ASSAULT ON CHAOTOA.
At Chaotoa the Russians had a position of the highest strategic
importance, from which they could threaten the advance of our right
wing upon Liao-yang or Mukden. Bridge Head--as it was called--was
also a barrier against the junction of our division--an armed point
thrust between our centre and our right flank that an enterprising
enemy might use to arrest any forward movement or in another attack
on Mou-tien-ling. The necessity of removing this menace became urgent
after the second attempt to recover the Pass, and the task was
undertaken by the force whose head quarters were at Saimaki. Chaotoa is
twenty miles north of Lien-chen-kwan, but in order to reach it safely
we must retrace our steps toward Feng-hoang-cheng and strike North-east
beyond the watershed. Leaving Saimaki on the right the road traverses
a mountainous country and in fifty miles crosses the river at a score
of places. By a rapid ascent we reach the watershed of the Eastern
range--a lofty eminence whence the eye wanders over a heaving ocean
of mountain and valley, clothed in many shaded greens of ripening
maize and cotton and indigo. As you draw near to the Tai-tsu river you
enter a long defile through which flows a stream, and at the western
end of the defile rises Chaotoa. The strength of the position is at
once apparent. Its precipitous front is washed by a tributary river
which flows North to join the valley stream and turning West empties
its waters into the broad flood of the Tai-tsu beyond Am-ping. In the
angle of the meeting of the waters was the enemy’s fortified position.
Their front was a sheer precipice with the deep river below; their left
flank sloped gently down to the valley stream beyond which was a plain
stretching to the Northern heights, and their right wing was defended
by hills. From this secure angle the Russian guns commanded the valley
and road: approach on their left was impossible without scaling heights
beyond which runs the deep broad river Tai-tsu.
[Illustration: Japanese Ambulance Party, Chaotoa.]
Chaotoa had been chosen as a defensive position some weeks before.
Trenches and gun emplacements had been made and had been abandoned. But
when General Kuropatkin decided to attack Mou-tien-ling a second time,
Chaotoa came once more into favour, and two brigades with twenty-four
field guns, eight mountain guns and a regiment of cavalry were sent to
re-occupy the place. Their first duty was to construct new trenches
and gun emplacements. The lines of trenches followed the contour of
the ridge, covering front and flanks save on the left slope by which
the united streams flow Westward. The right flank resting on hills was
thrown back toward the river and the gun positions dominated road and
valley, one battery being posted at the right centre. This was the
strength and situation of the enemy for several days previous to the
assault on Mou-tien-ling upon the 17th of July. But they were not to
remain long in uninterrupted possession. On the morning of the 17th,
the Japanese began their advance. One thousand Cossacks appeared on
their flank to the North-west of Saimaki and sought to arrest the
movement. But cavalry that must keep to the roads is of little use
except for reconnoitring and the Japanese had ceased to hold the
Cossack in much respect. The Russians were easily persuaded to retire,
and the only result of this demonstration of weakness was that one
battalion, instead of three battalions as was originally intended,
remained near Saimaki to guard our communications.
On the afternoon of the 18th, the advance guard of the Japanese
entered the valley before Chaotoa. The road winds between ranges of
hills following the course of the river whose banks are dotted with
peaceful homesteads and are vividly green with the ripening crops. As
it approaches Chaotoa the valley opens out to the South and West into a
cultivated plain backed by hills, and bounded by the stream which flows
along the front of the enemy’s position. Russian patrols and pickets
were in the hills along the South of the valley, but they made no
effort to arrest the advance. Before the steady movement of our troops,
the Russians fell back behind the trenches and guns of Chaotoa and
awaited the inevitable assault.
At noon a Japanese battalion had taken up a position near a village
on the South from which the movements of the enemy could be observed.
Clouds of dust indicated that they were withdrawing their heavy baggage
to a safe distance; soldiers retired from the trenches, and a wild
fear seized the Japanese that the enemy were about to escape without a
fight. Orders were given to prepare for the pursuit, and the battalion
was about to leave the village when a mounted officer was seen to ride
away, and presently the Russian troops re-ascended the slope and lined
the trenches. At half past four in the afternoon the enemy opened on
the village with sixteen guns and did considerable damage, for the
Japanese mountain batteries had not arrived.
From the valley the position looked unassailable save by a frontal
attack against an entrenched precipice--an assault from which even the
votaries of frontal attacks would shrink. But the Japanese are not
easily deterred by appearances; they hold fast to the sound doctrine
that every position, however strong, has its weak point, and that the
first duty of a commander is to discover that weakness. So the day
passed in desultory fighting and at night the real preparations were
made. Among military experts in Europe there is a tradition that
the Japanese avoid movements in the night. It is the part of wisdom
to prefer the light; yet this theory, like many more affecting the
Japanese, will bear revision. Under cover of darkness General Inouye
made his disposition for the assault on the morrow. His command
consisted of three infantry regiments, five mountain batteries and some
cavalry. Two regiments were moved forward to the front of Chaotoa. They
lay in the maize fields hidden from view by the broad green leaves of
the rising corn and spent the night in making breastworks. This front
line stretched from the North side of the valley across the stream and
extended over the plain on the enemy’s front and right. The Japanese
right flank was within 900 mètres from the Russian trenches and their
left was only 1,200 mètres distant. Before them were the deep river and
the precipitous side of Chaotoa. One regiment, commanded by Colonel
Hiraoka, who was the Japanese _attaché_ in the Boer war, remained
in reserve for a most important mission.
Night came, and the shadows stole up the hills, leaving the valley in
darkness. A strange stillness filled the air with foreboding. The moon
rose and flooded the hills with light, but revealed no sign of the
approaching conflict. Yet, in the corn fields below, thousands of khaki
clad men burrowed like moles. The enemy must have been conscious of
their presence, for they opened a cannonade that continued at intervals
through the night. From the trenches also came rifle fire, and twice
in the darkness a small force advanced to dispute the passage of the
river. They brought with them drums and trumpets. Could it be that the
Russians had adopted Chinese methods of warfare, and hoped to scare
the enemy with discord, or did they imagine that they might delude the
Japanese into belief that they were an army on the march? The musicians
left some of their instruments on the field. But from the corn fields
came no response. Bullets whistled among the green stalks, carrying
death and wounds in sharp swift notes to two hundred and eighty unseen
men, but not a sound or a sign was given. On the left, especially, our
casualties were heavy, for the line of infantry was within decisive
range. At last day dawned, and the hills awoke. Two mountain batteries
had been carried to the crest of a hill commanding the Russian position
from the East at a distance of 3,480 mètres; three other mountain
batteries were posted on the North bank of the stream, about half way
down the valley; they were in the shadow of a temple, 2,800 mètres
from the enemy. The Russians had no difficulty in locating the first
artillery position, but of the second they remained long in ignorance.
The four hundred shells they directed against it fell on a hill upon
the opposite bank of the stream where there was neither gun nor
rifle. When they discovered the mistake their range was deadly in its
accuracy, for it had doubtless been carefully measured, but there were
defects in the Russian fuses that rendered their shells often harmless.
While the artillery duel was in progress the Japanese were launching
a bolt more deadly than the shells of their mountain guns. I have
spoken of a weak point in the Russian position. That weakness was on
the right, where the hills appeared to afford a natural defence. But
hills are dangerous things unless well guarded, and the Russians had
not learned the lesson of turning movements. Soon after daybreak there
came from the rear of our position at the Eastern end of the valley a
regiment of brave and determined men. They had before them a long and
difficult march, and at the end of the journey a desperate task to
perform. Their leader was a soldier who had learned some useful lessons
in South Africa, for Colonel Hiraoka did not believe that military
science began and ended with the Franco-German War. He led his regiment
into the mountains and vanished from our view. Meanwhile, the men in
the cornfields waited long and anxiously. Already they had observed
symptoms of uneasiness on the part of the Russians, and feared that
they might escape before the web was spun round them. At one o’clock in
the afternoon some men left the trenches and did not return. Another
hour crept by and the Russian guns were withdrawn. It was obvious that
the enemy suspected some deep laid scheme and was making ready to
depart. General Inouye watched anxiously from the gun position in the
valley, and his glance was fixed on the hills to his left. Moments went
by, and half an hour seemed an age.
At last the signal! from the Russian trenches on the right came volley
after volley hurtling over the plain. The leaden hail swept across
the fields, and the corn stalks snapped under the hurricane like the
cracking of a myriad whips. This sudden storm was directed against the
defile beyond the plain where the head of Colonel Hiraoka’s regiment
appeared--appeared and vanished again to hurl itself on the right
flank of the Russians. In seven hours they had marched across nineteen
miles of trackless mountains, and climbed three steep ranges under a
blazing sun. Their arrival was well timed; had they been half-an-hour
later they would have failed in their mission. Two companies from the
force near Lien-cheng-kwan had hurried forward to meet them, and were
fortunate in effecting a junction. For a second or two they stood
out against the sky--a dark extended line advancing rapidly under a
heavy fire. On they swept with a cheer! The mountain batteries in the
valley--no longer having to face the superior range and weight of the
Russian guns--moved forward to their aid and hurled shrapnel into the
position. For nearly an hour the fight went on with fury; but not for
a moment did the regiment waver or loosen its grip on the enemy. Their
losses were heavy, and their leader fell mortally wounded, yet they
held fast, and the victory was theirs. With a shout that rang like
a trumpet among the echoing hills up sprang the fighting line from
the cornfields; each maize stalk became an armed man. Into the river
they rushed. The waters were deep and the current was strong, yet
in they sprang, holding their rifles aloft. Up to their necks they
were, and only one man was drowned. Under cover of the precipice they
darted toward the exposed flank of the Russians. Before this desperate
onslaught the shaken enemy could not stand. They fled down the slope,
and, massing near a plantation, made ready for flight. But their
retirement was not so orderly and deliberate as at Mou-tien-ling. The
guns opened and they bolted like hares.
To complete their discomfiture two companies and one section had scaled
the heights on the North, and, hurrying West, suddenly appeared among
the hills on the Russian flank. The enemy were now under rifle fire
from three sides and did not stop to arrange the order of their going.
The flight spread North and West, and at a quarter past five o’clock
in the afternoon the flag of the Rising Sun floated over Chaotoa and
one hundred and fifty Russians dead. Sixty-five prisoners were taken of
whom thirty-three were unwounded. Many wounded were carried from the
field early in the day when the fight was practically suspended. Among
the spoil were 215 rifles, 17,878 rounds of ammunition, three caisons,
152 shells, 26 tents, seven drums and four trumpets. The Japanese
casualties were 523--two officers and seventy men killed, sixteen
officers and 435 men wounded. The Japanese guns fired 440 common shells
and 2,500 shrapnel shells.
The capture of Chaotoa was a brilliant exploit, and must be accepted
as another proof of the immense superiority of the Japanese infantry.
The Russian troops were from Europe; they outnumbered their assailants
by nearly two to one; their twenty-four field guns were opposed to
mountain batteries; their position was strong by nature and art, and
much depended on their retention of Chaotoa. The flanking movements
were splendidly executed; and the one regret was that Colonel Hiraoka
did not live to reap the reward of his victory.