought a desperate fight for
the honour of the flag they flew.
Dumanoir's incompetent selfishness left the centre and rear to be crushed
by equal numbers and far superior fighting power. But it was no easy
victory. Outmatched as they were, Frenchmen and Spaniards fought with
desperate courage and heroic determination. Trafalgar is remembered with
pride by all the three nations whose flags flew over its cloud of
battle-smoke.
There is no naval battle regarding which we possess so many detailed
narratives of those who took part in it on both sides, and it would be easy
to compile a long list of stirring incidents and heroic deeds. Though the
battle lasted till about five o'clock, it had been practically decided in
the first hour. In that space of time many of the enemy's ships had been
disabled, two had been actually taken; and, on the other hand, England had
suffered a loss that dimmed the brightness of the victory.
In the first stage of the fight Nelson's flagship was engaged with the
"Redoutable" alone, the two ships locked together. Presently the
"Temeraire" closed on the other side of the Frenchman, and the "Victory"
found herself in action with a couple of the enemy that came drifting
through the smoke on the other side of her, one of them being the giant
"Santisima Trinidad." Before the "Temeraire" engaged her, the "Redoutable"
had been fearfully damaged by the steady fire of the "Victory," and had
also lost heavily in repeated attempts to board the English flagship. Only
a midshipman and four men succeeded in scrambling on board, and they were
at once killed or made prisoners. Captain Lucas, of the "Redoutable," in
the report on the loss of his ship, told how out of a crew of 643 officers
and men, sailors and soldiers, three hundred were killed, and more than two
hundred badly wounded, including most of the officers; the ship was
dismasted, stern-post damaged, and steering gear destroyed, and the stern
on fire; she was leaking badly, and most of the pumps had been shot
through; most of the lower-deck guns were dismounted, some by collision
with the enemy's sides, some by his fire, and two guns had burst. Both
sides of the ship were riddled, in several places two or more ports had
been knocked into one, and the after-deck beams had come down, making a
huge gap in the upper-deck. The "Redoutable," already in a desperate
condition, became a sinking wreck when the "Temeraire" added her fire to
that of the flagship.
But the "Victory" had not inflicted this loss herself unscathed. One of her
masts had gone over the side, and there had been heavy loss on her upper
decks and in her batteries. The wheel was shot away. Several men had been
killed and wounded on the quarter-deck, where Nelson was walking up and
down talking to Captain Hardy. One shot strewed the deck with the bodies of
eight marines. Another smashed through a boat, and passed between Nelson
and Hardy, bruising the latter's foot, and taking away a shoe-buckle. All
the while there came a crackle of musketry from a party of sharpshooters in
the mizen-top of the "Redoutable," only some sixty feet away, and Nelson's
decorations must have made him a tempting target, even if the marksmen did
not know who he was.
At twenty minutes past one he was hit in the left shoulder, the bullet
plunging downwards and backwards into his body. He fell on his face, and
Hardy, turning, saw some of the men picking him up. "They have done for me
at last, Hardy," he said. "I hope not," said the captain. And Nelson
replied: "Yes, my backbone is shot through." But he showed no agitation,
and as the men carried him below he covered his decorations with a
handkerchief, lest the crew should notice them and realize that they had
lost their chief, and he gave Hardy an order to see that tiller-lines were
rigged on the rudder-head, to replace the shattered wheel.
His flag was kept flying, and till the action ended the fleet was not aware
of his loss, and looked to the "Victory" for signals as far as the smoke
allowed. He had not been ten minutes among the wounded on the lowest deck
when the cheers of the crew, following on a sudden lull in the firing, told
him that the "Redoutable" had struck her colours.
Twenty minutes later the "Fougueux," the second prize of the day, was
secured. She had come into action with the "Temeraire" while the latter was
still engaged with the "Redoutable." On the surrender of the latter the
"Temeraire" was able to concentrate her fire on the "Fougueux." Mast after
mast came down, and the sea was pouring into two huge holes on the
water-line when the shattered ship drifted foul of the "Temeraire," and was
grappled by her. Lieutenant Kennedy dashed on board of the Frenchman, at
the head of a rush of boarders, cleared her upper decks, hauled down her
flag, and took possession of the dismasted ship.
Between two and three o'clock no less than nine ships were taken, five
Spanish and four French. Villeneuve's flagship, the "Bucentaure," was one
of these. She struck a few minutes after two o'clock. At the opening of the
battle she had fired four broadsides at the approaching "Victory." Nelson
gave her one shattering broadside in reply at close quarters, as he passed
on to attack the "Redoutable." As this ship's way was stopped, and a space
opened between her and the French flagship, Captain Fremantle brought his
three-decker, the "Neptune," under the "Bucentaure's" stern, raking her as
he passed through the line and ranged up beside her. Then Pellew brought
the "Conqueror" into action beside her on the other side, and as chance
allowed her guns to bear the "Victory" was at times able to join in the
attack. French accounts of the battle tell of the terrible destruction
caused on board the "Bucentaure" by this concentrated fire. More than two
hundred were _hors de combat_, most of them killed. Almost every officer
and man on the quarter-deck was hit, Villeneuve himself being slightly
wounded. The men could hardly stand to the guns, and at last their fire was
masked by mast after mast coming down with yards, rigging and sails hanging
over the gun muzzles. Villeneuve declared his intention of transferring his
flag to another ship, but was told that every boat had been knocked to
splinters, and his attendant frigate, which might have helped him in this
emergency, had been driven out of the melee. As the last of the masts went
over the side at two o'clock, the "Conqueror" ceased firing, and hailed the
"Bucentaure" with a summons to surrender. Five minutes later her flag,
hoisted on an improvised staff, was taken down, and Captain Atcherley, of
the "Conqueror's" marines, went on board the French flagship, and received
the surrender of Admiral Villeneuve, his staff-officer Captain Prigny,
Captain Magendie, commanding the ship, and General de Contamine, the
officer in command of the 4000 French troops embarked on the fleet.
Next in the line ahead of the "Bucentaure" lay the giant "Santisima
Trinidad," carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Cisneros. As the fleets
closed, she had exchanged fire with her four tiers of guns with several of
the British ships. When the melee began she came drifting down into the
thick of the fight. For a while she was engaged with the "Victory" in the
dense fog of smoke, where so many ships were tearing each other to pieces
in the centre. The high-placed guns of the "Trinidad's" upper tier cut up
the "Victory's" rigging and sent down one of her masts. The English
flagship was delivered from the attack of her powerful antagonist by the
"Trinidad" drifting clear of her. By this time Fremantle was attacking her
with the "Neptune," supported by the "Colossus." At half-past one a third
ship joined in the close attack on the towering "Trinidad," which every
captain who got anywhere near her was anxious to make his prize. This new
ally was the battleship "Africa." During the night she had run out to the
northward of the British fleet. Nelson had signalled to her early in the
day to rejoin as soon as possible, but her captain, Digby, needed no
pressing. He was crowding sail to join in the battle. He ran down past
Dumanoir's ships of the van squadron, putting a good many shots into them,
but receiving no damage from their ill-aimed fire. Then he steered into the
thick of the fight, taking for his guide the tall masts of the "Trinidad."
At 1.30 he opened fire on her. At 1.58 all the masts of the "Trinidad" came
down together, the enormous mass of spars, rigging, and sails going over
her side into the water as she rolled to the swell. She had already lost
some four hundred men killed and wounded (Admiral Cisneros was among the
latter). Many of her guns had been silenced, and the fall of the masts
masked a whole broadside. She now ceased firing and surrendered. In the log
of the "Africa" it is noted that Lieutenant Smith was sent with a party to
take possession of her. He does not seem to have succeeded in getting on
board, for the "Trinidad" drifted with silent guns for at least two hours
after, with no prize crew on board. It was at the end of the battle that
the "Prince" sent a party to board her and took her in tow.
Another flagship, the three-decker "Santa Ana," carrying the flag of
Rear-Admiral Alava, became the prize of the "Royal Sovereign." Collingwood
had opened the fight by breaking the line astern of her. His raking
broadside as he swept past her had put scores of her crew out of action.
When he laid his ship alongside of her to leeward, it was evident from the
very first that she could not meet the English ship on anything like equal
terms. In a quarter of an hour his flag-captain, Rotherham, grasped
Collingwood's hand, saying: "I congratulate you, sir. Her fire is
slackening, and she must soon strike." But the "Santa Ana" fought to the
last, till only a single gun, now here, now there, answered the steady,
pounding fire of the "Royal Sovereign's" broadside. At 2.30 her colours
came down. Collingwood told his lieutenant to send the Spanish admiral on
board his own ship, but word was sent back that Alava was too badly wounded
to be moved. More than four hundred of the "Santa Ana's" crew had been
killed and wounded.
The "Tonnant," third ship in Collingwood's line, and one of the prizes
taken in the Battle of the Nile, captured another flagship, that of the
gallant Rear-Admiral Magon, the "Algeciras." As the "Tonnant" went through
the allied line, after exchanging fire with the "Fougueux" and the
"Monarca," the "Algeciras" raked her astern, killing some forty men. The
"Tonnant" then swung round and engaged the "Algeciras," and was crossing
her bows when Magon, trying to run his ship alongside her, to board,
entangled his bowsprit in the main rigging of the English ship. She was
thus held fast with only a few forward guns bearing, while most of the
broadside of the "Tonnant" was raking her. From the foretop of the
"Algeciras" a party of marksmen fired down on the English decks and wounded
Captain Tyler badly. Admiral Magon, in person, tried to lead a strong body
of boarders over his bows into the English ship. Mortally wounded, he was
carried aft, and of his men only one set foot on the "Tonnant." This man
was at once stabbed with a pike, and would have been killed if an officer
had not rescued him.
The ships lay so close that the flashes of the "Tonnant's" guns set fire to
the bows of the "Algeciras," and the flames spread to both ships. A couple
of British sailors dragged the fire-hose over the hammock-nettings, and
while the guns were still in action they worked to keep down and extinguish
the flames. One by one the masts of the "Algeciras" went into the sea,
carrying the unfortunate soldiers in the tops with them. In a little more
than half an hour she lost 436 men, including most of her officers. Her
position was hopeless, and at last she struck her colours. The prize crew
that boarded her found Magon lying dead on the deck, with his captain,
badly wounded, beside him.
The "Bellerophon" (famous for her fight at the Nile, adding to her record
of hard fighting to-day, and destined to be the ship that was to receive
the conqueror of Europe as a prisoner) followed the "Tonnant" into action,
and found herself engaged with the Spanish "Monarca" on one side, and the
French "Aigle" on the other. She came in collision with the "Aigle," and
their yards locked together. The "Bellerophon's" rigging was cut to pieces;
two of her masts were carried away, and numbers of her crew were struck
down, her captain being wounded early in the day. A little after half-past
one the "Aigle" drifted clear, and was engaged by, and in half an hour
forced to strike to, the "Defiance." Meanwhile the "Bellerophon" was hard
at work with two Spanish ships, the "Monarca" and the "Bahama," and so
effectually battered them that at three o'clock the former was a prize, and
the other surrendered half an hour later.
The "Tonnant," after her capture of Magon's ship, shared in the victory
over another brave opponent, Commodore Churucca, and his ship, the "San
Juan Nepomuceno." Churucca was the youngest flag-officer in the Spanish
navy. He had won a European reputation by explorations in the Pacific and
on the South American coasts. Keen in his profession, recklessly
courageous, deeply religious, he was an ideal hero of the Spanish navy, in
which he is still remembered as "El Gran Churucca," the "great Churucca,"
who "died like the Cid." He had no illusions, but told his friends he was
going to defeat and death, and he knew that when he left Cadiz he was
bidding a last farewell to the young wife he had lately married.
"The French admiral does not know his business," he said to his first
lieutenant, as he watched the van division holding its course, while the
two English lines rushed to the attack. As the English closed with the
Spanish rear, Churucca's ship came into close action with the "Defiance,"
and was then attacked in succession by the "Dreadnought" and the "Tonnant."
The "San Juan" fought till half her men were _hors de combat_, several guns
dismounted, and two of the masts down. As long as Churucca lived the
unequal fight was maintained. For a while he seemed to have a charmed life,
as he passed from point to point, encouraging his men. He was returning to
his quarter-deck, when a ball shattered one of his legs. "It is
nothing--keep on firing," he said, and at first he refused to leave the
deck, lying on the planking, with the shattered limb roughly bandaged. He
sent for his second in command, and was told he had just been killed.
Another officer, though wounded, took over the active command when at last
Churucca, nearly dead from loss of blood, was carried below. He gave a last
message for his wife, sent a final order that the ship should be fought
till she sank, and then said he must think only of God and the other world.
As he expired the "San Juan" gave up the hopeless fight. The three ships
all claimed her as their prize, but it was the "Dreadnought" that took
possession.
The French "Swiftsure," once English, was won back by the "Colossus," after
a fight in which the "Orion" helped for a while. With her capture one-third
of the enemy's whole force, including several flagships, was in English
hands. The victory was won; it was now only a question of making it more
and more complete.
Shortly after three o'clock the Spanish 80-gun ship "Argonauta" struck to
the "Belleisle," which had been aided in her attack by the English
"Swiftsure." A few minutes later the "Leviathan" took another big Spaniard,
the "San Agustino," carrying her with a rush of boarders. It was about four
o'clock that, after an hour of hard fighting, the "San Ildefonso" hauled
down her colours to the "Defence." About this time the French "Achille" was
seen to be ablaze and ceased firing. In the earlier stages of the fight she
had been engaged successively with the "Polyphemus," "Defiance," and
"Swiftsure." Her captain and several of her officers and nearly 400 men had
been killed and wounded when she was brought to close action by the
"Prince." Her fore-rigging caught fire, and the mast coming down across the
decks started a blaze in several places, and the men, driven from the upper
deck by the English fire, had to abandon their attempts to save their ship.
She was well alight when at last she struck her colours, and the "Prince,"
aided by the little brig "Pickle," set to work to save the survivors of her
crew. She blew up after the battle. The "Berwick" was another ship taken
before four o'clock, but I cannot trace the details of her capture.
While the battle still raged fiercely, Admiral Dumanoir, in the
"Formidable," was steering away to the north-westward, followed by the
"Mont Blanc," "Duguay-Trouin," and "Scipion." But two ships of his
division, the "Neptuno" and the "Intrepide," had disregarded his orders,
and turned back to join in the fight, working the ships' heads round by
towing them with boats. The "Intrepide" led. Her captain, Infernet, was a
rough Provencal sailor, who had fought his way from the forecastle to the
quarter-deck. Indignant at Dumanoir's conduct, he had early in the battle
given orders to steer for the thickest of it. "_Lou capo sur lou
'Bucentaure'!_" ("Head her for the 'Bucentaure'!") he shouted in his native
patois. He arrived too late to fight for victory, but he fought for the
honour of his flag. After engaging several British ships, Infernet struck
to the "Orion." An officer of the "Conqueror" (which had taken part in the
fight with the "Intrepide") wrote: "Her captain surrendered after one of
the most gallant defences I ever witnessed. His name was Infernet, and it
deserves to be recorded by all who admire true heroism. The 'Intrepide' was
the last ship that struck her colours." The Spanish ship that had followed
the "Intrepide" into action, the 80-gun "Neptuno," had shortly before been
forced to strike to the "Minotaur" and the "Spartiate," another of the
prizes of Aboukir Bay.
Before these last two surrenders completed the long list of captured ships,
Nelson had passed away. The story of his death in the cockpit of the
"Victory" is too well known to need repetition. Before he died the cheers
of his crew and the messages brought to him had told him of capture after
capture, and assured him that his triumph was complete. As the firing
ceased, Collingwood took over the command of the fleet, and transferred his
flag from his own shattered and dismasted ship, the "Royal Sovereign," to
Blackwood's smart frigate, the "Euryalus."
When the "Intrepide" struck, seventeen ships of the allied fleet had been
taken, one, the "Achille," was in a blaze, and soon to blow up; four were
in flight far away to the north-west, eleven were making for Cadiz, all
bearing the marks of hard hitting during the fight. Some desultory firing
at the nearest fugitives ended the battle. Crowds on the breakwater of
Cadiz and the nearest beaches had watched all the afternoon the great bank
of smoke on the horizon, and listened to the rumbling thunder of the
cannonade. After sunset ship after ship came in, bringing news of disaster,
and all the night wounded men were being conveyed to the hospitals.
More than half the allied fleet had been taken or destroyed. The four ships
that escaped with Dumanoir were captured a few days later by a squadron
under Sir Richard Strachan. The French ships that escaped into Cadiz were
taken possession of by the Spanish insurgents, when Spain rose against the
French, and Cadiz joined the revolt.
As the battle ended, the British fleet was, to use the expression of the
"Neptune's" log, "in all directions." The sun was going down; the sky was
overcast, and the rising swell and increasing wind told of the coming
storm. Most of the prizes had been dismasted; many of them were leaking
badly; some of the ships that had taken them were in almost as damaged a
condition, and many of them were short-handed, with heavy losses in battle
and detachments sent on board the captured vessels. The crews were busy
clearing the decks, getting up improvised jury masts, and repairing the
badly cut-up rigging, where the masts still stood. Nelson's final order had
been to anchor to ride out the expected gale. Collingwood doubted if this
would be safer than trying to make Gibraltar, and he busied himself getting
the scattered fleet and prizes together, and tacking to the south-westward.
The gale that swept all the coasts of Western Europe caught the disabled
fleet with the hostile shore under its lee. Only four of the prizes, and
those the poorest ships of the lot, ever saw Gibraltar. Ship after ship
went down, others were abandoned and burnt, others drove ashore. In these
last instances the British prize crews were rescued and kindly treated by
the Spanish coast population. One ship, the "Algeciras," was retaken by the
French prisoners, and carried into Cadiz. Another, the big "Santa Ana," was
recaptured as she drifted helplessly off the port.
But though there were few trophies left after the great storm, Trafalgar
had finally broken the naval power of Napoleon, freed England from all fear
of invasion, and given her the undisputed empire of the sea. Yet there were
only half-hearted rejoicings at home. The loss of Nelson seemed a dear
price to pay even for such a victory.
Some 2500 men were killed and wounded in the victorious fleet. Of the
losses of the Allies it is difficult to give an estimate. Every ship that
was closely engaged suffered severely, and hundreds of wounded went down
in several of those that sank in the storm. For weeks after search-parties,
riding along the shores from Cadiz to Cape Trafalgar gathered every day a
grim harvest of corpses drifted to land by the Atlantic tides. The allied
loss was at least 7000 men, and may have been considerably greater.
The news came to England, just after something like a panic had been caused
by the tidings of the surrender of a whole Austrian army at Ulm. It reached
Napoleon in the midst of his triumphs, to warn him that his power was
bounded by the seas that washed the shores of the Continent. Well did
Meredith say that in his last great fight Nelson "drove the smoke of
Trafalgar to darken the blaze of Austerlitz."