RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS.
Exhausted by long hours of continuous combat upon a few handfuls of
dry rice, the Japanese were unable to make any progress. To add to
their troubles the field wire failed and General Kuroki was ignorant
of the movements of the armies in front of Liao-yang. All he could
hope was that the last report was an accomplished fact, and that they
had advanced as far as the river. But so far from showing signs of
retreating, the enemy, under General Kuropatkin himself, continued to
receive reinforcements, and pressed hard upon the Twelfth Division.
Throughout the 2nd of September, General Kuroki’s divisions were merely
a target for the Russian guns. No advance was possible until the Guards
on his left could make good their position. As this appeared remote,
the commander ordered them to leave three batteries with a small force
to occupy the Russians, while the greater part of the division joined
the main body at Kokanton. Meanwhile the fight went on with unabated
fury.
At three o’clock on the morning of the 3rd, the last desperate assault
of the Russians was repelled and Manjuyama was silent. Upon the reverse
slope within a few yards from the summit lay a triple line of Russian
dead. They lay as they had fallen--like brave men with their faces
to the foe--in almost perfect alignment as if stricken down by one
blow. Already the air was tainted with corruption and the Chinese
were robbing the dead. An awful sight was that hill, littered with
blood-sprinkled equipment, broken bayonets and shattered rifles. Dark
stains showed where many had fallen, and out of the reeking earth that
strove to hide them many a blackened hand was raised in mute appeal to
Heaven. Talk of the glory of a soldier’s grave! The poet who sings of
it cannot imagine its horrors. Though driven from the hill the enemy
held stubbornly to a position three thousand yards South, and a great
force was concentrated at Yentai on the railway, and at another point
to the North. Anxious to push on and to turn the Russian retreat into
a rout, General Kuroki found it impossible to advance. He had now two
divisions, and another brigade was hurrying to his support. But his men
were exhausted by many days of hard fighting. Two army corps confronted
him, and all he could reasonably hope and expect to do was to hold
his ground in the event of attack. Moreover, he knew nothing of the
situation South of Liao-yang, for his communication by wire was still
interrupted. Had he been informed of the success of the assault on the
trenches before the city he might have taken the risk and pushed on
toward the railway. In the circumstances, his hesitation was natural
and perhaps prudent, for it is open to doubt whether he could have
succeeded, and failure would have meant disaster.
On the 4th of September, having been reinforced by one brigade and
having command of two and a half divisions, General Kuroki decided to
advance. A dense fog screened our front and compelled us to proceed
with caution. But little or no resistance was encountered. The
five-peaked range was in our possession: the enemy had been expelled
from the colliery, and it was apparent that the Russians on our front
had retired. A mixed brigade marching from the coal mine discovered a
strong force in the hills four miles North and drove it out. Two and a
half miles to the South-west of the colliery another body of Russians
was encountered and engaged us in a confused sort of way until six
o’clock on the morning of the 5th, while five miles North-west of the
mine another skirmish lasted until morning.
At one o’clock on the morning of the 5th we occupied Sautowha, on the
main road ten miles north of Liao-yang, and in the afternoon shelled
the retreating columns of the enemy along the railway. Our losses were
heavy. From August 24th to September 5th the division operating on
our left flank had 2,082 casualties: 21 officers killed, 61 officers
wounded, 2,000 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded;
the central division had 2,024 casualties: 25 officers killed, 58
officers wounded, 1 officer missing, 1,940 non-commissioned officers
and men killed and wounded; the division on our right lost 1,540: 16
officers killed, 36 wounded, 1,421 non-commissioned officers and men
killed and wounded, and 67 missing. The reserves had 490 casualties,
making a total of 6,136 casualties, including 234 officers and 5,902
men. The proportion of killed to wounded was about five to one. The
army on our left in front of Liao-yang had 6,853 casualties, including
1,328 killed, of whom 56 were officers. The army on the extreme left
lost nearly 10,000.
Even this heroic struggle against overwhelming odds failed to turn the
Russian retreat into a rout. To effect the retirement of a defeated
army of two hundred thousand men without leaving captives and spoil
in the hands of the enemy requires time as well as adroitness. In the
opinion of men best qualified to judge, General Kuropatkin had ample
time in these three days. The resources at his command were great;
the country was in his favour, and his communications were never in
serious danger. He had many bridges across the river; many trains
were waiting on the railway to carry stores and equipment; his horses
and wagons were practically unlimited. The country over which he had
to retreat is a broad open plain without a single defile or range of
hills that the enemy might seize. Once over the river--and there was
none to oppose his crossing--General Kuropatkin’s army could move
along a front of three or four miles without risk or interference,
and fifteen miles North of Liao-yang he was beyond any danger of
effective pursuit. General Kuropatkin received all the credit due to so
successful a retreat, but it is well to point out that the conditions
were altogether on his side, and that in five months his troops had had
abundant experience to perfect themselves in these essential manœuvres.